Nuclear Energy Policy

Congressional research reportOct 15, 2014

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October 15, 2014

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Summary

Nuclear energy issues facing Congress include reactor safety and regulation, radioactive waste

management, research and development priorities, federal incentives for new commercial

reactors, nuclear weapons proliferation, and security against terrorist attacks.

The earthquake and resulting tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear

power plant on March 11, 2011, raised questions in Congress about the disaster’s possible

implications for nuclear safety regulation, U.S. nuclear energy expansion, and radioactive waste

policy. The tsunami knocked out electric power at the six-reactor plant, resulting in the

overheating of several reactor cores, loss of cooling in spent fuel storage pools, major hydrogen

explosions, and releases of radioactive material into the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) issued orders to U.S. nuclear plants March 12, 2012, to begin implementing

safety improvements in response to Fukushima.

Significant incentives for new commercial reactors were included in the Energy Policy Act of

2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58), such as tax credits and loan guarantees. Together with volatile

fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls, the federal incentives for nuclear

power helped spur renewed interest by utilities and other potential reactor developers. License

applications for as many as 31 new reactors were announced, and NRC issued licenses for four

reactors at two plant sites in early 2012. However, falling natural gas prices, safety concerns

raised by the Fukushima accident, and other changing circumstances have made it unlikely that

many more of the proposed nuclear projects will move toward construction in the near term.

Four U.S. reactors were permanently closed in 2013, and another shutdown has been announced

for late 2014. Three reactors were closed because of the need for major repairs, and the other two

because electricity prices fell below their generating costs.

DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes advanced reactors, fuel cycle

technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. The Obama Administration’s FY2015

funding request for nuclear energy research and development totaled $863.4 million. Including

advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology, infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the

total nuclear energy request was $25.0 million (2.9%) below the FY2014 funding level. The

House approved $826.7 million (H.R. 4923), while the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and

Water Development Appropriations recommended $777.0 million.

Disposal of highly radioactive waste has been one of the most controversial aspects of nuclear

power. The Obama Administration halted work on a long-planned waste repository at Yucca

Mountain, NV, and established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC)

to recommend new approaches to the waste problem. The BRC issued its final report to the

Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012. In response to the BRC report, and to provide an

outline for a new nuclear waste program, DOE issued a Strategy for the Management and

Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste in January 2013. The DOE strategy calls

for a new nuclear waste management entity to develop consent-based storage and disposal sites,

similar to recommendations by the BRC. No funding has been requested or appropriated since

FY2011 to continue NRC licensing of the Yucca Mountain repository, although the House voted

to provide DOE with $150.0 million and NRC $55.0 million for Yucca Mountain licensing

activities in FY2015.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Contents

Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1

Nuclear Power Status and Outlook .................................................................................................. 3

Possible New Reactors .............................................................................................................. 6

Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation .................................................................................. 10

Safety ....................................................................................................................................... 10

Emergency Planning ......................................................................................................... 12

Domestic Reactor Safety Experience ................................................................................ 13

Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc ......................................................................... 15

Licensing and Regulation ........................................................................................................ 15

Reactor Security ...................................................................................................................... 17

Decommissioning .................................................................................................................... 18

Nuclear Accident Liability....................................................................................................... 19

Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants ................................................................................... 21

Nuclear Production Tax Credit ................................................................................................ 22

Standby Support ...................................................................................................................... 23

Loan Guarantees ...................................................................................................................... 23

Subsidy Costs .................................................................................................................... 24

Nuclear Solicitations ......................................................................................................... 25

Global Climate Change ........................................................................................................... 27

Nuclear Power Research and Development................................................................................... 30

Nuclear Waste Management .......................................................................................................... 33

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation ...................................................................................................... 36

Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs ............................................................................. 37

Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 39

H.R. 259 (Pompeo)/S. 2279 (Lee)..................................................................................... 39

H.R. 1700 (Engel) ............................................................................................................. 39

H.R. 2081 (Thornberry) .................................................................................................... 39

H.R. 2609 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 1245 (Feinstein) ................................................................ 39

H.R. 2712 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 40

H.R. 2861 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 40

H.R. 3354 (Engel) ............................................................................................................. 40

H.R. 3766 (Ros-Lehtinen) ................................................................................................. 40

H.R. 3895 (Duncan) .......................................................................................................... 40

H.R. 4522 (Van Hollen)/S. 2271 (Murphy) ....................................................................... 40

H.R. 4869 (Lummis) ......................................................................................................... 40

H.R. 4923 (Simpson)......................................................................................................... 41

H.R. 4956 (Walz)............................................................................................................... 41

H.R. 5322 (Blackburn) ...................................................................................................... 41

S. 1240 (Wyden)................................................................................................................ 41

S. 1519 (Vitter) .................................................................................................................. 41

S. 2324 (Boxer) ................................................................................................................. 41

S. 2325 (Markey)............................................................................................................... 42

S. 2326 (Sanders)/H.R. 4667 (Welch) ............................................................................... 42

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Tables

Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications ................................................................ 8

Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................... 38

Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs) .............................................. 38

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 42

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Most Recent Developments

Agreements for the first loan guarantees for nuclear power plants under the Energy Policy Act of

2005 were signed February 20, 2014, by Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz. The federal loan

guarantees total $6.5 billion for two reactors being constructed at the Vogtle nuclear plant in

Waynesboro, GA.1 Southern Company, the plant’s lead owner, estimated that its $3.46 billion

share of the loan guarantee would reduce its present-value financing costs by up to $250 million.

The guaranteed loans are to be issued by the U.S. Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank.2 The plant

owners were not charged an upfront fee for the loan guarantees but are paying interest above the

applicable Treasury rate.3

The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) FY2015 funding request for nuclear energy research and

development, submitted to Congress in early March 2014, totaled $863.4 million. Including

advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology, infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the

total nuclear energy request is $25.0 million (2.9%) below the FY2014 funding level. The House

approved its FY2015 Energy and Water appropriations bill (H.R. 4923) on July 10, 2014, with

$826.7 million for nuclear energy. The Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Appropriations recommended $777.0 million on July 24, 2014.4 Pending enactment of full-year

appropriations, FY2015 funding for these programs is being provided by a continuing resolution

(P.L. 113-164).

The first construction starts for new U.S. nuclear power reactors since the 1970s officially took

place in March 2013 in South Carolina and Georgia. Pouring of the first “safety related” concrete,

which marks the start of reactor construction, was completed on March 11, 2013, for V.C.

Summer Unit 2 in Cayce, SC, and three days later for Vogtle Unit 3 in Georgia. The Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) had issued combined construction permits and operating licenses

(COLs) for two new reactors at the Vogtle site on February 9, 2012, and for two identical reactors

at the Summer plant on March 30, 2012. Each of the new Westinghouse AP1000 reactors,

scheduled for completion between 2017 and 2019, is expected to cost from $5 billion to $7

billion.

NRC approved a design certification September 16, 2014, for GE-Hitachi’s Economic Simplified

Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), following nine years of review. Like the Westinghouse

AP1000, the ESBWR includes “passive” safety features that are designed to protect the reactor

core from overheating after an accident. NRC is currently reviewing two COLs that would use the

ESBWR design: Fermi 3 in Michigan and North Anna 3 in Virginia.5

Mirshak, Meg, “Energy Secretary Moniz Visits Vogtle to Finalize Loan Guarantee,” Augusta Chronicle, February 21,

2014, http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2014-02-20/energy-secretary-moniz-visits-vogtle-finalize-loanguarantee.

Southern Company, “Southern Company Subsidiary, DOE Finalize Vogtle Nuclear Project Loan Guarantees,” news

release, February 20, 2014, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/southern-company-subsidiary-doe-finalizevogtle-nuclear-project-loan-guarantees-246395221.html.

See CRS Insight.

Senate Committee on Appropriations, “FY15 Subcommittee Reported Bill and Draft Report,” July 24, 2014,

http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/fy-2015-ew-subcommittee-reported-bill-and-draft-report.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Certifies GE-Hitachi New Reactor Design,” news release, September 16,

2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2014/.

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Four U.S. reactors were permanently closed during 2013, and the shutdown of a fifth unit was

announced for late 2014. Crystal River 3 in Florida was retired in February 2013 because of

cracks in its concrete containment structure. The single-unit Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin closed

in May 2013 because regional electricity prices had dropped below the reactor’s generating costs.

San Onofre 2 and 3 in California closed in June 2013 because of faulty steam generators (unit 1

had been shut previously). And the owner of the single-unit Vermont Yankee plant announced in

August 2013 that the reactor would permanently close in the fourth quarter of 2014 for economic

reasons. All of those units had substantial time remaining on their initial 40-year operating

licenses or had received or applied for 20-year license extensions from NRC. The shutdowns

prompted widespread discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors.

Continued operation of “at risk” nuclear generating capacity could be encouraged by regulations

proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on June 2, 2014, to reduce carbon

emissions at existing power plants. The EPA proposal would require states to reduce the “carbon

intensity” (carbon emissions per megawatt-hour of electrical generation) of their existing fossil

fuel-fired generating plants by 2030. The proposed standards assume that states will prevent the

premature retirement of up to 6% of their existing nuclear capacity and also complete five

reactors currently under construction. States could also respond to the standards by encouraging

construction of additional reactors or the expansion of generating capacity at existing nuclear

plants, among many other options.6

On March 12, 2012, NRC issued its first nuclear plant safety requirements based on lessons

learned from the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan. NRC ordered U.S. nuclear plant

operators to begin implementing safety enhancements related to power blackouts, reactor

containment venting, and monitoring the water levels of reactor spent fuel pools. The Fukushima

nuclear plant was hit by an earthquake and tsunami that knocked out all electric power at the sixreactor plant, resulting in the overheating of the reactor cores in three of the units and a

heightened overheating risk at several spent fuel storage pools at the site. The overheating of the

reactor cores caused major hydrogen explosions and releases of radioactive material to the

environment. NRC’s response to the accident has been the subject of continuing congressional

oversight.

After halting work on a long-planned nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada,

DOE issued a Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level

Waste in January 2013. The DOE strategy calls for a new nuclear waste management entity to

develop consent-based storage and disposal sites. A pilot interim spent fuel storage facility would

be opened by 2021 and a larger-scale storage facility, which could be an expansion of the pilot

facility, would begin receiving waste by 2025. A geologic disposal facility would open by 2048—

50 years after the initial planned opening date for the Yucca Mountain repository.7 Legislation to

redirect the nuclear waste program along similar lines was introduced by Senator Wyden on June

27, 2013 (S. 1240). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on

August 13, 2013, that NRC must continue work on the Yucca Mountain license application as

long as funding is available. The court determined that NRC has at least $11.1 million in

Environmental Protection Agency, “Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule,” http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollutionstandards/clean-power-plan-proposed-rule.

DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste, January 2013,

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/

Strategy%20for%20the%20Management%20and%20Disposal%20of%20Used%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20and%20High

%20Level%20Radioactive%20Waste.pdf.

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previously appropriated funds for that purpose.8 In its FY2015 Energy and Water Development

appropriations bill, the House voted to provide DOE $150.0 million and NRC $55.0 million for

Yucca Mountain licensing activities. No funding was included in the draft bill approved by the

Senate subcommittee.

Pursuant to a court ruling, DOE stopped collecting nuclear waste fees from nuclear power

generators on May 16, 2014, eliminating about $750 million in annual revenues for the waste

disposal program.9 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires the Secretary of Energy to adjust the

fees as necessary to cover the waste program’s anticipated costs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that DOE’s current waste plans are too vague to allow a

reasonable estimate to be calculated and that DOE must therefore stop collecting the fee.10

NRC approved a final rule August 26, 2014, on continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.11 The rule

responds to a federal circuit court ruling on June 8, 2012, that struck down NRC’s Waste

Confidence Decision, which contains the agency’s formal findings that waste generated by

nuclear power plants will be disposed of safely. The court ruled that the Waste Confidence

Decision required an environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act and that

NRC needed to consider the possibility that a permanent waste repository would never be built

and examine potential problems with waste storage pools. In approving the storage rule, NRC

ended its suspension of final licensing decisions for new reactors, spent fuel storage facilities, and

license renewals.12

Nuclear Power Status and Outlook

After nearly 30 years in which no new orders had been placed for nuclear power plants in the

United States, a series of license applications that began in 2007 prompted widespread

speculation about a U.S. “nuclear renaissance.” The renewed interest in nuclear power largely

resulted from the improved performance of existing reactors, federal incentives in the Energy

Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), the possibility of carbon dioxide controls that could increase

costs at fossil fuel plants, and volatile prices for natural gas—the favored fuel for new power

plants for the past two decades.

Four of the proposed new U.S. reactors received licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) in early 2012. NRC approved combined construction permit and operating

licenses (COLs) for Southern Company to build and operate two new Westinghouse AP1000

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of

mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/

BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.

Hiruo, Elaine, “DOE Implements Court-Ordered Suspension of Nuclear Waste Fee,” NuclearFuel, May 26, 2014.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, National Association of Regulatory Utility

Commissioners v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 11-1066, decided November 19, 2013,

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/2708C01ECFE3109F85257C280053406E/$file/11-10661466796.pdf.

NRC, “Waste Confidence—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” proposed rule, 78 Federal Register 56776,

September 13, 2013.

NRC, “NRC Approves Final Rule on Spent Fuel Storage and Ends Suspension of Final Licensing Actions for

Nuclear Plants and Renewals,” news release, August 26, 2014, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1423/

ML14238A326.pdf.

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reactors at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia on February 9, 2012. On March 30, 2012,

NRC approved COLs for two additional AP1000 reactors at the existing V.C. Summer nuclear

plant in South Carolina. Pouring of the first “safety related” concrete, which marks the start of

reactor construction, was completed on March 11, 2013, for Summer Unit 2 and three days later

for Vogtle Unit 3 (after several years of site preparation, component fabrication, and other

preliminary work).

