Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Congressional research reportJan 23, 2008

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and

Appropriations

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Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

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Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets

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Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

January 23, 2008

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RL33999

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Summary

The President’s FY2008 federal budget request, released February 5, 2007, included $647.2

billion in new budget authority for national defense including $483.2 billion for the regular

operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), $141.8 billion for military operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the

Department of Energy, and $4.8 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies. On July

31, 2007, the President requested an additional $5.3 billion for war-fighting costs, and on October

22 he requested an additional $42.3 billion for that purpose, bringing his total request for FY2008

war costs to $189.3 billion and the total national defense request to $694.8 billion. The

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the President’s proposal as $696.4

billion.

The House passed on May 17 its version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, approving

$1.2 billion more than the President’s then-pending request. The Senate passed its version of the

bill October 1. The conference report on the bill, authorizing $696.4 billion—$21 million less

than the request—was adopted by the House on December 12 and by the Senate on December 14.

On December 28, the White House announced that the President would “pocket veto” the

authorization bill—a procedure that would preclude efforts by Congress to override the veto. The

President objected to a provision of the bill that would allow lawsuits in U.S. courts against the

current Iraqi government for damages resulting from acts of the Saddam Hussein regime.

On January 16, the House passed H.R. 4986, a version of H.R. 1585 that was modified to allow

the President to waive application to Iraq of the provision that he had cited as grounds for his

veto. The new version of the bill also would make retroactive to January 1, 2008 a 3.5% pay raise

for military personnel and the renewal of authorization for several types of bonuses, including

enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses. The Senate passed the bill January 22. Reportedly, the

President is expected to sign the bill.

The House passed its version of the FY2008 defense appropriations bill on August 5. The bill,

H.R. 3222, provided $448.7 billion in discretionary budget authority for DOD’s “base” budget,

$3.6 billion less in discretionary budget authority than the $452.2 billion the President requested

for operations within the scope of that legislation. The Senate version of H.R. 3222, passed by

voice vote on October 4, 2007, provided $449.5 billion in discretionary DOD budget authority

plus $3 billion to better protect U.S. borders. Each version of the bill also included $10.9 billion

required by a permanent appropriation for military retirees’ medical care.

House-Senate conferees on H.R. 3222 concluded on November 6 a conference report that would

appropriate $448.7 billion plus $11.6 billion to acquire MRAPs. The House and Senate each

adopted the conference report on November 8. On November 13, the President signed the

appropriations bill into law (P.L. 110-116). This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Contents

Most Recent Developments.........................................................................................................1

Lawsuits Against Terrorist States...........................................................................................1

Veto Impact on Military Pay and Bonuses .............................................................................2

Pocket Veto or Regular..........................................................................................................2

FY2008 Defense Funding Status .................................................................................................4

Overview of Administration FY2008 Budget Request .................................................................5

Status of Legislation....................................................................................................................5

Facts and Figures: Congressional Action on the FY2008 Defense Budget Request.......................6

FY2008 Defense Budget Request and Outyear Plans: Questions of Affordability and

Balance.................................................................................................................................. 13

Issues in the FY2008 Global War on Terror Request .................................................................. 16

Additional FY2008 War Funding Request ........................................................................... 17

Congressional Action on Administration’s War Requests ..................................................... 18

Authorizers Categorize “War” Funding Differently ....................................................... 18

Authorizers Shift Funds to Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles ......................... 19

Administration Proposes More Funding for MRAP Vehicles ......................................... 20

Appropriations Action................................................................................................... 20

Other War-Related Provisions ....................................................................................... 22

FY2008 GWOT Request ..................................................................................................... 22

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 23

Broad Definition of Reconstitution or Reset ........................................................................ 25

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 26

Force Protection Funding .................................................................................................... 27

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 28

Questions Likely About Funding For Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund ........ 28

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 28

Oversight Concerns About Cost to Train and Equip Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces ......... 29

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 29

Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response Program .................................... 29

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 30

Military Construction Overseas and Permanent Basing Concerns ........................................ 30

Congressional Action .................................................................................................... 30

Potential Issues in the FY2008 Base Budget Request................................................................. 31

Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date .............................................................. 37

Congressional Budget Resolution........................................................................................ 37

FY2008 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the House Bill.............................................. 38

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ............................................................................... 38

Other FY2008 Defense Budget Issues ........................................................................... 39

Defense Authorization: Highlights of House Floor Action ................................................... 44

Administration Objections to the House Version of H.R. 1585............................................. 47

FY2008 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Bill .................................................................................................................................. 47

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ............................................................................... 48

Force Expansion and Pay Raise..................................................................................... 49

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Tricare and Other Health Issues..................................................................................... 49

Ballistic Missile Defense............................................................................................... 50

FCS and Other Ground Combat Systems ....................................................................... 51

Nuclear Weapons and Long-range Strike ....................................................................... 51

Acquisition Reform....................................................................................................... 52

Other Provisions ........................................................................................................... 52

Defense Authorization: Highlights of Senate Floor Action................................................... 53

July Floor Debate.......................................................................................................... 53

Troop Deployment Duration Amendments .................................................................... 54

Improving Health Care for Wounded Warriors............................................................... 55

Other Amendments Acted on in July ............................................................................. 56

Iraq Debate Resumed in September ............................................................................... 56

Petraeus Advertisement Amendments ............................................................................ 57

Habeas Corpus for Detainees ........................................................................................ 58

Federal Role in Prosecuting Hate Crimes ...................................................................... 58

Selected Other Amendments Acted on in September...................................................... 58

Defense Authorization: Final Senate Debate and Passage .................................................... 60

Conference Report on H.R. 1585 (FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill)............................... 61

Conference Report Highlights ....................................................................................... 62

Military Pay and Benefits.............................................................................................. 62

Health Care................................................................................................................... 63

‘Wounded Warrior’ Provisions ...................................................................................... 63

Readiness Improvements............................................................................................... 63

Roles and Missions Review........................................................................................... 64

Civilian Employees ....................................................................................................... 64

National Guard and Reserve Issues ............................................................................... 64

Shipbuilding ................................................................................................................. 65

Long-Range Strike and Nuclear Weapons...................................................................... 65

Contract Management ................................................................................................... 65

Amendments to the “Insurrection Act” .......................................................................... 65

Defense Appropriations: Highlights of the House Bill ......................................................... 66

Force Expansion ........................................................................................................... 67

Tricare Fee Hikes Rejected............................................................................................ 67

Other Quality of Life Initiatives .................................................................................... 67

Facilities Improvements ................................................................................................ 68

Shipbuilding Increase.................................................................................................... 68

Selected Other Major Weapons Program Changes ......................................................... 68

Defense Appropriations: Highlights of House Floor Action ................................................. 69

Selected Floor Amendments .......................................................................................... 69

Defense Appropriations: Highlights of Senate Committee Action ........................................ 70

Personnel Increase and Pay Raise.................................................................................. 70

Tricare Fees and the Defense Health Program ............................................................... 70

Long-Range Strike and Nuclear Weapons...................................................................... 71

Shipbuilding Costs and the Littoral Combat Ship .......................................................... 71

Selected Other Weapons Programs ................................................................................ 72

Defense Appropriations: Highlights of Senate Floor Action ................................................. 73

Iraq Deployment ........................................................................................................... 73

Border Security............................................................................................................. 74

Other Amendments ....................................................................................................... 74

Defense Appropriations: Conference Report.............................................................................. 75

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

War-Fighting Costs Excluded ........................................................................................ 75

Personnel Costs and Medical Care................................................................................. 76

Shipbuilding ................................................................................................................. 77

Ground Combat Vehicles............................................................................................... 77

Long-Range Strike and Nuclear Weapons...................................................................... 78

Ballistic Missile Defense............................................................................................... 78

Other Issues .................................................................................................................. 79

For Additional Reading ............................................................................................................. 79

Overall Defense Budget ...................................................................................................... 79

Military Operations: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere ........................................................ 79

U.S. Military Personnel and Compensation ......................................................................... 80

Defense Policy Issues.......................................................................................................... 80

Defense Program Issues ...................................................................................................... 81

Tables

Table 1. Status of FY2008 Defense Authorization, H.R. 1585/S. 1547 .........................................6

Table 2. Status of FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill ...............................................................6

Table 3. FY2008 National Defense Budget Request.....................................................................7

Table 4. Congressional Budget Resolution, H.Con.Res. 99/ S.Con.Res. 21,

Recommended National Defense Budget Function (050) Totals................................................9

Table 5. FY2008 Defense Authorization, House and Senate Action by Title.................................9

Table 6. FY2008 Department of Defense Base Budget Within the Scope of the Defense

Appropriations Bill, House and Senate Action by Title ........................................................... 11

Table 7. House and Senate 302(b) Allocations of FY2008 Total Discretionary Budget

Authority, Defense vs Non-Defense ....................................................................................... 12

Table 8. Expected Adjustments to FY2008 War Request ............................................................ 17

Table 9. DOD’s Global War on Terror, FY2006-FY2008 by Function ........................................ 24

Table 10. House Floor Action on Selected Amendments: FY2008 Defense Authorization

Bill, H.R. 1585....................................................................................................................... 45

Table A-1. Congressional Action on Selected Army and Marine Corps Programs: FY2008

Authorization......................................................................................................................... 83

Table A-2. Congressional Action on Shipbuilding: FY2008 Authorization ................................. 89

Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected Aircraft Programs: FY2008 Authorization............ 91

Table A-4. Congressional Action on Missile Defense Funding: FY2008 Authorization............... 94

Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected Army and Marine Corps Programs: FY2008

Appropriations ....................................................................................................................... 97

Table A-6. Congressional Action on Shipbuilding: FY2008 Appropriations ............................. 100

Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected Aircraft Programs: FY2008 Appropriations........ 102

Table A-8. Congressional Action on Missile Defense Funding: FY2008 Appropriations........... 104

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Appendixes

Appendix. Funding Tables......................................................................................................... 83

Contacts

Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 107

Key Policy Staff...................................................................................................................... 107

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Most Recent Developments

On January 22, the Senate passed H.R. 4986, a revised version of H.R. 1585, the FY2008

National Defense Authorization Act, thus clearing the bill for the President, who had vetoed the

original version of the bill on December 28. The President vetoed the initial version because of

one section which would allow victims of terrorist actions perpetrated by Saddam Hussein’s

regime to sue the current Iraqi government for damages in U.S. courts. The President said this

provision would allow plaintiffs to tie up in lawsuits billions of dollars worth of Iraqi assets, thus

hamstringing that country’s efforts at economic reconstruction and political reconciliation.

The revised defense bill, which would allow the President to exempt Iraq from the provision at

issue, would authorize all but $215 million of the $696.4 billion that was the President’s amended

request for national defense-related funding in FY2008—the same amount as was authorized the

vetoed bill. The only other differences between H.R. 1585 and H.R. 4986 were provisions added

to the later bill that would make retroactive to January 1, 2008 a 3.5% pay raise for military

personnel and the reauthorization of various bonuses, including enlistment and reenlistment

bonuses.

According to press reports, White House officials have said the President will sign the revised

defense bill, H.R. 4986.

Lawsuits Against Terrorist States

The section of H.R. 1585 to which the President objected is Section 1083, which would amend

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 U.S.C. 1602), the legislation that regulates the

conditions under which foreign countries or their instrumentalities can be sued in U.S. courts.

Section 1083 is based on a Senate floor amendment to H.R. 1585 sponsored by Senators Frank R.

Lautenberg, Arlen Specter, and 20 others. Among the section’s many provisions were one that

would allow monetary claims against a foreign state for damages (including punitive damages),

one that would nullify certain legal defenses currently available to a foreign government being

sued, and one that would allow a claimant to freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction of a state being

sued, as soon as a suit was filed.

The Administration contended that these provisions could result in billions of dollars in Iraqi

funds being tied up by court proceedings, thus undermining efforts to rebuild Iraq and train Iraqi

security forces.1 (For background on the issue, see CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State

Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL31258, Suits

Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by (name redacted).)

The revised version of the defense bill, H.R. 4986, retained Section 1083 but added to it a

provision that would allow the President to waive its application to Iraq, provided the waiver is in

the national security interest and will “promote the reconstruction of, the consolidation of

democracy in, and the relations of the United State with, Iraq,” and provided that Iraq continues

to be a reliable ally in combating international terrorism. Such a presidential waiver would expire

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: National Defense Authorization Act Section 1083: A Danger

to Iraq’s Progress,” December 28, 2007.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

30 days after it is made, unless the President gives Congress written notice of the basis for the

waiver.

The revised Section 1083 also expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. and Iraqi

governments should negotiate compensation for meritorious claims based on terrorist acts by the

Saddam Hussein regime against U.S. citizens or members of the U.S. armed forces if a

presidential waiver under this section bars lawsuits for this purpose.

Veto Impact on Military Pay and Bonuses

Because the President signed the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222, P.L. 110-116)

into law on December 26, the budget authority thus provided has been available for most ongoing

Pentagon operations, notwithstanding the absence of a companion authorization bill. However,

because legal authority for more than 20 enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses expired on January

1, 2008, the armed services have temporarily halted payments of those bonuses, pending

enactment of authorizing legislation.

New bonus agreements signed by the Army, Navy and Air Force on or after January 1, 2008

include an addendum which provides that, while the contracting service member will receive the

bonus if and when it is legislatively authorized, payment is not guaranteed. The Marine Corps has

suspended its use of bonuses altogether pending enactment of authorizing legislation, directing

units to temporarily extend the current enlistments of Marines who intend to reenlist and who

would be eligible for a reenlistment bonus.

Also as a result of the delay in enacting a defense authorization bill, the basic pay of military

personnel increased by 3% on January 1 rather than 3.5%, as was approved in the conference

report on H.R. 1585 (and as has taken effect for civilian federal employees).

The revised authorization bill, H.R. 4986, would authorize the 3.5% pay raise and the various

bonuses, retroactive to January 1.

Pocket Veto or Regular2

House and Senate negotiators had filed the conference report on the initial version of the defense

bill (H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-477) on December 6. The House adopted the conference report

December 12 by a vote of 370-49. The Senate adopted it December 14 by a vote of 90-3, clearing

the bill for the President.

On December 28, Administration officials announced that the President would not sign the bill

and that, since the House had adjourned, the bill thus would die as the result of a so-called

“pocket veto.” However, Democratic congressional leaders contended that Congress was not

adjourned and, therefore, that the President could not invoke that procedure under the

circumstances.

The following section was written with the assistance of (name redacted), a Legislative Attorney in the American

Law Division of CRS.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

The Constitution provides that, once a bill is passed by Congress and sent to the President, if he

neither (a) signs the measure nor (b) vetoes it and returns it to Congress within 10 days (not

counting Sundays), then the bill will become law without his signature, “unless the Congress by

their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law” (Article I, Section 7,

Clause 2). This last contingency was first referred to in 1812 as a “pocket veto.” The practical

significance of the issue is that, while Congress can try to override a regular veto with a twothirds majority in each chamber (thus enacting the vetoed legislation over the President’s

objection), it has no recourse in the case of a pocket veto except to pass a new bill.

