Global Climate Change: Major Scientific and Policy Issues

Order Code RL33602

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Global Climate Change:

Major Scientific and Policy Issues

August 11, 2006

John R. Justus and Susan R. Fletcher

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Global Climate Change:

Major Scientific and Policy Issues

Summary

There is growing evidence that human activities are affecting the heat/energyexchange balance between Earth, the atmosphere, and space through an increase in

“greenhouse gases.” If these gases continue to accumulate in the atmosphere at

current rates, most scientists believe significant global warming would continue to

occur through intensification of Earth’s natural heat-trapping “greenhouse effect.”

Over the past 100 years, particularly in recent decades, there have been measurable

increases in global temperature and sea levels, decreases of sea ice in the Arctic, and

melting among the world’s continental ice sheets and mountain glaciers. A

preponderance of the world’s scientists have concluded that human activities,

particularly the burning of fossil fuels, have increased atmospheric concentrations of

carbon dioxide (CO2) by 36% from pre-industrial levels of 280 parts per million

(ppm) to 380 ppm over the past 150 years, leading to an increase in global average

temperature of 0.9oF over the past 100 years. There is broad agreement on those

aspects of climate change, which have been measured and are reflected in global

data. Disagreements focus mainly on the magnitude and rate of change, the severity

of estimated warming, and its projected impacts — both positive and negative.

Moreover, wide variations of scientific opinion accompany model projections of a

warmer world: if these increases in greenhouse gas emissions continue, global

average temperature could rise anywhere from 2.7oF to 10.7oF over the next 100

years. Because the U.S. economy is so dependent upon energy, and so much of U.S.

and worldwide energy is derived from fossil fuels, options for reducing emissions of

carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose major challenges and controversy.

The basic policy question remains: Given scientific uncertainties about the

magnitude, timing, rate, and regional consequences of potential climatic change,

what are the appropriate responses for U.S. and world decision makers?

The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC), ratified by the United States , called for a “non-binding,” voluntary aim

for industrialized countries to stabilize their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990

levels by the year 2000. This was followed by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the

UNFCCC, which commits the major industrialized nations that have ratified it to

specified, legally binding emissions reductions. On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto

Protocol entered into force without ratification by the United States. As of July 10,

2006, 164 nations and economic regional integration organizations had ratified the

Protocol. In March 2001, the Bush Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and

thus the United States is not party to it (and therefore is not subject to its

requirements). President Bush concluded a cabinet-level climate policy review with

an announcement in 2002 of a “new approach” for the United States based on

reducing the greenhouse gas intensity (greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP)

of the U.S. economy.

This report briefly reviews the status of climate science, international

negotiations, and congressional activity focused specifically on climate change. It

replaces CRS Issue Brief IB89005.

Contents

Global Climate Change Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Climate System Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Policy Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Clinton Administration Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bush Administration Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

International Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . . . . . . . . . . 12

COP-1, The Berlin Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

COP-4, Buenos Aires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

COP-5, Bonn, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

COP-8 (New Delhi, India, 2002), COP-9 (Milan, Italy, 2003),

COP-10 (Buenos Aires, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

COP-11, Montreal, Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate . . . . . . . . . . 17

Congressional Interest and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Global Climate Change:

Major Scientific and Policy Issues

The measurable increase in average global temperatures, termed “global

warming” and linked to increases in “greenhouse” gases in the Earth’s atmosphere,

has led to international efforts to achieve reductions of emissions of those gases from

human activities, as well as domestic debates in the United States concerning the

appropriate policies to address related concerns. This report briefly reviews the

status of scientific research on the underpinnings of global climate change, and

briefly outlines both international action and domestic policies, including legislation

in the 109th Congress to address climate change.

Global Climate Change Science

A preponderance of the world’s scientists have concluded that human activities

have contributed to increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2)

by 36% from pre-industrial values of 280 parts per million (ppm) to 380 ppm over

the past 150 years, leading to an increase in global average temperatures. Global

temperatures have already risen 0.6oC (0.9oF) in the last 100 years, and, according to

model projections, might rise anywhere from as little as 1.8oC to as much as 7.1oC

(2.7oF to 10.7oF) over the next 100 years. However, the science of climate change

is not without challengers, who argue that scientific proof is incomplete or

contradictory, and that there remain many uncertainties about the nature and direction

of Earth’s future climate state. Nevertheless, there is significant concern that human

activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels, industrial production, deforestation, and

certain land-use practices, are increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon

dioxide (CO2) that, along with increasing concentrations of other trace gases such as

methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons

(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), may be leading to changes in the chemical

composition and physical dynamics of Earth’s atmosphere, including how

heat/energy is distributed between land, ocean, atmosphere, and space.

Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends

Scientists have found that the four most important variable greenhouse gases,

whose atmospheric concentrations can be influenced by human activities, are carbon

dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).

Historically, CO2 — which is produced when fossil fuels are burned — has been the

most important, but those other atmospheric trace gases are also radiatively active,

in that they can affect Earth’s heat budget and thereby contribute to a greenhouse

warming of the lower atmosphere.

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The amount of carbon cycling from naturally occurring processes each year

through the biosphere as CO2 is enormous — some 800 billion tons. Ice cores and

other proxy climate data, which also indicate CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere,

have shown, in general, a relatively stable global climate, at least over the past 10,000

years. As such, many scientists suggest that the amount of CO2 generated by natural

processes is about equal to the amounts absorbed and sequestered by natural

processes. However, human activity since the Industrial Revolution (ca. 1850),

primarily in the form of burning fossil fuels, is now generating some additional 24

billion tons of CO2 per year. Available evidence shows that about half this amount

is absorbed by natural processes on land and in the ocean, and that atmospheric

concentrations of CO2 are currently about 36% higher at 380 parts per million (ppm)

than they were some 150 years ago at 280 ppm. Some scientists believe that a large

amount of CO2 may be stored in northern latitude soils and in temperate and tropical

forests, suggesting a greater importance of the role of natural resources management

and land-use practices in these regions, including burning of biomass and

deforestation. Scientists estimate that anthropogenic emissions of CO2 alone may

account for as much as 60% of the increase in global mean temperatures of 0.9oF,

since 1850.

