Disaster Debris Removal After Hurricane Katrina: Status and Associated Issues

Congressional research reportApr 2, 2008

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Order Code RL33477

Disaster Debris Removal After Hurricane Katrina:

Status and Associated Issues

Updated April 2, 2008

Linda Luther

Analyst in Environmental Policy

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Disaster Debris Removal After Hurricane Katrina:

Status and Associated Issues

Summary

Hurricane Katrina produced unprecedented destruction, resulting in disaster

debris from vegetation and man-made structures. Before Katrina, the event that left

behind the greatest recorded amount of disaster-related debris in the United States

was Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which generated 43 million cubic yards (CY) of

debris in Florida’s Metro-Dade County. When the demolition of damaged property

in the New Orleans metropolitan area is complete, Hurricane Katrina will have

generated more than 100 million CY of disaster debris.

Before the Gulf Coast region can rebuild, particularly in the New Orleans area,

much debris generated by the storm must be removed and properly managed (i.e.,

landfilled, recycled, or burned). The types of debris generated include vegetation

(e.g., trees, limbs, shrubs), municipal solid waste (e.g., common household garbage

and personal belongings), construction and demolition debris (in some instances,

entire residential structures and all their contents), vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks, and

boats), food waste, white goods (e.g., refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners), and

household hazardous waste (e.g., cleaning agents, pesticides, pool chemicals). Each

type of waste may contain or be contaminated with certain toxic or hazardous

constituents. In the short term, removal of debris is necessary to facilitate the

recovery of the region. In the long term, the methods in which these wastes are to be

managed require proper consideration to ensure that their management (e.g.,

landfilling) would not pose a future threat to human health or the environment.

This report provides the background and information necessary to understand

why cleanup activities are still incomplete and additional funding of debris removal

activities may be needed for some time to come, as well as factors that make debris

removal a costly, complex, and lengthy operation. (The “debris removal” process

may involve several activities, such as waste separation, hauling, landfill disposal,

burning, and recycling.) To illustrate these points, this report provides an overview

of the types and amounts of debris generated, the governmental agency requirements

and responsibilities regarding the debris removal process, and the complicating

factors unique to Hurricane Katrina. Such factors include the slow pace of residents

to return to hard-hit areas of New Orleans, the difficulty in separating hazardous

debris from non-hazardous debris, and issues associated with demolishing private

structures and structures that may contain asbestos. Another issue of concern

involves sending construction and demolition (C&D) debris to landfills located in

communities affected by the storm. This could become an issue of concern to

Congress if agencies participating in the cleanup become liable under provisions of

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA), also known as Superfund; this could be possible because the definition

of C&D debris was expanded after the storm to include potentially contaminated

material.

Debris removal operations associated with the hurricane are essentially complete

in Alabama and Mississippi. Therefore, this report focuses primarily on issues

associated with continuing debris removal activities in Louisiana.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Amount and Types of Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Governmental Roles in Debris Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Funding Debris Removal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

State Debris Plans and Emergency Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Concerns Associated with Debris Removal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Difficulty Separating Waste and the Slow Return of Residents . . . . . . . . . . 9

C&D Waste Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Demolition of Private Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Asbestos in Buildings Being Demolished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix. Types of Disaster Debris, Selected Issues/Concerns with

Removal, and a Summary of Selected Governmental Roles

in Post-Katrina Debris Removal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

List of Tables

Table 1. Debris Amounts Collected in Louisiana

for Individual Types of Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Table A-1. Types and Examples of Disaster Debris

and Selected Issues/Concerns with Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Table A-2. Summary of Selected Governmental Roles

in Post-Katrina Debris Removal Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Disaster Debris Removal

After Hurricane Katrina:

Status and Associated Issues

Introduction

Many factors have influenced the time it has taken and the cost associated with

the recovery and reconstruction of the Gulf Coast region destroyed by Hurricane

Katrina. One significant factor has been the time it has taken to remove vegetative

debris and man-made structures damaged or destroyed by the storm.

Management of debris is a concern after any major disaster. Destruction in the

wake of Hurricane Katrina, and compounded soon after by the effects of Hurricane

Rita, created disaster-related debris greater than any amount previously recorded in

the United States. The volume of waste generated is unique because of the large area

over which the storm caused damage and the nature and scope of the damage.

Regions of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, covering 90,000 square miles, were

declared a “major disaster” by the President. Although debris was generated over the

entire disaster area, the most significant property damage was concentrated within a

100-mile radius of where the storm made landfall on the Gulf Coast. Within this

area, damage due to high winds, flooding from high rain fall, and storm surge

resulted in significant devastation. In the New Orleans metropolitan area, flooding,

largely resulting from breached levees and flood walls, left much of the area under

water.1

This report discusses issues associated with debris removal operations after a

disaster on the scale of Katrina. In particular, it discusses why debris removal is an

ongoing concern more than two years after the hurricane, and why it is likely to be

a concern for some time to come, as well as factors that make debris removal such

a costly, complex operation. To illustrate these points, this report provides an

overview of the types and amounts of debris generated, the governmental agency

requirements and responsibilities regarding the debris removal process, and

complicating factors unique to Hurricane Katrina. There are two primary areas of

interest for Congress with regard to debris removal. The first involves the continued

need, if cleanup is to continue, for funding to support debris removal operations,

particularly as the demolition of private structures continues in New Orleans. The

second involves the future potential for federal, state, and local agencies to become

liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

See CRS Report RL33141, Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of

Impacted Areas, by Thomas Gabe, Gene Falk, Maggie McCarty, and Virginia W. Mason;

see the section “Hurricane Katrina — Estimates of Population Affected in Impacted Areas.”

CRS-2

Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),2 popularly known as Superfund, as a result of their

current disposal practices (see “Factors Complicating Debris Removal” below).

Congressional concern regarding debris removal activities is evident the Water

Resources Development Act of 2007 (WRDA, P.L. 110-114).3 Under § 4101

(“Debris Removal”) of the bill, the Comptroller General of the United States, in

coordination with the Secretary of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and

the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in

consultation with affected communities, shall evaluate both federal and non-federal

demolition, debris removal, segregation, transportation, and disposal practices

relating to disaster areas designated in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

(including regulated and non-regulated materials and debris). Among other

provisions, that evaluation is to include a review of compliance with applicable

environmental laws and administrative actions relating to debris removal and

disposal in the disaster areas.

Debris removal operations associated with the hurricane in Alabama are

essentially complete. In Mississippi, debris removal operations are nearing

completion. Therefore, this report focuses primarily on issues associated with

continuing debris removal activities in Louisiana.

