Pakistan-U.S. Relations

Congressional research reportJul 1, 2009

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K. Alan Kronstadt

Specialist in South Asian Affairs

July 1, 2009

Congressional Research Service

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RL33498

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Pakistan-U.S. Relations

Summary

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered

vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism;

Afghan stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and

Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by

periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks

on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led

counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although

long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is

identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and

Afghanistan. Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and, until recently, largely ineffectual

counterinsurgency operations in the country’s western tribal areas, where Al Qaeda operatives

and pro-Taliban militants are said to enjoy “safe haven.” U.S. officials increasingly are concerned

that indigenous religious extremists represent a serious threat to the stability of the Pakistani state.

The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a bilateral cease-fire and a continuation of

substantive dialogue between Pakistan and neighboring India, which have fought three wars since

1947. A perceived Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation

efforts in South Asia. Attention to this issue intensified following nuclear tests by both countries

in 1998. The United States has been troubled by evidence of transfers of Pakistani nuclear

technologies and materials to third parties, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Such evidence

became stark in 2004, and related illicit smuggling networks may still be operative.

Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators turned positive after 2001, with some meaningful poverty

reduction seen in this still poor country. However, conditions deteriorated sharply in 2008-2009.

Democracy has fared poorly in Pakistan, with the country enduring direct military rule for more

than half of its existence. In 1999, the elected government was ousted in a coup led by Army

Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president. Musharraf retained the

position as army chief until his November 2007 retirement from the military. Late 2007 instability

included Musharraf’s six-week-long imposition of emergency rule and the assassination of

former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto. However, February 2008

parliamentary elections were relatively credible and seated a coalition led by Bhutto’s widower,

Asif Zardari, and opposed to Musharraf’s continued rule. Musharraf resigned the presidency in

August and Zardari subsequently was (indirectly) elected as the new President. The Bush

Administration determined in early 2008 that a democratically elected government was restored

in Islamabad, thus permanently removing coup-related aid sanctions.

The Obama Administration states an intention to continue pursuing close and mutually beneficial

relations with Islamabad. As part of its “new strategy” for Afghanistan, the Administration seeks

development of a “more coherent” Pakistan policy to include tripling nonmilitary aid to improve

the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as conditioning U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that

government’s progress in combating militancy and on democratization. A Special Representative

was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid and will by the end of FY2009 have

obtained more than $7.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including about $4.6 billion in

development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received about $7.2 billion in military

reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. Congress in 2009 authorized large and

sustained increases in bilateral assistance to Pakistan along with conditions on future security aid.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

Key Current Issues and Developments ........................................................................................3

The New U.S. Administration ...............................................................................................3

The Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative..........................................................5

The Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review..............................................6

May 2009 Trilateral Summit............................................................................................8

Deteriorating Economic Circumstances .................................................................................8

The Friends of Pakistan (FOP) Group....................................................................................9

Increasing Islamist Militancy .............................................................................................. 10

Threats to Punjab and Sindh.......................................................................................... 12

Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency ............................................... 13

Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies.................................................................. 16

The Swat Valley ............................................................................................................ 19

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) .............................................................................. 23

Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency................................................... 27

Major Shift in Pakistani Attitudes Toward the Taliban ................................................... 29

U.S. Policy and Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation ...................................................... 29

Cross-Border Coordination and U.S. Military Action..................................................... 32

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks ...................................................................... 33

Deteriorated Relations With India ....................................................................................... 36

Pre-November 26 Pakistan-India Engagement............................................................... 36

Mumbai Terrorism and Islamabad’s Response ............................................................... 37

Fallout for Bilateral Relations ....................................................................................... 39

Implications for U.S. Interests ....................................................................................... 41

Selected Commentary on U.S. Policy Options ..................................................................... 42

Setting and Regional Relations.................................................................................................. 44

Historical Setting ................................................................................................................ 44

Political Setting................................................................................................................... 46

Musharraf’s 1999 Coup d’Etat ...................................................................................... 46

The 2008 Democratic Revival ....................................................................................... 46

Role of the Pakistani Military........................................................................................ 53

Regional Relations .............................................................................................................. 55

Pakistan-India Rivalry................................................................................................... 55

The “IPI” Pipeline Project ............................................................................................. 57

Afghanistan .................................................................................................................. 58

China ............................................................................................................................ 60

Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues ....................................................................... 61

Terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 62

Al Qaeda’s Resurgence in Pakistan................................................................................ 64

Infiltration Into Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 66

Infiltration into Kashmir and India ................................................................................ 68

Domestic Terrorism....................................................................................................... 69

Other Security Issues .......................................................................................................... 70

Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation............................................................................... 70

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation ................................................................... 74

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy ......................................................................................... 79

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Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue.............................................................. 80

Baluchistan Unrest ........................................................................................................ 82

Narcotics ...................................................................................................................... 83

Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas ...................................................... 84

Democratization and Human Rights .................................................................................... 88

Democracy and Governance.......................................................................................... 88

Human Rights Problems................................................................................................ 92

Economic Issues ................................................................................................................. 94

Overview ...................................................................................................................... 94

Trade and Investment .................................................................................................... 97

U.S. Aid and Congressional Action ..................................................................................... 98

U.S. Assistance ............................................................................................................. 98

Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs ...................................................... 106

Coup-Related Legislation............................................................................................ 108

Proliferation-Related Legislation................................................................................. 108

9/11 Commission Recommendations........................................................................... 109

Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress .............................................. 109

Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 111th Congress .............................................. 111

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ....................................................................................................... 115

Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province and Federally

Administered Tribal Areas.................................................................................................... 116

Tables

Table 1. Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2010 .............. 113

Contacts

Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 116

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Introduction

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is

considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include

regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; domestic political stability and democratization;

nuclear weapons proliferation and security;

human rights protection; and economic

Pakistan in Brief

development. Pakistan remains a vital U.S.

Population: 176 million; growth rate: 1.95% (2009 est.)

ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Yet the

Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice the size

outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan

of California)

since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful

Capital: Islamabad

successes, have seen a failure to neutralize

Heads of Government: President Asif Ali Zardari and

anti-Western militants and reduce religious

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani (both of the Pakistan

extremism in that country, and a failure to

People’s Party)

contribute sufficiently to the stabilization of

Ethnic Groups: Punjabi 45%, Pashtun 15%, Sindhi 14%,

neighboring Afghanistan. In the assessment of

Saraiki 8%, Muhajir 8%. Baloch 4%, other 6%

a former senior U.S. government official,

Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Saraiki 10%,

“Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the

Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%; Baluchi, English (official),

world today. All of the nightmares of the 21st

and others 14%

century come together in Pakistan: nuclear

Religions: Muslim 95% (Sunni 75%, Shia 20%), Christian,

proliferation, drug smuggling, military

Hindu, and other 5%

dictatorship, and above all, international

Life Expectancy at Birth: female 66 years; male 64

terrorism.” Terrorist bombings and other

years (2009 est.)

militant attacks became a near-daily scourge

in 2008 and continue at a high rate in 2009,

Literacy: 50% (female 36%; male 63%; 2005 est.)

with Islamist militancy spreading beyond

Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $406 billion; per

western tribal areas and threatening major

capita: $2,440; growth rate 5.1% (2008)

Pakistani cities. Foreign Policy magazine’s

Currency: Rupee (100 = $1.21)

Failed State Index 2009 ranked Pakistan 10th

Inflation: 14.4% (May 2009)

in the world with a “critical” score, citing

especially acute group grievances and

Defense Budget: $3.56 billion (2.8% of GDP; 2008)

factionalized elites.2

U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $3.6 billion; imports from

U.S. $1.9 billion (2008)

Pakistan suffered a series of destabilizing

Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; Departments of

developments in 2007, including a monthsCommerce and State; Government of Pakistan;

long political crisis and a November

Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; The Military

emergency proclamation which severely

Balance

undermined the status of the militarydominated government of then-President and Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf; a surge in

domestic Islamist militancy following the July denouement of a standoff involving Islamabad’s

Red Mosque complex; and the December assassination of former Prime Minster and leading

opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile only

months earlier. These developments led many Washington-based analysts to more forcefully

question the Bush Administration’s largely uncritical support for President Musharraf as a key

Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, 618, 31, July 2008.

See the July 2009 index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index.

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U.S. ally. Following February 2008 parliamentary elections that seated a coalition of former

opposition parties vehemently opposed to Musharraf’s continued rule, the U.S. government

became more measured in its public posturing and, when Musharraf came under imminent threat

of impeachment in August, the Bush Administration called his fate a matter of internal Pakistani

politics. Abandoned by many political allies and even by his military successor, Musharraf made

the decision to resign the presidency and exit Pakistan’s political stage that month.

Islamabad’s new civilian ruling dispensation was welcomed by U.S. leaders. In July 2008,

President George W. Bush hosted Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani at the White House, where

the two leaders issued a joint statement reaffirming the U.S.-Pakistan “Strategic Partnership.”3 In

September, Benazir Bhutto’s widower Asif Ali Zardari—a controversial figure long bedeviled by

corruption charges who had taken the reins of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) upon her

demise—ascended to the Pakistani presidency with the congratulations of senior U.S. officials.

Later that month, a third round of the Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington,

where the two sides “reaffirmed their commitments to a wide-ranging, substantive, and long-term

strategic partnership.”4 President Zardari warns American audiences that failure to neutralize the

militant threat in his country will have global repercussions and he requests immediate financial

assistance along with increased trade to foster Pakistan’s economic independence. 5

There exist widely held suspicions among foreign governments and independent analysts alike

that Islamabad’s civilian leaders do not fully control the army, that the army does not fully control

the intelligence agencies, and that these intelligence agencies have lost their ability to rein in the

very militant groups they helped to create. Moreover, anti-American sentiments are deep and

widespread in Pakistan, with a significant segment of the populace viewing years of U.S. support

for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an impediment to, rather than facilitator of,

the process of democratization there. Underlying this sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps

malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam.6 The Bush

Administration continued to proclaim its ongoing support for Musharraf even after his imposition

of emergency rule and the later sweeping rejection of his parliamentary allies by Pakistani voters.

However, during the course of 2008, that Administration shifted its long-standing Pakistan

policies, in particular on the issue of democratization. Still, many Pakistanis remained resentful of

perceived U.S. interference and pressure. Many also have been hopeful that the new U.S.

administration of President Barack Obama would be less overbearing in its dealings with

Islamabad and do more to nurture Pakistan’s nascent democratic institutions.7

See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080728-5.html. Gilani’s visit was panned

by many analysts, who saw the new Pakistani leader failing to impress audiences in both Washington and Islamabad,

thus further straining already tense bilateral relations (see, for example, “Gilani’s Poor Show in the US,” Jane’s

Foreign Report, August 12, 2008).

See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110444.htm.

Asif Ali Zardari, “The Frontier Against Terrorism” (op-ed), Washington Post, June 22, 2009.

Kenneth Ballen, “Bin Laden’s Soft Support,” Washington Monthly, May 2008. A mid-2009 opinion poll found fully

88% of Pakistani respondents believing it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Muslim world (see

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf).

“Pakistanis Hope U.S. Under Obama Will Be Less Bossy,” Reuters, November 5, 2008.

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Key Current Issues and Developments

Pakistan’s worsening economic conditions, fluid political setting, and perilous security

circumstances make the job of U.S. decision makers difficult. On the economic front, the civilian

government in Islamabad faces crises that erode its options and elicit growing public resentment.

On the political front, an unprecedented ruling coalition including the country’s two leading

mainstream parties collapsed almost immediately upon the resignation of President Musharraf,

without having enacted any major policies. A more narrow ruling coalition then narrowly

survived a March 2009 crisis. On the security front, Pakistan is the setting for multiple armed

Islamist insurgencies, some of which span the border with Afghanistan and contribute to the

destabilization of that country. Al Qaeda forces remain active on Pakistani territory.

In September 2008, at least 53 people were killed and hundreds wounded when a suicide truck

bomber attacked the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. Pakistani officials suspect Taliban militants

based in western tribal areas of perpetrating the bombing. The attack—called “Pakistan’s 9/11” by

some observers—spurred numerous commentaries arguing that the “war on terrorism” could no

longer be perceived as an “American war” as it clearly requires Pakistanis to fight in their own

self-defense. 8 In February 2009, pro-Taliban militants consolidated their positions in the Swat

Valley, reached a peace accord with the government, and began incursions into the Buner district

only 60 miles from Islamabad. Upon this accord’s collapse in April, Pakistani security forces

launched major and apparently successful offensive operations in the North West Frontier

Province (NWFP), encouraging U.S. and other Western observers that Islamabad is willing to

undertake sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, perhaps with the broader

support of the Pakistani public, which may have a newly negative attitude toward indigenous

religious extremists. Government military operations in northwestern Pakistan have created up to

3 million internally displaced persons in less than one year.

The New U.S. Administration

A key aspect of the Obama Administration’s new approach to Pakistan is the development of a

more coherent policy, to include conditioning U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s

progress in combating militancy and also the tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of

the Pakistani people, with a particular focus on the FATA region. President Obama, Vice President

Joseph Biden, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton all supported the Enhanced Partnership With

Pakistan Act of 2008 (S. 3263) as Senators in the 110th Congress, and they encourage the 111th

Congress to pass a new version of that legislation in the 111th Congress (S. 962).9 Another

Pakistan-specific bill, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of

2009 (H.R. 1886) was passed by the full House in June 2009.

Even as President-elect, Barack Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without

“solving Pakistan” and working more effectively with that country, saying he thinks Pakistan’s

See, for example, “Admit It: This is Pakistan’s War” (editorial), News (Karachi), September 22, 2008.

See Secretary of State Clinton’s confirmation hearing statements at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/

KerryClintonQFRs.pdf.

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democratically elected government understands the threat and will participate in establishing “the

kind of close, effective, working relationship that makes both countries safer.”10

Pakistani President Zardari said his country looked forward to a “new beginning” in bilateral

relations, but repeated his admonition that Pakistan “needs no lectures on our commitment [to

fighting terrorism]. This is our war.” He has asked the Obama Administration to strengthen

Pakistan’s democracy and economic development in the interest of fighting extremism. 11 Despite

Pakistani hopes that President Obama will more energetically engage diplomatic efforts to resolve

the Kashmir problem, the Administration has offered no public expressions of support for such a

shift. Secretary of State Clinton has recognized the dangers of rising tensions in Kashmir while

also deferring calls for greater U.S. involvement there, saying the U.S. role will continue to be as

it was under the previous Administration: settlement facilitation, but no mediation.12

In what many observers considered to be a bracing U.S. government wake-up call to Islamabad,

Secretary Clinton told a House panel in April that “the Pakistani government is basically

abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates followed with

his own warning that U.S.-Pakistan relations could suffer if Islamabad did not “take appropriate

actions” to deal with the militant threat.13 Days later, President Obama himself expressed “grave

concern” about the situation in Pakistan, offering that the “very fragile” civilian government there

did not appear to have the capacity to deliver basic services to the Pakistani people. He further

stated that this lack of capacity makes it difficult for the government to gain the support and

loyalty of its people. He did, however, acknowledge that the Pakistani military was showing more

seriousness in addressing the threat posed by militants.14

Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani issued a rare public statement of reaction to the

U.S. criticisms, condemning the “pronouncements by outside powers raising doubts on the future

of the country.” Shortly after, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani,

penned an article in which he downplayed fears of an extremist takeover in Pakistan and called

the “panicked reactions” in the U.S. media counterproductive to the cause of strengthening

Pakistani democracy or facilitating the counterterrorism effort. He warned that “ordinary

Pakistanis are beginning to wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.”15

The Obama Administration’s tone shifted after Pakistani forces launched major offensive

operations against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley later in April. Visiting Islamabad and the

camps of internally displaced persons in early June at the specific request of President Obama,

Special Representative Richard Holbrooke saw Pakistan having turned a corner in both public

attitudes toward the militants and in the military’s offensive posture in western regions. Secretary

Clinton also expressed being “incredibly heartened by the resolve shown by the Pakistani people,

government, and military.” Pentagon officials say they are “encouraged” by the Pakistani military

effort, asserting that “sustained operations” will be key to success. In this regard, they look

See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635.

