Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq

Congressional research reportFeb 27, 2008

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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On October 16, 2002, President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against

Iraq Resolution of 2002. Since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Congress has enacted

appropriation bills to fund the continuation of the Iraq war, including military training,

reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq. In April, 2007, however, Congress

passed a supplemental appropriations bill to fund the war that contained conditions and a deadline

for ending some military operations. The President vetoed the bill, arguing in part that some of its

provisions are unconstitutional. The current dispute is centered on whether Congress has the

constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President’s authority to conduct military

operations in Iraq, even though it did not initially provide express limits. Specific issues include

whether Congress may, through limitations on appropriations, set a ceiling on the number of

soldiers or regulate which soldiers the President may assign to duty in Iraq, and whether an

outright repeal or expiration of the authorization for use of military force (AUMF) against Iraq

would have any effect.

It has been suggested that the President’s role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

provides sufficient authority for his deployment of troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress

to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles.

While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it

is within Congress’s authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been

suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the war in Iraq

would amount to an “unconstitutional condition.” The question may turn on whether specific

proposals involve purely operational decisions committed to the President in his role as

Commander in Chief, or whether they are instead valid exercises of Congress’s authority to

allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse.

This report begins by providing background, discussing constitutional provisions allocating war

powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant

court cases. It discusses Congress’s power to rescind prior military authorization, concluding, in

light of relevant jurisprudence and the War Powers Resolution, that the repeal of the AUMF,

absent the further denial of appropriations or the establishment of a specific deadline for troop

withdrawal, would likely have little, if any, legal effect on the continuation of combat operations.

The report discusses Congress’s ability to limit funding for military operations in Iraq, examining

relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well

as possible alternative avenues to fund operations if appropriations are cut. There follows a

summary of relevant measures included in the vetoed FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill,

H.R. 1591, and the enacted act, H.R. 2206. The report provides historical examples of measures

that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that

might be brought to bear on the question of Congress’s authority to limit the availability of troops

to serve in Iraq. Although not beyond debate, such a restriction appears to be within Congress’s

authority to allocate resources for military operations.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2

I. Constitutional Provisions ............................................................................................................. 2

Congress’s War Powers ............................................................................................................. 4

The Commander-in-Chief Clause ............................................................................................. 7

II. Repeal of Prior Authorization to Use Military Force................................................................ 13

Historical Practice ................................................................................................................... 14

Rescinding Military Authorization Versus Cutting Appropriations: Procedural and

Other Considerations............................................................................................................ 15

Legal Consequences of Congressional Rescission of Military Authorization, Absent

Additional Congressional Action ......................................................................................... 17

Judicial Interpretation ....................................................................................................... 17

Implications of the War Powers Resolution...................................................................... 21

Inherent Presidential Authority to Use Military Force Absent

Congressional Authorization.......................................................................................... 23

III. Use of the Power of the Purse to Restrict Military Operations ............................................... 23

Procedural Considerations ...................................................................................................... 25

Availability of Alternative Funds ............................................................................................ 27

Redeployment from Iraq: Provisions in the Vetoed Supplemental ......................................... 29

Criteria Relating to Troops................................................................................................ 30

Benchmarks for Iraqi Government and Dates for Redeployment..................................... 30

Other Restrictions ............................................................................................................. 31

Provisions from the Enacted Supplemental, P.L. 110-28 ........................................................ 32

Provisions from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161 ..................................... 33

IV. Limiting Deployment of Military Personnel............................................................................ 34

Analysis and Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 36

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 40

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On May 1, 2007, President George W. Bush vetoed the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, H.R. 1591, in part because of

measures designed to limit the U.S. military role in Iraq. He called the bill “unconstitutional

because it purports to direct the conduct of operations of war in a way that infringes upon the

powers vested in the presidency by the Constitution, including as commander in chief of the

Armed Forces.”1 The next day, the House of Representatives voted to approve the bill by a vote

of 222 to 203, failing to muster the two-thirds majority necessary to override the veto.2 Congress

then passed a new version of the supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2206 (P.L. 110-28),

without providing timetables for withdrawal from Iraq, but conditioning the release of

reconstruction assistance to Iraq on achievement of certain benchmarks by the Iraqi government,

unless the President waives the requirements.3 The House of Representatives agreed to vote on a

withdrawal deadline when it takes up FY2008 supplemental appropriations, which is expected in

September.

As Congress considers defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY2008, there may be a

renewed focus on whether or to what extent Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate

limits on the President’s authority to conduct military operations in Iraq. Congress may consider

measures, for example, to repeal the authorization to use force in Iraq, to set deadlines for the

withdrawal of most troops from Iraq, to set requirements for unit rotations into Iraq, or to make

other requirements that could affect the deployment of armed forces to Iraq.

It has been suggested that the President’s role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

provides sufficient authority for his deployment of additional troops, and any efforts on the part

of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers

principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to

concede that it is within Congress’s authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it

has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the

war in Iraq would amount to an “unconstitutional condition.”4 The question may turn on whether

the President’s decisions on troop deployment and mission assignment are purely operational

decisions committed to the President in his role as Commander in Chief, or whether

congressional action to limit the availability of troops and the missions they may perform is a

valid exercise of Congress’s authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the

purse.

153 CONG. REC. H4315 (daily ed. May 2, 2007) (President’s veto message), also available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070502-1.html.

Id. at H4326.

For a detailed analysis of the FY2007 supplemental appropriations bills, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007

Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by (name redacted).

See, e.g., David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, What Congress Can (And Can’t) Do on Iraq, WASH. POST (January

16, 2007) at A19; see also Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L.

291(2006)(predicting arguments that would be made to oppose congressional funding restrictions).

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On October 16, 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of

Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.5 While the President noted he had sought a

“resolution of support” from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated receiving that

support, he also stated that:

... my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in

the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President’s constitutional

authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S.

interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.6

The President indicated he would continue to consult with Congress and to submit written reports

to Congress every 60 days on matters relevant to the resolution to use force,7 which authorizes the

President to use the armed forces of the United States

as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security

of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant

United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

The statute required certain conditions to be met prior to the initiation of military operations and

made periodic reports to Congress mandatory, but did not set a timetable or any criteria for

determining when to withdraw troops from Iraq. It appears to incorporate future UN Security

Council resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security Council as well as those

adopted prior to its enactment, effectively authorizing military force not only to compel

disarmament but to carry out other functions necessary for achieving the goals adopted or that

may be adopted by the Security Council. Thus, it appears that the resolution authorizes force

deemed necessary by the President for so long as Iraq poses a continuing threat to the United

States and the U.S. military presence is not inconsistent with relevant U.N. resolutions.

The resolution does not itself stipulate limitations with respect to the amount of force that may be

used or the resources that may be expended to accomplish the authorized objectives; however,

Congress may set limits by means of legislation or the budgeting process. The Department of

Defense has some latitude regarding how it allocates funds for various operations, and may have

additional statutory authority to obligate funds without additional prior express authorization

from Congress.

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At least two arguments support the constitutionality of Congress’s authority to limit the

President’s ability to increase or maintain troop levels in Iraq. First, Congress’s constitutional

P.L. 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498. For more background, see CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and

Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted).

See President’s Statement on Signing H.J.Res. 114, October 16, 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/

2003/Oct/09-906028.html.

Id.

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power over the nation’s armed forces provides ample authority to legislate with respect to how

they may be employed. Under Article I, § 8, Congress has the power “To lay and collect Taxes ...

to ... pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To

provide and maintain a Navy,” “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land

and naval Forces,” and “To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules

concerning Captures on Land and Water,” as well as “To provide for calling forth the Militia to

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and “To provide for

organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be

employed in the Service of the United States.” Further, Congress is empowered “To make all

Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ...”

as well as “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or

in any Department or Officer thereof.”

Secondly, Congress has virtually plenary constitutional power over appropriations, one that is not

qualified with reference to its powers in section 8. Article I, § 9 provides that “No Money shall be

drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” It is well

established, as a consequence of these provisions, that “no money can be paid out of the Treasury

unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress”8 and that Congress can specify the terms

and conditions under which an appropriation may be used,9 so long as it does not impose an

unconstitutional condition on the use of the funds.10

On the executive side, the Constitution vests the President with the “executive Power,” Article II,

§ 1, cl. 1, and appoints him “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”

id., § 2, cl. 1. The President is empowered, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to

make Treaties,” authorized “from time to time [to] give to the Congress Information on the State

of the Union, and [to] recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge

necessary and expedient,” and bound to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id., § 3.

He is bound by oath to “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,” and, to

the best of his “Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Id., §

1, cl. 8.

It is clear that the Constitution allocates powers necessary to conduct war between the President

and Congress. While the ratification record of the Constitution reveals little about the meaning of

the specific war powers clauses, the importance of preventing all of those powers from

accumulating in one branch appears to have been well understood,11 and vesting the powers of the

sword and the purse in separate hands appears to have been part of a careful design.12

Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937).

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987). For a scholarly

treatment of the Appropriations Clause, see Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343 (1988).

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding invalid an appropriations proviso that effectively

nullified some effects of a presidential pardon and that appeared to prescribe a rule of decision in court cases); United

States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)(invalidating as a bill of attainder an appropriations provision denying money to

pay salaries of named officials).

See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 7 (2d ed. 2004)(noting that allocation of war powers to Congress was a

break with monarchial theories, under which all such powers belonged to the executive); id. at 8-12.

See WILLIAM C. BANKS AND PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 2732(1994).

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It is generally agreed that some aspects of the exercise of those powers are reserved to the

Commander in Chief, and that Congress could conceivably legislate beyond its authority in such

a way as to intrude impermissibly into presidential power. The precise boundaries separating

legislative from executive functions, however, remain elusive. There can be little doubt that

Congress would exceed its bounds if it were to confer exclusive power to direct military

operations on an officer not subordinate to the President,13 or to purport to issue military orders

directly to subordinate officers.14 At the same time, Congress’s power to make rules for the

government and regulation of the armed forces provides it wide latitude for restricting the nature

of orders the President may give. Congress’s power of appropriations gives it ample power to

supply or withhold resources, even if the President deems them necessary to carry out planned

military operations.15

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The power “To Declare War” has long been construed to mean not only that Congress can

formally take the nation into war but also that it can authorize the use of the armed forces for

military expeditions that may not amount to war.16 While a restrictive interpretation of the power

“To declare War” is possible, for example, by viewing the Framers’ use of the verb “to declare”

rather than “to make”17 as an indication of an intent to limit Congress’s ability to affect the course

of a war once it is validly commenced,18 Congress’s other powers over the use of the military

would likely fill any resulting void. In practice, courts have not sought to delineate the boundaries

of each clause relating to war powers or identify gaps between them to find specific powers that

are denied to Congress.19

Congress has by statute provided that the President must issue orders to subordinate military commands through the

appropriate chain of command rather than directly. See FRANCIS D. WORMUTH AND EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE

DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 93(2nd ed. 1989)(citing the Command of the Army

Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 485, 486-87, which required that “all orders and instructions relating to military operations” be

“issued through the General of the Army,” and made orders issued contrary to the provision punishable by prison

sentence from two to twenty years). Congress has also authorized judges to issue orders directed to military

commanders requiring them to provide military aid to marshals for the arrest of persons accused of crimes against the

United States who were on board foreign ships in U.S. harbors. 2 Stat. 339 (1805).

But see id. at 93-94 (asserting that during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War, the “army was given its

orders directly by Congress,” and that President Andrew Johnson’s efforts to circumvent the statute were cited in the

ninth article of impeachment against him, although no proof was offered at trial).

For a discussion of theories asserting the presidential prerogative to spend without appropriations when necessary for

military operations, see generally Colonel Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-traditional” Military Operations: The

Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998); see also Major Brian A. Hughes, Uses

and Abuses of O&M Funded Construction: Never Build on a Foundation of Sand, 2005-AUG ARMY LAW. 1

(describing how fiscal law constrains military spending, sometimes impeding military operations).

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).

The Framers’ decision to substitute “declare” for “make” has generally been interpreted to allow the President the

authority to repel sudden attacks. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-19 (rev.

ed. 1937)(explanation of James Madison and Elbridge Gerry on their motion to amend text).

Cf. John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1669-71 (2002)(arguing that “to declare”

means to formally recognize rather than to authorize or commence).

