Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Congressional research reportJan 18, 2007

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Reauthorization of the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

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January 18, 2007

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RL33474

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Summary

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a small, independent agency with

responsibility for investigating transportation accidents; conducting transportation safety studies;

issuing safety recommendations; aiding victim’s families in aviation disasters; and promoting

transportation safety. Near the conclusion of the 109th Congress, a two-year NTSB reauthorization

measure, covering fiscal years 2007 and 2008, was enacted (P.L. 109-443).

During the 109th Congress, legislation to reauthorize the NTSB for fiscal years 2007-2009 was

ordered reported in the House (H.R. 5076) seeking a three-year funding reauthorization for

FY2007 through FY2009, that included a 22% increase to authorized funding levels in FY2008

compared to FY2007 requested levels, largely to support a proposed staffing increase of about

19%. In contrast, the Senate initially passed a two-year reauthorization bill (S. 3679) in

September, 2006, covering FY2007 and FY2008, that paralleled the administration’s FY2007

funding request, but did not provide the increase sought in FY2008, instead proposing to maintain

staffing at current levels through FY2008. The NTSB indicated in reauthorization hearing

testimony that a staffing increase was needed to effectively carry out its mission. P.L. 109-443

authorizes funding in FY2007 slightly above the President’s requested appropriation level, and

authorizes a 13.5% increase in the authorized level in FY2008, compared to FY2007. Actual

funding levels, however, are dependent on amounts specified in appropriations legislation.

In addition to setting funding authorization levels, P.L. 109-443 extends and expands provisions

that relax certain contracting requirements for investigation-related services; establishes various

reimbursements to the NTSB as offsetting collections that are available until expended; and

authorizes reimbursable payment from the NTSB for Department of Transportation Office of

Inspector General (DOT OIG) investigations and audits of the NTSB. The act also requires the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to submit a report explaining why it has not implemented

NTSB’s most wanted aviation-related transportation safety improvements, and charges the GAO

with the responsibility of evaluating and auditing NTSB programs, operations, and activities on

an annual basis, or more frequently if determined necessary. The act also directs the DOT OIG to

conduct oversight and investigations related to the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project.

While not formally addressed during reauthorization debate, two other prominent issues involving

the NTSB may come under congressional scrutiny: concerns over industry stakeholders lobbying

NTSB officials in attempts to influence the scope or language of NTSB investigative findings,

and the NTSB’s heavy reliance on experts from transportation entities with a vested interest in the

outcome of an investigation for fact gathering and data analysis. Some experts argue that the

NTSB should instead create stronger ties with government laboratories and academic institutions

for expertise to lessen the chances that bias, or the perception of bias, could creep into the

accident-investigation process. This report will not be updated.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Contents

Background ................................................................................................................................1

NTSB History.......................................................................................................................1

NTSB Organization...............................................................................................................1

NTSB Mission ......................................................................................................................2

Accident Investigation ....................................................................................................2

Other Related Functions..................................................................................................3

Safety Recommendations and Advocacy .........................................................................3

NTSB Funding Levels...........................................................................................................6

Current Issues for Reauthorization ..............................................................................................7

NTSB Staffing Levels and Accident Coverage.......................................................................8

The NTSB Academy ........................................................................................................... 10

Relief from Certain Contracting Requirements .................................................................... 12

Reimbursements to the NTSB ............................................................................................. 12

Inspector General and Comptroller General Oversight of the NTSB .................................... 13

Other Possible Issues for NTSB Reauthorization and Congressional Oversight.......................... 14

Stakeholder Lobbying of NTSB Officials ............................................................................ 14

Use of Impartial Outside Expertise on Investigation Teams ................................................. 16

Other Transportation Safety Issues Addressed During NTSB Reauthorization............................ 17

Legislative Actions.................................................................................................................... 17

Tables

Table 1. Authorized, Appropriated, and Requested Funding Levels for the National

Transportation Safety Board.....................................................................................................7

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 17

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Background

NTSB History

The NTSB was established in 1967 as part of the newly formed Department of Transportation

(DOT). In 1974, Congress passed the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 (in P.L. 93-633),

making the NTSB completely separate from the DOT. Doing so gave NTSB complete

independence from DOT. As a fully independent agency, the NTSB can carry out unbiased

investigations and make recommendations regarding safety regulations and oversight practices of

DOT without the public perception of conflicting interests associated with being a component of

a regulatory department whose policies and regulatory oversight might be brought into question

during the course of an investigation. Over the course of its 39-year history, the NTSB has

established a worldwide reputation as a model agency for investigating accidents and identifying

needed transportation safety improvements. Through the issuance of safety recommendations and

advocacy for transportation safety needs, the NTSB has earned considerable respect from

Congress and the traveling public for its efforts in identifying needed transportation safety

improvements and maintaining public confidence in transportation safety.

NTSB Organization

The NTSB consists of a five-member board and a staff of approximately 400, about half of whom

are located at its Washington, DC, headquarters, with the rest distributed among several regional

offices throughout the United States. In the current reauthorization cycle, the NTSB is seeking to

increase its staff size to an authorized level of 475 full-time equivalent employees beginning in

FY2008. The NTSB has indicated that this staffing increase is needed to fully carry out the

NTSB’s mission, which includes conducting investigations and safety studies and preparing

safety recommendations and safety advocacy materials for all modes of transportation.1 While the

initial House proposal included authorization for staffing increases that match the NTSB’s request

for an increase to 475 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in FY2008 (See H.Rept. 109-512), the initial

Senate-passed bill would have maintained a staffing level of 399 FTEs in FY2008, which is

consistent with the FY2007 budget request. While the final enacted version of the National

Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) did not establish an

authorized FTE level, it did authorize a funding increase of roughly 13.5% in FY2008 compared

to FY2007 authorized levels. Absent specific report language directing how this additional

funding authority is to be used, it is uncertain if this would be used in whole or in part to fund

additional positions. If the increased funding authority were devoted exclusively for personnel

compensation and benefits, the number of authorized FTEs could be increased to about 450.