Asif Ali Zardari, “Partnering With Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, January 28, 2009.

See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf.

Transcript: House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on “New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in

the Obama Administration,” April 22, 2009; “Pentagon Chief in Taliban Warning,” BBC News, April 23, 2009.

“Obama Transcript: First 100 Days,” CNN.com, April 29, 2009.

“Pakistan Army Chief Hits Back at US Criticism,” Financial Times (London), April 27, 2009; Husain Haqqani,

“How Pakistan is Countering the Taliban” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2009.

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favorably upon signals that Pakistan has undertaken “fairly significant combat operations in

South Waziristan.”16

The Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative

Two days after taking office, President Obama announced the appointment of former Clinton

Administration diplomat Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative to Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Holbrooke’s central task will be to coordinate across the entire U.S. government to

achieve U.S. strategic goals in the region. Secretary of State Clinton strongly recommended such

an appointment on the grounds that Afghan-Pakistani relations were troubled and required special

attention from Washington. 17 In accepting the job, Holbrooke called the Pakistan situation

“infinitely complex” and noted the need to coordinate what he called a “clearly chaotic foreign

assistance program.”18 Prior to the announcement, there was speculation that the new U.S.

President would appoint a special envoy to the region with a wider brief, perhaps to include India

and even Kashmir. Upon persistent questioning, a State Department spokesman insisted that

Holbrooke’s mandate is “strictly” limited to dealing with “the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation.”19

Even some Pakistani analysts see Holbrooke’s leverage in Islamabad as being inherently limited

by the omission of India from his brief.20

Given Ambassador Holbrooke’s reputation as a “bulldozer” with strong and sometimes negative

views about South Asia’s circumstances, his appointment caused some consternation in the

region. 21 One senior analyst—seeing “dim and dismal” prospects for Holbrooke—predicted that

efforts to get Islamabad to finally shut down militant sanctuaries on Pakistani territory will be the

single hardest test of the Special Representative. Indeed, a key task for Holbrooke may be

determining whether Pakistan’s security establishment continues to see a strategic interest in

maintaining links with Islamist extremist groups or whether lack of capacity for dealing with such

groups is the crux of the problem. Other analysts warn that the regional setting is not amenable to

increased U.S. diplomatic engagement and/or pressure, and that U.S. involvement could even

backfire by breeding resentments in regional capitals. These observers urge instead a measured

approach focused on the creation of a coherent and comprehensive U.S. regional strategy. 22

See the June 5, 2009, State Department press release at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/124399.htm; “Clinton

Hails Pakistani Resolve in Battling Taliban,” USA Today, June 2, 2009; see the June 8, 2009, Defense Department

press release at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4430; “U.S. Sees New Pakistan

Combat Drive in Waziristan,” Reuters, June 8, 2009.

“Special Representative Holbrooke’s Role in Afghanistan and Pakistan” at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/

2009a/02/116314.htm.

See http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115297.htm. In 2008, Holbrooke penned a Foreign Affairs

article in which he declared that Afghanistan and Pakistan “now constitute a single theater of war.” Among the major

problem areas identified with regard to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, he called pacifying the “insurgent sanctuaries” in

Pakistan’s tribal areas as being the toughest, noting that “Pakistan can destabilize Afghanistan at will—and has”

(“Mastering a Daunting Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008).

See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115448.htm.

Moeed Yusuf, “Welcome to South Asia, Mr. Holbrooke!” (op-ed), Friday Times (Lahore), February 6, 2009.

“New Envoy Unnerves South Asia,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2009; “South Asian Chasm of Mistrust Awaits

Obama’s Envoy,” Reuters, February 8, 2009.

“For Holbrooke, Situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan is ‘Dim and Dismal’” (interview with Bruce Riedel), Council on

Foreign Relations, January 28, 2009; “US Envoy Faces Tough S Asia Test,” BBC News, February 11, 2009; Daniel

Markey, “So You Want to Be a Special Envoy,” Foreign Policy (online), January 2009.

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Ambassador Holbrooke has made multiple trips to the region in 2009. His maiden visit was made

to “listen and learn the ground realities.” In Islamabad, the Ambassador heard expected requests

for more U.S. assistance, as well as what was reported to be “universal” opposition to Predator

strikes on Pakistani territory.23 In April, Holbrooke and Adm. Mullen traveled together for

meetings with senior officials in Pakistan, where they reportedly sought to get Pakistan to step up

its fight against Islamist militants. By some accounts, the duo was coolly received by Pakistani

leaders who resent ongoing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks and criticisms of the InterServices Intelligence agency. 24 When the visit continued in New Delhi, Holbrooke sought to forge

unified purpose by identifying “a common threat, a common challenge, a common task” facing

the United States, Pakistan, and India alike. Indian audiences can be skeptical of such a tack,

given pervasive sentiments there that the Pakistani government is a fomenter, rather than pure

victim, of Islamist extremism. 25

The Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review

In February, President Obama assigned former CIA official and current Brookings Institution

scholar Bruce Riedel to lead a review that would bring together various other U.S. government

strategy proposals for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His co-chairs in the process were Special

Representative Holbrooke and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy.

In March, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that

conceives of the two countries as being part of “one theater of operations for U.S. diplomacy and

one challenge for our overall policy.”26 The strategy is rooted in the assumption that, “The United

States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats

posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” All elements of U.S. national power—

including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—are to be brought to bear in

attaining the “core goal” of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda and its safe havens in

Pakistan, and in preventing their re-emergence in Pakistan or Afghanistan. To this end, the

Administration intends to overcome the “trust deficit” the United States faces in the region and to

“engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable

economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.”27 As such, the Administration

supports the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962). It also supports

congressional passage of legislation that would provide duty-free treatment for certain goods

from designated “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” in Afghanistan and western Pakistan.

There are seven key aspects of the new strategy for U.S.-Pakistan relations: (1) bolstering

Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation; (2) engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat

posed by extremism; (3) assisting Pakistan’s capability to fight the extremists; (4) increasing and

broadening assistance in Pakistan; (5) exploring other areas of bilateral economic cooperation; (6)

strengthening Pakistani government capacity; and (7) asking for assistance from U.S. allies for

See http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/press-releases-2009.html; “In Pakistan, U.S. Special Envoy Finds

Discontent,” New York Times, February 12, 2009.

“US Pushes Pakistan to Boost Fighting of Militants,” Associated Press, April 6, 2009; “Holbrooke’s Visit,” News

(Karachi), April 11, 2009.

“U.S. Envoy Seeks Alliance With India and Pakistan Against Militants,” New York Times, April 9, 2009.

“Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and

Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009.

See the “White Paper” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.

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both Afghanistan and Pakistan.28 The Administration thus supports a policy that would

significantly increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan and that would establish as yet undetermined

“benchmarks” for measuring Islamabad’s success in combating extremism. President Obama

stated that “we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan

needs to root out the terrorists. After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check.”29

Performance benchmarks for military aid are likely to concentrate on measures of violence. A

process for establishing benchmarks was only just beginning as of late March, but the

Administration intends to establish these “across the board.”30

Ambassador Holbrooke has asserted that, of the many challenges faced by the Administration in

formulating its “AfPak” policy, the most daunting is dealing with western Pakistan and the “red

lines” set by Islamabad barring foreign troops from operating there.31 Holbrooke believes the new

approach differs from that of the previous Administration in its aim of better integrating “stovepiped” policies, in its greater resource endowment, and in its proposed effort to more directly

counter the propaganda of Islamist radicals in the region. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Chairman Senator John Kerry welcomed the new strategy as “realistic and bold.” House Foreign

Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Howard Berman also voiced strong support for the

President’s plan to boost civilian assistance efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Zardari

called the strategy “positive change” and welcomes increased U.S. aid as the best way to combat

militancy. 32 Even well before the U.S. President announced the new regional strategy, Islamabad

had expressed support for a regional approach emphasizing reconstruction and development, and

warned that a past overemphasis on the military dimension had not proven fruitful. 33

Some analysts worried that the new strategy was in trouble even before its unveiling, as a

weakened Pakistani government might be unable to serve as a viable counterpart in

implementation.34 In April, when asked by a Senate panel how the Administration would know if

its new strategy was working, Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy said there were “some very

broad metrics” for Pakistani counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, and she promised

that “in a very short amount of time” the Administration would provide details about more

specific metrics. There are in Washington some analysts who argue that U.S. success in

Afghanistan will require taking a far harder line with the Pakistani military than has been the case

to date, perhaps by threatening to cut off all aid to compel better cooperation.35

Ibid.

President’s speech at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/03/27/obama-announces-new-strategy-for-afghanistanand-pakistan.

“Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and

Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009.

Ibid.

“President Obama’s Afghanistan- Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy,” U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center

briefing, March 27, 2009; “Interview with Amb. Holbrooke and Gen. Petraeus,” Jim Lehrer Newshour (PBS)

transcript, March 27, 2009; Sen. Kerry’s statement at http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=310648; Rep.

Berman’s statement at at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=603; “Pakistan’s President

Praises Obama and Offers New Concession to Opposition,” New York Times, March 28, 2009.

See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Feb/PR_62_09.htm.

“Pakistani Political Crisis Jeopardizes U.S. Regional Strategy,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009; “Senate Armed

Services Committee Holds Hearing on US Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, April 1, 2009.

See, for example, Selig Harrison, “Face Down Pakistani Army” (op-ed), USA Today, April 1, 2009.

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U.S. policy options for addressing Pakistan’s myriad problems are quite limited, and the United

States seeks to fight Pakistani militants by proxy, “through an army over which it has little

control, and in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence.”36 A pair of May

opinion articles in the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review contained harsh, and in

some ways representative, criticism of the Pakistani government and the new U.S. strategy. One

called President Obama’s strategy “wholly inadequate” and said the real problem was Islamabad’s

lack of will, not lack of capacity. Another argued that massive new foreign aid is unlikely to

produce positive results because Pakistan’s central problem is a dysfunctional government that

will not be repaired through infusions of foreign assistance, but rather requires the Pakistanis

themselves to reform their own political system and restore the primacy of parliament. 37

May 2009 Trilateral Summit

Following a February trilateral meeting of top diplomats from the United Sates, Pakistan, and

Afghanistan, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the format had proved valuable enough to

continue on a regular basis.38 On May 6 and 7, President Obama hosted the Pakistani and Afghan

presidents in Washington, where he characterized their meeting as one of “three sovereign nations

joined by a common goal”: to permanently defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan

and Afghanistan. The U.S. President expressed being pleased that his counterparts were serious in

addressing the threat posed by such extremists, and he stated that such trilateral meetings would

continue on a regular basis.39 Secretary Clinton saw “very promising early signs” of improved

trilateral cooperation, and said she was “quite impressed” by the recent Pakistani military

operations.40 Press reports suggested that President Zardari’s meeting with the House Committee

on Foreign Affairs left many Members confused and disappointed, with the Chairman quoted as

saying Zardari “did not present a coherent strategy for the defeat of the insurgency.”41

Deteriorating Economic Circumstances42

Soaring inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, have elicited

considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan. Such concerns weigh heavily on the civilian

government. The Finance Ministry’s most recent annual Economic Survey (June 2009) reported

dismal economic performance, growing fiscal and current account deficits, rising external debt,

dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and a depreciating currency.43 Consumer prices in 2008

reached their highest levels since 1975, with an inflation rate above 25% for many months. The

rupee’s value hit record lows, down more than 20% against the U.S. dollar for the year, and net

international reserves have declined by more than half in only one year to around $7 billion. Two

major international investor rating indices recently cut Pakistan’s sovereign debt rating to

“U.S. Options in Pakistan Limited,” Washington Post, May 4, 2009.

Jeff Smith, “Time to Get Tough With Pakistan” (op-ed), and Mosharraf Zaidi, “Pakistan Demands Money for

Nothing” (op-ed), both in Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 2009.

See http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119864.htm.

See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900331.pdf.

White House press briefing, May 6, 2009.

“Emphasis on Al Qaeda at Three-Way Talks,” New York Times, May 7, 2009.

See also “Economic Issues” section below and CRS Report RS22983, Pakistan’s Capital Crisis: Implications for

U.S. Policy.

See http://www.finance.gov.pk/finance_economic_survey.aspx.

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“negative.” Moreover, serious power shortages have led to nationwide outages, triggering protests

that turned violent at times and further harmed the economy. 44 Such economic deterioration likely

leads to an increase in the pool of potential recruits for extremist groups.45

A senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official saw Pakistan requiring “substantial external

financing” to stabilize its economy. Estimates in the fall of 2008 had Pakistan urgently requiring

at least $4 billion to avoid defaulting on its balance of payments. Islamabad first looked to

intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and to traditional close state allies such

as China and Saudi Arabia. Meeting with no clear assurances, it then shifted attention to the

recently created, informal “Friends of Pakistan” grouping of countries, which met in midNovember. Yet this “Plan B” also failed to generate the desired results.46

As a fallback position, Pakistani leaders approached the IMF to discuss infusions of desperately

sought capital, although these came with stringent fiscal belt-tightening conditions that threatened

to damage the government’s domestic political standing. In November the IMF reached a StandBy Arrangement (SBA) to provide a $7.6 billion loan to Pakistan aimed at resolving the country’s

serious balance of payments difficulties. A first tranche of about $3.1 billion was delivered on

November 24. An IMF official later expressed confidence that Islamabad possessed a sound

strategy of action to include reducing unsustainably high fiscal deficits and tightening monetary

policy to reduce inflation and boost foreign exchange reserves.47 In its first formal review of the

SBA, the IMF in February reported being “impressed” by the Islamabad government’s “strong

resolve to sustain prudent macroeconomic policies, strengthen and broaden the social safety net,

and pursue reforms to enhance Pakistan’s medium-term growth prospects.”48 A second loan

tranche of $847 million was delivered on April 1, 2009. In addition, the World Bank, which also

has praised Islamabad’s stabilization program, intends to loan Pakistan up to $2 billion in 2009 to

support economic growth and poverty-focused programs.49

The Friends of Pakistan (FOP) Group

A “Friends of Pakistan” (FOP) group was launched in September 2008, when President Zardari

and the top diplomats of the United Arab Emirates, Britain, and the United States were joined by

foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, and

representatives of China, the European Union, and the United Nations. A resulting statement

expressed agreement to work in strategic partnership with Pakistan to combat violent extremism;

develop a comprehensive approach to economic and social development; coordinate an approach

to stabilizing and developing border regions; address Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and support

“Moody’s Cuts Pakistan’s Bond Outlook to Negative,” Reuters, September 23, 2008; “Electricity Outages Anger,

Frustrate Pakistanis,” Associated Press, June 4, 2008. See also “Troubled Pakistan Economy Compounds Leaders’

Woes,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2008.