The combined radiative forcing1 from the other trace gases is approximately

equal to that of CO2 and, collectively, they are projected to contribute about as much

to potential global warming over the next 60 years as CO2. Some of the halogenated

compounds, while present in the atmosphere at very low concentrations, are of

considerable interest because of their high global warming potentials (GWPs) and

long atmospheric residence times. Methane concentrations had been rising from a

preindustrial value of around 700 parts per billion (ppb) up to the mid-1990s, when

they began to level off to a present value of about 1,766 ppb, a 152% increase.

Nitrous oxide concentrations have been rising from a preindustrial value of around

270 parts per billion (ppb) up to a present value of about 317 ppb, representing a 17%

increase.

The atmospheric concentrations of the chlorofluorocarbons CFC-11, at 268 parts

per trillion (ppt), and CFC-113, at 84 ppt, have been on the decline in recent years in

response to the Montreal Protocol of the late 1980s.2 The concentration of CFC-12

at 533 ppt is also anticipated to decline, but the decline is expected to be delayed due

to (1) a longer atmospheric lifetime than CFC-11 or CFC-113, (2) its use in

long-lasting appliances such as home refrigerators, and possibly (3) particularly

extensive stockpiling at the global scale, due to a perceived lack of suitable

1

As a general concept, the term radiative forcing in climate science means any change in

the radiation (heat) entering or leaving the climate system. It can be due to changes in

sunlight arriving, or to differing amounts of radiatively active gases. A positive forcing

tends to warm the system while a negative forcing tends to cool it.

2

The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was a landmark

international agreement designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The treaty was

originally signed in 1987 and substantially amended in 1990 and 1992. The Montreal

Protocol stipulated that the production and consumption of compounds that deplete ozone

in the stratosphere — chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl

chloroform — were to be phased out by 2000.

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replacement at the time production decreases were being mandated. The Kyoto

Protocol on Climate Change (discussed in detail in the section on “U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change”) also regulates three other trace gases:

hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6),

whose limited concentrations in the atmosphere are anticipated to grow over the long

term. Sulfate aerosols, a byproduct of air pollution, and other natural phenomena are

also viewed as important for their transient and regional “climate cooling” effects in

Earth’s atmosphere.

On a related note, NASA scientist James Hansen has suggested that Earth’s

climate could benefit from near-term regulation of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. He

proposed that reducing emissions of halocarbons (refrigerants), methane, nitrogen

oxides, and carbon-black aerosols (soot) could have the effect of reducing ozone,

itself a greenhouse gas, in the troposphere. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases have

relatively short atmospheric lifetimes compared with CO2; however, most have a

much larger global warming potential (gwp). This would suggest that controlling

emissions of these greenhouse gases could reduce the rate and overall amount of

potential climate warming from greenhouse gases, leaving only that projected from

long-term CO2 emissions whose full effects might not be realized for another 75-100

years. Nevertheless, Hansen emphasized that any actions to reduce emissions of

these gases would need to be taken concomitantly with long-term strategies to reduce

CO2. Hansen also noted that modest gains from reducing CO2 and non-CO2

emissions in the near term could be achieved primarily through cleaner energy

production.3

Climate System Response

The most recent runs of state-of-the-art computer models of the Earth’s climate

(general circulation models, or GCMs) have projected a globally averaged warming

ranging from almost 3oF to 10.7oF over the next 100 years, if greenhouse gases

continue to accumulate in the atmosphere at the current rate. Many climate scientists

believe that such a warming could shift temperature zones, rainfall patterns, and

agricultural belts and, under certain scenarios, cause sea level to rise. With regard

to sea level rise, over the last 100 years, the global sea level has risen by about 10 to

25 centimeters (4 to 10 inches). It is likely that much of the rise in sea level has been

related to the concurrent rise in global temperature over the last 100 years. On this

time scale, the warming and the consequent thermal expansion of the world ocean

may account for about 0.8 to 3 inches of the observed sea level rise, while the

observed retreat of glaciers and ice caps may account for about 0.8 to 2 inches.

Other factors are more difficult to quantify, including isostatic effects associated

with rising or subsiding coastlines, neotectonics, and sedimentation. The rate of

observed sea level rise suggests a net positive contribution from the huge ice sheets

of Greenland and Antarctica, but observations of the ice sheets do not yet allow

meaningful quantitative estimates of their separate contributions. The ice sheets

3

See Dr. Hansen’s research article, Global Warming in the 21st Century: An Alternative

Scenario, on the website maintained by the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies at

[http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/features/altscenario/] .

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remain a major source of uncertainty in accounting for past changes in sea level

because of insufficient data about them over the last 100 years. Taking into account

the ranges in the estimate of climate sensitivity and ice melt parameters, and the full

set of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios, the models project an increase in global

mean sea level of between 5 and 37 inches by the year 2100. In addition, because of

the thermal inertia of the oceans, sea level could continue to rise for many centuries

beyond 2100 even if concentrations of greenhouse gases were stabilized at that time.

Some climate scientists further project that global warming could have far-reaching

effects — some positive, some negative, depending how it may be experienced in a

given region — on natural resources; ecosystems; food and fiber production; energy

supply, use, and distribution; transportation; land use; water supply and control; and

human health.