The five Safety Board members, presidentially appointed with the advice and consent of the

Senate, serve five-year terms and may continue to serve beyond their term until a replacement

board member is appointed. Not more than three Safety Board members may be appointed from

the same political party, and at least three members must be appointed on the basis of technical

qualifications, professional standing, and knowledge of transportation safety issues.

Testimony of Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, before the Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2006.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

One recent point of contention among board members is the appointment process for board

members’ personal staff. Under prior law, the NTSB chairman was the final authority with regard

to staffing, including the staffing of member offices.2 The National Transportation Safety Board

Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443), however, gives individual board members full

authority to appoint individuals for personal staff positions, with the restriction that staff

allocations be limited to a full time equivalent level of one senior professional staff position and

one administrative staff position.

NTSB Mission

The NTSB core mission consists of investigating transportation accidents and, based on

investigative findings and focused studies of transportation safety concerns, issuing safety

recommendations and advocating for improvements in transportation safety. Additionally the

NTSB provides assistance to victims’ families in airline disasters and serves as a board of appeals

for certain transportation regulatory actions.

Accident Investigation

The NTSB investigates the following transportation-related accidents and safety issues:

•

All accidents involving civil aircraft and public aircraft, other than military or

intelligence agency aircraft, within the United States and its territories;

•

Selected highway and railroad grade crossing accidents;

•

Railroad accidents involving passenger trains, loss of life, or significant property

damage;

•

Pipeline accidents involving significant property or environmental damage, or

loss of life;

•

In coordination with the Coast Guard, major marine casualties occurring on the

navigable waters or territorial sea of the United States, or involving U.S. flag

vessels, except those involving only public vessels; and

•

Other selected catastrophic accidents or recurring problems involving

transportation safety.

In accordance with international treaties, the NTSB also participates in investigations of foreign

aviation accidents involving any U.S. manufactured or registered aircraft.3 On occasion, the

NTSB may also lend its expertise in foreign investigations at the request of another country, even

though the United States may have no vested interest nor any specific right under international

agreement to participate in the accident investigation process. In these instances, where NTSB is

asked to consult or actively participate in an overseas investigation, the NTSB is sometimes

reimbursed for associated costs. Historically, these reimbursements had been deposited to the

Treasury General Fund. However, during this reauthorization cycle, the NTSB requested that this

and other reimbursements to the NTSB be specifically designated as offsetting collections for use

See 49 USC §1111(e).

See National Transportation Safety Board, About the NTSB: History and Mission. Washington, DC: National

Transportation Safety Board.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

by the NTSB. The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109443) included a provision designating such receipts, whether in the form of fees or

reimbursements, as offsetting collections available until expended. Prior to this legislative

change, only reimbursements related to activities of the NTSB Academy, such as tuition

payments or classroom rental fees, were specifically credited as offsetting collections.4

Other Related Functions

In addition to its core responsibility of investigating transportation mishaps, the NTSB renders

assistance to the families of passengers involved in air carrier accidents, and handles appeals of

certificate actions by the FAA or the Coast Guard and certain appeals involving civil penalties

from FAA enforcement actions. The NTSB also maintains a database of civil aviation accidents

and conducts special studies of selected transportation safety issues.

Safety Recommendations and Advocacy

While the NTSB has no authority to change transportation safety regulations and practices, its

principal means for effecting change in transportation safety is through the issuance of safety

recommendations to regulators, operators, and users of transportation systems. Since

investigations of complex accidents may take several years, the NTSB routinely issues

recommendations over the course of an investigation as needed safety improvements are

identified. The NTSB highlights its key safety recommendations on a list of “Most Wanted”

safety improvements that currently includes:5

•

Reducing the dangers of in-flight icing;

•

Eliminating flammable vapors in airliner fuel tanks;

•

Preventing collisions and near-misses on airport runways (runway incursions);

•

Improving cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders and requiring cockpit

video;

•

Requiring crew resource management training for commuter and charter flight

pilots;

•

Implementing positive train control systems for railroads;

•

Enhancing recreational boating safety;

•

Improving the safety of motor carrier operations;

•

Preventing medically unqualified drivers from operating commercial vehicles;

•

Enhancing protection for school bus and motor coach occupants;

•

Enhancing automobile seat-belt laws and enforcement;

•

Eliminating risks posed by hard core drunk drivers;

See 49 USC §1118(c).

National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, 2007, Washington,

DC: National Transportation Safety Board.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

•

Improving school bus safety at railroad grade crossings; and

•

Setting work hour limits and rest requirements that reflect current scientific

understanding of human fatigue for safety-critical transportation workers in all

transportation modes.

These “Most Wanted” transportation safety improvements typically encompass multiple safety

recommendations requesting action from the DOT and the states for statutory and regulatory

change to address these safety concerns.

While there is no statutory requirement to adopt NTSB-issued safety recommendations, the

NTSB’s ability to bring about transportation safety enhancements is rooted in its long-standing

reputation for thorough investigation and assessment of needed safety improvements. However,

there is not always universal agreement that NTSB recommendations are needed. For example,

the FAA has opposed NTSB’s urging to require child restraints on airliners for children under

two, arguing that the increased cost of having to purchase tickets for these children could cause

some families to drive instead, which is arguably more dangerous than flying.6 Also, pilot unions

have strongly opposed NTSB recommendations for cockpit video recorders, arguing that video

images would be of limited value and fearing that, despite statutory protections, these videos

could be misused if publicly disclosed or used for other purposes. In other examples, some

unfulfilled recommendations proposed by the NTSB were not technically feasible at the time they

were issued, and several years of research and development have been devoted to addressing

these recommendations, even though the recommendations have not yet been satisfactorily

addressed. For example, following the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996, the NTSB recommended

procedures and technologies to reduce fuel tank flammability and explosive fuel/air mixtures in

airline fuel tanks. While the NTSB has been disappointed that interim operational measures to

reduce fuel tank fires and explosions have never been satisfactorily implemented by the airlines,

the NTSB is encouraged that, through extensive research and development, viable technologies

for reducing flammability and inerting fuel tanks now exist and will be required on certain

airliners under proposed regulatory changes to reduce fuel tank flammability.7 However, despite

the current progress toward addressing this longstanding safety need, the NTSB would like to see

the requirements more broadly applied to all commercial airliners.

