Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace
Congressional research reportAug 31, 2011
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Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects
for a Lasting Peace
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
August 31, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33911
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace
Summary
In October 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) launched a peace
process designed to end factional fighting in Somalia, led by the government of Kenya. In
September 2003, the parties agreed on a Transitional National Charter (TNC). In August 2004, a
275-member Transitional Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya. In October 2004, parliament
elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of Somalia. In June 2006, the forces of the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of the capital, Mogadishu. During the six-month rule by
the ICU, Mogadishu became relatively peaceful, but efforts to bring peace did not lead to a major
breakthrough. On December 28, 2006, Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu with little resistance
from the ICU. The Ethiopian intervention led to more chaos and instability in Somalia. In January
2007, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) came to the capital, Mogadishu, from Baidoa
after the ouster of the ICU.
In June 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group dominated
by members of the ICU, signed an agreement in Djibouti mediated by then-United Nations Special
Envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah. The parties agreed to a cease-fire, the withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces, and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. A number of towns, including
the third-largest town, Kismaayo, are now under the control of Al-Shabaab, a group opposed to the
TFG. In February 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabaab as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization. In January 2009, the Somali Parliament elected the leader of the
ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, as president. In February 2009, President Ahmad appointed
Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister. In late October 2010, President Ahmad
appointed Mohamed A. Mohamed as prime minster shortly after Sharmarke resigned. In June 2011,
Prime Minister Mohamed was forced to resign because the Speaker demanded a new government.
Following the resignation, there were a number of demonstrations in Mogadishu and other towns in
support of the Prime Minister. Deputy Prime Minister Abdiweli M. Ali (from New York like his
predecessor) was appointed prime minister and in late June Parliament approved his nomination.
Humanitarian, political, and security conditions continue to deteriorate across south-central
Somalia. Between May and August 2011, an estimated 30,000 children have died as a result of
the current humanitarian crisis. An estimated 3.7 million people are in need of assistance, and one
in three children are malnourished. There are an estimated 792,544 Somali refugees in
neighboring countries and 1.7 Internally Displaced People (IDPs). An estimated 12.4 million
people are in need of assistance in the Horn of Africa region. In early August 2011, Al-Shabaab
forces pulled out of Mogadishu, the capital.
The Obama Administration is actively engaged in support of the TFG and in an effort to contain
terrorist groups in Somalia and the region. The U.S. Congress has passed a number of resolutions
and has conducted multiple hearings on Somalia. The United States provided an estimated $403.8
million in assistance to Somalia in FY2009. In FY2010, Somalia received $152.1 million. The
Obama Administration has requested $84.9 million for FY2011 and $82.3 for FY2012. The
United States also provides material support to TFG forces. As of August 2011, the United States
has provided $581 million in response to the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa region.
On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. An
estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than 80 injured. In late
November 2010, President Museveni visited Mogadishu and met with Somali officials and
AMISOM forces.
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Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace
Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
The Current Humanitarian Crisis .............................................................................................. 1
Security Conditions ................................................................................................................... 1
A New Government ................................................................................................................... 1
Al-Shabaab’s Attacks in Kampala ............................................................................................. 2
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Reshuffle .................................................................. 2
The United States and Somalia........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Assistance to Somalia........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Concerns............................................................................................................................ 4
Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions.................................................................................. 5
Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Movements in Somalia ....................................................................... 5
Background................................................................................................................................ 5
The Evolution of Al-Shabaab .................................................................................................... 6
The Leadership of Al-Shabaab .................................................................................................. 7
Foreign Fighters and Al-Shabaab .............................................................................................. 7
Al-Shabaab and Other Somali Terrorist Groups in Somalia...................................................... 8
Al-Shabaab Losing Support?..................................................................................................... 8
Internal Division Within Al-Shabaab ........................................................................................ 8
Hizbul Islam Leader Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys............................................................................ 9
Peacekeeping Mission: Background................................................................................................ 9
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)............................................................... 10
Political Developments: Background ............................................................................................ 11
Security Conditions: Background.................................................................................................. 12
Somali Piracy in the Horn of Africa .............................................................................................. 14
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 14
Who Are the Pirates? ............................................................................................................... 15
The Views from Somalia ......................................................................................................... 15
Policy Options to Address Piracy ............................................................................................ 16
Policy Options in Dealing with Political and Security Problems .................................................. 16
Background: 2006-2008 ................................................................................................................ 17
The Islamic Courts Union: Background ........................................................................................ 18
The Top Leaders of the Courts: Background ................................................................................. 21
The Executive Council (Before the Split) ............................................................................... 21
The Legislative Council or Shura (Before the Split) ............................................................... 22
The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia.............................................................................. 22
Al-Ittihad........................................................................................................................................ 24
Somalia: Background (1991-2006)................................................................................................ 25
Peace Processes ....................................................................................................................... 26
National Reconciliation Conference........................................................................................ 27
Ethiopia-Somalia Relations ........................................................................................................... 27
Legislation ..................................................................................................................................... 28
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Figures
Figure 1. Major Somali Clans and Subclans.................................................................................. 29
Figure 2. Map of Somalia .............................................................................................................. 30
Figure 3. Somali Refugees in the Region ...................................................................................... 31
Figure 4. Humanitarian Access vs. IDPs ....................................................................................... 32
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Somalia ................................................................................................ 4
Table 2. The Leadership of the Executive Council of the ARS Before the Split ........................... 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 33
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Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace
Recent Developments
The Current Humanitarian Crisis
Somalia is facing one of its worst humanitarian crisis in decades. Between May and August 2011, an
estimated 30,000 children have died as a result of the current humanitarian crisis. An estimated 3.7
million people are in need of assistance, and one in three children are malnourished. There are an
estimated 792, 544 Somali refugees in neighboring countries and 1.7 Internally Displaced People
(IDPs). Each day an estimated 1,500 Somali refugees arrive in Kenya, according to United Nations
officials. An estimated 12.4 million people are in need of assistance in the Horn of Africa region.
The United States has provided $581 million in response to the crisis as of August 2011. In August
2011, the Organization of Islamic Conference (IOC) pledged $350 million in assistance to Somalia.
The African Development Bank and members of the African Union also pledged $350 million in
response to the crisis in the region. In August 2011, Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan
visited Mogadishu with his family and four ministers. Prime Minister Erdogan stated during his visit
that the people of Turkey raised $115 million during the month of August in response to the
humanitarian crisis. In August, the government of Turkey deployed a number of doctors to
Mogadishu and pledged to build six hospitals.
Security Conditions
Since January 2011, the TFG and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have
intensified their attacks against Al-Shabaab forces in Mogadishu and southern Somalia. As of June
2011, Al-Shabaab forces had lost a number of districts in Mogadishu to TFG and AMISOM forces.
A number of Al-Shabaab fighters have defected to the TFG and a number of their senior
commanders have been killed. On June 10, 2011, the Minister of Interior and National Security,
Abdishakur Hassan Farah, was killed in a suicide attack. The attacker was reportedly his own niece.
In mid-June 2011, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the mastermind of the U.S. embassy attacks in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the most senior Al Qaeda operative in East Africa, was killed by
Somali security forces in Mogadishu. According to senior Somali officials, valuable documents were
captured from Fazul Mohamed, including letters written by him about the divisions and
ineffectiveness of Al-Shabaab. In early August 2011, Al-Shabaab forces pulled out of Mogadishu.
A New Government
In late October 2010, President Ahmed appointed Mohamed A. Mohamed as prime minster, shortly
after Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke resigned. In November 2010, Prime Minister
Mohamed formed an 18-member cabinet. The previous government had 36 ministers. The new
government had several Somali-Americans, including the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Information. Over the past six months, Prime Minister Mohamed carried out a number of important
reforms, including anti-corruption measures. In February 2011, the Somali Parliament decided to
extend its own mandate by three years. The mandate of the TFG was set to expire in August 2011,
with new elections planned before August 20, 2011. Parliament, however, extended its term without
consulting the TFG. The TFG opposed the three year extension and donor governments criticized the
unilateral move by parliament.
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The TFG is also expected to adopt a new constitution and implement other measures. In an effort to
resolve the crisis, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and the Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary General, Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga, called for a meeting in early
June 2011 in Kampala, Uganda. On June 9, 2011, the Speaker of Parliament and President Ahmed
agreed to postpone elections for twelve months. They also agreed that elections for the Speaker of
Parliament and President would take place before August 20, 2012. The Speaker had also demanded
to form a new government. The parties agreed that within 30 days of the signing of the agreement,
the Prime Minister would resign and the President would appoint a new prime minster. Parliament is
required to approve the cabinet within 14 days. The Prime Minister was forced to resign because the
Speaker demanded a new government. Following the agreement, there were a number of
demonstrations in Mogadishu and other towns in support of the Prime Minister. On June 19, 2011,
Prime Minister Mohamed resigned. Deputy Prime Minister Abdiweli M. Ali (from New York like
his predecessor) was appointed and in late June approved by the Parliament.
Al-Shabaab’s Attacks in Kampala
On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in
Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than
80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist
attacks. More than 20 suspects are currently in prison in Uganda.
The attacks took place at a rugby club and Ethiopian restaurant while people were watching the
final match of the World Cup. The following day, an Al-Shabaab official, Ali Mohamud Rage,
stated that “we are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their
AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura (Burundi’s
capital) too.”1
The international community condemned the attacks. In an interview with the South African
Broadcasting Corporation, President Obama stated that he had called President Museveni to
express “the condolences of the American people for this horrific crime that had been
committed.” The United Nations Security Council in a statement said “members of the Security
Council condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks that occurred in Kampala, Uganda,
on 11 July 2010, causing numerous deaths and injuries.” The African Union also condemned the
attacks.
In late July 2010, at the 15th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African
Union in Kampala, Uganda, the African Union agreed to send an estimated 4,000 more troops to
strengthen AMISOM. Guinea and Djibouti pledged a battalion each. Members of the InterGovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) also agreed in early July to send an estimated
2,000 troops.