However, the future of all other proposed new U.S. reactors is uncertain. High construction cost

estimates—a major reason for earlier reactor cancellations—continue to undermine nuclear power

economics. A more recent obstacle to nuclear power growth has been the development of vast

reserves of domestic natural gas from previously uneconomic shale formations, which has held

gas prices low and reduced concern about future price spikes. Moreover, it is unclear at this point

how much incentive might be provided to nuclear power by potential U.S. carbon controls.

Four U.S. reactors were permanently closed during 2013, and the shutdown of a fifth unit was

announced for late 2014. Crystal River 3 in Florida was retired in February 2013 because of

cracks in its concrete containment structure. The single-unit Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin closed

in May 2013 because regional electricity prices had dropped below the reactor’s generating costs.

San Onofre 2 and 3 closed in June 2013 because of faulty steam generators (unit 1 had been shut

previously). And the owner of the single-unit Vermont Yankee plant announced in August 2013

that the reactor would permanently close in the fourth quarter of 2014 for economic reasons. All

of those units had substantial time remaining on their initial 40-year operating licenses or had

received or applied for 20-year license extensions from NRC. The shutdowns prompted

widespread discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors.

The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi

nuclear power plant could also affect plans for new U.S. reactors, although U.S. nuclear power

growth was already expected to be modest in the near term. Following the Fukushima accident,

preconstruction work was suspended on two planned reactors at the South Texas Project. Tokyo

Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which owns the Fukushima plant, had planned to invest in

the South Texas Project expansion, but TEPCO’s financial condition plunged after the accident.

New U.S. safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima disaster could raise investor

concerns about higher costs. On the other hand, after the accident the Obama Administration

reiterated its support for nuclear power expansion as part of its clean energy policy.13

The recent applications for new power reactors in the United States followed a long period of

declining nuclear generation growth rates. Until the COLs were issued for the Vogtle and Summer

projects, no nuclear power plants had been ordered in the United States since 1978, and more than

100 reactors had been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. The most recent U.S. nuclear

unit to be completed was the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar 1 reactor, ordered in

1970 and licensed to operate in 1996. But largely because of better operation and capacity

expansion at existing reactors, annual U.S. nuclear generation has risen by about 20% since the

startup of Watts Bar 1.14 The U.S. nuclear power industry currently comprises 100 licensed

reactors (excluding the four permanently closed in 2013) at 62 plant sites in 31 states and

Oral Testimony of Energy Secretary Steven Chu at the House Energy and Commerce Committee – As Prepared for

Delivery, March 16, 2011, http://www.energy.gov/news/10178.htm.

Energy Information Administration, Electricity Data Browser, “Net Generation for All Sectors, Annual,” viewed

September 4, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser.

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generates about 19% of the nation’s electricity.15 TVA’s board of directors voted August 1, 2007,

to resume construction on Watts Bar 2, which had been suspended in 1985; the renewed

construction project was to cost about $2.5 billion and be completed in 2013. However, TVA

announced on April 5, 2012, that completing Watts Bar 2 would cost up to $2 billion more than

expected and take until 2015.16 At TVA’s request, NRC in March 2009 reinstated the construction

authorization for the two-unit Bellefonte (AL) nuclear plant, which had been deferred in 1988 and

canceled in 2006.17 The TVA board voted on August 18, 2011, to complete construction of

Bellefonte 1 after the Watts Bar 2 project is finished. Completing Bellefonte 1 was projected at

that time to cost $4.9 billion, with operation to begin by 2020.18 Citing lower electricity sales,

TVA on June 12, 2013, announced sharp cutbacks at the Bellefonte site.19

Annual electricity production from U.S. nuclear power plants is much greater than that from oil

and hydropower and other renewable energy sources. Nuclear generation has been overtaken by

natural gas in recent years, and it remains well behind coal, which accounted for about 39% of

U.S. electricity generation in 2013.20 Nuclear plants generated more than half the electricity in

four states in 2012—New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont—and 12 states

generated 25%-50% of their electricity from nuclear power.21 The 789 billion net kilowatt-hours

of nuclear electricity generated in the United States during 201322 was about the same as the

nation’s entire electrical output in the early 1960s, when the oldest of today’s operating U.S.

commercial reactors were ordered.23

Reasons for the 30-year halt in U.S. nuclear plant orders included high capital costs, public

concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory compliance issues.

High construction costs may pose the most serious obstacle to nuclear power expansion.

Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s ranged from $2 billion to $6

billion, averaging more than $3,900 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 2011 dollars),

far higher than commercial fossil fuel technologies. The nuclear industry predicts that new plant

designs could be built for less than that if many identical plants were built in a series, but current

estimates for new reactors show little if any reduction in cost.24

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest 2023-2014, NUREG-1350, Vol. 25, August 20013, p. 32,

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v25/sr1350v25.pdf.

Mary Powers, “Credit Agencies See Watts Bar-2 Cost Impact,” Nucleonics Week, April 12, 2012, p. 1.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1

and 2),” 74 Federal Register 10969, March 13, 2009.

Tennessee Valley Authority, “TVA Board Implements Vision,” press release, August 18, 2011, http://www.tva.com/

news/releases/julsep11/board_meeting/index.htm.

Tennessee Valley Authority, “TVA Announces Budget Reduction for Bellefonte Plant,” press release, June 12, 2013,

http://www.tva.com/news/releases/aprjun13/bellefonte_budget.html.

Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Net Generation by Energy Source, February 2014,

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_01. Net generation excludes electricity used

for power plant operation.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, 2013–2014, op. cit.

EIA, Electricity Data Browser, op. cit.

All of today’s 100 operating U.S. commercial reactors were ordered from 1963 through 1973; see “Historical Profile

of U.S. Nuclear Power Development,” U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, 1992.

For a comparison of generating costs, see CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by (name

redacted).

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In contrast, average U.S. nuclear plant operating costs per kilowatt-hour dropped substantially

since 1990, and expensive downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed U.S. commercial

reactors generated electricity at an average of 90% of their total capacity in 2013, according to the

Energy Information Administration (EIA).25

Seventy-three commercial reactors have received 20-year license renewals from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to a total of 60 years of operation. License

renewals for 19 additional reactors are currently under review, and more are anticipated,

according to NRC.26 However, as noted above, three reactors that have received license renewals,

Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, and Kewaunee, are being permanently closed for economic

reasons.

Possible New Reactors

Electric utilities and other firms have announced plans to apply for COLs for more than 30

reactors (see Table 1).27 (For a discussion of COLs, see the “Licensing and Regulation” section

below.)

As noted above, construction is currently underway on four of the proposed new reactors, at the

Vogtle and Summer sites. COLs are being actively pursued for 14 additional reactors (shown in

Table 1), whose owners have not committed to actual construction but are keeping the option

available if conditions are more favorable in the future. The experience of the first few reactors to

be constructed is likely to be crucial in determining whether a wave of subsequent units will

move forward as the nuclear industry envisions.

The two new Vogtle reactors are scheduled to go on line in 2017 and 2018,28 the same years now

planned for startup of the new Summer units,29 although possible delays of more than a year have

been reported.30 EIA estimates that construction costs of new nuclear power plants will average

$5,335 per kilowatt of capacity, or about $6.1 billion for an AP1000 unit, not including interest

costs.31 The two Summer units are expected to cost about $11.6 billion in 2012 dollars, according

to regulatory filings,32 while the two Vogtle units are projected by their primary owner to cost a

total of $13.35 billion.33

Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, “Capacity Factors for Utility-Scale Generators Not

Primarily Using Fossil Fuels,” February 2014, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=

epmt_6_07_b.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities,” May 5, 2014,

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, New Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors.html.

Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtlekemper.html.

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, “V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3, Quarterly Report to the

South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff,” June 30, 2013, http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/FD5FC097-395648A6-9098-2C2D115C8512/0/NNDQuarterlyReport2013Q2FINAL81413PUBLIC.pdf.

Carr, Housely, “SCE&G Talks with Contractors on Summer Will Be ‘Tense,’ Analyst Says,” Nucleonics Week,

August 14, 2014, p. 5.

Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants,” November

2010, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/beck_plantcosts/index.html.

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, “Petitions for Updates and Revisions to the Capital Cost Schedule and the

(continued...)

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Duke Energy’s Levy County project, with two AP1000 units, is scheduled by NRC to receive a

final decision on its COL in mid-2015, although Duke has terminated its engineering,

procurement, and construction (EPC) contract for the project. Duke said it did not foresee a need

for the plant as soon as previously planned, but “continues to regard the Levy site as a viable

option for future nuclear generation.”34 COLs for six reactors at four other sites—Fermi (MI),

South Texas Project, William States Lee (SC), and North Anna (VA)—are scheduled to be issued

by 2016. The joint venture developing the proposed South Texas Plant reactors, Nuclear

Innovation North America (NINA), is focusing solely on the COL and a DOE loan guarantee.35

The proposed new reactors at the Fermi and North Anna sites reached a milestone on September

16, 2014, when NRC approved the design certification for GE-Hitachi’s Economic Simplified

Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), following nine years of review. The COLs that are currently

under review for both those units would use the ESBWR design. Like the Westinghouse AP1000,

the ESBWR includes “passive” safety features that are designed to protect the reactor core from

overheating after an accident.36

As shown in Table 1, the remaining three projects that have not suspended their COLs, with a

total of four proposed reactors, do not have firm licensing schedules from NRC. As a result, these

reactors appear unlikely to be completed before the early 2020s. Some of these proposed nuclear

projects may require additional partners in order to proceed to construction, according to

company announcements.37

Several other COL applications have been suspended, withdrawn, or shifted to early site permits

(ESPs) only. Entergy suspended further license review of its planned GE ESBWR reactors at

River Bend, LA, and Grand Gulf, MS, although it still has a previously issued ESP for Grand

Gulf. AmerenUE suspended review of a COL for its proposed new Callaway unit in Missouri, and

Exelon withdrew its COL application for a proposed two-unit plant in Victoria County, TX. Most

recently, Duke Energy suspended its application for two new AP1000s at its Shearon Harris plant

in North Carolina, and Luminant suspended its COL for two Mitsubishi APWRs at Comanche

Peak in Texas.

TVA decided to defer consideration of its COL application for two new Westinghouse AP1000

reactors at its Bellefonte plant in Alabama in favor of completing the first of two unfinished

(...continued)

Construction Schedule,” before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, February 29, 2012,

http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/35AAED95-5226-416A-8DC2-0743BC93B911/0/

2012PetitiontoUpdateCostSchedules.pdf. Total cost based on SCE&G ownership of 55%.

Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtlekemper.html. Total cost based on Southern Company’s 45.7% ownership.

Duke Energy, “Duke Energy Reaches Revised Multi-year Settlement with Florida Consumer Advocates,” news

release, August 1, 2013, http://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2013080101.asp.

NRG Energy, “NRG Energy, Inc. Provides Greater Clarity on the South Texas Nuclear Development Project,” press

release, April 19, 2011, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=

UGFyZW50SUQ9OTAwMzB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Certifies GE-Hitachi New Reactor Design,” news release, September 16,

2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2014/.

Jeff Beattie, “Southeast Utilities Seek Partners to Hedge Nuclear Bets,” Energy Daily, October 5, 2010, p. 1.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Babcock & Wilcox reactors at the site. TVA had submitted a COL application for the Bellefonte

AP1000s in October 2007 as part of the NuStart consortium.38

Constellation Energy announced October 9, 2010, that it was abandoning negotiations with DOE

for a loan guarantee for the planned Calvert Cliffs 3 reactor, which Constellation had been

developing as part of its UniStar joint venture with the French national utility EDF.39

Constellation sold its share of UniStar to EDF so that EDF could seek another U.S. partner to

continue the Calvert Cliffs project.40 (For more discussion of Constellation’s decision, see the

“Loan Guarantees” section below.)

NRC anticipates that several more COL and other license applications will be submitted in the

future. This includes a TVA plan to submit construction permit applications for small modular

reactors (SMRs) of about 160 megawatts each at its Clinch River, TN, site.41

Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications

Announced

Applicant

Site

Reactor

Type

Units

Status

COL issued

Southern

Vogtle (GA)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL application submitted 3/13/08; engineering,

procurement, and construction (EPC) contract signed

4/8/08; ESP and limited construction approved 8/26/09;

conditional DOE loan guarantee announced 2/16/10;

NRC hearing held 9/27-28/11; COL approved 2/9/12;

first “safety-related concrete” poured 3/14/13

SCE&G

Summer

(SC)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 3/31/08; EPC contract signed 5/27/08;

COL approved 3/30/12; first “safety-related concrete”

poured 3/11/13

COL scheduled for completion

Duke Energy

Levy

County (FL)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 7/30/08; application scheduled for

completion in 2014; termination of EPC contract

announced 8/1/13

DTE Energy

Fermi (MI)

GE ESBWR

COL submitted 9/18/08; application scheduled for

completion in 2015

Nuclear

Innovation

North America

South Texas

Project

Toshiba

ABWR

COL submitted 9/20/07; EPC contract signed with

Toshiba 2/12/09; NRG Energy halted further investment

4/19/11; application scheduled for completion in 2016

Tennessee Valley Authority, “Single Nuclear Unit at the Bellefonte Plant Site,” fact sheet, http://www.tva.gov/

environment/reports/blnp/index.htm.

Constellation Energy, “Constellation Energy Releases Statement Regarding U.S. Department of Energy Loan

Guarantee,” press release, October 9, 2010, http://ir.constellation.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=516614.

Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Thomas

Piquemal, Group Executive Vice President, Finance, EDF, October 15, 2010, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/

CEG/1036755503x0x410084/e27369a0-ce85-432f-bfad-e17ddce4f8f2/101510_-_EDF_letter.pdf; Unistar, “EDF and

Constellation Energy Announce Comprehensive Agreement,” press release, October 27, 2010, http://press.edf.com/

press-releases/all-press-releases/2010/edf-and-constellation-energy-announce-comprehensive-agreement-82018.html&

return=42873.

NRC, “New Reactor Licensing Applications,” August 15, 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/newlicensing-files/new-rx-licensing-app-legend.pdf.