Background

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. It left

in its wake destruction unprecedented in the United States. Damage done to the

region was from two different but related sources — the hurricane itself (resulting in

flooding from storm surge and rainfall, and damage from high winds from the

hurricane itself and from tornadoes spawned by the storm) and the flooding of the

New Orleans metropolitan area from breaches in several levees. Storm surge and

related coastal flooding destroyed vegetation and man-made structures along the

coast of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In Louisiana, up to 80% of New

Orleans and large areas of Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes were flooded — to

depths of almost 20 feet in the hardest-hit areas. Some of those flooded areas

remained submerged for weeks. Two years after the storm, significant amounts of

debris remain.

Amount and Types of Debris

The scope of Katrina’s destruction is unique, due in part to the vast geographic

area over which it caused damage. Before Katrina, the disaster that generated the

greatest recorded amount of debris in the United States was Hurricane Andrew in

CERCLA is the principal federal statute addressing the cleanup of hazardous substances

that pose threats to public health, welfare, and the environment. Under CERCLA, in

general, waste generators, transporters who select the disposal site, and disposal facility

owners and operators are liable for response costs and for damage to natural resources.

Under WRDA, Congress generally authorizes new Corps water resources studies and

projects.

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1992. That storm created debris over a 500-square-mile area and generated 43

million cubic yards (CY) of debris in Florida’s Metro-Dade County.4 By comparison,

Hurricane Katrina created disaster debris across a 90,000-square-mile disaster area.

To date, disaster debris totals are estimated at —

3.4 million CY in Alabama,

45.8 million CY in Mississippi, and

64.3 million CY in Louisiana (this total includes debris from

Hurricane Rita).

Hurricane Katrina is also unique because of the type of waste generated.

Generally, “disaster debris” includes waste materials created as the result of a manmade or natural disaster, such as an earthquake, flood, hurricane, or terrorist attack.

Debris created from flooding is often quite different from debris created from an

earthquake or storm. Disaster debris from Hurricane Katrina involves two types of

waste — waste generated immediately during and after the storm (e.g., from high

winds and flooding related to rainfall and coastal storm surge) and extensive flooding

related to the levee failure in New Orleans (resulting in deep flood waters that left

some areas submerged for weeks).

The primary types of disaster debris being removed in the wake of Hurricane

Katrina fall into the following categories:

Municipal solid waste — general household trash and personal

belongings.

Construction and demolition (C&D) debris — building materials

(which may include asbestos-containing materials), drywall, lumber,

carpet, furniture, mattresses, plumbing.

Vegetative debris — trees, branches, shrubs, and logs.

Household hazardous waste — oil, pesticides, paints, cleaning

agents.

White goods — refrigerators, freezers, washers, dryers, stoves, water

heaters, dishwashers, air conditioners.

Electronic waste — computers, televisions, printers, stereos, DVD

players, telephones.

The unique nature of debris generated as a result of the New Orleans flooding

is illustrated in Table 1, which lists specific types of waste identified by the

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), EPA, and the Corps that

have been generated in Louisiana. (For more detail regarding the types of disaster

debris being removed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and some of the issues or

concerns associated with its removal, see Table A-1 in the Appendix. Also, selected

issues associated with debris removal are discussed in more detail in the “Factors

Complicating Debris Removal” section, below.)

By comparison, the disaster debris generated after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks

on New York City was approximately 1.4 million tons (2.8 million CY).

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Table 1. Debris Amounts Collected in Louisiana

for Individual Types of Waste

Type of

Waste

Curbside

debris

Amount

Comments

53,001,628 CY

These amounts reflect the total waste picked up

curbside and from private properties in the New

Orleans area and include all categories of waste being

picked up by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and

local governments (see the discussion of

governmental agency roles, below); it does not

include waste that is to be generated as a result of

demolition activities and rebuilding efforts.

White goods 891,996 units

This total also includes white goods generated as a

result of Hurricane Rita.

Freon

removal

324,595 units

Freon is removed from freezers, refrigerators, and air

conditioners and sent to local vendors for recycling.

Electronic

goods

602,711 units

Electronic goods can usually be recycled, but such

waste generated in the New Orleans area is likely

damaged beyond repair by flood waters.

Waste

containers

3,739,866

containers

Louisiana DEQ identifies “waste containers” as

drums, propane tanks, large and small containers, and

vehicle fuel tanks; these containers may also be

counted under curbside debris totals.

Hazardous

waste

16,114,493 lbs.

This total represents waste collected at HHW drop-off

points or through curbside collection and removal;

some waste in this category may also be counted

under the “Curbside debris” totals, above.

Nonhazardous

waste

3,645,023 lbs.

See comment for “Hazardous waste.”

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on a review of data from

LDEQ, available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2402].

In addition to debris totals reported by LDEQ (listed in Table 1), the Corps

reported that it removed 36 million pounds of rotten meat and other food from

several large commercial cold storage facilities from the New Orleans area. Also,

LDEQ reported that more than 350,000 cars and 60,000 vessels (e.g., fishing and

pleasure boats) were damaged or destroyed and abandoned.5

LDEQ “State of Louisiana Comprehensive Plan for Disaster Clean-up and Debris

Management,” July 2006, p. 1.

CRS-5

Governmental Roles in Debris Removal

Much of the federal agency response to debris removal after Hurricane Katrina

has been in accordance with provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act (The Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206) and the

National Response Plan.6 The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue a “major

disaster” or “emergency” declaration in response to catastrophes that overwhelm state

and local governments. After Hurricane Katrina, the President declared a major

disaster in certain areas of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. This declaration

authorized all federal agencies, as necessary, to provide assistance to respond to the

disaster, including the “demolition of unsafe structures which endanger the public”

(§ 5170b) and debris removal activities (§ 5173).7

The National Response Plan (NRP) was developed by the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) to structure the way responders work together and to

provide supporting mechanisms for disasters so serious that the Secretary of DHS

declares them to be “Incidents of National Significance.”8 The NRP applies to

situations where the resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and

have requested federal assistance. Various federal statutory authorities and policies

provide the basis for federal actions and activities in the context of domestic incident

management under the NRP. The NRP does not confer new authorities upon the

Secretary of DHS or any other federal official. Rather, the NRP establishes the

coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate the specific

statutory and policy authorities of various federal departments and agencies. As with

the Stafford Act, the President has designated DHS as the implementing agency for

the NRP.