See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1170 - 71 (1833) (stating that the powers to issue

letters of marque and reprisal and to authorize captures are incidental to the power to declare war, implying their

express mention was unnecessary, but noting that these “incidental” powers may also be employed during peace). But

see, e.g., J. Terry Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 53, 62 (1972)(arguing that early opinions

related to the Quasi-War with France, often advanced for the proposition that Congress is empowered to regulate

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Early exercises of Congress’s war powers may shed some light on the original understanding of

how the war powers clauses might empower Congress to limit the President’s use of the armed

forces. In the absence of a standing army, early presidents were constrained to ask Congress for

support in advance of undertaking any military operations.20 Congress generally provided the

requested support and granted the authority to raise the necessary troops to defend the frontiers

from deprivations by hostile Indians21 and to build a navy to protect U.S. commerce at sea.22

Congress, in exercising its authority to raise the army and navy, sometimes raised forces for

specific purposes, which may be viewed as both an implicit authorization to use the forces for

such purposes and as an implicit limitation on their use.23 On the other hand, Congress often

delegated broad discretion to the President within those limits, and appears to have acquiesced to

military actions that were not explicitly authorized.24

In several early instances, Congress authorized the President to use military forces for operations

that did not amount to a full war. Rather than declaring a formal war with France, Congress

authorized the employment of the naval forces for limited hostilities. The Third Congress

authorized the President to lay and enforce embargoes of U.S. ports, but only while Congress was

not in session (and embargo orders were to expire 15 days after the commencement of the next

session of Congress).25 The Fifth Congress authorized the President to issue instructions to the

commanders of public armed ships to capture certain French armed vessels and to recapture ships

from them,26 and to retaliate against captured French citizens who had seized U.S. citizens and

subjected them to mistreatment.27 Congress also authorized U.S. merchant vessels to defend

(...continued)

military operations that do not amount to war, should be read as strict interpretations of Congress’s power to make rules

for captures).

See ABRAHAM SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 116-17 (1976) (describing President

Washington’s efforts to obtain support for military efforts, including a build-up of military strength to preserve peace

and maintain U.S. stature among nations).

See, e.g., Act of March 3d, 1791, for raising and adding another Regiment to the Military Establishment of the

United States, and for making further provision for the protection of the frontier, 1 Stat. 222; Act of March 5, 1792, 1

Stat. 241 (adding three regiments for three years or until peace with Indian tribes was established); Act of July 16,

1798, 1 Stat. 604 (authorizing the President to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry and six troops of light

dragoons during the continuance of differences with the French Republic).

See, e.g., Act of March 27, 1794, To provide a naval armament, 1 Stat. 351 (“Whereas the depredations committed

by Algerine corsairs render it necessary...” authorizing the building and manning of six ships of specific types, until the

establishment of peace with the Regency of Algiers)(amended in 1796 to remove restrictions so that vessels could be

used for other purposes, 1 Stat. 453); Act of April 27, 1798, To provide an additional Armament for the protection of

the Trade of the United States..., 1 Stat. 552; Act of June 22, 1798, 1 Stat. 569 (authorizing the President “to increase

the strength of any revenue cutter, for the purposes of defence, against hostilities near the sea coast” by manning the

vessels with up to 70 seamen and marines).

Some proposals explicitly to limit how the vessels could be employed were stricken prior to enactment, but the

congressional debates left unclear whether the majority of members thought the restrictions unconstitutional or merely

unwise, or whether the absence of specific authority was meant to be a limitation. See SOFAER, supra note 20, at 14754. The John Adams Administration interpreted the legislation restrictively, and instructed naval commanders

accordingly that their authority was to be “partial and limited.” See id. at 156.

See id. at 129 (noting that offensive actions against Wabash Indians and against a British fort may have exceeded

express statutory authorization but were authorized by implication through appropriations).

Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372. See also Act of June 5, 1794 §§ 7- 8, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (authorizing the President to

use armed forces to detain violators and compel foreign ships to depart).

Act of May 28, 1798, 1 Stat. 561. See also Act of July 9, 1798, 1 Stat. 578.

Act of March 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743 (empowering and requiring the President to “cause the most rigorous retaliation to

be executed on [French suspects who] have been or hereafter may be captured in pursuance of any of the laws of the

(continued...)

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themselves against French vessels.28 The Supreme Court treated these statutes as authorizing a

state of “partial war” between the United States and France.29 Such an undeclared war was

described as an “imperfect” war, as distinguished from a “Solemn” or “perfect” war, declared as

such, in that, in the first case, all members of one nation are at war with all members of the other

nation; in the second case, those who are authorized to commit hostilities act “under special

authority.”30 This suggests an early understanding that Congress’s war powers extend to

establishing the scope of hostilities to be carried out by the armed forces.

In the majority of cases, however, it appears that Congress has given broad deference to the

President to decide how much of the armed forces to employ in a given situation. After Tripoli

declared war against the United States in 1801 and U.S. vessels were already engaged in

defensive actions against them, Congress did not enact a full declaration of war. Rather, it issued

a sweeping authorization for the commissioning of privateers, captures, and other actions to

“equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged

requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting effectually the commerce and

seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas,” as well as to “cause

to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify, and may, in

his opinion, require.”31 In declaring war against Great Britain in 1812, Congress authorized the

President to “use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect,

and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and

general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper....”32

That Congress has traditionally left it up to the President to decide how much of the armed forces

to employ in a given conflict need not imply that such deference is constitutionally mandated.

The fact that Congress has seen fit to include such language may just as easily be read as an

indication that Congress believes that the decision is its to delegate. Under this view, even in the

case of a declaration of war, Congress retains the power to authorize the President to use only a

portion of the armed forces to engage in a particular conflict. On the other hand, some have

argued that the President is authorized to deploy all of the armed forces as he sees fit, with or

without an express authorization to use force or a declaration of war.33 According to this theory, in

essence, Congress can stop the deployment of military forces only by cutting appropriations and

discharging the troops.

(...continued)

United States”).

1 Stat. 572.

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.(Dall.) 37 (1800).

Id. at 40. See also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.(Cranch) 1, 28 (1801)(“Congress may authorize general hostilities ... or

partial hostilities’”).

Act of February 6, 1802, 2 Stat.129 (emphasis added). For more examples of authorizations to use force and

declarations of war, see CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force:

Historical Background and Legal Implications, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat 755.

See, e.g., Bradley Larschan, The War Powers Resolution: Conflicting Constitutional Powers, The War Powers, and

U.S. Foreign Policy, 16 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 33, 45 (1987) (arguing that once Congress has raised an army and

appropriated funds for it, “it falls to the President to use the armed forces in his capacity to conduct foreign policy in

situations short of war”). The author states that it is “clear that the Congress may prohibit the use of U.S. forces in

certain areas by statute,” but that “it is the President who orders deployment of the troops.” Id. at 49.

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Congress has also used its authority to provide for the organization and regulation of the armed

forces to regulate how military personnel are to be organized and employed. The earliest statutes

prescribed in fairly precise terms how military units were to be formed and commanded. For

example, the 1798 act establishing the Marine Corps mandated the raising of a corps to consist of

“one major, four captains, sixteen first lieutenants, twelve second lieutenants, forty-eight

sergeants, forty-eight corporals, thirty-two drums and fifes, and seven hundred and twenty

privates....”34 Congress authorized the President to appoint certain other officers as necessary if he

were to assign the Marine Corps or any part of it to shore duty, and to assign the detachment to

duty in “forts and garrisons of the United States, on the sea-coast, or any other duty on shore.”

Officers of the Marine Corps could be detached to serve on board frigates and other armed

vessels. The Marine Corps was increased in size and reorganized in 1834 to be commanded by a

colonel, with the proviso that no Marine Corps officer could be placed in command of a navy

yard or vessel of the United States.35

It appears to have been understood that personnel and units authorized to perform certain duties

could not be assigned to perform other duties without authorization from Congress. In 1808,

when Congress authorized eight new regiments of specific types and composition, it felt

compelled to include language making members of the light dragoon regiment liable to “serve on

foot as light infantry” until sufficient horses and other accouterments could be provided.36 The

Supreme Court later interpreted an 1802 statute providing for the establishment of the Corps of

Engineers, although broadly worded to permit the President to direct that its members serve such

duty in such places as he saw fit, to authorize only engineering duties:

But, however broad this enactment is in its language, it never has been supposed to authorize

the President to employ the corps of engineers upon any other duty, except such as belongs

either to military engineering, or to civil engineering.37

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Early in the nation’s history, the Commander-in-Chief power was understood to connote “nothing

more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general

and admiral of the confederacy.”38 Concurring in that view in 1850, Chief Justice Taney stated:

[The President’s] duty and his power are purely military. As Commander-in-Chief, he is

authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his

command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and

conquer and subdue the enemy.39

This formula, taken alone, provides only an approximate demarcation of the line separating

Congress’s role from the President’s. Advocates of a strong role for Congress might characterize a

legislative effort to limit the number of troops available in Iraq as placing troops “by law” under

1 Stat. 594, 595 (1798).

4 Stat. 712, 713 (1834).

2 Stat. 481, 483 (1808).

Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 371 (1841)(finding that the President could contract for other services

but must pay an additional stipend for them from other funds).

The Federalist, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).

Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).

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the President’s command, while proponents of a strong executive would likely view it as a

limitation on the President’s ability to “employ them in the manner” he sees fit. With respect to

the latter argument, however, it should be noted that the particular question before the Fleming

Court did not call into question the extent to which Congress could restrict the manner of

employing troops once placed at the command of the President.

Other early cases demonstrate Congress’s authority to restrict the President’s options for the

conduct of war. In Little v. Barreme,40 Chief Justice Marshall had occasion to recognize

congressional war power and to deny the exclusivity of presidential power. There, after Congress

had authorized limited hostilities with France, a U.S. vessel under orders from the President had

seized what its commander believed was a U.S. merchant ship bound from a French port,

allegedly carrying contraband material. Congress had, however, provided by statute only for

seizure of such vessels bound to French ports.41 Upholding an award of damages to the ship’s

owners for wrongful seizure, the Chief Justice said:

It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high duty it is to ‘take

care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ and who is commander in chief of the armies and

navies of the United States, might not, without any special authority for that purpose in the

then existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of

the United States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were

forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce. But when it is observed that [an act of

Congress] gives a special authority to seize on the high seas, and limits that authority to the

seizure of vessels bound or sailing to a French port, the legislature seems to have prescribed

that the manner in which this law shall be carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of

any vessel not bound to a French port.42

Accordingly, the Court held, the President’s instructions exceeded the authority granted by

Congress and were not to be given force of law, even in the context of the President’s military

powers and even though the instructions might have been valid in the absence of contradictory

legislation.

In Bas v. Tingy,43 the Court looked to congressional enactments rather than plenary presidential

power to uphold military conduct related to the limited war with France. The following year, in

Talbot v. Seeman,44 the Court upheld as authorized by Congress a U.S. commander’s capture of a

neutral ship, saying that “[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United

States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this

inquiry.” During the War of 1812, the Court recognized in Brown v. United States,45 that Congress

was empowered to authorize the confiscation of enemy property during wartime, but that absent

such authorization, a seizure authorized by the President was void.

The onset of the Civil War provided some grist for later assertions of unimpeded presidential

prerogative in matters of war. In the Prize Cases,46 the Supreme Court sustained the blockade of

6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804).

1 Stat. 613 (1799).

6 U.S. (2 Cr.) at 177-178.

4 U.S. (4 Dall. ) 37 (1800).

5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 1, 28 (1801).

12 U.S. (8 Cr.) 110 (1814).

67 U.S. (2 Bl. ) 635 (1863).

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Southern ports instituted by President Lincoln in April, 1861, at a time when Congress was not in

session. Congress had at the first opportunity ratified the President’s actions,47 so that it was not

necessary for the Court to consider the constitutional basis of the President’s action in the absence

of congressional authorization or in the face of any prohibition. Nevertheless, the Court approved

the blockade five-to-four as an exercise of presidential power alone, on the basis that a state of

war was a fact and that, the nation being under attack, the President was bound to take action

without waiting for Congress.48 The case has frequently been cited to support claims of greater

presidential autonomy by reason of his role as Commander in Chief.

However, it should be recalled that where Lincoln’s suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

varied from legislation enacted later to ratify it, the Court looked to the statute49 rather than to the

executive proclamation50 to determine the breadth of its application.51 The Chief Justice described

the allocation of war powers as follows:

The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.

Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities

essential to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude

upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the

President....52

The Chief Justice described the Commander-in-Chief power as entailing “the command of the

forces and the conduct of campaigns,”53 but nevertheless agreed that military trials of civilians

accused of violating the law of war in Union states were invalid without congressional approval,

despite the government’s assertion that the “[Commander in Chief’s] power to make an effectual

use of his forces [must include the] power to arrest and punish one who arms men to join the

enemy in the field against him.”54

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also suggested that the President has some independent

authority to employ the armed forces, at least in the absence of contrary congressional action. In

the 1890 case of In re Neagle, the Supreme Court suggested, in dictum, that the President has the

power to deploy the military abroad to protect or rescue persons with significant ties to the United

States. Discussing examples of the executive lawfully acting in the absence of express statutory

authority, Justice Miller approvingly described the Martin Koszta affair, in which an American

naval ship intervened to prevent a lawful immigrant from being captured by an Austrian vessel,

12 Stat. 326 (1861)(ratifying all “acts, proclamations, and orders” done by the President “respecting the army and

navy ... and calling out or relating to the militia”).