“Pakistan’s Slump Creates Openings for Terrorists,” USA Today, February 24, 2009.

In October, the lead U.S. diplomat for the region told an Islamabad audience that the purpose of the Friends of

Pakistan effort was not to “throw money on the table” or to provide “a cash advance,” but rather to forward a

“systematic process” in which foreign aid to Pakistan is optimally targeted (see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/

2008/111084.htm).

See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/car111508a.htm and http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/

2008/121108.htm.

IMF press release, February 25, 2009, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0948.htm.

World Bank press release, February 7, 2009.

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democratic institutions.50 The FOP met in Abu Dhabi in November to discuss the parameters of

its work. Participants noted Pakistan’s formidable challenges and called for well-coordinated

international action to address them. Such cooperation is planned for four broad areas:

development, security, energy, and institution-building.51

In April, 31 countries and 18 international institutions sent representatives to an FOP/Donors’

Conference in Tokyo. There Ambassador Holbrooke announced the Administration’s intent to

provide a total of $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the 2009-2010 period, calling the funds

a “downpayment on President Obama’s commitment” to support pending Pakistan-specific

legislation (S. 962).52 The U.S. pledge brought to more than $5 billion the total offered by the

international community on top of the IMF package. In the lead-up to the conference, Pakistani

officials called for a “Marshall Plan” for Pakistan that would provide $30 billion in international

donations over a five-year period. The Pakistani Ambassador to the United States is among those

who called such proposed aid “miniscule” when compared to the bailouts being provided to

American automobile and other companies, a characterization that rankled some in Congress. 53

Increasing Islamist Militancy

Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007. Pakistan is the site of numerous armed

insurgencies of various scales that represent an increasingly severe threat to domestic, regional,

and perhaps global security.54 The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that, “Radical

elements in Pakistan have the potential to undermine the country’s cohesiveness.” A September

2008 report by leading U.S.-based experts on Pakistan claimed that, “Militant groups freely meet,

train, and raise funds throughout Pakistan.”55 According to the State Department’s Country

Reports on Terrorism 2008 (released April 2009),

The United States remained concerned that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

of Pakistan were being used as a safe haven for Al Qaeda (AQ) terrorists, Afghan insurgents,

and other extremists. ... The coordination, sophistication, and frequency of suicide bombings

that increased sharply in 2007, continued to grow in Pakistan in 2008. ... Extremists led by

Baitullah Mehsud and other AQ-related extremists spread north throughout the FATA with

See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110353.htm.

See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/Nov/PR_345_08.htm. During President Zardari’s June 2009 visit

to Brussels, EU officials pledged to provide as much as $92 million in new humanitarian aid.

See the State Department’s April 17, 2009, press release at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/121822.htm.

“Pakistan Asks U.S. for 30 Billion Dollar ‘Marshall Plan’ to Stabilize Region” (interview), Washington Times, April

8, 2009.

For example, in late 2008, the British Prime Minister estimated that three-quarters of the most serious terrorism plots

investigated in Britain had links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan (“Brown Offers Pakistan Anti-Terror Aid,” Washington Post,

December 15, 2008).

See http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf and http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/

attachments/PakistanPolicyWorkingGroupReport.pdf. One mid-2008 Pakistani newspaper editorial estimated that only

30% of the country or less was under the effective writ of the state, down from about half in the late 1990s. Another

lamented that “it is quite obvious that the militants call the shots” in much of western Pakistan. According to the

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “Militancy is spreading and recruitment is in full swing.” The group cites what

it calls credible reports that “militants are being handled with kid gloves while security forces are regularly using

excessive force against noncombatants” (“Is There Peace Deal with the Terrorists or Not?” (editorial), Daily Times

(Lahore), June 11, 2008; “Militant Menace” (editorial), News (Karachi), June 25, 2008; “HRCP Urges Holistic

Approach to Combating Militants,” Press Release, June 3, 2008).

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an increased presence in Bajaur and Khyber. In most of the FATA, the militants continued to

openly challenge the writ of the state with high levels of violence. ... There was a growing

trend of militants garnering support by promising to fill a vacuum left by “ineffective”

government structures.56

The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reports that the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan in

2008 was more than double that of the previous year, with 2,293 terrorism-related fatalities

placing the country second in the world on such a scale, after Iraq. The country also suffered

1,264 kidnappings in 2008, the most in the world and more than double the number in

neighboring Afghanistan.57 Only two suicide bombings were reported in Pakistan in 2002; that

number grew to 59 in 2008. Pakistan’s intelligence agency reports that Pakistan has overtaken

Iraq as site of the world’s most suicide-bombing deaths. Pakistani police have proven unable to

deal with suicide attacks, given a dearth of proper training and equipment. By nearly all accounts,

Pakistani law enforcement personnel are outgunned and out-financed by militants.58

The myriad militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have displayed mutual

animosity in the past, have increased their levels of coordination and planning. According to

Secretary of Defense Gates, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar,

and other affiliated groups are “all working together” in safe havens on the Pakistani side of the

Durand Line.59 The FATA has been called “the most ungoverned, combustible region in the

world,” and an unrelenting surge in Islamist-related violence in Pakistan has some observers

fearing for the stability of the civilian government in Islamabad and even the potentially total

collapse of the Pakistani state.60 Representative of such concerns are the warnings of a senior

regional analyst who asserts that a “chronic failure of leadership” by Pakistani civilians and

military alike had left “state institutions paralyzed” and brought the country “close to the brink,

perhaps not of a meltdown of the government, but to a permanent state of anarchy.”61

Top Islamabad government officials identify terrorism and extremism as Pakistan’s most urgent

problems. They vow that combating terrorism is their top priority, and President Zardari stated in

June 2009 that his government would “continue this war to the end.”62 Opinion surveys in

Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 found strong support for an Islamabad government emphasis

on negotiated resolutions. They also showed scant support for unilateral U.S. military action on

Pakistani territory.63 As Islamist-related violence in Pakistan increases in intensity, Pakistani

animosity toward U.S. policies appears to grow, as well. Afghan and Pakistan Taliban militants

See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122434.htm.

NCTC 2008 report at http://wits.nctc.gov/ReportPDF.do?f=crt2008nctcannexfinal.pdf; Asif Ali Zardari, “The

Terrorists Want to Destroy Pakistan, Too” (op-ed), New York Times, December 9, 2008.

See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm ; “Suicide Attacks a Growing

Threat in Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor,” October 10, 2008; “Neither Safe Nor Sorry,” Herald (Karachi),

December 2008; “Pakistan Losing Fight Against Militants,” Associated Press, December 5, 2008.

Transcript: “Meet the Press With David Gregory,” March 1, 2009.

“Like the Wild, Wild West, Plus Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, March 30, 2008; “Analysts Fear Pakistan Could Fall

to Extremists,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2008; “Islamist Insurgency Threatens Pakistan’s Fledgling

Democracy,” Agence France Presse, December 7, 2008; “Militants Killing Laughter and Music in Pakistan Region,”

Reuters, February 9, 2009.

Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink,” New York Review of Books, June 11, 2009.

Quoted in “Pakistan’s Zardari Vows to Fight Taliban to the End,” Reuters, June 12, 2009.

See http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf and http://www.iri.org/

newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp.

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may also be closing ranks in preparation for an expected influx of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In

March, one of a trio of senior Taliban commanders in the FATA told an interviewer that Pakistanbased militants are specifically targeting U.S. troops in Afghanistan.64

U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told a House panel in 2009 that,

No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border

areas and improving governance and creating economic and educational opportunities

throughout the country. In 2008, Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but its

record in dealing with militants has been mixed, as it balances conflicting internal and

counterterrorist priorities. The government is losing authority in the north and the west and

even in the more developed parts of the country. Mounting economic hardships and

frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater radicalization.65

Threats to Punjab and Sindh

Lahore—the provincial capital of Punjab and so-called cultural heart of Pakistan—was for many

years mostly unaffected by spiraling violence elsewhere in the country. This conclusively ended

with three major terrorist attacks in less than three months in early 2009: On March 3, about a

dozen terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team with automatic weapons, rockets, and hand

grenades as it was being driven through central Lahore. Six players were wounded, and six

policemen in another vehicle were killed along with two by-standers. Most or all of the assailants

escaped, and the security lapses were a major international embarrassment for the Pakistani state.

Then, on March 30, militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud attacked a police academy in

Manawan—near the Indian border and only a few miles from central Lahore—killing eight cadets

and wounding scores more before elite commandos secured the facility in a day-long siege. Four

extremists were reported killed during the commando raid. Mehsud himself claimed the attack

was revenge for U.S.-launched drone attacks in Pakistan.66 Finally, on May 27, terrorists used

automatic weapons and a car bomb in a failed effort to attack the Punjabi headquarters of the ISI.

Security personnel apparently prevented the suicide bombers from reaching the target building,

but their explosives leveled a neighboring building and the assault left 27 people dead, including

an ISI agent, 12 policemen, and several civilian bystanders.

Such attacks heighten the sense of crisis surrounding Pakistan’s civilian leaders. Militants from

western Pakistan appear intent on attacking Lahore to demonstrate the extent of their capabilities

and to threaten the government’s writ throughout the country.67 Following the May suicide

assault, Army Chief Gen. Kayani said Pakistan “will not be terrorized” and he vowed to press

ahead with efforts to “defeat the destabilizing forces that are out to harm the country.”68

“Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of U.S. Influx,” New York Times, March 27, 2009; “Taliban

Commander Says U.S. Troops Are Being Targeted,” ABC News.com, March 18, 2009.

Transcript: “House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Holds Hearing on ‘Worldwide Threats,’” February

25, 2009.

“Militant Claims Responsibility for Pakistan Attack,” New York Times, April 1, 2009.

“Sense of Crisis Deepens in Pakistan After Lahore Attack,” Reuters, March 3, 2009; “Why Attack Lahore?,” BBC

News, March 30, 2009; “Insurgent Threat Shifts in Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 31, 2009.

See the Inter-Service Public Relations May 28, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/28.

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Islamist militants may be increasing their influence in southern Punjab, where most anti-India

groups have originated and where a number of Taliban cells have already been discovered. 69 A

report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group urged Islamabad to end its effort to

differentiate between militant networks and instead move toward a “zero-tolerance” policy,

especially with regard to Punjab-based Sunni extremist organizations. 70 The “Punjabi Taliban,” a

loose conglomeration of banned militant groups in the Pakistani heartland, are comparatively

better educated and better equipped than their Pashtun countrymen, and are notable for having in

many cases enjoyed state patronage in the recent past.71 An apparent consolidation of an alliance

between Taliban forces from western Pakistan and indigenous Punjabi extremists is identified as

having the potential to seriously destabilize the Pakistani state.72

Extremists may also be moving from the FATA to Karachi in large numbers in 2009, exacerbating

preexisting ethnic tensions and perhaps forming a new Taliban safe haven in Pakistan’s largest

city. In April, at least 20 people were killed in ethnic clashes pitting Muhajirs against Pashtuns in

Karachi.73 A human rights group has warned that an influx of Pashtuns displaced by combat in the

northwest into Karachi’s Sindh province is leading to discrimination and could further inflame

interethnic tensions.74

Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency75

An ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan

remain matters of serious concern to U.S. policy makers. It is widely held that success in

Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the

key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and

Kabul. In September 2008, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said he viewed the

two countries as “inextricably linked in a common insurgency” and had directed that maps of the

Afghan “battle space” be redrawn to include the tribal areas of western Pakistan. 76 As Presidentelect, Barack Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without “solving Pakistan” and

working more effectively with that country.77 Numerous other senior U.S. officials—both civilian

and military—share the view that Pakistan and Afghanistan are best considered as a single

“problem set” in the context of U.S. interests.78

“Pakistan Fears Taliban Will Regroup in South,” Financial Times (London), June 25, 2009; “Meeting Punjab’s

Police and Bombers,” BBC News, June 25, 2009.

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” Asia Report No. 164, March 13, 2009.

Hasan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4, April 2009.

“Insurgents Make Inroads in Key Pakistan Province,” New York Times, April 14, 2009.

“Pakistan Influx Fans Karachi Tensions,” BBC News, February 12, 2009; “Are the Taliban Finding a New Foothold

in South?,” Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 2009; “Refugee Crisis Inflames Ethnic Strife in Pakistan,” Wall Street

Journal, May 30, 2009; “Deadly Clashes Rock Pakistan City, BBC News, April 29, 2009.

See Amnesty International’s July 2, 2009, press release at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/

pakistan-more-two-million-people-living-outside-displacement-camps-face-.

See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.

Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008.

See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635.

“Petraeus: Afghan, Pakistan Problems Are Really One,” Associated Press, January 9, 2009; “National Security

Advisor Say Pakistan is Top U.S. Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2009.

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Many independent analysts agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy “sanctuary” in Pakistan,

their Afghan insurgency will persist. U.S. civilian and military now call for a more

comprehensive strategy for fighting the war in Afghanistan, one that will encompass Pakistan’s

tribal regions. According to a 2008 Pentagon report, the existence of militant sanctuaries inside

Pakistan’s FATA represents “the greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan.” In

March 2009, an American combat commander in Afghanistan claimed that major Taliban attacks

inside that country continue to occur only with an “almost absolute reliance on foreign fighters

from Pakistan and other countries.” Despite an upswing in Pakistani military efforts in western

Pakistan, U.S. requests that Pakistan “do more” in its fight against the Taliban did not recede: In

April, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan said Pakistan “must erase these [Taliban]

safe havens” near the border. However, more recently, a U.S. combat officer said that Pakistani

military operations were having a major impact on the ability of Taliban forces to operate on both

sides of the Durand Line and that U.S. military efforts in eastern Afghanistan were being

coordinated with the Pakistanis to maximize this effect.79

Afghan officials accuse Pakistani officials of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan.

Islamabad has sought to allay fears that truces in the tribal regions would lead to more crossborder attacks, assuring Afghan officials that Pakistan makes no distinction between Pakistani

and Afghan interests on this issue.80 Yet Afghan President Karzai has specifically named Baitullah

Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah among the anti-Afghan militants he wishes to see neutralized.81

Pakistan’s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of

Taliban elements operating from its territory.82 The “Kandahari clique” reportedly operates not

from Pakistan’s tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial

capital of Quetta.83 Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s intelligence services know the

whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active

contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate

that elements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban and other

extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire

support for Taliban offensives (see also “Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency”

below). 84 Other reports indicate that U.S. military personnel have been unable to count on the

U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2008;

Defense Department press release, March 6, 2009, at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?

transcriptid=4367; “US Commander: Pakistan Must Do More to Fight Taliban,” Reuters, April 19, 2009; U.S. colonel’s

June 23, 2009, comments at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4437.

See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/June/PR_156_08.htm. Some nongovernmental commentators in

Pakistan openly insist that Pakistan’s domestic security is the primary goal and helping Afghanistan is a secondary

objective, only (see, for example, Khalid Aziz, “Has Waziristan Stabilized?” (op-ed), News (Karachi), June 7, 2008).