For decades, a constitutional debate has been underway over whether the President can exercise

the pocket veto after an adjournment between the two sessions of a Congress or only after the

adjournment at the end of a two-year Congress.3 Congress has adopted various procedures to

designate agents to whom the President could return a vetoed bill during an inter-session

adjournment, thus appearing to provide an opportunity for Congress to try to override the veto.

However, several recent presidents, including George W. Bush and William J. Clinton have

argued that none of those devices block the use of a pocket veto during an adjournment within a

two-year Congress.4

In the case of H.R. 1585, a White House spokesman told reporters December 31 that the

Administration regarded Congress as being in a state of adjournment and, thus, that the defense

authorization bill would die by pocket veto at midnight that date. However, the President also

returned the bill to the House accompanied by a “Memorandum of Disapproval,” stating his

reasons for withholding approval of the bill.5 This so-called “protective return” procedure—both

invoking the pocket veto power and returning the bill to Congress—has been used by previous

Administrations in similar circumstances. 6

After the House reconvened in January, it committed the vetoed defense bill, H.R. 1585, and the

President’s accompanying “Memorandum of Disapproval” to the House Armed Services

Committee, thus upholding the constitutional position that the House did not acknowledge that

the President’s action was a pocket veto.

On January 16, Armed Services Chairman Ike Skelton then introduced the new bill, H.R. 4986,

consisting of the text of the vetoed bill with the changes required to address the issues of Section

1983 and the need to make the pay raise and bonus authorities retroactive. On the same day, the

revised bill was passed by the House 369-46 under suspension of the rules, a procedure requiring

a two-thirds majority to pass the bill.

The Senate passed the bill January 22 by a vote of 91-3, thus clearing the bill for the President.

The Supreme Court has addressed the pocket veto issue twice, but those decisions do not appear to have definitively

resolved the dispute. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) and Wright vs. U.S., 302 U.S. 583 (1938).

For additional information, see CRS Report RL30909, The Pocket Veto: Its Current Status, by (name redacted).

President George W. Bush, “Memorandum of Disapproval [concerning H.R. 1585],” December 28, 2007. White

House, “Press Gaggle by Scott Stanzel,” December 31, 2007.

CRS Report RL30909, pp. 6-7.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

FY2008 Defense Funding Status

On November 13, the President signed into law the conference report on the FY2008 Defense

Appropriations bill (H.R. 3222, P.L. 110-114), which would provide $460.3 billion in new budget

authority for activities of the Department of Defense. The House had approved the compromise

version of the bill November 8 by a vote of 400-15 and the Senate adopted it by voice vote the

same day.

In general, the appropriations bill funds only DOD’s base budget—its activities other than the

conduct of ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The only exception to that rule is

the conference report’s inclusion of $11.6 billion to purchase Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected

(MRAP) vehicles, which are designed to better protect their occupants against land-mines than

conventional vehicles. The conference report also includes a continuing resolution that would

allow federal agencies to continue operating, through December 14, 2007, even if their regular

appropriations bills for FY2008 have not been enacted.

Because none of the regular FY2008 appropriations bills had been enacted by October 1, when

the new fiscal year began, a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 52), passed by the House September

26 by a vote of 404-14 and by the Senate September 27 by a vote of 94-1, provided for continued

funding the government through November 16. Funding for DOD under that continuing

resolution is based on the amount appropriated in the FY2007 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 109289), which funded both the DOD base budget and a so-called bridge fund of $70 billion to pay

for war costs in the opening months of the fiscal year. H.J.Res. 52 also provided an additional

$5.2 billion to purchase MRAP vehicles.

Neither the House-passed nor the Senate-passed versions of H.R. 3222 addressed the President’s

request to fund ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2008, which will be

dealt with in a separate bill. Budget amendments in July and October increased the President’s

initial request for $141.7 billion to cover war-fighting costs in FY2008 to $189.3 billion.

On November 14, by a vote of 218-203, the House passed H.R. 4156, a bill that would provide

$50 billion to cover war costs pending congressional action early next year on the balance of the

President’s request. The bill also would require DOD to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from a

combat role in Iraq and would set a non-binding goal of removing U.S. forces in that country

from all but a few supporting roles by December 2008, for which reason the President said he

would veto the bill7.

On November 16, the Senate rejected a motion to end debate on the H.R. 4156 by a vote of 53-45

(with 60 votes required to invoke cloture). Earlier the same day, the Senate rejected by a vote of

45-53 a cloture motion relating to a Republican-sponsored bill, S. 2340, that would provide $70

billion for war costs with no limitations on U.S. deployments.

House-Senate conferees also have agreed on a conference report to the FY2008 Military

Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations bill (H.R. 2642/S. 1645) that includes $21.4

billion for DOD military construction and family housing programs. However, the agreement on

In May of 2007, the President successfully resisted congressional efforts to put similar limitations on the FY2007

war-cost supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1591). (See CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental

Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by (name redacted).)

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

that bill was incorporated into the conference report on H.R. 3043, the FY2008 Labor, HHS and

Education appropriations bill. The House approved the combined conference report November 6

by a vote of 269-142, but the Senate rejected it November 7 on a point of order. (For full

coverage, see CRS Report RL34038, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related

Agencies: FY2008 Appropriations, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted)

Overview of Administration FY2008 Budget Request

On February 5, 2007, the White House formally released to Congress its FY2008 federal budget

request, which included $647.2 billion in new budget authority for national defense. In addition to

$483.2 billion for the regular operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), the request

includes $141.7 billion for continued military operations abroad, primarily to fund the campaigns

in Iraq and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs

of the Department of Energy, and $5.2 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies.

(Note: The total of $647.2 billion for national defense includes an adjustment of -$275 million for

OMB scorekeeping. DOD figures for the base budget do not add to the formal request in OMB

budget documents.)

The requested “base” budget of $483.2 billion for DOD—excluding the cost of ongoing combat

operations—is $46.8 billion higher than the agency’s base budget for FY2007, an increase of 11%

in nominal terms and, by DOD’s reckoning, an increase in real purchasing power of 7.9%, taking

into account the cost of inflation.

In requesting an additional $141.7 billion to cover the anticipated cost for all of FY2008 of

ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration has complied with Congress’s

insistence that it be given time to subject that funding to the regular oversight and legislative

process. Nevertheless, since the Administration has requested that these funds be designated as

“emergency” appropriations, they would be over and above restrictive caps on discretionary

spending, even though the FY2008 combat operations funding request of $141.7 billion is 29% as

large as the regular FY2008 DOD request.

On July 31, the Administration increased its request for DOD war-fighting costs in FY2008 by

$5.3 billion to procure MRAP vehicles. On October 22, the Administration increased its war-costs

request by an additional $42.3 billion, bringing the total to $189.3 billion.

Status of Legislation

Congress began action on the annual defense authorization bill with the House Armed Services

Committee approving its version of the bill (H.R. 1585) in a session that began May 9, and with

House passage on May 17. The Senate Armed Services Committee marked up its version, S. 567,

on May 24 and reported the measure as a clean bill (S. 1547) on June 5.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Table 1. Status of FY2008 Defense Authorization, H.R. 1585/S. 1547

Full Committee

Markup

House

Senate

5/9/07

5/24/07

House

Report

House

Passage

Senate

Report

Senate

Passage

Conf.

Report

H.Rept.

110-146

5/11/07

5/17/07

397-27

S.Rept.

110-77

6/5/07

10/1/07

92-3

H.Rept.

110-477

12/6/07

Conference

Report Approval

House

Senate

Public

Law

Table 2. Status of FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill

Subcommittee

Markup

House

Senate

7/12/07

9/11/07

House

Report

House

Passage

Senate

Report

Senate

Passage

Conf.

Report

H.Rept.

110-279

7/30/07

8/5/07

395-13

S.Rept.

110-155

9/14/07

10/4/07

(Voice

Vote)

H.Rept.

110-434

11/6/07

Conference

Report Approval

House

Senate

Public

Law

11/8/07

400-15

11/8/07

(Voice

vote)

P.L. 110116

11/13/07

Facts and Figures: Congressional Action on the

FY2008 Defense Budget Request

The following tables provide a quick reference to congressional action on defense budget totals.

Additional details will be added as congressional action on the FY2008 defense funding bills

proceeds.

•

Table 3 shows the Administration’s FY2008 national defense budget request by

budget sub-function and, for the Department of Defense, by appropriations title.

The total for FY2007 also represents, in part, requested funding. It includes $93.4

billion in FY2007 supplemental appropriations that the Administration requested

in February 2007. In May, however, Congress actually approved $99.4 billion for

the Department of Defense, $6.0 billion more than the Administration had asked

for.

•

Table 4 shows the recommendations on defense budget authority and outlays in

the House and Senate versions of the annual budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 99

and S.Con.Res. 21. These amounts are not binding on the Armed Services or

Appropriations committees.

•

Table 5 shows congressional action on the FY2008 defense authorization bill by

title. Technically, this table shows the budget authority implications of the

provisions of the bill. For mandatory programs, the budget authority implication

is the amount of budget authority projected to be required under standing law.

The table also follows the common practice of the House and Senate Armed

Services Committees, which is to show as the “budget authority implication” of

the bill, the amounts expected to be available for programs within the national

defense budget function not subject to authorization in the annual defense

authorization bill. Except for some mandatory programs, the authorization bill

does not provide funds but rather authorizes their appropriation. Appropriations

bills may provide more than authorized, less than authorized, or the same as

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

authorized, either in total or for specific programs. Appropriations bills may

provide no funds for programs authorized and may provide funds for programs

not authorized. In practice, defense appropriations bills often follow the amounts

authorized, however.

•

Table 6 shows congressional action on the FY2008 defense and military

construction appropriations bills. The table does not show funding for defenserelated activities of agencies other than the Defense Department, except for about

$1.0 billion for the intelligence community. In particular, it does not include

$17.4 billion requested for defense-related nuclear energy programs (nuclear

weapons and warship propulsion) of the Energy Department.

•

Table 7 shows House and Senate Appropriations Committee allocations of funds

under Section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act, for defense and military

construction/veterans affairs appropriations bills compared to allocations for

other, non-defense bills. The “302(b)” allocations are a key part of the

appropriations and budget process. A point of order holds against any bill that

exceeds its 402(b) allocation. In recent years, appropriations have trimmed

allocations for the defense appropriations bill, freeing up more money for nondefense appropriations. The effect on defense was mitigated by the available of

emergency appropriations for defense. In effect, emergency appropriations for

war costs have been used indirectly to finance higher non-defense appropriations.

Table 3. FY2008 National Defense Budget Request

(billions of dollars)

FY2007

Total

with

Supp

FY2007

Supp

Requesta

FY2007

Enacted

FY2008

Request

Department of Defense

Base Budget

Military Personnel

111.1

—

111.1

118.9

Operation and Maintenance

127.7

—

127.7

143.5

Procurement

81.1

—

81.1

100.2

Research, Development, Test, &

Evaluation

75.7

—

75.7

75.1

Military Construction

8.8

—

8.8

18.2

Family Housing

4.0

—

4.0

2.9

Revolving & Management Funds

2.4

—

2.4

2.5

Other Defense Programsa

23.7

—

23.7

23.3

Offsetting Receipts/Interfund

Transactions

-1.8

-1.4

General Provisions/Allowances

3.6

—

3.6

-0.3

436.4

—

436.4

483.2

5.4

12.1

17.5

17.1

Subtotal—DOD Base Budget

War-Related Funding

Military Personnel

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

FY2007

Total

with

Supp

FY2007

Supp

Requesta

FY2007

Enacted

FY2008

Request

Operation and Maintenance

39.1

37.5

76.6

73.1

Procurement

19.8

25.3

45.2

36.0

Research, Development, Test, &

Evaluation

0.4

1.4

1.9

2.9

Military Construction

—

1.9

0.9

Family Housing

—

0.0

Revolving & Management Funds

—

1.3

1.7

Other Defense Programsa

0.1

1.3

1.4

1.3

Intelligence Community Management

0.0

0.1

—

Iraqi Freedom Fund

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.1

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

1.5

5.9

7.4

2.7

Iraq Security Forces Fund

1.7

3.8

5.5

2.0

Joint IED Defeat Funda

1.9

2.4

4.4

4.0

Mine Resistant Ambush Prot.,

vehicles

0.0

5.3

Subtotal—DOD War-Related

70.0

93.4

163.4

146.9

OMB vs DOD Scorekeeping Adjustment

—

-0.3

Total DOD (Base and War-Related)

506.4

93.4

599.8

629.9

Department of Energy Defense Related

17.0

—

17.0

17.4

Department of Energy

15.8

—

15.8

15.9

Formerly utilized sites remedial action

0.1

—

0.1

Defense nuclear facilities safety board

0.0

—

0.0

Energy employees occupational illness

comp.

1.1

—

1.1

1.4

5.2

—

5.2

FBI Counter-Intelligence

2.5

—

2.5

Intelligence Community Management

0.9

—

0.9

1.0

Homeland Security

1.5

—

1.5

1.4

Other

0.3

—

0.3

528.6

93.4

622.0

652.5

Other Defense Related

Total National Defense

Sources: FY2007 enacted calculated by CRS based on congressional conference reports and Department of

Defense data; FY2007 supplemental from Department of Defense; FY2008 request from Department of Defense

and Office of Management and Budget. DOD Base and War-Related Total and National Defense Total reflect

OMB figures that differ slightly from DOD estimates. The FY2008 request does not reflect an anticipated budget

amendment adding $42 billion to the request.

FY2007 supplemental amount is shown here as requested.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Table 4. Congressional Budget Resolution, H.Con.Res. 99/ S.Con.Res. 21,

Recommended National Defense Budget Function (050) Totals

(billions of dollars)

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

Budget Authority

622.4

647.2

584.7

545.0

551.5

560.7

Outlays

571.9

606.5

601.8

565.3

556.4

549.5

Administration Projection

House-Passed (H.Con.Res. 99)

National Defense Base Budget (Function 050)

Budget Authority

525.8

507.0

534.7

545.2

550.9

559.8

Outlays

534.3

514.4

524.4

536.4

547.6

548.2

Allowance for Overseas Operations and Related Activities (Function 970)

Budget Authority

124.3

145.2

50.0

—

Outlays

31.5

114.9

109.4

42.3

13.6

4.5

Budget Authority

619.4

648.8

584.8

545.3

551.1

559.9

Outlays

560.5

617.8

627.0

572.9

558.4

551.8

Senate-Passed (S.Con.Res. 21)

Conference Report (S.Con.Res. 21)

National Defense Base Budget (Function 050)

Budget Authority

525.8

507.0

534.7

545.2

550.9

559.8

Outlays

534.3

514.4

524.4

536.4

547.6

548.2

Overseas Deployments and Other Activities (Function 970)

Budget Authority

124.2

145.2

50.0

—

Outlays

31.9

115.9

109.8

41.7

13.6

4.5

Sources: CRS from H.Con.Res. 99; S.Con.Res. 21; Office of Management and Budget.