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Announced

Applicant

Site

Reactor

Type

Units

Status

Duke Energy

William

States Lee

(SC)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 12/13/07; application scheduled for

completion in 2016

Dominion

North Anna

GE ESBWR

COL submitted 11/27/07; ESP approved 11/20/07;

application scheduled for completion in 2016

COL schedule under revision

FPL

Turkey

Point (FL)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 6/30/09; preconstruction work being

conducted

PPL

Bell Bend

(PA)

Areva EPR

COL submitted 10/10/08, not scheduled for review

UniStar

Calvert

Cliffs (MD)

Areva EPR

COL submitted 7/13/07 (Part 1), 3/13/08 (Part 2);

Constellation withdrew from project 10/8/10;

application not scheduled for review

Licensing suspended

Entergy

Grand Gulf

(MS)

Not specified

COL submitted 2/27/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09;

ESP approved 3/27/07

Exelon

Victoria

County

(TX)

Not specified

COL application withdrawn and ESP application

submitted 3/25/10; ESP application withdrawn 8/28/12

AmerenUE

Calloway

(MO)

Areva EPR

COL submitted 7/24/08; license review suspended

6/23/09

Entergy

River Bend

(LA)

Not specified

COL submitted 9/25/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09

TVA

Bellefonte

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 10/30/07; licensing deferred 9/29/10

Unistar

Nine Mile

Point (NY)

Areva EPR

COL submitted 9/30/08; licensing suspended 12/1/09

Duke Energy

Harris (NC)

Westinghouse

AP1000

COL submitted 2/19/08; EPC contract signed 1/5/09;

licensing suspended 5/2/13

Luminant

Power

Comanche

Peak (TX)

Mitsubishi USAPWR

COL submitted 9/19/08; review suspended 3/31/14

Total COL applications

Total currently active

COLs

Sources: NRC, Nucleonics Week, Nuclear News, Nuclear Energy Institute, company news releases.

Note: Applications are for COLs unless otherwise specified.

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Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation

Safety

Worldwide concern about nuclear power plant safety rose sharply after the Fukushima accident,

which is generally considered to be much worse than the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident

in Pennsylvania but not as severe as the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet

Union. Total radioactive releases from the Fukushima accident have been estimated at 25 million

curies,42 compared with 140 million curies from Chernobyl43 and 43,000 curies from Three Mile

Island.44

The Fukushima disaster resulted in similar levels of radioactive contamination per square meter

to that of Chernobyl, but the Fukushima contamination was much less widespread and affected a

smaller number of people.45 Timely evacuation of areas up to 30 kilometers (km, 18.6 miles) from

the Fukushima Daiichi plant reduced radiation exposure from the accident. A health survey

conducted by the Fukushima prefecture estimated the total dose to the prefecture’s 435,788

people at less than 617 sieverts (61,700 rem), averaging no more than about 1.4 millisieverts (140

millirem) per person for the first 28 months after the accident.46 For comparison, NRC limits the

dose resulting from the use of radioactive materials to 100 millirem per year (1 millisievert) to

any individual member of the public.47 (For more background on the Fukushima accident, see

CRS Report R41694, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and

(name redacted).)

The Fukushima disaster has raised particular policy questions for the United States because,

unlike Chernobyl, the Fukushima reactors are similar to common U.S. designs. Although the

Fukushima accident resulted from a huge tsunami that incapacitated the power plant’s emergency

diesel generators, the accident dramatically illustrated the potential consequences of any natural

catastrophe or other situation that could cause an extended “station blackout”—the loss of

alternating current (AC) power. Safety issues related to station blackout include standards for

World Nuclear Association, “Fukushima Accident 2011,” September 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/

Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident-2011. Radioactivity units converted from 940

petabecquerels of Iodine-131 equivalent.

World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident 1986,” June 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-andSecurity/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” April 25, 2014,

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.

French Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), Assessment on the 66th Day of Projected External

Doses for Populations Living in the North-West Fallout Zone of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Report DRPH/201110, p. 27, http://hps.org/documents/irsn_fukushima_report.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, 2013 NEA Annual Report, p. 8.

CRS calculations based on data in Table 3.

NRC, “Radiation Protection and the NRC,” http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/

br0322/#intro.

See also Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Station, INPO 11-005, November 2011, available from the Nuclear Energy Institute at

http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/special-report-on-the-nuclearaccident-at-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-station.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

backup batteries, which had been required to provide power for 4-8 hours, and additional

measures that may be required to assure backup power.

Safety concerns at U.S. reactors were also raised by hydrogen explosions at three of the

Fukushima reactors—resulting from a high-temperature reaction between steam and nuclear fuel

cladding—and the loss of cooling at the Japanese plant’s spent fuel storage pools. Other safety

issues that have been raised in the wake of Fukushima include the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear

plants to earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters, the availability of iodine pills to prevent

absorption of radioactive iodine released during nuclear accidents, and the adequacy of nuclear

accident emergency planning.

In response to such concerns, NRC on March 23, 2011, established a task force “made up of

current senior managers and former NRC experts” to “conduct both short- and long-term analysis

of the lessons that can be learned from the situation in Japan.”49 The Near-Term Task Force issued

its report July 12, 2011, making recommendations ranging from specific safety improvements to

broad changes in NRC’s overall regulatory approach.50 NRC staff subsequently identified several

of those actions that “can and should be initiated without delay.”51 The NRC Commissioners

largely agreed with the recommendations on October 18, 2011, and instructed the agency’s staff

to “strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five

years—by 2016.”52 Tier 1 regulatory actions, which are now being implemented, include53

•

Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations and walkdowns. Nuclear plant operators

must evaluate the implications of updated seismic and flooding models, including

all potential flooding sources. Plant operators must identify and verify the

adequacy of flood and seismic protection features at their sites.

•

Station blackout regulatory actions. NRC issued an order on March 12, 2012,

that required U.S. reactors to implement mitigation strategies “that will allow

them to cope without their permanent electrical power sources for an indefinite

amount of time.” Under the order, installed equipment at each plant must be

sufficient to maintain or restore cooling until portable on-site equipment and

supplies could take over. The portable on-site equipment would have to provide

sufficient cooling until “sufficient offsite resources” could be brought in to

maintain cooling indefinitely. Enough equipment and personnel would be

required to protect all affected reactors at a multi-unit plant. NRC is currently

preparing permanent regulations based on the mitigation strategies order.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directs Staff on Continuing Agency Response to

Japan Events; Adjust Commission Schedule,” press release, March 23, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/

ML110821123.pdf.

Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Recommendations for Enhancing

Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, July 12, 2011,

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf.

NRC, “Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” SECY-110124, September 9, 2011.

NRC, “Staff Requirements – SECY-11-0124 – Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the NearTerm Task Force Report,” October 18, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1126/ML11269A204.pdf.

NRC, “What Are the Lessons Learned from Fukushima?,” September 10, 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/

operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/priorities.html.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

•

Reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments. NRC on March 12, 2012,

ordered nuclear plants to install “reliable, hardened” vents for the containments

in Mark I reactors (the type at Fukushima). The vents would be designed to

reduce containment pressure before damage occurred to the reactor core. NRC

modified the order in June 2013 to require that the vents continue to function

after core damage occurred, which could prevent hydrogen generated by

overheated fuel cladding from leaking into the reactor building, as occurred at

Fukushima. Because venting after core damage has occurred could release

radioactive core material into the environment, NRC is also considering a

requirement that vents include filters or that other strategies be implemented to

reduce such emissions.

•

Spent fuel pool instrumentation. NRC ordered nuclear plants on March 12, 2012,

to install safety instrumentation to monitor spent fuel pool conditions, such as

water level, temperature, and radiation levels, from the plant control room.

•

Strengthening and integrating accident procedures and capabilities. NRC issued

an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on April 18, 2012, to require

integrated emergency procedures, including clear command-and-control

strategies and training qualifications for emergency decisionmakers.

•

Emergency preparedness regulatory actions. NRC has asked nuclear plants how

many workers would be needed to respond to large accidents affecting multiple

reactors at the same site. In addition, plants were asked to assess and ensure the

operability of emergency communications systems during such accidents.

The NRC staff slightly modified its proposals for top priority actions and divided the remaining

Task Force proposals into two lower tiers, which were determined to require further assessment

and potentially long-term study. Included in the lower-tier actions were requirements for

emergency water supply systems for spent fuel pools, secure power for emergency

communications and data systems, confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards, and

modifications to NRC’s regulatory process.54

Emergency Planning

Following the Three Mile Island accident, which revealed severe weaknesses in preparations for

nuclear plant emergencies, Congress mandated that emergency plans be prepared for all licensed

power reactors (P.L. 96-295, §109). NRC was required to develop standards for emergency plans

and review the adequacy of each plant-specific plan in consultation with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA).

NRC’s emergency planning requirements focus on a “plume exposure pathway emergency

planning zone (EPZ),” encompassing an area within about 10 miles (16.1 km) of each nuclear

plant. Within the 10-mile EPZ, a range of responses must be developed to protect the public from

radioactive releases, including evacuation, sheltering, and the distribution of non-radioactive

iodine (as discussed above). The regulations also require a 50-mile “ingestion pathway EPZ,” in

R.W. Borchardt, NRC Executive Director for Operations, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in

Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” SECY-11-0137, October 3, 2011.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

which actions are developed to protect food supplies.55 Nuclear plants are required to conduct

emergency preparedness exercises every two years. The exercises, which are evaluated by FEMA

and NRC, may include local, state, and federal responders and may involve both the plume and

ingestion EPZs.56

The size of the plume exposure EPZ has long been a subject of controversy, particularly after the

9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in which nuclear plants were believed to have been a

potential target. Attention to the issue was renewed by the Fukushima accident, in which some of

the highest radiation dose rates were measured beyond 10 miles from the plant.57 Controversy

over the issue intensified after NRC recommended the evacuation of U.S. citizens within 50 miles

of the Fukushima plant on March 16, 2011. The NRC recommendation was based on computer

models that, using meteorological data and estimates of plant conditions, found that potential

radiation doses 50 miles from the plant could exceed U.S. protective action guidelines.58

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NRC modified its nuclear plant emergency planning

requirements and began a comprehensive review of emergency planning regulations and

guidance. An NRC final rule based on that review took effect December 23, 2011.59 Among the

changes included in the rule are new requirements for periodic updates of EPZ evacuation time

estimates, mandatory backups for public alert systems, and protection of emergency responders

during terrorist attacks. The new emergency planning regulations were prepared before the

Fukushima accident, but the NRC staff recommended approval of the changes without waiting for

further changes that might result from the lessons of the Japanese accident. Emergency planning

changes resulting from Fukushima should be implemented later, the staff recommended.60

Domestic Reactor Safety Experience

Nuclear power safety has been a longstanding issue in the United States. Safety-related

shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation and

maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In one serious case, it

was discovered in March 2002 that leaking boric acid had eaten a large cavity in the top of the

reactor vessel in Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The corrosion left only the vessel’s quarterinch-thick stainless steel inner liner to prevent a potentially catastrophic loss of reactor cooling

water. Davis-Besse remained closed for repairs and other safety improvements until NRC allowed

the reactor to restart in March 2004.

10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Emergency Preparedness & Response,” website, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/

emerg-preparedness.html.

Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), “Readings of Integrated Dose at

Monitoring Post out of 20 Km Zone of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP,” data series, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/incident/

1304275.htm.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. Guidelines,”

press release, March 16, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110800133.pdf.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Enhancements to Emergency Planning Regulations,” Final rule, Federal Register,

November 23, 2011, p. 72560.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Final Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” SECY-110053, April 8, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0053scy.pdf.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

NRC’s oversight of the nuclear industry is a subject of contention as well; nuclear utilities often

complain that they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics

charge that NRC frequently relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or

costly to the industry.

In terms of public health consequences, the safety record of the U.S. nuclear power industry in

comparison with other major commercial energy technologies has been excellent. During more

than 3,500 reactor-years of operation in the United States,61 the only incident at a commercial

nuclear power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries to the public has been the Three Mile

Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core melted.62 A study of 32,000 people living

within five miles of the reactor when the accident occurred found no significant increase in

cancer rates through 1998, although the authors noted that some potential health effects “cannot

be definitively excluded.”63

The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal operation

are not generally believed to pose significant hazards, although some groups contend that routine

emissions are unacceptably risky. There is substantial scientific uncertainty about the level of risk

posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other hazardous

substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure levels. In the

case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated mostly from

health effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly

Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing in World War II, medical patients, and nuclear industry

workers.64

NRC announced April 7, 2010, that it had asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to

“perform a state-of-the-art study on cancer risk for populations surrounding nuclear power

facilities.” Unlike in previous studies, NAS is to examine cancer diagnosis rates, rather than

cancer deaths, potentially increasing the amount of data. The new study would also use

geographic units smaller than counties to determine how far members of the study group are

located from reactors, to more clearly determine whether there is a correlation between cancer

cases and distance from reactors. After issuing a report on methodologies for the study in 2012,

NAS began planning a pilot study at seven nuclear facilities in late 2013.65

NRC’s 1986 Safety Goal Policy Statement declared that nuclear power plants should not increase

the risk of accidental or cancer deaths among the nearby population by more than 0.1%.66 Later

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Myths & Facts About Safety,” viewed September 16, 2014, .http://www.nei.org/

Knowledge-Center/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Myths-Facts-About-Safety.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” April 25, 2014,

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.

Evelyn O. Talbott et al., “Long Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 19791998,” Environmental Health Perspectives, March 2003, pp. 341-348, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/

PMC1241392.

National Research Council, Committee to Assess the Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing

Radiation, Beir VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, 2006. Available at

http://www.nap.edu.

National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, “Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near

Nuclear Facilities, Phase 2: Pilot Planning,” http://nas-sites.org/cancerriskstudy/.