“Karzai Threatens to Send Soldiers Into Pakistan,” New York Times, June 15, 2008. Afghan intelligence officials

claimed that suicide bombers who undertook a brazen daylight attacks in Kabul in February 2009 were trained at camps

in the FATA (“Pakistan Accused of Link to Kabul Attacks,” New York Times, March 20, 2009).

“Right at the Edge,” New York Times, September 7, 2008; “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek,

September 15, 2008.

Mukhtar Khan, “Quetta: The Headquarters of the Afghan Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 2,5, May 2009.

See, for example, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, March 10, 2008. One U.S. military officer claimed

that Pakistani military forces flew multiple helicopter missions to resupply Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan’s

Nangarhar province in 2007. The Islamabad government angrily denied the claims and a former top U.S. military

commander in Afghanistan cast doubt on their veracity. In another example, an October 2008 press report claimed that

British officials covered up evidence that a Taliban commander killed in Afghanistan in 2007 was in fact a Pakistani

military officer (“Pakistani Forces Helped Taliban in 2007: U.S. Lt. Col.,” Defense News, September 22, 2008;

(continued...)

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Pakistani military for battlefield support and do not trust Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, whom some

say are active facilitators of militant infiltration into Afghanistan. At least one senior U.S. Senator

has questioned the wisdom of providing U.S. aid to a group that is ineffective, at best, and may

even be providing support to “terrorists.”85

As pressure on Islamabad to curtail the cross-border attacks has increased, Pakistani officials

more openly contend that the problem is essentially internal to Afghanistan and has its roots in the

inability of the Kabul government to effectively extend its writ, and in the lack of sufficient

Afghan and Western military forces to defeat the Taliban insurgents. This view is supported by

some independent analyses.86 Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani

interest. They ask interested partners to enhance their own efforts to control the border region by

undertaking an expansion of military deployments and checkposts on the Afghan side of the

border, by engaging more robust intelligence sharing, and by continuing to supply the

counterinsurgency equipment requested by Pakistan. Islamabad touts the expected effectiveness

of sophisticated technologies such as biometric scanners in reducing illicit cross-border

movements, but analysts are pessimistic that such measures can meaningfully address militant

infiltration, as such elements generally skirt border checkposts, in any case.87

U.S./NATO Supply Routes

With roughly three-quarters of supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan moving either through or

over Pakistan, insurgents in 2008 began more focused attempts to interdict NATO supply lines,

especially near the historic Khyber Pass connecting Peshawar with Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Such

efforts included a March 2008 attack that left 25 fuel trucks destroyed. In November, scores of

masked militants hijacked a supply convoy of 13 trucks, capturing loads of wheat along with two

Humvees. Weeks later, insurgents set fire to nearly 100 trucks, destroying at least 50 cargo

containers and killing several Pakistani drivers in the process. At year’s end, the Pakistani

military reportedly launched a major offensive in the Khyber agency aimed at securing the supply

route, which was temporarily closed during the height of the fighting. Despite the Pakistani effort,

sporadic interdiction attacks continue to date.88

U.S. military officials claim that attacks on supply routes have a negligible effect on combat

operations in Afghanistan, with only about 1% of the cargo moving from the Karachi port into

Afghanistan being lost to such attacks, and with stockpiled supplies that could last 60-90 days in

the event of a severing of the supply chain. 89 Nevertheless, in the fall of 2008 the U.S. military

(...continued)

“Taliban Leader Killed by SAS Was Pakistan Officer,” London Sunday Times, October 12, 2008).

“Border Complicates War in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, April 4, 2008; “Democrat Questions US Aid to

Pakistan,” Associated Press, May 27, 2008.

See, for example, “As ISAF Command Changes, Time for a Reality Check on the Conflict in Afghanistan and

Pakistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, June 4, 2008; “American Failure in Afghanistan & Need for a

New Social Contract in the FATA,” Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, July 2008.

See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/July/PR_208_08.htm; “Stopping Terrorists” (editorial), News

(Karachi), June 10, 2008.

“Taliban Hits NATO Supply Line,” New York Times, February 4, 2009; “Militants in Pakistan Torch Afghan-Force

Supplies,” Reuters, March 15, 2009.

“US Plays Down Impact of Convoy Attacks in Pakistan,” Reuters, December 8, 2008. In April 2009, Centcom

Commander Gen. Petraeus told a House panel that between February 15 and March 15 roughly 3,600 NATO cargo

containers went through the Khyber Pass and only about 1% of these was damaged or destroyed in transit (“House

(continued...)

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began testing alternative routes, concentrating especially on lines from Central Asia and Russia.

Moscow agreed to allow non-lethal NATO supplies to Afghanistan to cross Russian territory, but

apparently declines to allow passage of troops as sought by NATO. The Centcom commander

subsequently reported that alternative routes had been secured, but it is not yet clear whether

these can carry the kind of heavy traffic seen in Pakistan. In March, an alternate route through

Russian and Uzbek territory opened for nonlethal cargo. It is expected to carry about 500

containers per month, less than one-seventh of that taken through Pakistan.90

Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies

Fighting between government security forces and religious militants intensified in 2008. Shortly

after former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s December 2007 assassination, the Pakistan army

undertook a major operation against militants in the South Waziristan agency assumed loyal to

Baitullah Mehsud. Occasionally fierce fighting continued in that area throughout the year and into

2009. The NWFP governor has claimed Mehsud oversees an annual budget of up to $45 million

devoted to perpetuating regional militancy. Most of this amount is thought to be raised through

narcotics trafficking, although pro-Taliban militants also sustain themselves by demanding fees

and taxes from profitable regional businesses such as marble quarries. The apparent impunity

with which Mehsud is able to act has caused serious alarm in Washington, where officials worry

that his power and influence are only growing.91

The Pakistani Taliban

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged as a coherent grouping in late 2007 under Baitullah

Mehsud’s leadership. This “Pakistani Taliban” is said to have representatives from each of

Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the “settled” districts abutting the FATA.

There appears to be no reliable evidence that the TTP receives funding from external states. The

group’s principal aims are threefold: (1) to unite disparate pro-Taliban groups active in the FATA

and NWFP; (2) to assist the Afghan Taliban in its conflict across the Durand Line; and (3) to

establish a Taliban-style Islamic state in Pakistan and perhaps beyond. As an umbrella group, the

TTP is home to tribes and sub-tribes, some with long-held mutual antagonism. It thus suffers

from factionalism. Mehsud himself is believed to command 5,000-10,000 militants. 92 In August

2008, the Islamabad government formally banned the TTP due to its involvement in a series of

suicide attacks in Pakistan.

(...continued)

Armed Services Committees Holds Hearing on the New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, April

2, 2009).

Pentagon Seeks New Afghan Supply Routes,” Financial Times (London), September 23, 2008; “U.S. to Widen

Supply Routes in Afghan War,” New York Times, December 31, 2008; “U.S. Secures New Supply Routes to

Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 21, 2009; “Seeking Safe Supply Routes,” Chicago Tribune, February 2, 2009;

“Avoiding Pakistan, New Supply Route to Afghanistan Opens,” New York Times, March 4, 2009.

“Mehsud Spending Up to 3bn on Militancy Annually: Ghani,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 30, 2008; “Pakistan

Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business,” New York Times, July 14, 2008; “Taliban Leader Flaunts Power Inside

Pakistan,” New York Times, June 2, 2008.

“Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, October 28, 2008; Hassan Abbas, “A

Profile of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008.

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Militancy in western Pakistan is not coherent, and Taliban forces there are riven by deep-seated

tribal rivalries that may prevent the TTP from ever becoming a truly unified force. Some analysts

believe that by pursuing sometimes contradictory military strategies in the region the United

States and Pakistan have missed a chance to exploit such divisions. According to this argument,

U.S.-launched missile strikes have a unifying effect on the militants and so undermine the

Pakistani strategy of driving a wedge between various Islamist factions.93 In 2009, U.S.

intelligence agencies reportedly have launched a major effort to examine potential fault lines

within the Islamist militant groups of western Pakistan with an eye toward exploiting rifts with

diplomatic and economic initiatives, a strategy associated with Gen. Petraeus that realized

successes in Iraq.94 Some scholars argue, however, that the Taliban is not nearly as fragmented as

many believe, but rather is a decentralized organization, and that distinctions between Pakistani

and Afghan networks are largely arbitrary.95

Pakistani Military Operations

The Pakistan army has deployed some 120,000 regular and paramilitary troops to western

Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there. Their militant foes have employed heavy

weapons in more aggressive tactics, making frontal attacks on army outposts instead of the hitand-run skirmishes of the past. Pakistan has sent major regular army units to replace Frontier

Corps soldiers in some areas near the Afghan border and has deployed elite, U.S.-trained and

equipped commandos to the tribal areas.96

Ongoing battles with militants have concentrated on three fronts: the Swat valley, and the Bajaur

and South Waziristan tribal agencies. Yet the strife has affected other areas of western Pakistan.

Taliban forces may also have opened a new front in the Upper Dir valley of the NWFP, where one

report says a new militant “headquarters” has been established. 97 In late 2008 and early 2009,

Taliban forces also spread their activities into the previously relatively peaceful Orakzai agency,

the only in the FATA that does not border Afghanistan.98 Moreover, an unprecedented January

2009 attack on a Frontier Corps outpost in the Mohmand district by some 600 Taliban militants

represented an unusual reversal in that the militants had crossed into Pakistan from Afghanistan,

signaling increased coordination by Taliban units spanning the border.99

Military Operations in the Tribal Agencies

“Operation Sher Dil,” launched in Bajaur in September 2008, reportedly caused the deaths of

more than 1,500 militants and some 100 soldiers before Pakistani officials declared it successfully

completed in February. Still, pessimistic analysts view the gains from such operations as

“Tribal Tribulations – The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 13, 2009.

“US Probes Divisions Within Taliban,” Boston Globe, May 24, 2009.

See, for example, Antonio Giustozzi, “One or Many? The Issue of the Taliban’s Unity and Disunity,” Pakistan

Security Research Unit Brief No. 48, April 23, 2009.

“Pakistan May Step Up Action Against Insurgents,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 2008.

“Taliban Opens New Front in Pakistan,” Daily Telegraph (London), September 19, 2008.

“Six Killed in Orakzai Agency Suicide Blast,” Daily Times (Lahore), December 6, 2008; “Orakzai Becomes New

Haven for Taliban,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 4, 2009.

“46 Die in Taliban Attack on Pakistani Troops,” New York Times, January 12, 2009.

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temporary and predict that widespread militant presence in Bajaur and neighboring regions is apt

to continue in the future.

A new peace agreement was signed with Bajaur’s tribal elders, but it appears that the bulk of

militants forces repositioned themselves, and the army’s heavy bombardments may have alienated

large segments of the local population.100 Some 8,000 Pakistani troops were backed in Bajaur by

helicopter gunships and ground attack jets. The Frontier Corps’ top officer estimated that militant

forces in the agency numbered about 2,000, including foreigners. Battles included a series of

engagements at the strategic Kohat tunnel, a key link in the U.S. military supply chain running

from Karachi to Afghanistan.101 The fighting apparently attracted militants from neighboring

regions and these reinforced insurgents were able to put up surprisingly strong resistance,

complete with sophisticated tactics, weapons, and communications systems, and reportedly made

use of an elaborate network of tunnels in which they stockpile weapons and ammunition. 102

Sporadic military operations in the FATA have been ongoing, with Pakistani authorities

sometimes reporting significant militant casualties, although these claims cannot be corroborated.

Civilians are often killed in the fighting. 103 The Pakistani military reports that many FATA tribal

leaders are fully supportive of the army’s efforts there.104 In June 2009, Pakistani security forces

apparently opened a new front for offensive operations in the northwest. During the second week

of the month, some 800 militants reportedly moved into the Bannu region 90 miles southwest of

Peshawar.105 The army responded with artillery and helicopter gunship assaults on Taliban

positions. Operations were expanded into South Waziristan with multiple strikes by fixed-wing

aircraft in direct response to Taliban-launched suicide attacks.

On June 14, the NWFP governor announced that the government was preparing to begin military

operations targeting Baitullah Mehsud and his loyalists in South Waziristan, with army troops

reportedly massing in surrounding areas. Within days, the troops were reported to have virtually

surrounded Mehsud-controlled areas (on the Pakistani side of the international border), though no

ground operation has been launched to date. Islamabad has ramped up pressure by posting large

monetary rewards for information leading to the death or capture of Mehsud and his deputies. A

military blockade of Mehsud’s strongholds and weeks of near-constant airstrikes against his

fighters’ positions have no doubt weakened Taliban forces in South Waziristan, yet the June 23

assassination of a key pro-government tribal leader there demonstrated that Mehsud remained a

potent enemy able to violently suppress local opposition.106

100

“Pakistan Says Wins Key Region on Afghan Border,” Reuters, February 28, 2009; “28-Point Bajaur Peace Accord

Signed,” News (Karachi), March 10, 2009; “Pakistan Regains Control of Remote Area, For Now,” New York Times,

March 9, 2009..

101

“‘Stability in Bajaur Within Two Months,’” Daily Times (Lahore), September 27, 2008; “Pakistan and Taliban

Battle for Key Tunnel,” London Sunday Times, October 19, 2008.

102

“Pakistani Troops Destroy Taliban Stronghold,” Financial Times (London), September 30, 2008; “8,000 Pakistani

Soldiers Take on Al Qaeda in Volatile Tribal Region,” London Times, September 27, 2008.

103

See, for example, “Pakistan Militant Raid ‘Kills 50,’” BBC News, February 7, 2009; “11 Children Among 26 Killed

in Darra Shelling,” News (Karachi), February 10, 2009.

104

See for example, the Inter-Services Public Relations’ February 7, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/

front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/2/7.

105

“Pakistan Lifts Veil on Not-So-Secret Waziristan War,” Reuters, May 20, 2008; “War on Taliban Sparks Refugee

Crisis,” Sunday Times (London), November 16, 2008.

106

“Pakistan Treads Warily as New Fight Looms,” Washington Post, June 29, 2009.

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In June, North Waziristan militants loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadar formally scrapped a 16-month-old

peace deal with the government in what they called a protest against U.S. drone attacks in the

region. Bahadar also reportedly demanded an end to military operations against Mehsud’s forces.