Table 5. FY2008 Defense Authorization, House and Senate Action by Title

(budget authority in millions of dollars)

House

Request

House

Passed

House

Request

Senate

Request

Senate

Reported

Senate

Request

Department of Defense Base Budget

Military Personnel

116,279.9

115,489.9

-790.0

116,279.9

120,228.0

+3,948.1

Operation and

Maintenance

142,854.0

142,514.1

-339.9

142,854.0

143,492.2

+638.2

Procurement

100,223.0

102,678.6

+2,455.6

100,223.0

109,859.5

+9,636.5

Research, Development,

Test, & Evaluation

75,117.2

73,456.3

-1,660.9

75,117.2

74,659.0

-458.2

Military Construction &

Family Housing

21,165.2

21,224.3

+59.1

21,165.2

21,781.4

+616.2

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

House

Request

House

Passed

House

Request

Senate

Request

Senate

Reported

Senate

Request

Other Programsa

23,530.9

25,162.6

+1,631.7

25,149.7

25,220.2

+70.5

Revolving & Management

Funds

2,453.1

2,887.2

+434.1

2,496.0

2,458.2

-37.8

Unallocated

Reductions/Inflation

Savings

—

-205.0

—

-1,627.0

Subtotal,

Discretionary

481,623.3

483,208.1

+1,584.8

483,285.0

496,071.5

+12,786.5

Offsetting

Receipts/Interfund/Trust

Funds

1,791.0

1,707.0

-84.0

2,586.5

—

Subtotal—DOD

Base Budget

483,414.3

484,915.1

+1,500.8

485,871.5

498,658.0

+12,786.5

17,319.3

17,027.3

-292.0

16,927.1

16,925.2

-1.9

—

4,159.0

—

Department of

Homeland Security

1,142.0

—

Department of Justice

(FBI)

2,437.0

—

Selective Service

22.0

—

Intelligence Community

Management

705.4

—

Maritime Administration

154.4

—

National Science

Foundation

67.0

—

Department of

Commerce

14.0

—

CIA Retirement &

Disability

262.5

—

Radiation Exposure Trust

Fund

31.0

—

Subtotal—Other

Defense-Related

22,154.6

21,862.6

-292.0

21,086.2

21,084.3

-1.9

505,568.8

506,777.7

+1,208.8

506,957.7

519,742.3

+12,784.6

Other Defense-Related

Atomic Energy DefenseRelated

Defense-Related

Activities

Total National Defense

Base Budget

War-Related Funding (Title IV of H.R. 1585; Titles XV and XXIX of S. 1547)

Military Personnel

17,070.3

17,471.8

+401.5

17,070.3

12,922.0

-4,148.3

Operation and

Maintenance

73,099.1

72,219.1

-880.0

72,867.5

72,015.5

-852.0

Procurement

35,956.6

36,327.5

+370.9

35,956.6

28,303.4

-7,653.1

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

House

Request

House

Passed

House

Request

Senate

Request

Senate

Reported

Senate

Request

Research, Development,

Test, & Evaluation

2,857.4

2,151.1

-706.2

2,857.4

1,950.3

-907.0

Military Construction

907.9

695.5

-212.4

907.9

752.7

-155.3

Revolving & Management

Funds

1,681.4

—

1,690.4

1,689.6

-0.8

Defense Health Program

1,022.8

—

1,022.8

—

Drug Interdiction

257.6

—

257.6

—

Inspector General

4.4

—

4.4

—

Iraqi Freedom Fund

107.5

—

107.5

—

Afghanistan Security

Forces Fund

2,700.0

—

2,700.0

—

Iraq Security Forces Fund

2,000.0

—

2,000.0

—

Joint IED Defeat Fund

4,000.0

—

4,000.0

4,500.0

+500.0

—

1,000.0

+1,000.0

—

151.1

—

373.7

323.7

-50.0

141,816.1

141,789.8

-26.2

141,816.1

128,549.6

-13,266.5

647,384.9

648,567.5

+1,182.6

648,773.7

648,291.9

-481.9

Strategic Readiness Fund

Other

Subtotal—WarRelated

Total Including WarRelated

Sources: CRS, from H.Rept. 110-146, DOD, OMB, House Armed Services Committee, S.Rept. 110-77. Neither

the “House Request” nor “Senate Request” column reflects budget amendments that increased War-Related

Funding.

Shows “Budget Authority Implication” amounts in committee reports. “Other Programs” includes defense

health, drug interdiction, chemical demilitarization.

Table 6. FY2008 Department of Defense Base Budget Within the Scope of the

Defense Appropriations Bill, House and Senate Action by Title

(budget authority in millions of dollars)

Request

House

Senate

Conference

Title I: Military Personnel

105,404

105,018

105,522

105,292

Title II: Operation and Maintenance

142,854

137,135

142,679

140,062

Title III: Procurement

99,623

99,608

98,225

98,202

Title IV: Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation

75,117

76,231

75,382

77,271

Title V: Revolving & Management Funds

2,454

3,842

2,397

2,702

Title VI: Other Programsa

25,750.0

26,099.0

26,316

Title VII: Related Agencies

968.0

946.0

972

988

Title VIII: General Provisions (Net, excluding

emergency funding for MRAPs)

53.0

-205.0

-2,026

-2,160

Defense Appropriations Bill

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Request

House

Senate

Conference

452,223

448,671

449,467

448,673

MRAP Emergency Funds

—

11,630

Border Security Improvements (non-DOD)

—

3,000

—

452,223.0

448,673.0

452,467

460,303

10,876.0

10,876

10,871

463,045.0

459,556.0

463,343.0

471,592.0

subtotal – DOD Base Budget (included in

scope of FY2008 Defense Appropriations

Bill, H.R. 3222)

Total, reported in the conference report on H.R.

3222 (H.Rept. 110-434, p. 487) with the President’s

request adjusted to reflect exclusion from this bill of $187

billion requested for the cost of the war in Iraq and

Afghanistan

Tricare-for-Life accrual payments

Total including MRAP and Tri-Care

Accrual, but excludes non-DOD Border

Security

Sources: House Appropriations Committee, conference report on the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill

(H.Rept. 110-434); House Appropriations Committee, “Conference Report with Outlays,” unpublished

computer printout, November 6, 2007.

Notes: Table excludes amounts requested for War-Related Funding.

Totals may not add due to rounding.

“Other Programs” include defense health, chemical agents and munitions destruction, drug interdiction,

joint improvised explosive device defeat fund, rapid acquisition fund, and office of the inspector general.

Table 7. House and Senate 302(b) Allocations of FY2008 Total Discretionary Budget

Authority, Defense vs Non-Defense

(millions of dollars)

Appropriations

Subcommittee/Bill

FY2008

House

6/8/2007

House

vs.

Request

FY2008

Senate

6/14/2007

Senate

vs.

Request

FY2007

Enacted

FY2008

Request

Defense

419,612

462,879

459,332

-3,547

459,332

-3,547

Military Construction,

Veterans Affairs

49,752

60,745

64,745

+4,000

64,745

+4,000

Total Defense and

Mil Con/VA

469,364

523,624

524,077

+453

524,077

+453

Total Other/NonDefense

Discretionary

403,354

409,225

428,976

+19,751

428,976

+19,751

Total Discretionary

872,718

932,849

953,053

+20,204

953,053

+20,204

Source: House Appropriations Committee, “Report on the Suballocation of Budget Allocations for Fiscal Year

2008,” H.Rept. 110-183, June 8, 2007; Senate Appropriations Committee, “Allocation to Subcommittees of

Budget Totals from the Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal Year 2008,” S.Rept. 110-86, June 18, 2007.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

FY2008 Defense Budget Request and Outyear Plans:

Questions of Affordability and Balance

Several aspects of the Department’s FY2008 budget request and its projected budgets through

FY2013 raise questions about the affordability of DOD’s plan as a whole and about the balance of

spending among major elements of the defense budget.

(1) DOD’s funding plan for FY2008-FY2013, excluding the cost of military operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan, projects that the department’s base budget will increase in real purchasing

power, after adjusting for inflation, by 8.0% between FY2007 and FY2008 and by another 3.5%

in FY2009 before declining slightly over each of the following four years. But the tightening fiscal

squeeze on the federal government may put strong downward pressure on the defense budget; and

the unbudgeted funds needed for ongoing military operations abroad may compound the problem.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the

Government Accountability Office (GAO) agree that the current mix of federal programs is

fiscally unsustainable for the long term. 8 The nation’s aging population combined with rising

health costs are driving an increase in spending for federal entitlement programs which, in turn,

will fuel rising deficits compounded by a steadily increasing interest on the national debt. The

upshot is that, if total federal outlays continue to account for about 20% of the GDP and federal

revenues remain at about their current level, total federal spending on discretionary programs, in

terms of real purchasing power, would have to be sharply reduced to meet the goal of a balanced

federal budget by 2012 and then to cover the rising costs of Medicare, Medicaid and Social

Security resulting partly from the retirement of baby boomers.

To protect DOD from this fiscal vise, some have recommended that the defense budget

(excluding the cost of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) be sustained at 4% of GDP—a

share of the national wealth that DOD last claimed in FY1994.9 But that proposal would have to

overcome the thus far intractable political challenges of increasing federal revenues, reducing

discretionary non-defense spending, and/or restraining the growth of entitlement costs.

(2) Although the Administration has submitted a budget proposal to cover the cost of ongoing

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2008 that is separate from its “base” budget request for

the year, it may be difficult, as a practical matter, for Congress to subject the request for cost-ofwar appropriations to the same oversight it applies to regular, annual defense spending requests.

If the congressional defense committees mark up the FY2008 defense funding bills on their usual

schedules, as the House and Senate Armed Services committees are doing with respect to the

annual defense authorization bill, they will have had to review in less than four months both the

President’s $482 billion request for the base DOD budget and the additional $142 billion

requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The burden may be compounded by the fact that

the congressional defense committees may not have time-tested analytical tools with which to

scrutinize the request for ongoing combat operations, as they do for reviewing the base budget.

See CRS Report RL33915, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, by (name redacted). See also OMB, Budget of the

United States Government for Fiscal Year 2008, February 2007, pp. 16-21; CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook:

Fiscal Years 2008-2017, January 2007, pp. 10-11; GAO, The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2007

Update, GAO-07-510R.

Baker Spring, “Defense FY2008 Budget Analysis: Four Percent for Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation,

Backgrounder no. 2012, March 5, 2007.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Moreover, for most of that four month period, Members of Congress, and the defense funding

committees in particular, have been deeply preoccupied with debate over the Administration’s

FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. 1591) to pay for combat operations

in Iraq and Afghanistan, legislation that has become the vehicle for congressional efforts to

reduce the involvement of U.S. troops in Iraq.

In addition, since DOD does not include the forecast cost of ongoing operations in its projections

of defense budget requests in future years, except for a $50 billion placeholder for FY2009

included in the FY2008 request, Congress has not been given a clear sense of how severely the

federal government’s overall fiscal squeeze may constrain future defense budgets.

(3) DOD projects that its total budget will remain approximately constant, in real terms, from

FY2009 through FY2013. But for years, most of the major components of the defense budget have

shown a steady cost growth, in excess of the cost of inflation. Thus, the relatively flat defense

budgets planned would have to accommodate other types of costs that also seem to be escalating

almost uncontrollably, notably including (1) the rising cost of health care for personnel still on

active service, retirees and their dependents, (2) operations and maintenance costs that have been

increasing since the Korean War at an average of 2.5% per year above the cost of inflation, and

(3) new weapons that are expected to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of U.S. forces, but

which carry high price tags to begin with and then, all too often, substantially overrun their initial

cost-estimates.10

(4) One of the most powerful drivers of DOD’s internal cost squeeze, the steady increase in the

cost of military personnel, would be compounded by the President’s recommendation—in line

with congressional proposals—to increase active-duty Army and Marine Corps end-strength.

Between FY1999 and FY2005, the cost of active-duty military personnel, measured per-servicemember, grew by 33% above inflation, largely because of congressional initiatives to increase

pay and benefits. A large fraction of the increased cost is due to increases in retired pay and

greatly expanded medical benefits for military retirees.

This year, the Administration has proposed (and the congressional defense committees have urged

for years) an increase in active-duty end-strength that would add 92,000 soldiers and Marines to

the rolls, thus increasing the services’ fixed costs by at least $12 billion annually (once the startup costs of the policy have been absorbed). At the same time, the Navy and Air Force are cutting

personnel levels to safeguard funds for weapons programs. The Air Force is cutting about 40,000

full-time equivalent positions and the Navy about 30,000. One issue is whether these cuts will be

used, directly or indirectly, not to pay for Air Force and Navy weapons programs, but for Army

and Marine Corps end-strength increases.

(5) The Navy’s ability to sustain a fleet of the current size within realistically foreseeable budgets

may especially problematic. After years of criticism from Members of Congress who contended

that the Navy was buying too few ships to replace vessels being retired, the service released in

February a long-range shipbuilding plan that would fall just short of the Navy’s current goal of

In a review of 64 major weapons programs, the GAO found that their total cost had grown by more than 4.9%

annually, in real terms. The total estimated cost of the 64 programs in FY2007 was $165 billion more (in FY2007

dollars) than had been projected in FY2004. See GAO-07-406SP, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected

Weapons Programs, March 2007, p. 8. According to the GAO analysis, a major reason for that unbudgeted cost

increase was that many programs depend on technologies that promise transformative combat effectiveness, but which

have not been adequately developed before they are incorporated into the design of a new weapon. Ibid., p. 9.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

maintaining a fleet of 313 ships. But the plan assumes that the Defense Department, which

bought seven ships in FY2007 and is requesting the same number in FY2008, would buy between

11 and 13 ships in each of the following five years. The plan assumes that amount appropriated

for new ship construction would rise from a requested $12.5 billion in FY2008 to $17.5 billion in

FY2013 (in current-year dollars).11

Considering the fiscal demands likely to put downward pressure on future defense budgets,

funding the Navy’s plan may be challenging. But even if the Navy got the annual shipbuilding

budgets it plans to request, it might not be able to buy all the ships it plans as quickly as it plans

to do so, because of escalating costs and delays in some of the new types of ships slated to

comprise the future fleet. In the past, Navy cost and schedule forecasts later proven to be overly

optimistic have led to long-range shipbuilding plans that promised increases in shipbuilding

budgets in the “out-years” that have not been realized. Unachievable shipbuilding plans may

discourage the Navy and Congress from weighing potential tradeoffs between, on the one hand,

construction of promising new designs and, on the other hand, building additional ships of types

already in service and upgrading existing vessels.

