Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Congressional research reportFeb 18, 2010
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Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal
Programs
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
February 18, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33347
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Summary
Nearly half a million miles of oil and natural gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United
States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry
hazardous materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The
nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running alternately through remote and densely
populated regions; consequently, these systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack.
The 109th Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) to
improve pipeline safety and security practices. The 110th Congress passed the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), which mandated pipeline
security inspections and potential enforcement (§ 1557) and required federal plans for critical
pipeline security and incident recovery (§ 1558). The 111th Congress is overseeing the
implementation of these acts and considering new legislation related to the nation’s pipeline
network. Recent legislative proposals include the Clean, Affordable, and Reliable Energy Act of
2009 (S. 1333), which would change natural gas pipeline integrity assessment intervals (§ 401);
the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act (H.R. 2220), which would mandate
a new federal pipeline security study (§ 406); and the Hazardous Material Transportation Safety
Act of 2009 (H.R. 4106), which seeks to improve the collection and use of hazardous material
transportation incident data (§ 203) and increase staffing at the Pipeline and Hazardous Material
Safety Administration (§304).
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), within the Department
of Transportation (DOT), is the lead federal regulator of pipeline safety. PHMSA uses a variety of
strategies to promote compliance with its safety regulations, including inspections, investigation
of safety incidents, and maintaining a dialogue with pipeline operators. The agency clarifies its
regulatory expectations through a range of communications and relies upon a range of
enforcement actions to ensure that pipeline operators correct safety violations and take preventive
measures to preclude future problems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes
of transportation—including pipelines. The agency oversees industry’s identification and
protection of pipelines by developing security standards; implementing measures to mitigate
security risk; building stakeholder relations; and monitoring compliance with security standards,
requirements, and regulation. While PHMSA and TSA have distinct missions, pipeline safety and
security are intertwined.
Although pipeline impacts on the environment remain a concern of some public interest groups,
both federal government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline programs have
been on the right track. As oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues,
Congress may focus on the effectiveness of state pipeline damage prevention programs, the
promulgation of low-stress pipeline regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, and the
relationship between DHS and the DOT with respect to pipeline security, among other provisions
in federal pipeline safety regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to
assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the
nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure.
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Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Pipeline Industry Characteristics ...........................................................................................1
Pipeline Safety Record....................................................................................................2
Pipeline Security Risks ...................................................................................................2
Office of Pipeline Safety .......................................................................................................4
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 .......................................................................5
OPS Pipeline Security Activities .....................................................................................5
Transportation Security Administration .................................................................................6
TSA Pipeline Security Plan .............................................................................................7
TSA Pipeline Security Activities .....................................................................................7
Security Incident Investigations..................................................................................... 10
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.............................................................................. 10
Key Policy Issues...................................................................................................................... 11
Pipeline Damage Prevention ............................................................................................... 12
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations ......................................................................................... 12
PHMSA Safety Enforcement............................................................................................... 13
TSA and PHMSA Cooperation ............................................................................................ 14
Pipeline Security Regulations.............................................................................................. 15
TSA Pipelines Security Resources....................................................................................... 16
Additional Issues................................................................................................................. 17
Distribution Integrity Management................................................................................ 17
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals...................................................................... 17
Natural Gas Distribution Excess Flow Valves ................................................................ 18
TSA Pipeline Security Information Collection............................................................... 18
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 19
Tables
Table 1. TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives....................................................................................7
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20
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Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Introduction1
Nearly half a million miles of oil and natural gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United
States.2 These pipelines are integral to U.S. energy supply and have vital links to other critical
infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military bases. While an efficient and
fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry volatile, flammable, or toxic
materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation’s
pipeline networks are also widespread, running alternately through remote and densely populated
regions; consequently, these systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 2006
partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil field—the largest in the United States—due to
pipeline safety problems demonstrated this vulnerability.