In general, NTSB’s safety recommendations and safety advocacy programs have influenced the

regulatory agenda of transportation agencies regarding safety initiatives and have had a profound

influence on Congressional decision-making and oversight of transportation safety issues. Since

1967, the NTSB has issued over 12,000 safety recommendations across all modes of

transportation, of which about 83% led to the implementation of acceptable safety improvements.

Despite the generally high level of acceptance of NTSB-issued safety recommendations, there is

lingering concern over the amount of time it can take to implement recommended safety

improvements. One significant factor contributing to the length of time it can take to adopt NTSB

safety recommendations is the process of assessing the feasibility, cost, and benefits of adopting a

recommendation and developing an implementation plan which is left up to the recipient of a

Federal Aviation Administration, “Child Restraint Systems: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Withdrawal.”

Federal Register, 70(165), August 26, 2005, pp. 50226-50228.

National Transportation Safety Board, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, Federal Issues, Aviation:

Eliminate Flammable Fuel/Air Vapors in Fuel Tanks on Transport-Category Aircraft; Federal Aviation

Administration, “Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport Category Airplanes; Proposed Rule,” Federal

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

safety recommendation. Since the last reauthorization in 2003, the NTSB has tried to improve this

process by working more closely and collaboratively with DOT agencies when drafting safety

recommendations to better ensure that these recommendations can be implemented in a timely

and acceptable manner. The NTSB refers to this initiative as SWAT for “Safety With A Team.”8

However, this approach has been criticized by some as having the potential effect of watering

down the NTSB’s safety objectives. These critics contend that by collaborating too closely with

regulatory agencies and other stakeholders, the NTSB may be swayed away from issuing or

wording safety recommendations that may be more difficult or challenging for regulators to

address and could bring the NTSB’s impartiality and independence into question. Striking an

appropriate balance between identifying needed safety improvements and proposing

recommendations that are operationally and technically achievable remains an ongoing challenge

for the NTSB. Policymakers may deliberate about how to best structure interactions between the

NTSB and recipients of NTSB recommendations to facilitate the communication of the NTSB’s

desired safety objectives and the operational and technical limitations that may stand in the way

of fully meeting these objectives.

The Senate NTSB reauthorization bill (S. 3679) included a provision that would have required the

NTSB to review the DOT’s annual report to Congress detailing its responses to NTSB safety

recommendations.9 Under this provision, the NTSB would have been required to transmit

comments on this report to the appropriate congressional committees within 90 days after the

report is submitted by the DOT. Under existing statute, the DOT is to submit its report to

Congress each year on January 1. While this language was not included in the final enacted

legislation, P.L. 109-443 did include a provision requiring the FAA to submit a report explaining

why it has not implemented aviation-related safety improvements identified in the NTSB’s Most

Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list issued in 2006.

Also, the Senate reauthorization bill (S. 3679) included a provision that would have required the

NTSB to provide, as appropriate, recommendations and comments to Congress regarding pending

transportation safety legislation. While legislation can serve as an appropriate means to

implement NTSB safety recommendations that may otherwise languish and other improvements

to transportation safety, formally involving the NTSB in the review and analysis of pending

legislation may raise concerns regarding the separation of powers between the executive and

legislative branches. The NTSB already actively participates in congressional oversight regarding

transportation safety issues, for example, by providing testimony to Congress at safety oversight

hearings and through more informal meetings with Members of Congress and their staff.

However, formally involving an executive agency such as the NTSB in the legislative process and

the work of Congress, even on a limited basis, may introduce complications and potential

challenges regarding separation of powers and may raise concerns that the NTSB could be drawn

into partisan debates over transportation safety issues or pressured by stakeholders and special

interest groups. The enacted legislation (P.L. 109-443) did not include this provision.

National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB Celebrates One Year of SWAT Success,” The Chairman’s Corner,

August 27, 2004, p. 1.

See 49 USC §1135(d).

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NTSB Funding Levels

Funding for the NTSB has historically consisted of: a base authorization or appropriation amount;

a set-aside emergency fund to cover unforeseen accident costs such as wreckage recovery,

salvage, and storage; and supplemental appropriations to cover the costs of large, complex

investigations such as the investigation of the TWA flight 800 accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-168), authorized

base appropriations from FY2003 through FY2006 for the NTSB. The annual authorization level

was set at $73.325 million in FY2003, and was increased at a rate of about 6% per year, reaching

$87.539 million for FY2006 (see Table 1). In addition to these sums, P.L. 108-168 authorized

additional funding for operating the NTSB Academy from FY2003 through FY2008. However,

these additional funds for the academy were never appropriated. Instead, appropriations language

over the past two years has instructed the NTSB not to increase academy funding or increase

investigator details to the academy in a manner that may detract from their primary investigation

duties.

Since FY2003, appropriations for the NTSB have been slightly below authorized levels. In

FY2003, the NTSB received $72 million. In FY2004, the NTSB received $73.5 million, plus an

additional $600,000 to boost the balance of the NTSB’s emergency fund back to $2 million. In

FY2005, the NTSB received a base appropriation of $76.7 million, less a rescission of $8 million

in unobligated supplemental appropriations intended to cover costs associated with the

investigations of EgyptAir flight 990 in 1999 and Alaska Air flight 261 in 2000, both of which are

now completed. Thus, the net appropriation for FY2005 was $68.7 million. In FY2006, the NTSB

received $76.7 million, less a rescission of $1 million from the same supplemental funding

account to cover the EgyptAir flight 990 and Alaska Air flight 261 investigations. After factoring

in a government-wide 1% rescission, the NTSB’s net appropriation for FY2006 was just under

$75 million. In testimony before both the House Aviation Subcommittee and the Senate

Subcommittee on Aviation, NTSB Chairman Mark Rosenker, then serving as Acting Chairman,

asserted that the agency’s FY2006 budget was unable to support the staff size of 416 full-time

equivalents with which the NTSB began the year.10 The NTSB responded accordingly by

reducing staff through attrition to a current level of 396 full-time equivalents.