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Reshuffle
In mid-May 2010, the Somali Speaker of Parliament resigned after several months of dispute with
the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. A day later, President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmad fired the Prime Minister. In late May, President Ahmad reinstated the Prime Minister. The
1
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10602791.
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reversal of the decision was temporary. In late September 2010, Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarke was forced to resign.
In late May 2010, the Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Sheik Sharif Hassan, ran for Speaker
and won the support of 217 members of parliament (MPs) out of 550. During the vote, an
estimated 388 MPs were present. Four ministers resigned in protest, arguing that this was preplanned and that Hassan used government resources to bribe members of parliament to support
his candidacy. The former Speaker was targeted by the current Speaker and the President because
he was pushing for parliament to resume its session in order to question government officials
about government activities and responsibilities. The Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime
Minster pushed for parliament to remain in recess. In June 2010, the Somali government
appointed a new cabinet. The new cabinet includes members of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, who
signed an agreement with the TFG a few months earlier.
The United States and Somalia
The Obama Administration is actively engaged in support of the TFG and in an effort to contain
terrorist groups in Somalia and the region. The U.S. Congress has passed a number of resolutions
and conducted multiple hearings on Somalia. In early August 2009, Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton met with President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia in Kenya. The Secretary expressed
U.S. support for the TFG. President Sheikh Sharif briefed the Secretary and her delegation about
the challenges facing his government and asked for U.S. support. In late September 2009,
President Ahmad came to the United States to address the U.N. General Assembly, and visited in
Washington to meet with U.S. officials and Somali community members. In late September 2009,
he expressed concern that pledges made by some governments to the TFG have not been
delivered. He made the point that every time a pledge is made to the TFG, the insurgents also get
support from their allies. He asserted that the insurgents get the support faster and the TFG has to
wait for months.2
U.S. Assistance to Somalia
The United States provided an estimated $403.8 million in assistance to Somalia in FY2009. In
FY2010, Somalia received $152.1 million. The Obama Administration has requested $84.9
million for FY2011 and $82.3 million for FY2010. The United States also provides material
support to TFG forces. In September 2010, U.S. support for TFG forces increased and the Obama
Administration is reaching out to other donor governments to assist Somalia.3 The Obama
Administration has also requested $91.8 million for U.N. Support to the African Union Mission in
Somalia (UNSOA) for FY2012. The European Commission provided $399 million in
development aid to Somalia from 2003 to 2009, and $125 million in humanitarian assistance
between 2005 and 2008.
2
3
Ted Dagne met with President Ahmad and his delegation in Washington on September 29, 2009.
Ted Dagne interview with senior Somali and State Department officials in early October 2010.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Somalia
($ in thousands)
FY2009
Actual
Total
FY2010
Actual
FY2011
Request
FY2012
Request
403,838
152,176
84,958
82,371
Economic Support Fund
32,250
31,270
25,818
25,821
Global Health and Child Survival-USAID
1,550
1,550
1,550
1,550
Development Assistance
International Military Education and Training
40
International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement
2,000
2,000
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining
and Related Programs
2,353
2,000
53,550
Peacekeeping Operations
246,600
102,000
Public Law 480 (Food Aid)
123,438
15,003
51,000
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, FY2012.
U.S. Concerns
U.S. officials are concerned that Al Qaeda and
its allies in East Africa continue to pose serious
threats. Al Qaeda poses a direct threat against
U.S. interests and allies in East Africa, although
Al-Shabaab appears more focused at this point
on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens,
the TFG, and African Union peacekeeping
forces (AMISOM). Al-Shabaab, however, has
threatened to attack neighboring countries,
including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Eritrea. On
February 2, 2009, Director of National
Intelligence Dennis Blair, at a Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence hearing, stated:
We judge most Al-Shabaab and East Africabased Al Qaeda members will remain focused
on regional objectives in the near-term.
Nevertheless, East Africa-based Al Qaeda
leaders or Al-Shabaab may elect to redirect to
the Homeland some of the Westerners,
including North Americans, now training and
fighting in Somalia.4
Somalia: Facts and Statistics
Population: 10.1 million
Growth rate: 2.85% (2010 est.)
Life expectancy: 50 years
Approximate size: slightly smaller than Texas
Capital: Mogadishu
Infant Mortality Rate: 107.4 deaths/1,000 live births
(2010 est.)
HIV/AIDS, adult prevalence rate: 0.5% (2007 est.)
GDP, per capita: $600 (2009 est.)
GDP, real growth rate: 2.6% (2009 est.)
Ethnic groups: Somali, 85%; Bantu & other non-Somali,
15% (including Arabs, 30,000)
Religion: Sunni Muslim
Official language: Somali
Source: CIA, The World Factbook 2010
4
Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
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On August 5, 2010, more than a dozen Somali Americans/permanent residents were arrested.
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 14 people are being charged with providing support
to Al-Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in Minnesota states that Amina Farah Ali and Hawo
Mohamed Hassan raised funds for Al-Shabaab. The indictment states that 12 money transfers
were made in 2008 and 2009. Holder stated at a press conference that “the indictments unsealed
today shed further light on a deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters to the AlShabaab terror organization from cities across the United States. These arrests and charges should
serve as an unmistakable warning to others considering joining terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab—
if you choose this route, you can expect to find yourself in a U.S. jail cell or a casualty on the
battlefield in Somalia.”
Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions
The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains dire, according to United Nations officials and
Somali humanitarian workers. The fighting in Mogadishu has added more challenges to already
poor conditions on the ground. Targeted attacks on humanitarian groups have made delivery of
assistance difficult. The Obama Administration has also suspended assistance in areas controlled
by Al-Shabaab. An estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced and more than 475,000 have
fled to neighboring countries in the past two years. Human rights groups and Somali observers
estimate more than 22,000 people have been killed over the past two years. Civilians,
humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights advocates have been the primary targets of
the insurgents, TFG, and Ethiopian security forces. According to Amnesty International, “rape,
killings and looting have become widespread. Entire neighborhoods have been destroyed.” A
number of Somali journalists covering the crisis in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents
and security forces over the past 18 months. Dozens of humanitarian and human rights advocates
have been killed, injured, or imprisoned. Because of these targeted attacks, many human rights
advocates and journalists have fled Somalia to neighboring countries for safety. Somalis working
for international NGOs and foreign media have also been attacked by insurgents and
TFG/Ethiopian security forces.
Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Movements in Somalia
Background
The United States, Somalia’s neighbors, and some Somali groups have expressed concern over
the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. In the mid-1990s, Islamic
courts began to emerge in parts of the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. These
courts functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own militia.
Members of the Al Ittihad Al Islami5 militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces for
these courts in the 1990s. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment
5
The 2005 U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism described Al Ittihad Al Islami as “a Somali extremist
group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s, failed to obtain its objective of establishing
a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and
Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive, lacked central leadership, and suffered
divisions between factions.”
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conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country. Somali factions,
including the so-called Islamic groups, often go through realignments or simply disappear from
the scene. Very little is known about the leadership or organizational structure of these groups.
There have been a number of radical Islamic groups in Somalia whose prominence alternately
waxed and waned: Al Ittihad Al Islami (Islamic Union), Al Islah (Reform), Al Tabligh (Conveyers
of God’s Work). In 1995, a group called Jihad Al Islam, led by Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, emerged
in Mogadishu and gave the two main warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi,
an ultimatum to end their factional fighting. The group claimed at that time that it maintained
offices in several countries, including Yemen, Pakistan, Kenya, and Sudan. Some members of this
group later formed the Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club (SIC) in 1996. SIC’s principal
objective was to establish Sharia courts throughout the country. Some members of the
Mogadishu-based former Transitional National Government (TNG) reportedly were key players
in the establishment of these courts. Very little is known about al-Islah, although it is perceived as
a group dominated by Hawiye clan businessmen. According to the State Department’s 2006
Country Reports on Terrorism, “while numerous Islamist groups engaged in a broad range of
activities operate inside Somalia, few of these organizations have any known links to terrorist
activities. Movements such as Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), and
Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (Majma’) sought power by political rather than violent
means and pursued political action via missionary or charity work.”
In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related
entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order 13224. Bush Administration officials
accused Al Ittihad Al Islami of links with Al Qaeda. None of the groups mentioned above remain
active, although some of their leaders are now leaders of groups engaged in terrorist activities in
Somalia. The leader of Hizbul Islam, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorist list, was
a leader in Al Ittihad Al Islami. In the late 1990s, after a Ethiopia and its Somali allies attacked
and crushed Al-Ittihad, a number of its fighters, the current leadership of Al-Shabaab, went to
Afghanistan and others went underground.
The Evolution of Al-Shabaab
In 2003, the leadership of Al-Ittihad, including Sheik Ali Warsame, brother in law of Sheik
Hassan Aweys and a number of other top leaders, met and later decided to form a new political
front. The young members of Al-Ittihad disagreed with the decision of the older leadership in
2003 and decided to form their own movement. These young leaders, some of whom had fought
in Afghanistan, met in Laasa aanood, a town in northern Somalia, and later formed a group
known then as Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahedeen, currently known as Al-Shabaab. The current
leader of Al-Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the late Aden Hashi Ayrow, Ibrahim Haji Jama,
Mukhtar Robow, helped form the new movement. The primary objective of this group was
irredentism and to establish a “Greater Somalia” under Sharia. But Al-Shabaab was not active and
did not control any territory in Somalia until 2007-2008.
The Ethiopian invasion and the ouster of the Courts from power in December 2006 contributed to
the emergence of a strong resistance movement. The leadership of the Islamic Courts moved to
Eritrea, while the Al-Shabaab secretive leadership slowly took control over the resistance
movement. Many Somalis joined the fight against the Ethiopian forces. Some of these volunteers
did not know or had only limited knowledge of the intent and objectives of Al-Shabaab. By mid2007, the true leaders of Al-Shabaab emerged and the ties with Al-Qaeda became clear. In
February 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabaab as a Foreign
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Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The TFG was able to win
over some Al-Shabaab fighters to join the government side.