The 109th Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) to
improve pipeline safety and security practices. The 110th Congress passed the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), which mandated pipeline
security inspections and potential enforcement (§ 1557) and required federal plans for critical
pipeline security and incident recovery (§ 1558). The 111th Congress is overseeing the
implementation of these acts and considering new legislation related to the nation’s pipeline
network. Recent legislative proposals include the Clean, Affordable, and Reliable Energy Act of
2009 (S. 1333), which would change natural gas pipeline integrity assessment intervals (§ 401);
the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act (H.R. 2220), which would mandate
a new federal pipeline security study (§ 406); and the Hazardous Material Transportation Safety
Act of 2009 (H.R. 4106), which seeks to improve the collection and use of hazardous material
transportation incident data (§ 203) and would increase staffing at the Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration (§304).
Pipeline Industry Characteristics
Roughly 170,000 miles of oil pipeline in the United States carry over 75% of the nation’s crude
oil and around 60% of its refined petroleum products.3 There are nearly 200 interstate oil
pipelines, which account for roughly 80% of total pipeline mileage and transported volume.4 The
U.S. natural gas pipeline network consists of around 217,000 miles of interstate transmission, and
89,000 miles of intrastate transmission. 5 It also contains some 20,000 miles of field and gathering
pipeline, which connect gas extraction wells to processing facilities. 6 Around 120 systems make
1
Parts of this report were previously published in CRS Report RL31990, Pipeline Security: An Overview of Federal
Activities and Current Policy Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak.
2
In this report “oil” includes petroleum and other hazardous liquids such as gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, home heating
oil, propane, and butane unless otherwise noted. Other hazardous liquids transported by pipeline include anhydrous
ammonia, carbon dioxide, kerosene, liquefied ethylene, and some petrochemical feedstocks.
3
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., “Natural Gas Transmission, Gas Distribution, and Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Annual Mileage,” Web table, January 12, 2010, http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-stats.
4
Richard A Rabinow, “The Liquid Pipeline Industry in the United States: Where It’s Been, Where It’s Going,”
Prepared for the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, April 2004, p. 4.
5
Energy Information Administration, “Estimated Natural Gas Pipeline Mileage in the Lower 48 States, Close of 2008,”
Online table, 2009. http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/mileage.html
6
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., January 12, 2010.
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up the interstate network; another 90 or so systems operate strictly within individual states.7
These interstate and intrastate gas transmission pipelines feed around 1.1 million miles of
regional lines in some 1,300 local distribution networks.8 Natural gas pipelines also connect to
113 liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage sites, which augment pipeline gas supplies during peak
demand periods.9
Pipeline Safety Record
Taken as a whole, releases from pipelines cause few annual fatalities compared to other product
transportation modes. Oil pipelines reported an average of 2.6 deaths per year from 2004 through
2008; natural gas transmission pipelines reported an average of 1.0 death per year during the
same period.10 Accidental pipeline releases result from a variety of causes, including third-party
excavation, corrosion, mechanical failure, control system failure, and operator error. Natural
forces, such as floods and earthquakes, can also damage pipelines. According to the Department
of Transportation (DOT), there were 103 oil pipeline accidents and 63 natural gas transmission
pipeline accidents in 2008.11 Although pipeline releases have caused relatively few fatalities in
absolute numbers, a single pipeline accident can be catastrophic. For example, a 1999 gasoline
pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington, killed two children and an 18-year-old man, and
caused $45 million in damage to a city water plant and other property. In 2000, a natural gas
pipeline explosion near Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed 12 campers, including four children. 12 In
2006, damaged pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over 200,000 gallons of crude oil in
an environmentally sensitive area. Such accidents have generated substantial scrutiny of pipeline
regulation and increased state and community activity related to pipeline safety. 13
Pipeline Security Risks
Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist attack with firearms, with explosives, or by
other physical means. Some pipelines may also be vulnerable to “cyber-attacks” on computer
control systems or attacks on electricity grids or telecommunications networks. 14 Oil and gas
pipelines have been a target of terrorists globally, including within the United States. In
Colombia, for example, rebels have bombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline and other pipelines over
950 times since 1993.15 In 1996, London police foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to
7
Energy Information Administration, “About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines,” June 2007, pp. 1, 29.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/fullversion.pdf
8
BTS, September 2008.