NRC, “Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,” policy statement, Federal Register, August 21,

1986, p. 30028, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/policy/51fr30028.pdf.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

NRC guidance established a “subsidiary benchmark” for the probability of accidental core

damage (fuel melting): Core damage frequency should average no more than one in 10,000 per

reactor per year.67 In addition, NRC set a benchmark that reactor containments should be

successful at least 90% of the time in preventing major radioactive releases during a core-damage

accident. Therefore, the benchmark probability of a major release from containment failure

during a core melt accident would average less than one in 100,000 per reactor per year.68 (For the

current U.S. fleet of about 100 reactors, that rate would yield an average of one core-damage

accident every 100 years and a major release every 1,000 years.) On the other hand, some groups

challenge the complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending

that accidents with serious public health consequences may be more frequent.69

Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc

The Chernobyl accident was by far the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred

anywhere in the world. At least 31 persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other

injuries, and thousands of additional cancer deaths among the tens of millions of people exposed

to radiation from the accident may occur during the next several decades.

According to a 2006 report by the Chernobyl Forum organized by the International Atomic

Energy Agency, the primary observable health consequence of the accident was a dramatic

increase in childhood thyroid cancer. The Chernobyl Forum estimated that about 4,000 cases of

thyroid cancer have occurred in children who after the accident drank milk contaminated with

high levels of radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid. Although the Chernobyl

Forum found only 15 deaths from those thyroid cancers, it estimated that about 4,000 other

cancer deaths may have occurred among the 600,000 people with the highest radiation exposures,

plus an estimated 1% increase in cancer deaths among persons with less exposure. The report

estimated that about 77,000 square miles were significantly contaminated by radioactive

cesium.70 Greenpeace issued a report in 2006 estimating that 200,000 deaths in Belarus, Russia,

and Ukraine resulted from the Chernobyl accident between 1990 and 2004.71

Licensing and Regulation

For many years, a top priority of the U.S. nuclear industry was to modify the process for licensing

new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power plant, according

to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and designs were less

subject to mid-construction safety-related changes required by NRC. The Energy Policy Act of

1992 (P.L. 102-486) largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.

NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-89-102, “Implementation of the Safety Goals,” Memorandum to

James M. Taylor from Samuel J. Chilk, June 15, 1990, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003707881.pdf.

U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed

Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,” Revision 1, November 2002, http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power-reactors/rg/01-174.

Public Citizen Energy Program, “The Myth of Nuclear Safety,” http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/

nuclear_power_plants/reactor_safety/articles.cfm?ID=4454.

The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts,

International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2006.

Greenpeace. The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health, April 2006, p. 10.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C. 2011-2282)

had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit to build a plant

and then, after construction was finished, an operating license to run it. Each stage of the

licensing process involved adjudicatory proceedings. Environmental impact statements also are

required under the National Environmental Policy Act.

Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided a

clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses. Under the new process, NRC can issue

combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs) and allow completed plants to

operate without delay if they meet all construction requirements—called “inspections, tests,

analyses, and acceptance criteria,” or ITAAC. NRC would hold preoperational hearings on the

adequacy of plant construction only in specified circumstances.

DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 program had paid up to half the cost of several COLs and early site

permits to test the revised licensing procedures. However, the COL process cannot be fully tested

until construction of new reactors is completed. At that point, it could be seen whether completed

plants would be able to operate without delays or whether adjudicable disputes over construction

adequacy may arise. Section 638 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58)

authorizes federal payments to the owner of a completed reactor whose operation is held up by

regulatory delays. The nuclear industry has asked Congress to require NRC to use informal

procedures in determining whether ITAAC have been met, eliminate mandatory hearings on

uncontested issues before granting a COL, and make other changes in the licensing process.72

A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in issuing and

enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have regularly

complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety regulations have

burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs. But many environmentalists,

nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with being too close to the nuclear industry, a

situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight of nuclear power plants and routine

exemptions from safety requirements.

Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear plant owners, who are

required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also

monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear

power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the performance of

reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety violations, NRC often

dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.

NRC’s reactor safety program is based on “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety

enforcement is guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC’s

risk-informed reactor oversight system, inaugurated April 2, 2000, relies on a series of

performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.73

Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear

Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 5, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/

newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.

For more information about the NRC reactor oversight process, see http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/

ASSESS/index.html.

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Reactor Security

Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks, and

critics have long questioned the adequacy of requirements for nuclear plant operators to defend

against such attacks. All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by NRC have a series of

physical barriers against access to vital reactor areas and are required to maintain a trained

security force to protect them.

A key element in protecting nuclear plants is the requirement that simulated terrorist attacks,

monitored by NRC, be carried out to test the ability of the plant operator to defend against them.

The severity of attacks that plant security must prepare for is specified in the “design basis threat”

(DBT).

EPACT05 required NRC to revise the DBT based on an assessment of terrorist threats, the

potential for multiple coordinated attacks, possible suicide attacks, and other criteria. NRC

approved the DBT revision based on those requirements on January 29, 2007. The revised DBT

does not require nuclear power plants to defend against deliberate aircraft attacks. NRC

contended that nuclear facilities were already required to mitigate the effects of large fires and

explosions, no matter what the cause, and that active protection against airborne threats was being

addressed by U.S. military and other agencies.74 After much consideration, NRC voted February

17, 2009, to require all new nuclear power plants to incorporate design features that would ensure

that, in the event of a crash by a large commercial aircraft, the reactor core would remain cooled

or the reactor containment would remain intact, and radioactive releases would not occur from

spent fuel storage pools.75 The rule change was published in the Federal Register June 12, 2009.76

NRC rejected proposals that existing reactors also be required to protect against aircraft crashes,

such as by adding large external steel barriers. However, NRC did impose some additional

requirements related to aircraft crashes on all reactors, both new and existing, after the 9/11

terrorist attacks of 2001. In 2002, as noted above, NRC ordered all nuclear power plants to

develop strategies to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions that could result from

aircraft crashes or other causes. An NRC regulation on fire mitigation strategies, along with

requirements that reactors establish procedures for responding to specific aircraft threats, was

approved December 17, 2008.77 The fire mitigation rules were published in the Federal Register

March 27, 2009.78

Other ongoing nuclear plant security issues include the vulnerability of spent fuel pools, which

hold highly radioactive nuclear fuel after its removal from the reactor, standards for nuclear plant

security personnel, and nuclear plant emergency planning. NRC’s March 2009 security

NRC Office of Public Affairs, NRC Approves Final Rule Amending Security Requirements, News Release No. 07012, January 29, 2007.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Rule—Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,

Commission Voting Record, SECY-08-0152, February 17, 2009.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,” Final Rule,

74 Federal Register 28111, June 12, 2009. This provision is codified at 10 CFR 50.150.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Approves Final Rule Expanding Security Requirements for Nuclear Power

Plants,” press release, December 17, 2008, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-227.html.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Power Reactor Security Requirements,” Final Rule, 74 Federal Register 13925,

March 27, 2009.

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regulations addressed some of those concerns and included a number of other security

enhancements.

EPACT05 required NRC to conduct force-on-force security exercises at nuclear power plants

every three years (which was NRC’s previous policy), authorized firearms use by nuclear security

personnel (preempting some state restrictions), established federal security coordinators, and

required fingerprinting of nuclear facility workers.

(For background on security issues, see CRS Report RL34331, Nuclear Power Plant Security and

Vulnerabilities, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).)

Decommissioning

When nuclear power plants reach the end of their useful lives, they must be safely removed from

service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular

contributions to dedicated funds to ensure that money is available to remove radioactive material

and contamination from reactor sites after they are closed.

The first full-sized U.S. commercial reactors to be decommissioned were the Trojan plant in

Oregon, whose decommissioning completion received NRC approval on May 23, 2005, and the

Maine Yankee plant, for which NRC approved most of the site cleanup on October 3, 2005. The

Trojan decommissioning cost $429 million, according to reactor owner Portland General Electric,

and the Maine Yankee decommissioning cost about $500 million.79 Decommissioning of the

Connecticut Yankee plant cost $790 million and was approved by NRC on November 26, 2007.80

NRC approved the cleanup of the decommissioned Rancho Seco reactor site in California on

October 7, 2009.81 The decommissioning of Rancho Seco was estimated to cost $500 million,

excluding future demolition of the cooling towers and other remaining plant structures.82 Total

costs for decommissioning, spent fuel storage, and site restoration at the recently closed San

Onofre units 2 and 3 are estimated at $4.1 billion.83

When a reactor is permanently shut down, the owner (licensee) has 30 days to notify NRC. The

licensee then certifies with NRC when spent fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor

vessel. By two years after shutdown, the licensee must submit a Post Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR). The PSDAR specifies which of the two primary

decommissioning options will be pursued:

•

DECON: Plant and equipment are dismantled and removed, or decontaminated to

the level required for release from NRC licensing.

Sharp, David, “NRC Signs Off on Maine Yankee’s Decommissioning,” Associated Press, October 3, 2005.

E-mail communication from Bob Capstick, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 28, 2008.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Releases Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant for Unconditional Use,” press release,

October 7, 2009, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-165.html.

“20 Years Later, Rancho Seco Ready for Final Shutdown,” Sacramento County Herald, June 9, 2009.

Edison International, “SCE Submits Nuclear Plant Decommissioning Plan to Federal Regulator,” news release,

September 23, 2014, http://newsroom.edison.com/releases/sce-submits-nuclear-plant-decommissioning-plan-to-federalregulator.

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•

SAFSTOR: The plant is placed in a safe, stable condition for future

dismantlement and decontamination.

According to NRC, nine reactors are currently in SAFSTOR: Dresden 1 (IL), Indian Point 1

(NY), La Crosse (WI), Millstone 1 (CT), Peach Bottom 1 (PA), San Onofre 1 (CA), GE

Vallecitios (CA), NS Savannah (MD), and Three Mile Island 2 (PA). Four units are in DECON:

Fermi 1 (MI), Humboldt Bay (CA), and Zion 1 and 2 (IL).84

After nuclear reactors are decommissioned, the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) accumulated during their

operating lives remains stored in pools or dry casks at the plant sites. About 5,900 metric tons of

spent fuel is currently stored at 12 closed nuclear power plants and Vermont Yankee, which is to

close in late 2014.85 “Until this SNF is removed from these [at the time] nine sites, the sites

cannot be fully decommissioned and made available for other purposes,” DOE noted in a 2008

report.86 President Obama’s decision to terminate development of an underground spent fuel

repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, has increased concerns about the ultimate disposition of spent

fuel at decommissioned sites. (For more information, see CRS Report R42513, U.S. Spent

Nuclear Fuel Storage, by (name redacted).)

Nuclear Accident Liability

Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents is addressed by the PriceAnderson Act (primarily Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2210).

EPACT05 extended the availability of Price-Anderson coverage for new reactors and new DOE

nuclear contracts through the end of 2025. (Existing reactors and contracts were already covered.)

Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for nuclear

damages awarded to the public by the court system, and they must waive most of their legal

defenses following a severe radioactive release (“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”). To pay any

such damages, each licensed reactor with at least 100 megawatts of electric generating capacity

must carry the maximum liability insurance reasonably available, which was raised from $300

million to $375 million on January 1, 2010.87 Any damages exceeding $375 million are to be

assessed equally against all 100-megawatt-and-above power reactors, up to $121.3 million per

reactor (increased for inflation from $111.9 million on September 10, 2013).88 Those

assessments—called “retrospective premiums”—would be paid at an annual rate of no more than

$19.0 million per reactor (up from $17.5 million), to limit the potential financial burden on

reactor owners following a major accident. According to NRC, 104 commercial reactors,

NRC, Information Digest, 2013-2014, NUREG-1350, Volume 25, Appendix C, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr1350.

Gutherman Technical Service, “2011 Used Fuel Data,” January 14, 2012.

DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Report to Congress on the Demonstration of the Interim

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor Sites, DOE/RW-0596, Washington, DC,

December 2008, p. 1, http://www.energy.gov/media/ES_Interim_Storage_Report_120108.pdf.

American Nuclear Insurers, “Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance,” January 2010,

http://www.nuclearinsurance.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20the%20US.pdf.

NRC, “Inflation Adjustments to the Price-Anderson Financial Protection Regulations,” 79 Federal Register 41835,

July 12, 2013.

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including the four closed in 2013,89 are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective

premium requirement.90

For each nuclear incident, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide up to

$13.6 billion in public compensation. That total includes $121.3 million in retrospective

premiums from each of the 104 currently covered reactors, totaling $12.6 billion, plus the $375

million in insurance coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the incident. On top of those

payments, a 5% surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective

premium to $127.4 million and the total available compensation to about $13.6 billion. Under

Price-Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which

varies over time depending on the number of covered reactors, the amount of available insurance,

and the inflation adjustment. Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require

congressional approval under special procedures in the act.

EPACT05 increased the limit on per-reactor annual payments to $15 million from the previous

$10 million, and required the annual limit to be adjusted for inflation every five years. As under

previous law, the total retrospective premium limit is adjusted every five years as well. For the

purposes of those payment limits, a nuclear plant consisting of multiple small reactors (100-300

megawatts, up to a total of 1,300 megawatts) would be considered a single reactor. Therefore, in

the event of a severe release a power plant with six 120-megawatt small modular reactors would

be liable for retrospective premiums of up to $121.3 million, rather than $727.8 million

(excluding the 5% surcharge).

The Price-Anderson Act also covers contractors who operate DOE nuclear facilities. EPACT05

set the liability limit on DOE contractors at $10 billion per accident, to be adjusted for inflation

every five years. The first adjustment under EPACT, raising the liability limit to $11.961 billion,

took effect October 14, 2009.91 The liability limit for DOE contractors previously had been the

same as for commercial reactors, excluding the 5% surcharge, except when the limit for

commercial reactors dropped because of a decline in the number of covered reactors. PriceAnderson authorizes DOE to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount of their liability, so

that damage payments for nuclear incidents at DOE facilities would ultimately come from the

Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE to fine its contractors for safety violations, and

contractor employees and directors can face criminal penalties for “knowingly and willfully”

violating nuclear safety rules. EPACT05 limited the civil penalties against a nonprofit contractor

to the amount of management fees paid under that contract.