67 U.S. (2 Bl. ) at 668 (“[The President] does not initiate war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting

for any special legislative authority.”). The minority argued that only congressional authorization could stamp an

insurrection with the character of war. Later, a unanimous Court adopted the majority view. The Protector, 79 U.S. (12

Wall.) 700 (1872).

Act of March 3d, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 (authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus, but with limitations in Union

states to those held as prisoners of war; all others were to be indicted or freed.)

Proclamation of September 15, 1863, 13 Stat. 734 (suspending habeas corpus with respect to those in federal custody

as military offenders or “as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders and abettors of the enemy”).

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).

Id. at 139 (Chase, C.J., concurring).

Id. at 139 (“Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander under him,

without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or

civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity...”).

Id. at 17 (government argument).

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despite the absence of clear statutory authorization.55 Only one federal court, in an 1860 opinion,

has clearly held that in the absence of congressional authorization, the President has authority to

deploy military forces abroad to protect U.S. persons (and property).56 Nevertheless, there

historically appears to be some support for this view by both the executive and legislative

branches.57 However, the scope of any such authority remains unclear, as does the degree to

which it may be limited by an act of Congress.

The expansion of presidential power related to war, asserted as a combination of Commander-inChief authority and the President’s inherent authority over the nation’s foreign affairs, began in

earnest in the twentieth century. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,58 the Supreme

Court confirmed that the President enjoys greater discretion when acting with respect to matters

of foreign affairs than may be the case when only domestic issues are involved. In that case,

In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (describing the incident and rhetorically asking, “Upon what act of congress then

existing can any one lay his finger in support of the action of our government in this matter?”). For further discussion,

see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 347-348 (2nd ed. 2002); WORMUTH & FIRMAGE,

supra note 13, at 154 (stating that the U.S. captain had acted against the President’s orders, but that President Pierce

justified the action to Congress, which later awarded the captain a medal). In an earlier opinion, the Court had also

stated in dictum that one of the privileges of a U.S. citizen is “to demand the care and protection of the Federal

government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign

government.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872). It should be noted that Koszta was not a U.S. citizen, but

a legal immigrant who had declared an intention to apply for citizenship. Accordingly, an 1868 statute authorizing the

use of any means “not amounting to acts of war” to obtain the release of U.S. citizens was likely inapplicable.

Expatriation Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223.

Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (Nelson, Circuit Justice) (holding that a Navy commander

was not civilly liable for damages caused by his forces during an 1854 action to protect U.S. citizens and property in

Greytown, Nicaragua). In an opinion by Circuit Justice Nelson, the Court held that the Commander was not liable

because the military action was pursuant to a valid exercise of federal authority to be exercised by the President:

...as it respects the interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of the lives or property

of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the president. Acts of lawless

violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his property, cannot be anticipated and provided

for; and the protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently, require the most

prompt and decided action. Under our system of government, the citizen abroad is as much entitled

to protection as the citizen at home. Id. at 112.

See GAO, Office of Compt. Gen., President - Authority - Protection of American Lives and Property Abroad, 55

Comp. Gen. 1081 (1975) (describing historical practice and the weight of scholarly authority as supporting the power

of the President to order military rescue operations in the absence of congressional authorization); Dept. of Justice,

Office of Legal Counsel, 4A U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 185, Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad

Without Statutory Authorization (1980) (alleging presidential authority to deploy forces to protect, and retaliate for

injuries suffered by, U.S. persons and property). For discussion of the deployment of military forces to protect U.S.

persons or property, see FISHER, supra note 11, at 57-58 (describing historical practice, and noting mid-20th century

study listing 148 examples of this occurrence); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 54-57 (rev.

ed. 2004)(discussing mid-nineteenth century instances where presidents unilaterally committed forces to protect U.S.

persons or property). The number and degree to which these actions occurred without congressional authorization is the

subject to some debate. See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 13, at 135-51(discussing and disputing validity of

various lists of military actions compiled to demonstrate historical prevalence of presidential war-making). For

example, some argue that President Jefferson’s ordering of the Navy to protect American shipping from Barbary pirates

was done without congressional approval, while others view these orders as having been issued pursuant to legislation

providing for a “naval peace establishment.” Compare Dept. of Justice, Off. of Legal Counsel, supra, at 187

(describing Jefferson’s use of the Navy as a “famous early example” of President’s acting without congressional

authorization to protect U.S. interests) with FISHER, supra note 11, at 35-36 (characterizing the orders as being issued

pursuant to congressional authorization, and noting that Jefferson denied having inherent authority to commit such

acts). Whether such usage would legitimate the authority is also subject to debate. See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra

note 13, at 135.

299 U.S. 304 (1936).

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Congress, concerned with the outside arming of the belligerents in the war between Paraguay and

Bolivia, had authorized the President to proclaim an arms embargo if he found that such action

might contribute to a peaceful resolution of the dispute. President Franklin Roosevelt issued the

requisite finding and proclamation, and Curtiss-Wright and associate companies were indicted for

violating the embargo. They challenged the statute, arguing that Congress had failed adequately

to elaborate standards to guide the President’s exercise of the power thus delegated.59 Justice

Sutherland concluded that the limitations on delegation in the domestic field were irrelevant

where foreign affairs are involved, a result he based on the premise that foreign relations is

exclusively an executive function combined with his constitutional model positing that

internationally, the power of the federal government is not one of enumerated but of inherent

powers, emanating from concepts of sovereignty rather than the Constitution. The Court affirmed

the convictions, stating that:

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in

the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very

delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal

government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis

for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental

power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It

is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—

perhaps serious embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,

congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry

within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and

freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs

alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the

conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.60

The case is cited frequently to support a theory of presidential power not subject to restriction by

Congress, although the case in fact involved an exercise of authority delegated by Congress.

Curtiss-Wright remains precedent admonishing courts to show deference to the President in

matters involving international affairs, including by interpreting ambiguous statutes in such a

manner as to increase the President’s discretion.61 The case has also been cited in favor of broad

presidential discretion to implement statutes related to military affairs.62 To the extent, however,

that Justice Sutherland interpreted presidential power as being virtually plenary in the realms of

foreign affairs and national defense, the case has not been followed to establish that Congress

lacks authority in these areas.

The constitutional allocation of war powers between the President and Congress, where Congress

had not delegated the powers exercised by the President, was described by Justice Jackson,

concurring in the Steel Seizure Case63:

The Supreme Court had recently held that the Constitution required Congress to elaborate standards when delegating

authority to the President. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

299 U.S. at 319-20.

See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291, 293-294 & n. 24, 307-308 (1981); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509

U.S. 155 (1993)(construing treaty and statutory provisions as not limiting presidential discretion in interdicting

refugees on high seas in the light of the President’s “unique responsibility” in foreign and military affairs, citing

Curtiss-Wright).

See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952).

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The Constitution expressly places in Congress power “to raise and support Armies” and “to

provide and maintain a Navy.” This certainly lays upon Congress primary responsibility for

supplying the armed forces. Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their

appropriation and may determine in what manner and by what means they shall be spent for

military and naval procurement....

There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in

Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its

industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly of “war powers,” whatever they are.

While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only

Congress can provide him any army or navy to command.

The Jackson opinion is commonly understood to establish that whatever powers the President

may exercise in the absence of congressional authorization, the President may act contrary to an

act of Congress only in matters involving exclusive presidential prerogatives.64

Presidents from Truman to George W. Bush have claimed independent authority to commit U.S.

armed forces to involvements abroad absent any Congressional participation other than

consultation and after-the-fact financing. In 1994, for example, President Clinton based his

authority to order the participation of U.S. forces in NATO actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina on his

“constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations” and as his role as Commander in

Chief,65 and protested efforts to restrict the use of military forces there and elsewhere as an

improper and possibly unconstitutional limitation on his “command and control” of U.S. forces.66

Justice Jackson’s concurrence took note of the fact that Curtiss-Wright did not involve a case in which the President

took action contrary to an act of Congress. Id. at 635-36 &n.2. Curtiss-Wright, he said

involved, not the question of the President’s power to act without congressional authority, but the

question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress. The constitutionality of the

Act under which the President had proceeded was assailed on the ground that it delegated

legislative powers to the President. Much of the Court’s opinion is dictum, but the ratio decidendi

is contained in the following language:

When the President is to be authorized by legislation to act in respect of a matter intended to

affect a situation in foreign territory, the legislator properly bears in mind the important

consideration that the form of the President’s action - or, indeed, whether he shall act at all may well depend, among other things, upon the nature of the confidential information which

he has or may thereafter receive, or upon the effect which his action may have upon our

foreign relations. This consideration, in connection with what we have already said on the

subject, discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to

lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed. As this court

said in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 , ‘As a government, the United States is

invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the

powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other

countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers.’ (Italics

supplied [by Justice Jackson]) Id., at 321-322.

That case does not solve the present controversy. It recognized internal and external affairs as being

in separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to

the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in external

affairs. It was intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional

authority, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.

30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 406 (March 2, 1994).

See Interview with Radio Reporters, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1763-64; see also FISHER, supra note 11, at 184.

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Ever since Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto, all

Presidents have regarded it as an unconstitutional infringement on presidential powers.67

In the context of what it terms the “Global War on Terror,” the Bush Administration has claimed

that the President’s commander-in-chief authority entails inherent authority with respect to the

capture and detention of suspected terrorists, authority he has claimed cannot be infringed by

legislation.68 In 2004, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether Congress could pass a statute

to prohibit or regulate the detention and interrogation of captured suspects, which the

Administration had asserted would unconstitutionally interfere with core commander-in-chief

powers, by finding that Congress had implicitly authorized the detention of enemy combatants

when it authorized the use of force in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.69

However, the Supreme Court in 2006 invalidated President Bush’s military order authorizing

trials of aliens accused of terrorist offenses by military commission, finding that the regulations

promulgated to implement the order did not comply with relevant statutes.70 The Court did not

expressly pass on the constitutionality of any statute or discuss possible congressional incursion

into areas of exclusive presidential authority, which was seen by many as implicitly confirming

Congress’s authority to legislate in such a way as to limit the power of the Commander in Chief.71

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While it is well-established that Congress and the President each possess authority on ending a

military conflict, issues may arise if the political branches are in disagreement as to whether or

how to end a military conflict. Inter-branch disagreement regarding the cessation of hostilities has

been a rare occurrence, but it is not unprecedented. In the 110th Congress, a number of proposals

have been introduced that would repeal or establish an expiration date for the Authorization for

Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002.72 The following sections discuss the

constitutional authority implicated by a repeal of military authorization, procedural, and other

P.L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. See CRS Report RL33532, War Powers Resolution:

Presidential Compliance, by (name redacted).

See, e.g. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2002)

(testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft)(arguing that Congress has no constitutional authority to interfere with

the President’s decision to detain enemy combatants); see also Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander

in Chief—Congress’s Authority to Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183

(2004)(documenting Bush Administration claims with respect to Congress’s lack of power to legislate in matters

related to the conduct of the war and arguing that these represent an expansion over prior administrations’ claims).

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).

The Court adopted Chief Justice Chase’s formulation for allocating war powers, see id. at 2773, and Justice

Jackson’s framework for determining separation-of-powers disputes between the President and Congress, see id. at

2774 n.24 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene

military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers,

placed on his powers. The Government does not argue otherwise.”)(citation omitted).

See H.R. 1460 (repealing 2002 resolution); H.R. 1262 (same); S. 679 (declaring that objectives of 2002 resolution

have been achieved, and requiring redeployment of forces from Iraq); S.J.Res. 3 (establishing expiration date for 2002

resolution); S. 670 (requiring new military authorization unless certain objectives are met); H.R. 930 (repealing 2002

resolution); H.R. 508 (same); H.R. 413 (same).

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considerations involved in rescinding prior military authorization as compared to limiting

appropriations, and the legal effect that a repeal would have on continuing hostilities.

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Although the U.S. Constitution expressly empowers Congress to declare war, it is notably silent

regarding which political body is responsible for returning the United States to a state of peace.

Some evidence suggests that this omission was not accidental.73 During the Constitutional

Convention, a motion was made by one of the delegates to modify the draft document by adding

the words “and peace” after the words “to declare war.”74 This motion, however, was

unanimously rejected. Convention records do not clearly evidence the framers’ intent in rejecting

the motion.

Some early constitutional commentators suggested that the motion failed because the framers

believed that the power to make peace more naturally belonged to the treaty-making body, as

conflicts between nations were typically resolved through treaties of peace.75 Although the

framers did not specifically empower Congress to make peace, they also did not expressly locate

the power with the treaty-making body, perhaps because of a recognition that peace might

sometimes be more easily achieved through means other than treaty.76

It has been suggested that the framers did not allocate an exclusive body with peace-making

authority because they believed “it should be more easy to get out of a war than into it.”77 Given

the framers’ failure to designate a single political branch responsible for returning the country

from a state of war to a state of peace, the power to make peace was likely understood to be a

Up to that point, the shared American and English tradition suggested that the institution with the power to instigate

war was also the body with the power to end it. Blackstone believed that under the English system, “wherever the right

resides of beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of ending it, or the power of making peace.” 1

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 250 (1756). When America declared its

independence, it also rejected the monarchial form of government. Nevertheless, the legal document that the

Constitution was intended to replace, the Articles of Confederation, expressly accorded the national legislative body

with “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX,

§ 1. Under the Articles, there was neither a national executive nor judicial body.