9
Michelle M. Foss, “Introduction to LNG,” Center for Energy Economics, University of Texas at Austin, January
2007, p. 5.
10
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “Significant Pipeline Incidents,” Web page, January 25,
2010. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SigPSI.html
11
Ibid.
12
National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report PAR-03-01, February 2003.
13
See, for example: Bellingham Herald Editorial Board, “Citizen Need Panel To Monitor Pipeline Safety,” Bellingham
Herald (WA), Januray 24, 2010; Janet Zink, “Fueling the Resistance,” St. Petersburg Times, December 16, 2007; W.
Loy, “Slope Mayor Questions Leak Detection,” Anchorage Daily News, March 14, 2006; J. Nesmith and R. K. M.
Haurwitz, “Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,” Austin American-Statesman, July 22, 2001.
14
J.L. Shreeve, “Science & Technology: The Enemy Within,” The Independent. London, UK, May 31, 2006, p. 8.
15
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-971, September 2005, p. 15; Stratfor
(continued...)
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bomb gas pipelines and other utilities across the city.16 Militants in Nigeria have repeatedly
attacked pipelines and related facilities, including the simultaneous bombing of three oil pipelines
in May, 2007.17 A Mexican rebel group similarly detonated bombs along Mexican oil and natural
gas pipelines in July and September, 2007.18 In June, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice
arrested members of a terrorist group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the
John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New York.19 Natural gas pipelines in British
Columbia, Canada, were bombed six times between October 2008 and July 2009 by unknown
perpetrators.20
Since September 11, 2001, federal warnings about Al Qaeda have mentioned pipelines
specifically as potential terror targets in the United States. 21 One U.S. pipeline of particular
concern and with a history of terrorist and vandal activity is the Trans Alaska Pipeline System
(TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in
Valdez. TAPS runs some 800 miles and delivers nearly 17% of United States domestic oil
production.22 In 1999, Vancouver police arrested a man planning to blow up TAPS for personal
profit in oil futures.23 In 2001, a vandal’s attack on TAPS with a high-powered rifle forced a twoday shutdown and caused extensive economic and ecological damage.24 In January 2006, federal
authorities acknowledged the discovery of a detailed posting on a website purportedly linked to
Al Qaeda that reportedly encouraged attacks on U.S. pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons
or hidden explosives. 25 In November 2007 a U.S. citizen was convicted of trying to conspire with
Al Qaeda to attack TAPS and a major natural gas pipeline in the eastern United States.26 To date,
there have been no known Al Qaeda attacks on TAPS or other U.S. pipelines, but such attacks
remain a possibility.
(...continued)
Forecasting, Inc.,” Colombia: The FARC’s Low-Level Pipeline Campaign,” Stratfor Today, June 23, 2008.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/colombia_farcs_low_level_pipeline_campaign?ip_auth_redirect=1
16
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s
Infrastructures, Washington, DC, October 1997.
17
K. Houreld, “Militants Say 3 Nigeria Pipelines Bombed,” Associated Press, May 8, 2007.
18
Reed Johnson, “Six Pipelines Blown Up in Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2007. p A-3.
19
U.S. Dept. of Justice, “Four Individuals Charged in Plot to bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport,” Press
release, June 2, 2007.
20
Elise Stolte, “EnCana Puts Record $1M on Bomber’s Head,” Edmonton Journal, July 31, 2009.
21
“Already Hard at Work on Security, Pipelines Told of Terrorist Threat,” Inside FERC, McGraw-Hill Companies,
January 3, 2002.
22
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Internet page, Anchorage, AK, February 8, 2009. http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/
about.html.
23
D. S. Cloud, “A Former Green Beret’s Plot to Make Millions Through Terrorism,” Ottawa Citizen, December 24,
1999, p. E15.
24
Y. Rosen, “Alaska Critics Take Potshots at Line Security,” Houston Chronicle, February 17, 2002.
25
W. Loy, “Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,” Anchorage Daily News, January 19, 2006.
26
U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, “Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support
to Al-Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years’ Imprisonment,” Press release, November 6, 2007; A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman,
“Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 2006, p. A1.