The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial nuclear

power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that it has worked

well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a secure source of

As of June 2014. See NRC, “Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief,” http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.html. NRC can exempt shutdown reactors from the retrospective

premiums after their spent fuel has sufficiently cooled. See NRC, “Exemption Requests to Reduce Liability Insurance

Coverage for Decommissioning Reactors after Transfer of All Spent Fuel from a Spent Fuel Pool to Dry Cask Storage,

SECY-04-0176, September 29, 2004, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2004/.

Reactors smaller than 100 megawatts must purchase an amount of liability coverage determined by NRC but are not

subject to retrospective premiums. Total liability for those reactors is limited to $560 million, with the federal

government indemnifying reactor operators for the difference between that amount and their liability coverage (Atomic

Energy Act §170 b. and c.).

Department of Energy, “Adjusted Indemnification Amount,” 74 Federal Register 52793, October 14, 2009.

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compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. Extension of the act was widely considered a

prerequisite for new nuclear reactor construction in the United States. Opponents contend that

Price-Anderson inappropriately subsidizes the nuclear power industry by reducing its insurance

costs and protecting it from some of the financial consequences of the most severe conceivable

accidents. Projections that damages to the public from the Fukushima accident will greatly exceed

the Price-Anderson liability limits prompted renewed calls for reexamination of the law.92

The U.S. government is supporting the establishment of an international liability system that,

among other purposes, would cover U.S. nuclear equipment suppliers conducting foreign

business. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) will not

enter into force until at least five countries with a specified level of installed nuclear capacity

have enacted implementing legislation. Such implementing language was included in the Energy

Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, Section 934), signed by President Bush

December 19, 2007. Supporters of the Convention hope that more countries will join now that the

United States has acted. Aside from the United States, four countries have submitted the

necessary instruments of ratification, but they do not have the required nuclear capacity for it to

take effect.93 Canada signed the convention on December 3, 2013, with the government

announcing that it would be submitted to Parliament for approval. Ratification by Canada, which

has a large nuclear reactor fleet, would put the convention into force 90 days later.94

Under the U.S. implementing legislation, the CSC would not change the liability and payment

levels already established by the Price-Anderson Act. Each party to the convention would be

required to establish a nuclear damage compensation system within its borders analogous to

Price-Anderson. For any damages not covered by those national compensation systems, the

convention would establish a supplemental tier of damage compensation to be paid by all parties.

P.L. 110-140 requires the U.S. contribution to the supplemental tier to be paid by suppliers of

nuclear equipment and services, under a formula to be developed by DOE. Supporters of the

convention contend that it will help U.S. exporters of nuclear technology by establishing a

predictable international liability system. For example, U.S. nuclear equipment sales to the

growing economies of China and India would be facilitated by those countries’ participation in

the CSC liability regime.

Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants

The nuclear power industry contends that support from the federal government would be needed

for “a major expansion of nuclear energy generation.”95 Significant incentives for building new

nuclear power plants were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58),

signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005. These include production tax credits, loan

Ellen Vancko, Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Impact of Fukushima on the US Nuclear Power Industry,”

presentation to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference on Nuclear Safety and Fukushima, April

7, 2011, https://csis.org/files/attachments/110407_vancko_nuclear_safety_0.pdf.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Latest Status of Convention on Supplementary compensation for Nuclear

Damage, July 7, 2014, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.shtml.

Ostroff, Jim, “Nuclear Compensation Convention on the Verge of Taking Effect,” Nucleonics Week, December 12,

2013, p. 1.

Nuclear Energy Institute, “NEI Unveils Package of Policy Initiatives Needed to Achieve Climate Change Goals,”

press release, October 26, 2009, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-unveils-package-of-policyinitiatives-needed-to-achieve-climate-change-goals/.

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guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear

liability system (discussed in the previous section on “Nuclear Accident Liability”). Relatively

low prices for natural gas—nuclear power’s chief competitor—and rising estimated nuclear plant

construction costs have decreased the likelihood that new reactors would be built without federal

support. Any regulatory delays and increased safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima

accident could also pose an obstacle to nuclear construction plans.

As a result, numerous bills have been introduced in recent years to strengthen or add to the

EPACT05 incentives (see “Legislation in the 113th Congress” at the end of this report). Nuclear

power critics have denounced the federal support programs and proposals as a “bailout” of the

nuclear industry, contending that federal efforts should focus instead on renewable energy and

energy efficiency.96

Nuclear Production Tax Credit

EPACT05 provides a 1.8-cents/kilowatt-hour tax credit for up to 6,000 megawatts of new nuclear

capacity for the first eight years of operation, up to $125 million annually per 1,000 megawatts.

The credit is not adjusted for inflation.

The Treasury Department published interim guidance for the nuclear production tax credit on

May 1, 2006.97 Under the guidance, the 6,000 megawatts of eligible capacity (enough for about

four or five reactors) are to be allocated among reactors that filed license applications by the end

of 2008. If more than 6,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity ultimately qualify for the production

tax credit, then the credit is to be allocated proportionally among any of the qualifying reactors

that begin operating before 2021.

By the end of 2008, license applications had been submitted to NRC for more than 34,000

megawatts of nuclear generating capacity,98 so if all those reactors were built before 2021 they

would receive less than 20% of the maximum tax credit. However, the reactor licensing status

shown in Table 1 indicates that only four new units, totaling about 4,600 megawatts of capacity,

are currently licensed for construction and likely to be completed before 2021. Eight other units,

totaling about 10,300 megawatts, are scheduled to receive their licenses by 2016 and could

possibly go into service by 2021.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has urged Congress to remove the 6,000 megawatt capacity

limit for the production tax credit, index it for inflation, and extend the deadline for plants to

begin operation to the start of 2025. NEI also proposed that a 30% investment tax credit be

available for new nuclear construction as an alternative to the production credit.99

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Senate Appropriators Lard President Obama’s Stimulus Package with

up to $50 Billion in Nuclear Reactor Pork,” press release, January 30, 2009, http://www.nirs.org/press/01-30-2009/1.

Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 2006-18, “Credit for

Production From Advanced Nuclear Facilities,” Notice 2006-40, May 1, 2006, p. 855.

Energy Information Administration, Status of Potential New Commercial Nuclear Reactors in the United States,

February 19, 2009.

Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear

Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 4, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/

newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.

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Standby Support

Because the nuclear industry has often blamed licensing delays for past nuclear reactor

construction cost overruns, EPACT05 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide “standby

support,” or regulatory risk insurance, to help pay the cost of regulatory delays at up to six new

commercial nuclear reactors. For the first two reactors that begin construction, the DOE payments

could cover all the eligible delay-related costs, such as additional interest, up to $500 million

each. For the next four reactors, half of the eligible costs could be paid by DOE, with a payment

cap of $250 million per reactor. Delays caused by the failure of a reactor owner to comply with

laws or regulations would not be covered. Project sponsors will be required to pay the “subsidy

cost” of the program, consisting of the estimated present value of likely future government

payments. DOE published a final rule for the “standby support” program August 11, 2006.100

Under the program’s regulations, a project sponsor may enter into a conditional agreement for

standby support before NRC issues a combined operating license. The first six conditional

agreements to meet all the program requirements, including the issuance of a COL and payment

of the estimated subsidy costs, can be converted to standby support contracts. However, no

applicant has pursued the incentive.101

Loan Guarantees

Title XVII of EPACT05 authorizes federal loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for

advanced energy projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including new nuclear power

plants. Under such loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered

loans if the borrower defaulted. This would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide

financing at low interest rates. The Title XVII loan guarantees are widely considered crucial by

the nuclear industry to obtain financing for new reactors. However, opponents contend that

nuclear loan guarantees provide an unjustifiable subsidy to a mature industry and shift investment

away from environmentally preferable energy technologies.102 The authorized ceiling on nuclear

power plant loan guarantees is currently $18.5 billion.103

Agreements for the first loan guarantees for nuclear power plants under EPACT05 were signed

February 20, 2014, by Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz. The federal loan guarantees total $6.5

billion for the two reactors being constructed at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia—$3.46

billion for Southern Company, the plant’s lead owner, and $3.06 billion for Oglethorpe Power

Corporation. A further $1.8 billion loan guarantee for the Vogtle project, for the Municipal

100

Department of Energy, “Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays,” Federal Register, August 11, 2006,

p. 46306.

101

Freebairn, William, “Nuclear Tax Credits, Previously Low-Profile, Might Draw Scrutiny: Lobbysists,” Nucleonics

Week, May 17, 2012.

102

Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, Statement on Nuclear Developments Before the Committee on Energy

and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 18, 2009,

http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528ec4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=9f14a78d-58d0-43fb-bf5b-21426d1d888e.

103

The FY2009 omnibus funding act (P.L. 111-8) increased DOE’s total loan guarantee authority for specified

technology categories to $47 billion, in addition to $4 billion in general authority provided in FY2007. Of the $47

billion, $18.5 billion continued to be reserved for nuclear power as provided in earlier appropriations, and $2 billion

was for uranium enrichment. Previous time limits on the loan guarantee authority were eliminated. DOE later allocated

an additional $2 billion to enrichment projects from the $4 billion in general authority.

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Electric Authority of Georgia, has not been finalized. Southern Company estimated that its Vogtle

loan guarantees would reduce its present-value financing costs by up to $250 million.104

Subsidy Costs

Title XVII requires the estimated future government costs resulting from defaults on guaranteed

loans to be covered up-front by appropriations or by payments from project sponsors, such as the

utility planning to build a plant. As specified by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA,

contained in P.L. 101-508), these “subsidy costs” are calculated as the present value of the

average possible future net costs to the government for each loan guarantee. If those calculations

are accurate, the subsidy cost payments for all the guaranteed projects together should cover the

future costs of the program, including default-related losses. However, the Congressional Budget

Office has predicted that the up-front subsidy cost payments will prove too low by at least 1%

and is scoring bills accordingly.105 For example, appropriations bills that provide loan guarantee

authorizations include an adjustment equal to 1% of the loan guarantee ceiling. (For more

information on loan guarantee subsidy costs, see CRS Report R42152, Loan Guarantees for

Clean Energy Technologies: Goals, Concerns, and Policy Options, by (name redacted).)

The guaranteed loans for the new Vogtle reactors are to be issued by the U.S. Treasury’s Federal

Financing Bank. No subsidy cost was charged for the Vogtle loan guarantees, which raised

considerable comment, as the risk of the project is likely to be greater than zero. The

methodology that may have led to such a result is discussed below.

In order to estimate credit subsidy costs for a loan transaction, certain information is required: (1)

loan value, (2) loan term (years), (3) credit risk, including default rates and recovery rates, (4)

loan interest rate, and (5) Treasury interest rate(s). Details of the credit subsidy cost calculations

for each loan (i.e., default rates, recovery rates, and project credit rating) have not been made

public. However, some aspects and considerations of the Vogtle project loans may provide some

perspective regarding the zero credit subsidy fee assessment.

Defaults—net of recoveries—and interest are the two primary subsidy cost components that

likely resulted in the zero subsidy fee calculation. The default subsidy represents the present

value of expected government losses due to defaults less recoveries. Default rates and recovery

rates—based on loan credit risk and other parameters—are applied to the outstanding principal

balance for each payment period. Two aspects of the Vogtle loans may have contributed to either

low default rates and/or high recovery rates: (1) strong financial condition and obligations of the

borrowers, and (2) the possibility of costs being passed through to Georgia Power and Oglethorpe

electricity consumers, thereby resulting in low repayment risk, and therefore a low default

subsidy estimate. These characteristics raise questions about the need for federal credit support

for this project. Nevertheless, it is likely that default-related losses to the government exist.

Interest rates for the Vogtle project loans range from 3.5% to 3.9%—higher than Treasury rates—

for disbursements made in February 2014. It is possible that gains to the government from higher

interest rates—relative to Treasury securities—offset any estimated default-related losses to the

104

Southern Company, “Federal Loan Guarantees Mark Latest Milestone in Historic Vogtle Project,” news release,

February 20, 2014.

105

Congressional Budget Office, S. 1321, Energy Savings Act of 2007, CBO Cost Estimate, Washington, DC, June 11,

2007, pp. 7-9, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8206/s1321.pdf.

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government, while also taking into account other payments from the borrower or costs to the

government. Should this be the case, the FCRA-prescribed calculation methodology could result

in a zero, or even a negative, credit subsidy cost.

The nuclear industry contends that historical experience indicates defaults are likely to be

minimal and that nuclear plant subsidy costs should therefore be low.106 However, nuclear power

critics contend that nuclear power plants are likely to experience delays and cost overruns that

could lead to much larger losses under the loan guarantee program. The Center for American

Progress concluded that nuclear subsidy costs “should be at least 10 percent and possibly much

more.”107

Constellation Energy informed DOE on October 8, 2010, that it was withdrawing from loan

guarantee negotiations on Calvert Cliffs 3, blaming “the Office of Management and Budget’s

inability to address significant problems with its methodology for determining the project’s credit

subsidy cost.” Constellation’s letter to DOE said OMB’s “shockingly high” estimate of the

subsidy cost for Calvert Cliffs 3 was 11.6%, or about $880 million. “Such a sum would clearly

destroy the project’s economics (or the economics of any nuclear project for that matter), and was

dramatically out of line with both our own and independent assessments of what the figure should

reasonably be,” the letter stated.108 Although OMB has not released its subsidy cost methodology,

it may consider the default risk for a “merchant plant” such as Calvert Cliffs to be significantly

higher than that of a rate-regulated plant such as Vogtle. A plant under traditional rate regulation

is allowed to pass all prudently incurred costs through to utility ratepayers, while a merchant plant

charges market rates for its power. A merchant plant, therefore, could potentially earn higher

profits than a rate-regulated plant, but it also runs the risk of being unable to cover its debt

payments if market rates for wholesale electric power drop too low or if its costs are higher than

anticipated.