The Leadership of Al-Shabaab
The leaders of Al-Shabaab are not well known, with few exceptions. Some of the key
commanders and leaders of Al-Shabaab come from Somaliland. Ahmed Abdi Godane (also
known as Abu Zubayr), who is designated by the U.S. as a terrorist and who trained and fought in
Afghanistan, is a key commander from Somaliland. Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur), who is also
designated as a terrorist, is considered one of the key leaders of the Shabaab and a former
spokesman, although in recent months he has been marginalized and has been at odds with the
other commanders, especially Godane. Robow is now the commander of the Bay and Bakool
regions. Another key leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama (al-Afghani), who is on the U.S. terrorism list
and also from Somaliland, and reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Other key leaders of
Al-Shabaab include Bashir Mohamed Mohamud, Sudi Arable, Fuad Ahmed Khalaf “Shangole,”
Ali Mohamed Hussein Rage (current Al-Shabaab Spokesman), Ahmed Korgab, and Mohamed
Fidow.
Foreign Fighters and Al-Shabaab
Some observers and security officials estimate there are several hundred foreign fighters in
Somalia. U.S. officials have long expressed concern about the presence of known terrorist
individuals in Somalia. Some observers contend that Somalia is being used as a transit and hiding
place by some of these individuals, including Harun Fazul, the leader of the 1998 and 2002
bombings, Saleh Nabhan, and Talha al-Sudani. Nabhan was killed by U.S. forces in September
2009, and al-Sudani was reportedly killed in Somalia in 2007.
In May 2009, the U.S. State Department issued a press release confirming the presence of foreign
fighters in Mogadishu, while France, the United Nations, and the African Union made similar
statements. According to senior security sources in Mogadishu and regional officials, some of the
foreign fighters are now commanding both Somali and foreign fighters in Mogadishu and other
parts of Somalia. In May 2009, a spokesman of Al-Shabaab admitted that foreign fighters have
joined the fighting. According to Sheik Husayn Fidow, “the Muslim people of Somalia have
asked for assistance from other Muslim nations worldwide.” In response to these wellcoordinated attacks, TFG President Sheik Sharif Ahmad stated that his government will respond
forcefully.
Some of the top foreign commanders in Al-Shabaab include
•
Fazul Abdullah (also known as Harun Fazul) from Comoros and the mastermind
of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
•
Sheik Mohamed Abu Faid, Saudi national
•
Abu Mansur Al Ameriki, American national
•
Abu Musa Mombasa, Pakistani national
•
Mohamoud Mujajir, Sudanese national
•
Abu Suleiman Al-Banadiri, Somali of Yemeni decent
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Al-Shabaab and Other Somali Terrorist Groups in Somalia
On February 1, 2010, Al-Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan Al Turki,
reportedly agreed to merge under one name: Al-Shabaab Mujahidin Movement. Both Al-Shabaab
and the Ras Kamboni group have been coordinating their attacks against the TFG and working
closely with foreign fighters over the past two years. Senior TFG officials consider the merger a
reaffirmation of a pre-existing informal alliance between the two groups.6 The merger is also
triggered in part due to defections and the reported illness of Hassan Al-Turki, the leader of Ras
Kamboni. Al Turki, an Ethiopian from the Ogaden clan, was designated as a terrorist by the
United States in 2004. Another possible reason for the merger is due to the expected major
military offensive by TFG forces against Al-Shabaab and its allies. A number of negotiations on
merger with Hizbul Islam have failed.
Al-Shabaab Losing Support?
Internal divisions and defections seem to be weakening Al-Shabaab. Two senior Al-Shabaab
leaders, Mohamed Faruq and Ali Hassan Gheddi, defected with an estimated 550 fighters to join
the TFG. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, a militia group that was previously opposed to the TFG, has
been working closely with the TFG against Al-Shabaab and other anti-government militia groups.
Al-Shabaab brutal measures against the civilian population has contributed to a widespread antiShabaab sentiments. The December 2009 suicide bombing during a graduation ceremony for
medical students at a hotel in Mogadishu further eroded Al-Shabaab’s popularity. The attack
reportedly killed 23 people, including three TFG ministers. The suicide bombing was carried out
by a Danish citizen of Somali descent. Among the dead and wounded were students, family
members, journalists, members of parliament, and faculty members. One of the ministers killed,
Ibrahim Addou, was an American citizen and a former faculty member at American University in
Washington, DC. Al-Shabaab recruitment among the Somali Diaspora seems to be declining due
to increased law enforcement monitoring and also growing anti-Shabaab sentiment, although
some foreigners are going to Somalia to join the movement.
Internal Division Within Al-Shabaab
In August-September, Al-Shabaab launched a series of attacks against African Union and TFG
forces in Mogadishu. In late September 2010, Al-Shabaab lost many fighters infighting and
retreated from some areas it had firm control in the past. The loss led to internal infighting since
some of the senior commanders were opposed to these attacks, arguing that it was too risky. In
September 2010, Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) withdrew his forces from Mogadishu and went
back to his stronghold: the Bay and Bakool region, according to senior Somali and regional
officials. Some Al-Shabaab commanders assert that the loss of many of their fighters during the
August-September fighting could be because of new weapons that AU and TFG forces allegedly
received from donor governments. Meanwhile, the TFG intends to deploy a two-pronged
approach in dealing with Al-Shabaab: continue the offensive and reach out to moderate elements
of Al-Shabaab.
6
Ted Dagne interviewed President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia and other senior officials, January 29 and February
1, 2010.
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Hizbul Islam Leader Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys
In late April 2009, Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys returned to Mogadishu from Eritrea. Sheik Aweys
had remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after the top leadership of the ARS signed an
agreement in Djibouti with other Somali parties, which led to the formation of the current
government. ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did not garner significant support,
although Aweys intensified his support for the extremist groups inside Somalia. ARS-Asmara
leaders were not in full agreement with Aweys and his support for the extremist groups inside
Somalia. They provided written documentation to this effect to a visitor in April 2009. These
leaders stated that they formed their own organization and would disassociate themselves from
Aweys. Sheik Aweys came under intense pressure from some of his supporters to return to
Mogadishu, and he also came to the conclusion that he was isolated and losing support in Eritrea.
Sheik Aweys seemed confused at times and routinely contradicted himself in an interview in
Asmara, Eritrea. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly his support for a peaceful
participation in the current political process, Aweys responded positively.
However, when he was asked whether he would denounce terrorism and call for an end to
violence against civilians, Aweys stated that since he considers the American interpretation of
terrorism as anti-Islam, he “cannot condemn terrorism.” Doing so, he asserted, is “denouncing his
own religion.” Aweys believes that he was placed on the U.S. terrorism list because of his religion
and beliefs. When asked if he wished to be removed from the list, Aweys stated that he would not
seek to be removed because that would be going against his religion. Sheik Aweys asserted that
since there are no major differences among Somalis, if left alone, Somalis will find their own
solution. When confronted about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia, he
characterized these acts as a struggle against the enemies of Somalia. Upon his return to
Mogadishu in late April 2009, Sheik Aweys discovered that the clan elders and militia who
supported him in the past now wanted him to work with the government and end the violence.
The militia group he helped create, Hizbul Islam, also was split and some have joined AlShabaab. Some of the top leaders of the Al-Shabaab also want him to declare an alliance with
Osama Bin Laden and cut his ties with Eritrea, measures he has resisted thus far.
Peacekeeping Mission: Background
On December 6, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1725, “reiterating
its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the
Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative
institutions and of an inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal
Charter.” U. N. Security Council Resolution 1725 further called for “all Member States, in
particular those in the region, to refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and
related measures, and should take all actions necessary to prevent such contravention.” Moreover,
the Security Council expressed its “willingness to engage with all parties in Somalia who are
committed to achieving a political settlement through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, including
the Union of Islamic Courts.” The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, authorized the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and
the African Union to establish “a protection and training mission in Somalia.” U. N. Security
Council Resolution 1725 specifically stated that countries bordering Somalia “would not deploy
troops to Somalia.”
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On February 20, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1744 reiterating its support
for the Transitional Federal Institutions and authorizing the African Union to establish a mission
in Somalia. Resolution 1744 calls for “a national reconciliation congress involving all
stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and representatives of
civil society.” The resolution, while it welcomed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from
Somalia, did not include a provision that restricts the participation of Somalia’s immediate
neighbors in the peacekeeping operation as resolution 1725 did.
The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1772 on August 20, 2007, authorizing the
African Union to maintain its operation in Somalia for an additional six months. The resolution
also authorized peacekeeping forces on the ground to take all necessary measures to support and
protect those involved in the Reconciliation Congress. Finally, Resolution 1772 called on all
Member States, especially those in close proximity to Somalia, to comply with the arms embargo
that was established in 1992 by Resolution 733.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
At the African Union Summit in late January 2007, several African countries pledged to
contribute troops for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Ghana, Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda, and
Malawi have pledged troops. The African Union is facing difficulties in convincing governments
to make serious troop contributions to the mission. Observers contend that without a negotiated
settlement with groups still outside the TFG, it will be difficult to maintain peace and stability in
Somalia. In late July 2010, at the 15th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the
African Union in Kampala, Uganda, the African Union agreed to send an estimated 4,000 more
troops to strengthen AMISOM. Guinea and Djibouti pledged a battalion each. Members of the
Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) also agreed in early July to send an
estimated 2,000 troops. As of July 2010, there were an estimated 7,000 AMISOM peacekeeping
personnel in Somalia. As of July 2010, an estimated 26 Ugandan peacekeepers and 29
peacekeepers from Burundi have been killed.