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Office of Pipeline Safety
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481) and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act
of 1979 (P.L. 96-129) are two of the key early acts establishing the federal role in pipeline safety.
Under both statutes, the Transportation Secretary is given primary authority to regulate key
aspects of interstate pipeline safety: design, construction, operation and maintenance, and spill
response planning. Pipeline safety regulations are covered in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.27 The DOT administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) within the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The OPS
has approximately 200 full-time equivalent staff, including inspectors, based in Washington,
D.C., Atlanta, Kansas City, Houston, and Denver.28 In addition to its own staff, PHMSA’s
enabling legislation allows the agency to delegate authority to intrastate pipeline safety offices,
and allows state offices to act as “agents” administering interstate pipeline safety programs
(excluding enforcement) for those sections of interstate pipelines within their boundaries.29 Over
400 state pipeline safety inspectors are available in 2010.
PHMSA’s pipeline safety program is funded primarily by user fees assessed on a per-mile basis
on each regulated pipeline operator (49 U.S.C. § 60107). P.L. 109-468 authorizes annual pipeline
safety program expenditures (§ 18) of $79.0 million in FY2007, $86.2 million in FY2008, $91.5
million in FY2009, and $96.5 million in FY2010. The President’s FY2010 budget request
included $105.2 million for pipeline safety.30 The FY2011 budget requests $111.1 million.31
PHMSA uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance with its safety standards. The agency
conducts physical inspections of facilities and construction projects; conducts programmatic
inspections of management systems, procedures, and processes; investigates safety incidents, and
maintains a dialogue with pipeline operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations
through published protocols and regulatory orders, guidance manuals, and public meetings.
PHMSA relies upon a range of enforcement actions, including administrative actions and civil
penalties, to ensure that operators correct safety violations and take measures to preclude future
safety problems. From 2005 through 2009, PHMSA initiated over 1,300 enforcement actions
against pipeline operators. Civil penalties proposed by PHMSA for safety violations during this
period totaled approximately $27.4 million.32 PHMSA also conducts accident investigations and
systemwide reviews focusing on high-risk operational or procedural problems and areas of the
pipeline near sensitive environmental areas, high-density populations, or navigable waters.
Since 1997, PHMSA has increasingly encouraged industry’s implementation of “integrity
management” programs on pipeline segments near “high consequence” areas. Integrity
27
Safety and security of liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities used in gas pipeline transportation is regulated under
CFR Title 49, Part 193.
28
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011: Appendix,
February 2010, p. 989.
29
49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for these programs from the federal government.
30
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010: Appendix,
February 2009, p. 952.
31
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, February 2010, p. 988.
32
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program: Summary of
Enforcement Actions,” Web page, January 25, 2010. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/
Actions_opid_0.html
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management provides for continual evaluation of pipeline condition; assessment of risks to the
pipeline; inspection or testing; data analysis; and followup repair, as well as preventive or
mitigative actions. High-consequence areas include population centers, commercially navigable
waters, and environmentally sensitive areas, such as drinking water supplies or ecological
reserves. The integrity management approach directs priority resources to locations of highest
consequence rather than applying uniform treatment to the entire pipeline network.33 PHMSA
made integrity management programs mandatory for most operators with 500 or more miles of
regulated oil pipeline as of March 31, 2001 (49 C.F.R. § 195).
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002
On December 12, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-355). The act strengthened federal pipeline safety programs, state oversight of
pipeline operators, and public education regarding pipeline safety.34 Among other provisions, P.L.
107-355 required operators of regulated gas pipelines in high-consequence areas to conduct risk
analysis and implement integrity management programs similar to those required for oil
pipelines. 35 The act authorized the DOT to order safety actions for pipelines with potential safety
problems (§ 7) and increased violation penalties (§ 8). The act streamlined the permitting process
for emergency pipeline restoration by establishing an interagency committee, including the DOT,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and other agencies, to ensure coordinated review and permitting of
pipeline repairs (§ 16). The act required DOT to study ways to limit pipeline safety risks from
population encroachment and ways to preserve environmental resources in pipeline rights-of-way
(§ 11). P.L. 107-355 also included provisions for public education, grants for community pipeline
safety studies, “whistle blower” and other employee protection, employee qualification programs,
and mapping data submission.