Nuclear Solicitations

DOE issued a solicitation for up to $20.5 billion in nuclear power and uranium enrichment plant

loan guarantees on June 30, 2008.109 According to the nuclear industry, 10 nuclear power projects

applied for $93.2 billion in loan guarantees, and two uranium enrichment projects asked for $4.8

billion in guarantees, several times the amount available.110

106

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Loan Guarantees for the Vogtle Nuclear Power Project—Understanding the Credit

Subsidy Cost,” 2014, http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Loan-Guarantees-forthe-Vogtle-Nuclear-Power-Proje?feed=factsheet.

107

Richard Caperton, Protecting Taxpayers from a Financial Meltdown, Center for American Progress, Washington,

DC, March 8, 2010, p. 2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2010/03/08/7400/protecting-taxpayersfrom-a-financial-meltdown/.

108

Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Dan

Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy, October 8, 2010, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/

constellationenergy.PDF?sid=ST2010100900005.

109

http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/keydocs.html.

110

Marvin S. Fertel, Statement for the Record to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,

Nuclear Energy Institute, March 18, 2009, p. 9, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=

Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=4de5e2df-53fe-49ba-906e9b69d3674e41.

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In the uranium enrichment solicitation, DOE in July 2009 informed USEC Inc., which proposes

to build a new plant in Ohio, that its technology needed further testing before a loan guarantee

could be issued.111 DOE notified Congress in March 2010 that it would reprogram $2 billion of its

unused FY2007 loan guarantee authority toward uranium enrichment, increasing the uranium

enrichment total to $4 billion. The move would potentially allow guarantees to be provided to

both USEC and the other applicant in the uranium enrichment solicitation, the French firm Areva,

which has proposed a plant in Idaho.112 DOE offered a $2 billion conditional loan guarantee to

Areva on May 20, 2010.113

DOE informed USEC in October 2011 that the centrifuge technology for its proposed new

enrichment plant still needed further testing and offered to provide up to $300 million to help

build a demonstration “train” of 720 centrifuges.114 The FY2013 Continuing Appropriations

Resolution (P.L. 112-175) included $100 million for the USEC demonstration program.115 The

FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, §321) provided up to $56 million for the

program through special reprogramming authority.

DOE has recently provided other assistance to USEC. DOE agreed on May 15, 2012, to provide

depleted uranium stockpiles (material left over from the enrichment process) to Energy Northwest

for reenrichment at USEC’s plant in Paducah, KY, for use as reactor fuel.116 DOE agreed on

March 13, 2012, to acquire low-enriched uranium from USEC in exchange for taking

responsibility for low-value depleted uranium tails that USEC would otherwise have to dispose

of, freeing $44 million of USEC’s funds for the centrifuge project.117 DOE announced June 13,

2012, that it would provide $88 million for the centrifuge demonstration program by taking over

responsibility for disposal of additional depleted uranium from USEC. In return, DOE will take

ownership of the equipment and technology used in the demonstration and lease it to USEC.118

Despite the DOE assistance, USEC filed for bankruptcy reorganization March 5, 2014. The U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware approved USEC’s reorganization plan September

5, 2014, in which the company will be renamed Centrus Energy Corporation.119 DOE’s Oak

111

Department of Energy, “800 to 1000 New Jobs Coming to Piketon,” press release, July 28, 2009,

http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/press/072809.pdf.

112

Maureen Conley, “DOE Finds $2 Billion More for SWU Plant Loan Guarantees,” NuclearFuel, April 5, 2010, p. 3.

113

Department of Energy, “DOE Offers Conditional Loan Guarantee for Front End Nuclear Facility in Idaho,” press

release, May 20, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/8996.htm.

114

Maureen Conley, “Congress ‘Frustrated’ by Inaction on USEC Loan Guarantee,” NuclearFuel, October 31, 2011,

p. 8.

115

All FY3013 figures are pre-sequester.

116

USEC Inc., “Five-Party Arrangement Extends Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Enrichment Operations,” press

release, May 15, 2012, http://www.usec.com/news/five-party-arrangement-extends-paducah-gaseous-diffusion-plantenrichment-operations. The depleted uranium consists of “high assay” tails, which have relatively high levels of fissile

U-235.

117

USEC Inc., “Funding,” web page, http://www.usec.com/american-centrifuge/what-american-centrifuge/plant/

funding.

118

Department of Energy, “Obama Administration Announces Major Step Forward for the American Centrifuge

Plant,” press release, June 13, 2012, http://energy.gov/articles/obama-administration-announces-major-step-forwardamerican-centrifuge-plant.

119

USEC, “Court Confirms USEC Inc. Plan of Reorganization,” news release, September 5, 2014,

http://www.usec.com/news/court-confirms-usec-inc-plan-reorganization.

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Ridge National Laboratory took over management of USEC’s centrifuge demonstration project in

April 2014, making USEC a subcontractor.120

DOE issued a draft solicitation for an additional $12.6 billion in nuclear loan guarantees on

September 30, 2014, including new nuclear reactors, upgrades and uprates of existing nuclear

reactors, and nuclear fuel facilities.121

Global Climate Change

Global climate change that may be caused by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions

is cited by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of

reactors. Nuclear power plants emit relatively little carbon dioxide, mostly from nuclear fuel

production and auxiliary plant equipment. This “green” nuclear power argument has received

growing attention in think tanks and academia. As stated by the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology in its major study The Future of Nuclear Power: “Our position is that the prospect of

global climate change from greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse consequences that flow

from these emissions is the principal justification for government support of the nuclear energy

option.”122 The Obama Administration is including nuclear power as part of its clean energy

strategy.

However, some environmental groups have contended that nuclear power’s potential greenhouse

gas benefits are modest and must be weighed against the technology’s safety risks, its potential

for nuclear weapons proliferation, and the hazards of radioactive waste.123 They also contend that

energy efficiency and renewable energy would be far more productive investments for reducing

greenhouse gas emissions.124

Proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions—through taxation, a cap-and-trade system, or other

regulatory controls—could significantly increase the cost of generating electricity with fossil

fuels and improve the competitive position of nuclear power. A federal Clean Energy Standard

that includes nuclear power, as proposed in President Obama’s January 2011 State of the Union

Address, could provide a similar boost to nuclear energy expansion. Utilities that have applied for

nuclear power plant licenses have often cited the possibility of federal greenhouse gas controls or

other mandates as one of the reasons for pursuing new reactors.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a proposed rule on June 18, 2014, to

address CO2 emissions from existing power plants.125 The potential effect of the proposed rule on

120

Hiruo, Elaine, “Low Volume, Non-Production Costs Driving Net Loss, USEC Says,” NuclearFuel, August 18,

2014.

121

DOE, “Department of Energy Issues Draft Loan Guarantee Solicitation for Advanced Nuclear Energy Projects,”

news release, September 30, 2014, http://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-issues-draft-loan-guaranteesolicitation-advanced-nuclear-energy-projects.

122

Interdisciplinary MIT Study, The Future of Nuclear Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, p. 79.

123

Gronlund, Lisbeth, David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, Union of Concerned

Scientists, December 2007.

124

Travis Madsen, Tony Dutzik, and Bernadette Del Chiaro, et al., Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power

Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming, Environment America Research and Policy

Center, November 2009, http://www.environmentamerica.org/uploads/39/62/3962c378b66c4552624d09cbd8ebba02/

Generating-Failure—Environment-America—Web.pdf.

125

Environmental Protection Agency, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric

(continued...)

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nuclear power has become a significant policy question. The formula in the proposed rule for

setting state CO2 goals explicitly accounts for some existing nuclear capacity and reactors under

construction, providing a potential incentive for states to try to keep those plants operating.

However, EPA’s proposed rule allows states to develop their own plans for meeting the CO2

emission rate goals, making it difficult to predict how nuclear energy might ultimately fare.

The proposed EPA standards would set state-specific goals for the amount of CO2 that could be

emitted in 2030 for each megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity generated. EPA projects that, under

those proposed emissions rates, U.S. power plants would produce 30% less CO2 by 2030 than

they did in 2005 (the base year in President Obama’s Climate Action Plan).126

The unadjusted baseline for the proposed standards was developed by dividing 2012 power plant

CO2 emissions in each state by the amount of electricity generated by fossil fuel-fired plants. In

the case of Ohio, which EPA provided as an example, the unadjusted CO2 emission rate for fossil

plants in 2012 was 1,897 lbs./MWh (compared with the average rate for coal-fired plants of about

2,000 lbs./MWh). To develop the 2030 standard, EPA adjusted each state’s baseline rate with four

groups of actions, or “building blocks,” that the agency determined states could reasonably

achieve:

1. Increase efficiency of existing coal-fired steam units by 6%;

2. Replace some coal-fired generation with increased output from underutilized

natural gas combined-cycle units;

3. Prevent projected losses of 6% of each state’s existing nuclear generating

capacity, complete five nuclear reactors currently under construction, and

increase generation from renewable energy; and

4. Implement energy efficiency measures to reduce projected electricity

demand.

The nuclear adjustment was made by calculating the projected annual electricity generation from

reactors under construction within each state (if any), along with the electricity generated by 6%

of each state’s existing nuclear capacity, which EPA deems to be at risk of shutdown. These

amounts are added to each state’s total fossil fuel-fired electrical generation, resulting in a

decrease in the CO2 generation rate per megawatt-hour.127

In the Ohio example, the state has no reactors under construction but has two operating nuclear

reactors, with total generating capacity of 2,150 megawatts. Six percent of that capacity is

projected to generate 993,077 MWh per year, which EPA added to total generation from fossil

fuel sources, renewable energy sources, and electricity generation avoided through efficiency

measures, as described in the “building blocks.” The increase in total electric generation spreads

CO2 emissions among more megawatt-hours, so the rate of CO2/MWh goes down. The nuclear

(...continued)

Utility Generating Units,” proposed rule, June 18, 2014, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/06/18/201413726/carbon-pollution-emission-guidelines-for-existing-stationary-sources-electric-utility-generating.

126

Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan, June 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/

sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.

127

EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Goal Computation Technical Support Document, June 2014,

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-goal-computation.pdf.

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additions plus the other changes described above result in a proposed 2030 standard for Ohio of

1,338 lbs. of CO2 per MWh—a 29.5% reduction from the unadjusted baseline.

Although the state standards for CO2 emission rates would be binding, each state could meet them

using whatever mix of options it chose. A state would not have to employ the same “building

blocks” in its compliance plans that EPA used to calculate the standards. According to an EPA

explanation, each state “is free to meet that goal in the way that works best for that state. It can

rely more or less heavily on specific measures such as efficiency or renewable energy, or even

pursue others such as increases in transmission efficiency or new gas generation.”128 Additional

nuclear reactors beyond the five already under construction would also be an option.

Because of the state flexibility, the effect of the EPA proposal on nuclear power is inherently

uncertain. EPA’s emission rate methodology might encourage states to take steps to ensure that

nuclear plants currently under construction were completed, and to prevent the shutdown of

existing nuclear capacity, because if they did not, they would need to find alternative ways to

meet the CO2 emission rate standard. For example, if Ohio’s two nuclear plants closed, the state

would lose 993,077 MWh of zero-carbon electricity in its CO2 rate formula and would need to

increase other low-carbon electricity sources or take other steps beyond those already in the EPA

building blocks.

The Nuclear Energy Institute, representing the nuclear industry, issued a statement praising the

EPA proposal for recognizing “the need to maintain and expand the use of nuclear energy.”129

However, nuclear industry officials have expressed unhappiness that the nuclear “building block”

includes only the 6% of existing nuclear capacity considered to be “at risk,” rather than all

existing nuclear capacity. According to a media report, the industry is concerned that including

only 6% of existing nuclear in the state goal calculations would not provide states with enough

incentive to prevent nuclear plants from being shut down and replaced by cheaper gas plants.130

In the Ohio example, only 993,077 MWh of carbon-free generation would have to be replaced

with other options if both the state’s reactors were shut down, under the EPA proposal. But if all

the state’s nuclear electricity were included in the nuclear building block, then 16.95 million

MWh (about 9% of the state’s total 2012 generation) would have to be replaced if the Ohio

reactors shut down (2,150 megawatts operating at 90% of capacity for a year).

On the other hand, a news release by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, a group

critical of the nuclear industry, contended that EPA’s proposed rule “would encourage states to

provide ratepayer subsidies for continued operation of nuclear reactors that cannot compete

economically in the current electricity marketplace.”131

128

McCabe, Janet, “Understanding State Goals under the Clean Power Plan,” EPA Connect, June 4, 2014,

http://blog.epa.gov/epaconnect/2014/06/understanding-state-goals-under-the-clean-power-plan/.

129

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Carbon Reduction Requires Big Role for Nuclear Energy,” news release, June 2, 2014,

http://www.nei.org/News-Media/Media-Room/News-Releases/Carbon-Reduction-Requires-Big-Role-for-Nuclear-Ene.

130

Reeves, Dawn, “EPA May Revisit ESPS’ Nuclear Provisions in Face of Industry Concerns,” Inside EPA.com, June

13, 2014, http://insideepa.com/201406132474001/EPA-Daily-News/Daily-News/epa-may-revisit-esps-nuclearprovisions-in-face-of-industry-concerns/menu-id-95.html.

131

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “EPA Carbon Rule Offers Misguided Subsidies for Uneconomic, Aging

and Dangerous Nuclear Reactors,” news release, June 2, 2014, http://www.nirs.org/nukesandglobalwarming/

epacarbonrulepr6214.pdf.

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For more details, see CRS Report R43652, State CO2 Emission Rate Goals in EPA’s Proposed

Rule for Existing Power Plants.