The African Union peacekeeping mission is mandated to
•
support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
•
provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to
enable them carry out their functions;
•
assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of
Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive
Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented
by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners;
•
provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the
disarmament and stabilization efforts;
•
monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation;
•
facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations,
including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of
IDPs; and
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•
protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of selfdefense.7
Political Developments: Background
In February 2009, President Ahmad appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister.
Sharmarke is the son of the former President of Somalia, who was killed during the 1969 military
coup. Sharmarke received overwhelming support in the Transitional Parliament. The appointment
of Sharmarke provided important representation in the new government for the Darod clan.
Sharmarke belongs to the same sub-clan, the Majertain, as former president Yusuf. Moreover, the
Transitional Parliament was expanded in 2008 and now includes an additional 149 members from
the main opposition group, the ARS. Parliament also extended the mandate of the Transitional
Federal Government by another two years until 2011. Some observers expressed concern about
the size of the new parliament, while others argued that it was a necessary measure to make the
parliament more inclusive.
In late December 2008, President Yusuf resigned from office and left for Yemen. President Yusuf
was opposed to the Djibouti peace process and repeatedly clashed with his prime minister. In
January 2009, the Somali Transitional Parliament elected the leader of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmad as president. President Ahmad is seen by many Somalis as a leader with the best
chance of bringing peace and stability to Somalia and as someone who can bring those elements
outside the peace process to join the new government. In January 2009, President Ahmad went to
Ethiopia and took part in the African Union (AU) summit, where he was welcomed by member
states. In 2006, Ethiopian forces attacked and forced out Ahmad’s Islamic Courts Union from
power. However, President Ahmad was warmly welcomed by Ethiopian authorities during the AU
summit in Ethiopia.
Humanitarian and security conditions continue to deteriorate in south-central Somalia, despite
some political progress and a recent peace agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group formed by
former members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Somalis from different backgrounds. The
ouster from power of the ICU by Ethiopian forces in December 2006 created a security vacuum
that was soon occupied by the more radical elements of the ICU’s military factions. The moderate
leadership of the ICU became marginalized, splintered, and weakened over the past year. U.S.,
TFG, and Ethiopian officials labeled the entire leadership of the ICU as extremist and terrorist in
2006. Eighteen months later, however, the same governments supported the inclusion of some
former ICU members in a U.N.-led peace process.
In May-June, 2008, TFG and ARS officials met in Djibouti under the auspices of the United
Nations. Officials from the United States, Europe, the African Union, the Arab League, the
Organization of Islamic Conference, and regional governments took part as observers during the
talks in Djibouti. The parties agreed on a wide range of issues, including cessation of hostilities
and a commitment to find a durable peace agreement.8 The parties agreed to support the
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force and the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces from Somalia. The agreement, however, links the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces with the
7
8
Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council 69th Meeting, January 19, 2007.
CRS interview with senior TFG officials and members of the Somali opposition in Kenya, May and August 2008.
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deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force, although Ethiopian forces have already withdrawn
from some areas. In addition, in November 2008, the Ethiopian government announced that its
forces would pull out of Somalia by the end of 2008. In January 2009, Ethiopian forces
completed their withdrawal from Somalia. The parties also agreed to provide unhindered
humanitarian access to civilians in need and to establish a Joint Security Committee to ensure
implementation of security arrangements and create an interim joint security force.9 The parties
established a High Level Committee, chaired by the United Nations, to deal with political, justice,
and governance issues.
The Djibouti agreement is complicated and has repeatedly been undermined by infighting within
the TFG, insecurity, the growing influence of insurgent groups, and limited support by the
international community. The TFG forces, under the leadership of President Yusuf, were weak,
ineffective, and seriously debilitated by defections. In 2008-2009, an estimated 40% of the police
force, trained by the United Nations, left the force due to lack of payment. Some donor
governments have withheld funds pledged to the TFG due to lack of transparency and human
rights abuses. Infighting within the TFG, especially between then-Prime Minister Nur Adde and
then-President Yusuf, weakened the TFG. In November 2007, Prime Minister Nur Adde replaced
Ali M. Ghedi, a man seen by many Somalis as ineffective and highly partisan.
Prime Minister Nur Adde, who was seen by many Somalis and Somali observers as a key actor to
bridge the gap between the TFG and the opposition, often clashed with President Yusuf. In July
2008, the prime minister dismissed the mayor of Mogadishu and governor of Benadir region,
Mohamed Dheere, because of mismanagement of funds. In protest, 10 pro-Yusuf ministers
resigned, triggering a crisis within the TFG. In August 2008, the prime minister and the president
met in Ethiopia, and later reached an agreement on a number of issues. In Mid-December 2008,
President Yusuf fired Prime Minister Nur and named Mohamed Mohamud Guled as the new
prime minister. The prime minister rejected his dismissal, arguing that President Yusuf lacked the
legal authority to dismiss him and that only Parliament has the power to dismiss the prime
minister. On December 15, 2008, a majority of the Somali Parliament voted in support of Prime
Minister Nur Adde. The government of Kenya imposed a travel ban and asset freeze against
President Yusuf.
Security Conditions: Background
In late September 2009, government forces seized control of Beledweyne from Hizbul Islam.
Beledweyne, a town near the Ethiopian border, has changed hands several times in the past six
months. Meanwhile, attacks against government forces and African Union peacekeeping troops in
Mogadishu intensified in September. An estimated 21 people, including 17 African Union
peacekeepers, were killed in a suicide attack in late September 2009. The Deputy Force
Commander was one of the victims in the attack. Al-Shabaab used two stolen United Nations
trucks to carry out the attack against the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. Two of the
suicide bombers are believed to be Somali-Americans.
In mid-September 2009, U.S. forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaeda member
suspected of attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the leader of the
terrorist attack against the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002. Several other foreign
9
United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), August 2008.
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fighters were killed along with Nabhan. The killing of Nabhan has reportedly shaken the
leadership of Al-Shabaab, according to regional and Somali security sources. Of the three most
wanted al-Qaeda leaders in East Africa, the only one left is the leader of the group and the
mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings: Haroon Fazul. The killing of Nabhan is likely to
weaken the link between the Shabaab and al-Qaeda, and it may take some time for al-Qaeda to
replace Nabhan with someone familiar with that region. Earlier that year, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam made important gains in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, in large part due to
defections to the insurgency and lack of resources by the TFG. The TFG forces later regrouped,
and by mid-June managed to regain some lost ground in Mogadishu.
In early May 2009, Somali extremist groups backed by foreign fighters launched a major
offensive against the TFG and AMISOM. More than 300 people were killed during that period
and many more wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to oust the TFG from power
and force AMISOM to leave Somalia. Several Al-Shabaab factions, Hizbul al-Islam, and foreign
fighters have been engaged in a series of battles against government forces. Al-Shabaab also
reportedly assassinated a number of senior TFG officials, including the police chief and the
Minister of Interior. Senior Somali officials, African Union sources, and other regional officials
estimate that more than 400 foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia have been engaged in support of the
Al-Shabaab forces. More than 290 fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May, and an
estimated 50 fighters were in Mogadishu for much longer. Some of these fighters have been killed
in battles in Mogadishu, according to senior officials in Mogadishu. The insurgents receive
support from outside and from some Somali businessmen, who are unhappy with the TFG
leadership. Over the years, some Somali businessmen backed one faction or another to protect
business or clan interests.
As of January 2010, insurgent groups were in control of most of south-central Somalia, including
the third-largest town, Kismaayo. TFG forces, as well as the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM), do not have control or presence outside Baidoa and Mogadishu. Even in the case of
Mogadishu, the insurgents control some parts of Mogadishu and some of their forces are active
outside the capital. The Al-Shabaab forces also have expanded their military operations to other
parts of Somalia and routinely assassinate opponents and government officials.
In late October 2008, simultaneous and well-coordinated suicide attacks in Puntland and
Somaliland reportedly killed an estimated 20 people and injured many more. The targets of the
attacks were the Ethiopian Consulate, the office of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), and a security office close to the Presidential Palace. The suicide mission was
reportedly carried out by members of the Al-Shabaab, although no organization claimed credit for
the attacks. One of the suicide bombers was an American-Somali from Minneapolis who,
according to press reports, left the U.S. to take part in the suicide attacks. Reportedly, over a
dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis have left the United States, and some community leaders
believe they went to Somalia to join the insurgency. There is no clear evidence of how many and
for what purpose these Somalis left Minneapolis.10 Over the past decade, many Somalis have
returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and teachers. A number of these
Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and security forces.
10
“Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis,” International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2008.
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The TFG remains vulnerable and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on resources,
including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), mobility, and a well-organized and sustainable
military operation. The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent the takeover of
Mogadishu by the insurgents. But the African Union force does not have a Chapter 7 mandate,
requiring the force to be on the defensive rather than take offensive measures against the
insurgents. The African Union force has used its long-range artilleries against the insurgents.
These measures have weakened and forced the insurgents to remain outside the range of these
weapons. But the most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those of the AU is that the
insurgents are highly decentralized and move in small units, and operate independently of one
another.
Somali Piracy in the Horn of Africa11
Overview
I Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks on over 111
commercial ships, and successfully hijacking an estimated 40 ships in 2008. In 2010, there were 219
attacks, 49 successful, by Somali pirates. In 2011, more than 100 ships have been attacked by
Somali pirates. Ransom payments per ship hijacked averaged $4-$5 million in 2010 and 2011, and
totaled roughly $105 million through the end of 2009, according to the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The United States, Russia, India, China, and several other countries have deployed warships to
tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region. As of June 2011, Somali pirates were holding more than
400 crew members and over two dozen ships. In late August 2010, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Susan Rice, stated during a U.N. Security Council debate on piracy that “ultimately, only
security and stability in Somalia will resolve the root causes of the current piracy problem.” In
February 2009, the U.S. Navy arrested 16 suspected Somali pirates. In December 2008, the Indian
Navy reportedly arrested 23 Somali and Yemeni pirates. Moreover, the Russian Navy also arrested a
number of suspected Somali pirates.