Testimony of Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, before the Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2006.

Testimony of Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, before the Committee on

Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. Senate, May 24, 2006.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Table 1. Authorized, Appropriated, and Requested Funding Levels for the National

Transportation Safety Board

(FY2003 - FY2009, $ in millions)

Fiscal Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

- Base

- Academy

House-proposed (H.R. 5076)

105

Senate-passed (S. 3679)

P.L. 109-443

Authorizations

P.L. 108-168

Appropriations

Administration Requests

100

105

FTEs

—

416

396

399

475

Note: Amounts above are after rescissions to base and supplemental funding levels. Amounts do not include the

NTSB’s emergency fund currently authorized at a level not to exceed $4 million and appropriated at a level of $2

million. Full-time equivalent (FTE) employee levels for 2007-2009 reflect administration requested staffing levels.

See text.

The administration proposed an authorization and appropriation of $80 million for FY2007, $4

million above FY2006 enacted levels, to cover salary and cost increases. In FY2008, the

administration proposed a funding authorization of $100 million, 22% above the FY2007

requested amount. This increase would be used to hire about 75 additional investigators and

support staff, a staffing increase that the NTSB believes is necessary to adequately perform its

mission. For FY2009, the administration has requested an authorization of $105 million to sustain

this increased staffing level and cover anticipated salary and cost increases. H.R. 5076, as initially

reported (see “House-proposed” in Table 1), roughly paralleled the administration request,

proposing a slightly higher authorized amount in FY2007, $1 million less than the administration

projection for FY2008, and an amount equal to the administration’s projection for FY2009. In

contrast, the Senate (S. 3679) initially passed a two-year authorization that would have matched

the requested funding level in FY2007, but did not include the increased funding sought in

FY2008. The enacted NTSB reauthorization legislation (P.L. 109-443) provides a two-year

reauthorization, authorizing $82 million in FY2007, and $93 million in FY2008. In addition to

these authorized amounts, existing statute provides for the continued maintenance of $2 million in

the NTSB’s emergency fund, and authorizes additional funding to increase the balance of the

emergency fund up to the authorized limit of $4 million.

Current Issues for Reauthorization

Several issues were identified during the current debate over NTSB reauthorization The central

issue during this reauthorization cycle was the adequacy of the NTSB’s staff size. The NTSB

requested a staff increase of roughly 22% starting in FY2008, an increase it believes is necessary

to adequately carry out its mission. Other issues considered during the NTSB reauthorization

process included the mission, operations, and funding of the NTSB Academy; relief from certain

contracting requirements for investigation-related services; the designation of various

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

reimbursements to the NTSB as offsetting collections; and payment for Department of

Transportation Inspector General investigations and audits of the NTSB.

NTSB Staffing Levels and Accident Coverage

The Washington Post reported that in 2005, by NTSB’s own estimates, its field investigators

deployed to only 62% of all fatal airplane crashes in the United States, compared to 75% in

2001.11 The trend has alarmed some aviation safety experts who contend that the NTSB could

miss opportunities to improve safety or identify a critical safety concern before it leads to more

mishaps. The NTSB, on the other hand, asserts that its near-term strategy has been to target the

deployment of its field investigators to focus on crashes where new safety issues are likely to

present themselves. However, without on-scene involvement this is often difficult to assess,

particularly in the early stages of an investigation. Therefore, it appears that the NTSB’s longterm strategy is to request funding for additional investigative staff beginning in FY2008. This

request for additional funding to hire new investigators and support staff was a central issue in the

current reauthorization debate.

Analysis by the GAO indicates that both the number of NTSB on-site field investigations of

aviation accidents and investigations where only an FAA-inspector was sent to the crash site have

been declining since 2002.12 However, the number of “data collection accidents,” where

investigators do not perform on-scene functions, has been steadily increasing. In 2002, the NTSB

sent investigators to 322 aviation field accidents compared to 219 in 2005. Also, the number of

“limited” investigations, where on-scene functions are delegated to FAA inspectors, has declined

by about half in the past three years, from 1,461 in 2002 to 762 in 2005. During that same period,

the number of “data collection” investigations—where most or all of the investigation process is

completed in the office through telephone interviews and data gathering—has increased by a

factor of almost five, from 159 in 2002 to 783 in 2005. While this trend may, in part, be due to a

reduction in the severity of aviation accidents, it is also likely the result of NTSB’s changing

strategy to manage its limited investigator resources and clear a large backlog of uncompleted

investigations. In 2001, the NTSB’s backlog of cases more than six months old was 2,400.13 This

backlog was reduced down to 944 cases in early 2006, but one apparent consequence is that

investigators have been spending more time in the office completing old cases and less time in the

field doing on-site investigation.

While the most critical need for investigators appears to be for general field investigators that

handle the bulk of NTSB’s case load of aviation investigations involving smaller aircraft,

expertise in certain speciality fields may also need to be expanded to address the growing

complexity of major transportation disasters. For example, the Air Line Pilots Association

(ALPA), the largest union representing airline pilots in the United States, has been critical of what

they consider a lack of in-depth investigation by the NTSB delving into human factors aspects of

airline crashes. A union representative stated that the NTSB tended to overlook human factors

Sara Kehaulani Goo, “NTSB Goes to Fewer Crashes; Backlogged Investigators Pass on Small-Plane Accident Sites,”

The Washington Post, February 8, 2006, p. A17 (Corrected February 24, 2006).

U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Transportation Safety Board: Preliminary Observations on the

Value of Comprehensive Planning and Greater Use of Leading Preactices and the Training Academy, Statement of

Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation,

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, May 24, 2006, GAO-06-801T.