Skeptics of the global warming theory have called into question the reliability

of the computer climate models and their output used to make projections of future

warming that supported Kyoto Protocol negotiations. They also challenge some

scientists’ assertions that recent episodic weather events may seem more extreme in

nature, and that this may be indicative of long-term climate change.

Evidence of natural variability of climate is large enough that even the

record-setting warmth at the end of the 20th century has made it difficult for many

climate scientists to state beyond a reasonable doubt that weather extremes

experienced over the past two decades are attributable to “global warming,” at least

at the present time. However, the warming trend at the surface appears to be

continuing. In some cases, causal relationships between seasonal and inter-annual

climate variability and present-day severe weather events are beginning to be

recognized and even predicted, owing to an improved ability to observe such

phenomena as El Nino and La Nina, the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), and the

Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). That notwithstanding, singular extreme weather

events have focused public, academic, and government attention on possible

outcomes of potential long-term climate change and a need for a better understanding

of regional climates on decadal to century time scales.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) researchers

reported that the 12 warmest years (globally averaged) since historical records have

been kept occurred in the past two decades, with 1990 and 1998 among the warmest.

Those records reveal the year 2005 as being slightly warmer than 1998. At least

some of this warming, they concluded, is human-induced. In fact, according to a

report of the National Research Council released June 22, 2006,4 there is sufficient

evidence from tree rings, retreating glaciers, and other “proxies” to say with

confidence that the last few decades of the 20th century were warmer than any

comparable period in the last 400 years; however, there is less confidence in

reconstructions of surface temperatures from 1600 back to A.D. 900, and very little

confidence in findings on average temperatures before then.

4

National Research Council, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Committee on

Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years, Surface Temperature

Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,

2006), 141 pp.

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On the other hand, satellite instruments — which, through indirect methods,

measure the average temperature of the atmosphere in a deep column above the

surface — have not demonstrated any positive warming trend over the past 20-year

period, at least until very recently. A report issued in 2000 by the U.S. National

Research Council’s Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Reconciling

Observations of Global Temperature Change,5 attempted to resolve apparent

disparities between temperature data measured at the surface and those from

satellites. Scientists who question the surface temperature record state that such

disparate trends invalidate the output of general circulation models (GCMs), many

of which demonstrate homogenous warming throughout all the levels of the Earth’s

atmosphere. Panel scientists concluded that there may be a systematic disconnect

between the upper and near surface atmosphere and cited physical processes not

currently accounted for in GCMs that may have a unique impact on the upper

atmosphere. In addition, they acknowledged that only long-term, systematic

monitoring of the upper atmosphere could resolve the differences in temperature

trends.

Scientific work continues in the opposing communities and among government

and university modeling centers, accompanied by analysis of weather balloon and

radiosonde data and re-analysis of surface temperature and satellite data sets, with the

prospect of advancing resolution of this pivotal issue. The most recent entry into this

fray, released May 2, 2006, by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP),

is the first of what will be 21 Synthesis and Assessment Products, this one entitled

Temperature Trends in the Lower Atmosphere — Steps for Understanding and

Reconciling Differences; CCSP Synthesis and Assessment Product 1.1.6 As the

CCSP report recounts the argument: Surface data showed substantial global-average

warming, while early versions of satellite and radiosonde data showed little or no

warming above the surface. According to the CCSP report, however, this significant

discrepancy no longer exists because errors in the satellite and radiosonde data have

been identified and corrected. New data sets have also been developed that do not

show such discrepancies. At the present time, this Synthesis and Assessment Product

is an important revision to the conclusions of earlier reports from the U.S. National

Research Council (2000) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(2001). For recent decades, all current atmospheric data sets now show globalaverage warming that is similar to the surface warming. While those data are

consistent with the results from climate models at the global scale, discrepancies in

the tropics still remain to be resolved.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), jointly established in

1988 by the United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), reported in its Second Assessment

(1996) that “[such] a change is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin ... [and that]

the balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and

5

National Research Council, Climate Research Committee, Panel on Reconciling

Temperature Observations, Reconciling Observations of Global Temperature Change

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2000), 104 pp.

6

This report may be viewed in PDF format on the U.S. Climate Change Science Program

website at [http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap1-1/finalreport/default.htm].

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from changes in geographical, seasonal, and vertical patterns of atmospheric

temperature, suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.”7 Issuing an

updated conclusion in January 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel in its Third

Assessment (2001) reported that a firmer association between human activities and

climate seemed to have emerged, stating that “in the light of new evidence and

improved understanding, and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, most

of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the

increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.”8 That was news, because reservations

about the source of the past century’s warming and whether it bore a human

fingerprint are often cited in policy debates, usually in support of deferring actions

aimed at mitigating possible global warming. In addition, the IPCC reported a higher

range of potential warming — roughly between 2.7oF and just under 11oF over the

next 100 years.

In the United States, the national assessment report Climate Change Impacts on

the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change,

released in November 2000 to the President and the Congress and published under

the auspices of the U.S. Global Research Program, received criticism from many of

those involved in its review. Critics claimed that many of the model-projected

impacts of possible future climate changes were overstated and unsubstantiated.

Additional criticism was leveled at the national assessment report because it was

produced by a National Assessment Synthesis Team, an advisory committee

chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. As such, the report was not

subjected to Office of Science and Technology Policy and Office of Management and

Budget standards for government-issued reports mandated by Information Quality

Act Guidelines. The National Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), with overall

authority for the report, countered that much of the criticism it had received did not

take into account the time scales upon which the report was based; the report targeted

the effects of climate toward the middle of this century to the end of the next. Also,

seemingly contradictory outcomes were produced by the two climate models selected

for making the climate projections, casting some lingering doubt on the overall value

and utility of the results for decision makers at the local, regional, and national levels.