FARRAND, supra note 17, at 319; see also 3 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1352 (Henry Gilpin, ed.

1840).

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1173 (1833); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 110-111 (2nd ed. 1929). It should be noted that at the time the proposal was

rejected, the framers had designated the Senate as the treaty-making body. The President was made part of the treatymaking body several weeks later. FARRAND, supra note 17, at 538.

As a practical matter, a requirement that peace be achieved through a treaty between the warring parties would, in

certain circumstances, lead to odd results:

The President, who is the Commander-in-Chief...and a majority of both branches of Congress,

which declares war and maintains the forces necessary for its prosecution, might desire peace yet

be unable to obtain it because a third of the Senate plus one Senator were contrary minded. Or our

erstwhile antagonist might be the contrary minded one. Or the war might have resulted in the

extinction of said antagonist. Such, in fact, was the situation at the close of the Civil War, which

accordingly could not be brought to an end in the legal sense by a treaty of peace....

Edward S. Corwin, Power of Congress to Declare Peace, 18 MICH. L. REV. 669, 672-673 (1920).

Id. at 669. See also MADISON, supra note 74, at 1352 (quoting delegate Oliver Ellsworth in debate to give Congress

the power to “make war”).

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shared power, with each branch having the authority on terminating a military conflict.78 The

executive could return the country to a state of peace through a treaty with the warring party,

subject to the Senate’s advice and consent. Congress could declare peace or rescind a previous

authorization to use military force pursuant to its plenary authority to repeal prior enactments, its

power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or its power to make laws “necessary and

proper” to effectuate its constitutional powers.79

Regardless of the framers’ intent, the legislative and executive branches have historically treated

peace-making as a shared power. Peace has been declared in one of three ways: (1) via legislation

terminating a conflict, (2) pursuant to a treaty negotiated and signed by the executive and ratified

following the advice and consent of the Senate, and (3) through a presidential proclamation.80 All

three methods have been recognized as constitutionally legitimate by the Supreme Court,81

including most clearly in the 1948 case of Ludecke v. Watkins, where the Court plainly stated,

“The state of war may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation.”82

Notably, the Court has recognized that the termination of a military conflict is a “political act,”83

and it has historically refused to review the political branches’ determinations of when a conflict

has officially ended.84

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As a procedural matter, it is more difficult for Congress to terminate authorization for a military

conflict than to limit appropriations necessary for the continuation of hostilities. As in the case of

ordinary legislation, congressional declarations of peace and rescissions of military authorization

have historically taken the form of a bill or joint resolution passed by both Houses and presented

to the President for signature.85 Like other legislation, such measures are subject to presidential

veto, which Congress may override only with a two-thirds majority of each House.86

See Corwin, supra note 76, at 673.

Id. at 674.

A listing of all instances where the U.S. has formally declared war or authorized the use of military force, along with

the date and means by which peace was declared or military authorization was terminated, can be found in CRS Report

RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal

Implications, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

E.g., Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904) (recognizing state of war with Spain as ending with ratification of

peace treaty); The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1871) (relying on presidential proclamations to determine the beginning and

ending date of the Civil War); Commercial Trust v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (recognizing congressional act as

ending war with Germany). It should be noted that the Civil War is the only “war” which was ended by presidential

proclamation. It could be argued that the methods by which the political branches may signal the termination of a

domestic insurrection are different than those by which they may end a conflict with a foreign nation.

335 U.S. 160, 168 (1948) (internal quotations omitted). There are potentially other ways in which peace could be

made that were not contemplated by the Ludecke Court. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

COMMANDER IN CHIEF 79-80 (1970) (suggesting that a war could also be ended by, among other things, an executive

agreement with or without specific congressional authorization).

Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168-169.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186, 213-214 (1962) (describing the Court’s refusal to review the political branches’

determination of when or whether a war has ended). See generally ROSSITER, supra note 82, at 83-89 (discussing

Supreme Court jurisprudence upholding political branches’ determinations as to the official end of a war, including in

cases where actual hostilities ceased several years beforehand).

See CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical

(continued...)

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In contrast, Congress’s ability to deny funds for the continuation of military hostilities is not

contingent upon the enactment of a positive law, though such a denial may take the form of a

positive enactment.87 Although the President has the power to veto legislative proposals, he

cannot compel Congress to pass legislation, including bills to appropriate funds necessary for the

continuation of a military conflict. Thus, while a majority of both Houses would be necessary to

terminate military authorization, and a super-majority of both Houses would be required to

override a presidential veto, a simple majority of a single House could prevent the appropriation

of funds necessary for the continuation of a military conflict. 88 It should be noted, however, that

legislation probably would be required to prevent the President from exercising statutory

authority to transfer certain funds appropriated to other operations for use in support of the

military conflict that Congress was attempting to limit. Like other positive legislation, such a

measure would be subject to presidential veto.

While it may be procedurally easier for Congress to refuse appropriations for a military conflict

than to rescind military authorization, policy considerations may sometimes make the latter

option more appealing. For example, some Members of Congress who support the winding down

of a military operation might nevertheless be reluctant to reduce the funds for troops on the

battlefield. There might also be concerns over potential effects that a denial of appropriations

might have on unrelated military operations. Although appropriations legislation can be crafted to

effectively terminate hostilities while permitting funding of force protection measures during the

orderly redeployment of troops from the battlefield, such legislation, like other positive

enactments, would be subject to presidential veto.

In certain circumstances, a President may be more willing to agree to a rescission of military

authorization than to an appropriations bill that limits the funding of military operations,

particularly if the rescission does not include a deadline for troop withdrawal. Indeed, during the

Vietnam War, Congress was able to rescind military authorization at an earlier date than it was

able to cut off appropriations. In 1971, Congress passed and President Nixon signed a measure

rescinding the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which had provided congressional authorization

for U.S. military operations against North Vietnam.89 The Mansfield Amendment, enacted later

that year, called for the “prompt and orderly” withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina at the

“earliest possible date.”90 However, these measures did not include a deadline for troop

withdrawal. Although U.S. troop presence in South Vietnam diminished considerably pursuant to

the Nixon Administration’s “Vietnamization” strategy even prior to these enactments, the United

(...continued)

Background and Legal Implications, by (name redacted) and (name redacted);

see also J. Gregory Sidak, To

Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 81-86 (discussing historical operation of bicameralism and presentment in the warmaking context, along with scholarly views concerning whether presentment is necessary).

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. (2)-(3).

See, e.g., P.L. 91-652, § 7(a) (1971) (prohibiting funds appropriated from being used to introduce U.S. ground troops

into Cambodia); P.L. 93-50, § 307 (1973) (prohibiting appropriated funds from being used in U.S. combat activities in

Indochina after August 15, 1973); P.L. 103-139, § 8135 (1993) (barring appropriations from being used for combat

forces in Somalia after March 31, 1994). For additional examples, see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of

Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, by (name redacted), and

CRS Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia,

and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by (name redacted) et al.

See Sidak, supra note 85, at 104-105.

P.L. 91-672, § 12 (1971).

P.L. 92-156, § 601(a) (1971).

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States continued significant air bombing campaigns in the years following the rescission of

military authorization. During this same period, President Nixon vetoed or threatened to veto a

number of appropriations bills that would have either prohibited funds from being used for certain

military operations in Southeast Asia or required a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from

Vietnam. In 1973, two years after rescinding military authorization, Congress was finally able to

enact appropriations limitations, signed by the President, that barred combat operations in

Indochina.91 These appropriations measures were approved only after the signing of a cease-fire

agreement with North Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, and

served primarily to end the aerial bombing campaign in Cambodia and prevent U.S. forces from

being reintroduced into hostilities.

In sum, in situations where Congress seeks to prevent the executive’s continuation of military

combat operations, it may be procedurally easier for Congress to deny appropriations than it

would be to statutorily compel a withdrawal from hostilities. However, past experience suggests

that, at least in certain circumstances, policy considerations may cause the two branches to view

the rescission of military authorization as a more appealing alternative—postponing an interbranch conflict on appropriations for a later date, enabling Congress to signal its interest in

winding down a conflict, and (at least temporarily) preserving the President’s discretion as to how

the conflict is waged.

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Although Congress has the power to rescind authorization of a military conflict or enact a

declaration of peace, the practical effect that such an action might have on the President’s ability

to continue a military conflict may nevertheless remain difficult to predict. Historically, courts

have been unwilling to interpret a congressional rescission of military authorization as barring the

executive from continuing to wage a military campaign, at least so long as Congress continues to

appropriate money in support of such operations. Although the War Powers Resolution

establishes procedures by which Congress may direct the withdrawal of U.S. troops from military

conflicts that lack statutory authorization, the constitutionality and practical effects of these

requirements have been questioned. Finally, even in the absence of express congressional

authorization, the President may possess some inherent or implied power as Commander in Chief

to continue to engage in certain military operations. The following sections explain these points

in greater detail.

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Jurisprudence suggests that courts would not necessarily view a repeal of prior authorization, by

itself, as compelling the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. As an overarching matter, courts

have been highly reluctant to act in cases involving national security, especially when they

E.g., P.L. 93-50, §§ 304-307 (1973) (preventing funding expenditures from being used “in or over . . . or off the

shores of” Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam after August 15, 1973). For further background and

examples of funding restrictions proposed and enacted, see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding

Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, by (name redacted), and CRS

Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and

Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by (name redacted) et al.

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require a pronouncement as to the legality of a military conflict or the strategies used therein.92

Many such cases have been dismissed without reaching the merits of the arguments at issue,

including when they involve a political question that the judiciary considers itself ill-suited to

answer.93 Legal actions brought by Members of Congress challenging the lawfulness of military

actions have had no greater success than suits brought by private citizens.94 While the courts have

suggested a willingness to intervene in disputes between the two branches that reach a legal (as

opposed to political) impasse, they have yet to find an impasse on matters of war that has required

judicial settlement. In other words, as long as Congress retains options for bringing about a

military disengagement but has not exercised them, courts are unlikely to get involved.95

The Vietnam conflict is the lone instance where Congress repealed military authorization while

major combat operations were still ongoing. Although the Nixon Administration significantly

decreased the number of U.S. troops present in South Vietnam following the repeal of the Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution and enactment of the Mansfield Amendment in 1971,96 major combat

This is not to say that every legal challenge to a wartime activity is doomed to failure. In some circumstances, the

courts have found unlawful certain military activities involving the seizure of property or the detention of enemy

combatants, at least in instances such action was deemed to lack sufficient congressional authorization. See, e.g., Little

v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804) (upholding damage award to owners of U.S. merchant ship seized during quasiwar with France, when Congress had not authorized such seizures); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (finding unlawful the government seizure of property to settle labor dispute during Korean War);

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding that federal habeas statute applied to persons detained in Guantanamo Bay

pursuant to the “war on terror”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (persons deemed “enemy combatants” in the

“war on terror” have right to challenge detention before a neutral decision-maker); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.

2749 (2006) (finding that military tribunals convened by presidential order did not comply with the Uniform Code of

Military Justice).

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court described situations where the political question doctrine

was implicated:

It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the

questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which

identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any

case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional

commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s

undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of

government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;

or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on

one question.

Id. at 217.

For background and examples, see CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress

Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution, by (name redacted).

See, e.g, Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp.2d 34 (D. D.C. 1999) (dismissing action seeking declaration that the

President acted unlawfully in ordering air strikes in Kosovo and Yugoslavia without congressional authorization,

because impasse had not been reached, as Congress had not barred introduction of U.S. forces or barred appropriations

from being used for such purpose).

In a statement upon signing into law legislation containing the Mansfield Amendment, President Nixon claimed that

its instructions were non-binding and pledged to continue his own policies for ending the war. Courts reached different

conclusions as to the binding nature of the Mansfield Amendment’s instructions for withdrawal. In 1972, a district

court in the Second Circuit concluded, in an opinion affirmed without opinion by the court of appeals, that the

Amendment “had binding force and effect on every officer of the Government...[and] illegalized the pursuit of an

inconsistent executive or administration policy.” DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y., 1972), aff’d without

opinion, 456 F.2d 1335 (2nd Cir. 1972). A year later, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while not deciding

the issue, suggested that the binding nature of the Amendment was unsettled, and noted that “weighty constitutional

considerations which support the President in his duties as Commander-in-Chief preclude too hasty an adoption of the

(continued...)

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operations continued into 1973, when Congress cut off all funding for military operations in

Indochina.