Nuclear Power Research and Development

The Obama Administration’s FY2015 funding request for nuclear energy research and

development totaled $863.4 million. Including advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology,

infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the total nuclear energy request was $25.0

million (2.9%) below the FY2014 funding level. DOE’s FY2015 nuclear R&D budget

justification described the following major goals for the program:

•

Improve the safety, reliability, and economics of nuclear power plants;

•

Implement a “consent based” strategy for developing nuclear waste storage and

disposal facilities;

•

Develop improved waste management and fuel cycle technologies; and

•

Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy would lead a major initiative announced in the FY2015 budget

request to commercialize the Brayton cycle for commercial power plants. Called Supercritical

Transformational Electric Power Generation (STEP), the initiative was proposed to be a joint

effort by DOE’s nuclear energy, fossil energy, and renewable energy programs. The Brayton cycle

uses supercritical gas to drive electric generators rather than the steam cycle that dominates the

industry today. DOE’s budget justification predicted that Brayton-cycle power plants could reach

efficiencies of up to 50%, compared with 33% for steam-cycle plants. The STEP program is to

reach a 50-50 cost sharing agreement with the private sector in FY2015 to develop a 10 megawatt

(electric) Brayton cycle pilot plant. Funding for the STEP initiative, provided within the nuclear

energy budget, would total $27.5 million in FY2015.

The House Appropriations Committee had recommended $899.0 million for nuclear energy,

$35.6 million above the Administration request. However, an amendment on the House floor

(H.Amdt. 979) reduced the nuclear total by $73.3 million to provide more funding for the Corps

of Engineers. The amendment did not specify how the reduction would be allocated among

Nuclear Energy programs.

The Senate subcommittee draft report recommended $777.0 million for nuclear energy programs,

$86.4 million below the request. The draft rejected the Administration’s $97 million request for

small modular reactor licensing support and cut the $100.5 million request for reactor concepts

R&D by 45%.

The House Appropriations Committee report agreed with the Administration’s $27.5 million

request for the STEP initiative and authorized DOE to “modify” the 50% cost-sharing goal for

qualifying pilot plants. The draft Senate report also recommended the full STEP request but

cautioned that the program should “be limited in scope, schedule, and cost.”

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Nuclear Energy Policy

Reactor Concepts

The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced

small modular reactors, and research to enhance the “sustainability” of existing commercial light

water reactors. The total FY2015 funding request for this program was $100.5 million, a

reduction of $12.3 million from FY2014.

DOE proposed to combine the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) R&D and Advanced Reactor

Concepts subprograms into the Advanced Reactor Technologies subprogram in FY2015. Funding

for the combined subprogram would be $70.2 million, a reduction of $12.6 million from the

combined subprograms in FY2014. Reactor concepts being developed by the Advanced Reactor

Technology subprogram are generally classified as “Generation IV” reactors, as opposed to the

existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II

and III. Nuclear technology development under this program focuses on “fast reactors,” using

high-energy neutrons, fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors, and high temperature gascooled reactors. International research collaboration in this area would continue under the

Generation IV International Forum (GIF).

The House Appropriations Committee recommended $138.0 million for Reactor Concepts, $37.5

million more than the request and $25.0 million above FY2014. The committee agreed with the

proposal to consolidate Advanced SMR research with Advanced Reactor Concepts. The House

panel voted to boost funding for the Advanced Reactor Concepts subprogram to $101.0 million,

adding funding for high temperature gas reactor research. As noted above, the House approved an

amendment to reduce the Committee’s recommended total nuclear funding level without

specifying cuts in individual nuclear subprograms.

DOE’s FY2015 request for the Light Water Reactor Sustainability subprogram was $30.3 million,

$350,000 above the FY2014 appropriation. The House panel recommended $35.0 million. The

program conducts research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors

beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC). The program, which is cost-shared with the nuclear industry, studies the

aging of reactor materials and analyzes safety margins of aging plants. This subprogram is also

conducting research to understand the Fukushima disaster and to develop prevention and

mitigation measures, according to the DOE justification.

The draft Senate bill and report would cut reactor concepts to $55.0 million, consisting of $49.2

million for the combined Advanced Reactor Technologies subprogram and $5.8 million for Light

Water Reactor Sustainability. The draft report directed DOE to focus the Light Water Reactor

Sustainability subprogram on “understanding of accident scenarios, such as those exhibited in the

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.”

Small Modular Reactor Licensing Support

Rising cost estimates for large conventional nuclear reactors—widely projected to be $6 billion or

more—have contributed to growing interest in proposals for small modular reactors (SMRs).

Ranging from about 40 to 300 megawatts of electrical capacity, such reactors would be only a

fraction of the size of current commercial reactors, which typically exceed 1,000 megawatts.

Several modular reactors would be installed together to make up a power block with a single

control room, under most concepts. Current SMR proposals would use a variety of technologies,

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Nuclear Energy Policy

including high-temperature gas technology and the light water (LWR) technology used by today’s

commercial reactors.

DOE requested $97.0 million for FY2015 to provide technical support for licensing small

modular reactors, $13 million below the FY2014 funding level. Under the program, DOE is to

pay up to half the costs associated with NRC design certification and licensing of selected SMRs,

as well as for economic studies and other analyses that would support SMR deployment in

general.

A consortium led by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) was announced by DOE in November 2012 as

the first award recipient under the program. However, B&W announced April 14, 2014, that it

would reduce its spending on the project to $15 million per year and delay its design certification

application to NRC indefinitely, citing a lack of investors and customer contracts.132 Because of

the project’s slowdown, DOE reportedly stopped paying matching funds to B&W after the first

quarter of 2014.133

DOE selected a second SMR to receive assistance under the program in December 2013. The

NuScale Power SMR has a generating capacity of only 45 megawatts. Under the company’s

current concept, up to 12 reactors would be housed in a single pool of water, which would

provide emergency cooling. The NuScale SMR is intended to be ready for commercial operation

by around 2025, according to DOE.134 The DOE budget justification contends that reduced

funding for the SMR program will be sufficient for both the B&W and NuScale projects in

FY2015.

Because of the uncertainty about the B&W SMR project, the House Appropriations Committee

cut the SMR program to $54.5 million, with all of the remaining funding directed to the NuScale

project. However, the committee said that it “will consider additional funding according to

developments.” The Senate draft report recommended no new funding for SMR licensing

support, citing the availability of $85.0 million in prior-year funds that could be reprogrammed

for the NuScale project.

Small modular reactors would go against the overall trend in nuclear power technology toward

ever-larger reactors intended to spread construction costs over a greater output of electricity.

Proponents of small reactors contend that they would be economically viable despite their far

lower electrical output because modules could be assembled in factories and shipped to plant

sites, with minimal on-site fabrication, and because their smaller size would allow for simpler and

more effective safety systems. In addition, although modular plants might have similar or higher

costs per kilowatt-hour than conventional large reactors, their ability to be constructed in smaller

increments could reduce electric utilities’ financial commitment and risk.

132

Babcock & Wilcox Company, “B&W Announces Restructuring of Small Modular Reactor Program,” news release,

April 14, 2014, http://www.babcock.com/news-room/Pages/BW-Announces-Restructuring-of-Small-Modular-ReactorProgram.aspx.

133

McAuliffe, Michael, “B&W Says DOE Stops Matching Funds after SMR Program Slowdown,” Nucleonics Week,

August 14, 2014, p. 3.

134

DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactortechnologies/small-modular-nuclear-reactors.

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Fuel Cycle Research and Development

The Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program conducts “long-term, science-based”

research on a wide variety of technologies for improving the management of spent nuclear fuel,

according to the DOE budget justification. In general, the program is investigating ways to

separate radioactive constituents of spent fuel for re-use or to be bonded into stable waste forms.

The total FY2015 funding request for this program was $189.1 million, $2.9 million above the

FY2014 appropriation.

The Administration requested a nearly one-third increase for the Used Nuclear Fuel R&D

subprogram, from $60.0 million in FY2014 to $79.0 million in FY2015. This subprogram focuses

on establishing a new spent fuel management system, consistent with the Administration’s moves

to terminate the previously authorized waste repository program at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE

released its Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level

Radioactive Waste in January 2013 that calls for a “consent-based siting process” for nuclear

storage and disposal facilities. The Used Fuel subprogram would also conduct waste

transportation analyses and research on potential waste repositories, including salt caverns and

deep boreholes, according to the DOE justification. DOE also proposed that Congress provide

mandatory appropriations for the spent fuel management program beginning in FY2018 to

supplement discretionary appropriations. (See the “Nuclear Waste Management” section for more

details.)

Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D Program include the development of accidenttolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, development of

improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons, and technology to

increase nuclear fuel resources, such as uranium extraction from seawater.

The House Appropriations Committee recommended $182.0 million for Fuel Cycle R&D, $7.1

million below the request and $4.5 million below FY2014. The committee provided $60.1 million

for accident-tolerant fuels research, $55.0 million for Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition, and $55.0

million for used-fuel disposition R&D, such as long-term dry cask storage.

The Senate draft report recommended $230.0 million for Fuel Cycle R&D, including $119.0

million for Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition. Within Used Fuel Disposition, $89.0 million would be

provided for developing a consolidated spent fuel storage facility through a consent-based siting

process. Such a storage facility could hold spent fuel from nuclear power plants until a permanent

underground repository could be developed. The draft report also recommended $60.1 million for

accident-tolerant fuels.

Nuclear Waste Management

One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive waste, which

can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces an annual average of

about 20 metric tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, for a nationwide total of about 2,000

metric tons per year. U.S. reactors also generated an average of about 75,000 cubic meters of low-

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Nuclear Energy Policy

level radioactive waste per year during the past decade, including contaminated components and

materials resulting from reactor decommissioning.135

The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel (paid for

with a fee on nuclear power production) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states

have the authority to develop disposal facilities for most commercial low-level waste. Under the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10101, et seq.), spent fuel and other highly

radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository, consisting of a large network

of tunnels carved from a geologic formation that has remained stable for hundreds of thousands

of years. As amended in 1987, NWPA designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only

candidate site for the national repository. The act required DOE to begin taking waste from

nuclear plant sites by 1998—a deadline that even under the most optimistic scenarios will be

missed by more than 20 years. DOE filed a license application with NRC for the proposed Yucca

Mountain repository in June 2008.

The Obama Administration “has determined that developing the Yucca Mountain repository is not

a workable option and the Nation needs a different solution for nuclear waste disposal,”

according to the DOE FY2011 budget justification. To develop alternative waste management

strategies, the Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear

Future, which issued its final report to the Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012.136 The Blue

Ribbon Commission recommended that future efforts to develop nuclear waste facilities follow a

“consent based” approach and be carried out by a new organization, rather than DOE. The

Commission said the new nuclear waste entity should have “assured access” to the Nuclear Waste

Fund, which holds fees collected from nuclear power plant operators to pay for waste disposal.

Under NWPA, those funds cannot be spent without congressional appropriations.

DOE released its Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste in January 2013 in response to the Blue Ribbon Commission report. The

strategy calls for a pilot interim storage facility for spent fuel from closed nuclear reactors to open

by 2021 and a larger storage facility, possibly at the same site, to open by 2025. A site for a

permanent underground waste repository would be selected by 2026, and the repository would

open by 2048. Storage and disposal sites would be selected by a new waste management

organization through a consent-based process, as recommended by the Blue Ribbon

Commission.137

DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) currently is responsible for civilian waste management

activities. NE’s Fuel Cycle R&D Program (discussed in the “Nuclear Power Research and

Development” section above) includes funding under the Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition

subprogram to begin implementing the DOE waste management strategy. DOE requested $79.0

135

DOE, Manifest Information Management System, http://mims.doe.gov/GeneratorData.aspx. Annual low-level waste

disposal volume varies considerably, ranging during the past decade from a high of 114,841 cubic meters in 2006 to a

low of 35,216 cubic meters in 2013.

136

Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012,

http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.

137

DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January

2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/

Strategy%20for%20the%20Management%20and%20Disposal%20of%20Used%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20and%20High

%20Level%20Radioactive%20Waste.pdf.

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million for the Used Fuel subprogram in FY2015, $19.0 million above the FY2012 funding level,

and no funding for Yucca Mountain.

In approving the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill for FY2014 (H.R. 2609), the

House Appropriations Committee excoriated the Obama Administration’s termination of the

Yucca Mountain project as “blatant political maneuverings.” The House-passed FY2015 energy

and water bill included $150.0 million for DOE and $55.0 million for NRC to continue Yucca

Mountain licensing activities. The House provided no funding to implement DOE’s alternative

nuclear waste management strategy.

The Senate Appropriations subcommittee recommended $119.0 million in FY2015 for Used Fuel

and did not mention Yucca Mountain. The subcommittee’s draft bill included a provision from the

previous year that would authorize DOE to conduct a pilot program to develop one or more high

level radioactive waste storage facilities, with the consent of state, local, and tribal governments.

Senator Wyden, along with Senators Murkowski, Feinstein, and Alexander, introduced legislation

June 27, 2013, to redirect the nuclear waste program (S. 1240) along the lines recommended by

the Blue Ribbon Commission. The bill would establish an independent Nuclear Waste

Administration to develop nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. Siting of such facilities

would require the consent of the affected state, local, and tribal governments. The Nuclear Waste

Administration could spend nuclear waste fees collected after the bill’s enactment without the

need for further appropriation. Fee collection would halt after 2025 if a waste facility had not

been opened. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing on the bill July 30,

2013.

DOE had filed a license application with NRC for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in

June 2008 but filed a motion to withdraw the application on March 3, 2010. An NRC licensing

panel rejected DOE’s withdrawal motion June 29, 2010, on the grounds that NWPA requires full

consideration of the license application by NRC. The full NRC Commission deadlocked on the

issue September 9, 2011, leaving the licensing panel’s decision in place and prohibiting DOE

from withdrawing the Yucca Mountain application. However, the commission ordered at the same

time that the licensing process be suspended because of “budgetary limitations.”138 No funding

was provided in FY2012 or FY2013 or requested for FY2014 or FY2015 to continue Yucca

Mountain licensing activities. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit ruled on August 13, 2013, that NRC must continue work on the Yucca Mountain license

application as long as funding is available. The Court determined that NRC had at least $11.1

million in previously appropriated funds for that purpose.139

NWPA required DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites by January 31, 1998. Nuclear

utilities, upset over DOE’s failure to meet that deadline, have won two federal court decisions

upholding the department’s obligation to meet the deadline and to compensate utilities for any

resulting damages. Utilities have also won several cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

DOE estimates that liability payments would eventually exceed $20 billion if DOE were to begin

138

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository),”

CLI-11-07, September 9, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2011/201107cli.pdf.