The full national assessment, plus various regional and resource-focused assessments

are now available at the website maintained by the U.S. Global Change Research

Program.9

On June 6, 2001, a Committee on the Science of Climate Change of the U.S.

National Research Council (NRC) released a report, Climate Change Science: An

Analysis of Some Key Questions, stating that global warming could well have serious

societal and ecological impacts by the end of this century.10 Commissioned by the

7

The IPCC First (1990), Second (1995), and Third (2001) Assessments and IPCC Special

Reports appear in PDF format on the IPCC website at [http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm].

8

Ibid.

9

The National Assessment reports may be viewed in PDF format on the U.S. Global Change

Research Program website at [http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/default.htm].

10

National Research Council, Committee on the Science of Climate Change, Climate

(continued...)

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Bush White House and prepared by 11 of the nation’s leading climate scientists, the

report summarized the current state of knowledge on climate change and confirmed

that the climatic changes observed during the past several decades were most likely

due to human activities. The committee members warned, however, that they could

not rule out the possibility that the climate’s natural variability could be responsible

for a significant portion of that trend. The authors agreed that human-induced

warming and sea level rise were expected to continue through the 21st century and

beyond, but they emphasized that current predictions of the magnitude and rate of

future warming “should be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments

(either upward or downward).”

The NRC report generally concurred with the latest conclusions of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which found that the Earth warmed by

about 1oF during the 20th century, and that most of the warming of the past 50 years

was probably due to increases in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

President Bush made a speech on global climate change from the Rose Garden

on June 11, 2001, following release of that NRC Key Questions report and

completion of a cabinet-level review of climate change options. In that speech,

timed just before his trip to Europe to meet with leaders there, the President

acknowledged that the world has warmed and that greenhouse gases have increased,

largely due to human activity, but emphasized that the magnitude and rate of future

warming are unknown.

The Policy Context

Since the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, U.S. climate

policy has been evolving through several different stages, first under the Clinton

Administration, and then under a very different approach taken by the Bush

Administration. This history is reviewed briefly below. (For more information on

U.S. Climate Policy and how it has developed, see CRS Report RL31931, Climate

Change: Federal Laws and Policies Related to Greenhouse Gas Reductions.)

Clinton Administration Policies. Taking office the year after the UNFCCC

was completed, the Clinton Administration presided over early U.S. efforts to deal

internationally with climate change, and to participate in formulation of the Kyoto

Protocol to the UNFCCC. On October 19, 1993, President Clinton released his

Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), which proposed voluntary domestic measures

to attain greenhouse gas emissions stabilization as outlined by the UNFCCC, to

stabilize U.S. emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.11 The CCAP called for

comprehensive voluntary measures by industry, utilities, and other large-scale energy

users. CCAP stressed energy-efficiency upgrades through new building codes in

10

(...continued)

Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (Washington, DC: National Academy

Press, 2001), 42 pp.

11

This plan may be viewed in HTML format on a website maintained by the U.S. Global

Change Research Information Office (GCRIO) at [http://gcrio.gcrio.org/USCCAP/toc.html].

CRS-8

residential and commercial sectors, and other improvements in energy-generating or

-using technologies. Large-scale tree planting and forest reserves were encouraged

to enhance sequestration of carbon dioxide and to conserve energy. Other aspects of

the plan addressed mitigation of greenhouse gases other than CO2. The CCAP

avoided mandatory command and control measures.

On November 12, 1998, President Clinton instructed a representative to sign the

legally binding Kyoto Protocol that established mandatory reductions in greenhouse

gas emissions for the 38 industrialized nations in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This

drew protest by some in Congress. Some Members claimed Clinton action was in

violation of the June 1997 Byrd/Hagel Resolution (S.Res.98) that required an

economic analysis of legally binding emission reductions on the United States, as

well as binding obligations for all UNFCCC parties, including developing countries.

The President announced he would continue to pursue “meaningful” commitments

from key developing countries — which have no binding obligations to reduce or

restrain greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol — before he would send

the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent (which is required to enable U.S.

ratification of any treaty).

The Clinton Administration released an economic analysis in July 1998,

prepared by the Council of Economic Advisors, that concluded that with emissions

trading among the Annex B/Annex I countries, and participation of key developing

countries in the “Clean Development Mechanism” — which grants the latter

business-as-usual emissions rates through 2012 — the costs of implementing the

Kyoto Protocol could be reduced as much as 60% from many estimates.12 Other

economic analyses, however, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and the

DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), and others, projected a potentially

large declines in GDP from implementing the Protocol.

On November 11, 2000, President Clinton issued a statement on “Meeting the

Challenge of Global Warming” in response to the results of the report Climate

Change Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate

Variability and Change.13 In his statement, President Clinton said his Administration

would promulgate new regulations for U.S. electric power plants, imposing

emissions caps on sulphur, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and CO2. He also called for

establishment of a domestic emissions trading program and promised a continued

U.S. leadership role in climate change to set an example for other industrialized

countries. President Clinton announced he would take such steps as necessary to

keep the United States on target for meeting Kyoto Protocol goals, if certain

concessions were made regarding international adoption of flexible mechanisms such

as emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (CDM), credit for carbon

sinks, and accountable, legally-binding, compliance mechanisms.

12

U.S., Executive Office of the President, President’s Council of Economic Advisers, The

Kyoto Protocol and the President’s Policies to Address Climate Change: Administration

Economic Analysis, prepared for the Council by the Interagency Analytical Team,

Washington, July 1998 (various pagings).

13

Footnote 9, op.cit.

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Bush Administration Policies. Soon after taking office, the Bush

Administration had asked for a delay in resumption of the negotiations that had

collapsed in November 2000 at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the U.N.