Shortly after, some 150 militants ambushed a Pakistani army convoy moving through North

Waziristan, killing up to 30 soldiers. Despite such provocation, there are no signs of a Pakistani

military offensive in the region where Bahadar’s forces are active. Increased conflict in North

Waziristan could, however, make more difficult the campaign against Mehsud.107

Some analysts suspect that the Pakistani military is setting what may, from a U.S. perspective, be

overly narrow objectives in targeting Mehsud while leaving untouched other Taliban groups

operating in the FATA. These include militant forces loyal to Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadar,

and perhaps even Jalaluddin Haqqani, all of whom are seen to be focused on fighting U.S.-led

forces in Afghanistan rather than against the Pakistani army. They are thus in some accounts

considered to be “pro-government Taliban” with whom the Pakistani army may yet hope to

conclude truce deals. 108 Indeed, to the extent that the Pakistani military’s motives are limited to

ending Mehsud’s ability to launch attacks inside Pakistan, they may not sufficiently coincide with

the U.S. aim of ending the region’s status as an Al Qaeda safe haven from which attacks inside

Afghanistan and potentially on Western/U.S. targets can be plotted and launched.109

The Swat Valley

Pakistan has since late 2007 faced a “neo-Taliban” insurgency in the scenic Swat Valley just 100

miles northwest of the capital, where radical Islamic cleric Maulana Fazlullah and some 5,000 of

his armed followers seek to impose Sharia law. This rebellion against the state is notable as the

only insurgency with geographic reach beyond the “tribal belt” and in part of Pakistan’s “settled

areas” nearer the Indus river plains. Fazlullah, also known as “Maulana Radio” for his fiery (and

unlicensed) FM broadcasts, moved to create a parallel government like that established by

Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. Some 2,500 Frontier Corps soldiers were deployed to the

valley, and the army soon took charge of the counterinsurgency effort at the request of the

provincial governor, massing about 15,000 regular troops. By the close of 2007, militant elements

in the area were reported to be in retreat, and the Pakistani government claimed victory. 110 Yet, in

2008, with militants still active in Swat, government officials reportedly struck a peace deal. That

deal collapsed by mid-year, with sporadic and sometimes heavy fighting in Swat continuing

throughout the year.111

By all accounts, Islamist insurgents expanded their influence in Swat in 2008, and many

observers asserted that by 2009 the state’s writ had completely vanished from the scenic valley.

Over the course of 2008, scores of local police officers were killed by insurgents, many of them

beheaded, and fully half of the region’s police force reportedly deserted in the face of brutal

Taliban assaults.112 Aggressively pursuing their radical social agenda, Taliban militants issued an

107

“Second Front Opens in Waziristan Following Militant Attack,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 3, 2009.

“Analysis: Waziristan Operation to Focus on Baitullah Mehsud,” Long War Journal, June 17, 2009.

109

“Gains in Pakistan Fuel Pentagon Optimism for Pursuing Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, June 13, 2009.

110

“Pakistan Claims Win in Crucial NW Valley,” Washington Post, December 15, 2007.

111

“Forces Launch New Offensive in Swat,” Dawn (Karachi), January 6, 2008; “Army Vows to Clear Swat of

Militants,” News (Karachi), February 26, 2008; “Pakistan Clashes Take Heavy Toll,” BBC News, August 4, 2008.

112

“In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban,” New York Times, January 25, 2009; Kamila Hyat, “Debacle in

Swat” (op-ed), News (Karachi), January 22, 2009; “In Pakistan, Swat Valley Cops Give Up Fight,” Christian Science

(continued...)

108

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edict that girls’ education cease as of mid-January. In response, the government ordered all

private schools closed in the region. Pakistan’s army chief claimed that month that his forces “had

both the will and resolve to establish the writ of government” in Swat.113

The 2009 Swat Accord

By February, the NWFP chief minister was calling the problem a full-blown rebellion against the

state, and President Zardari himself conceded that militant forces had established a “huge”

presence in his country. Shortly after, Zardari reportedly agreed in principle to restore Sharia law

in the Swat region in a bid to undercut any popular support for the uprising there.114 The accord

announced on February 16 hung in limbo for nearly two months, with neither side willing to

formalize its still clouded terms. 115 In addition to bringing Islamic law to the entire Malakand

division of the NWFP (including Swat), the provisions of the accord reportedly included

requirements that the Taliban recognize the writ of the state, give up their heavy weapons and

refrain from displaying personal weapons in public, denounce suicide attacks, and cooperate with

local police forces. In return for such gestures, the government agreed to gradually withdraw the

army from the region.116 Pakistanis appeared to strongly support the government’s move. 117

President Zardari asserted that his government’s strategy in Swat was to engage “traditional local

clerics to help restore peace in the area, and return the writ of the state.” He insisted that there

was not and would not be any negotiations with the Taliban.118 The deal may have been an

attempt at face-saving by a provincial government that had been badly discredited by the NWFP’s

rapidly worsening security circumstances.119 It may also have been part of a “counter-spin”

strategy by the Pakistani army, which would demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the

government was not taking dictation from the United States, while also showing that the

government was willing to negotiate. When the Taliban disregarded the provisions of the accord,

Pakistani leaders would have more firm justification for an all-out military offensive. 120 On April

13, Zardari signed a regulation imposing Islamic law after Parliament passed a resolution

recommending such a move.

(...continued)

Monitor, February 5, 2009.

113

See http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/1/28.

114

“Pakistani Violence Intensifies As Policy Wobbles,” Reuters, February 10, 2009; “Taliban is in ‘Huge’ Amounts of

Pakistan: Zardari,” Reuters, February 13, 2009; “Pakistan Restores Islamic Law to Pacify Swat Valley,” Reuters,

February 16, 2009.

115

“Taliban’s Terms Unclear,” Los Angeles Time; February 24, 2009.

116

“Secret Details of Swat Peace Accord,” News (Karachi), April 11, 2009.

117

According to one scientific opinion survey taken in March, an impressive 80% of Pakistani respondents supported

the government’s decision to sign the Swat accord, with nearly that percentage believing the deal would bring peace to

the region. A majority (56%) also expressed support for potential future Taliban demands to impose Sharia law in

major Pakistani cities (see http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp).

118

Asif Zardari, “Pakistan is Steadfast Against Terror” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2009.

119

“Sharia Deal Saves ANP Govt?,” Pulse (Islamabad), February 20, 2009.

120

This narrative was conveyed by a Pakistani army spokesman in “Winning Over Pakistan,” Macleans (Toronto), may

21, 2009.

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Reactions to the Swat Accord

The White House was critical of the April Sharia deal in Swat, saying that solutions to Pakistan’s

security problems “don’t include less democracy and less human rights.” A State Department

spokesman emphasized that the United States was “very concerned” and maintained a view that

“violent extremists need to be confronted”121 Prime Minister Gilani dismissed U.S. criticisms by

claiming the issue was an internal matter and that his government had no alternatives given the

circumstances. Pakistan’s lead diplomat in Washington sought to assure a skeptical American

audience that his government was not offering any concessions or ceding any ground to the

Taliban, but rather was “attempting to drive a wedge” between Al Qaeda and Taliban militants on

the one hand, and an indigenous Swati movement on the other, as part of a “pragmatic” strategy

“to turn our native populations against the terrorists.”122

Still, most observers saw the deal as a blatant capitulation and unprecedented surrender of

territory to a militant minority beyond the FATA, and as part of a disturbing broader trend. 123 The

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan marked April 13 as a day of “humiliating submission” by

the government. London-based Amnesty International warned that the deal could legitimize

human rights abuses that have taken place as Taliban influence increases. New York-based

Human Rights Watch called the move a “grave threat” to the rights of women, especially. 124 A

senior independent Pakistani analyst and former army general said the government “has yielded

under compulsion at a time when Talibanization is sweeping the country and overwhelming the

state.” Even a senior Pakistani Islamist politician, Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam chief Fazlur Rehman,

told Parliament that the Taliban were threatening the Pakistani capital.125 The peace deal was

particularly alarming for India, where officials feared it would further exacerbate the existing

Islamist militant threat they face. The Pakistan army’s subsequent offensive operation was not

entirely encouraging for New Delhi, as Islamabad was seen to be selectively targeting some

extremist groups while leaving so-called “anti-India assets” undisturbed. 126

Accord Fails, Army Moves In

As with past iterations of truce deals in the nearby FATA, the Swat accord was seen to give

militants breathing space and an ability to consolidate their gains. Reports immediately arose that

Taliban forces were moving into the valley by the thousands to establish training camps in the

forests around Mingora, Swat’s largest town. Lucrative emerald mines came under control of

militants and profits reportedly were used to finance attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan.127

121

“US Criticizes Islamic Law Deal in Pakistan,” Associated Press, April 14, 2009; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/

2009/04/121748.htm. At least one report claimed that U.S. officials were privately supportive of a truce deal as an

attempt to drive a wedge between Swat’s militants and the Al Qaeda-linked Pakistani Taliban led by Baitullah Mehsud

(US Backs Sharia Plan to Split Muslim Extremists,” London Daily Telegraph, February 18, 2009).

122

“Gilani Defends Deal With Swat Militants,” Financial Times (London), April 20, 2009; Husain Haqqani, “We’re

Not Ceding Ground” (op-ed), USA Today, February 19, 2009.

123

See, for example, Shuja Nawaz, “ Wariness in Pakistan” (op-ed), Boston Globe, February 22, 2009; Ahmed Rashid,

“Pakistan’s Deal With the Devil” (op-ed), Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2009.

124

HRCP press release, April 14, 2009; AI press release, February 16, 2009; HRW press release, April 15, 2009.

125

Talat Masood, “Implications of the Deal” (op-ed), News (Karachi), April 20, 2009; “Taliban Nearing Capital, Warns

Fazl,” News (Karachi), April 23, 2009.

126

“Pakistan’s Swat Offensive Leaves India Skeptical,” Reuters, May 18, 2009.

127

“Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban,” New York Times, March 6, 2009; “Pakistan Peace Deal Gives

New Clout to Taliban Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2009; “Swat’s Taliban Expand Operations,” BBC News,

(continued...)

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Fears that, rather than being placated by the truce, militants would use their Swat positions as a

springboard from which to launch further forays were quickly confirmed. In early April, Taliban

forces moved into the neighboring Buner district, now only 60 miles from the Pakistani capital.

Local tribal militias put up resistance, but were quickly overwhelmed, and the Pakistani army had

no local presence. Within two weeks Taliban forces were said to have taken full control of

Buner. 128 Islamabad responded to the incursion with assurances that regular army troops would be

used to evict militants from the district.129

In late April, Pakistani paramilitary troops supported by helicopter gunships reportedly were

engaging militants in Buner and Lower Dir. At the same time, the army accused the militants of

“gross violations” of the accord. 130 Pakistani commandos were airdropped into Buner’s main

town and regained control, but heavy fighting forced many hundreds of civilians to flee. Some

reports had the militants using civilians as “human shields.”131 The fighting pitted about 15,000

government troops against an estimated 4,000-5,000 militants.

As militants appeared to consolidate their hold on large swaths of the NWFP, alarm grew in

Washington that the Pakistani government may have lacked the will to sustain the fight; on May 4

Adm. Mullen expressed being “gravely concerned” about the progress made by militants. He

indentified Pakistan’s simultaneous pursuit of peace deals and military operations as “strategic

moves” that are, from an American perspective, “at cross purposes.”132 Secretary of Defense

Gates concluded that the Swat agreement’s “failure,” followed by militant movements into

neighboring Buner, was a “real wakeup call for the Pakistani government.”133

Heavy combat raged throughout May, with militants putting up strong resistance. When Taliban

forces returned in large numbers to Mingora, army leaders reportedly resolved to finally abandon

negotiations and press ahead with a larger offensive effort, this time with greater support from the

Pakistani public.134 Still, the army itself continued to avoid heavy ground combat, preferring

instead to employ helicopter gunships, aerial bombing, and artillery.135 By mid-May, Pakistani

government officials were reporting that more than 1,000 militants had been killed in the military

offensive, though these figures cannot be independently confirmed. Still, reports indicated that

even in Buner the army was not in full control, and Pakistani commanders were acknowledging

(...continued)

April 21, 2009; “Taliban Jihad Against West Funded by Emeralds From Pakistan,” Sunday Telegraph (London), April

5, 2009.

128

“Taliban Swarm District Near Swat,” BBC News, April 8, 2009; “Pakistani Taliban Begin Imposing Rule in New

Area,” Reuters, April 13, 2009; “Buner Falls to Swat Taliban,” Dawn (Karachi), April 22, 2009.

129

“Pakistan Military Prepares to Block Taliban Expansion,” Financial Times (London), April 25, 2009.

130

Inter-Services Public Relations press release, May 2, 2009, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/2.

131

“Taliban Face Human Shields Charge,” BBC News, May 4, 2009.

132

“Taliban Advance, Pakistan’s Wavering Worry Obama Team,” Washington Post; “U.S. Questions Pakistan’s Will

to Stop Taliban,” New York Times, both April 24, 2009; “DoD News Briefing With Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon

Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.,” May 4, 2009.

133

“Interview With Secretary Gates,” CNN.com, May 3, 2009.

134

“The Taliban Tightens Hold in Pakistan’s Swat Region,” Washington Post, May 5, 2009; “Pakistani Army Posed for

New Push Into Swat,” New York Times, May 6, 2009. At one point, the army claimed to have killed up to 200 militants

in in a single day (see http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/5/10).

135

“Pakistani Army Avoiding Close Combat With Taliban,” Associated Press, May 8, 2009; “Pakistan Says it is

Stepping Up Attacks Against Taliban,” New York Times, May 13, 2009.

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that regaining full control of the region could take many months. 136 In late May, the battle for

Mingora was engaged and a week later the army was declaring that Swat’s main city had been

fully secured.

On June 4, Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani told a Corps Commanders’ meeting

that the tide in Swat had “decisively turned,” and he expressed hope that the government would

immediately launch “a robust administrative effort” to enable the return of IDPs as soon as

possible. By month’s end, the army was claiming to have cleared the last remaining Taliban

stronghold in Swat. Nevertheless, sporadic lethal battles have continued in the region in July even

as IDPs have begun returning. 137 If the summer passes and Swat is still seen to be unsecured, the

Zardari government is likely to face growing domestic political problems. Some observers

speculate that the military wants to substantively secure the Swat Valley before initiating an

anticipated ground offensive in South Waziristan. The army reportedly plans to maintain a

presence in Swat for at least six months and perhaps for as long as one year. One estimate sees

reconstruction of Swat and four neighboring districts costing $1 billion or more.138

A senior Pakistani official reportedly claimed the two-month-long Swat offensive had left more

than 3,500 militants dead, but Islamabad’s official body count stands at about 1,700. There are no

independent confirmations of such claims. There are, however, signs that the Swat militants

refrained from entering pitched battles with army forces and instead retreated back into rural

areas, thus retaining the capability to harass both residents and security forces in the future. No

top Taliban commanders are known to have been killed or captured and, by many accounts, the

military succeeded only in establishing control of Malakand’s urban centers and main roadways.

Particularly skeptical observers suspect that the Pakistani military has vastly over-reported

Taliban casualties in a possible effort to impress an American audience and so continue to receive

large assistance packages.139

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Violence between Pakistani security forces and religious militants in western Pakistan beginning

in the first half of 2008 and continuing to date has driven millions of civilians from their homes

and caused a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Current estimates of the total number of

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) range from 1.9 million to 3.5 million, a significant

discrepancy that in part reflects the difficulty of identifying and reaching a population that is

scattered in villages, remote areas, and urban environments.

136

“Pakistan Army Struggles in Buner,” BBC News, May 20, 2009; “Pakistani Troops Make Gains Against Taliban in

Swat Valley,” Washington Post, May 22, 2009.

137

See the June 4, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/6/4;

“Pakistani Troops Clear Taliban Stronghold in Swat,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; “Taliban Resurface in Parts of Buner

District,” News (Karachi), July 18, 2009.

138

Inter-Services Public Relations press release, May 31, 2009, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/31; “Pakistan Focus Turns to Swat Reconstruction,” Financial Times (London), May 26,

2009.

139

“Pakistan’s Victories Over the Taliban: Less Than Meets the Eye,” Time, June 1, 2009; “Taliban Losses Are No

Sure Gain for Pakistanis,” New York Times, June 28, 2009; B. Raman, “The Missing Dead” (op-ed), Outlook (Delhi),

June 24, 2009.