(6) The services’ plans to modernize their tactical air forces suffer from the type of excessive

budgetary and technological optimism that also afflicts the shipbuilding plan. Roughly midway

through a 40-year, $400 million effort to replace the post-Vietnam generation of Air Force, Navy

and Marine Corps fighter planes with versions of the Air Force’s F-22A, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F,

and the tri-service F-35 (or Joint Strike Fighter), the services’ plans have been buffeted by

escalating costs, slipping schedules and external budget pressures. In the case of the F-22A, this

produced a current budget plan that will buy only 183 planes rather than the 381 the Air Force

says it needs. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps have reduced the total number of F-35s they

plan to buy from 1,089 to 680.

Adjustments like this are easier to make with aircraft budgets that fund dozens of units annually

costing tens of millions of dollars apiece than it is with shipbuilding budgets that fund a handful

of units each year, many of which cost upwards of a billion dollars apiece. But while it may be

easier for the services to deal with the consequences of optimistic tactical aircraft recapitalization

plans than it is for the Navy to manage the shipbuilding program, there is a similar underlying

problem. If the services’ long-range plans assume budgets, costs, technical breakthroughs and

production schedules that will not be realized, a service may delay and, ultimately, increase the

cost of upgrades to planes already in service that will have to be kept combat-ready until the new

craft are fielded:

The military services accord new systems higher funding priority, and the legacy systems

tend to get whatever funding is remaining after the new systems’ budget needs are met. If

new aircraft consume more of the investment dollars than planned, the buying power and

budgets for legacy systems are further reduced to remain within DOD budget limits.

However, as quantities of new systems have been cut and deliveries to the warfighter

delayed, more legacy aircraft are required to stay in the inventory and for longer periods of

time than planned, requiring more dollars to modernize and maintain aging aircraft.12

Although most Defense Department shipbuilding is funded in the “Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy” (SCN)

appropriation, certain types of non-combatant vessels are funded in other appropriation accounts, particularly the

National Defense Sealift Fund, which is under Revolving and Management Funds.

Government Accountability Office, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy, GAO07-415, April 2007, p. 13.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Issues in the FY2008 Global War on Terror Request13

For the seventh year of war operations since the 9/11 attacks, DOD originally requested $141.7

billion, 29% of the amount it is requesting for all routine DOD activity in FY2008. For the first

time since the 9/11 attacks, the Administration has submitted a request for war funding for the full

year to meet a new requirement levied in the FY2007 John Warner National Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364).14 Since FY2003, Congress has funded war costs in two bills,

typically a bridge fund included in the regular DOD Appropriations Act to cover the first part of

the fiscal year and a supplemental enacted after the fiscal year has begun. 15

On July 31, 2007, the Administration requested an additional $5.3 billion to purchase Mine

Resistant Ambush Program vehicles (MRAPs), bringing the total to $147 billion for FY2008. On

September 26, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the administration would be

requesting an additional $42.3 billion. With those funds, the total request for FY2008 would be

$189.3 billion, 14% above the FY2007 enacted level and 62% above the FY2006 enacted level.

The Administration’s original FY2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) request of $141.7 billion is

similar to its FY2007 funding request for FY2007 war costs with certain exceptions: funds are not

included to support the higher troop levels announced by the president in January 2007 or to

increase the size of the Army and Navy (included in the baseline) and lesser amounts are

requested to train Afghan and Iraqi security force (see Table 8). In testimony, Secretary of

Defense Gates characterized the FY2008 GWOT request as “a straightline projection for forces of

140,000 in Iraq” because funding for the surge is only included through September 30, 2007, the

end of FY2007.16 In mid-September 2007, General Petraeus recommended and the President

decided to extend the current troop increase of about 30,000 in Iraq for an additional four months

in FY2008.

On September 26, 2007, Secretary Gates announced that the Administration will be submitting a

request for an additional $42 billion for war costs in FY2008, including about $6 billion for the

extension of the troop surge. If troop levels were to fall further later in the year—as Secretary

Gates recently suggested might occur—less funds might be needed.

On September 26, 2007, the House passed H.J.Res. 52, a continuing resolution to fund

government operations temporarily until passage of the regular appropriations acts. That

resolution includes funds for both DOD’s baseline program and war costs, as well as the $5.3

billion requested for MRAPS in late July. Both the House and Senate are expected to pass a

continuing resolution to fund FY2008 government operations before the end of the fiscal year on

September 30, 2007.

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in the U.S. Defense Budget.

Section 1008, P.L. 109-364.

See Table A1 in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations

Since 9/11, by (name redacted); in FY2003, war funds were provided in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations (P.L.

108-7) as well as the FY2003 Supplemental see also CRS Report RS22455, Military Operations: Precedents for

Funding Contingency Operations in Regular or in Supplemental Appropriations Bills, by (name redacted).

Senate Appropriations Committee, Hearing on Supplemental War Funding, February 27, 2007, transcript, p. 11.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

According to DOD, the original FY2008 war request includes $109.7 billion for Iraq and $26.0

billion for Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations.17 That request supports a total of

320,000 deployed personnel including 140,000 in Iraq and 20,000 in Afghanistan. DOD does not

explain the difference between the 160,000 military personnel deployed in Iraq and in

Afghanistan and the additional 160,000 deployed elsewhere supporting those missions.18

Additional FY2008 War Funding Request

In testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Gates announced some of the

major elements that would be part of the Administration’s new request had not yet been

submitted. Table 8 below shows the additional amounts beyond the levels currently being

considered by Congress. The main elements of the anticipated request reportedly will be

•

$6.3 billion for operations (presumably to extend the surge for four months);

•

$13.9 billion more for force protection including additional MRAPs;

•

$8.9 billion more for reconstituting the force;

•

$6.4 billion to enhance ground forces;

•

$3.3 billion in emergency requests;

•

$1.0 billion for military construction;

•

$1.0 billion for training and equipping Iraq security forces;

•

$.9 billion for military intelligence; and

•

$.2 billion for coalition support and Commanders Emergency Response Program.

Additional details are not currently available. At the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on

September 26, 2007, Senator Byrd stated that the committee expected DOD to submit detailed

justification material for the new request.

Table 8. Expected Adjustments to FY2008 War Request

(in billions of dollars)

Category

TOTAL

Sources: FY2008 DOD Global War on Terror Request, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force

adjustment requests, August 2007.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Congressional Action on Administration’s War Requests

Both the House and Senate include funds for DOD’s war or Global War on Terror (GWOT)

request in a separate title in their respective versions FY2008 authorization bills (H.R. 1585 and

S. 1547). The House passed its bill on May 17, 2007, and the Senate began consideration of the

bill on July 9, 2007, pulled the bill from the floor after several days of debate over Iraq

amendments, and resumed consideration of the bill on September 17.

House Appropriations Committee Chair Congressman Murtha has announced that the House will

consider war funding in a separate bill. The timing of the FY2008 supplemental is unclear. The

President has not formally submitted a request for the additional $42.3 billion that Secretary

Gates announced in a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on September 26, 2007. If

H.J.Res. 52, the continuing resolution passed by the House is enacted, then DOD’s $5.3 billion

request for 1,520 MRAPs would be funded. In its report on DOD’s FY2008 Appropriation

(H.Rept. 110-279), the House Appropriations Committee deferred consideration of some $2.0

billion in DOD’s baseline request to the GWOT bill on the grounds that these were war-related

requests, a move that could increase the amount of emergency war funding.

Authorizers Categorize “War” Funding Differently

The House and Senate bills adopt different approaches to war funding. The House accepts DOD’s

designation of funds requested for GWOT and provides the full $141.7 billion requested while

the Senate bill approves the full amount but transfers some $13.4 billion of the GWOT-requested

funds to DOD’s baseline program. Thus, the Senate-reported version—currently on hold after

several days of floor consideration in July—provides $128.3 billion for GWOT, ostensibly a cut

of some $13.4 billion to the GWOT request. In fact, however, almost all of the programs in

DOD’s GWOT request are included in the baseline program.

The SASC report recommends the transfer from GWOT to the baseline program on the grounds

that funds provided for military personnel, procurement, and military construction that are

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

dedicated to “growing the force,” and funds for weapon system upgrades that pre-date the Afghan

and Iraq conflicts should both be considered part of DOD’s baseline or regular program rather

than valid war-related requirements.

According to its report, the SASC transfers are intended to identify the full amount of funding for

the expansion of the Army and Marine Corps that was originally justified by the Administration

as a way to meet the need for more military personnel for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Originally rationalized as a way to lengthen periods between deployments, it is now being

proposed as a permanent long-term expansion of the Army and Marine Corps.

The FY2008 GWOT request includes $4.1 billion for military personnel, $689 million in

operating and maintenance costs, and $169 million for military construction to pay, equip and

house an increase of 92,000 Army and Marine Corps troops by 2012.19 If the United States

significantly decreases the number of troops in Iraq, it is not clear that the Army and Marine

Corps would need to be larger unless additional large-scale deployments are anticipated for the

future.

The weapon system upgrades transferred by the Senate authorizers—for example, $515 million

for upgrades to CH-47 Army helicopters, $1.4 billion for Bradley fighting vehicles, and $1.3

billion for Abrams tanks—are programs that were underway before 9/11 and could be considered

part of the Army’s ongoing modernization efforts. DOD also includes funds for these programs in

its baseline request. DOD has argued that much of its war-related procurement request is for

reconstitution or reset—the replacement of equipment that is expected to wear out sooner because

of the stress of combat action. These replacements are typically upgraded versions rather than

strictly replacements and hence contribute to modernization.

At the same time as the SASC transfers GWOT funds to the baseline program, the Committee

expresses some concern that growth in the size of the Army and Marine Corps may “come too

late to impact the war in Iraq.” Nevertheless, the SASC endorses the transfers to the base budget

as a way to capture “integrated” costs and not obscure the “true cost that the actual end strength

presents.”20

Authorizers Shift Funds to Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles

The two authorizing bills largely endorse DOD’s request with one major exception—both

recommend an increase of $4.1 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP), a

troop transport vehicle considered to be more effective than uparmored HMMWVs in

withstanding attacks from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and now deemed an urgent new

war requirement. This increase would be offset by cuts to GWOT programs deemed of lower

priority. On July 31, 2007—after the House and Senate authorizers reported—the Administration

requested an additional $5.36 billion for MRAP—including testing and transportation as well as

procurement costs—but did not propose any offsets from either DOD’s baseline or GWOT

requests.

Although there appears to be widespread agreement that the MRAP is more effective against IED

attacks, the vehicle is still undergoing operational testing and the first 100 vehicles produced

CRS calculations based on S.Rept. 110-77.

S.Rept. 110-77, pp. 433 and 325.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

failed testing. Testing is continuing on the original configuration and a second phase of testing is

underway at Aberdeen Test Center for MRAP II that is to be capable of stopping explosively

formed projectiles (EFPs), the newest threat in Iraq.

About 200 vehicles are currently in theater. According to press reports, the services are planning a

rapid expansion of production to meet a requirement estimated to be from 18,000 to 23,000

vehicles, enough to replace every uparmored HMMWV in theater. Several variants are being

tested and as many as 20 contractors may compete for the large buy. Of the estimated requirement

in theater, about 60% are slated for the Army and 30% for the Marine Corps. The Army and

Marine Corps have not yet decided whether MRAPs are a long-term or temporary requirement.21

Administration Proposes More Funding for MRAP Vehicles

On July 31, 2007, the Administration requested an additional $5.3 billion for the FY2008 Global

War on Terror (GWOT) in order to purchase 1,520 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)

vehicles and provide additional parts for other MRAPs already on order. According to the

Administration, this would enable DOD to ramp up to the maximum feasible production rate and

deliver about 8,000 vehicles in theater by May 2008.22 DOD is expected to request an additional

$10 billion more for MRAPs.23

Currently, DOD has a total of about $4.3 billion in funding for MRAP vehicles and associated

testing and support including some $3.2 billion in the FY2007 Supplemental (including $1.2

billion added by Congress) and a recently-approved $1.1 billion reprogramming of FY2007

funds. If the Administration’s new request for FY2008 is approved, DOD would have a total of

$10.2 billion for MRAP vehicles. 24 DOD has not yet indicated the total number of MRAPs,

presumably because the services have not yet decided the mix of the different variants undergoing

testing to be purchased; current figures suggest that an individual MRAP would cost over $1

million apiece compared to about $350,000 for an uparmored HMMWV.

Appropriations Action

As passed by the House on August 5, 2007, the FY2008 DOD Appropriations Act, H.R. 3222,

does not address DOD’s war request. House leaders plan to propose a separate bill at a later date.

In their report, the House appropriators promises to address the following issues as part of its

consideration of FY2008 war funding:

•

Funding for additional C-17 transport aircraft (included in earlier supplementals

but not considered a war cost by DOD);

•

Funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles;

Inside the Navy, “CENTCOM, SOCOM and Pentagon Direct Bulk of New MRAP fleet to Army,” August 6, 2007;

Inside the Navy, “Aberdeen Commander Says MRAP II won’t Slow Ongoing MRAP I Testing,” August 6, 2007; Inside

Defense, “Congress OKs MRAP Reprogramming; Additional production orders Expected;” Inside Defense, “Pentagon

Eyes More than A Dozen New Potential Vendors for MRAP II,” August 1, 2007.

White House, Letter from President George W. Bush to Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi transmitting OMB

Estimate No. 5, “FY2008 Revised Emergency Proposals,” July 31, 2007.

Testimony by Secretary Robert Gates before Senate Appropriations Committee, September 26, 2007.

CRS calculations based on H.Rept. 110-279, H.Rept. 110-146, and S.Rept. 110-77, and OMB request of July 31,

2007.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

•

Funding for additional Blackhawk MEDEVAC helicopters;

•

Funding for the Global train and Equip Program, a new program to train foreign

security forces facing insurgencies in countries other than Iraq or Afghanistan;

•

Funding to enhance the readiness of stateside units in the strategic reserve that

would be available for contingencies other than Iraq and Afghanistan;

•

Shortfalls in funding for the Defense Health Program because of “efficiency”

wedges included in DOD’s request;

•

Shortfalls in funding for Basic Allowance for Housing.25

The House appropriators did, however, defer some $2.0 billion in baseline requests to the war bill

slated for September, characterizing some requests for ammunition, modifications and tactical

vehicles as war rather than baseline requirements, a mirror image of Senate authorization action

that transferred funds from DOD’s war request to its baseline program.