Sara Kehaulani Goo, “NTSB Goes to Fewer Crashes.”

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

either for the sake of expediency or due to budget pressures.14 While human factors causes play a

role in the majority of aviation accidents, workload and staffing levels may limit the involvement

of NTSB’s human factors experts in exploring the root causes of these accidents, such as training,

policies, and procedures. Besides human factors, the NTSB also faces potential staffing needs in

other highly specialized areas such as airline operations, air traffic control, aircraft structures and

systems, and maritime operations. Because these disciplines are highly specialized, it takes

considerable effort to recruit qualified individuals and train them to apply their knowledge and

expertise to accident investigation. Staff attrition in these highly specialized disciplines could

increase the NTSB’s reliance on outside expertise and have an impact not only on the ability of

the NTSB to fully investigate transportation accidents, but also on the quality of the NTSB’s

investigation and analysis. Policymakers may consider options to enhance the NTSB’s ability to

recruit and retain field investigators and specialists in a variety of critical science and engineering

fields as well as professionals with unique operational experience in various transportation

modes.

While the House bill (H.R. 5076) would have provided almost full funding to support the

administration’s request for increasing NTSB staffing levels by about 19% to address these

concerns, the Senate bill (S. 3679) did not include funding for increasing NTSB staff levels. The

Senate bill (S. 3679) did, however, include a provision that would have required the NTSB to

include in its annual report lists of and explanations for: transportation accidents that the NTSB

was statutorily mandated to investigate but did not; and any ongoing investigations that had

exceeded the expected time allotted for their completion. Such information may provide better

insight into whether, and to what extent, NTSB staffing levels are impacting its ability to meet

statutory obligations for investigating transportation accidents and to carry out these obligations

in a timely fashion. Such data may also provide a better sense of what transportation modes and

specific areas of expertise may need additional staffing for the NTSB to effectively carry out its

mission. The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) authorizes a funding increase of

roughly 13.5% in FY2008 compared to FY2007 authorized levels. While the act did not specify

how this additional funding authority is to be allocated, CRS estimates that, if such funds are

appropriated in FY2008 and allocated exclusively for increasing staffing levels, the NTSB may

be able to increase its FTE level to about 450 in FY2008.

The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) also included a provision, adopted from

the Senate bill (S. 3679), that requires the NTSB to maintain at least one full-time employee in

every state located more than 1,000 miles from the nearest NTSB regional office, to provide

initial investigative response to accidents across all modes of transportation. This measure would

most directly impact the state of Hawaii, where the NTSB does not have a field office or any

staff. Currently, investigations of accidents in Hawaii are typically run out of the NTSB’s

Gardena, California field office. Air safety in Hawaii has particularly been a continuing issue of

interest because of the importance of aviation for inter-island transportation and a large air tour

industry in the state.

Andy Pasztor, “WSJ: Pilots Group Criticizes National Transportation Safety Board,” Dow Jones Newswires, October

17, 2005.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

The NTSB Academy

The National Transportation Safety Board Amendments Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-424) gave NTSB

the authority to enter into agreements for facilities, technical services, and training in accident

investigation theory and practice. In 2000, NTSB awarded a 20-year contract for a training site to

the George Washington University (GWU). Construction on the NTSB Academy, located on the

Loudon County Campus of GWU in Ashburn, Virginia, was completed in August 2003.

In addition to assessing the funding needed to sustain the operations of the NTSB Academy, a key

issue for Congress has been whether to fund the NTSB Academy as a separate entity or a

component of the overall NTSB budget. Funding the NTSB Academy within the overall NTSB

budget would give NTSB greater flexibility to fund Academy activities based on internal training

requirements and external demand for training. However, doing so may place an additional

burden on the NTSB’s ability to carry out its investigative, research, and safety advocacy

functions if operating costs for the Academy exceed projections or external demand for the NTSB

Academy is less than projected. In addition to providing a separate funding authorization for the

NTSB Academy on top of NTSB base authorization levels, P.L. 108-168 allows the NTSB to

impose and collect fees for services provided by or through the Academy which may be credited

as offsetting collections that remain available until expended. In the current reauthorization

debate, the NTSB has proposed that funding authorization for the NTSB Academy be made part

of the broader agency authorization, rather than a distinct entity. The NTSB asserts that a single

authorization amount is more consistent with its objective of integrating the academy operations

into the overall mission and program for the agency. This would also be in line with

appropriations actions over the past three fiscal years that have not identified separate funding

levels for the academy. Unlike P.L. 108-168, H.R. 5076 goes along with this request and does not

specify any separate or additional funding levels for the academy. Also, as requested, the bill

would strike a statutory provision for separate reporting to Congress on NTSB Academy

operations. The NTSB has proposed that this reporting be consolidated with the NTSB’s annual

report to Congress on its overall operations. The Senate bill (S. 3679), likewise combines

academy funding with the broader agency budget.

While the NTSB seeks to better integrate the operations of the academy with the overall role of

the agency, GAO analysis of academy operations suggests that significant progress is still needed

to accomplish this objective. Despite the creation of the academy three years ago, the GAO found

the “NTSB has not developed a strategic training plan, nor has it identified the core competencies

needed to support its mission and a curriculum to develop these competencies.”15 The GAO also

found that the NTSB Academy facility is significantly underutilized, in part because the NTSB

lacks a core curriculum for its own staff. In fact, for FY2006, 97% of NTSB staff training is

expected to come from training vendors other than the NTSB Academy. GAO estimated that

available classroom space was utilized less than 10% of the time they were available during

FY2005. Moreover, in FY2004 and FY2005, NTSB staff made up less than 20% of the total

enrollment in classes offered at the NTSB Academy. However, despite having an enrollment of

about 80% fee-paying external students and having the option to rent out classroom space when it

is not in use, revenues generated from these sources have covered only about 8% of the

U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Transportation Safety Board: Preliminary Observations on the

Value of Comprehensive Planning and Greater Use of Leading Practices and the Training Academy, Statement of

Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, May 24, 2006, GAO-06-801T, p. 11.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

academy’s total operating expenses, including lease of the facility itself under the terms of a longterm lease agreement with the George Washington University. Excluding the cost of the lease,

reimbursements still only covered about 15% of NTSB’s other costs to run the facility and offer

instruction, even though the NTSB does not figure in instructor salaries for NTSB personnel

assigned to teach classes at the academy. In response to these findings, policymakers may seek to

improve NTSB’s approach to staff training and its initiatives to generate additional revenue

through course offerings, symposia, and other training opportunities offered through the NTSB

Academy.