In January 2009, the United States and Britain signed legal agreements with the Government of
Kenya to extradite suspected pirates to be prosecuted in Kenya. An estimated 90 pirates have
been detained. Some insurgent leaders have warned the pirates to end the piracy and to release
crew members and ships currently controlled by the pirates. On December 16, 2008, the United
Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of “all necessary measures” by
foreign military forces to stop piracy in Somalia. The resolution authorizes military operations
inside Somalia and in its airspace for one year, with the consent of the TFG. In late August 2010,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, stated during a U.N. Security Council debate
on piracy that “ultimately, only security and stability in Somalia will resolve the root causes of
the current piracy problem.”
11
For more on piracy in the Horn of Africa, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch
et al.
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Who Are the Pirates?
The number of Somali pirates is unknown. While there are more pirates now than in previous
years, the pirates do not seem to have a unified organization with a clear command structure.
Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali
warlords. The pirates primarily come from the Puntland region of Somalia and are members of
different clans. Some press reports have suggested that the pirates are being controlled and
directed by the Islamic insurgents in south-central Somalia. There is no evidence, however, to
support this assertion, and during the six months the ICU was in power, the leaders took measures
to end piracy and other criminal activities. In November 2008, Sheik Hassan Aweys called on the
pirates to end their criminal activities, and other insurgent leaders threatened to take military
action against the pirates. The pirates, however, are not operating alone, according to a number of
Somali and regional sources. Some Somali businessmen and officials in Puntland are reportedly
behind the piracy. The pirates are reportedly receiving valuable information about the types of
ships, cargo, and timing from Somalis in the Persian Gulf.12 They also possess sophisticated
technology, including global positioning systems (GPS), automatic identification system (AIS),
and satellite phones.
The Views from Somalia
Some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign problem with little impact on their daily life.
Some argue that the piracy problem will continue as long as the ship owners are willing to pay the
pirates ransom. In the face of difficult economic conditions and a growing humanitarian crisis,
many Somalis resent the fact that the piracy problem has received a great deal of international
attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some Somalis get involved in criminal
activities in order to survive, while many others have made these kinds of criminal activities a
lifetime profession. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalis have been
principal victims of criminals. Somalis had to pay “taxes” to warlords in order to pass from one
neighborhood to another. Humanitarian assistance convoys are routinely targeted by criminal
elements, forcing humanitarian agencies to hire gunmen for protection. Many Somalis contend
that in the absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life with all the difficulties
they face daily.13
Some Somalis argue that the fishermen have become pirates because their way of life was
destroyed by illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping that has been ignored by foreign
governments. In 2005, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a report
documenting the damages resulting from toxic waste dumping on Somalia’s shores. According to
a UNEP spokesman, “there’s uranium radioactive waste, there’s lead, there’s heavy metals like
cadmium and mercury, there’s industrial waste, and there’s hospital wastes, chemical wastes, you
name it.” According to the report, the primary reason for toxic dumping in Somalia is cost. The
report states that it costs $2.5 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250 per ton to
dump waste in Europe.14 In July 2008, then-United Nations Special Envoy Ould-Abdallah stated
that “because there is no (effective) government, there is so much irregular fishing from European
12
CRS interviews with Somali officials, opposition leaders, and regional officials.
Ted Dagne interviewed many Somalis in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya in 2007-2008.
14
http://new.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_SOMALIA_LAYOUT.pdf.
13
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and Asian countries.” The Special Envoy argued that it is important to tackle these illegal
activities by some countries, and not to solely focus on the problem of piracy.15
Policy Options to Address Piracy
The United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions on piracy in the Horn of Africa.
Another way that the international community has responded to the threat of piracy is by
deploying warships to the Gulf of Aden. Since the deployment of these warships to the region,
however, the number of hijacked ships has increased. Somali community leaders and regional
analysts argue that the groups most capable and best positioned to handle the piracy problem are
the Islamic insurgents and the clan elders. The Islamic Courts dealt with this problem effectively
when they were in power, according to senior leaders of the Islamic Courts and independent
observers. The Islamic insurgents claim that they are opposed to these kinds of criminal activities
for religious reasons. The Islamic leadership sees the piracy problem as a source of concern
because they fear that they could be erroneously or deliberately linked to the piracy phenomenon
and become targets of punitive action by the international community. Another option is to
provide quick and robust economic incentives to lure the unemployed away from piracy and other
criminal activities.
Policy Options in Dealing with Political and
Security Problems
Some suggest that the international community may consider engagement with the Islamic
insurgents and clan elders as a means to resolve the political and security problems facing
Somalia. According to some observers, it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the
Islamic movements discretely. Most observers believe that the Al-Shabaab can only be contained
by another Islamic movement supported by clan elders. Some of the most influential leaders in
the Al-Shabaab are on the U.N. and U.S. Terrorism Lists. Some observers argue that removing
some of these individuals from these lists in exchange for some concessions, including an end to
the insurgency and acceptance of a negotiated settlement, should be considered as an option. One
of the facilitators of the Djibouti talks was a Somali man on a U.N. Terrorism List. According to
U.N. officials, that man is no longer on that List.
Some of the leaders in the Al-Shabaab seem determined to continue their military campaign and
are not inclined to participate in negotiations. According to some experts, targeted measures,
including sanctions and assassination of the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab, could pave
the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. However, others believe that this option is likely to
backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence. Another option is to refer some of
these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes.
The most effective way of containing the extremists, most observers contend, is to look for a
Somali-led solution, both political and military. The TFG, Islamic Courts, Somaliland, Puntland,
and other moderate Somali forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of the most
extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab politically and militarily. Such a coalition is likely to get
15
Ted Dagne interview with U.N. Special Envoy in Kenya, August 2008.
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more support of the Somali population rather than a peacekeeping force. The coalition can be
assisted by neighboring countries. A Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most
powerful justifications used by the Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces. A
unified regional approach is pivotal, however. Most believe that Eritrea has leverage over some of
the influential Islamic leaders, some of whom are in Eritrea.
Background: 2006-2008
On December 24, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces launched a military campaign against the
forces of the ICU, a group that took over power in Mogadishu in June 2006. On December 28,
2006 Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu with little resistance from the ICU. The ICU
leadership decided a day before the Mogadishu attack to leave the city in order to avoid
bloodshed and the destruction of Mogadishu, according to a senior official of the ICU.16 On
January 1, 2007, the ICU lost its last stronghold, Kismaayo, after its forces withdrew to an area
near the Kenyan border, although most of its fighters and leaders either simply melted into
society throughout Somalia or fled to neighboring countries. Some of the top leaders of the ICU
are in Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia.17 In late January, the Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), formerly known as ICU, Sharif
Sheik Ahmed, traveled to Kenya. On January 24, 2007, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Michael
Ranneberger, reportedly met with Sheik Ahmed. Other leaders of the Courts have also been
approached by U.S. officials as part of a new strategy to reach out to Court officials and others to
participate in proposed negotiations among Somali groups and the TFG.
The Ethiopian military intervention, while it has accomplished its military objective of ousting
the Courts from Mogadishu and other areas the Courts controlled, was criticized by governments
and regional organizations. The African Union, the European Commission, the Arab League, and
others have called for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Ethiopian officials
argued that their military action was justified because the Islamic Courts posed a serious threat to
Ethiopia and regional stability, and because the Islamic Courts is an extremist, Jihadist group.
Ethiopian and U.S. officials also have accused the Courts of being influenced or tied to wellknown terrorist individuals and Al Qaeda. Islamic Courts officials have repeatedly rejected these
allegations and on a number of occasions have offered to work with U.S. officials, according to
one senior Courts official. Allegations about the presence of the three suspects involved in the
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 were made on many occasions
over the years. However, the Islamic Courts did not exist as an organized group when these
allegations were made. Those in charge of Mogadishu and other areas in southern Somalia were
the warlords who were and in some cases still are ministers in the current Transitional Federal
Government.
On January 8, 2007, the U.S. Air Force, using AC-130 gun ships, attacked several locations in
southern Somalia, reportedly to kill the three terror suspects in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania. Reportedly, the United States launched another attack the following day,
although U.S. officials deny any further attacks. The British humanitarian group, Oxfam, stated in
a press release that an estimated 70 people were killed in the bombings and vital water resources
were destroyed in Afmadow district. A number of governments criticized the U.S. attacks,
16
17
Author interview with senior ICU official in late December 2006.
Author interview with senior ICU official and regional sources in the Horn of Africa.
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including officials in Europe and the government of Djibouti, where U.S. forces are currently
stationed. Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Yusuf told the BBC that the raid was
counterproductive to achieving peace. He also stated that his government had not been informed
about the air strikes. According to a New York Times article, the United States actively
coordinated with Ethiopian forces in targeting suspected terrorists and Islamic Union forces.18
U.S. Special Operations troops from Task Force 88 were reportedly deployed to Ethiopia and
entered Somalia. Moreover, the United States reportedly shared intelligence with the Ethiopian
military and used an airstrip in Eastern Ethiopia to launch attacks inside Somalia. A senior
Ethiopian government official denied that there was any coordination with U.S. forces.
During the occupation, Ethiopian troops came under attack, and a number of Ethiopian soldiers
were killed by snipers or in ambushes. Some Somalis and human rights advocates are concerned
over what some people refer to as a witch hunt by TFG and Ethiopian security forces. Ethiopian
and TFG security forces reportedly went house to house to arrest Oromos (an Ethiopian ethnic
group), supporters of the Islamic Courts, and members of the TFG considered not supportive of
the new Somali government and the Ethiopian intervention. The government of Kenya deported
dozens of Somalis and other nationals to TFG officials and Ethiopian security forces, according to
Kenyan sources. In one particular case, Kenyan officials reportedly blindfolded and handcuffed
30 individuals and returned them to Mogadishu, where these detainees were taken by Ethiopian
and TFG security personnel to unknown locations, according to Somali sources and government
officials in the region. A number of Kenyan Muslims who were in Ethiopian detention were
released in 2008.