Under the NRP, DHS identifies and groups the capabilities of federal

departments and agencies into 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to provide

the planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency services

that are most likely to be needed during Incidents of National Significance. ESFs

that include debris removal missions are ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering”

(for which the Corps is the coordinating agency), and ESF #10, “Oil and Hazardous

Materials Response” (for which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]

is the coordinating agency). Not all ESFs are necessarily activated by the declaration

This report provides information necessary to understand individual agency roles specific

to the debris removal and management process. For more information on provisions of the

Stafford Act and the National Response Plan, see CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford

Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding.

The Stafford Act and implementing regulations use the term “debris removal” in a broad

sense to encompass the entire process of removing, handling, recycling, and disposing of

debris (44 C.F.R. 206.224). Similarly, in this report, the term “debris removal” is used

broadly. Where necessary, actions such as disposal or recycling will be referred to

specifically.

In accordance with provisions of the NRP, all presidentially declared disasters and

emergencies under the Stafford Act are considered Incidents of National Significance (see

“Section II. Planning Assumptions and Consideration” of the NRP, available at

[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml]).

CRS-6

of an Incident of National Significance. After Katrina, ESFs 3 and 10 were activated,

in turn activating certain response functions of the Corps and EPA.

The primary roles of DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

the Corps, EPA, and state and local governments with regard to debris removal

activities are summarized in Table A-2 in the Appendix. Table A-2 focuses

primarily on these agencies’ roles under the Stafford Act and other authorities and

as outlined under the NRP (e.g., EPA responsibilities under ESF #10 may include

requirements applicable to the management of solid and hazardous waste under

provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §

6901 et seq.]). It does not summarize all potential debris removal activities that may

be required of all federal, state, or local agencies under all federal, state, or local laws

or regulations.

Funding Debris Removal Activities

Congress appropriates money for activities authorized by the Stafford Act to the

Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The Stafford Act authorizes debris removal by federal

agencies from publicly owned properties (e.g., roads and public buildings). The most

commonly used method for state and local governments to acquire assistance for

debris removal is through the FEMA Public Assistance (PA) program. FEMA can

either reimburse local governments for the cost of debris removal, or the local

government can request direct federal assistance from FEMA, which then tasks the

Corps to complete the debris removal process.

The 109th and 110th Congress enacted six emergency supplemental

appropriations bills (P.L. 109-61, P.L. 109-62, P.L. 109-148, P.L. 109-234, P.L. 11028, and P.L. 110-116) that appropriated more than $123 billion to fund emergency

assistance activities. (See CRS Report RL33226, Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Legislation for Disaster Assistance: Summary Data, FY1989 to

FY2007, by Keith Bea and Justin Murray.) It is difficult to determine how much of

those funds have been or will be used for debris removal operations. However, as

of November 11, 2006, FEMA determined that federal funding obligated for debris

removal in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana was almost $3.4 billion (and

projected another $800 million in additional funding needed to complete the work).9

The disaster declarations for Louisiana and Mississippi, and subsequent

amendments,10 specify that FEMA would reimburse designated local governments

100% of the cost of debris removal on public and private property, in designated

counties that are eligible for assistance, until June 30, 2006. After July 1, 2006, in

most Louisiana parishes and Mississippi counties, federal assistance for debris

removal is 90%.

Data provided to CRS by FEMA on November 13, 2006.

See 71 Fed. Reg. 2261, FEMA Notice: “Louisiana; Amendment No. 10 to Notice of a

Major Disaster Declaration,” January 13, 2006 and 71 Fed. Reg. 13861, FEMA Notice:

“Mississippi; Amendment No. 13 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration,” March 17,

2006.

CRS-7

On June 29, 2006, President Bush announced an extension of the 100% cost

reimbursement for Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, Washington, and Plaquemines

Parishes in Louisiana through December 31, 2006.11 The 100% reimbursement for

private property debris removal was further extended to: May 31, 2007, for Jefferson

and Orleans parishes; June 29, 2007, for Plaquemines parish; and July 31, 2007, for

St. Bernard parish.12 Further, on October 26, 2007, FEMA announced that it would

extend its mission to remove marine debris from waterways, canals, and drainage

ditches.13 An extension date was not specified.

The federal government paid 100% of the cost of marine debris removal from

the Mississippi Sound through May 15, 2007;14 for properties located within the

official storm surge-inundated areas of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties, the

90% reimbursement continued through June 30, 2007.15 Pursuant to the initial

disaster declaration for Alabama, the 100% cost reimbursement applied to debris

removal operations in designated counties until October 27, 2005.

Funding for any work after the specified extensions reverts to the standard 75%

federal and 25% non-federal cost-share arrangement for debris removal and

emergency protective measures.

FEMA typically reimburses localities for removing storm-related debris only

from public rights-of-way. The agency agreed to pay the cost of debris removal from

private property, including commercial property, from a number of selected Katrinaaffected counties and parishes in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. However,

this was done after affected state and local governments alerted FEMA that

widespread debris on private property created a health and safety risk and identified

the areas that required debris removal.

State Debris Plans and Emergency Declarations

Both Mississippi and Louisiana are removing their disaster debris in accordance

with specific disaster debris management plans and emergency declarations (as

outlined in Table A-2 in the Appendix, below). A debris management plan serves

See June 30, 2006 FEMA press release “President Bush Extends 100% Funding for Debris

Removal in Five Louisiana Parishes,” available at [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.

fema?id=27342].

See May 21, 2007, FEMA press release “FEMA's Private Property Debris Removal in the

State Nears End,” available at [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=36413].

See October 26, 2007 FEMA press release “FEMA Extends Mission to Clear Marine

Debris through Interagency Agreement,” available at [http://www.fema.gov/news/

newsrelease.fema?id=41509].

See June 30, 2006 FEMA press release “President Bush Extends 100 Percent Pay for

Marine Debris Removal,” available at [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=

27338].

See February 28, 2007, FEMA press release “Debris Removal Deadline Extended to June

30,” available at [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=34531].

CRS-8

as guidance to anyone involved in debris removal operations.16 Those plans delineate

the types of disaster debris that will be handled under the specified emergency

conditions and the existing laws that apply to the handling and disposal of different

types of waste (i.e., hazardous waste, non-hazardous waste, asbestos-containing

materials). The plans also specify requirements regarding the selection of debris

storage and staging sites and waste handling methods (e.g., chipping/grinding,

burning, or landfilling) for certain types of waste.

The debris management plans provide an outline of existing applicable law.