The actions by Senate authorizers and House appropriators underline one of the dilemmas in war

funding that has continued for several years—how to distinguish between programs that are

necessary because of war requirements and those that are dedicated to enhancing capabilities that

DOD considers necessary to meet longer-term requirements, including potential future counterinsurgency struggles. One sign of this concern is the requirement by the HAC for a DOD report

that outlines the assumptions underlying reset requirements to repair and replace war-worn

equipment and explains “how recapitalization and upgrade requirements are related to war needs

rather than ongoing modernization.”26

Both the Senate authorizers and the HAC appropriators show concern about potential overlaps

between war and baseline requirements, with the Senate authorizers concerned that DOD’s

definition of war costs is too broad and the House appropriators suggesting that DOD defined war

requirements too narrowly. The HAC cut $2.0 billion from DOD’s baseline request, arguing these

items should be considered war-related. The items include:

•

$180 million for special pay for language skills and hardship duty;

•

$1.1 billion in procurement for heavy Army trucks and night vision devices,

Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), upgrades to C-130 aircraft and

war consumable, Hellfire missiles for Predator (armed) UAVs, Air Force

ammunition and trucks;

•

$500 million for the Global Train and Equip program, a program to equip and

train foreign security forces other than Iraq or Afghanistan who face counterinsurgency threats; and

•

$100 million for a “Rapid Acquisition Fund,” intended to make it easier for DOD

to procure urgently needed items.

This $2.0 billion that the HAC proposes to transfer from DOD’s baseline request to GWOT

effectively frees up funding for other programs desired by the appropriators and makes it easier

for DOD to cut $3.5 billion from the DOD request as is required by each appropriation committee

H.Rept. 110-279, p. 3.

H.Rept. 110-279, p. 163.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

to comply with the overall caps on discretionary spending set in S.Con.Res. 21, the FY2008

Budget Resolution (see Table 4).27 Although DOD’s GWOT request is also addressed in the

budget resolution, the amount can be adjusted more easily than for DOD’s baseline program.

Other War-Related Provisions

As part of its markup of the H.R. 3222, the House appropriators include several general

provisions related to war, several of which have been included in previous appropriations acts.

These provisions include:

•

a prohibition on spending any funds in the act to train foreign security forces who

engage in gross violations of human rights (Sec. 8060);

•

a requirement for separate budget justification materials for named operations

costing more than $100 million (Sec. 8085);

•

a requirement for written notification of the period of mobilization for all

activated reservists (Sec. 8089);

•

a provision prohibiting spending funds for permanent bases in Iraq or to control

Iraqi oil resources (Sec. 8103);

•

a 90% limitation on operation and maintenance obligations until DOD submits a

report on contractor services; and

•

a requirement that the cost of ongoing operations be included in the budget

request; and

•

a new requirement that DOD provide monthly reports of “boots on the ground,”

in Iraq and Afghanistan or military personnel deployed in-country.28

FY2008 GWOT Request

In its original request, DOD’s justification language and funding levels for the FY2008 GWOT

request are almost identical to those included in its FY2007 Supplemental request in several

categories such as military operations and reconstitution of war-worn equipment, citing the same

force levels and the same examples. For example, DOD’s request for $70.6 billion in FY2008

funds special pays, benefits, subsistence, the cost of activating reservists, and the cost of

conducting operations and providing support for about 320,000 deployed military personnel

serving in and around Iraq and Afghanistan assuming the same operating tempo as in FY2007.29

The original FY2008 GWOT request did not include the roughly $4 billion additional cost for the

“plus-up” or increase of five Army brigades or about 30,000 troops announced by the president

on January 10, 2007 completed in June 2007.30

Each appropriation committee sets 302 (b) allocations for its subcommittees that together meet the total for

discretionary spending set by the 302(a) levels set in the budget resolution.

See sections of H.R. 3222 listed and H.Rept. 110-279, p. 27.

DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, pp. 15 and 17; online at http://www.dod.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf.

This CRS estimate includes adjustment to DOD’s estimate of $5.6 billion to reflect later reprogrammings by DOD

for excess costs for activating reservists and depot maintenance and excludes the cost of an additional Marine

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

The revised DOD request announced by Secretary Gates includes an additional $6.3 billion for

operations, presumably to cover the costs of the retaining the additional five combat brigades in

country in the first part of the year and then redeploying those forces home by July 2008.

Should force levels decline later in the year—a decrease of 30,000 or five additional brigades was

broached by Secretary Gates in mid-September and in testimony to the Senate Appropriations

Committee—some of these additional funds might not be necessary.31 In July testimony, the

Congressional Budget Office projected that a four-month surge as proposed by the President

could cost about $10 billion between FY2007 and FY2010 and that a 12 month surge would cost

about $22 billion. 32 These estimates are substantially higher than DOD estimates because CBO

assumed a greater number of support troops would be required than did DOD and CBO projected

its cost estimates farther into the future.

Congressional Action

The House authorizers cut $881 million from DOD’s $6 billion request for the Logistics Civil

Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, which provides base camp services on the grounds that a

14% increase was not justified given the fact that the FY2008 request is predicated on a straightline projection from FY2007—without the temporary increase in military personnel this year. At

the same time, the HASC added $401 million to the Military Personnel request to cover the cost

of an additional 36,000 Army and 9,000 Marine Corps personnel suggesting that the committee

expects the higher levels in FY2007 to persist.33

Reflecting readiness concerns, the HASC sets up a Defense Readiness Production Board whose

mission is to identify critical readiness requirements. DOD is also given authority to use

multiyear procurement contracts of up to $500 million authority for items deemed of critical

readiness importance without statutory approval and even if DOD would not save money (Section

1701 to Section 1708, H.R. 1585). The bill also authorizes $1 billion for these purposes.34

The SASC transfers $4.1 billion from DOD’s GWOT request in Title XV for higher Army and

Marine Corps force levels adopted originally to meet OIF/OEF needs to the base budget, with the

rationale that these increases or “over strength” are no longer appropriately considered temporary

emergency expenses. The committee reduces the DOD O&M request from $72. 9 billion to $72.0

billion with the change reflecting a transfer of $712 million to the base budget to “grow the

force.”35

(...continued)

Expeditionary Force in FY2007.

Philadelphia Inquirer, “Bush Says U.S. Will Shift More Troops to Support Role,” September 14, 2007, and

Secretary Robert Gates testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, September 26, 2007.

CBO, Testimony to the House Budget Committee, July 31, 2007; available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/84xx/

doc8497/07-30-WarCosts_Testimony.pdf.

H.Rept. 110-146, p. 469.

H.Rept. 110-146, pp. 481-482.

S.Rept. 110-77, p. 489 and pp. 515-516, and DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, p. 75.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Table 9. DOD’s Global War on Terror, FY2006-FY2008 by Function

(billions of dollars)

FY2007

Total

Request

vs FY06

FY2008

Request

FY2008

Request vs.

FY2007

Total w/

Request

FY2006

Enacted

FY2007

Bridge

Enacted

FY2007

Supp.

Request

FY2007

Total

with

Request

Incremental Pay

and Benefits and

operating and

support Costs

67.2

30.5

39.2

69.8

2.6

70.6

0.8

Temporary Troop

Plus-up and

Increased Naval

Presence

0.0

5.6

0.0

-5.6

Reconstitution or

Reset

19.2

23.6

13.9

37.5

18.4

37.6

0.0

Force Protection

5.4

3.4

8.0

11.3

6.0

11.2

-0.1

Joint Improvised

Explosive Device

Defeat Fund

3.3

1.9

2.4

4.4

1.0

4.0

-0.4

Accelerating

Modularity

5.0

0.0

3.6

-1.4

1.6

-2.1

Infrastructure &

equipment for

Perm. Inc. in Size

of Army and MC

0.0

1.7

0.0

-1.7

Equip and Train

Afghan and Iraq

Security Forces

4.9

3.2

9.7

12.9

8.0

4.7

-8.2

Coalition Support

1.2

0.9

1.0

1.9

0.7

1.7

-0.2

Commanders

Emergency

Response Fd

0.9

0.5

1.0

0.1

1.0

0.0

Military

Construction

Overseas in Iraq

and Afghanistan

0.2

0.0

1.1

0.9

0.7

-0.4

Military Intelligence

1.5

0.8

2.7

3.5

2.0

2.7

-0.8

Non-DOD

Classified and

Non-GWOT

5.6

5.1

3.6

8.8

3.2

5.9

-2.8

Regional War on

Terror

0.0

0.3

0.0

-0.3

GRAND TOTAL

114.4

70.0

93.4

163.4

49.0

141.7

-21.7

Type of Expense

Sources: DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, Table 2, p. 75, at http://www.dod.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf. Table 2

does not reflect budget amendments that increased the Administration’s request for War-Related Funding.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

Broad Definition of Reconstitution or Reset

As in FY2007, DOD is requesting $37.6 billion for reconstitution which appears to encompass a

broader set of requirements than the standard definition of reset—the repair and replacement of

war-worn equipment when troops and equipment are re-deployed or rotated.36 Within

reconstitution, DOD includes not only equipment repair and replacement of battle losses and

munitions, but also replacement of “stressed” equipment, upgrading of equipment with new

models, additional modifications, and new or upgraded equipment as well an expansion of the

supply inventory ($900 million) that assumes that currently high stock levels will need to be

continued.

Of the $37.6 billion reconstitution request, $8.9 billion is for equipment repair including $7.8

billion for the Army $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps, amounts similar to DOD’s request in

FY2007 and fairly similar to earlier DOD projections.37 The remaining $28.7 billion is for

procurement. In a report to Congress in September 2006, DOD estimated that equipment

replacement in FY2008 would be about $5.0 billion for the Army and about $500 million for the

Marine Corps, levels substantially below the $21.1 billion for the Army and $7.2 billion for the

Marine Corps requested for FY2008.

This four-fold increase in Army and ten-fold increase in Marine Corps reconstitution

requirements in FY2008 may reflect both an expanded definition of what constitutes war-related

equipment replacement and a DOD decision to request more than one year’s requirement in

FY2008 as occurred in the FY2007 Supplemental where requirements were front loaded

according to OMB Director, Rob Portman.38 With the exception of force protection equipment

(much of which is funded in O&M), DOD appears to characterize all of its FY2008 war

procurement request as reconstitution (see Table 9) including upgrades and replacement of

current equipment that would normally considered part of peacetime modernization.

With over $8 billion in war-related procurement funds from previous years still to be put on

contract, Congress could choose to delay some of the items requested by DOD, as was the case in

Congressional action on the FY2007 where some requests were deemed “premature” or not

emergencies. 39 The FY2008 war request may also reflect a response to the concerns of Service

For DOD definition, see DOD, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 23, pp. 23-21;

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf; CBO defines reset as the repair or replacement of war-worn

equipment; see CBO, Letter to Rep. Skelton, “The Potential Costs Resulting from Increased Usage of Military

Equipment from Ongoing Operations,” March 18, 2005; available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/61xx/doc6160/03-18WornEquip.pdf.

In a September 2006 report to Congress, DOD estimated repair requirements at $8.0 billion for the Army and $830

million for the Marine Corps in FY2008, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs:

Report to the Congress, September 2006, pp. 24-25; DOD, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Global War on Terror Request,

Exhibits for FY2008, all appropriations, Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance, Construction, Revolving and

Management Funds, Procurement, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, February 2007;

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/

FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/FY_2008_GWOT_Request__Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Emergency

Supplemental, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)/Regional War on Terrorism (RWOT), Exhibit O-1, pp. 2 and 7.

Testimony of OMB Director Rob Portman before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on the FY2008 DOD

Budget, February 6, 2007, p. 41 of transcript.

CRS calculation based on BA appropriated and Defense Finance Accounting Service, Supplemental & Cost of War

Execution reports as of February 28, 2007; see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for

Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by (name redacted).

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

witnesses raised in testimony over the last year or two that Congress would need to appropriate

funds for equipment replacement for two years after forces are withdrawn. 40

In both FY2007 and FY2008, the services request includes replacement for various aircraft and

helicopters—both battle losses and anticipated replacements for “stressed” aircraft. Under DOD’s

standard budget guidance, the services are only to request new major weapon systems for combat

losses that have already been experienced unless they get specific approval for an exception,

which appears to be the case for both the FY2007 and the FY2008 requests where the services

have requested replacements for “stressed” aircraft rather than combat losses. In the case of the

FY2008 request, particularly, DOD would not have information about combat losses. In response

to congressional doubts, the administration withdrew its request for six new EA-18 electronic

warfare aircraft and two JSF aircraft in the FY2007 Supplemental.

Another issue is whether replacing older aircraft no longer in production with new aircraft just

entering or scheduled to enter production is a legitimate emergency requirement since systems

would not be available for several years. Under their expanded definition, DOD’s request

includes replacement of MH-53 and H-46 helicopters with the new V-22 tilt rotor aircraft,

replacement of an F-16 with the new F-35 JSF, and replacement of older helicopters with the

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, a troubled program not yet in production which the Army is

considering terminating.41 In addition, the FY2008 request includes replacement of stressed

aircraft with 17 new C-130Js, modification upgrades to C-130 aircraft, F-18 aircraft, AH-1W and

CH-46 helicopters.

Congressional Action

With a few exceptions, the House authorizers supported the Administration’s procurement

request. The exceptions include the transfer of funds from various programs deemed lower

priority to provide an additional $4.1 billion for the Mine Resistant Ambush program (see below)

as well as cuts to the Air Force’s F-35 and C130J aircraft requests and the Army’s request for

Armed Reconnaissance helicopters. On the other hand, the House added $2.4 billion for

additional C-17 cargo aircraft that will keep the production line open, an issue raised in previous

years.

In its report, the SASC reduces GWOT funding for procurement from $36.0 billion to $28.3

billion including the following.

•

$4.6 billion in transfers to the base budget;

•

$1.9 billion in program cuts, primarily delays in troubled programs such as the V22 (-$493 million), UH-1Y/Ah-1Z (-$123 million), and C-130J aircraft (-$468

million); and

House Armed Services Committee, Costs and Problems of Maintaining Military equipment in Iraq, January 31,

2007, hearing transcript; House Armed Services Committee, Army and Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground

Equipment and Rotorcraft, hearing transcript, June 27, 2006.

House Armed Services Committee, Air Land Subcommittee, “Opening Statement at Markup by Chair Neil

Abercrombie,” May 2, 2007.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

•

$4.7 billion in program adds, echoing House action by adding $4.1 billion for the

Mine Resistant Ambush Program (MRAP), now a high priority because of its

success in protecting soldiers against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

The programmatic cuts also reflect committee questions about DOD’s plan for rapid production

buildups for these programs.42 The committee’s transfer of procurement to the base budget may

be designed to give greater visibility to the full spending on individual programs. Since most of

DOD’s FY2008 GWOT procurement request reflects anticipated replacement needs and upgrades

rather than war losses, and with production lead times of two to three years, the committee may

believe that the war-related connection for the requests are less clear.