During this period, federal courts heard a number of suits challenging the legality of continued

hostilities in the absence of congressional authorization. None of these challenges proved

successful, in large part because Congress continued to appropriate money for military

operations. It is a well-established principle that Congress’s appropriation of funds may serve in

some circumstances to confer authority for executive action.97 Reviewing courts have found this

principle no less applicable concerning matters of war. The appropriation of billions of dollars in

support of U.S. combat operations in Indochina, even after the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin

resolution, was viewed as congressional authorization for continued U.S. participation in

hostilities,98 regardless of whether some Members of Congress had a motivation for approving

continued appropriations other than that reflected in the express language of the enacted

legislation.99

Courts have also declined on political question grounds to examine the motives of Congress in

choosing to appropriate funds after rescinding direct authorization for U.S. military activities.100

In the words of one court, any attempt to assess Congress’s intentions in appropriating funds, and

determining whether such appropriations were truly meant to further continuing hostilities, would

necessarily “require the interrogation of members of Congress regarding what they intended by

their votes, and then synthesization of the various answers. To do otherwise would call for gross

(...continued)

view” that the Amendment was binding. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1156-1157 (2nd Cir. 1973).

Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947). See also Berk v. Laird 317 F. Supp. 715,

727-728 (D.C.N.Y. 1970) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing congressional appropriations as

authorizing executive activity, and concluding that Congress’s appropriations for ongoing military operations in

Indochina constituted authorization of those activities). Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 2000 OLC LEXIS

16, Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo (2000), at * 14-33 (discussing judicial and scholarly recognition

of appropriations statutes serving to authorize combat operations) [hereinafter “OLC Opinion on Hostilities in

Kosovo”].

See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (“In other words, there was

sufficient legislative action in extending the Selective Service Act and in appropriating billions of dollars to carry on

military and naval operations in Vietnam to ratify and approve the measures taken by the Executive, even in the

absence of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.”); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404

U.S. 869 (“The framers’ intent to vest the war power in Congress is in no way defeated by permitting an inference of

authorization from legislative action furnishing the manpower and materials of war for the protracted military operation

in Southeast Asia.”); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding that Constitution had not been

breached when President acted with support of Congress, including through the appropriation of billions of dollars to

support ongoing combat operations); see also Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1970) (decided prior to repeal

of Gulf of Tonkin resolution, but recognizing that continued appropriation of funds as authorization of conflict’s

continuation).

See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1313-1314 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (finding

appropriations legislation gave President sufficient authority to order the bombing of Cambodia, despite claim by some

Members of Congress that legislation was “coerced” by presidential veto of appropriations bills that would have

immediately cut off funding of such acts); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D.C.Mass. 1973) (same).

100

Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043 (the decision to endorse military action through appropriations rather than direct

authorization was “committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the power and competency of the judiciary,

because there are no intelligible and objectively manageable standards by which to judge such actions”); Sarnoff v.

Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (“Whether a plaintiff challenges the selective

service system or the foreign aid and appropriations aspects of congressional cooperation in the present conflict, he

presents a political question which we decline to adjudicate.”); Berk, 317 F. Supp. at 728-729 (recognizing that method

that Congress chooses to endorse or authorize action is a political question).

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speculation in a delicate matter pertaining to foreign relations.”101 Such an examination of

Congress’s motivations was deemed beyond the scope of appropriate judicial scrutiny.102

Some argued that Congress’s termination of statutory authorization for ongoing hostilities and

instruction that the conflict end at the soonest practical date barred the President, at the very least,

from “escalating” hostilities. Though the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested in a

1971 case that this argument might be valid,103 subsequent rulings indicated that the court would

only be willing to consider this argument in very limited circumstances. Notably, in the 1973 case

of DaCosta v. Laird,104 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a challenge to the

President’s order to mine the harbors of North Vietnam, where it was argued that this order

represented an unlawful escalation of hostilities in light of congressional enactments ordering the

withdrawal of U.S. troops at the earliest practicable date. The circuit court dismissed this

challenge because it raised a nonjusticiable political question. Deciding such a case would require

the court to assess the strategy and tactics used by the executive to wind down a conflict, an

assessment it was ill-equipped to make:

Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the

nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot

reasonably determine whether a specific military operation constitutes an “escalation” of the

war or is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan. What if, for

example, the war “de-escalates” so that it is waged as it was prior to the mining of North

Vietnam’s harbors, and then “escalates” again? Are the courts required to oversee the

conduct of the war on a daily basis, away from the scene of action? In this instance, it was

the President’s view that the mining of North Vietnam’s harbor was necessary to preserve

the lives of American soldiers in South Vietnam and to bring the war to a close. History will

tell whether or not that assessment was correct, but without the benefit of such extended

hindsight we are powerless to know.105

Though the circuit court did not completely rule out the possibility that a further escalation of

hostilities could be deemed unlawful, the court suggested it would be willing to consider such

arguments only in the most limited of circumstances. For example, the court suggested that a

“radical change in the character of war operations—as by an intentional policy of indiscriminate

bombing of civilians without any military objective—might be sufficiently measurable judicially

to warrant a court’s consideration.”106

In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, decided later that year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed

a lower court decision that had declared unlawful the continued bombing of Cambodia following

the removal of U.S. troops and prisoners of war from Vietnam. The circuit court held that it was a

nonjusticiable political question as to whether the bombing violated the Mansfield Amendment’s

instruction that hostilities be terminated at the “earliest practicable date.” Comparing the situation

with that at issue in DaCosta, the court found that the challenge raised “precisely the questions of

fact involving military and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary.”107 Further, even

101

Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.Supp. 689, 706 (D.C.Pa. 1972), aff’d without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).

Id.; Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1314 &n.4.

103

DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1370.

104

DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973).

105

Id. at 1155.

106

Id. at 1156 (italics added).

107

Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1309-1310 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).

102

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assuming arguendo that the military and diplomatic issues raised by the bombing were judicially

manageable, the circuit court found that Congress had authorized the bombing through continued

appropriations.108

Taken together, these cases suggest that a reviewing court would probably not interpret a repeal of

prior military authorization as requiring the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from ongoing

hostilities in Iraq. Further, courts may be reluctant to assess whether specific military tactics or

strategies pursued by the executive constitute an impermissible “escalation” of a conflict in the

aftermath of such a repeal.109 Accordingly, it does not appear that the termination of direct

authorization to use force, absent additional action such as the denial of appropriations or

possibly the inclusion of an unambiguous deadline for troop withdrawal, would be interpreted by

a reviewing court as constraining the executive’s ability to continue U.S. combat operations.

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The consequences of a repeal of an authorization to use military force were arguably made more

significant with the enactment of the War Powers Resolution (WPR).110 Enacted in 1973 over

President Nixon’s veto, the WPR was an effort by Congress to reassert its role in matters of

war—a role that many Members believed had been allowed to erode during the Korean and

Vietnam conflicts. Among other things, the WPR establishes a procedure by which Congress may

(theoretically) compel the President to withdraw U.S. forces from foreign-based conflicts when a

declaration of war or authorization to use military force has been terminated. Specifically, WPR §

5(c) provides that

at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of

the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific

statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so

directs by concurrent resolution.

While § 5(c) offers a mechanism by which Congress might compel presidential compliance with

a law that had rescinded statutory authorization to use military force,111 its constitutional validity

is doubtful given the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 1983 case of INS v. Chadha.112 In Chadha, the

Court held that for a resolution to become a law, it must go through the bicameral and

108

Id. at 1313. Specifically, the court noted the language of § 108 of the Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations

for Fiscal 1974, P.L. 93-52, which barred funding for military operations in and around Indochina after August 15,

1973. The Court inferred from this language that military activities at issue in the case before it, occurring before this

deadline, were authorized.

109

See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 540 (1970) (characterizing the extension of the conflict in Vietnam

into Cambodia as a “necessary incidental, tactical incursion ordered by the Commander in Chief” that would be

authorized so long as the military operations in Vietnam were found to be authorized), rev’d on other grounds, 464

F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972)(ordering district court to dismiss for lack of standing).

110

P.L. 93-148 (1973) [hereinafter “War Powers Resolution” or “WPR”]. For further background and explanation of

the War Powers Resolution, see CRS Report RL32267, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Four Years, by

(name redacted).

111

The wording of the War Powers Resolution makes clear that appropriations in support of military operations does

not in itself constitute “specific statutory authorization” of those operations for purposes of WPR requirements. See

WPR § 8(a) (noting that authorization is not to be inferred from provisions “contained in any appropriation Act, unless

such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... [and states] that

it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization...”).

112

462 U.S. 919 (1983).

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presentment process in its entirety.113 Accordingly, a concurrent or simple resolution could not be

used as a “legislative veto” against executive action. Although the Chadha Court did not

expressly find WPR § 5(c) to be unconstitutional, it was listed in Justice White’s dissent as one of

nearly 200 legislative vetoes for which the majority had sounded the “death knell,”114 and most

commentators have agreed with this assessment.115 Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the WPR

could be used to enforce a congressional repeal of an authorization to use military force in Iraq.

Section 5(b) of the WPR establishes a requirement for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 60 days after

armed forces are introduced without congressional authorization into a situation where hostilities

are imminent, unless Congress enacts legislation providing authority for the use of force or

extends the deadline.116 This provision would not appear to supply a means by which Congress

could compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, as the introduction of those forces was

done pursuant to congressional authorization.117 Even if Congress were to rescind that

authorization, the legality of actions taken pursuant to it would not be nullified.118 Arguably,

however, a substantial increase in troop levels that takes place subsequent to any repeal of the

authorization for use of military force against Iraq could trigger the requirements of WPR §

5(b),119 although it is unclear how large such an increase would need to be before it would be

sufficiently “substantial.”120 Congress has in the past enacted or considered legislation declaring

113

Id. at 951.

Id. at 967, 1003 (White, J., dissenting).

115

See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Comm. Rep., Persian Gulf and the War Powers Resolution, S.Rept. No. 106,

100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1987) (describing § 5(c) as being “effectively nullified” by the Chadha decision); HENKIN,

supra note 55, at 126-127 (recognizing invalidation of § 5(c) by Chadha and describing arguments to the contrary as

“plausible but not compelling”); WORMUTH AND FIRMAGE, supra note 13, at 222 (noting that the reasoning of Chadha

“apparently invalidates secion 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution”); Ronald D. Rotunda, the War Powers Act in

Perspective, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (1997) (claiming that most “scholars have concluded that...[§ 5(c)] is

unconstitutional ever since INS v. Chadha). In contrast, some have argued that neither a declaration of war nor a

subsequent rescission of authorization to use force constitutes an “ordinary” act of legislation falling under the

requirements of the Presentment Clause. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70

VA. L. REV. 101, 130-132 (1984). The legitimacy of this argument is untested and highly controversial, as Congress has

always presented a declaration of war or authorization to use military force to the president. Further, even assuming

arguendo that a declaration of war does not need to be presented to the President, it is not necessarily clear that

legislation ending hostilities would also not require presentment. See HENKIN, supra note 55, at 127, 379; Carter, supra,

at 130-132 (describing weaknesses of argument against presentment requirement); see also Sidak, supra note 85, at 8485 (discussing historical and scholarly view that presentment is necessary).

116

The requirement in § 5(b) does not apply in cases in which Congress “is physically unable to meet as a result of an

armed attack upon the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1554. The 60-day deadline is automatically extended for thirty days

“if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the

safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a

prompt removal of such forces.”

117

P.L. 107-243, § 5 (c) (“Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific authorization within the

meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”)

118

See DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (the repeal of Gulf of Tonkin resolution “ did not wipe out its history nor could it

have the effect of a nunc pro tunc action”).

119

P.L. 93-148, §§ 4(a), 5(b). The reporting requirement in § 4(a), which begins the sixty-day withdrawal deadline, also

comes into effect in the event troops are introduced in “numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed

Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.” However, it appears that the deadline only applies if

the report was made necessary due to circumstances described in § 4(a)(1), where troops are initially introduced into

hostilities. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 103 (1990)(explaining that the omission of a

requirement for the President to specify whether a report is submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1) or § 4(a)(2) or (3) makes it

impossible to know whether the sixty-day time period has been triggered).

120

In addition, it could be argued that even if Congress repealed the AUMF, the subsequent appropriation of funds in

support of military operations would constitute legal authorization for such activity—at least in circumstances where

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114

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the 60-day limit to have taken effect, although apparently with little practical effect.121 In any

case, it appears that WPR section 5(c), which permits Congress to compel the withdrawal of U.S.

troops via concurrent resolution, was intended to address situations where Congress desired an

end to previously authorized hostilities.

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Even in the absence of express congressional authorization, it is well-recognized that the

President may still employ military force in some circumstances pursuant to his powers as

Commander in Chief and his inherent authority in the area of foreign affairs,122 at least so long as

no statute stands in his way. A President would likely argue that this inherent authority would

permit him to instruct U.S. forces to engage in certain military operations related to an ongoing

conflict, even if statutory authorization for U.S. participation in that conflict had been rescinded.