They also include changes to existing law or regulatory requirements as specified in

emergency declarations issued by the respective Departments of Environmental

Quality (DEQ).17 Both states’ emergency declarations, among other provisions,

specify existing and emergency requirements applicable to the management of solid

waste, hazardous waste, and asbestos-containing materials. They also expand

existing law or regulatory requirements to accommodate debris management issues

unique to Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Louisiana DEQ emergency declaration

expanded the definition of C&D waste to allow for the disposal of certain demolition

wastes that would not otherwise be allowed in a C&D landfill (see the “Factors

Complicating Debris Removal” section, below).18 Louisiana DEQ issued the second

extension to its 12th amended emergency declaration on January 28, 2008. Provisions

of that declaration expired on or about February 28, 2008.

On April 14, 2006, the Mississippi DEQ (MDEQ) issued a revision to its

emergency authorizations for the management of building and structural debris and

vegetative debris. In that revision, MDEQ declared that emergency need for

additional storage and staging sites in response to storm management of Katrina

wastes no longer exists for most counties and cities. MDEQ further directed local

governments to begin preparing to close their storage and staging sites and begin

transporting the remaining wastes directly to authorized disposal sites.

Louisiana DEQ, “Hurricane Katrina Debris Management Plan,” posted online by LDEQ

on October 19, 2005 and available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Default.aspx?

tabid=2245] (in August 2006, LDEQ issued a new debris management plan, also available

on this website); and Mississippi DEQ, “Hurricane Katrina Disaster Debris Management

Response” documents regarding “Building and Structural Debris Disposal” and “Vegetative

Debris Disposal” available at [http://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/page/Main_Hurricane

KatrinaDisasterRecovery?OpenDocument].

Louisiana DEQ’s “Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order” and related

amendments and extensions are available online at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/

Default.aspx?tabid=2570]; Mississippi DEQ’s Emergency Order 5062 05, September 13,

2005, is available online at [http://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/page/Main_Hurricane

KatrinaDisasterRecovery?OpenDocument].

Unlike previous declarations, the expanded definition of C&D waste no longer applies to

all C&D waste generated in the state. Instead, it applies to waste being sent to four

designated landfills.

CRS-9

Concerns Associated

with Debris Removal Activities

Debris removal after a disaster presents challenges unique to that disaster.

Often, the debris removal process takes months or even years to finish. The slow

pace of debris removal, particularly in flooded regions of the New Orleans area, has

drawn attention from area stakeholders, as well as some Members of Congress. The

type and breadth of destruction associated with Hurricane Katrina has resulted in

various factors that complicate, and hence prolong, debris removal operations. Some

of the prominent issues are discussed below.

Difficulty Separating Waste and the Slow Return of Residents

After most disasters, landfill space is usually limited, so communities try to

divert as much waste from landfill disposal as possible through such means as reuse

and recycling, burning, and composting. For example, vegetative debris can be

chipped, composted, or burned; metals can be recycled; C&D waste can be partially

recycled; household hazardous wastes can be separated and disposed of in specially

designed landfills or incinerated; and refrigerators/freezers are emptied of spoiled

foods and reused or recycled.

The separation of waste is also necessary to comply with existing federal and

state laws regarding waste management.19 For example, those requirements specify

criteria under which solid, hazardous, C&D, and asbestos-containing wastes must be

managed. Each category of disaster debris is required to be managed in a way that

will limit the threat that such waste may pose to humans or the environment. To

ensure that disaster debris is managed appropriately, the Corps is segregating and

managing disaster debris as follows:

White goods — collected separately, drained of freon, and recycled.

Metals — collected and recycled.

Vegetative debris — collected, and often ground, for re-use or

burned; when mixed or contaminated with other wastes, burning is

not an option.

Electronic wastes — collected separately and recycled, to the degree

possible.

Household hazardous waste — collected separately and disposed of

in specially designed landfills.

C&D waste with asbestos-containing material (ACM) — separated

and disposed into asbestos-permitted landfills.

Tires — collected and recycled.

States are required to regulate the management of solid and hazardous waste in

accordance with provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Solid

waste is defined broadly under the law as “any garbage, refuse ... and other discarded

material” (42 U.S.C. § 6903). Hazardous waste, a subset of solid waste, is defined as a solid

waste that is either specifically listed in the regulations (40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31-261.33) or

meets specific criteria that make it toxic, ignitable (i.e., burns readily), corrosive, or reactive

(e.g., explosive) (40 C.F.R. § 261.3).

CRS-10

Although the Corps requested that residents separate wastes, much of the

disaster debris from flooded regions of the New Orleans area was mixed to the point

that separation is either very difficult or essentially impossible.20 Removing debris

from each private property is time-consuming and labor-intensive. A crew must first

segregate the waste, then waste that can be removed using equipment (e.g., a front

loader) is loaded into trucks. Remaining waste must be removed by hand by a rightof-entry crew (i.e., a crew that has received permission from the property owner to

enter the site).

For most disasters, residents evacuate an area for the duration of the event and

return soon after — able to participate in the waste removal process. After Katrina,

the destruction was so great that returning to many communities was impossible.

This was the case particularly in the flooded areas of Orleans and St. Bernard

Parishes. More than two years after the storm, it is estimated that the population in

those Parishes has reached approximately 70% (Orleans) and 41% (St. Bernard) of

pre-Katrina levels.21

In addition to facilitating more efficient pick-up by placing waste curbside,

returning residents may expedite the removal process by separating the various types

of waste themselves. For example, they may empty refrigerators of spoiled food

(which may also eliminate the need to dispose of refrigerators or freezers); separate

household hazardous waste before it leaks or otherwise contaminates other debris;

remove rain-soaked debris before it becomes moldy or contaminated with other

waste; deal with downed trees, branches, or other vegetative waste; or assist with the

demolition of their homes.

However, even in areas where residents have returned, the separation of wastes

can be problematic. Returning residents have been reminded not to commingle

household garbage, such as food waste, with demolition debris, such as shingles.

According to Waste Management, Inc. (the company that has contracted to remove

household garbage, as opposed to Corps-managed debris, in certain areas of the city),

this has been a problem in some areas — resulting in waste piles that they are not

allowed to remove.22

The slow return of residents is evident in the high number of trips that debris

removal operators have had to make through some communities. According to the

Corps, after a disaster, it typically takes debris collectors two to three passes through

a neighborhood before the disaster debris is removed. After Hurricane Katrina, more

than 20 passes were made in some neighborhoods, and debris collection was still not

complete.

For more information about the individual types of waste and issues associated with their

removal, see Table A-1 in the Appendix, below.