The NTSB has indicated that, in 2006, it significantly revised the philosophy for the Academy

and is focusing on developing “state-of-the-art training courses and programs.”16 However,

examination of the available course offerings and current academy operations suggest, on the

contrary, that the academy is largely maintaining a status quo with regard to its operations and

approach to training. Because the NTSB Academy has been operational for only a few years,

opportunities exist for refining and expanding its structure and course offerings. The NTSB

indicated that it plans to establish a training and academic oversight board for the academy. The

oversight board will consist of senior NTSB staff and will work closely with other government

training facilities to “benefit from their experience and best practices.”17 Congressional oversight

may seek to more thoroughly examine the NTSB’s planning and execution of efforts to improve

and expand the curriculum of the NTSB Academy.

The Senate bill (S. 3679) included language that would have required the NTSB to develop a plan

to make the NTSB Academy self-sufficient. The bill proposed that a draft of the plan is to be

submitted for committee and GAO review and comments within 90 days after enactment, and a

final plan, addressing comments received on the draft, would be required 90 days thereafter. The

bill would have required the plan to be fully implemented within two years. Language in the bill

would have directed the NTSB to consider subleasing of the academy facility for generating

revenue and would have required that the plan include a fiscal projection of its impact on

academy expenses and revenue. However, a subsequent GAO study of NTSB Academy finances

and business practices concluded that “... [the] NTSB may have difficulty increasing revenues or

decreasing external training costs enough to ever fully offset the training center’s costs.”18 Also,

the GAO report noted that the NTSB has been in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act because it

negotiated the lease on the NTSB Academy facility as an operating lease instead of a capital

lease, and did not obtain budget authority for the full term of the 20-year lease. Language to

remedy this situation was not included in the NTSB reauthorization legislation. Possible remedies

identified by the GAO include obtaining a deficiency appropriation for the full amount of the

lease, renegotiating the lease contract, terminating the lease, or obtaining authority to obligate

lease payments on an annual basis. GAO concluded that vacating the space may be the most costeffective strategy; however the potential benefits derived from this facility were not fully

considered in the GAO’s analysis. Because the reauthorization legislation did not address the

issue of the NTSB Academy management practices, weighing the costs and benefits of

maintaining the training center remains a specific issue for congressional oversight and possible

legislation during the 110th Congress.

Testimony of Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, before the Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2006, p. 5

Ibid.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Transportation Safety Board: Progress Made, Yet Management

Practices, Investigation Priorities, and Training Center Use Should Be Improved, November 2006, GAO-07-118, p.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Relief from Certain Contracting Requirements

The extensive and often lengthy processes involved in federal procurement are often not

amenable to transportation accident investigations where obtaining unique services, such as

wreckage recovery, must be completed in a timely manner. Often, only one source or a very small

number of vendors possess the unique capabilities needed by the NTSB. The NTSB has the

authority to enter into agreements and other transactions necessary to carry out its mission

without going through normal procurement procedures required of contracts in excess of $25,000.

However, the NTSB has been criticized in the past regarding its financial management and

oversight. At issue is striking a balance between providing flexibility to complete needed

investigative tasks in a timely and efficient manner while providing sufficient financial

management controls and oversight to minimize the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. P.L. 108-168

clarifies the NTSB’s authority regarding exemption from contracting requirements to be used

only if necessary to expedite an investigation, and requires the NTSB to list all such contracts

over $25,000 in its annual report to Congress. However, this provision expired at the end of

FY2006. The NTSB requested that the sunset clause of this provision be deleted and the NTSB’s

special contracting authority for investigation-related services be made permanent.19

The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) strikes the sunset clause of the NTSB’s

special contracting authority as requested, and requires reporting on contracts awarded under this

special authority to be identified in the NTSB’s annual report to Congress each year.

Reimbursements to the NTSB

As previously mentioned, the NTSB participates in some foreign accident investigations where it

is not representing a particular United States interest in the process or outcome of the

investigation, but rather lends its technical expertise and experience to the investigation. In some

cases, the NTSB is reimbursed for the personnel, travel, and other expenses it incurs while

participating in these accident investigations, but these receipts are currently not credited as

offsetting collections. Similarly, airlines are required to pay the costs of disaster mortuary services

for airline disasters. However, the NTSB often pays for these costs up front to ensure the

immediate delivery of these services and later seeks reimbursement from those responsible for

payment. In the past, these reimbursements were not specifically credited as offsetting

collections. Under the statutes existing prior to the enactment of the NTSB Reauthorization Act of

2006 (P.L. 109-443), the only reimbursements to the NTSB that were specifically credited as

offsetting collections were those items related to the NTSB Academy, such as tuition payments

for courses and fees for facility rentals.20 Because other reimbursements that were not specifically

credited to NTSB funding lines, the NTSB expressed concern that it could face a funding shortfall

if it is necessary to expend any sizable amount of agency funds on reimbursable items that are not

directly offset by reimbursements received by the Treasury. Therefore, the NTSB requested that

all such reimbursable items be credited as offsetting collections to the NTSB funding line. The

NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) included language that authorizes the NTSB to

collect fees, refunds, and reimbursements as it determines appropriate for any services it provides,

either directly or indirectly.

Ibid.

See 49 USC §1118(c).