Framework Convention on Climate Change (see COP-6 discussion later in this

report), in order to allow time for consideration of its approach and policies. Talks

were accordingly scheduled for the second half of July 2001. However, in late March

2001, the Bush Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol — causing widespread

dismay among the nations of the European Union — citing lack of developing

country participation and possible harm to the U.S. economy. This followed

extensive press attention to, first, statements by the EPA Administrator that —

pursuant to her understanding of a campaign statement by then-candidate George W.

Bush — carbon dioxide would be included in a multi-pollutant regulatory effort; and

then a repudiation of that position and clarification by President Bush and

Administration spokespersons that carbon dioxide would not be regulated.

President Bush made a policy statement in mid-June 2001, resulting from a

continuing cabinet-level review of climate change options, in which he outlined the

U.S. approach as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary actions,

increased scientific research, and market mechanisms. As noted above, this preceded

his trip to Europe for meetings with European heads of state, which ended with

statements that Europe and the United States “agree to disagree” on climate change

approaches. President Bush also outlined a Climate Change Research Initiative

(CCRI) and a National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI), along with

a new Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology

Integration to oversee their implementation. The CCRI and the NCCTI focus on

short-term, policy-relevant objectives of climate change science and climate change

technology applications, respectively. A previously established U.S. Global Change

Research Program (USGCRP) supports long-term, fundamental, scientific research

objectives, and a Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) supports the federal

government’s broader portfolio of climate change technology R&D.

Both the new CCRI and the existing USGCRP were combined for the first time

into the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) in the FY2004 budget. The

FY2007 budget requested a total spending level of $1.717 billion for research

managed by the CCSP, which is $4 million (+0.2%) above the FY2006 funding

estimate of $1.713 billion. Included in the $1.717 billion CCSP funds are $200

million for the CCRI. While funding for the embedded CCRI experienced growth

over two fiscal years from FY2003 to FY2005, the FY2007 funding request for CCRI

at $200 million is level with the FY2006 funding estimate of $200 million. That

leaves the FY2007 funding requested for the embedded USGCRP standing at $1.517

billion, which is $4 million (+0.3%) above the FY2006 funding estimate of $1.513

billion. Some $2.98 billion is in the requested FY2007 funding profile for

technology research and development in the Climate Change Technology

Program(CCTP) and its embedded NCCTI, an amount $207 million (+7.5%) above

the FY2006 funding level of $2.773 billion.

Two issues of concern to Congress are the extent to which spending for the

CCRI and CCTP represents new money, versus how much is attributable to the

reclassification of ongoing research and technology programs, and whether reduced

funding in some cases, or virtually level funding in most other cases, might be

CRS-10

deemed necessary or sufficient to accomplish the work of the CCSP and the CCTP.

Five reports currently serve as guidance documents for CCSP and CCTP activities.

The Administration released a Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan on

July 24, 2003.14 The plan included five major research goals and dozens of specific

research targets as well as 23 written synthesis and assessment products with

deadlines. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences

conducted an independent review of the CCSP Strategic Plan and in April 2004

published its overall assessment in a 51-page report, Implementing Climate and

Global Change Research: A Review of the Final U.S. Climate Change Science

Program Strategic Plan.15 To complement the CCSP Strategic Plan, the Department

of Energy has released four guidance documents for Climate Change Technology

Program activities: Results of a Technical Review of the U.S. Climate Change

Technology Program’s R&D Portfolio (May 2006), Climate Change Technology

Program Strategic Plan Public Review Draft (January 2006), U.S. Climate Change

Technology Program: Technology Options for the Near and Long Term (September

2005), and U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: Vision and Framework for

Strategy and Planning (August 2005).16 Release by the CCTP of the completed final

Strategic Plan on Climate Change Technology is expected late in 2006.

In June 2001, the Europeans announced their intentions to proceed with

ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, while President Bush indicated the United States

would continue to participate in negotiations of the UNFCCC parties in order to

pursue its own objectives, but would not participate directly in Kyoto Protocol

negotiations. When talks resumed among UNFCCC parties at “COP-6 resumed” in

mid-July in Bonn, Germany, and continued in the fall of 2001 in Marrakech,

Morocco at COP-7, the United States delegation did not make new proposals and

declined to participate in negotiations on issues of the Kyoto Protocol. Agreement

among the other parties was found on the remaining Protocol issues at COP-7, and

they announced that they would seek ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and its entry

into force — even without the participation of the United States.

On February 14, 2002, apparently concluding the cabinet-level review of climate

change underway since early 2001, President Bush announced a U.S. policy for

climate change: a “new approach for meeting the long-term challenge of climate

change.”17 The centerpiece of this announcement was the plan to reduce greenhouse

14

The Strategic Plan may be viewed in PDF format on a website maintained by the U.S.

Climate Change Science Program at [http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/

default.htm]

15

National Research Council, Committee to Review the U.S. Climate Change Science

Program Strategic Plan, Implementing Climate and Global Change Research: A Review of

the Final U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan (Washington, The National

Academies Press, 2004), 51 pp.

16

Each of these four technology reports may be viewed in PDF format on a website

maintained by the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program at [http://www.

climatetechnology.gov/].

17

“President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives,” remarks during

a visit February 14, 2002, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration campus

(continued...)

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gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next 10 years. Greenhouse gas

intensity measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output, and has

been declining in the United States over the past several years. The Administration

stated that the goal, to be met through voluntary action, is to achieve efficiency

improvements that would reduce the 183 metric tons of emissions per million dollars

of gross domestic product (GDP) expected under “business as usual” to 151 metric

tons in 2012. The plan noted that “if, in 2012, we find that we are not on track

toward meeting our goal, and sound science justifies further policy action, the United

States will respond with additional measures that may include a broad, market-based

program” and other incentives and voluntary measures to accelerate technology

development.