Force Protection Funding

DOD’s original FY2008 request includes about $11 billion in funding for force protection in both

FY2007 and FY2008 primarily for body armor, armored vehicles, protecting operating bases and

surveillance operations. The original FY2008 request is almost identical to FY2007 and includes:

•

$3.5 billion to purchase an additional 320,000 body armor sets reaching a

cumulative total of 1.7 million original and upgraded sets meeting 100% of total

requirements as well as the new Advanced Combat helmet, earplugs, gloves and

other protective gear;

•

$7.0 billion for protection equipment and activities including munitions

clearance, fire-retardant NOMEX uniforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft

survivability modifications, route clearance vehicles; and

•

funding for more uparmored HMMWVs ($1.3 billion), armored security ($301

million) and mine protection vehicles ($174 million); and

•

$585 million for Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), a truck

with a V-shaped hull which has proven effective against IEDs.43

There has been considerable controversy in Congress about whether DOD has provided adequate

force protection in a timely fashion with Congress typically adding funds for more body armor,

more uparmored HMWWVs, and other force protection gear. In the FY2007 Supplemental,

Congress added $1.2 billion to DOD’s request for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles

(MRAP) providing a total of $3.0 billion.44 In response to this controversy, the Administration

recently submitted an amended GWOT request for an additional $5.3 billion for MRAPS in order

to ramp up production sooner (see discussion above).

S.Rept. 110-77, pp. 511 and 513.

DOD lists $700 million in force protection funding for armored vehicles in its justification but this appears to be an

understatement; see FY2008, Exhibit P-1 for listing of individual items; DOD, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Global War on

Terror Request, Exhibits for FY2008, all appropriations, February 2007; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/

defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/FY_2008_GWOT_Request__Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf. For MRAP funding, see Other Procurement accounts of each service

and Defensewide and Procurement, Marine Corps in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global

War on Terror Request, Exhibits for FY2008, Exhibit P-1, Procurement, February 2007; http://www.defenselink.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/

FY_2008_GWOT_Request_-_Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf.

CRS calculation based on H.Rept. 110-107, conference report on H.R. 1591, April 24, 2007; see Congressional

Record, April 24, 2007.

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Congressional Action

The House bill authorizes $4.6 billion for MRAPS, an increase of $4.1 billion over the request to

be financed by taking funds from programs deemed lower priority such as a $1 billion transfer

from Bridge to Future Networks, an upgraded command and communication support system that

has experienced problems. In addition, the HASC requires DOD to submit reports every 30 days

on MRAP requirements, contracting strategy, and other matters.45

Like the House, the SASC adds $4.1 billion to DOD’s request for MRAP. At the same time, the

committee raises concerns about the differences between the Army and Marine Corps MRAP

strategies with the Army envisioning 1:7 replacements of MRAPS for uparmored HMMWVs and

the Marine Corps 1:1 replacements. The SASC endorses most of DOD’s force protection request

and increases funding for night vision devices to meet an unfunded Army requirement. 46

Questions Likely About Funding For Joint Improvised Explosive

Device Defeat Fund

In FY2008, DOD is requesting an additional $4.0 billion for the Joint Improvised Explosive

Device Defeat Fund, similar to the FY2007 level, for a special new transfer account set up in

recent years to coordinate research, production and training of ways to combat Improvised

Explosive Devices (IEDs), the chief threat to U.S. forces. With the funding approved in the

FY2007 Supplemental (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28), the Joint IED Defeat Fund would receive a total

of $7.6 billion. If the FY2008 request is approved, the total would reach $12.1 billion, including

both the $500 million in DOD’s base budget and $4 billion in the GWOT request.

Although Congress has been supportive of this area and endorsed DOD’s request in the FY2007

Supplemental, both houses have raised concerns about the management practices of the Joint

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) including its financial practices, its

lack of a spending plan, service requests that duplicate JIEDDO work, and its inability to provide

specific information to Congress. In the original FY2007 Supplemental conference report, the

conferees note that Congress “will be hard-pressed to fully fund future budget requests unless the

JIEDDO improves its financial management practices and its responses” suggesting that the

FY2008 request could be met with some skepticism.47 The FY2008 GWOT justification is almost

identical to that for the FY2007 Supplemental.

Congressional Action

The House authorizers endorse DOD’s request for an additional $4 billion for the Joint IED

Defeat Fund included in the GWOT request. At the same time, the SASC also transfers $500

million funded in the base budget for that fund to Title XV classifying all JIEDD funds as warrelated. In response to concerns raised by the GAO as well as the appropriators about the

H.Rept. 110-146, pp. 427 and 466-467.

S.Rept. 110-77, pp. 509-510.

H.Rept. 110-107, p. 133; H.Rept. 110-60, p. 106; S.Rept. 110-37, pp. 25-27; in the Congressional Record, May 24,

2007 (p. H5806), House Appropriations Chair Obey includes materials instructing DOD to follow the committee

reports for H.R. 1591 unless the final version of H.R. 2206 differs; there was no conference report on the final version

of H.R. 2206.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

management of the funds, including duplication with service programs, lack of an overall

strategy, and organizational structure, the SASC requires a management plan for the office from

DOD within 60 days of enactment. The SASC also calls on the office to provide $50 million in

funds and work with other DOD offices on blast injury research and treatment on medical

responses to IEDs as well as requiring a report on these efforts by March 1, 2008.48

Oversight Concerns About Cost to Train and Equip Afghan and

Iraqi Security Forces

For training and equipping, the FY2008 GWOT request includes an additional $2.7 billion to

expand Afghanistan’s 31,000 man Army and 60,000 man police force and an additional $2.0

billion for more equipment and training for Iraq’s 136,000 man Army and 192,000 man police

force. Including the funds in the FY2007 Supplemental would bring the total to $19.2 billion for

Iraq and $10.6 billion for Afghanistan.

Although the FY2008 GWOT requests are considerably lower than the amounts requested for

FY2007—$2 billion vs. $5.5 billion for Iraq and $2.7 billion vs. $7.4 billion for Afghanistan—

Congress has voiced concerns about the progress and the total cost to complete this training.

While the final version of the FY2007 supplemental dropped a House-proposal to set a 50% limit

on obligations until various reports were submitted, OMB is required to submit report every 90

days on the use of funds and estimate of the total cost to train Iraq and Afghan Security forces

within 120 days of enactment. The FY2007 Supplemental also requires that an independent

organization assess the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces to bring “greater security to Iraq’s

18 provinces in the next 12-18 months....” 49

Congressional Action

In the authorization act, the House endorses the funding request but requires various reports on

progress in training Iraqi security forces within 90 days of enactment and every three months

thereafter (Sec. 1225, Title XII) as well as requiring a report on progress toward security and

stability in Afghanistan within 90 days of enactment (Sec. 1232, Title XII).

Like the House, the SASC approves DOD’s funding request but requires quarterly reports, prior

congressional notification of transfers from the funds, and the concurrence of the Secretary of

State for assistance provided from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund or the Iraq Security

Forces Fund.50

Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response Program

In FY2008, DOD requests $1.7 billion for coalition support for U.S. allies like Pakistan and

Jordan which conduct border counter-terror operations, and for the U.S. to provide lift to its

allies. DOD also requests $1 billion for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)

S.Rept. 110-77, pp. 516-517 and Sec. 1510, S. 1547.

H.Rept. 110-107, Sec. 1313 and Sec. 1320 of H.R. 1591 and H.Rept. 110-60, p. 101; see also Congressional Record,

May 24, 2007, p. H5776ff.

S.Rept. 110-77, p. 506, sections 1511 and 1512.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

where individual commanders can fund small-scale development projects, in both cases funding

levels similar to FY2007.

While Congress has consistently supported the CERP program, it has voiced skepticism about the

amounts requested for coalition support. In FY2007, for example, Congress has proposed cutting

the Administration’s request for $950 million to $500 million on the grounds that DOD has not

defined the use of these funds for a new “Global train and equip” program authorized in

FY2006.51

Congressional Action

In H.R. 1585, the House reauthorize CERP but do not set a funding limit on the program and do

not address coalition support limits.

Unlike the House, the SASC sets a $977 million cap for the Commanders’ Emergency Response

Program (CERP), DOD’s request. The SASC also supports the $1.4 billion limit on coalition

support to reimburse allies and a $400 million limit on “lift and sustain” funds to provide support

services to nations supporting OIF and OEF operations as requested (see S. 1510, Sec. 1532 and

Sec. 1533).

Military Construction Overseas and Permanent Basing Concerns

For war-related military construction and family housing, DOD requests $908 million in FY2008

compared to $1.8 billion in FY2007. Although the funding level is lower than the previous year,

the same concerns about permanent basing in Iraq continue to be voiced. Some of the FY2008

projects requested—such as building bypass roads, power plants and wastewater treatment plants

in Iraq and providing relocatable barracks to replace temporary housing and constructing fuel

storage facilities to replace temporary fuel bladders—have been rejected previously as either

lacking sufficient justification.52

Although Congress approved most of the projects requested in the FY2007 supplemental, the

FY2007 supplemental included a prohibition on obligating or expending any funds for permanent

stationing of U.S. forces in Iraq. In the past, Congress has rejected projects similar to those

requested in FY2008 as insufficiently justified or as implying some kind of permanency.

Congressional Action

In H.R. 1585, the House reduces the FY2008 GWOT request for military construction by $212

million, rejecting utility projects such as power plants and wastewater collection facilities

perceived as indicating a permanent presence. 53 The House also extends the congressional

prohibition on using funds for permanent basing in Iraq or to control Iraqi oil resources (Sec.

1222, H.R. 1585).

H.Rept. 110-107, p. 126; see also H.Rept. 110-37, p. 22.

DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, p. 58-60; available at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/

defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf.

H.Rept. 110-146, p. 470.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

The SASC approves all DOD’s requests for projects in Iraq and Afghanistan but transfers $169

million requested for state-side projects to the base budget.54 Like the House, the SASC also

extends the provision prohibiting the United States from establishing permanent bases in Iraq or

taking control of Iraqi oil resources (Sec. 1531, S. 1547). In its appropriations bill, the House

includes the same prohibition.

Potential Issues in the FY2008 Base Budget Request

Following is a brief summary of some of the other issues that may emerge during congressional

action on the FY2008 defense authorization and appropriations bills, based on congressional

action on the FY2007 funding bills and early debate surrounding the President’s FY2008 budget

request.

•

Military Pay Raise. The budget request would give military personnel a 3% pay

raise effective January 1, 2008, thus keeping pace with the average increase in

private-sector wages as measured by the Department of Labor’s Employment

Cost Index (ECI). Some, contending that military pay increases have lagged

civilian pay hikes by a cumulative total of 4% over the past two decades or so,

have called for a 3.5% raise to close that so-called pay-gap. Defense Department

officials deny any such pay-gap exists, maintaining that their proposed 3%

increase would sustain their policy of keeping military pay at about the 70th

percentile of pay for civilians of comparable education and experience. Congress

mandated military pay-raises of ECI plus ½% in FY2000-FY2006. But for

FY2007, the Administration requested an increase of 2.2%, equivalent to ECI,

and Congress ultimately approved it, rejecting a House-passed increase to 2.7%.

•

Army and Marine Corps End-Strength Increases. The budget request includes

$12.1 billion in the FY2008 base budget and an additional $4.9 billion in the

FY2008 war-fighting budget toward the Administration’s $112.3 billion plan to

increase active-duty end-strength by 65,000 Army personnel and 27,000 Marines

by 2013. Most of the additional personnel are slated for assignment to newly

created combat brigades and regiments, which would expand the pool of units

that could be rotated through overseas deployments, thus making it easier for the

services to sustain overseas roughly the number of troops currently deployed in

Iraq and Afghanistan. This recommendation marks a new departure for the

Administration, which has resisted for several years calls by the congressional

defense committees for such an increase in troop-strength. On the other hand, the

proposal might be challenged by Members who wonder how the services, in a

time of tightening budgets, will afford the roughly $13 billion annual cost of the

additional troops. The proposal also might be opposed by Members skeptical of

future extended deployments on the scale of the current missions in Iraq and

Afghanistan.

•

Tricare Fees and Co-pays. For the second year in a row, the Administration’s

budget proposes to increase fees, co-payments and deductibles charged retirees

under the age of 65 by Tricare, the Defense Department’s medical insurance

program for active and retired service members and their dependents. The

S.Rept. 110-77, pp. 587-588.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

increases are intended to restrain the rapid increase in the annual cost of the

Defense Health Program, which is projected to reach $64 billion by FY2015. The

budget request also reduces the health program budget by $1.9 billion, the

amount the higher fees are expected to generate. The administration contends that

these one-time increases would compensate for the fact that the fees have not be

adjusted since they were set in 1995. The Administration also is requesting a

provision of law that would index future increases in Tricare fees to the average

rate of increase in health care premiums nationwide. As was the case last year,

the Administration proposal is vehemently opposed by organizations representing

service members and retirees, which contend that the Defense Department has

failed to adequately consider other cost-saving moves and that retiree medical

care on favorable terms is appropriate, considering the unique burdens that have

been borne by career soldiers and their dependents. Any future Tricare fee

increases, some groups contend, should be indexed to increases in the Consumer

Price Index (CPI) rather than to the much more rapid rise in health insurance

premiums. Last year, Congress blocked the proposed fee increases for one year

and established a study group to consider alternative solutions to the problem of

rising defense health costs. That panel is slated to issue interim recommendations

in May, 2007.55

•

National Guard Representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A number of

National Guard units have been stripped of equipment needed for other units

deploying to Iraq, leaving the units at home ill-prepared either to train for their

military mission or to execute their domestic emergency role as the agent of their

state governor. Some Members of Congress and organizations that speak for the

Guard contend that this situation reflects the regular forces’ dismissive attitude

toward Guard units, which should be counterbalanced by making the Chief of the

National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and elevating him

to highest military rank—general (4 stars)—from his current rank of lieutenant

general (3 stars). Congress has rejected these proposals before, but in March a

congressionally chartered commission studying National Guard and reserve

component issues endorsed the higher rank, while opposing the Joint Chiefs

membership.

•

National Guard Stryker Brigades. Governors, Members of Congress and

National Guard officials from several states have called on Congress to equip

additional Guard combat units with the Stryker armored combat vehicle, which

currently equips five active-duty Army brigades and one National Guard brigade

(based in Pennsylvania). Stryker brigades deployed in Iraq report the eightwheeled armored cars to be rugged under fire and agile; and because they move

on oversize tires rather than metal caterpillar tracks like the big M-1 tanks and

Bradley troop carriers that equip some Guard units, Strykers would be more

versatile in domestic disaster-response missions, since they could travel on streets

and roads without tearing them up. Perhaps as important as the Stryker units’

vehicular capability is the surveillance and information network that is part of a

Stryker brigade. It cost about $1.2 billion to equip the Pennsylvania Guard unit as

a Stryker brigade.

See CRS Report RS22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for Congress, by (name redacted).

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

•

Future Combat Systems. The FY2008 budget request contains $3.7 billion to

continue development of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), a $164

billion program to develop a new generation of networked combat vehicles and

sensors that GAO and other critics repeatedly have cited as technologically risky.

That critique may account for the fact that, last year, Congress cut $326 million

from the Administration’s $3.7 billion FY2007 request for the program. Ongoing

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also highlight the concern of some that FCS

will be a more efficient way to fight the kind of armored warfare at which U.S.

forces already excel while offering no clear advantage in fighting the sort of

counter-insurgency operations that may be a major focus of U.S. ground

operations for some time to come. 56 Particularly because the FY2008 request

includes the first installment of procurement money for FCS ($100 million),

critics may try once again to slow the project’s pace, at least for the more

technologically exotic components not slated for deployment within the next five

years.