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According to one report, nearly half of the estimated 450,000 residents of the Mehsud territories

of South Waziristan were driven from their homes by conflict in early 2008.140 The Pakistani

military effort in Bajaur ran from mid-2008 to early 2009; some 300,000 refugees reportedly fled

the region and many continue to live in makeshift camps near Peshawar.141 By June, following

weeks of fierce combat in the Swat Valley, more than two million Pakistanis had been displaced,

about half of them children. Less than 10% of these were reported to be staying in the 26 U.N.run camps; the remainder appear to have found haven with friends, relatives, or in “spontaneous

shelters.”142 Beds and medicine have been in short supply in the affected areas; indeed, the crisis

may be pushing Pakistan’s already deteriorated health care system to the brink of collapse.

Humanitarian relief efforts inside Pakistan historically have been significantly hindered by

bureaucratic snags and by corruption.143

International human rights groups have called for greater international assistance to civilians

adversely affected by the more recent fighting in and around the Swat valley. One warned that

citizens there were being left “at the mercy of the Taliban” and it accused the Pakistani

government of “fiddling while the NWFP burns.” In May, the U.N. High Commissioner for

Refugees called for a massive aid operation to cope with the new IDPs caused by the combat. To

date, the United Nations has received less than half of the $543 million in requested international

donations for Pakistani IDP relief. Aid agencies warn that the funding gap threatens to undermine

their efforts to address what one called the worst funding crisis faced in a major humanitarian

emergency in more than a decade. 144

On May 19, 2009, Secretary of State Clinton announced that some $110 million in urgent U.S.

humanitarian assistance would flow into Pakistan, to include relief kits, tents, radios, and

generators to provide light and water, along with many thousands of tons of wheat and other basic

foodstuffs. Upon arriving in Islamabad and visiting IDP camps in early June at the explicit

request of President Obama, Amb. Holbrooke announced that the United States would provide an

additional $200 million in urgent humanitarian assistance to address Pakistan’s IDP problem. 145 In

mid-June, a House committee hearing on the crisis heard testimony from several witnesses who

warned against premature returns, but who also emphasized that fast action was required to

forestall any increase in anti-government sentiments among the displaced. 146

140

“Pakistan Lifts Veil on Not-So-Secret Waziristan War,” Reuters, May 20, 2008.

“Pakistan: People of Buner at Mercy of Taliban,” Amnesty International press release, April 23, 2009; “Pakistanis

Flee Into Afghanistan,” BBC News, September 29, 2008; “War on Taliban Sparks Refugee Crisis,” Sunday Times

(London), November 16, 2008.

142

These “invisible refugees” are placing a crushing burden on the country’s already insufficient infrastructure

(“Pakistan’s ‘Invisible Refugees’ Burden Cities and Families’ Hospitality,” New York Times, June 18, 2009).

143

“Pakistan Hospitals, Camps Are Overwhelmed,” Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2009; “Pakistan Health Care

Crumbles With Refugee Influx,” Associated Press, June 8, 2009; “Pakistan Appears Unprepared for ‘Massive

Displacement,’” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2009.

144

“Aid Warning Amid Pakistan Unrest,” BBC News, June 11, 2009.

141

145

See the State Department’s press release at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/05/123640.htm and a June 3,

2009, press release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-09060301.html.

146

“Rep. John F. Tierney Holds a Hearing on U.S. Contributions to the Response to Pakistan’s Humanitarian Crisis,”

CQ Transcriptions, June 16, 2009.

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Civil-Military Relations and Relief Efforts

Poor civil-military coordination appears to have hindered humanitarian relief efforts. Civilian

administration of the “underprepared, underfunded, and overwhelmed” undertaking has by many

accounts been poor. 147 The Islamabad government’s relief and reconstruction efforts are being

overseen by a federal Special Support Group (SSG) of the Pakistani army established on May 11,

2009. The SSG’s director, Mangla Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed, had previously

served as deputy director of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority, the lead

agency in the 2005 earthquake response which, by some accounts, was marred by a lack of

transparency and accountability.148 In mid-July, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen

lauded the Pakistani army for learning from previous failed campaigns against the Taliban and for

dealing effectively with the problem of IDPs.149

The Pakistani military’s years of vacillation and inconsistent operations against Islamist militant

groups in the NWFP and FATA likely expanded the geographic scope and collateral effects of the

Malakand fighting. If such wavering policies continue in the Waziristan regions, as some

observers fear they may, the negative impact on civilians could again be worsened. As articulated

by one analysis,

The military’s contradictory policies of appeasement and heavy force have dramatically

raised the civilian costs of fighting terrorism, but the military will nevertheless be keen to

exploit any successes in relief and reconstruction to win public support and bolster its

standing. ... The elected federal government must be the focal point of reconstruction and

ensure local community participation in identifying priorities, implementing projects and

maintaining accountability.150

Independent analysts strongly urge the Islamabad government and the international community to

ensure that relief and reconstruction efforts are overseen by civilian authorities so as to best

empower displaced communities in determining their own needs and priorities. This would entail

intimate engagement of the NWFP provincial government, and include building the capacity of

civilian police forces and judicial administration. Indeed, it is widely held that the government’s

broader counterinsurgency effort can only succeed if the military component is combined with

sustained political outreach to consolidate the anti-Taliban consensus that appears to have

emerged among the Pakistani public. Such outreach would emphasize the reconstruction and

rehabilitation aspects of the government’s policy goals. Ultimately, this process would for many

analysts result in bringing the full writ of the Pakistani state into largely autonomous areas like

the FATA.151 Obama Administration officials remain concerned that the Islamabad government

147

“After the Exodus,” Economist (London), June 4, 2009.

“Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 46, March 15, 2006.

149

See the June 5, 2009, State Department press release at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/124399.htm;

“Clinton Hails Pakistani Resolve in Battling Taliban,” USA Today, June 2, 2009; see the June 8, 2009, Defense

Department press release at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4430; “U.S. Sees New

Pakistan Combat Drive in Waziristan,” Reuters, June 8, 2009; “Head of U.S. Joint Chiefs Praises Pakistani Operation,”

New York Times, July 17, 2009.

150

“Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 93, June 3,

2009.

151

See, for example, Maleeha Lodhi, “Winning the Peace” (op-ed), News (Karachi), June 2, 2009, Rasul Bakhsh Rais,”

Securing Victory” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), June 2, 2009; Sherry Rehman, “Malakand: The Next Test” (op-ed),

News (Karachi), June 6, 2009.

148

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will be unable to follow through on its stated intentions to quickly rebuild and provide lasting

security to the areas devastated by the Swat offensive.152

Pakistani Public Perceptions

Available evidence strongly suggests that recent months have witnessed a major shift in Pakistani

public attitudes toward religious militancy and extremism, with a majority of citizens now

appearing to support Pakistani military operations that were only recently and for many years

seen to have been launched only at the behest and in the interests of the United States.153 Yet

Pakistani leaders, along with independent analysts, are concerned that public sentiments will

quickly shift if the government fails to effectively assist the IDPs.154 The broad public and

political support for military operations could evaporate if civilian casualties mount and the

government’s humanitarian response is seen as inadequate.155 Some analysts are pessimistic in

this regard, given a lack of effective civil or judicial systems in place and the absence of the kinds

of local police forces that could ensure civilian security in the middle- and long-term. In a setting

of rampant government corruption and nearly nonexistent public services, extremism could

continue to thrive. According to one mid-June commentary, “We are still waiting to see any

semblance of a government plan for dealing with the IDP’s return home.”156

Pakistan’s refugee crisis may provide the U.S. government with an opportunity to demonstrate its

professed humanitarian concerns for the Pakistani people and so perhaps reverse widespread

public hostility toward the United States.157 Yet Islamist charities have been active in the relief

effort and by some accounts are using the opportunity to forward an anti-Western agenda,

potentially turning public sentiment against Islamabad’s cooperation with the United States. Such

a tack is facilitated by the near-total absence of an overt U.S. “footprint” due to still-pervasive

anti-American sentiments, despite America’s status as the leading contributor of international

relief funds. Sensitive to being too closely associated with an unpopular ally, Pakistani authorities

reportedly do not allow American aid workers or aircraft to distribute humanitarian aid at IDP

camps, thus denying potential public diplomacy gains and leaving open a space in which

extremist groups such as the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD, now operating as Falah-i-Insaniat)

can influence opinion without “competition.”158

152

“Seeking Truth and Trust in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June 16, 2009.

“For Pakistanis, A Fight Against Their Own,” Washington Post, June 12, 2009;”Support for Pakistan’s Anti-Taliban

War Seen Solid,” Reuters, June 29, 2009.

154

“Pakistani Leaders Worries About Public Relations War,” Reuters, May 15, 2009.

155

“Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 93, June 3,

2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Hearts on the Line in Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, June 12, 2009; “Urgency Rises in

Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2009.

156

Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s Summer of Chaos,” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2009; “Pakistan Faces Challenge of

Cementing Victory Against Taliban,” Los Angles Times, June 22, 2009.

157

Trudy Rubin, “Pakistanis’ Flight Opens Window for U.S.” (op-ed), Philadelphia Inquirer, May 24, 2009.

158

“In Pakistani Relief Camps, Charities Press Anti-U.S. View,” New York Times, July 2, 2009. The JuD—a nominally

charitable organization—is identified as a continuation of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) with a new name. The

LeT, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, has been held responsible for numerous deadly attacks inside both

Pakistan and India, including the November 2008 gun and bomb assault on Mumbai that left some 173 people dead.

153

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Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency

The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is Pakistan’s main intelligence agency. Close

U.S. links with the ISI date back at least to the 1980s, when American and Pakistani intelligence

officers oversaw cooperative efforts to train and supply Afghan “freedom fighters” who were

battling the Soviet Army. Yet mutual mistrust has been ever-present and, in 2008, long-standing

doubts about the activities and aims of the ISI compounded. 159 Some analysts label the ISI a

“rogue” agency driven by Islamist ideology that can and does act beyond the operational control

of its nominal administrators. Yet most conclude that the ISI, while sometimes willing to “push

the envelope” in pursuing Pakistan’s perceived regional interests, is a disciplined organization

that obeys the orders of its commanders in the Pakistani military.160

A 2002 statement by the then-British foreign secretary noted the British government’s acceptance

of “a clear link” between the ISI and Pakistan-based terrorist groups including the LeT, JeM, and

Harakat Mujahideen. 161 The Afghan government claims to have evidence of ISI complicity in

both an April 2008 assassination attempt on President Karzai and in the July 2008 bombing of

India’s Kabul Embassy. New Delhi joined Kabul in accusing the ISI of involvement in the latter

attack. Islamabad countered that, despite repeated demands, neither neighbor provided evidence

supporting the “unsubstantiated allegations.”162 The top Afghan intelligence official has reported

to his government that the ISI provides material support to Taliban commanders based in

Quetta.163 A 2008 think-tank report on insurgency in Afghanistan included the finding that,

“There is some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government—for example, within

the Frontier Corps and the ISI—were involved in assisting insurgent groups” inside

Afghanistan.164 The ISI may even maintain contacts with Baitullah Mehsud, possibly tipping off

the Taliban commander when Pakistani army forces get any fixes on his position.165

In mid-2008, a top U.S. intelligence official reportedly presented evidence to Pakistani officials

that ISI agents were providing assistance to militant elements who undertake attacks in

Afghanistan. Specifically mentioned was an alleged relationship between ISI agents and members

of the Haqqani network believed based in the FATA and named as responsible the Kabul embassy

159

“When Spies Don’t Play Well with Their Allies,” New York Times, July 20, 2008.

See, for example, “The ISI and Terrorism: Beyond the Accusations,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder,

July 9, 2008. In an episode that only brought embarrassment for Pakistan’s newly seated civilian government, a July

2008 effort to bring the ISI under the formal control of the Interior Ministry was reversed only hours its announcement,

fueling speculation that the Pakistani military does not intend to relinquish its traditionally primary role in foreign and

national security policy making. U.S. officials reportedly continue to quietly criticize the new civilian government for

its alleged “lack of supervision” of the ISI (“Spy Agency Confusion in Pakistan,” BBC News, July 27, 2008; “Pakistan

Puts Move to Rein in Spies on Ice,” Reuters, August 5, 2008; “Pakistan’s ‘Rogue’ Spy Agency Attacked,” Financial

Times (London), August 19, 2008).

161

See the June 2002 British Foreign Office press release at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2003/10/

fco_nst_100602_strawindpak.

162

“Pakistan ‘Behind Afghan Attacks,’” BBC News, July 14, 2008; “India Blames Pakistan in Embassy Bombing,”

Associated Press, July 21, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2008/Aug/Spokes_13_08_08.html.

163

“Afghan Official: Pakistan Spy Agency Aided Taliban Militants,” Associated Press, March 27, 2009.

160

164

Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study 4, 2008, at http://www.rand.org/

pubs/monographs/MG595/index.html, p. xiv. A spokesman for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations rejected the

report’s findings as “misleading, factually incorrect, and based on propaganda,” saying it was part of a “smear

campaign” aimed at disrupting Pakistan’s relations with its partners in fighting terrorism (http://www.ispr.gov.pk/

Archive&Press/CurrentMonth/10-Jun-2008.htm).

165

“Mehsud’s Friends in High Places,” Newsweek, April 13, 2009.

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bombing. U.S. counterterrorism officials do not appear to believe that senior Pakistani leaders

have sanctioned aid to the Haqqani network, but suspect that local and retired ISI operatives are

complicit. 166 Islamabad angrily rejected such reports as “baseless and malicious,” but Pakistan’s

federal information minister did concede that some individuals within ISI “probably” remain

“ideologically sympathetic to the Taliban” and act out of synch with government policy.167

In September 2008, the Islamabad government named a new ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja

Pasha, who had served as director general of military operations since 2005. Pasha, said to be

close with Gen. Kayani, is identified as a professional soldier who takes the threat of Islamist

extremism seriously. Although little is known about the new intelligence chief, his appointment

was met with cautious optimism by the Bush Administration.168 In November, the civilian

government disbanded the ISI’s political wing, which was widely suspected of manipulating

domestic political outcomes over a period of decades. Foreign Minister Qureshi said the move

would free the ISI to concentrate on counterterrorism efforts.169

U.S. suspicions have not receded, however. A 2009 book by a senior New York Times reporter

cited a May 2008 U.S. signals intelligence intercept in which Pakistan’s Army Chief allegedly

referred to terrorist leader Jalaluddin Haqqani as a “strategic asset.”170 More recently, U.S.

officials have fingered Pakistan’s military intelligence agency as actively supporting the Afghan

Taliban with money, supplies, and planning guidance. A Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman

called the relevant press report “sensational journalism” that conveyed “flawed” assumptions

about Pakistan’s intent, which is to see a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.171 Only days later,

Secretary of Defense Gates told an Afghan television interviewer that “the ISI’s contacts with

some of these extremist groups [such as those led by Hekmatyar, Haqqani, and others] are a real

concern for us, and we have made those concerns known directly to the Pakistanis.” In fact, the

period coinciding with the public release of the Obama Administration’s new regional strategy

saw a spate of senior U.S. military officers issuing accusations of ongoing ISI support the

regional militants.172 Pakistani officials repeatedly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI

are cooperating with militants or extremists. In May 2009, a State Department spokesman

indicated that the United States takes such officials “at their word.”173

166

“C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008; “Pakistanis Aided Attack in

Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1, 2008; “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek,

September 22, 2008.