In addition, the policy directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with

other key agencies, to “substantially improve the emission reduction registry” to

upgrade the voluntary emission reduction program under Section 1605(b) of the 1992

Energy Policy Act, to bring about enhanced measurement accuracy, reliability, and

verifiability. Other measures included providing for protected, transferable emission

reduction credits, increased funding of $700 million in total climate-related spending,

and a new management structure to coordinate climate change and technology

research. Domestic policies such as tax incentives for renewable energy and new

technology, development of fuel-efficient vehicles and cleaner fuels, and carbon

sequestration were also proposed, along with several international bilateral initiatives

and relatively modest increases in foreign assistance.

Some observers praised the plan for taking a practical, conservative approach

to government action and for relying on voluntary measures. Critics observed that

voluntary approaches by themselves have not historically often been effective, and

noted that the reductions in energy intensity are very little different from current

trends and would allow for significant increases in overall greenhouse gas emissions

rather than reductions.

Continuing to encourage voluntary action rather than mandatory requirements,

the Administration detailed on February 12, 2003, a set of voluntary agreements by

various industry groups under an umbrella initiative titled Climate VISION

(Voluntary, Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now). These initiatives by

sectoral groups involve actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve

energy efficiency.18

International Action

The United States was involved in negotiations and international scientific

research on climate change prior to ratifying the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention

17

(...continued)

in Silver Spring, Maryland. Remarks and fact sheet may be viewed on the White House

website at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html].

18

For a fuller description, see the “Global Climate Change Policy Book” on the White

House website at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html].

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on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This included passage of a National Climate

Program Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-367). (These activities are discussed in CRS Report

RL30522, Global Climate Change: A Survey of Scientific Research and Policy

Reports, which covers early aspects of the scientific debate and contains a chronology

of U.S. government involvement in climate change policy before 1992.)

U.N. Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC)19

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

was opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development (UNCED) conference in Rio de Janeiro (known by its popular title, the

Earth Summit). On June 12, 1992, the United States, along with 153 other nations,

signed the UNFCCC, that upon ratification committed signatories’ governments to

a voluntary “non-binding aim” to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse

gases with the goal of “preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s

climate system.” These actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, with

the intention of stabilizing their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the

year 2000; and other responsibilities would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties.

The parties agreed in general that they would recognize “common but differentiated

responsibilities,” with greater responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions

in the near term on the part of developed/industrialized countries, which were listed

and identified in Annex I of the UNFCCC and thereafter referred to as “Annex I”

countries.

On September 8, 1992, then-President George H. W. Bush transmitted the

UNFCCC for advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification. The Foreign

Relations Committee approved the treaty and reported it (Senate Exec. Rept. 102-55)

October 1, 1992. The Senate consented to ratification on October 7, 1992, with a

two-thirds majority vote. President Bush signed the instrument of ratification

October 13, 1992, and deposited it with the U.N. Secretary General. According to

terms of the UNFCCC, having received over 50 countries’ instruments of ratification,

it entered into force March 24, 1994.

Since the UNFCCC entered into force, the parties have been meeting annually

in conferences of the parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change,

and beginning in the mid-1990’s, to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol to establish legally

binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.

After completion of the Protocol in 1997, COP meetings focused on formulating the

operational rules that would prevail as nations attempted to meet their obligations to

reduce emissions. These rules were essentially agreed upon at COP-7 (see below)

in 2001. A number of difficult issues were under discussion at these annual

meetings, including how emissions trading rules would be set, how to count elements

in a nation that absorb carbon (carbon “sinks”) such as forests, and the continuing

question of “next steps” that might focus on how to proceed in the period following

19

For current information, status of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and extensive

background on the UNFCCC and the annual meetings of the UNFCCC parties, see the

Secretariat website at [http://www.unfccc.int].

CRS-13

the year 2012, which concludes the “commitment period” during which emissions

reductions were to be achieved by those countries with reduction obligations. (For

detailed discussion of the key issues being negotiated at these annual meetings, see

CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.)

On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. At that time, 141

nations had ratified it, including 35 of the 38 Annex B industrialized countries.

Those Annex B parties to the UNFCCC that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol

continue to express hope that the United States will re-engage in international efforts

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As of July 10, 2006, some 164 nations had

ratified or accepted the Kyoto Protocol.

COP-1, The Berlin Mandate

The UNFCCC Conference of Parties met for the first time in Berlin, Germany

in the spring of 1995, and voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries’ abilities

to meet commitments under the Convention. These were expressed in a U.N.

ministerial declaration known as the “Berlin Mandate,” which established a two-year

Analytical and Assessment Phase (AAP), to negotiate a “comprehensive menu of

actions” for countries to pick from and choose future options to address climate

change which for them, individually, made the best economic and environmental

sense. The Berlin Mandate exempted non-Annex I countries from additional binding

obligations, in keeping with the principle of “common but differentiated

responsibilities” established in the UNFCCC — even though, collectively, the larger,

newly industrializing countries were expected to be the world’s largest emitters of

greenhouse gas emissions 15 years hence.

COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland

The Second Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-2) met in July 1996

in Geneva, Switzerland. Its Ministerial Declaration was adopted July 18, 1996, and

reflected a U.S. position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under

Secretary for Global Affairs for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which (1)

accepted the scientific findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); (2) rejected

uniform “harmonized policies” in favor of flexibility; and (3) called for “legally

binding mid-term targets.”

COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change was adopted by COP-3, in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, after intensive

— and tense — negotiations. Most industrialized nations and some central

European economies in transition (all defined as Annex B countries in the Protocol,

a list that closely resembles Annex I of the UNFCCC) agreed to legally binding

reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6%-8% below 1990 levels

in the years 2008-2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United

States would be required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990

levels. (For more details, see CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The

CRS-14

Kyoto Protocol.) The Protocol provided that it would enter into force when it had

been ratified by 55 countries, accounting for 55% of developed country emissions in

1990. In 1997, prior to the completion of the Protocol, the U.S. Senate passed S.Res.

98, which urged the President not to agree to a treaty that did not include binding

commitments for developing countries, or that would cause harm to the U.S.

economy. As noted above, although President Clinton did sign the Protocol in 1998,

it was never submitted by his administration to the Senate because it would not have

met the conditions of S.Res. 98.

The Clinton Administration initiated funding efforts to address climate change;

in the FY2001 budget request funding was included for a Climate Change

Technology Initiative (CCTI) first introduced in his FY1999 budget. Somewhat

reduced funding for the climate technology initiatives was provided through

appropriations in previous years.

COP-4, Buenos Aires

COP-4 took place in Buenos Aires in November 1998. It had been expected

that the remaining issues unresolved in Kyoto would be finalized at this meeting.

However, the complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved

insurmountable, and instead the parties adopted a two-year “Plan of Action” to

advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to

be completed by 2000.

COP-5, Bonn, Germany

The 5th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate

Change met in Bonn, Germany, between October 25 and November 4, 1998. It was

primarily a technical meeting, and did not reach major conclusions.

COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands

When COP-6 convened November 13-25, 2000, in The Hague, Netherlands,

discussions evolved rapidly into a high-level negotiation over the major political

issues. These included major controversy over the United States’ proposal to allow

credit for carbon “sinks” in existing forests and on agricultural lands, satisfying a

major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over

consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission

reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain

financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their

obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In the final hours of COP-6, despite some compromises agreed between the United

States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a

whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the

talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP-6, suspended COP-6

without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was

later announced that the COP-6 meetings (termed “COP-6 bis”) would be resumed

in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting

of the parties to the UNFCCC — COP-7 — had been set for Marrakech, Morocco,

CRS-15

in October-November 2001. (For more detailed discussion of COP-6 issues, see

CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.)

COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany

When the COP-6 negotiations resumed July 16-27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany,

little progress had been made on resolving the differences that had produced an

impasse in The Hague. However, this meeting took place after President George

Bush had become the U.S. President and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March.

As a result, the U.S. delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the

negotiations related to the Protocol, and chose to act as observers. As the other

parties negotiated the key issues, agreement was reached on most of the major

political issues, to the surprise of most observers given the low level of expectations

that preceded the meeting. The agreements included:

(1) Mechanisms — the “flexibility” mechanisms which the United States had

strongly favored as the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions

trading; joint implementation; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),

which provides funding from developed countries for emissions reduction

activities in developing countries, with credit for the donor countries. One of

the key elements of this agreement was that there would be no quantitative limit

on the credit a country could claim from use of these mechanisms, but that

domestic action must constitute a significant element of the efforts of each

Annex B country to meet their targets.

(2) Carbon sinks — credit was agreed to for broad activities that absorb carbon (

carbon sinks) from the atmosphere or store it, including existing forest and

cropland management, and revegetation, with no overall cap on the amount of

credit a country could claim for sinks activities. In the case of forest

management, an Appendix Z establishes country-specific caps for each Annex

I country; for example, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan

(which represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland

management, countries could receive credit only for carbon sequestration

increases above 1990 levels.

(3) Compliance — final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that

would address noncompliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP-7,

but broad outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets would

include a requirement to “make up” shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1; suspension of the

right to sell credits for surplus emissions reductions; and a required compliance

action plan for those not meeting their targets.

(4) Financing — three new funds were agreed upon to provide assistance for needs

associated with climate change; a least-developed-country fund to support

National Adaptation Programs of Action; and a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund

supported by a CDM levy and voluntary contributions.

A number of operational details attendant upon these decisions remained to be

negotiated and agreed upon; these were the major issues of the COP-7 meeting that

followed.

CRS-16

COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco

At the COP-7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, October 29-November 10, 2001,

negotiators in effect completed the work of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action,

finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the

Protocol. The United States delegation continued to act as observers, declining to

participate in active negotiations. Other parties continued to express their hope that

the United States would re-engage in the process at some point, but indicated their

intention to seek ratification of the requisite number of countries to bring the Protocol

into force (55 countries representing 55% of developed country emissions of carbon

dioxide in 1990). A target date for bringing the Protocol into force was put forward

— the August-September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development

(WSSD) to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa — but this target was not met.

The main decisions at COP-7 included operational rules for international emissions

trading among parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint implementation; a

compliance regime that outlines consequences for failure to meet emissions targets

but defers to the parties to the Protocol after it is in force to decide whether these

consequences are legally binding; accounting procedures for the flexibility

mechanisms; and a decision to consider at COP-8 how to achieve a review of the

adequacy of commitments that might move toward discussions of future developing

country commitments.

COP-8 (New Delhi, India, 2002), COP-9 (Milan, Italy, 2003),

COP-10 (Buenos Aires, 2004)

At these three meetings of the conference of parties to the UNFCCC, attempts

were made to consider next steps after the 2008-2012 commitment period, but these

attempts encountered resistance from developing countries and some other parties.

The announced reluctance of Russia at the Milan COP-9 to undertake ratification of

the Kyoto Protocol called into question whether or when the Protocol might enter

into force. Without U.S. participation, the required 55% of baseline emissions of

parties would not be achieved if Russia did not ratify. However, just before the COP10 meeting, Russia did ratify the Protocol on November 18, 2004. Thus it became

possible for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force 90 days later, on February 16,

2005. All three of these meetings centered on largely technical issues, and avoided

major substantive declarations; what “next steps” involving developing countries

should be remained a controversial issue, and was not resolved.