These population estimates are based on active residential postal deliveries, as determined

by the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center. The most recent data were released

by the Center on January 15, 2008, and are available online at [http://www.gnocdc.org/].

Bruce Eggler, The Times-Picayune, “Officials raise stink over trash; Slow pickup is

‘crisis,’ councilwoman says,” May 4, 2006.

CRS-11

C&D Waste Issues

As stated previously, RCRA governs the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes.

Municipal solid waste landfills that collect household garbage are predominantly

regulated by state and local governments. EPA has, however, established minimum

criteria that these landfills must meet. States are then authorized to implement their

own criteria that are at least as stringent as the federal requirements. Louisiana is

authorized to implement its own waste management programs under RCRA. An

element of that program is the authorization to issue permits to construct and operate

municipal solid waste landfills.

Under federal law, C&D waste is classified neither as hazardous waste nor as

municipal solid waste. Therefore, C&D landfills are not subject to federal design and

operational criteria (i.e., C&D landfills are not required under federal law to have

protective liners that a municipal solid waste landfill, which is expected to receive

a certain amount of hazardous waste from households, would have). The disposal

of C&D waste as a waste category is primarily a state-regulated issue. Louisiana

regulations define C&D waste as

nonhazardous waste generally considered not water-soluble, including but not

limited to metal, concrete, brick, asphalt, roofing materials (shingles, sheet rock,

plaster), or lumber from a construction or demolition project, but excluding

asbestos-contaminated waste, white goods, furniture, trash, or treated lumber.

The admixture of construction and demolition debris with more than five percent

by volume of paper associated with such debris or any other type of solid waste

(excluding woodwaste or yard trash) will cause it to be classified as other than

construction/demolition debris.23

The LDEQ “Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order” specifies criteria

applicable to C&D waste disposal and expands the definition to include —

furniture, carpet, and painted or stained lumber contained in the

demolished buildings;

the incidental admixture of construction and demolition debris with

asbestos contaminated waste (i.e., incidental asbestos-contaminated

debris that cannot be extracted from the demolition debris); and

yard waste and other vegetative matter.

Under provisions of the most recent emergency declaration, this definition of C&D

waste applies only to waste that can be taken to four specific landfills in the New

Orleans area.24 All other permitted facilities that received C&D waste pursuant to

previous versions of the emergency declaration were allowed to do so until April 20,

2007. Thereafter, those facilities were required to operate in accordance with the

definition of C&D waste specified in the state’s solid waste regulations (see above).

Louisiana Code Title 33, Part VII § 115.

The landfill specified in the emergency declaration are Gentilly, River Birch, Highway

90, and Tidewater.

CRS-12

The use of local landfills to dispose of certain hurricane-related waste has been

a continuing concern to various stakeholders. In particular, issues associated with the

use of the Gentilly Landfill and the Chef Menteur Landfill (which was closed on or

about August 15, 2006) have drawn significant attention. There are a variety of

issues associated with each landfill, but one issue common to both is the concern

among some stakeholders that C&D waste commingled with contaminated waste is

being accepted at landfills that are not designed to accept such wastes.

Both the Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills were authorized by LDEQ to

accept C&D waste in accordance with provisions of the emergency declaration.25

The Gentilly Landfill was issued a permit to operate as a C&D landfill before

Hurricane Katrina, but it did not begin to accept waste until after the storm. On

February 14, 2006, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin used his “emergency authority”

to suspend provisions of the city’s comprehensive zoning ordinance to allow Waste

Management, Inc. to operate the Chef Menteur Landfill.26

Among other reasons, LDEQ cites the need for these landfills because of their

close proximity to areas that received heavy damage, thus expediting the debris

removal process and minimizing the cost (compared to hauling the waste to landfills

farther away). LDEQ also argues that the waste being sent there will be of a

relatively benign nature and will pose a minimal risk to the environment.

Opponents to the use of the landfills to accept Katrina-related C&D debris argue

that the proximity to the most heavily damaged areas of the New Orleans area is, in

fact, a drawback to their location — they argue that the sites are close to

neighborhoods attempting to recover from the storm. Also, they question how

“benign” the waste truly is. For example, they argue that under the expanded

definition of C&D debris, the landfills can accept waste that is potentially more

harmful. Also, they fear that with thousands of homes being torn down, trash haulers

will have a difficult time sorting out the hazardous debris from the harmless, and that

material more noxious than that allowed under the emergency declaration will wind

up at landfills that are not designed to protect the environment from potentially

hazardous wastes.27

Background information and documents regarding the operation of both landfills are

available on LDEQ’s hurricane information website at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/

portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2403].

LDEQ released decisional documents that delineate the justification for the use of Gentilly

Landfill and the Chef Menteur Landfill for the disposal of hurricane-related waste. See

LDEQ’s “Justification for Utilization of Chef Menteur C&D Disposal Facility for the

Disposal of Hurricane-Generated Debris,” available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/

apps/pubNotice/pdf/Chefmonteurdecisionenglish5-12-06.pdf]; and the “Revocation of Order

Authorizing Commencement of Operation & Authorization for Utilization of Gentilly

Landfill for Disposal of Hurricane Generated Construction and Demolition Debris,”

available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2403].

Gordon Russell, The Times-Picayune, “Chef Menteur landfill testing called a farce, Critics

say debris proposal ‘would be a useless waste of time,’” May 26, 2006.

CRS-13

In November 2005, EPA provided FEMA with a technical analysis and

recommendation for use of the Gentilly Landfill. In particular, EPA was responding

to “[q]uestions from federal elected officials and others [regarding] the issue of

potential Superfund liability of federal agencies engaged in hurricane response for

future cleanup of the landfill.”28 The memorandum discusses, among other points,

the background of the site, the permitting process, and the on-site process of

inspecting and separating waste. EPA concluded that there is no a way to protect

against future Superfund liability absolutely, particularly liability for a landfill.

However, EPA recommended that current operations take steps to continue good

operating practices and to document their activities, such as by posting signs clearly

identifying categories of acceptable waste, distributing leaflets to debris haulers

clearly identifying categories of acceptable waste, documenting current operating

safeguards, and publishing written procedures for segregating waste streams prior to

loading debris removal trucks, so that only non-hazardous materials are loaded into

trucks bound for the non-hazardous waste landfill.