167

“Pakistan Denies ‘Malicious’ Report on CIA Confrontation,” Agence France Presse, July 30, 2008; “Pakistan

Concedes Some ISI Spies Sympathetic to Taliban,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2008.

168

“The Mystery Spymaster,” Newsweek, October 13, 2008; “Pakistan Picks New Chief for Intelligence Agency,”

Washington Post, September 29, 2008.

169

“Pakistan Disbands Political Wing of Spy Agency,” Reuters, November 23, 2008.

170

David Sanger, The Inheritance (Harmony Books, 2009).

171

“Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times, March 26, 2009;

http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2009/March/Spokes_26_03_09.htm.

172

See the April 2009 Pentagon transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4392;

“American Leverage in South Asia,” BBC News, March 30, 2009.

173

See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/05/122798.htm.

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Major Shift in Pakistani Attitudes Toward the Taliban

During the first several months of 2009, the FATA-based Taliban launched numerous suicide

bombings and other terrorist attacks across Pakistan in retaliation for the army operations against

their allies in Swat. They took responsibility for multiple bomb explosions and warned people to

evacuate several large cities, saying “major attacks” would be forthcoming. 174 Taliban militants

and their allies had been terrorizing the people of western Pakistan for some time before 2009,

but they may have gone one step too far by quickly violating the Swat accord with incursions into

neighboring districts.175 Moreover, in April, video footage of Taliban militants in Swat flogging a

teenaged girl accused of having an affair was widely viewed on television and the internet, and

contributed to turning public sentiment against the extremists. The result appeared to be a major

shift in sentiments held by Pakistani public and media.176

In a seminal nationally televised speech on May 7, Prime Minister Gilani announced that a

“remedy for [the situation in Swat] has become necessary,” explaining that his government’s

sincere efforts at peaceful resolution had failed upon the militants’ refusal to lay down their arms

as agreed. He thus called for national unity and full support for the government in taking the

“extreme step” of sending the army into Swat and Malakand to halt the “reign of terror” being

perpetrated by the militants. Parliamentarians voiced approval of the army operations, and even

many high-profile Muslim clerics endorsed the offensive. On May 18, an all-parties conference in

Islamabad issued a 16-point resolution vowing to unite the country against the NWFP insurgents

and to combat extremism and terrorism more generally. 177

Available evidence now strongly suggests that recent months have witnessed a major shift in

Pakistani public attitudes toward religious militancy and extremism, with a majority of citizens

now supporting military operations that were only recently and for many years seen to have come

only at the behest and in the interests of the United States. One opinion survey conducted by a

Maryland-based group in late May found that the percentage of Pakistanis who consider the

activities of Islamist militants a major threat to Pakistan more than doubled in only 18 months to

81%. Solid majorities also expressed support for the government’s policy in Swat.178

U.S. Policy and Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation

The spread of Islamist militancy in Pakistan has elicited acute U.S. government attention,

multiple high-level visits, and increasingly large amounts of security-related assistance. Pentagon

174

“Multiple Blasts in Pakistan After Taliban Warning,” New York Times, May 28, 2009; “Pakistani Cities Are New

Battleground for Taliban,” Los Angeles Times, May 31, 2009.

175

Sufi Mohammed, apparently emboldened by the government’s concession in Swat, laid out an ambitious plan to

bring a “complete Islamist system” to the entire NWFP and perhaps all of Pakistan (“Extremist Tide Rises in Pakistan,”

Washington Post, April 20, 2009).

176

“War on Taliban Hailed,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 8, 2009; “Taliban-Style Justice Stirs Growing Anger,”

Washington Post, May 10, 2009.

177

“Pakistan PM Addresses Nation, Declares War on Militants,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 7, 2009; “NA

Echoes With Support for Swat Operation,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 13, 2009; “Clerics Back Pakistani Offensive

Against Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2009; “APC Wants End to Terror,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 19,

2009.

178

“For Pakistanis, A Fight Against Their Own,” Washington Post, June 12, 2009; “Support for Pakistan’s AntiTaliban War Seen Solid,” Reuters, June 29, 2009; poll details at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/

WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf.

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officials have for some time been frustrated by the allegedly feckless counterinsurgency efforts of

the internally squabbling Islamabad government.179 Numerous reports indicate that U.S. officials

have been frustrated by signs that the Pakistani military is slow to shift away from a conventional

war strategy focused on India, and they have made clear the United States stands ready to assist

Pakistan in “reorienting” its army for counterinsurgency efforts. This is not clearly a task the

Pakistani military leadership is eager to complete. 180 Some U.S. military commanders in

Afghanistan are reported to be deeply skeptical that Islamabad will use future U.S. military

assistance for its intended purposes.181 Some senior Members of Congress, the Chairman of the

Senate Armed Services Committee among them, have continued to express doubts about

Pakistan’s will and capacity to make meaningful changes in the near-term. 182

The New York Times has reported that, since 2004, the U.S. military has used secret authority to

carry out covert attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in several countries, including

Pakistan.183 Then-President Musharraf rejected suggestions that U.S. troops could be more

effective than Pakistanis in battling militants, saying a direct U.S. military presence in Pakistan

was neither necessary nor acceptable. Upon assuming the presidency, Asif Zardari warned that

Pakistan “will not tolerate the violation of [its] sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power

in the name of combating terrorism.” He, too, insisted that, with the provision of U.S.

intelligence, Pakistani forces are better suited to combating terrorists in the border region.184 U.S.

military incursions into Pakistan put tremendous pressure on both Islamabad’s civilian

government and on the country’s military. Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States has warned

that such attacks are counterproductive to the extent that they turn Pakistani public opinion

against the counterterrorism effort.185 One former Bush State Department official assesses that

unilateral U.S. military activity on Pakistani territory can be “profoundly counterproductive” by

empowering Pakistani elements who already distrust U.S. intentions. 186 Even President Bush’s

Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, said, “Unilateral actions are probably not a durable

or a viable solution over a prolonged period of time.”187

The United States has built a new coordination and intelligence-sharing center on the Afghan side

of the shared border near the Khyber Pass. Another such site is under construction and four more

reportedly are being considered. Hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. aid is slated to go toward

training and equipping more than 8,000 paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) troops by mid-2010. A

“secret task force” of more than 70 U.S. military advisors and technical specialists reportedly has

179

“U.S. Debates Going After Militants in Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, August 23, 2008.

“Realigning Pakistan’s Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 18, 2009.

181

“Sen. Carl Levin and Sen. Bob Casey Hold a News Conference on Their Trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ

Transcriptions, June 3, 2008.

182

Transcript: “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Current and Worldwide Threats to the National

Security of the United States,” March 10, 2009; “Levin: No US Aid Until Pakistan Takes on Militants,” Associated

Press, March 31, 2009.

183

“Secret Order Lets U.S. Raid Al Qaeda in Many Countries, New York Times, November 10, 2008.

184

“Special Ops Chief See Opportunities to Assist Pakistani Military,” Inside the Pentagon, February 7, 2008;

“Pakistan’s Musharraf Says No to US Troops,” Associated Press, January 24, 2008; http://www.pid.gov.pk/

Final%20Speech%20of%20President.doc; “Zardari to U.S.: Let Pakistan Go After Terrorists” (interview),

MSNBC.com, September 22, 2008.

185

“U.S. Raids Hurt Cause By Angering Pakistanis - Envoy,” Reuters, September 5, 2008.

180

186

See the statement of Daniel Markey before the House Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on

National Security and Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2008.

187

See http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/2008/109857.htm.

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been working in Pakistan since the summer of 2008. The Taliban’s April 2009 advances in

Pakistan spurred U.S. officials to consider stepping up U.S. counterinsurgency training for

Pakistani security forces, perhaps at a site outside of Pakistan. Through the International Military

Education and Training (IMET) program, the United States hosted a reported 260 Pakistani

officers in 2008 for a variety of exchanges.188 Moreover, the Obama Administration reportedly

has launched a clandestine effort in Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent Taliban forces from

using FM radio transmissions and the internet to intimidate civilians and plan attacks, by

jamming or otherwise blocking such communication channels. 189

In late 2008, U.S. and Pakistani military forces reportedly were improving their coordination and

intelligence sharing efforts, perhaps reflecting a greater willingness by Pakistan to combat

militants on its territory. Pakistani officers are now allowed to view video feeds from unmanned

American drones and to access U.S. intercepts of militants’ communications.190 Vice President

Biden returned from a trip to the region and reported seeing “a great deal more cooperation”

between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries in the border area. Then-ISAF Commander U.S. Gen.

David McKiernan lauded improved tactical-level coordination that has allowed for joint

operations along the border. 191

Yet some reporting has been less encouraging and suggests that progress on cooperation and

coordination is hampered by language barriers, tensions between Pakistani and Afghan officials,

and pervasive mistrust among the U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan militaries. For example, the $3

million Border Coordination Center (BCC) at Torkham opened in March 2008, but operations

were delayed by logistical problems and political wrangling. During the period, the number of

insurgent attacks in the region increased sharply, reportedly delaying construction of a second

BCC to the southeast.192

Appearing before both Senate and House panels in May 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates urged

Congress to quickly provide significant new counterinsurgency funding for Pakistan, arguing that

the newly authorized Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) should be overseen by

U.S. military commanders rather than by State Department civilians. Yet many in Congress

voiced doubts about the wisdom of creating a major new stream of military funding under

Pentagon oversight, as such aid traditionally has been subject to Foreign Assistance Act

restrictions. When the House Appropriations Committee took up the issue in May, its members

determined to place PCCF oversight in the hands of the State Department after FY2010.193

188

“Secret U.S. Unit Trains Commandos in Pakistan,” New York Times, February 23, 2009; “Taliban Advance in

Pakistan Prompts Shift by U.S.,” Washington Post, April 29, 2009; “US, Pakistan Build Military Ties, One Officer at a

Time,” Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 2009.

189

“Pentagon Jams Web, Radio Links of Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2009.

190

Beneath US-Pakistani Tension, A New Cooperation,” Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 2008; “U.S., Pakistan

Work Together in Afghan Border Operation,” Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2008; “Pakistan and U.S. Rebuild

Strained Military Ties,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2009.

191

“Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. on CBS’s ‘Face the Nation,’” CQ Transcripts, January 25, 2009; “Transcript:

General David McKiernan Speaks at Council’s Commander Series,” Federal News Service, November 18, 2008. See

also an ISAF press releases at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/11-november/pr081117-622.html and

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/11-november/pr081120-630.html.

192

“U.S.-Funded Intelligence Center Struggles in Khyber Region,” Washington Post, January 12, 2009.

193

“Gates Pushes Congress to Boost Pakistan Aid,” Washington Post, May 1, 2009; “Democrats Steer Pakistan

Security Account to State,” Associated Press, May 7, 2009.

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Cross-Border Coordination and U.S. Military Action

American commanders in Afghanistan reportedly have sought greater leeway to attack indigenous

Pakistani militants on Pakistani soil. Permission for U.S.-led attacks on forces under the

command of militant leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani and Baitullah Mehsud is not overtly

forthcoming to date. 194 By one account, top Bush Administration officials in 2007 drafted a secret

plan to facilitate U.S. Special Operations force missions in western Pakistan, a plan that the U.S.

President may have approved in July 2008. Pakistan’s army chief strongly denied that his country

had agreed to any new rules of engagement permitting U.S. ground forces to operate inside

Pakistan. As part of the Joint Statement issued following a September 2008 session of the U.S.Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, the United States reiterated “support for Pakistan’s sovereignty,

independence, unity, and territorial integrity.”195

U.S.-led coalition forces at times come under artillery fire launched on the Pakistani side of the

border. Mid-2008 reports of a major buildup of U.S.-led coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan

triggered alarm in Pakistan, where fears of a “foreign invasion” are exacerbated by cross-border

military action. According to a NATO spokesman at the time, “There is no planning for, nor

mandate for, an incursion of NATO troops into Pakistan.”196 Airstrikes and rumors of potential

U.S. ground incursions “seriously undermine” the Pakistani people’s support for the Islamabad

government, according to the NWFP governor.197 There is in Pakistan no shortage of conspiracy

theorists, some of whom are convinced that the true intent of U.S. policy is to dismantle the

world’s only Muslim state with nuclear weapons.198

2008 Frontier Corps Deaths and U.S. Special Forces Raid

In June 2008, a unit of Pakistani paramilitary soldiers was caught up in a firefight between

Taliban militants and U.S.-led coalition forces at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the

Mohmand tribal agency. U.S. air assets, apparently targeting fleeing insurgents, delivered 12

gravity bombs on Pakistani territory and killed 11 Frontier Corps soldiers. Islamabad strongly

condemned the airstrike, calling it “unprovoked” and “a gross violation of the international

border” that “tends to undermine the very basis of our cooperation.” A Pakistani military

statement called the airstrike “cowardly,” and some in Pakistan believe the country’s troops were

194

“U.S. Commanders Seeking to Widen Pakistan Attacks,” New York Times, April 20, 2008. U.S. military forces

operating in the FATA would likely face significant resistance from well-armed tribesmen with a proud martial history.

The military strength of the FATA tribes is unclear, but one estimate counts some 200,000 young, unemployed males

who could be considered potential fighters, especially against what was perceived to be a foreign invasion. Also among

the radical Islamist militants operating in the FATA are an estimated 2,000 battle-hardened Uzbeks (Brian Cloughley,

“Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief 29, January 24, 2008; “Open Borders

and the Militant Uzbeks of Pakistan,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, January 25, 2008).

195

“Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 10, 2008; “Pakistan Did Not

Agree to New Rules, Officials Say,” Washington Post, September 12, 2008; http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/

2008/sept/110444.htm.

196

“US Troops Poised to Cross Afghan Border for Raid on Bases,” Times (London), July 16, 2008; “Afghan NATO

Force Hits Targets Inside Pakistan,” Reuters, July 16, 2008.

197

“Pakistan Fears Over US Air Raids,” BBC News, July 14, 2008. See also “Unilateral Action by U.S. a Growing Fear

in Pakistan,” New York Times, July 22, 2008.

198

See, for example, “Ringed by Foes, Pakistanis Fear the U.S., Too,” New York Times, November 23, 2008.