COP-11, Montreal, Canada

COP-11 was held in Montreal, Canada, November 28 - December 9, 2005. This

was a concurrent meeting — the 11th meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC, and the

first meeting of the parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol. One of the key outcomes

of the Kyoto Protocol MOP was adoption of the “Marrakech Accords,” which outline

what the Secretariat terms the “rule book” for the Protocol. Among other things, it

formally launches emissions trading by providing rules for trading, and outlines the

operational rules for the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation,

both of which provide for credit to developed countries for projects to reduce

emissions or augment sinks in developing or other eligible countries. Other rules

CRS-17

adopted include how emissions are accounted for, guidelines on data systems needed,

rules for a compliance system, and rules governing how absorption of carbon dioxide

by agricultural soils and forests is to be measured. Discussions of “next steps” were

considered under both the Protocol and the Convention. Negotiations under the

Protocol were agreed upon that could lead to new binding commitments for Kyoto

Protocol parties after 2012; and a decision under the Framework Convention was

made to open a non-binding “dialogue on long-term cooperative action,” which could

include all parties to the Convention, including the United States.

Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

On July 27, 2005, a six-nation partnership was announced at the South East

Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum — the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate (APP). This partnership agreement included six nations

— the United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The

participants described the focus of the partnership as technology development and

reduction of greenhouse gas intensity, with voluntary participation. Representatives

of the six nations met in Sydney, Australia, in early January 2006, and spelled out the

purpose and provided a work plan for the partnership in statements on January 12,

2006. The purposes that have been identified include to “Create a voluntary, nonlegally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the development,

diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer-term costeffective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among the Partners

through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical results.” The

charter for the partnership states: “The partnership will be consistent with and

contribute to our efforts under the UNFCCC and will complement, but not replace,

the Kyoto Protocol.”20

Eight task forces were established to review the status of their sectors with

regard to clean development and climate, to identify cost and performance objectives

and realistic goals, and report on recommended actions within their sectors. The 8

sectors are: (1) Cleaner Fossil Energy, (2) Renewable Energy and Distributed

Generation, (3) Power Generation and Transmission, (4) Steel, (5) Aluminum, (6)

Cement, (7) Coal Mining, and (8) Buildings and Construction.

Congressional Interest and Activities

The prospect of global warming, and questions about what the United States

could or should do about it have yielded, over the last several years, a range of

legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress. Issues dealt with in bills that have been

introduced in the 109th Congress include regulating emissions of carbon dioxide

along with emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury in so-called

20

See a comprehensive Fact Sheet and other information on the APP at [http://www.

asiapacificpartnership.org ].

CRS-18

“multi-pollutant” legislation;21 greenhouse gas reduction and carbon dioxide

emissions trading systems;22 energy issues relevant to climate change, especially

those associated with encouraging or authorizing energy efficiency and alternative

energy sources23; carbon sequestration technologies and methodologies; federal and

national research concerning the prospect of abrupt climate change, climate change

impacts, and climate system surprises; federal spending on climate change science

programs and climate change technology programs and, more broadly, on global

change monitoring and research programs; and long-term research and development

programs to develop new technologies to help stabilize greenhouse gas emissions.

(For an overview, summary, and comparison of key climate change legislation, see

CRS Report RL32955, Climate Change Legislation in the 109th Congress.)

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), enacted in August 2005, included

among its provisions programs to promote the development and deployment of

technologies to reduce greenhouse gas intensity. The Senate voted to include a Sense

of the Senate resolution — which was not included in the final legislation — stating

that human activities are a substantial source of greenhouse gas accumulations in the

atmosphere that are causing temperatures to increase, and that “Congress should

enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory market-based

limits and incentives on greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse the growth of

such emissions at a rate and in a manner that — (1) will not significantly harm the

United States economy; and (2) will encourage comparable action by other nations

that are major trading partners and key contributors to global emissions.”24

On May 18, 2006, the House of Representatives in H.R. 5386, the FY2007

Interior-Environment appropriations bill, considered sense-of-the-Congress language,

similar to that of the Senate, stating that there should be enacted a comprehensive and

effective national program of mandatory, market-based limits and incentives on

emissions of greenhouse gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such

emissions.25 That language called for limits and incentives that did not significantly

harm the U.S. economy and that would encourage comparable action by our major

trading partners and key contributors to global emissions. The language was rejected,

however, on a parliamentary point of order as constituting legislation in an

appropriations bill, and, as such, violating clause 2 of rule XXI of House Rules.26

21

See CRS Report RL32755, Air Quality: Multi-Pollutant Legislation in the 109th Congress.

22

See CRS Report RS21581, Climate Change: Senate Proposals to Reduce Greenhouse Gas

Emissions; and CRS Report RS21067, Global Climate Change: Controlling CO2 Emissions

Cost-Limiting Safety Valves.

23

See CRS Report RL33588, Renewable Energy Policy: Tax Credit, Budget, and

Regulatory Issues; and CRS Report RL33599, Energy Efficiency Policy: Budget, Electricity

Conservation, and Fuel Conservation Issues.

24

Section 1612 of the Senate version of H.R. 6.

25

H.R. 5386, Title IV, Section 425, as reported in the House, H.Rept. 109-465.

26

For the floor debate see pp. H2826-2829 in the May 18, 2006, daily edition of the

Congressional Record, v. 152, no 62.

CRS-19

Congressional hearings on climate change in the 109th Congress included seven

in the Senate by four committees: Commerce, Science and Transportation; Energy

and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; and Foreign Relations. In

the House, committee hearings included four hearings by three committees: Energy

and Commerce; Government Reform; and Science. These were for the most part

overview or oversight hearings, and were not focused on specific legislation.