To date, no similar technical analysis regarding Superfund liability has been

conducted for the Chef Menteur Landfill. However, a representative of the Louisiana

Field Office of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) submitted comments

to the Corps presenting the Service’s concerns regarding the operation of the landfill

and the types of waste being accepting there.29 Specifically, the Service expressed

concern that the operation of the Chef Menteur Landfill will pose a threat to the

adjacent Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge. The comments state that

[The Service]... is primarily concerned about the potential secondary and indirect

effects of siting and operating construction/demolition debris (C&D) landfill at

[the Chef Menteur Landfill] location...Given the scope and nature of the flooding

events and the age of many of the buildings to be demolished and deposited in

the proposed landfill, we believe that the delivery of materials containing

numerous environmental contaminants, such as lead-based paint, asbestos,

creosote, arsenic-based wood treatment chemicals, various petroleum products,

and a variety of pesticides and household cleaning chemicals would be

unavoidable. Placement of such materials in an unlined landfill, particularly

within coastal wetlands, could potentially result in leaching and resultant

persistent contamination of ground water, surface water and adjacent wetland

habitats.

Memorandum from George Pavlou, Senior Federal Official, New Orleans Field Office,

to John Connolly, Infrastructure Branch Chief, “Potential Federal CERCLA Liability for use

of the Gentilly Landfill for debris operations from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA-1603-DR-LA,

ESF#10 Task Order,” November 11, 2005, available online at [http://www.deq.louisiana.

gov/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2403].

May 19, 2006, letter from Russell C. Watson, Supervisor, Louisiana Field Office of the

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, District Commander, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers. This letter is not available to the public online, but was provided

to CRS by The Times-Picayune after the publication of its June 6, 2006, article referring to

the letter (“Federal agency enters debate over landfill, Wildlife Service official calls for

liner, limits at Chef Menteur site,” available online at [http://www.nola.com/frontpage/

t-p/index.ssf?/base/news-5/1149574327298360.xml]).

CRS-14

Further, the letter describes hydrological pathways that contaminated leachate from

the landfill could travel to reach the Refuge. It requests that a liner be installed at the

landfill or that restrictions be applied to waste being hauled there. Neither the Corps

nor LDEQ formally responded to the Service’s comments before the landfill was

closed.

Opponents of the use of the landfills filed suit to halt waste shipments to each

landfill. The first lawsuit, related to Gentilly, resulted in a settlement agreement

between the plaintiff (the Louisiana Environmental Action Network, LEAN) and

LDEQ that limits C&D shipments to 19,000 CY per day at the site.30 LDEQ cites the

settlement agreement limiting debris intake at the Gentilly Landfill, in part, for its

decision to use the Chef Menteur site.31 The available landfill capacity at the 100acre Chef Menteur site is 7.2 million CY of debris.32 It is estimated that the landfill,

when filled to capacity, would result in a debris pile 80 feet above surrounding

landscape elevations.33

In the second lawsuit, related to Chef Menteur, the judge rejected the plaintiff’s

(LEAN’s) motion for a temporary restraining order that would have shut down the

landfill.34 However, on July 13, 2006, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin announced the

expiration of his emergency executive order allowing the operation of the Chef

Menteur Landfill effective August 14, 2006.35 Waste Management, Inc., the

company operating the landfill, asked a federal court to order the site to remain open,

but the judge refused its request for a temporary restraining order. Waste

Management subsequently stopped accepting waste at the site, on or about August

14, 2006, after receiving a cease and desist order from the mayor’s office. The

company now has the option of going through the permit application process (as

opposed to operating the site pursuant to an emergency permit issued by the mayor).

If Waste Management chooses to do so, it is anticipated that the permit request may

be denied by the New Orleans City Council, which is reportedly opposed to the

landfill.36 It is unknown at this time whether Waste Management will explore other

options to reopen the site (e.g., filing additional lawsuits).

Documents related to the suit, including the administrative order and settlement

agreement, are available online at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Default.aspx?tabid=

2403].

See LDEQ’s “Justification for Utilization of Chef Menteur C&D Disposal Facility for the

Disposal of Hurricane-Generated Debris,” pp. 2-3.

Ibid, p. 8.

Russell Watson letter to the Corps (footnote 24).

The judge’s ruling is available online at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/tabid/2245/

Default.aspx].

See City of New Orleans Press Release, “Mayor Does Not Renew Executive Order

Landfill Set to Close August 14th,” available at [http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?

portal=1&load=~/PortalModules/ViewPressRelease.ascx&itemid=3642].

Frank Donze, The Times-Picayune, “Denied reprieve, eastern N.O. landfill closes,”

August 16, 2006.

CRS-15

Another controversy regarding the Chef Menteur landfill involves a donation

agreement between the city of New Orleans and Waste Management. When Mayor

Nagin signed the agreement permitting operation of the Chef Menteur landfill, he

also signed a notarized agreement with Waste Management stating that the company

would “donate” 22% of the landfill’s revenues to the city of New Orleans.

On December 15, 2006, in response to a congressional inquiry, FEMA

determined that the donation agreement was not appropriate.37 Among other

findings, FEMA asserted that the agreements appeared to provide evidence that the

landfill operator’s “donation” of 22% of gross revenues was contingent on the city’s

approval to operate the landfill. FEMA notes that it did not require the city to pay

for debris removal necessitated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, FEMA

found that “the City should not profit from those debris removal operations,

especially when the profit (donations) appears to be at the federal government’s

expense.”

Together with the fact that the disposal fees charged by the landfill operator

(called “tipping fees”) for the Chef Menteur landfill were significantly higher than

other local landfills, FEMA’s review indicates that the landfill operator passed the

cost of the “donations” to the Corps’ contractors. FEMA therefore determined that

the donations should be treated as a credit and deducted from the city’s final claim

for other disaster costs, effectively to reduce costs for the city’s debris removal.

Demolition of Private Properties

DHS estimates that hundreds of thousands of homes were destroyed or sustained

major damaged by the storm and subsequent flooding.38 The degree to which cleanup

and, possibly, rebuilding may occur depends on the extent to which and when some

of those damaged structures will be demolished and removed.

Neither FEMA nor the Corps can unilaterally decide to demolish homes or

remove the debris from private property. That determination must be made by the

homeowner and involves a multi-step process involving property decommissioning

and condemnation. That process includes inspecting the structure, evaluating the

presence of hazardous substances and materials; testing for asbestos-containing

materials; removing and segregating regulated and hazardous substances and

materials; and transporting and disposing of hazardous waste streams.