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Inspector General and Comptroller General Oversight of the NTSB

While the NTSB is an independent agency completely separate from the DOT, the DOT Office of

Inspector General was given limited authority to audit and review NTSB functions in the 2000

NTSB reauthorization act (P.L. 106-424; 49 USC § 1137). This provision addressed concerns

over identified fraud and inefficiencies in the NTSB’s financial management office in the 1990s

that went unchecked for some time, in part because there was no entity to oversee and audit these

operations. The law gives the DOT Office of Inspector General limited oversight of the NTSB’s

financial management, property management, and business operations, but does not give the

Inspector General authority to review the NTSB’s investigative functions or safety

recommendations process.

The statutory authority specified that the Inspector General shall be reimbursed by the NTSB for

any costs associated with audits or reviews of the NTSB. This, however, posed potential problems

by creating a possible conflict of interest, or at least a perception of a possible conflict of interest.

Also, because Inspector General audits are not specifically budgeted for, related costs could

impact the NTSB’s resources to carry out its core mission to investigate accidents and promote

transportation safety. Therefore, the NTSB requested that this statutory language be repealed and

the DOT Office of Inspector General be directly appropriated funds for its activities related to

NTSB oversight. 21 The DOT Office of Inspector General concurred with this recommendation.

The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) authorizes such sums as may be necessary

for the DOT Office of Inspector General’s costs associated with investigations and audits of the

NTSB. The provision, however, also includes a proviso stating that, in the absence of a specific

appropriation for this purpose, the NTSB and the DOT Office of Inspector General shall establish

a reimbursable agreement to cover such expenses.

The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) also requires that the GAO evaluate and

audit the programs and expenditures of the NTSB on at least an annual basis, or more frequently

if determined necessary by the Comptroller General. The GAO is required to evaluate and audit

the NTSB’s information management and security; resource management; workforce

development efforts; procurement and contracting planning, practices, and policies; the extent to

which the NTSB follows leading practices in management; and the extent to which the NTSB

addresses management challenges in completing accident investigations. The provision language

also allows for the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and/or the Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to carry out such audits and evaluations in

lieu of or in addition to GAO-led audits, as deemed necessary.

Testimony of Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, before the Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2006.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Other Possible Issues for NTSB Reauthorization

and Congressional Oversight

Besides the issues specifically identified during the NTSB reauthorization debate, two other

prominent, and related, issues involving the NTSB may come under congressional scrutiny. First,

some have expressed concerns over possible industry stakeholder lobbying of NTSB officials in

attempts to influence the scope or language of NTSB investigative findings. 22 Second, concerns

have also been raised about the NTSB’s heavy reliance on experts from transportation entities

with a vested interest in the outcome of an investigation, such as airlines and aircraft

manufacturers, for fact gathering and data analysis. Some experts argue that the NTSB should

instead create stronger ties with government laboratories and academic institutions for expertise

to lessen the chances that bias, or the perception of bias, could creep into the accident

investigation process.23 These issues were not specifically addressed in reauthorization

legislation.

Stakeholder Lobbying of NTSB Officials

One ongoing concern is the degree to which entities with a vested interest in the outcome of an

investigation may be able to influence NTSB board members. This is an important consideration

because under the NTSB party system of conducting investigations, entities with vested interests

in an investigation are made a part of the investigation team and work closely with NTSB staff

and officials to provide technical knowledge and experience.24

However, the potential exists for entities to cross a fuzzy line between providing technical

knowledge and expertise and attempting to gain or exert influence in the NTSB investigative

process and decisions about what findings, conclusions, and causal factors will be highlighted in

the board’s final report on an investigation. Former chairman Ellen Engelman Conners claimed

that during the investigation of the crash of American Airlines flight 587, board members came

under intense pressure from both the airline and the aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, in an effort to

sway the NTSB’s conclusions and language in the final report.25 Conners maintained that

lobbying efforts have not yet influenced the outcome of an investigation, but these tactics have

delayed the investigation process.26 It is notable, however, that in the American Airlines flight 587

investigation, the Safety Board, in a split decision, voted to change the order of causal factors

recommended by the NTSB staff, a move that placed a greater emphasis on the design

characteristics of the aircraft’s rudder control system and de-emphasized the role that American

Airline’s pilot training played in the accident. Two board members at the time, issued a joint

See, Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Safety Agency’s Chief Is Wary of Lobbying,” The Washington Post, January 6, 2005, p.

A6.

Cynthia C. Lebow, Liam P. Sarsfield, William L. Stanley, Emile Ettedgui, and Garth Henning, Safety in the Skies:

Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, 2000, RAND Corporation, Institute for Civil Justice:

Santa Monica, CA, p. xiv.

See 49 CFR §831.11.

Matthew L. Wald, “Agency Official Says Lobbying Hindered Airline Crash Inquiry.” The New York Times, January

6, 2005; Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Safety Agency’s Chief Is Wary of Lobbying,” The Washington Post, January 6, 2005, p.

A6.

Ibid.

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Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

dissenting statement asserting that “[t]o diminish the role of the [training] in the accident is to

downplay the role it played in the pilot’s actions which caused the accident.”27 The counterargument for reversing the order was to emphasize the design problems with the rudder system

which more closely paralleled the new recommendations issued by the NTSB in its final report.

Recommendations pertaining to pilot training had previously been issued by the NTSB during the

course of the investigation. The dissenting members believed that the statement of probable cause

should accurately reflect the findings of the investigation and not be flavored to emphasize the

importance of any particular recommendations being put forth. While the motives behind such a

change in emphasis to a probable cause statement could arguably be justified based on more

closely aligning the wording of the probable cause to the NTSB’s agenda for advocating

recommended safety changes based on investigative findings, in this case, the potential public

perception that the adopted probable cause language may have, in part, been influenced by

lobbying efforts by a party to the investigation could bring the board members’ motives into

question. A pattern of actions of this sort could potentially lead to a loss of public trust in the

NTSB and the party process of investigating accidents.