139

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of

mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/

BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

removing waste from reactor sites by 2020, the previous target for opening Yucca Mountain.140

(For more information, see CRS Report R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by (name red

acted); CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by (name redacted); and CRS Report

R40996, Contract Liability Arising from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, by (name

redacted).)

Pursuant to a court ruling, DOE reportedly stopped collecting nuclear waste fees from nuclear

power generators on May 16, 2014, eliminating about $750 million in revenues for the waste

disposal program.141 NWPA requires the Secretary of Energy to adjust the fees as necessary to

cover the waste program’s anticipated costs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit ruled that DOE’s current waste plans are too vague to allow a reasonable

estimate to be calculated and that DOE must therefore stop collecting the fee.142

NRC approved a final rule August 26, 2014, on continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.143 The

rule responds to a federal circuit court ruling on June 8, 2012, that struck down NRC’s Waste

Confidence Decision, which contained the agency’s formal findings that waste generated by

nuclear power plants will be disposed of safely. The court ruled that the Waste Confidence

Decision required an environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act and that

NRC needed to consider the possibility that a permanent waste repository would never be built

and to examine potential problems with waste storage pools.

The Waste Confidence Decision, first issued in 1984 and since updated twice, resulted from a

1979 federal circuit court ruling that required NRC to determine whether waste from nuclear

facilities would be safely managed after their licenses expired. After the Waste Confidence

Decision was struck down in 2012, NRC suspended final licensing decisions for new reactors,

spent fuel storage facilities, and license renewals. Upon approving the continued storage rule to

replace the Waste Confidence Decision, NRC ended its licensing suspension.144

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

Renewed interest in nuclear power in much of the world has led to increased concern about

nuclear weapons proliferation, because technology for making nuclear fuel can also be used to

produce nuclear weapons material. Of particular concern are uranium enrichment, a process to

separate and concentrate the fissile isotope uranium-235, and nuclear spent fuel reprocessing,

which can produce weapons-useable plutonium.

140

Ibid., p. 80.

Hiruo, Elaine, “DOE Implements Court-Ordered Suspension of Nuclear Waste Fee,” NuclearFuel, May 26, 2014.

142

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, National Association of Regulatory Utility

Commissioners v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 11-1066, decided November 19, 2013,

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/2708C01ECFE3109F85257C280053406E/$file/11-10661466796.pdf.

143

NRC, “NRC Approves Final Rule on Spent Fuel Storage and Ends Suspension of Final Licensing Actions for

Nuclear Plants and Renewals,” news release, August 26, 2014, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1423/

ML14238A326.pdf.

144

NRC, “Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” final rule, 79 Federal Register 56238, September 19, 2014.

141

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts a safeguards program that is intended

to prevent civilian nuclear fuel facilities from being used for weapons purposes, but not all

potential weapons proliferators belong to the system, and there are ongoing questions about its

effectiveness. Several proposals have been developed to guarantee nations without fuel cycle

facilities a supply of nuclear fuel in exchange for commitments to forgo enrichment and

reprocessing, which was one of the original goals of the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership, now called the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.145

Several situations have arisen throughout the world in which ostensibly commercial uranium

enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been subverted for military purposes. In 2003 and

2004, it became evident that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had sold sensitive technology

and equipment related to uranium enrichment to states such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea.

Although Pakistan’s leaders maintain they did not acquiesce in or abet Khan’s activities, Pakistan

remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG). Iran has been a direct recipient of Pakistani enrichment technology.

IAEA’s Board of Governors found in 2005 that Iran’s breach of its safeguards obligations

constituted noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and referred the case to the U.N.

Security Council in February 2006. Despite repeated calls by the U.N. Security Council for Iran

to halt enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, and imposition of sanctions, Iran continues

to develop enrichment capability at Natanz and at a site near Qom disclosed in September 2009.

Iran insists on its inalienable right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to

Article IV of the NPT. Interpretations of this right have varied over time. International talks with

Iran over its nuclear program are ongoing. The case of Iran raises perhaps the most critical current

question for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: How can access to sensitive fuel

cycle activities (which could be used to produce fissile material for weapons) be circumscribed

without further alienating non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT?

Leaders of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime have suggested ways of reining in

the diffusion of such inherently dual-use technology, primarily through the creation of incentives

not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. The international community is in the process of

evaluating those proposals and may decide upon a mix of approaches. At the same time, there is

debate on how to improve the IAEA safeguards system and its means of detecting diversion of

nuclear material to a weapons program in the face of expanded nuclear power facilities

worldwide.

(For more information, see CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy

Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, coordinated by (name redacte

d).)

Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs

The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear energy programs and NRC.

The sources for the funding figures are Administration budget requests146 and committee reports

145

The organization approved a new mission statement with the name change at its June 2010 meeting in Ghana.

Seehttp://www.ifnec.org/About/History.aspx.

146

DOE, “FY 2015 Congressional Budget Request,” DOE/CF-0098, Vol. 3, March 2014, http://energy.gov/cfo/

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which fund DOE and NRC. The

House passed its version of the FY2015 Energy and Water bill (H.R. 4923, H.Rept. 113-486) on

July 10, 2014. The Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Appropriations

approved a draft FY2015 bill and report on July 24, 2014.147 Pending enactment of full-year

appropriations, FY2015 funding for these programs is being provided by a continuing resolution

(P.L. 113-164).

Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(budget authority in millions of current dollars)

FY2012

Approp.

FY2013

Approp.a

FY2014

Approp.

FY2015

Request

FY2015

House

FY2015

Senate

Subcom.

Reactor Safetyb

800.1a

—c

811.4

815.2

—c

—

Nuclear Materials and

Waste

227.1

—

232.5

232.2

—

Yucca Mountain

Licensing

55.0

Inspector General

10.9

12.0

12.1

Total NRC budget

authority

1,038.1

1,036.0

1,055.9

1,059.5

1,064.5

1,059.5

—Offsetting fees

-909.5

-930.7

-935.2

-890.3

-935.2

Net appropriation

128.6

126.6

125.2

124.3

174.3

124.3

FY2013 figures do not reflect March 1, 2013, sequester under P.L. 112-25.

Subcategories from NRC budget request.

Subcategories not specified.

Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs)

(budget authority in millions of current dollars)

FY2012

Approp.

FY2013

Approp.

FY2014

Approp.

FY2015

Request

FY2015

House

FY2015

Senate

Subcom.

Reactor Concepts

115.5

104.8

113.0

100.5

138.0

55.0

Small Modular Reactor

Licensing

67.0

62.7

110.0

97.0

54.5

Fuel Cycle R&D

187.4

169.9

186.5

189.1

182.0

230.0

Nuclear Energy Enabling

Technologies

74.9

67.9

71.1

78.2

101.0

73.5

International Nuclear

3.0

2.8

2.5

3.0

(...continued)

downloads/fy-2015-budget-justification; NRC, “Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2015,” NUREG-1100,

Volume 30, March 2014, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v30/.

147

Senate Committee on Appropriations, “FY15 Subcommittee Reported Bill and Draft Report,” July 24, 2014,

http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/fy-2015-ew-subcommittee-reported-bill-and-draft-report.

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

FY2012

Approp.

FY2013

Approp.

FY2014

Approp.

FY2015

Request

FY2015

House

FY2015

Senate

Subcom.

Energy Cooperation

Radiological Facilities

Management

69.9

65.4

25.0

5.0

25.0

Idaho Facilities

Management

155.0

145.0

196.6

185.9

206.0

185.9

Program Direction

91.0

85.1

90.0

73.1

73.0

73.1

Yucca Mountain

repository

150.0

765.4

708.4

889.2

863.4

826.7

777.0

Total, Nuclear Energya

Excludes funding provided under other accounts.

Nuclear energy total reduced by House floor amendment without specifying changes in subcategories.

Legislation in the 113th Congress

H.R. 259 (Pompeo)/S. 2279 (Lee)

Energy Freedom and Economic Prosperity Act. Terminates nuclear energy production tax credit,

among other provisions. House bill introduced January 15, 2013; referred to Committee on Ways

and Means. Senate bill introduced May 1, 2014; referred to Committee on Finance.

H.R. 1700 (Engel)

Nuclear Disaster Preparedness Act. Requires the President to issue guidance for federal response

to nuclear disasters, covering specific topics listed in the bill. Introduced April 24, 2013; referred

to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

H.R. 2081 (Thornberry)

No More Excuses Energy Act of 2013. Includes provisions to prohibit NRC from considering

nuclear waste storage when licensing new nuclear facilities, and to establish a tax credit for

obtaining nuclear component manufacturing certification. Introduced May 21, 2013; referred to

multiple committees.

H.R. 2609 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 1245 (Feinstein)

Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014. Provides

funding for DOE nuclear programs and NRC. House bill introduced July 2, 2013; reported as

original measure by Committee on Appropriations July 2, 2013 (H.Rept. 113-135); passed House

July 10, 2013, by vote of 227-198. Senate bill introduced June 27, 2013; reported as original

measure by Committee on Appropriations June 27, 2013 (S.Rept. 113-47). FY2014 Energy and

Water Development funding provided by Division D of P.L. 113-76, Consolidated Appropriations

Act, 2014.

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

H.R. 2712 (Lowey)

Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2013. Requires evacuation planning within 50 miles of

U.S. nuclear power plants and that reactor license renewals be subject to the same standards that

would apply to new reactors. Introduced July 17, 2013; referred the Committee on Energy and

Commerce.

H.R. 2861 (Lowey)

Requires NRC to distribute safety-related fines collected from nuclear facilities to the counties in

which the facilities are located to maintain radiological emergency preparedness plans.

Introduced July 30, 2013; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

H.R. 3354 (Engel)

Dry Cask Storage Act. Requires spent fuel at nuclear power plants to be moved from spent fuel

pools to dry casks after it has sufficiently cooled. Costs of the fuel transfers would be offset by a

reduction in nuclear waste fees owed to the federal government. Introduced October 28, 2013;

referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

H.R. 3766 (Ros-Lehtinen)

Requires congressional approval of U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with countries

that do not agree to forgo enrichment and reprocessing. Introduced December 12, 2013; referred

to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Rules.

H.R. 3895 (Duncan)

Energy Exploration and Production to Achieve National Demand (EXPAND) Act. Among other

provisions, repeals nuclear production tax credit, authorizes expedited nuclear licensing

procedures, requires NRC to develop “technology neutral” guidelines for licensing advanced

nuclear plants, requires an accelerated schedule for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, and limits

fees for uranium mining on federal lands. Introduced January 16, 2014; referred to multiple

committees.

H.R. 4522 (Van Hollen)/S. 2271 (Murphy)

Establishes a Green Bank to finance clean energy, including nuclear projects. Both bills

introduced April 30, 2014; House bill referred to Committee on Ways and Means and to Energy

and Commerce for specific provisions; Senate bill referred to Committee on Finance.

H.R. 4869 (Lummis)

Department of Energy Research and Development Act of 2014. Authorizes DOE research and

development programs, including nuclear energy. Introduced June 13, 2014; referred to

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

H.R. 4923 (Simpson)

Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015. Provides

appropriations for DOE nuclear programs and NRC. Introduced June 20, 2014; reported as an

original measure June 20, 2014, by the Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 113-486). Passed

House July 10, 2014, by vote of 253-170.

H.R. 4956 (Walz)

American Energy Opportunity Act of 2014. Among other provisions, establishes the Carbon Free

Technology and Nuclear Energy Reserve that could be used to offset the cost of loan guarantees

for commercial nuclear power plants, the disposition and recycling or reprocessing of spent fuel

from nuclear power plants, and the financing of long-term safe storage of spent fuel. Introduced

June 24, 2014; referred to multiple committees.

H.R. 5322 (Blackburn)

Consolidate Heavy-handed and Outdated Programs Act of 2014. Consolidates nuclear energy

programs under a new Department of Energy and the Environment. Introduced July 31, 2014;

referred to multiple committees.

S. 1240 (Wyden)

Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013. Establishes an independent Nuclear Waste

Administration to develop nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. Siting of such facilities

would require the consent of the affected state, local, and tribal governments. The Nuclear Waste

Administration could spend nuclear waste fees collected after the bill’s enactment without the

need for further appropriation. Fee collection would halt after 2025 if a waste facility had not

been opened. Introduced June 27, 2013; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

Full committee hearing held July 30, 2013.

S. 1519 (Vitter)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reorganization Plan Codification and Complements Act.

Specifies functions and authorities of the Chairman and Commissioners of NRC. Specifies that

any commissioner may request a vote on whether a particular issue should be reserved for the

Chairman or handled by the full Commission. Introduced September 18, 2013; referred to

Committee on Environment and Public Works.

S. 2324 (Boxer)

Safe and Secure Decommissioning Act of 2014. Prohibits NRC from waiving emergency

preparedness and security requirements at nuclear reactors that are undergoing decommissioning

until all of such a reactor’s spent nuclear fuel has been transferred from storage pools into dry

casks. Introduced May 13, 2014; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.

Congressional Research Service

Nuclear Energy Policy

S. 2325 (Markey)

Dry Cask Storage Act of 2104. Requires each nuclear reactor to submit a plan to NRC for

tranferring spent fuel currently stored in pools to dry casks within seven years. After the seven

year period, additional spent fuel must be transferred to dry casks within a year after it has been

determined to be sufficiently cool. Emergency planning zones must be expanded from 10 to 50

miles in radius around any reactor that is determined by NRC to be out of compliance with its

spent fuel transfer plan. Introduced May 13, 2014; referred to Committee on Environment and

Public Works.

S. 2326 (Sanders)/H.R. 4667 (Welch)

Nuclear Plant Decommissioning Act of 2014. Provides for consultation with state and local

governments, and the consideration of state and local concerns, during NRC approval of postshutdown decommissioning activities reports, and requires reactors undergoing decommissioning

to comply with state laws and standards. Senate bill introduced May 13, 2014; referred to

Committee on Environment and Public Works. House bill introduced May 15, 2014; referred to

Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Energy Policy

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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