Further, even if Congress were to enact legislation requiring the cessation of military operations

after a specified date, it is highly unlikely that this measure would be interpreted to prohibit any

and all military operations, specifically as they relate to rescue and evacuation missions. It

appears well-understood, at least as a matter of historical practice, that such missions are not

intended to be covered under legislation otherwise barring future participation in hostilities.123

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Congress has used its spending power to restrict the deployment and use of the armed forces in

the past.124 In 1973, for instance, after other legislative efforts failed to draw down U.S.

(...continued)

Congress intended appropriations to support further hostilities, rather than simply to protect troops already in the field.

See OLC Opinion on Hostilities in Kosovo, supra note 97, at * 33-52 (discussing instances in which appropriations

suggest a clear intent by Congress to authorize further hostilities, and arguing that the WPR “ cannot be read to deny

legal effect to...[the] clear intent” of Congress to use appropriations measures to authorize further hostilities).

121

See GLENNON, supra note 119, at 104 (noting efforts with respect to Lebanon in 1983, P.L. 98-119, and Grenada, in

which case no such final triggering legislation emerged, despite both Houses having passed measures to that effect).

The necessity for separate legislation to trigger the triggering provision, subject as it is to presidential veto, seems to

defeat the purpose for § 5(b). See id. at 105 (opining that the provision’s “central objective was to create a selfactivating mechanism to control abuse of presidential discretion in the event Congress lacked the backbone to do so”).

122

See supra at 9-15.

123

For example, even after Congress enacted legislation cutting off funding for all combat operations in Indochina,

President Ford’s subsequent use of military forces to evacuate U.S. citizens and third country nationals was not

seriously questioned, nor was a subsequent authorization of an operation to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez from

Cambodian territory (a mission which was reported to Congress following the procedures of the War Powers

Resolution, but only after the operation was completed). For background on congressional attitudes towards these

rescue missions, see FISHER, supra note 11, at 157-158. See also Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F.Supp. 1024, 1030

(D.C. Cal. 1980). The Rappenecker case involved a civil suit by former crewmen of the Mayaguez for injuries they

received during their rescue. Although the President ordered their rescue in the absence of prior congressional

authorization, the Court assumed that the order was constitutionally valid. Id.

124

For examples of such measures and a discussion of the context in which they were enacted, see CRS Report

RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas

Deployments, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL33803,

Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military

(continued...)

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participation in combat operations in Indochina,125 Congress effectively ended it by means of

appropriations riders prohibiting use of funds. Section 307 of the Second Supplemental

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1973, P.L. 93-50 (1973), stated that, “None of the funds herein

appropriated under this act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in

or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, and after August 15, 1973, no other

funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.” Section

108 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 1974, P.L. 93-52 (1973),

provided that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds

herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly

combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North

Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.” A year later, Congress passed an authorizing

statute, section 38(f)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559 (1974), which set a

total ceiling of U.S. civilian and military personnel in Vietnam of 4,000 six months after

enactment and a total ceiling of 3,000 within one year of enactment.

A provision of an authorization act, section 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms

Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329 (1976), comprehensively prohibited using funds for

military and paramilitary operations in Angola. It stated that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for

the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting, augmenting, directly or

indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to

conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola, unless and until Congress expressly

authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section.

This section added that if the President determined that the prohibited assistance to Angola should

be furnished, he should submit to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations a report describing recommended amounts and categories of assistance to be provided

and identities of proposed aid recipients. This report also was to include a certification of his

determination that furnishing such assistance was important to U.S. national security interests and

an unclassified detailed statement of reasons supporting it.

Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year

1976, P.L. 94-330 (1976), signed the same day as P.L. 94-329, provided that, “None of the funds

appropriated or made available pursuant to this act shall be obligated to finance directly or

indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola.”

In the 1980s, various versions of the Boland Amendment were enacted to prohibit using funds for

various military activities in or around Nicaragua.126 For example, section 8066 of the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act included in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution

for Fiscal Year, 1985, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984), for example, stated that “During Fiscal

(...continued)

Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by (nam

e redacted) et See

al. also, e.g., (name redacted),

How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM.J.INT’L. L. 758

(1989), and Tiefer, supra note 4.

125

See P.L. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (repealing Gulf of Tonkin Resolution); P.L. 92-156, § 601(a), 85 Stat. 423, 430

(Mansfield Amendment); see also P.L. 92-156, § 501(a), 85 Stat. 423, 427 (1971) (Fullbright proviso).

126

E.g., P.L. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1904, 1935 (1984); see 133 Cong Rec. 15664-15701 (June 15, 1987) (detailing

various forms of the Boland Amendment that were enacted).

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Year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or

any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be

obligated or expended for the purpose, or which would have the effect of supporting, indirectly or

indirectly, military or paramilitary operation in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,

movement or individual.” This provision stated that after February 28, 1985, the President could

expend $14 million in funds if the President made a report to Congress which specified certain

criteria, including the need to provide further assistance for military or paramilitary operations

prohibited by the Boland Amendment, and if Congress passed a joint resolution approving such

action.

In the 1990s, Congress enacted section 8151 of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994,

P.L. 103-139 (1993), which approved using armed forces for certain purposes including combat in

a security role to protect United Nations units in Somalia, but cut off funding after March 31,

1994, except for a limited number of military troops to protect American diplomatic personnel

and American citizens unless further authorized by Congress. Section 8135 of the DOD

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, P.L. 103-335 (1994), provided that, “None of the funds

appropriated in this act may be used for the continuous presence in Somalia of United States

military personnel, except for the protection of United States personnel, after September 30,

1994.” In title IX of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, P.L. 103-335 (1994),

Congress provided that, “No funds provided in this act are available for United States military

participation to continue Operation Support Hope in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994,

except for any action that is necessary to protect the lives of United States citizens.”

These examples reveal the approaches that Congress has employed to prohibit or restrict using

military force. They have ranged from the least comprehensive “none of the funds appropriated in

this act may be used” to the most comprehensive “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no

funds may be used.” The phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this act” limits only funds

appropriated and made available in the act that carries the restriction, but not funds, if any, that

may be available pursuant to other appropriations acts or authorizing statutes. To restrict funds

appropriated and made available not only in the act that carries the restriction, but also pursuant

to other appropriations acts, Congress has used the phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this

act or any other act may be used.” The most comprehensive restriction is “notwithstanding any

other provision of law, no funds may be used.” This language precludes using funds that have

been appropriated in any appropriations acts as well as any funds that may be made available

pursuant to any authorizing statutes including laws that authorize transfers of appropriated or

nonappropriated funds.127

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There is a parliamentary impediment to including the phrases “none of the funds appropriated in

this act or any other act may be used” or “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds

may be used” in a general appropriations bill. House Rule XXI, clause 2, makes subject to a point

127

See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. chap. 15, subchap. III “Transfers and Reimbursements” for provisions that authorize transfers of

funds, including the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535 and 1536, which allows an agency to transfer funds to another

agency if the receiving agency can provide or get by contract goods or services less expensively or more conveniently

than the ordering agency can get goods or services by a contract with a commercial enterprise. Transfer authority also

is included in some other provisions of the United States Code that apply to individual departments and agencies and

sometimes in appropriations acts.

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of order language that changes existing law (i.e., legislation) in a general appropriations bill (i.e.,

one providing appropriations for several agencies). A bill that appropriates funds for a single

purpose or a single agency is not a general appropriations bill to which this restriction applies.

The intent of Rule XXI, clause 2 is to separate the authorizing and appropriating functions and

place them in separate committees.

Nonetheless, a practice has developed that just as the House may decline to appropriate funds for

a purpose that has been authorized by law, it may by limitation prohibit appropriating money in a

general appropriations bill for part of a purpose while appropriating funds for the remainder of it.

Such a limitation “... may apply solely to the money of the appropriation under consideration”

and “... may not apply to money appropriated in other acts.”128 Thus, the phrase “none of the

funds appropriated in this act may be used” is not subject to a point of order, but the phrase “none

of the funds appropriated in this act or any other act may be used” and the phrase

“notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used” do not appear to qualify as

permissible limitations in a general appropriations bill and would be subject to points of order

under Rule XXI, clause 2 because they are considered legislation. To avoid a point of order, a

limitation in a general appropriations bill may not impose new or additional duties on an

executive official, may not restrict authority to incur obligations, and may not make an

appropriation contingent upon (i.e., “unless” or “until”) the occurrence of an event not required

by law.129 If a Member raises a point of order that language in a general appropriations bill

violates Rule XXI, clause 2, and the point of order is sustained by the chair, the legislative

language is stricken.

Although legislation in a general appropriations bill is subject to a point of order under Rule XXI,

clause 2, a restriction in a House rule is not self-enforcing. Consequently, legislation may be

included in a general appropriations bill and become law if no point of order is raised, if a point

of order is overruled, or if the House either suspends the rules or agrees to a special order known

as a rule reported from the Committee on Rules that waives the point of order against including

such legislation.130

Like House Rule XXI, clause 2, Senate Standing Rule XVI also prohibits including legislation in

a general appropriations bill, but the Senate rule permits legislation to be included if it is germane

to the subject matter of the bill under consideration. If a point of order that language constitutes

legislation on an appropriations bill is raised, the proponent of the language may defend it by

asserting that it is germane. The question of germaneness is not decided by the presiding officer;

it is submitted to the Senate. If a majority of Senators vote that the language in question is

germane, it remains in the bill and the point of order that it constitutes legislation is dismissed and

is not presented to the presiding officer for a ruling. If a majority of the Senate votes that

language is not germane, the presiding officer then rules on whether it constitutes legislation. If

the point of order is sustained, the language is removed; if it is overruled, the language remains in

the bill and can be enacted.131

128

See John V. Sullivan, House Parliamentarian, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of

Representatives One Hundred Ninth Congress, H. DOC. 108-241, at § 1053 (2005).

129

See id. at §§ 1053-57 for an explanation of limitations.

130

Id. at § 1058.

131

Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian Emeritus, and Alan S. Frumin, Senate Parliamentarian, Riddick’s Senate

Procedure: Precedents and Practices, S. DOC. 101-28, at 101 et seq. (1992).

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As mentioned earlier, the intent of these House and Senate rules is to separate authorizing and

appropriating functions by constraining the bodies from enacting legislation in appropriations

bills, but prohibiting use of funds for a purpose or purposes does not contravene the House or

Senate rule provided that the prohibition applies only to funds appropriated in the bill being

considered.

Because an appropriations act generally funds programs for a fiscal year, each provision

contained in the act is presumed to be in effect only until the end of the fiscal year. “A provision

contained in an annual appropriation act is not to be construed as permanent legislation unless the

language used therein or the nature of the provision makes it clear that Congress intended it to be

permanent. The presumption can be overcome if the provision uses language indicating futurity

or if the provision is of a general character bearing no relation to the object of the appropriation....

The most common word of futurity is ‘hereafter’ and provisions using this term have often been

construed to be permanent.”132 Other words of futurity include “after the date of approval of this

act,”“henceforth,” and specific references to future fiscal years.133

While including a word or words of futurity has the effect of making a provision extend beyond

the fiscal year covered by an appropriations act, such a provision would constitute legislation that

would appear to be subject to a point of order under House Rule XXI, clause 2 and Senate

Standing Rule XVI during congressional consideration. If the parliamentary impediments can be

overcome, however, such legislation may be enacted and become valid law.

¢ȱȱȱȱ

A fundamental principle in appropriations law is that appropriations may not be augmented with

funds from outside sources without statutory authority.

As a general proposition, an agency may not augment its appropriations from outside sources

without specific statutory authority. When Congress makes an appropriation, it also is

establishing an authorized program level. In other words, it is telling the agency that it

cannot operate beyond the level that it can finance under its appropriation. To permit an

agency to operate beyond this level with funds derived from some other source without

specific congressional sanction would amount to a usurpation of the congressional

prerogative. Restated, the objective of the rule against augmentation of appropriations is to

prevent a government agency from undercutting the congressional power of the purse by

circuitously exceeding the amount Congress has appropriated for that activity.134

While no statute in precise terms expressly prohibits augmenting appropriations, the concept is

based on some appropriations laws. The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b),

requires that a government official who receives money for the government from any source must

deposit it in the U.S. Treasury as soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim.

Under the Purpose Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1301, appropriated funds may be used only for the

purposes for which they are appropriated. A criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 209, prohibits

132

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, I PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-34

(3d ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted).

133

Id. at 2-36.

134

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, II PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, 6162 (3d ed. 2006).

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supplementing the salary of an officer or employee of the government from any source other than

the United States government.135

An example of a statute permitting gift funds from other countries to finance a war is section 202

of the Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-403 (1990), passed before the first

Gulf war. Section 202 added a new section 2608 to title 10 of the United States Code to authorize

any person, foreign government, or international organization to contribute money or real or

personal property for use by the Department of Defense. However, before the Department of

Defense could spend the funds, they had to be first appropriated by Congress.

The Purpose Statute states that funds may be used only for purposes for which they have been

appropriated; by implication it precludes using funds for purposes that Congress has prohibited.