•

Nuclear Power for Warships. Congress may use the FY2008 bills to continue

pressing the Navy to resume the construction of nuclear-powered surface

warships. All U.S. subs commissioned since 1959 have had nuclear-powerplants

because they give subs the extremely useful ability to remain submerged, and

thus hard to detect, for weeks at a time. All aircraft carriers commissioned since

1967 also have been nuclear-powered ships. But because nuclear-powered

surface ships cost significantly more to build and operate than oil-powered ships

of comparable size, the Navy has built no nuclear-powered surface vessels since

1980, and has had none in commission since 1999. Proponents of nuclear power

long have contended that this focus on construction costs has unwisely

discounted the operational advantages of surface combatants that could steam at

high speed for long distances, without having to worry about fuel consumption.

In recent years, they have cited rising oil prices to argue that nuclear-powered

ships may not be much more expensive to operate than oil-fueled vessels. In

2006, a Navy study mandated by the FY2006 defense authorization bill (P.L.

109-163, Section 130) concluded that nuclear power would add about $600

million to $700 million to the cost of a medium-sized warship, like the Navy’s

planned CG(X) cruiser, and that such a ship’s operating cost would be only 010% higher than an oil-powered counterpart, provided crude oil costs $74.15 or

more, per barrel (as it did a various times during 2006).57 Congress might add to

the FY2008 bills provisions that would require certain kinds of warships to be

nuclear-powered in the future. Alternatively, it might require the Navy to design

both oil-powered and nuclear-powered versions of the CG(X), the first of which

is slated for funding in the FY2011 budget.

•

Littoral Combat Ships. Congress will closely scrutinize the Navy’s most recent

restructuring of its plan to bulk up the fleet with a large number of small, fast

Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) intended to use modular packages of weapons and

equipment to perform various missions. In FY2005-FY2007, Navy budgets

See CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by

(name redacted).

See CRS Report RL33946, Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by

Ronald O’Rourke.

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

funded six LCSs being built to two different designs by two contractors,

Lockheed and Northrop Grumman. The Navy plans to select one of the two

designs which would account for all the LCSs built beginning in FY2010. But in

March 2007, responding to escalating costs in the first few LCS ships under

construction, the Navy restructured the program, cancelling contracts for three of

the ships already funded and reducing the number of LCS ships requested in the

FY2008 budget from three to two. In the FY2008 defense bills, Congress might

endorse the Navy’s action, add funds for additional ships in FY2008, or take

additional steps to ensure that LCS construction costs are under control before

additional ships are funded. 58

•

Virginia-Class Submarines. Members may try to accelerate the Navy’s plan to

begin in FY2012 stepping up the production rate of Virginia-class nuclearpowered attack submarines from one ship per year to two. Because of the

scheduled retirement after 30 years of service of the large number of Los

Angeles-class subs commissioned in the 1980 and 1990s, the Navy’s sub fleet

will fall short of the desired 48 ships (out of a total fleet of 313 Navy vessels)

from 2020 until 2033. In addition to approving the Navy’s FY2008 request for

$1.8 billion to build a sub for which nuclear reactors and other components were

funded in earlier years and $703 million for reactors and components that would

be used in subs slated for funding in future budgets, Congress may add more socalled “long lead” funding for an additional sub for which most of the funding

would come in FY2009 or FY2010. The Navy says it would need an additional

$400 million down payment in FY2008 to make it feasible to fund an additional

sub in FY2010.59 But Navy officials also argue that buying an additional sub

before 2012 could throw future Navy budgets out of balance.

•

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter). Congress may reject the Administration’s proposal

to drop development of the General Electric F-136 jet engine being developed as

a potential alternative to the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine slated to power the F35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress has backed development of an alternate engine

for the F-35 since 1996 and last year rejected the Administration’s proposal to

terminate the program, adding $340 million to the FY2007 defense funding bills

to continue the alternate engine program.60 Defense Department officials, noting

that they would save $1.8 billion by ending the alternate engine program, contend

that because of improvements in the process of designing and developing jet

engines, it would not be imprudent to rely on a single type of engine to power

what likely will be the only U.S. fighter plane in production after about 2015.

Many Members are skeptical of that argument, citing the poor reliability

demonstrated in the late 1970s by the Pratt & Whitney F-100 engine that

powered both the F-15 and F-16, a problem the caused Congress to mandate

development of an alternative (GE-built) engine. Supporters of the dual engine

approach also contend that competition between the two engine manufacturers

See CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options

for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

See CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald

O’Rourke.

See CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, by

(name redacted).

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

produced significant savings in F-15 and F-16 engine costs, a claim disputed by

some analyses.

•

C-17 Production and C-5 Upgrades. There appears to be strong support in

Congress for fielding a larger fleet of long-range cargo jets big enough to heavy

Army combat gear than Defense Department plans would fund. As in past years,

the result may be a combination of congressional actions that would (1) restrict

the ability of the Air Force to retire older C-5A planes and (2) fund additional C17 planes, beyond the 190 the Air Force plans to buy. In March 2006, the

Defense Department’s first “post 9/11” review of its long-range transportation

needs concluded that the services’ long-range airlift needs could be met, with

acceptable risk, by the Air Force’s plan to upgrade fleet of 109 C-5s (divided

between “A” and newer “B” models) and to buy a total of 180 C-17s. Rejecting

the department’s analysis on several grounds, Congress barred retirement of any

C-5s and added 10 C-17s to the FY2007 defense funding bills. The most

conspicuous change in this issue since then has been the Administration’s

decision to enlarge the Army and Marine Corps, a move which, arguably,

requires a larger airlift fleet.61

•

Air Force Tanker Procurement. The $315 million requested in FY2008 to

develop a new mid-air refueling tanker to replace the Air Force KC-135s well

into their fifth decade of service may become a vehicle for congressional action

intended to bolster the position of either Boeing or the team of Northrop

Grumman and Airbus, who are competing for the contract in a contest scheduled

to be decided late in 2007. Immediately at issue is a contract for 179 refueling

planes. But follow-on contracts may bring the number of planes ultimately

purchased to 540.62

•

New Nuclear Warhead. Differences over the future role of nuclear weapons in

U.S. national security planning may crystalize into a debate over the $119 million

requested in the FY2008 national defense budget to continue development of a

so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which is intended to replace

warheads that were built in the 1970s and 1980s and have been kept in service

longer than initially planned. That total includes $89 million for the National

Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy and $30 million for

the Navy. The new warhead is intended to be easier to maintain than aging types

now in service and to be deployable without breaking the moratorium on nuclear

test explosions the U.S. government has observed since 1992. Supporters argue

that RRW is needed because of concerns that maintenance of currently deployed

warheads may prove increasingly difficult in the long term. On the other hand,

critics of the RRW program contend that fielding new warheads of an untested

type might build political pressure to resume testing eventually. Moreover, they

contend, that the program to extend the service life of existing warheads without

testing has proven successful for more than a decade and should become even

more reliable because of advances in understanding of the physics of current

weapons. Since the funds requested in FY2008 would allow the RRW program to

See CRS Report RL34264, Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5 Modernization and C-17 Acquisition

Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

See CRS Report RL34398, Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Aircraft Acquisition Program, by (name redact

ed).

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Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations

cross a critical threshold, from design and cost analysis to the start of detailed

development work, Members who want to rein in the program have a strong

incentive to use the FY2008 funding bills to do it.63

•

Non-Nuclear Trident Missile Warhead. Months after Congress denied most of

the $127 million requested in FY2007 to develop a non-nuclear warhead for the

Trident long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missile, the administration has

requested $175 million for the program in FY2008. The argument in favor of the

program is that it would allow U.S. forces to quickly strike urgent or mobile

targets anywhere in the world, even if no U.S. forces were located nearby. On the

other hand, some skeptics of the program argue that the system would require

precise, virtually real-time intelligence about targets that may not be available

and that other countries—including some like Russia and China that are armed

with long-range, nuclear-armed missiles—might misinterpret the launch of a

conventionally-armed U.S. missile as an indication that they were under nuclear

attack. Some Members may try to slow the program, as Congress did last year.64

•

Missile Defense Budget. If only because it is the largest acquisition program in

the budget, the $8.9 billion requested in FY2008 for the Missile Defense Agency

would draw close scrutiny because of the stringent budget limits within which the

defense committees are working. But there also may be some efforts to cut that

request that are rooted in the long-running debate that continues over how soon

missile defense would be needed, and over the relative effectiveness of the many

anti-missile systems under development. Efforts are likely to reduce funding for

some of the more technologically challenging programs, such as the Airborne

Laser (ABL), which has encountered several delays and for which the

Administration has requested $549 million in FY2008.65 Another possible target

for congressional cuts is the $300 million requested to begin work on a third antimissile site in Eastern Europe. Touted by the Administration as a defense against

a possible threat from Iran, the proposal to field anti-missile interceptors in

Poland has been denounced by Russia.

•

Revisiting BRAC. Because of well-publicized cases of inadequate care received

by some Iraq War veterans at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which is slated

for realignment as one of the recommendations made by the 2005 Base

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, and approved by President

George W. Bush, critics of some other BRAC actions may be encouraged to try

to slow or reverse those decisions. If successful, such efforts might unravel the

entire base closure process, which was designed to prevent Members from

politicking to save any one particular base from closure. Since 1989, the

requirement that Congress and the President deal with each of the four sets of

recommended closures as a package, on a “take it or leave it” basis, has

highlighted the potential savings of the entire package of closures while

See CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments,

and CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension

Program, both by Jonathan Medalia.

See CRS Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for

Congress, by (name redacted).

See CRS Report RL32123, Airborne Laser (ABL): Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name reda

cted).

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preventing supporters of any one base from rounding up support for saving their

site from closure on the grounds that, considered in isolation, closing it would

save very little. But since the furor over Walter Reed has at least prompted some

public calls for reconsidering that particular BRAC decision, critics of other

closures may argue that changes in circumstance since 2005 require a re-look at

other parts of the BRAC package. In addition, jurisdictions anticipating a large

population influx as they acquire organizations formerly housed at installations

being closed, may seek impact assistance to expand their transportation, utility,

housing, and education infrastructures.

•

Contract Oversight. Because of several recent cases in which high profile

weapons acquisition programs have been hobbled by escalating costs and

technical shortcomings, Members may want to review the management of

individual programs and the evolution over the past decade or so of the Defense

Department’s acquisition management process with an eye toward using the

FY2008 funding bills to strengthen the government’s hand in dealing with

industry. Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations

Adm. Michael G. Mullen have declared that the Navy intends to reclaim some of

the authority over ship design it has ceded to industry and Members may look for

ways to jump-start that effort as they deal with, for instance, the troubled Littoral

Combat Ship (LCS) program. Similarly, Members intent on imposing

congressional priorities on the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) may

question the amount of managerial discretion the Army has vested in the Lead

System Integrator: a private entity—in this case, a team of Boeing and SAID—

hired to manage a large, complex program that consists of more than a dozen

vehicles and sensors linked by a computer network. One rationale for the

outsourcing to industry of management roles previously filled by Pentagon

acquisition managers is that the Defense Department no longer has the in-house

expertise needed to manage such complicated acquisitions. Some Members may

want the Defense Department to come up with a long-term plan to restore enough

in-house expertise to make the government a smarter customer. 66

Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to

Date

Congressional Budget Resolution

Congress has completed, work on the annual congressional budget resolution, which includes

recommended ceilings for FY2008 and the following four fiscal years on budget authority and

outlays for national defense and other broad categories (or “functions”) of the federal

government. These functional ceilings are neither binding on the Appropriations committees nor

do they formally constrain the authorizing committees in any way. But the budget resolution’s

ceiling on the so-called “050 function”—the budget accounts funding the military activities of

DOD and the defense-related activities of the Department of Energy and other agencies—may

See CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LSIs) - Background, Oversight

Issues, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted).

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indicate the general level of support in each chamber for the President’s overall defense budget

proposal.

The House version of the budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 99), adopted March 29, 2007, by a vote

of 216-210 that broke basically along party lines, recommended for FY2008 a ceiling of $507

billion in budget authority for the 050 function and an additional allowance of $145 billion for

“overseas deployments and other activities.” Together, the two amounts add up to an overall

ceiling on defense-related budget authority in FY2008 of $652 billion, essentially the amount the

President requested. The House budget resolution also included non-binding policy

recommendations that (1) opposed the Administration’s request to increase retirees’ medical fees

and (2) called for a reduction in the administration’s $9.8 billion budget request for missile

defense.

The Senate version of the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 21), adopted March 23 by a vote of 5247 that basically followed party lines, recommended for FY2008 a ceiling on defense-related

budget authority of $649 billion, slightly less than the total that was requested for both the regular

FY2008 defense budget and the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The conference report on the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 21) set budget authority ceilings of

$507 billion for the 050 function and an additional $145 billion for overseas deployments in Iraq

and Afghanistan. Appropriations designated as being necessary for overseas deployments in

excess of $145 billion would be exempt from budget caps in the House. In the Senate, they would

be subject to a point of order which could be waived by a supermajority of 60 votes.

The conference report also accepted the House-passed provisions opposing the proposed increase

in retirees’ medical fees and calling for a reduction in the missile defense budget. Both chambers

adopted the conference report on May 17, the House by a vote of 214-209 and the Senate by a

vote of 52-40.

FY2008 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the House Bill

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Although the effort of some Members of Congress to force a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq

is one of the most contentious issues on the country’s political agenda, the version of the FY2008

defense authorization bill passed May 17 by the House (H.R. 1585) includes no provisions

relating to any deadline for ending U.S. deployments in Iraq. However, the bill would require

several reports on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The bill would require the top U.S. military commander in Iraq and the U.S. ambassador to

provide Congress with a detailed assessment of the situation in that country covering various

issues, including an assessment of Iraqi security forces and a review of trends in attacks by

insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters on U.S. and allied forces.

The bill also includes several provisions focused on operations in Afghanistan, including a

requirement the Secretary of Defense send Congress a detailed plan for achieving sustained, longterm stability in that country. The bill also would require creation of a special inspector general to

oversee U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, paralleling the office that has

uncovered instances of waste and fraud in Iraqi reconstruction efforts.

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In addition, the bill would require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization, created to coordinate efforts to neutralize

roadside bombs and car bombs, which have been responsible for more U.S. troop fatalities in Iraq

than any other factor. The bill also would cut from the military construction request $212 million

for facilities such as powerplants and wastewater treatment plants which, the House Armed

Services Committee said in its report on H.R. 1585 (H.Rept. 110-146), implied an intention to

continue U.S. deployments for a prolonged period.