A variety of safeguards already exist to prevent external entities from influencing NTSB findings

and conclusions. First, under the “Sunshine Act”,28 the Safety Board as a whole must meet in

public on most matters pertaining to accident investigations, which would increase the

transparency of any attempt by a board member or members to sway an investigation. Also, while

interested parties may provide technical expertise in the fact finding phase of an investigation,

analysis of these facts is done strictly by the NTSB staff of investigators. The investigative

process is designed to provide each party an opportunity to provide the NTSB with its

perspectives and concerns. Parties are free to submit their own analyses and exchange

information and ideas with NTSB investigators. Also, formal procedures exist for parties to

petition the NTSB to reconsider or modify its investigative findings after an investigation has

been completed and the final report has been adopted. 29 Nonetheless, in a highly complex and

contentious accident, evaluating competing perspectives brought forth by various parties to the

investigation can prove challenging for the NTSB and can stretch out the length of time needed to

complete an investigation. Also, despite these procedures, the potential for parties to exert their

influence on the NTSB process still exists, and could have a negative impact on the effectiveness

of the NTSB. Even if the NTSB was not swayed by such efforts to influence an investigation, a

public perception that the NTSB was not fully impartial could diminish the agency’s reputation

and credibility. Striking a balance between allowing involved parties to provide unique data and

technical analysis that often they alone possess while preventing these entities from subtly or

overtly attempting to sway the investigative process in their favor or exert influence and pressure

on board members is likely to be a sizable challenge. Policymakers may consider limitations or

more formal rules for the interaction between investigative parties and the NTSB, although this

issue has not been specifically addressed during the current reauthorization process.

Member Carol J. Carmody’s Statement, in which Member Richard F. Healing joined. In National Transportation

Safety Board, In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587, Airbus Industrie A300-605R,

N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November 12, 2001, NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 165.

Under the “Sunshine Act” or “Government in the Sunshine Act”, 5 USC §552b, entities like the Safety Board must

deliberate in open, public meetings, when conducting certain agency business, such as reviewing and adopting the

findings of an accident investigation.

See 49 CFR §845.41.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Use of Impartial Outside Expertise on Investigation Teams

A lingering concern, closely tied to possible stakeholder lobbying of NTSB officials, is the

NTSB’s extensive reliance on entities with a stake in the investigation, such as airlines and

aircraft manufacturers, for technical expertise. This reliance on subject matter experts from those

entities that may be under investigation leaves open the possibility that NTSB could receive

biased analysis of technical data and potentially puts the NTSB in the position of evaluating

competing hypotheses and analysis of technical data provided by parties that approach the

accident from a particular perspective with particular interests to protect.

In 2000, the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice reviewed the NTSB’s aviation

investigation practices and found that “[c]oncern about the party process has grown as the

potential losses resulting from a major crash, in terms of both liability and corporate reputation,

have escalated, along with the importance of NTSB findings to the litigation of air crash cases.”30

The report strongly recommended that the NTSB develop policies and procedures for making

greater use of outside experts from more impartial sources such as government laboratories and

academia to participate in and contribute to the investigative process. The report also

recommended that the NTSB’s internal resources be enhanced through better training and

strategic staffing if the agency’s independence is to be assured. The report proposed a model in

which private consultants and academics be made an integral part of the party process, instead of

having peripheral roles of support and analysis of elements of the investigation. As a first step,

RAND suggested that the NTSB perform a nationwide assessment of federal laboratories,

universities, and independent corporations to identify the resources and expertise to augment

NTSB investigative capabilities, and form memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and other

formal relationships with these entities. While the NTSB has entered into formal MOUs with the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and has a close working relationship

with several Department of Defense (DoD) laboratories, these entities largely continue to play a

support role in investigations and are not an integral part of the party process. While subject

matter experts from academia are routinely consulted and sometimes asked to provide analysis of

technical data and facts regarding an accident, these experts also do not participate in the

investigation to the same degree of involvement as parties to the investigation such as aircraft

manufacturers, airlines, and pilot unions. Policymakers may consider whether changes to the

NTSB party process, such as allowing outside experts to play a more integral role in

investigations, could improve the NTSB investigative process. This issue has not been formally

addressed by Congress in the current reauthorization process.

Cynthia C. Lebow, et al., Safety in the Skies.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Other Transportation Safety Issues Addressed

During NTSB Reauthorization

The NTSB Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-443) also served as a vehicle for enacting other

transportation-safety related legislation outside the jurisdiction of the NTSB. These include a

mandate for the FAA to complete a safety review examining runway safety area alternatives at

Juneau International Airport, Juneau, Alaska; a provision directing the DOT Inspector General, in

cooperation with the Department of Justice and the Attorney General of Massachusetts, to

conduct investigations of criminal and fraudulent activities related to the construction of the

Boston Central Artery Tunnel project; a provision directing the DOT Inspector General to provide

oversight to the project-wide safety review of the Boston Central Artery Tunnel that was initiated

in response to the July 10, 2006 collapse of a section of the tunnel’s roof resulting in a fatality to a

motor vehicle occupant; and a provision requiring the DOT Inspector General to provide periodic

reports to Congress regarding the findings of its oversight, audits, and investigations of the

Boston Central Artery Tunnel project.

Legislative Actions

On March 8, 2006, the House Aviation Subcommittee held a hearing on NTSB reauthorization.

The National Transportation Safety Board Amendments Act of 2006 (H.R. 5076) was introduced

in the House by Representative Don Young on April 4, 2006, and ordered reported by voice vote

of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on April 5, 2006. The Senate Committee

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing on NTSB

reauthorization on May 25, 2006. The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act

of 2006 (S. 3679), was introduced by Senator Burns on July 18, 2006, and was ordered reported

without amendment favorably on July 19, 2006 by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation. On September 15, 2006, S. 3679 was ordered reported with an amendment in

the nature of a substitute, which was agreed to by unanimous consent of the Senate on September

25, 2006. On December 6, 2006, an amended version of H.R. 5076, retitled the National

Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act of 2006, was passed by the House. On

December 7, 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 5076 without amendment, and it was signed by the

President on December 21, 2006 becoming P.L. 109-443.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Aviation Policy

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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