When Congress states that no funds may be used for a purpose, an agency would violate the

Purpose Statute if it should use funds for that purpose; it also in some circumstances could

contravene a provision of the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Section 1341 prohibits

entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in excess of an amount appropriated

unless authorized by law. If Congress has barred using funds for a purpose, entering into an

obligation or expending any amount for it would violate the act by exceeding the amount—

zero—that Congress has appropriated for the prohibited purpose.136

To determine whether an agency has violated the Antideficiency Act, it would be necessary to

review the language in an appropriations act or authorizing statute that includes a prohibition on

using funds for a specific purpose. If an appropriations act prohibits using funds “in this act” for a

purpose, for example, expending any amount from that act for the prohibited purpose would

appear to contravene the Antideficiency Act because Congress has appropriated zero funds for it.

Entering into obligations or expending funds, if any, that may be available from a different

appropriations act or other fund for that purpose, however, would not appear to be prohibited by

the Antideficiency Act; an agency would be able to use funds from sources other than the

appropriations act that contains the prohibition or limitation.

Violating the Antideficiency Act would be significant because it has notification and penalty

provisions not found in the Purpose Statute. The Purpose Statute does not expressly provide for

penalties; it generally is enforced by imposing administrative sanctions on the officer or

employee who violates the statute.137 The Antideficiency Act, by contrast, contains a provision

that not only provides for administrative discipline, including, when circumstances warrant,

suspension from duty without pay or removal from office, 31 U.S.C. § 1349, but also one that

requires an immediate report of a violation to the President and Congress, 31 U.S.C. § 1351.

Moreover, the Antideficiency Act has a criminal penalty provision: Section 1350 of title 31

provides that an officer or employee who “knowingly and willfully” violates the act “shall be

fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” Although the act

has a criminal provision, no one appears to have been prosecuted or convicted for violating it.138

Another criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 435, not part of the Antideficiency Act, makes

punishable by a fine of $1,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, knowingly

135

Id. at 6-163.

Id. at 6-62.

137

Id. at 6-78.

138

Id. at 6-141.

136

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contracting to erect, repair, or furnish any public building or for any public improvement for an

amount more than the amount appropriated for that purpose.

The Antideficiency Act prohibits entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in

excess of an amount appropriated unless authorized by law. One law that authorizes entering into

obligations in advance of appropriations is the Feed and Forage Act. Also referred to as Revised

Statute 3732, the Feed and Forage Act is part of and an express exception to the Adequacy of

Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 11. Section 11 generally states that no government contract or

purchase may be made unless it is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its

fulfillment. The Feed and Forage Act exception authorizes the Department of Defense and the

Department of Transportation139 with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as

service in the Navy to make contracts in advance of appropriations for clothing, subsistence,

forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies. Obligations entered into

pursuant to Feed and Forage Act authority must not exceed the necessities of the current year. The

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation immediately must advise Congress of

the exercise of this authority and report quarterly on the estimated obligations incurred pursuant

to it.140 Although the Feed and Forage Act authorizes entering into obligations such as contracts,

actual expenditures are not permitted pursuant to this authority until Congress appropriates the

necessary funds.141

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On May 1, 2007, President George W. Bush vetoed the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, H.R. 1591.142 In his veto message,

the President said that the bill was objectionable because it would set an arbitrary date to begin

withdrawing American forces from Iraq and would micromanage commanders in the field by

restricting their ability to fight. He also objected to the inclusion of billions of dollars of spending

and other provisions not related to the war. Finally, he asserted that the bill was unconstitutional

because it “purport[ed] to direct the conduct of operations of war in a way that infringes upon the

powers vested in the presidency by the Constitution, including as commander in chief of the

Armed Forces.”143 The next day, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 222 to 203—twothirds not voting in the affirmative—failed to override the veto.144

139

6 U.S.C. § 468 transfers the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security, but a corresponding change to 41

U.S.C. § 11 has not been enacted.

140

See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 238-247 (1975) for an explanation of the Feed and Forage Act.

141

See Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Budget Execution Flexibilities, Fiscal Year 2005 (2004), available at

http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/execution/Final_Budget_Execution.pdf.

142

The House agreed to its version of H.R. 1591 by a vote of 218 to 212 on March 23, 2007. 153 CONG. REC. H2999

(daily ed. March 23, 2007). On March 29, 2007, the Senate agreed to its version of H.R. 1591 by a vote of 51 to 47.

153 CONG. REC. S4093 (daily ed. March 29, 2007). The House agreed to the conference report to accompany H.R. 1591

on April 25, 2007, by a vote of 218 to 208. 153 CONG. REC. H4157-H4158 (daily ed. April 25, 2007). See 153 CONG.

REC. H3823 (daily ed. April 24, 2007) for a reprint of the conference report, H.Rept. 110-107. The Senate agreed to the

conference report on April 26, 2007, by a vote of 51 to 46. 153 CONG. REC. S5153 (daily ed. April 26, 2007). For a

comprehensive discussion of H.R. 1591 and the status of followup legislation, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007

Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by (name redacted).

143

See 153 CONG. REC. H4315 (daily ed. May 2, 2007) for a reprint of the veto message.

144

Id. at H4326.

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Section 1901 of H.R. 1591, had it become law, would have provided that none of the funds

appropriated or made available in the supplemental appropriations bill or in any other act could

be used to deploy any armed forces unit unless the chief of the military department concerned

certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services

in advance of deployment that the unit was “fully mission capable” (i.e., “capable of performing

assigned mission essential tasks to prescribed standards under the conditions expected in the

theater of operations, consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Defense

readiness reporting system”). The President would have had the authority to waive the capability

requirement on a unit-by-unit basis if he certified in writing to the appropriate committees that

deploying a unit that is not fully mission-capable were required for reasons of national security

and transmitted a report detailing the reason or reasons.

Under section 1902, no funds appropriated or made available in the supplemental or in any other

act would have been permitted to be obligated or expended to initiate developing, to continue

developing, or to execute any order that would have the effect of extending the deployment of

any Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard unit beyond 365 days or of any Marine Corps

or Marine Corps Reserve unit beyond 210 days. This limitation was not to be construed to require

force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total U.S. force levels in Iraq prior to January 10,

2007. The President would have had the authority to waive this limitation on a unit-by-unit basis

by certifying in writing national security reasons and reporting details to the Committees on

Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services.

Pursuant to section 1903, no funds in the supplemental or in any other act were to be available for

deploying Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard units for Operation Iraqi Freedom if

such unit had been deployed within the previous 365 days, or for deploying any Marine Corps or

Marine Corps Reserve unit if such unit had been deployed within the previous 210 days. This

limitation was not to be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the levels

in that country prior to January 10, 2007. Like the limitations in sections 1901 and 1902, this one

would have been subject to waiver by the President on a unit-by unit basis under the certification

and notification procedures prescribed in the earlier limitations.

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Section 1904 modified House and Senate language relating to Iraqi benchmarks and timetables. It

would have required the President by July 1, 2007, to make and report to Congress

determinations relating to progress that the government of Iraq is making in meeting benchmarks

taken from the House and Senate bills. The President’s inability to make any of the

determinations relating to the benchmarks was to have resulted in the commencement of troop

redeployment from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of completing redeployment

within 180 days. If the President were able to make the determinations, the Secretary of Defense

would have been required to commence redeploying forces from Iraq not later than October 1,

2007, with a goal of completing redeployment within 180 days. In either case, funds appropriated

or otherwise made available in the bill or any other act were to be immediately available to plan

and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq.

Section 1904(a) of H.R. 1591 would have directed the President to determine and report findings

to Congress on or before July 1, 2007, that relate to several matters including whether the Iraqi

government—

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•

has given U.S. and Iraqi forces authority to pursue all extremists and is making

substantial progress in delivering Iraqi forces to Baghdad and protecting them

from political interference;

•

is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue

reconciliation initiatives, including enacting a hydro-carbon law, adopting

legislation for conducting provincial and local elections, reforming current laws

governing the de-Baathification process, amending the Iraqi constitution, and

allocating Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects;

•

is making, with U.S. armed forces, substantial progress in reducing the level of

sectarian violence in Iraq; and

•

is ensuring the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Parliament are

protected.

Under section 1904(e), after the conclusion of the 180-day redeployment period specified above,

the Secretary of Defense would not be permitted to deploy or maintain members of the U.S.

armed forces for any purpose other than the following:

•

protecting American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including U.S.

armed forces;

•

serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions;

•

engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or

capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global

reach; or

•

training members of the Iraqi security forces.

Section 1904(f) would have required that 50% of funds for assistance to Iraq under the headings

“Economic Support Fund” and “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement” was to be

withheld from obligation until the President had made a determination that the government of

Iraq has met certain benchmarks.

Finally, Section 1904(h) would have required that, beginning on September 1, 2007, and every 60

days thereafter, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces, Iraq, and the U.S. Ambassador to

Iraq were jointly to submit to Congress a report describing and assessing in detail the progress

that the government of Iraq is making regarding benchmarks listed in section 1904(a).

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Section 1311 would have prohibited the use of funds in the supplemental or in any other act to

establish any military installation or base for the permanent stationing of U.S. military forces in

Iraq or to exercise U.S. control over oil revenues in Iraq. Section 1312 would have denied

authority to use funds in the supplemental to contravene several conventions and laws, including

the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment and 18 U.S. Code section 2340A. This limitation also applied to

renditions. Section 1313 contained a requirement for the Secretary of Defense, within 30 days of

enactment and every 90 days thereafter, to submit to the congressional defense committees a

classified report assessing the individual transition readiness of units of Iraqi and Afghan security

forces.

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The House and Senate agreed to H.R. 2206, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina

Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-28, on May 24, 2007,145 and

the President signed it on May 25. This act provides supplemental funding through September 30,

2007, with no timetable for withdrawing troops. Section 1314 contains the major provisions

relating to Iraq; it establishes 18 political and security benchmarks for the Iraqi government to

meet. These benchmarks, similar to those that were included in the vetoed H.R. 1591, include

enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification and on ensuring equitable distribution

of hydrocarbon resources, increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of

operating independently, and allocating $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects,

including delivering essential services, on an equitable basis.

The President is required to submit reports to Congress by July 15, 2007, and by September 15,

2007, on whether the Iraqi government is making sufficient progress in achieving these

benchmarks. Obligation of reconstruction assistance to Iraq in the Economic Support Fund, about

$1.6 billion, is prohibited unless the President certifies in both reports that Iraq is making

progress on all the benchmarks or waives this requirement with a detailed rationale. The act

requires an assessment of progress by the Iraqi government in meeting the benchmarks from the

Government Accountability Office and an assessment of combat readiness of Iraqi security forces

from an independent private sector entity selected by the Department of Defense.

P.L. 110-28 does not include criteria relating to United States forces including mission readiness,

periods between deployments, and duration of deployments, which were a part of the vetoed H.R.

1591 and could have been waived on a unit-by-unit basis by the President for national security

reasons.

An earlier version of H.R. 2206, passed by the House, would have split the total amount into two

portions. The first portion, about $47.6 billion, would have been available immediately to fund

about two additional months of military operations. The second portion, about $53.2 billion,

would have been available only if the President on or before July 13, 2007, submitted a report to

Congress detailing progress of the Iraqi government in meeting political and security

benchmarks, similar to those that were included in the vetoed H.R. 1591, and a joint resolution of

approval was enacted into law.146 The Senate passed on May 17, 2007, a version of H.R. 2206

that expressed the sense of Congress in support of United States forces and requested a

conference with the House.147 The House earlier rejected by a vote of 171 to 255 H.R. 2337, a bill

to require the Department of Defense to redeploy service members and contractors from Iraq

within 180 days.148

145

The House divided the question and held two votes; the first one on $10.8 billion in congressional additions to the

request by the Department of Defense passed by a vote of 348 to 73, and the second one on $88.5 billion requested by

DOD passed by a vote of 280 to 142. See 153 CONG. REC. H5909-5911 (daily ed. May 25, 2007, which continued

proceedings of May 24) for these votes and 153 CONG. REC. H5776-H5800 and H5801-5805 (daily ed. May 25, 2007)

for the text of the first and second amendments, respectively. The Senate agreed to H.R. 2206 by a vote of 80 to 14. 153

CONG. REC. S6823 (daily ed. May 24, 2007).

146

The House agreed to its May 10 version of H.R. 2206 by a vote of 221 to 205. See 153 CONG. REC. H4831-H4854

and H4866-H4867 (daily ed. May 11, 2007) for the text and vote on H.R. 2206, respectively.

147

The Senate agreed to its May 17 version of H.R. 2206 by a vote of 94 to 1. See 153 CONG. REC. S6218-6219 (daily

ed. May 17, 2007) for the text and vote on H.R. 2206, respectively.

148

See 153 CONG. REC. H4796 and H4807 (daily ed. May 10, 2007) for the text and vote on H.R. 2337, respectively.