On January 17, 2007, the Transitional Federal Parliament ousted the Speaker of Parliament,
Sharif Hassan Sheik Adan, from his position. The former Speaker, who has been a vocal critic of
the Ethiopian intervention and the U.S. air strike, has a strong following in Mogadishu and was
active in reaching out and engaging the Islamic Courts officials when they had control over
Mogadishu. Then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Fraser stated in midJanuary 2007 that “the no-confidence motion brought against the Parliament Speaker is likely to
have a negative impact on this process of dialogue.”19 In late January, the TFG elected Sheikh
Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, a former warlord and an ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf, as
Speaker of Parliament.
The Islamic Courts Union: Background
In early 2006, factional violence in Mogadishu once again erupted, killing hundreds of civilians
and displacing many more people. The surge in violence was between militia loyal to the Islamic
Courts and a self-proclaimed anti-terrorism coalition backed by powerful local warlords. The
fighting in Mogadishu erupted when the forces loyal to a well-known warlord and then Minister
of National Security of the TFG, Mohamed Qanyare, attacked one of the Courts. The fighting
received unusual attention in Somalia and in the region due, in large part, to reports that the
warlords were backed by the United States government. The Bush Administration acknowledged
that Washington was assisting “responsible individuals” to help bring stability and fight terrorism
in Somalia. Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Fraser reportedly stated that the
18
Michael Gordon and Mark Mazzetti. “U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda,” New York Times, February 23,
2007.
19
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6273949.stm.
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United States “will work with those elements that will help us to root out Al Qaeda and prevent
Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists.”20 In late June 2006, Fraser stated that the United
States has three major policy goals in Somalia: counter-terrorism efforts, creation of an effective
government, and responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
On February 18, 2006, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT)
was created, allegedly to fight terrorism. Very little is known about ARPCT, although the
founders of the Alliance are known warlords who contributed to numerous armed clashes and
instability in Somalia over the past decade. Members of the Alliance reportedly include Bashir
Rage, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Finnish, and Abdirashid Shire
Ilqyete. These actors were seen by many Somali groups as major obstacles to the creation of
central authority in Mogadishu, as agreed to by all major Somali groups under the IGAD peace
agreement in 2004. In early June 2006, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi dismissed four
ministers from the Transitional Federal Government belonging to ARPCT.
These ministers include Mohamed Qanyare (National Security Minister), Musa Sudi Yalahow
(Commerce Minister), Issa Botan Alin (Rehabilitation Minister), and Omar Finnish (Minister for
Religious Affairs). The warlords were dismissed because they reportedly ignored calls by Prime
Minister Ghedi’s government to stop the fighting in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts leaders
argued then that the TFG did nothing to challenge these warlords and kept them in senior
positions in the TFG until the Islamic Courts defeated the warlords in Mogadishu. In late July
2006, members of the TFG parliament complained that the U.S. government bypassed the TFG
and provided support to the warlords, the same warlords who obstructed peace in Somalia. A
member of the TFG parliament told a U.S. Congressional delegation in August 2006 that “you
cannot fight terrorism by supporting warlords.”21
In early June 2006, the forces of the Islamic Courts captured Mogadishu, forcing ARPCT militia
to flee the capital. The chairman of the Islamic Courts, Sharif Shaykh Ahmed, stated that his
group would negotiate with the TFG. In response to accusations that the Islamic Courts Union
was associated with or had harbored international terrorist elements, Shaykh Ahmed stated that
“we are not terrorists and we will not allow anyone to hijack the capital. We have said hundreds
of times that America’s talk of terrorism in Somalia is fabricated and serves suspicious political
purposes.”22
The forces of the Islamic Courts Union strengthened and expanded areas under their control after
the defeat of the warlords in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts forces captured the towns of Jowhar
and Beledweyne in mid-June 2006. For the first time in years, Mogadishu became relatively
peaceful, and the Islamic Courts received support from the population in areas it controlled. The
level of support enjoyed by the Islamic Courts, however, is difficult to measure, although the
group had constituencies from multiple sub-clans and had broad support among Somali women.
According to Somali sources in Mogadishu and Islamic Courts officials, the people provided
crucial support by feeding their forces and working with Islamic Courts officials in bringing
peace and stability. During the Mogadishu fighting, women supporters of ICU played important
20
Peter Goodspeed, “Somalia Looking Like Pre-Taliban Afghanistan: U.S. Backed Warlords, Al Qaeda-Linked Thugs
Kill Dozens” National Post, with files from News Services. May 16, 2006.
21
The author met with several Members of Parliament and the TFG Foreign Minister in Kenya in August 2006.
22
“Somali Islamic Courts Leader Comments on Domestic Situation, Future Outlook.” Al-Ashraq Al-Awsat. June 6,
2006.
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roles. Since the Islamic Courts largely functioned as providers of social services, the Courts did
not maintain a large fighting force. The warlords maintained a robust force in different parts of
Mogadishu, with heavy weapons and “technicals” (machine-guns mounted on pickup trucks). The
Islamic Courts group had only four technicals when the fighting erupted with Qanyare and other
warlords, according to a senior Courts official. The ICU success in Mogadishu effectively led to
the collapse of the ARPCT and forced the warlords to flee.
Negotiations between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts in Sudan did
not lead to a major breakthrough, although the talks ended speculation that the Islamic Courts
rejected negotiations. The Islamic Courts leaders stated that they would work with the Baidoabased transitional government, although disagreement on key issues remained. In June 2006, the
transitional parliament voted in favor of a foreign peacekeeping force. But this move was rejected
by some Islamic Courts leaders as being unnecessary and counter-productive. Earlier, in 2005, the
African Union had approved a proposal for Uganda and Sudan to deploy a peacekeeping force to
Somalia under the auspices of the IGAD. The deployment did not take place in large part because
of the refusal of the United Nations Security Council to remove a United Nations arms embargo
on Somalia. The Bush Administration did not support the lifting of the arms embargo, although
the United Nations Security Council did provide the necessary exemption in December 2006.
In mid-June 2007, an International Somalia Contact Group, consisting of the United States,
Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Tanzania, and the European Union, was formed and
met to discuss the unfolding Somalia crisis. The United Nations, the African Union, the Arab
League, and IGAD were also invited as observers. The Contact Group did not invite Somalia’s
immediate neighbors, in part due to Somali opposition and international concern that these
countries are engaged in activities in support of or against some groups in Somalia. In a press
release after its first meeting, the Contact Group stated that “the goal of the International Contact
Group will be to encourage positive political developments and engagement with actors inside
Somali to support the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions. The
Contact Group will seek to support efforts, within the framework of the Transitional Federal
Institutions, to address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, establish effective
governance and stability, and address the international community’s concern regarding terrorism.”
Meanwhile, in early January 2007, the International Contact Group on Somalia issued another
communiqué strongly urging that it is “essential that an inclusive process of political dialogue and
reconciliation embracing representative clan, religious, business, civil society, women’s, and
other political groups who reject violence and extremism be launched without delay.”
The Islamic Courts, while well received by the people in the areas the Courts controlled, received
negative press coverage, especially in the West. The Courts’ activities were often characterized as
extremist and jihadist. The ICU was accused of shutting down cinemas and prohibiting women
from working. Some of these measures were taken by the Courts, although for reasons other than
the Courts’ alleged jihadist and extremist ideology. For example, movies were banned in the
morning in response to requests from parents because Somali children were going to movies in
the morning instead of school.23 The ban on television did not take place, except for restrictions
on watching soccer games late at night, according to Islamic Courts officials and Somali residents
in Mogadishu. This measure was reportedly taken because of disturbances and fighting late at
night. There is no evidence to support the allegation that women were prohibited from working.
23
The author had over 25 conversations between July 2006 and March 2007 with senior Islamic Courts officials and
Somali residents in Mogadishu.
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Islamic Courts officials point out that in the short time they were in power, they did more than
restore law and order. Properties taken by warlords were reportedly returned to the rightful
owners. For example, the family of President Yusuf reportedly returned to Mogadishu after
almost 16 years when the Courts restored order in the capital, according to an Islamic Courts
official. Most important, they argue, they gave hope to the people of Somalia that they can live in
peace after more than a decade of violence.
The Top Leaders of the Courts: Background
The Islamic Courts Union, which emerged to the scene in 2006, included some of the top leaders
of Al-Ittihad. General knowledge of the top leadership of the Islamic Courts Union, later renamed
the Somali Council of the Islamic Courts (SCIC), is sketchy. The leadership was often referred to
as jihadist, extremist, and at times terrorist by some observers without much evidence to support
the allegations. For example, the assessment of the Islamic Courts by U.S. officials was that less
than 5% of the Islamic Courts leadership can be considered extremist, according to a senior State
Department official. In late June 2006, the Courts established a consultative body to function as
the legislative (Shura) arm of the Courts. Hassan Dahir Aweys was elected to head the Legislative
Council. Aweys was one of the top leaders of the now-defunct Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) and
was designated by the Bush Administration as a terrorist. Sharif Sheik Ahmed, the leader of the
Courts, was appointed chairman of the Council’s Executive Committee to lead the day-to-day
affairs of the Courts. Some observers and government officials have erroneously described Aweys
as the leader of the Courts. However, the moderate leader of the Courts, Sharif Sheik Ahmed, was
never replaced by Aweys. Some observers argued that referring to Aweys as the leader of the
Courts was deliberately designed by some groups and governments to give the Courts a negative
image.