Other FY2008 Defense Budget Issues

Some of the hundreds of changes the House made to the President’s FY2008 defense request in

H.R. 1585 reflect broader themes, some of which the House has struck in its action on earlier

defense budget requests:

The bill would fund the proposed expansion of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps and would

compensate the troops more generously. After years of rejecting recommendations by many

Members to increase the number of ground troops, the Administration has launched a plan to

increase the permanent end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps by a total of 92,000 troops by

2012. H.R. 1585 would authorize the two services to accelerate the buildup, but would not require

them to do so. In addition to funding that end-strength increase, the bill would increase military

pay by 3.5%, instead of the 3.0% increase requested, and would bar for the second year in a row a

proposed increase in medical care fees for retirees.

It would mandate several actions intended to improve the quality of military medical care,

particularly for service members in outpatient status. The bill incorporates the text of H.R. 1538,

the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007, passed by the House March 28, 2007, among the

provisions of which are (1) requirements for more proactive management of outpatient service

members, (2) requirements for regular inspections of housing facilities occupied by recovering

service members and reports on other aspects of military medical care, and (3) a one-year ban on

the privatization of jobs at any military medical facility.

The bill would shore up current combat capabilities, in part with funds diverted from the budget

request for technologically advanced weapons programs that promise increased military

capability in the future. It would add funds to the requests for anti-missile systems designed to

protect forces in the field from the sort of short-range and medium-range missiles deployed (or

nearly deployed) by potential adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. At the same time, it

would slice funding from the amounts requested for the Airborne Laser and for development of

space-based anti-missile weapons, more innovative weapons intended for use against long-range

missiles that those adversaries have not yet fielded. Similarly, it would cut several hundred

million dollars from the request for the Army’s Future Combat System program, targeting some

of its more exotic elements, while adding funds to expand production of Stryker armored combat

vehicles and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) troop carriers. It also would extend

production of the C-17, long-range, wide-body cargo jet, adding funds for 10 more airplanes.

The House bill would slow some acquisition programs to allow a more orderly process of setting

their requirements and testing their effectiveness. For instance, the bill would require an

operationally realistic test of the communications and sensor network that is essential to the

Army’s FCS program before the system goes into production. It also would defer production of a

medium-range cargo plan, the Joint Cargo Aircraft, until the Pentagon completes a study of its

requirement for aircraft of that type. In addition, the bill would slow development of a new troop

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carrier, slated to replace the High-Mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), until

some of the technologies slated for use in the new vehicle are more mature.

The bill also would slow some programs that might draw adverse international reactions. It

would reduce funding for development of a new Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and for

construction of a new production facility for plutonium to be used in nuclear warheads, programs

some have said would complicate U.S. efforts to bar the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also

would eliminate funding to deploy anti-missile interceptors in Europe, a plan to which Russia has

objected. In addition, the bill would reduce funding for development of a non-nuclear warhead for

Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the launch of which—some critics warn—might be

mistakenly interpreted as the launch of a nuclear attack.

Some other highlights of H.R. 1585 include the following:

•

Tricare Fee Freeze. As the FY2007 authorization bill did, this bill would bar for

one year proposed increases in Tricare fees (including pharmacy fees). The

House Armed Services Committee noted that a commission appointed to study

alternative Tricare cost controls is not scheduled to complete its work until the

end of the year. The bill also would authorize an increase in Tricare funding by

$1.9 billion, the amount by which Pentagon officials reduced the Tricare budget

request in anticipation of the higher fees.

•

Health Care Improvements. The bill would create an initiative to improve care

of service members suffering traumatic brain injury, which is a relatively

frequent result of roadside bomb attacks on U.S. vehicles in Iraq. It also would

allow the Navy to reduce its number of medical personnel by only 410, rather

than the reduction of 900 the budget assumed. The bill also incorporates the

provisions of H.R. 1538, the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007, passed by

the House March 28 which, among many other provisions, would do the

following: mandate the assignment of case managers to outpatient service

members and require regular reviews of their cases; create toll-free hotlines on

which service members and their families can report deficiencies in militarysupport facilities; establish standardized training programs for Defense

Department personnel engaged in evaluating wounded service members for

possible discharge on grounds of disability; establish a separate fund to support

the treatment of wounded or injured service members and their return to service

or their transition to civilian life; mandate development of policies to reduce the

likelihood that personnel in combat will experience post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD) or other stress-related illnesses; require regular inspections of all living

quarters occupied by service members recovering from wounds; and prohibit for

one year any effort to convert jobs at a military medical facility from military to

civilian positions. In addition, the bill would require a long-term longitudinal

study of health and behavioral problems experienced by service members

deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also would require that the annual budget for

Walter Reed Army Medical Center not be reduced below the level spent in

FY2006 until replacement facilities are available to provide the same level of

care provided at Walter Reed in that year.

•

National Guard and Reserve Issues. The bill would elevate the chief of the

National Guard Bureau, a position that currently carries with it the rank of

lieutenant general, to the rank of general, and would designate that officer as an

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advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

However, the bill would not make the Guard Bureau chief a member of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, as some supporters of the National Guard have advocated. The

bill also would authorize an addition of $1.1 billion to the $1.1 billion requested

for equipment for the National Guard and reserve component forces, an increase

intended to address equipment shortfalls. budget in order to fill Guard and

reserve equipment shortages. The chief of the National Guard Bureau has

estimated that, for the Guard alone, equipment shortfalls would cost $2 billion to

fill. In addition, the bill would authorize the addition of $30 million to upgrade

the engines on F-16s flown by National Guard squadrons. The bill also would

require the Secretary of Defense to send Congress quarterly reports on the

readiness of National Guard units to perform both their wartime mission and the

domestic missions the would be called on in response to a natural disaster or

domestic disturbance. It also would require the Army to submit to Congress a

report on the desirability of equipping additional National Guard units with

Stryker vehicles.

•

Training. The bill would authorize an additional $250 million for training not

covered by the budget request. The committee warned that the readiness of

ground combat forces in particular was suffering because their training was

focused heavily on the type of mission they would perform in Iraq and

Afghanistan, rather than on the full spectrum of missions they might have to

execute.

•

Maintenance and Readiness. The bill would add to the budget request $165

million for additional major overhauls of ships, planes, vehicles and electronic

equipment beyond what the budget would cover. It also would create a $1 billion

Strategic Readiness Fund to allow the services to address equipment shortages

that resulted in critical readiness shortfalls. To better focus attention on readiness

problems, the bill would create a Defense Readiness Production Board to identify

shortages of equipment or supplies anticipated to last for two years or longer. It

also requires DOD to report the current readiness of ground forces and prioritize

the steps that will be taken to improve the state of readiness.

•

Special Forces Priorities. Several provisions of the bill reflect a concern by

some Members that the services’ special operations forces have been

emphasizing “direct action” (efforts to kill or capture terrorists) at the expense of

“indirect action” (training other countries’ security forces and developing

working relationships with them to help set conditions that inhibit the spread of

terrorism). The bill would require the Special Operations Command to send

Congress an annual report on its plan to meet its requirements for indirect action.

It also would authorize additional funds for “irregular warfare support” research

aimed at better understanding radical Islamist strategies and the cultures in which

terrorists seek a foothold.

•

Civilian Employees. The bill would change the rules governing so-called A-76

cost competitions to determine whether functions currently performed by federal

employees should be contracted out to private companies. The House Armed

Services Committee said that the changes, which would tend to advantage federal

employees in such a contest, were needed to ensure a fair and balanced cost

comparison. The bill also would require a recently created personnel system for

civilian DOD employees to provide rights of collective bargaining and appeal

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rights which are provided by the civil service system. It also would impose limits

on the new system’s “pay for performance” compensation rules.

•

Armored Troop Carriers. The bill would increase by $4.1 billion—to $4.6

billion—the amount authorized to equip Army, Marine Corps and Special

Operations units with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles,

shaped and armored to better protect troops from roadside bombs. It approved the

requests for $2.3 billion to buy armored HMMWV vehicles and $1.1 billion for

add-on armor to protect personnel in other vehicles from roadside bombs.

•

Ground Combat Vehicles. The bill would cut $857 million from the $3.56

billion requested to continue developing the Army’s Future Combat System

(FCS), a networked set of ground vehicles, unmanned aircraft and sensors that

would make up the next generation of ground combat equipment. FCS supporters

contended that the cut would cripple the program; but proponents of the

reduction contended that the cuts were aimed at more exotic components not

slated to enter service for years, sparing elements of FCS that would be available

sooner. The bill also approved the request for $4 billion to upgrade M-1 tanks and

Bradley armored troops carriers currently in service. It would authorize $88

million of the $288 million requested for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a

Marine Corps effort to develop a new amphibious combat vehicle, work on

which has been suspended pending a DOD review.

•

Communication Programs Slowed. The bill would cut $2.1 billion from the

$2.6 billion requested for the Joint Network Node (JNN), an effort to develop for

ground troops an internet-based mobile voice, video and data link that would be

used pending development of a more ambitious communications network system

designated Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). The House

Armed Services Committee contended that JNN could not usefully absorb the

amount requested. Moreover, the committee insisted that JNN, which had been

launched as an interim system start managed under relatively informal

procedures, begin to operate under the more demanding procedures applied to

major systems purchases and that the procurement of future lots of the system by

competed. The bill also would cut $102 million from the $222 million requested

to develop the follow-on communication system, WIN-T. On the other hand, the

bill authorized the $964 million requested to develop a satellite-based, long-range

communications network linked by lasers.

•

Combat Jets. The bill would authorize production 11 of the 12 F-35 tri-service

fighters requested. It would use the $230 million thus saved from the $2.7 billion

F-35 procurement request plus $250 million diverted from the $3.5 billion R&D

request to continue development of an alternative jet engine, a project the budget

would terminate. The bill also would authorize the amounts requested for 20 Air

Force F-22 fighters ($3.2 billion, plus $744 million for R&D) and 18 EA-18Gs,

which are electronic-jamming versions of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F fighter ($1.3

billion, plus $273 million for R&D). It would authorize 33 of the 36 F/A-18E/Fs

requested ($2.6 billion, a $182 million reduction from the request).

•

Long-Range Cargo Jets. The bill would add to the budget $2.4 billion for 10

additional C-17 wide-body, long-range cargo jets. DOD’s budget would have

ended production of the planes, as would its FY2007 budget, which Congress

also overrode to keep the C-17 production line running. In addition, the bill

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would repeal existing law that bars DOD from retiring any of its C-5 cargo jets.

The bill would allow the Air Force to begin retiring older C-5s once the

production of C-17s, plus remaining C-5s comprised a total long-range cargo

fleet of 299 planes.

•

Shipbuilding. The bill included a provision requiring that all new classes of

cruisers, submarines and aircraft carriers be nuclear-powered, although the

requirement could be waived in any case in which the Secretary of Defense

determined it not to be in the national interest. The bill added to the budget

request $1.7 billion for a San Antonio-class amphibious landing transport (in

addition to the $1.4 billion requested for one of the ships), $400 million for a TAKE class supply ship (in addition to the $456 million requested for one), and

$588 million to buy the nuclear power plant and other components of an

additional Virginia-class submarine, for which the bulk of the funds would have

to be provided in a future budget (in addition to the $1.8 billion approved as

requested for one sub and the $703 million requested for another set of longleadtime sub components). The bill also authorized $711 million for two smaller

warships, designated LCS, which is what the Navy wanted after it dropped from

its FY2008 budget request funding for a third ship of the class because of

escalating costs in construction of earlier ships of the type. The committee also

directed the Navy to report on the underlying causes of the LCS cost-overruns

and on steps that were being taken to prevent their recurrence. The bill also

authorized the amounts requested to begin work on a nuclear-powered carrier

($2.7 billion), to complete two DDG-1000-class destroyers that were partly

funded in the FY2007 budget and to buy components for use in future ships of

this type ($2.8 billion), and to complete a helicopter carrier designed to support

amphibious landings, some funds for which were provided in the FY2007 budget

($1.4 billion).

•

Missile Defense. The bill would cut a total of $764 million from the $8.8 billion

requested for the Missile Defense Agency. The largest cut in a single missile

defense program was $250 million cut from the $548 million requested to

continue development of an airborne laser (ABL). The bill also would cut $160

million from the $300 million requested to field in Eastern Europe a third cluster

of anti-missile interceptor rockets. The cut would block construction of the

planned launch silos in Poland. The bill also would authorize a total of $2.5

billion, slightly more than was requested, for Patriot and Aegis systems designed

to protect U.S. forces and allies against short-range and medium-range missiles

currently deployed by North Korea, Iran and many other countries. It would deny

$10 million requested to begin development of space-based anti-missile

interceptor missiles.

•

Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation. The bill would cut $45 million from

the $119 million requested to develop a new nuclear warhead—the Reliable

Replacement Warhead (RRW)—to replace aging warheads current deployed. The

House Armed Services Committee said it wanted to slow development of the new

weapon pending a report on future U.S. nuclear weapons deployments, which the

bill would create a blue-ribbon panel to prepare. The bill also would authorize

$142 million of the $175 million requested to develop a non-nuclear warhead for

the Trident submarine-launched missile. The committee wanted to defer

production of the weapon pending study of how it would be used and how the

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risk could be minimized that launch of a conventionally-armed Trident would be

misinterpreted as nuclear attack.

•

Roles and Missions. The bill would require the Defense Department to review

every four years the division of labor—the allocation of “roles and missions”—

among the four armed services and other Pentagon agencies, identifying the

“core competencies” of each service or agency. It also would make several

changes in the Defense Department’s long-range budget and weapons planning

processes with the aim of ensuring that future weapons programs be given the

go-ahead only if they met the requirements of an agreed-on mission and were to

be used by an organization with the appropriate core competency to perform that

mission. The bill also would direct the Secretary of Defense to decide whether or

not to designate one of the armed services to manage all medium altitude and

high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs, for the sake of efficiency.

Air Force officials have contended that their service should get that role, a move

the other services have strongly opposed.

•

Prospective Ban on Future Use of LSIs. The bill would prohibit the awarding

of new contracts for any Lead System Integrator (LSI) on a major system, as of

the start of FY2011. The bill would require the Secretary of Defense to send

Congress by October 1, 2008, a plan to develop among government acquisition

employees the skills needed to perform “inherently governmental functions” in

managing major acquisition programs.

•

Environmental Issues. The bill would require future periodic revisions of longrange national strategic plans to take account of the impact on U.S. interests of

global climate change. The committee said that the strategic, social, political, and

economic consequences of climate change could increase political instability in

parts of the world. The bill also would require GAO to report on the extent to

which the readiness of U.S. forces has improved as the result of several waivers

from various environmental laws granted to the Defense Department.

Defense Authorization: Highlights of House Floor Action

House debate on H.R. 1585, which began on May 16 and was concluded May 17, was governed

by a rule (H.Res. 403) that allowed consideration of 50 amendments covering a wide range of

subjects.

Iran Policy. The House rejected two amendments that would have restricted the use of funds

authorized by the bill to plan or carry out military operations against Iran. An amendment by

Representative Andrews of New Jersey that would have prohibited the use o

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