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The rule reported by the Committee on Rules which provided for consideration of H.R. 2206 in

the House of Representatives, H.Res. 486, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., makes in order as an amendment

the text of H.R. 2451, which requires withdrawing most United States forces from Iraq by June

28, 2008, when the House considers supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq

or Afghanistan for FY2008.149

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The Senate on December 18, 2007,150 and the House the following day151 passed H.R. 2764, the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161),152 which the President signed on

December 26, 2007. The act provides $70 billion in supplemental appropriations for military

activities in Iraq. Language requiring redeployment of U.S. armed forces from Iraq is not

included, but Section 609 of Division L of the act mandates that the Secretary of Defense should

report to Congress on progress toward stability in Iraq within 60 days after enactment and every

90 days thereafter. The Secretary’s reports should address several matters including measures of

political stability, primary indicators of the degree of security in Iraq, estimated strength of the

insurgency, criteria for assessing capabilities and readiness of Iraqi military forces and police, and

an assessment of U.S. military requirements, including planned force rotations through the end of

calendar year 2008. The supplemental funds for these military activities and the report

requirement were part of a floor amendment that the Senate agreed to by a vote of 70 to 25 on

December 18.153

Earlier that day, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have expressed the sense of the

Senate that the missions of U.S. armed forces in Iraq should change to more limited ones

announced by the President in a September 13, 2007, address to the nation—counterterrorism

operations; training, equipping, and supporting Iraqi forces; and the necessary mission of force

protection, with the goal of completing that transition by the end of 2008. The vote was 50 to 45,

with 60 votes required for passage.154 An amendment that would have directed the President to

commence redeploying U.S. armed forces from Iraq within 90 days after enactment and

prohibited funding continued deployments in Iraq after nine months from the enactment date

except for limited missions also did not pass by a vote of 24 to 71.155 Because these amendments

did not get 60 votes, they were withdrawn under the terms of the unanimous consent agreement.

On November 14, 2007, the House by a vote of 218 to 203 and 1 present passed H.R. 4156, the

Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008,156 that would have

provided $50 billion in supplemental funds for military activities in Iraq. A provision would have

directed the President within 30 days after enactment to commence an immediate and orderly

149

The House agreed to H.Res. 438 by a vote of 218 to 201. See 153 CONG. REC. H 5730 and 5748 for the text and vote

on H.Res. 438, respectively.

150

153 CONG. REC. S15888 (daily ed. December 18, 2007).

151

153 CONG. REC. H16913 (daily ed. December 19, 2007).

152

See CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations,

International Affairs, and Other Purposes, by (name redacted) et al., for more information.

153

153 CONG. REC. S15927 and S15860-S15861 (daily ed. December 18, 2007) for the text and vote, respectively.

154

Id. at S15929 and S15860 for the text and vote, respectively.

155

Id. at S15845 and S15853 for the text and vote, respectively.

156

See 153 CONG. REC. H13917 and 13943 (daily ed. November 14, 2007) for the text and vote, respectively.

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redeployment of U.S. armed forces from Iraq with a goal of completing a transition to a limited

presence and missions not later than December 15, 2008. After concluding the transition, the

Secretary of Defense would have been able to deploy or maintain U.S. armed forces in Iraq only

to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities, U.S. armed forces, and American citizens; to conduct limited

training, equipping, and providing logistical support to Iraqi security forces; and to engage in

targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda infiltrated groups, and other

terrorist organizations in Iraq.

Other provisions of House-passed H.R. 4156 would have prohibited using funds for any treatment

or technique not authorized in the Army Field Manual or in contravention of some statutes

enacted to implement the U.N. Convention Against Torture and denied funds to deploy any U.S.

armed forces unit to Iraq unless the President certified it as fully mission capable or waived the

certification requirement for national security reasons. They also would have mandated reports on

plans to achieve the transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq, on performance measures for military

and political stability in Iraq, and on a comprehensive regional stability plan for the Middle East.

The Senate on November 16, 2007, rejected a motion to close further debate on a motion to

proceed to H.R. 4156 by a vote of 53 to 45, with 60 needed for passage.157

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The Constitution accords Congress with ample authority to regulate the use of military personnel.

Among other things, Congress is designated with the power “To raise and support Armies;” “To

provide and maintain a Navy;” “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land

and naval Forces;” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for

governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”158 In the

110th Congress, several legislative proposals have been introduced that would limit the

deployment of certain military personnel to Iraq.159 Some have argued that congressional action

limiting the use of particular troops during wartime would, at least in certain circumstances,

infringe upon the President’s authority as commander in chief to conduct a military campaign in a

manner that he deems appropriate.160

As a matter of historical practice, Congress has occasionally imposed limitations and other

requirements on the deployment of U.S. troops, including during wartime. These limitations have

been effectuated either through the statutory prohibition on the use of military personnel for a

particular purpose, or via the denial of appropriations in support of a particular operation. The

157

153 CONG. REC. S14591 (November 16, 2007).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

159

See, e.g., H.R. 1591 (as passed by both Houses and vetoed by the President) , §§ 1902-1903 (limiting deployment of

U.S. troops to Iraq); S.Amdt. 2012 to H.R. 1585 (requiring minimum periods between deployment for units and

members of the armed forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom); H.R. 1234 (barring funds

from being appropriated for further deployment of U.S. military personnel to Iraq); S. 670 (limiting funds for

deployment of additional U.S. troops to Iraq unless Secretary of Defense certifies that troops are adequately trained and

prepared).

160

See Rivkin and Casey, supra note 4 (“Congress cannot, in other words, act as the president’s puppet master, and so

long as currently authorized and appropriated funding lasts, the president can dispatch additional troops to Iraq with or

without Congress’s blessing.”)

158

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following are examples in which Congress has limited the President’s ability to use particular

military personnel for certain purposes:

•

1915—The Army appropriations act restricted Army tours of duty in the

Philippines to two years and tours in the Canal Zone to three years, unless the

servicemember requested otherwise or in cases of insurrection or actual or

threatened hostilities.161 The restriction was amended in 1934 to provide for twoyear tours and in both areas as well as certain other foreign duty stations.162 The

restriction was repealed in 1945,163 and replaced with a requirement for the

Secretary of Defense to report twice annually to the Armed Services committees

regarding regulations governing the lengths of tours of duty for the Army and Air

Force outside the continental United States.

•

1933—The Treasury and Post Office Appropriation Act for FY1934,164 provided

that “Assignments of officers of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to permanent

duty in the Philippines, on the Asiatic Station, or in China, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,

or the Panama Canal Zone shall be for not less than three years. No such officer

shall be transferred to duty in the continental United States before the expiration

of such period unless the health of such officer or the public interest requires

such transfer, and the reason for the transfer shall be stated in the order directing

such transfer.”

•

1940—The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided that “Persons

inducted into the land forces of the United States under this Act shall not be

employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories

and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands.”165

•

1945—In an act extending the Selective Training and Service Act until the end of

World War II, as determined by the earlier of dates proclaimed by the President

or by concurrent resolution by both Houses of Congress, provided that no

inductee under the age of nineteen “shall be ordered into actual combat service

until after he has been given at least six months of [appropriate] military

training....”166

•

1948—The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided that eighteen- and nineteenyear old enlistees for one-year tours could not be assigned to land bases outside

the continental United States.167

•

1951—The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 required

inductees, enlistees, and other persons called to active duty to receive at least

four months’ “full and adequate” training prior to deployment overseas, and

161

38 Stat. 1078.

P.L. 73-266, 48 Stat. 815, 816.

163

P.L. 80-436, 62 Stat. 70-71.

164

47 Stat. 1516, § 12.

165

P.L. 76-783, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886.

166

P.L. 79-54, § 2, 59 Stat. 166-67.

167

P.L. 80-759, § 4(h), 62 Stat. 604, 608.

162

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prohibited the expenditure of funds to transport or maintain a servicemember

overseas in violation of the provision.168

•

1956—10 U.S.C. § 6015 prohibited assignment of female servicemembers to

duty on combat aircraft and all vessels of the Navy.169 10 U.S.C. § 6018

prohibited the assignment of Navy officers to shore duty not explicitly authorized

by law.170

•

1985—The National Defense Authorization Act, 1985 prohibited the expenditure

of funds to support an end strength of U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed in

NATO countries above a level of 326,414.171 The measure was later modified to

reduce the level further but to provide waiver authority to the President to

increase the force level to up to 311,855, upon notification to Congress, if he

determined the national security interests required exceeding the ceiling.172

•

1992—The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 prohibited the use of

appropriated funds to support an end strength level of members of the Armed

Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in nations outside

the United States at any level in excess of 60 percent of the end strength level of

such members on September 30, 1992, with exceptions in the event of

declarations of war or emergency.173

The precise scope of Congress’s ability to limit the deployment of U.S. military forces has not

been ruled upon by the courts, and it is therefore unclear whether legislative measures limiting the

use of particular military personnel during wartime would ever be deemed to be an

unconstitutional infringement upon the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.174

Nonetheless, historical practice suggests that, at least in some circumstances, Congress may

oblige the President to comply with certain requirements on the deployment of particular military

personnel, including during periods of armed conflict.

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Much of the historical debate over war powers has taken place in the context where a President

has initiated the use of military force with ambiguous or no congressional authorization, which is

not the case here. There is no obvious reason, however, to suppose that Congress’s constitutional

power to limit hostilities depends on whether the hostilities were initiated with Congress’s

express approval at the outset.175 Likewise, it does not seem consistent to suggest that Congress’s

168

P.L. 82-51, § 1(d), 65 Stat. 75, 78.

70A Stat. 375-76.

170

70A Stat. 376.

171

98 P.L. 525, § 1002(c)(1), 98 Stat. 2575.

172

P.L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1546 (1990).

173

P.L. 102-484, § 1302, 106 Stat. 2545.

174

For example, some have suggested that Congress could not bar the President from using military force to respond to

a foreign invasion. See Sidak, supra note 85, at 51-55.

175

See Tiefer, supra note 4, at 310-12 (outlining possible arguments for differentiating between authorized and

unauthorized wars).

169

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authority to limit the scope of hostilities may be exercised validly only at the initiation of

hostilities, without opportunity for changing course once troops are engaged.

In modern times, federal courts have been reticent to decide cases involving war powers on the

merits,176 including those involving appropriations measures.177 However, in discussing whether a

particular challenge raises non-justiciable political questions involving matters textually

committed to the political branches by the Constitution,178 courts have generally reiterated the

understanding of a shared allocation of war powers.179 That is, it is generally agreed that Congress

cannot “direct campaigns,” but that Congress can regulate the conduct of hostilities, at least to

some degree, and that Congress can limit military operations without the risk of a presidential

veto by refusing to appropriate funds.

In 1970, in response to a challenge related to the Vietnam conflict, a federal district court180

expounded on the theme of congressional authority, with particular reference to Congress’s

appropriations power:

The power to commit American military forces under various sets of circumstances is shared

by Congress and the Executive.... The Constitutional expression of this arrangement was not

agreed upon by the Framers without considerable debate and compromise. A desire to

facilitate the independent functioning of the Executive in foreign affairs and as commanderin-chief was tempered by a widely shared sentiment opposing the concentration of

unchecked military power in the hands of the president. Thus, while the president was

designated commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Congress was given the power to

declare war. However, it would be shortsighted to view Art. I, § 8, cl. 11 as the only

limitation upon the Executive’s military powers.... [I]t is evident that the Founding Fathers

envisioned congressional power to raise and support military forces as providing that body

with an effective means of controlling presidential use thereof. Specifically, the House of

Representatives ... was viewed by the Framers as the bulwark against encroachment by the

other branches. In The Federalist No. 58 (Hamilton or Madison), we find:

The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the

supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the

176

See Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won’t Resolve the War Powers Debate, 47

CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1305 (1997)(explaining paucity of court decisions regarding war powers).

177

See Stith, supra note 9, at 1387 (noting that courts have declined to enforce executive compliance with

appropriations limitations, “particularly in areas where the Executive’s powers constitutional are significant”).

178

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (noting that justiciability of a foreign affairs matter is determined “in

terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of

its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action”); Powell v. McCormack,

395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969)(making “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate

political department” the dominant factor for determining justiciability).

179

Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1971)(“The Congress may without executive cooperation

declare war, thus triggering treaty obligations and domestic emergency powers. The executive may without

Congressional participation repel attack, perhaps catapulting the country into a major conflict. But beyond these

independent powers, each of which has its own rationale, the Constitutional scheme envisages the joint participation of

the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities.”). Another court found justiciable

the question of whether military operations were constitutional, proclaiming the test to be “whether there is any action

by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military activity in question,” Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d

Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). The same court, however, found a determination of the effects of

Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to be a non-justiciable political question. DaCosta v. Laird, 448

F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 979 (1972).

180

Davi v. Laird, 318 F.Supp. 478, 480 (W.D. Va. 1970).

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purse—that powerful instrument by which we behold in the history of the British

Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually

enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as

it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of

the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most

complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the

immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every

grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

Despite Congress’s well-established authority over appropriations, it has been argued that the

power of the purse cannot be wielded in such a way as to fetter the discretion of the Commander

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