The leadership of the Islamic Courts remained largely under the control of religious scholars and
academics. The focus by some observers and officials on three individuals in 2006-2007, Aweys,
Hassan Al-Turki, and Aden Ayro, may have been to show the Islamic Courts as a group controlled
and influenced by these individuals. Al-Turki, a man born in the ethnically Somali Ogaden region
of Ethiopia, was listed by the Bush administration as a terrorist because of his membership in AlIttihad. According to Courts officials, Al-Turki did not even hold a leadership position within the
organization. Both Aweys and Al-Turki were placed on the list because of their membership in
Al-Ittihad. Ayro’s role within the Courts was highly exaggerated since he did not hold a
leadership position in the organization. Ayro was often referred to as the leader of Al-Shabaab, the
Youth, although there is no evidence to support that he was the leader of that group. Ayro was
suspected of killing four aid workers in the breakaway region of Somaliland as well as a Somali
scholar in Mogadishu named Abdulqadir Yahya. In May 2008, Ayro was killed in a U.S. air strike.
Since the killing of Ayro, the insurgency has intensified its attacks and is now in control of many
parts of south-central Somalia.
The Executive Council (Before the Split)
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Received a Law Degree from a University in Libya; served as President
of Somali Intellectuals Associations; President of the District Court in Jowhar; President of
Somali Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC); never been active in politics; married with two
children. Now, Chairman of the ARS.
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Abdurahman Muhamoud Farah. Vice President of SCIC. Studied in Mogadishu; a longtime
advocate of peace and clan unity; never active in politics.
Abdulqadir Ali Omar. Vice President of SCIC. Longtime advocate of clan unity; religious
scholar, and advocated against abuses by the warlords.
Ibrahim Hassan Addou. Foreign Secretary and a member of the Shura (Legislative Council) of
the SCIC; Ph.D., MA, BA from American University, Washington, D.C.; Worked at American
University from 1981 to 1992; held several positions at Benadir University in Mogadishu,
including Vice President for Academic Affairs and President; married with three children.
The Legislative Council or Shura (Before the Split)
Hassan Dahir Aweys. Speaker of the Shura. Former army officer in the Somali Armed Forces;
fought in the Ethiopia-Somalia wars in the 1970s; former senior member of Al-Ittihad; fought
against Ethiopia and Abdullahi Yusuf in the mid-1990s.
Omar Imam Abubakar. Number two in the Shura and effectively the most influential and active
member of the Shura; received his Ph.D. from a University in Saudi Arabia; lectured in
Mauritania and Somalia for many years.
Abdulahi Ali Afrah. Senior leader in the Shura. Holds a BA in Agriculture, longtime civil
servant in the Siad Barre government; received an MA from a University in the U.S. and lived in
Canada for many years.
Muhamoud Ibrahim Suleh. Senior member of the Shura, son of a well-known religious leader.
The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
In September 2007, Somalis from the Diaspora, civil society, opposition groups, and former
members of parliament met in Eritrea and formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(ARS). More than 400 people participated at the founding conference. Al-Shabaab did not
participate, and later condemned the leadership of the Alliance. The Alliance significantly
reduced the dominance of the Council of the Islamic Courts and brought into the leadership
people from civil society, women’s groups, and former members of the TFG. The Alliance also
brought into the coalition people from different regions and clans of Somalia. In addition,
individuals, such as Hassan Aweys, considered by the West as extremists or terrorists were not
given leadership positions. According to the Alliance, the main objectives of the coalition are as
follows.
•
The liberation of Somalia from Ethiopia.
•
Somali solutions by Somali stakeholders through dialogue and peaceful means.
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•
To establish a National Government “completely devote its utmost care to the
welfare of the people, protect its rights, properties and promote its spiritual and
material development.”24
•
Fighting crimes and violence targeted against civilian population, such as killing,
raping, pillaging, dislodging and displacing.
•
Resettlement of displaced people.
•
To organize general elections once peace and security are established.
In March 2008, the chairman of the ARS, in a letter to the President of the Security Council,
wrote, “A peacekeeping mission would be possible only after the departure of the Ethiopian
troops. Experience has shown that when peacekeepers are unilaterally imposed by the Security
Council, they turn into peace enforcers. To avoid such a situation, the consent of the parties to the
conflict is essential.” In January 2008, the ARC leadership informed a congressional delegation
that the ARS will accept a humanitarian cease-fire, zones of tranquility, and negotiations with the
TFG and others once Ethiopian forces are replaced by a neutral force. This position led to a split
of the ARS. Many of the top leaders of the ARC left Eritrea for Djibouti to participate in the
U.N.-sponsored negotiations.
Table 2. The Leadership of the Executive Council of the ARS Before the Split
Name
Title
Affiliation
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Chairman
Somali Council of the Islamic
Courts (SCIC)
General Jama Mohmed Galib
Vice Chairman
Civil Society
Zakaria Hagi Mohamud Abdi
Vice Chairman
Parliament
Prof. Ibrahim Hassan Addou, Ph.D.
Foreign Affairs Advisor
SCIC
Dr. Mohamed Ali Dahir
Administration Consultant
Somali intellectual
Prof. Abdirahman Ibrahim Ibbi
Assistant to the
Chairman
Parliament
Ambassador Yusuf H. Ibrahim
Foreign Affairs
Secretary
Parliament
Ahmed Abdullahi Sheikh
Information Secretary
Civil Society
Col. Omar Hashi Aden
Interior Secretary
Parliament
Col. Omar Hashi Aden
Interior Secretary
Parliament
Abdifitah Mohamed Ali
Finance Secretary
SCIC
Yusuf Mohamed Siad
Defense Secretary
SCIC
Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, MD
Health Secretary
Civil Society
Dr. Mohamed Ali Ibrahim, Ph.D.
Justice Secretary
SCIC
Dr. Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim
Relief and Rehabilitation Secretary
24
Political program of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia.
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Name
Title
Affiliation
Mrs. Fowsia Mohmed Sheikh
Human Rights Secretary
Parliament
Mohamud Ahmed Tarzan
Planning & Training Secretary
Diaspora
Abdulkadir Mohmed Dhakane
Education Secretary
Parliament
Mohmed Ibrahim Garyare
Social Affairs Secretary
Diaspora
Ahmed Abdulle Hussain
Reconciliation Secretary
SCIC
Abdullahi Sheikh
Auditing Secretary
SCIC
Al-Ittihad
Al-Ittihad was perhaps the most active and at one point most successful of all the Islamic groups.
Al-Ittihad is an Islamic group whose principal ideology was to establish an Islamic state and to
bring law and order by utilizing the Islamic court system. Founded in the late 1980s, Al-Ittihad
unsuccessfully sought to replace clan and warlord politics with an Islamic state. In the early
1990s, Al-Ittihad had modest successes; for example, it administered territories under its control
in the south. But Al-Ittihad never emerged as a major military or political force in Somalia. The
clan-based groups and factions led by warlords in Mogadishu are secular and have been at odds
with Al-Ittihad, even though some of these groups maintained tactical alliances from time to time
with Al-Ittihad. Al-Ittihad’s failure to maintain control over territories and spread its ideology led
to a shift in strategy in the mid-1990s. Al-Ittihad abandoned its ambition to spread its ideology
through military means and began to concentrate on providing social services to communities
through Islamic schools and health care centers.
Al-Ittihad’s social activities and religious objectives in Somalia seemed inconsistent with its
activities in support of armed groups in the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, AlIttihad was reportedly engaged in military activities in support of ethnic Somalis. Several antiEthiopian groups are active in the Somali region and Al-Ittihad cooperated with these groups in
carrying out attacks against Ethiopian targets. In 1999, the Ogaden Islamic Union, under the
leadership of Muhammad Muallem Omar Abdi, the Somali People’s Liberation Front under the
leadership of Ahmed Ali Ismail, and the Western Somali Liberation Front under the leadership of
Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Hussein formed a coalition called the United Front for the Liberation of
Western Somalia, their term for the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia.25 The Ogaden National
Liberation Front was engaged in military activities in the region, and in the past formed alliances
with other Ethiopian opposition groups.
Many Somali watchers believe that Al-Ittihad’s strength was highly exaggerated and that
information about its alleged links with international terrorist organizations is unreliable. The
State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism stated in 2006 that “in recent years the
existence of a coherent entity operating as AIAI (Al-Ittihad) has become difficult to prove.” There
is no reliable information or pattern of behavior to suggest that Al-Ittihad had an international
agenda, as was the case with the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan. Some
observers note that if Al-Ittihad had a clear internationally oriented agenda, its obvious ally in the
region would be the NIF regime in Sudan or the Sudanese-backed Eritrean Islamic Jihad. The
25
Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS). “Islamists Regroup Their Forces After Ethiopian Preemptive
Strike,” May 17-23, 1999.
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Sudanese regime did back regional extremist groups and international terrorist organizations, but
there was no apparent relationship between the NIF and Al-Ittihad. Many Somalis often refer to
Al-Ittihad’s social services and the peace and stability that prevailed in the areas it controlled.
In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al-Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related
entities whose assets were frozen by an executive order. Bush Administration officials accused
Al-Ittihad of links with Al Qaeda. The Administration did not publicly offer evidence supporting
its allegations, but some officials asserted that links between AIAI and Al Qaeda date back to the
U.S. presence in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope (1992-1994). This assertion, however,
seems inconsistent with the reality on the ground at that time, according to some observers. Then,
the dominant players in Mogadishu were the warlords and not Al-Ittihad. In early November
2001, federal authorities raided several Somali-owned money transfer businesses in the United
States operated by Al-Barakaat Companies.
The Bush Administration ordered the assets of Al-Barakaat frozen because of its alleged links to
Al Qaeda. U.S. officials, however, later seemed to back off from their earlier assertion that AlBarakaat and individuals associated with the money transfer business sector are directly linked to
Al Qaeda. In September 2002, U.S. officials cleared three Somalis and three Al-Barakaat
branches accused of ties with Al Qaeda. The three individuals and businesses were removed from
the U.S. Treasury Department list of terrorist supporters and their assets were also unfrozen. The
United States has had no presence in Somalia since Washington pulled out of the peacekeeping
operation in 1994. In September 2008, the European Court of Justice annulled the decision taken
by the EU Council to freeze the assets of two Somalis and Al-Barakaat International Foundation
of Sweden.