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intentionally targeted. The Bush Administration expressed regret for the deaths of Pakistani

soldiers, but the incident served to inflame already sensitive bilateral ties. 199

Two months later, U.S. special forces troops staged a helicopter raid in a South Waziristan

village; at least 20 people were reported killed, women and children among them. The Pakistani

government strongly condemned the “completely unprovoked act of killing” and lodged formal

protests with the U.S. Embassy for the “gross violation of Pakistan’s territory” and “grave

provocation.” Both chambers of Parliament issued unanimous resolutions strongly condemning

the “cowardly” attack.200 In a strongly-worded statement, Gen. Kayani said, “The sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the country will be defended at all cost and no external force is allowed to

conduct operations inside Pakistan.... There is no question of any agreement or understanding

with the Coalition Forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the

border.”201 Plans for further U.S. ground incursions reportedly were suspended to allow the

Pakistani military to press its own attacks, although some observers say the Pentagon had

underestimated the strength of the Pakistani response to cross-border raids. The backlash may

have caused U.S. officials to focus on an intensified Predator missile strike campaign.202

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks

Missile strikes in Pakistan launched by armed American Predator and Reaper UAVs have been a

controversial, but sometimes effective tactic against Islamist militants in remote regions of

western Pakistan.203 Pakistani press reports suggest that such drones “violate Pakistani airspace”

on a daily basis, and there appear to have been 23 separate U.S.-launched drone attacks in

western Pakistan during the first half of 2009, for a rough average of one attack every eight

days.204 Three Predators are said to be deployed at a secret Pakistani airbase and can be operated

by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency without specific permission from the Islamabad

government.205 In February 2009, the CIA for the first time publically acknowledged the drone

199

See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/June/PR_164_08.htm; “Pakistan Says U.S. Airstrike Killed 11 of

Its Soldiers,” New York Times, June 10, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/June/PR_173_08.htm;

“US Strikes Undercut Efforts on Pakistan-Afghan Border,” Associated Press, June 11, 2008; “Air Strike Damages

Trust in Pakistan-US Alliance,” Reuters, June 12, 2008.

200

See http://www.ispr.gov.pk/Archive&Press/Sep2008/3-sep-2008.htm; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/

Printer_Friendly/Sep/PR_Print_264_08.htm.

201

See http://www.ispr.gov.pk/Archive&Press/Sep2008/10-Sep-2008.htm.

202

“U.S. Stops Spec Ops Raids Into Pakistani Tribal Areas,” Army Times, October 6, 2008; “United States Takes to Air

to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, October 27, 2008.

203

“Unilateral Strike Called a Model for U.S. Operations in Pakistan,” Washington Post, February 19, 2008. In mid2008, the Predator drones operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region reportedly were fitted with sophisticated

new surveillance systems that were employed successfully in Iraq. These systems allow for much better tracking of

human targets, even those inside buildings (“Higher-Tech Predators Targeting Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times,

September 12, 2008).

204

A Pakistani press report counted 60 U.S.-launched drone attacks on Pakistan from January 2006 through early April

2009, claiming that only a small fraction of these hit their intended targets, killing 14 extremists along with 687

civilians (“60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians,” News (Karachi), April 10, 2009).

205

Pakistan officially denies the existence of any such bases; however, a senior U.S. Senator confirmed the claim in

2009, and subsequent reporting indicated that the United States reportedly flies armed UAVs out of the Shamsi airbase

some 200 miles southwest of Quetta (“Drones Based in Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 2009; “Secrecy and

Denial as Pakistan Lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants,” London Times, February 18, 2009).

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campaign in Pakistan when the Agency’s new director, Leon Panetta, said the effort had been

successful and would continue. 206

The accelerated drone campaign in western Pakistan that began in mid-2008 appears to have

taken a significant toll on Al Qaeda operatives. Centcom Commander Gen. Petraeus claims that

such strikes are “extremely important” and have killed at least three top extremist leaders in that

region. 207 According to Pakistani intelligence officials, who reportedly are now providing

targeting information to the United States, drone attacks have eliminated more than half of the top

20 Al Qaeda “high-value targets” in western Pakistan since mid-2008. Yet such officials also say

the strikes have exacerbated the Al Qaeda threat by dispersing terrorist cells. Even a selfdescribed “Taliban logistics tactician” conceded that drone attacks have been “very effective.”208

Some critics of the armed UAV program suggest that its managers use the secrecy surrounding

the effort to hide abuses and sometimes significant civilian casualties.209

By some accounts, U.S. officials reached a quiet January 2008 understanding with then-President

Musharraf to allow for increased employment of U.S. aerial surveillance and UAV strikes on

Pakistani territory.210 Musharraf’s successor, President Zardari, may even have struck a secret

accord with U.S. officials involving better bilateral coordination for UAV attacks and a jointly

approved target list. Reports citing unnamed senior officials from both countries have claimed

that a tacit agreement on drone attacks was reached in September 2008; these reports are

officially denied by Islamabad. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Gates has assured Congress

that the U.S. intent to continue with such strikes has been conveyed to the Pakistani

government.211 Pentagon officials eager to increase the use of armed drones in Pakistan reportedly

meet resistance from State Department diplomats who fear that Pakistani resentments built up in

response to sovereignty violations and to the deaths of civilians are harmful to U.S. interests,

outweighing potential gains. There exists an ongoing and vigorous debate over whether drone

attacks create more extremists than they eliminate. 212

Officially, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry calls Predator attacks “destabilizing” and “helping the

terrorists.” Strident Pakistani government reaction has included summoning the U.S. Ambassador

to lodge a strong protest, condemning missile attacks that Islamabad believes “undermine public

support for the government’s counterterrorism efforts” and should be “stopped immediately.”

206

“Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, CIA Chief Says,” Washington Post, February 26, 2009.

“Al Qaeda Seen as Shaken in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June 1, 2009; “Petraeus: Afghan Tribes Needed to Fight

Militants,” Associated Press, November 6, 2008.

208

“Predators on the Hunt in Pakistan,” Newsweek, February 9, 2009; “Pakistan Lends Support for U.S. Military

Strikes,” Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2009; “Strikes Worsen Qaeda Threat, Pakistan Says,” New York Times,

February 25, 2009; Talib quoted in “Porous Pakistani Border Could Hinder U.S.,” New York Times, May 5, 2009.

209

“CIA Secrecy on Drone Attacks Data Hides Abuses,” Inter Press Service, June 12, 2009.

210

“US Launches Waziristan UAV Strike With Tacit Pakistani Approval,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 19, 2008.

211

David Ignatius, “A Quiet Deal With Pakistan” (op-ed), New York Times, November 4, 2008; “Pakistan and U.S.

Have Tacit Deal on Airstrikes,” Washington Post, November 16, 2008; “No Understanding With US on Drone Attacks:

FM,” Daily Times (Lahore), November 18, 2008; Gates statement in “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds

Hearing on Challenges Facing the Defense Department” (transcript), January 27, 2009. In October 2008, Pakistan’s

Ambassador to the United States acknowledged that there is “definitely” bilateral cooperation “in using strategic

equipment that is used against specific targets,” but that U.S. military aircraft do not overfly or launch strikes on

Pakistani territory (see http://www.cfr.org/publication/17567).

212

“Do U.S. Drones Kill Pakistani Extremists or Recruit Them?,” McClatchy News, April 7, 2009; “Drones Sharpen

Pakistani Outrage,” Chicago Tribune, May 5, 2009; “The CIA’s Silent War in Pakistan,” Time, June 1, 2009.

207

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During his first visit to Pakistan as Centcom chief in late 2008, Gen. Petraeus reportedly was met

with a single overriding message from Pakistani interlocutors: cross-border U.S. military strikes

in the FATA are counterproductive. Pakistan’s defense minister warned Gen. Petraeus that the

strikes were creating “bad blood” and contributing to anti-American outrage among ordinary

Pakistanis. The Islamabad government has asked for full Pakistani control of UAVs over

Pakistani territory.213

In November 2008, the first suspected Predator strike beyond the FATA was recorded when

missiles hit a village in the Bannu district—well inside Pakistan’s “settled areas.” This attack

spurred Islamabad to issue a strong protest, and Pakistan’s army chief called for an end to such

strikes.214 Yet, two days later, fugitive British militant Rashid Rauf was reported killed in a

missile strike in North Waziristan. Pakistani military officials then responded by issuing thinlyveiled threats to shoot down any American drones flying over Pakistani territory.215 No such

efforts are known to have been undertaken. A strike in South Waziristan in February may have

been targeting Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud for the first time. Subsequent attacks in

the region are believed be in support of the Pakistani military’s own mid-2009 operations against

Mehsud’s forces and included a June 23 strike on a funeral that reportedly killed scores of

militants and may have narrowly missed Mehsud himself.216

President Zardari had called on then-President-Elect Obama to re-assess the Bush Administration

policy of employing aerial attacks on Pakistani territory. Yet dual Predator strikes apparently took

place just days after President Obama took office. 217 The Obama Administration may be

considering proposals to expand the UAV campaign into the Baluchistan province where many

Afghan Taliban commanders are said to be based. While some officials favor such an expansion,

others fear it could create a backlash and destabilize Islamabad’s fragile civilian government. 218 In

May, the U.S. military said that Pakistan was for the first time being given a broad array of

noncombat surveillance information, including real-time video feeds, collected by American

UAVs, but they denied a Los Angeles Times report that Pakistan had been offered joint control of

armed drones. The Pakistani government also denied any agreement on joint control. The limited

intelligence-sharing program is said to be part of a bilateral trust-building effort.219

213

“Pakistan Condemns US Strikes in Border Regions,” Associated Press, October 10, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/

Press_Releases/2008/Oct/PR_331_08.htm; “U.S. Airstrikes Creating Tension, Pakistan Warns,” Washington Post,

November 3, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/March/PR_128_09.htm; “Pakistani: U.S. Should

Cede Control of Drones,” San Antonio Express-News, April 29, 2009.

214

“American craft Kills 5 Militants in Pakistan,” New York Times, November 20, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/

Press_Releases/2008/Nov/PR_349_08.htm; “Pakistani General Calls for Halt to Missile Strikes,” Reuters, November

20, 2008.

215

“Pakistan Can Stop Drone Raids: Air Force chief,” Reuters, November 25, 2008.

216

“Obama Widens Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, February 21, 2009; “Strike Reportedly Missed

Chief of Pakistani Taliban by Hours,” New York Times, June 25, 2009.

217

“Pakistani Leader Seeks New US Policy,” Associated Press, November 10, 2008; “President Orders Air Strikes on

Villages in Tribal Area,” Guardian (London), January 24, 2009.

218

“U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike Into Pakistan,” New York Times, March 18, 2009; “US Appears Split Over Missile

Strikes in Pakistan,” Reuters, April 29, 2009.

219

“Pakistan Gets Sensitive U.S. Drone Images, With Limits,” New York Times, May 14, 2009; “Pakistan Gets a Say in

Drone Attacks on Militants,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2009; “Pakistan Says Has No Deal With U.S. on Drone

Use,” Reuters, May 15, 2009; “U.S. Resumes Surveillance Flights Over Pakistan,” New York Times, June 30, 2009.

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Deteriorated Relations With India220

Pre-November 26 Pakistan-India Engagement

Among the top goals of Indian officials in 2008 was gauging the new civilian Pakistani

government’s commitment to the bilateral peace process. Within this modest context, the outcome

of Pakistan’s national elections was viewed as generally positive. However, ensuing months saw a

marked deterioration of India-Pakistan relations. In May 2008, India accused Pakistan of

committing multiple cease-fire and territorial violations along the Kashmiri Line of Control

(LOC). Reported violations continued and Indian officials suspect the Pakistani military was

renewing its alleged practice of providing cover fire for militant infiltrations into Indian

Kashmir.221 Visits to Islamabad by the Indian foreign minister and later by Foreign Minister

Qureshi to New Delhi were cordial and appeared to get the peace process back on track, but

produced no new initiatives. Then, on July 7, a suicide car bomb killed 58 people, including 4

Indian nationals, at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Afghan, Indian, and American

officials claimed that Pakistan’s intelligence agency was complicit.222

New Delhi subsequently warned Islamabad that recent events—culminating in the embassy

bombing—had brought the peace process “under stress.” Blunt language again followed when a

senior Indian official suggested that Pakistan-India relations were at a four-year low ebb.223 Along

with the Kabul bombing, Indians widely suspected Pakistani complicity in July 2008 terrorist

attacks inside India, and India’s Prime Minister warned that such terrorism could bring the

bilateral peace process to a halt. Moreover, New Delhi’s progress in an initiative that would allow

India to purchase nuclear materials and technologies on the international market spurred

Islamabad to warn of a potential new nuclear arms race on the Asian subcontinent. 224

Renewed violence in India’s Jammu and Kashmir state in August further exacerbated bilateral

tensions. Later that month, a senior Indian official expressed worry at the possibly imminent

removal from office of Pakistani President Musharraf, saying such a development would “leave

radical extremist outfits with freedom to do what they like” in the region. 225 Still, senior officials

in both capitals sought to press ahead with engagement. The new Pakistani President met with the

Indian Prime Minister in New York City in September, where the two leaders formally stated their

intent to restart the waning peace process by scheduling the fifth round of the composite

dialogue.226 Yet, Islamabad continued to criticize New Delhi’s Kashmir policies, calling the

220

See also CRS Report R40087, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. Alan

Kronstadt, and “Pakistan-India Rivalry” section below.

221

“India to Protest to Pakistan Over Border Shooting,” Reuters, May 19, 2008; “Skirmishes Can Hurt India-Pakistan

Peace Process,” Reuters, July 30, 2008; “Despite Warning, Pak Violates Ceasefire Again,” Times of India (Delhi),

August 14, 2008.

222

“Pakistan ‘Behind Afghan Attacks,’” BBC News, July 14, 2008; “India Blames Pakistan in Embassy Bombing,”

Associated Press, July 21, 2008; “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 1,

2008.

223

“Briefing by Foreign Secretary After India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary-Level Talks,” Indian Ministry of External

Affairs, July 21, 2008; “India Official Sees Sinking Relations With Pakistan,” New York Times, August 1, 2008.

224

“India Says Peace Talks With Pakistan Under Threat,” Associated Press, August 15, 2008; “India Suggests

Pakistani Hand in New Delhi Blasts,” Associated Press, September 15, 2008; “Pakistan Warns of New Nuclear Arms

Race With India,” Associated Press, July 23, 2008.

225

“Q&A With Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan,” Straits Times (Singapore), August 12, 2008.

226

“India, Pakistan Leaders Agree to Kickstart Peace Talks,” Agence France Presse, September 24, 2008.

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uprising in Indian Kashmir “entirely indigenous” and urging India to “bring the atrocities against

Kashmiris to an end.”227

In November, a fifth round of Home/Interior Secretary-level talks on terrorism and drug

trafficking was held in Islamabad and, hours before the November 26 Mumbai terrorist attacks

began, Foreign Minister Qureshi was in New Delhi to review progress in the composite dialogue.

Thus, on the brink of yet another serious derailing of the peace process caused by a major terrorist

attack, many observers were sanguine about the outlook for improving relations.228

Mumbai Terrorism and Islamabad’s Response229

On the evening of November 26, a number of well-trained militants came ashore from the

Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with

automatic weapons and explosives. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 174

people, including nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. Among the multiple

sites attacked in the peninsular city known as India’s business and entertainment capital were two

luxury hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway

terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two

hospitals. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. Indian officials

concluded that the attackers numbered only ten, one of whom was captured and later confirmed to

be a Pakistani national.

The audacious, days-long attack on India’s most populous city deeply affected the Indian people

and their government. Because the attackers appear to have come from, and received training and

equipment in, neighboring Pakistan, the episode has led to renewed bilateral tensions. In the U.S.

Congress, H.Res. 1532, agreed to by unanimous consent, condemned the attacks, offered

condolences and support to the people and government of India, and expressed U.S.

congressional desire to improve coordination between the United States and India to combat

terrorism and advance international security. The resolution also called upon the Pakistani

government to cooperate fully with India in bringing the culprits to justice and to prevent

Pakistan’s territory from “serving as a safe-haven and training ground for terrorists.”

The investigation into the attacks remains incomplete to date, but press re

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