Local governments have limited capabilities to oversee the complicated

documentation requirements that must be completed before a private structure can

be demolished. Further, demolition decisions are controversial and have social and

See December 15, 2006, memorandum from Tondra Hadley, Director DHS Central

Regional Office, Office of Disaster Assistance Oversight, to James Stark, Director, FEMA’s

Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office available online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/

auditrpts/OIG_DD-07-03_Dec06.pdf].

See the DHS, Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, “Current

Housing Unit Damage Estimates,” February 12, 2006 (revised April 7, 2006), available at

[http://www.gnocdc.org/].

CRS-16

political implications. It has been speculated by some that many residents will not

choose to allow their homes to be demolished, but may instead opt to repair or

rehabilitate their damaged homes.

Another complicating factor is the potential presence of human remains in some

of the destroyed homes. As a result, canine search teams must search debris before

it is removed. Also, demolition teams must use excavators to remove the homes in

layers instead of “bulldozing” them to prevent any human remains from being lost.

The number of private structures ultimately demolished will likely have the

greatest impact on the time it takes to complete debris removal operations. Many

questions must be answered before the extent of the demolition will be known. For

example, the plan for rebuilding New Orleans is still largely unknown. That plan

may specify areas in which rebuilding will not be allowed or where rebuilding may

be required to be elevated.

Asbestos in Buildings Being Demolished

The presence of asbestos-containing materials in damaged residential structures,

and the need to segregate that material before demolition and disposal, will add to the

time it takes to demolish individual structures. Both federal and state laws specify

criteria that must be met when demolishing a structure with asbestos-containing

materials.39 Further, Mississippi and Louisiana have each published their own

protocols for complying with state asbestos requirements, as they apply to the

destruction and cleanup after Hurricane Katrina.40 EPA is working closely with each

state and is providing debris management guidance to ensure minimization of

exposures while expediting cleanup. For example, EPA has advised states to make

efforts to segregate asbestos and certain other types of waste for proper disposal in

landfills prior to burning the debris.41

Not knowing how many structures will have asbestos, it is difficult to estimate

how much time may be added to the demolition process (and subsequent debris

The Clean Air Act (§ 112) establishes national emissions standards for hazardous air

pollutants (NESHAP), including asbestos. Individual states, in coordination with EPA, must

manage ACM in compliance with the asbestos NESHAP, with regard to asbestos removal

and disposal during building destruction and renovation (40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-61.160).

See Mississippi DEQ’s “Policy for Handling Demolitions of Structures to Address

Potential Asbestos,” January 3, 2006, and “USA EPA ‘NAA Extension Letter,’” March 9,

2007, available at [http://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/page/Main_HurricaneKatrina

DisasterRecovery?OpenDocument]; Louisiana DEQ’s “LDEQ Protocol to Comply with the

LESHAP Regulations,” March 16, 2006, available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/

portal/Default.aspx?tabid=2251]; and the February 24, 2006, letter from Granta Nakayama,

EPA Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, to Mike McDaniel,

Secretary, LDEQ, specifying EPA’s agreement with LDEQ regarding asbestos issues in

hurricane-affected areas, available at [http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/tabid/2223/

Default.aspx].

EPA, Hurricane Katrina Response, Frequent questions, “Asbestos,” available at

[http://www.epa.gov/katrina/faqs.htm].

CRS-17

removal process). However, it is a factor that was identified by the Corps as one that

would limit the ability to remove debris.42

Conclusion

On February 26, 2007, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

held a field hearing in New Orleans to address issues associated with hurricane

protection, wetlands restoration, and debris management in the aftermath of

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.43 The hearing included discussions on concerns about

landfill use in New Orleans, particularly the Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills.

Also, on July 27, 2006, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public

Works held a hearing on the Stafford Act that, among other topics, looked at the

status of debris removal operations in the Gulf Coast area.44 The hearing included

discussions on the scope of the damage and volume of debris created by the storm;

the status of debris removal activities; concerns regarding the pace of debris removal

operations; and the role of federal agencies in the cleanup response, particularly as

they relate to Emergency Support Functions #3 and #10 under the National Response

Plan (discussed in Table A-2 in the Appendix, below). There have also been

hearings to discuss issues associated with the federal government’s contracting

policies, practices, preparations, and response to Hurricane Katrina, of which debris

removal efforts are a part.45

The need for funding for debris removal operations will continue as demolition

activities continue in the New Orleans metropolitan area. It is difficult to estimate

how long demolition will take, but it will likely take years to complete. After that,

the rebuilding itself will also generate a significant amount of construction debris.

This is likely to continue for several years.

The Corps, “Louisiana and City of New Orleans-Debris Removal and Demolition

Mission,” provided to CRS on March 16, 2006, and identified as materials used for

presentation to DHS, February 14, 2006.

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing “Moving Forward after

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” February 27, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana, opening

statements and witness testimony available online at [http://epw.senate.gov/public/

index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=ebb4fe82-802a-23ad-4fee177386faa730].

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing “The Stafford Act: A Path

Forward for the Nation’s Emergency Preparedness and Response System,” July 27, 2006,

opening statements and witness testimony available online at [http://epw.senate.gov/

hearing_statements.cfm?id=259724].

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Hurricanes Katrina

and Rita: Outstanding Need, Slow Progress,” January 29, 2007, at [http://hsgac.senate.gov/

index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=415]; and House Committee on

Government Reform hearing No. 109-160, “Sifting Through Katrina’s Legal Debris,

Contracting in the Eye of the Storm,” May 4, 2006, at [http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/

house/house07ch109.html].

CRS-18

Appendix. Types of Disaster Debris, Selected Issues/Concerns

with Removal, and a Summary of Selected Governmental Roles

in Post-Katrina Debris Removal Activities

Table A-1. Types and Examples of Disaster Debris

and Selected Issues/Concerns with Removal

Waste Type

Examples

Selected Issues/Concerns with Removal

Municipal solid

waste (MSW)

Personal belongings

and general household

trash

Commonly, MSW is non-hazardous waste that is sent to landfills permitted to

accept such waste. After being submerged in flood waters, such waste may

have become contaminated with hazardous constituents that are essentially

impossible to separate or remove. In areas subject to flooding or storm surge,

MSW may include the entire contents of homes in that area.

Putrescibles

Rotten or spoiled

fruits, vegetables,

seafood, or meats

Putrescibles are considered MSW, but must be removed as soon as possible to

avoid odor problems, environmental contamination, and rodent infestation.

When mixed with other MSW, as in flood conditions, they may contaminate

surrounding debris. Millions of pounds of food waste were generated in the

New Orleans area.