Somalia: Background (1991-2006)
In 1991, General Mohamed Siad Barre, who came to power through a military coup in 1969, was
ousted from power by several Somali armed groups. Following the collapse of central authority in
Mogadishu, rival Somali groups engaged in armed struggle for personal political power and
prevented food and medicine from reaching innocent civilians suffering from drought and famine.
An estimated 500,000 people died from violence, starvation, and disease as Somalia was wracked
by continued internal chaos. On November 9, 1992, then-President George H.W. Bush authorized
Operation Restore Hope, using the U.S. military, to safeguard non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering Somali civilian
population.
The U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) successfully subdued the warlords and armed factions
and enabled NGOs to safely provide humanitarian relief to Somalis. In May 1993, UNITAF
handed over the operation to the United Nations. The U.N. effort was known as United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. In May 1993, UNOSOM II coalition forces were attacked
by one of the factions in Mogadishu. On October 3, 1993, after a 17-hour battle between U.S.
troops and Somali factions in Mogadishu, in which 18 U.S. Rangers were killed, President
Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. In March 1994, the United States
completely pulled out of Somalia and, one year later, the United Nations pulled out the remaining
peacekeepers. Since the withdrawal of United Nations forces in March 1995, Somalia has been
without a central government and has been splintered into several regions controlled by clanbased factions.
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Peace Processes
There have been 14 Somali reconciliation or peace conferences to bring an end to the fighting in
Somalia since the early 1990s. Some were held under the auspices of or were supported by the
United Nations, or governments in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have largely failed to bring
about lasting peace in Somalia. Moreover, competing efforts by international actors contributed to
the failure of peace efforts in Somalia. In 1996, the government of Ethiopia convened a peace
process in the resort town of Sodere, Ethiopia. Many political actors and armed factions
participated, although a few boycotted the peace process. The Sodere process collapsed when the
government of Egypt convened another meeting of the Somali groups in Cairo in 1997.
Subsequently, the Cairo initiative failed when yet another peace conference was convened by
Somali factions in Bosaso, Somalia in 1998. In February 2000, IGAD approved a peace plan
proposed by the government of Djibouti. In May 2000, the Somali Reconciliation Conference
opened in Arta, Djibouti in which 400 delegates took part for several months of deliberation. The
Arta process was boycotted by several powerful warlords, as well as the governments of
Somaliland and Puntland.
On August 13, 2000, participants agreed to the creation of a Transitional National Government
(TNG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA). On August 26, 2000, participants nominated
Abdulqassim Salad Hassan as president of the TNG. In October 2002, the Inter-Governmental
Authority for Development launched another peace process, led by the government of Kenya. An
estimated 350 delegates from different regions of Somalia participated in the opening session of
the conference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. The government of Somaliland boycotted the
conference. In the first phase of the conference, the parties signed a temporary cease-fire, and
agreed to respect and honor the outcome of the conference. The parties further agreed to establish
a federal system of government and committed themselves to fight terrorism. In September 2003,
the parties agreed on a Transitional National Charter, paving the way for a National Unity
government.
In August 2004, a new Transitional Somali Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya. The 275member parliament consists of the major political factions and seems to represent all the major
clans of Somalia. The Transitional Charter allocated 61 seats for the major four clans and 31 seats
for the small clans. The Charter also allocated 12% of the seats to women. The Charter accepted
Islam as the national religion and agreed that Sharia law would be the basis of national
legislation. In fact, previous Somali constitutions had similar provisions. In October 2004, the
Somali Transitional Parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of Somalia.
The swearing-in ceremony was attended by 11 heads of government from African countries and
representatives from regional organizations and the United Nations.
In November 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed appointed Professor Ali Mohamed Gedi as
prime minister. The transitional government, however, was not able to function effectively or
move to Mogadishu in large part due to opposition from the warlords in Mogadishu, even though
some of these warlords signed the agreement and were ministers in the government. The inability
of the transitional government to establish effective control allowed warlords and clan factions to
dominate many parts of Somalia until late December 2006. Some observers contend that the
defeat of the warlords by the Islamic Courts paved the way for the establishment of central
authority in Mogadishu.
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National Reconciliation Conference
Somalia’s recent peace effort, the National Reconciliation Congress, convened in the Shagaani
district of Mogadishu on July 15, 2007, after being postponed twice for logistical and security
reasons. The first phase of the conference ended on August 30, 2007. Somali Ambassador to
Kenya Mohammed Ali Nur spoke optimistically about the results of the first phase of the
conference at a news conference in Nairobi, Kenya: “I am happy to announce the declaration of
peace agreement between major clans who are participating in the congress has already been
signed.… The transitional government has done and will continue doing its best to lead the
process of reviving Somalia from the ashes of the vicious civil war.” Whereas the first phase of
the conference focused on the resolution of clan conflicts and disarmament, the second phase
focused on issues such as power sharing, governance, sharing of natural resources, sea piracy,
welfare, and internally displaced persons.
Ethiopia-Somalia Relations
For over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have
been poor. Somalia invaded Ethiopia twice in the 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie and in
1976 during the Mengistu Haile Mariam military rule. In the first war, the Ethiopian military
commander General Aman Andom defeated Somali forces, but his request to go inside Somalia
was rejected by the Emperor, and he was ordered to remain behind the border. The 1976 invasion
of Ethiopia by Somali forces and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) initially
succeeded, leading to the capture of many Ethiopian towns by Somali forces. Somali forces
briefly captured the third-largest city, Dire Dawa, in Eastern Ethiopia. However, Ethiopian forces,
with the support of Cuban and South Yemeni forces, were able to defeat the Somali forces,
although elements of the Somali rebel forces remained in control of remote areas in the largely
Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia.
Both Ethiopian and Somali governments intervened in the internal affairs of the two countries,
and successive governments on both sides supported each others’ armed opposition groups. The
current president of the Transitional Federal Government, President Abdullahi Yusuf, was one of
the first to receive Ethiopia’s assistance after he fled Somalia in the late 1970s. He was one of the
first senior officials to challenge the Siad Barre government. Ethiopia was also the principal
backer of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the group that liberated the northwest region of
Somalia, currently known as Somaliland. The change of government in Ethiopia did not end
Ethiopia’s intervention in Somali affairs. The current government of Ethiopia became a key
backer of a number of Somali factions and leaders, including the current president of the TFG,
Abdullahi Yusuf, Hussein Aideed, and other Somali factions.
The Barre government was also a major sponsor of Ethiopian armed rebel groups. The current
ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),
received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly
carried Somali-issued passports. Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia.
The ouster of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central government in Somalia
ended support for Ethiopian armed groups, although some Somali factions continue to support the
ONLF. For most of the 1990s, Ethiopia’s primary concern was Al-Ittihad in Somalia and its
activities in support of the ONLF.
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Al-Ittihad and ONLF carried out a number of attacks against Ethiopian targets, and Ethiopian
security forces have violently retaliated against these groups and their supporters. The fighting
with Al-Ittihad was triggered in the early 1990s when Ethiopian security forces brutally cracked
down on the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a member of the first transitional government of
Ethiopia. The ONLF joined the transitional government of Ethiopia in part because the Ethiopian
Transitional Charter provided nations and nationalities the right to self determination; however,
the ONLF push for self determination created tension between the ruling EPRDF and the ONLF.
In the early 1990s, Ethiopian security forces assassinated a number of ONLF leaders, cracked
down on the organization, and moved the Ethiopian Somali region capital from Gode to Jijiga, a
central government stronghold. Members of the ONLF fled to Somalia and were embraced by AlIttihad, a fairly new group at that time. Hence, some observers view Al-Ittihad as a group largely
concerned with domestic issues. Ethiopia’s principal interest at that time was to ensure that a
united Somalia did not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia
remained stable. Ethiopian forces attacked Somalia a number of times over the past decade and
often maintained presence inside Somali territory. Ethiopia’s relationship with the current
president of the TFG was strengthened when Yusuf backed Ethiopia’s efforts against Al-Ittihad in
the 1990s. The Ethiopian government’s animosity towards the ousted Shura leader of the Islamic
Courts, Sheik Aweys, is linked to Aweys’ role as one of the leaders of Al-Ittihad fighting against
Ethiopia and that of Abdullahi Yusuf.
In 2004, the government of Ethiopia released a report, the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Security Policy and Strategy. The 158-page report covers a wide range
of issues, including Ethiopia’s assessment of its relations with Somalia. The report states that
Somalia attacked Ethiopia twice in pursuit of its Greater Somalia ambition. The report notes that
“at this time the Greater Somalia agenda has failed.” Moreover, the Greater Somalia agenda no
longer poses a serious threat to Ethiopia. The report contends that the factionalization of Somalia
has allowed anti-peace and extremists elements to become strong, posing a threat to Ethiopia. In
order to reduce the threat from some parts of Somalia, the Ethiopian government must pursue a
policy of engagement and support to Puntland and Somaliland, according to the report. The report
also recommends a policy of targeting those armed elements that threaten Ethiopian security. This
report was released two years before the Islamic Courts emerged, although the report gave the
same labels of extremist, terrorist, and anti-peace to groups that were dominant at that time.
Legislation
H.Res. 339
Introduced 4/21, 2009; passed 4/22/2009.
H.Res. 859
Introduced 10/22/2009.
S.Res. 108
Introduced 4/22/2009; passed 4/22/2009.
H.Res. 1538
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Introduced 7/20/2010; passed 7/27/2010.
H.Res. 1596
Introduced 7/30/2010.
H.Con.Res. 303
Introduced 7/22/2010.
S.Res. 573
Introduced 6/29/2010.
Figure 1. Major Somali Clans and Subclans
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Figure 2. Map of Somalia
Source: Cartographic Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Map No. 3690 Rev. 7,
January 2007. Adapted by CRS.
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Figure 3. Somali Refugees in the Region
Source: United Nations.
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Figure 4. Humanitarian Access vs. IDPs
Source: United Nations.
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Author Contact Information
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
tdagne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7646
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.