White goods

Refrigerators, freezers,

air conditioners,

washers, dryers, stoves,

water heaters, and

dishwashers

After Hurricane Katrina, white goods such as refrigerators and freezers

contained rotten food that had to be removed before the appliances could be

recycled or otherwise disposed of. White goods containing freon (e.g.,

refrigerators, freezers, and air conditioners) have to be properly drained of

freon before recycling or disposal.

Household

hazardous waste

(HHW)

Oil, pesticides, paints,

cleaning agents

Where practical, it is usually preferable to collect HHW separately from

municipal waste to avoid sending large quantities to landfills that are not

intended to accept hazardous waste. However, in extensively flooded areas of

New Orleans, particularly where residents have not returned, containers may

have leaked and contaminated the surrounding debris. Homeowners have been

asked to separate HHW that has not leaked or spilled from other disaster

debris. However, in areas where homeowners have not returned, HHW may

become mixed with demolition waste.

CRS-19

Waste Type

Examples

Selected Issues/Concerns with Removal

Construction and

demolition (C&D)

debris

Asphalt, drywall,

plaster, brick,

metal, concrete,

roofing materials, and

untreated lumber

C&D waste is generally considered a relatively benign type of waste. Such

waste is generally disposed of at specially designated C&D landfills but must

have toxic materials removed beforehand. Under normal conditions, separating

toxic materials from C&D waste is not a problem (other than adding to the

time it takes to demolish a structure). However, C&D waste generated in

flooded areas of New Orleans may be mixed with or be contaminated with

toxic substances such lead, asbestos, arsenic (in certain treated wood),

petroleum products, household hazardous waste, putrescibles, or mold.

Destruction may be so extensive that the separation of toxics is essentially

impossible.

Vegetative debris

Trees, branches,

shrubs, and logs

Chipping and mulching vegetative waste for reuse or composting are preferred

methods of managing vegetative waste. However, when it is generated in

significant amounts, burning may be the primary viable management option.

Automobilerelated materials

Cars and trucks, fuel,

motor oil, batteries,

and tires

Tens of thousands of cars, trucks, and boats were abandoned in the New

Orleans area. Waste from those vehicles include metals that can be recycled.

Typically, auto-related wastes such as motor oil, gasoline, whole tires, and

batteries are prohibited from MSW landfills or are recycled.

Electronic waste

Computers, televisions,

printers, stereos, DVD

players, telephones

Electronic waste can typically be reused or recycled. However, this is not

feasible if the products have become contaminated with sewage or flood

waters. Such waste may include various hazardous components, such as lead

and mercury.

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on a review of Mississippi and Louisiana Departments of Environmental Quality disaster management plans.

CRS-20

Table A-2. Summary of Selected Governmental Roles

in Post-Katrina Debris Removal Activities

Agency

Role/Responsibility Under

the Stafford Act/National Response Plan

Comments

FEMA

Provide assistance to respond to the disaster, including

funding debris removal and the “demolition of unsafe

structures which endanger the public”; provide funding from

the Disaster Relief Fund to agencies with various Emergency

Support Functions (ESF) specified in the National Response

Plan (NRP); FEMA receives requests for assistance from

state representatives, and “mission assigns” the Corps to

perform specific tasks that are deemed eligible.

Debris removal missions under ESF#3,

Public Works and Engineering, and ESF #10,

Oil and Hazardous Materials Response,

involve an interagency and intergovernmental team that includes, among

many, the following agencies: FEMA, the

Corps, EPA (including regional offices), the

states of Louisiana and Mississippi, local

Parishes and counties, and the American Red

Cross.

The Corps

The Corps acts as the coordinator for ESF #3. The Corps’

mission includes right of way clearance, curbside pickup,

private property debris removal (PPDR), and property

demolition. Included within its ESF #3 mission is providing

personnel for the Corps’ debris removal team, obtaining a

contractor to execute the mission, and coordinating landfill

and burn site and the final disposal of debris.

Debris removal may be entirely the mission

of the Corps under its authority, or it may be

done by the local government and reimbursed

by FEMA (under the Stafford Act’s Public

Assistance [PA] program). In Louisiana, the

Corps has the ESF #3 mission in 21 parishes,

while 19 other parishes are conducting debris

removal on their own through the FEMA PA

program. In Mississippi, the Corps has the

ESF #3 mission in 15 counties, and 75 other

counties are conducting debris removal on

their own through the FEMA PA program.

The management of contaminated debris is coordinated with

EPA under ESF #10.

CRS-21

Agency

EPA

Role/Responsibility Under

the Stafford Act/National Response Plan

Under ESF #3, EPA assists local agencies in locating disposal

sites for debris clearance activities and assists with

contaminated debris management activities by coordinating

and/or providing resources, assessments, data, expertise,

technical assistance, monitoring, and other appropriate

support.

EPA is the lead federal agency under ESF #10. Under the

mission, FEMA funds EPA’s retrieval and disposal of orphan

tanks and drums and the collection of household hazardous

waste; the collection of liquid and semi-liquid waste has also

been tasked to ESF #10.

State and

local

government

The states help coordinate local governmental requests for

federal assistance and work with FEMA to define the

mission. The Corps coordinates with state representatives

regarding operational issues.

Local agencies are responsible for providing Rights-of-Entry

permits to allow the Corps or its contractors to enter private

property for debris removal activities (within the Corps’

authority); establishing criteria and procedures for classifying

different types of debris; selecting disposal methods and

approving disposal operations; condemning properties;

providing demolition plans, and designating the appropriate

type of landfill.

Comments

EPA has worked with other federal agencies

(particularly the Corps), state agencies, and

local governments to facilitate the collection,

segregation, and management of household

hazardous waste. EPA has provided guidance

on identifying and disposing of electrical

equipment that may contain PCBs and on the

handling and disposal of debris containing

asbestos. EPA has also provided the affected

states with guidance on burning debris.

The Louisiana and Mississippi Departments

of Environmental Quality (LDEQ and

MDEQ, respectively) are the environmental

regulatory arms of the state government.

Each state is authorized to implement its own

solid and hazardous waste management

program, including siting and permitting

debris disposal sites.

State or local governments may choose to

accept the debris removal mission and apply

for reimbursement from FEMA (see the

Comments section regarding the Corps,

above).

Each state is conducting debris removal operations in

accordance with declarations of emergency issued by its

respective Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and

in accordance with specific debris management plans issued

after the storm.

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on a review of selected provisions of the Stafford Act, ESFs #3 and #10 of the National Response Plan,

and debris management plans issued by the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.