OPS Pipeline Security Activities
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), issued during the Clinton administration, assigned
lead responsibility for pipeline security to the DOT.36 At the time, these responsibilities fell to the
OPS, at that time a part of the DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA),
since the agency was already addressing some elements of pipeline security in its role as safety
regulator. In 2002, the OPS conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify critical pipeline
facilities and worked with industry groups and state pipeline safety organizations “to assess the
33
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Pipeline Safety. Pipeline Integrity Management in High
Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators with 500 or More Miles of Pipeline), Federal Register, December 1,
2000, p. 75378.
34
P.L. 107-355 encourages the implementation of state “one-call” excavation notification programs (§ 2) and allows
states to enforce “one-call” program requirements. The act expands criminal responsibility for pipeline damage to cases
where damage was not caused “knowingly and willfully” (§ 3). The act adds provisions for ending federal-state
pipeline oversight partnerships if states do not comply with federal requirements (§ 4).
35
A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that PHMSA’s gas integrity management program
benefitted public safety, although the report recommended revisions to PHMSA’s performance measures. See GAO.
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures
Should Be Improved, GAO-06-946, September 8, 2006, pp. 2-3.
36
Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998.
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industry’s readiness to prepare for, withstand and respond to a terrorist attack.... ”37 Together with
the Department of Energy and state pipeline agencies, the OPS promoted the development of
consensus standards for security measures tiered to correspond with the five levels of threat
warnings issued by the Office of Homeland Security.38 The OPS also developed protocols for
inspections of critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate security
practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the OPS established a variety of
communication links to key staff at the most critical pipeline facilities throughout the country.
The OPS also began identifying near-term technology to enhance deterrence, detection, response,
and recovery, and began seeking to advance public and private sector planning for response and
recovery. 39
On September 5, 2002, the OPS circulated formal guidance developed in cooperation with the
pipeline industry associations defining the agency’s security program recommendations and
implementation expectations. This guidance recommended that operators identify critical
facilities, develop security plans consistent with prior trade association security guidance,
implement these plans, and review them annually.40 While the guidance was voluntary, the OPS
expected compliance and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing security programs
within 12 months, potentially as part of more comprehensive safety inspections. 41
In November 2004, the President signed the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs
Improvement Act (P.L. 108-426), which eliminated RSPA and placed the Office of Pipeline
Safety under the new Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration. This administrative
restructuring did not significantly affect the authorities or activities of the OPS.
Transportation Security Administration
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 10771) establishing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the DOT. According to
TSA, the act placed the DOT’s pipeline security authority (under PDD-63) within TSA. The act
specified for TSA a range of duties and powers related to general transportation security, such as
intelligence management, threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Among other provisions, the act transferred to DHS the Transportation Security Administration
from the DOT (§ 403). On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing, and protecting critical infrastructure.42 HSPD-7 maintains DHS as the lead agency
for pipeline security (par. 15), and instructs the DOT to “collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines)” (par. 22h). The order
37
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), RSPA Pipeline Security Preparedness, December 2001.
Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 19, 2002.
39
Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), statement before the
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, February 13, 2002.
40
James K. O’Steen, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Implementation of RSPA Security
Guidance, presentation to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 25, 2003.
41
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June 10, 2003.
42
HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (par. 37).
38
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requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with “appropriate private sector entities”
in sharing information and protecting critical infrastructure (par. 25). TSA joined both the Energy
Government Coordinating Council and the Transportation Government Coordinating Council
under provisions in HSPD-7. The missions of the councils are to work with their industry
counterparts to coordinate critical infrastructure protection programs in the energy and
transportation sectors, respectively, and to facilitate the sharing of security information.
TSA Pipeline Security Plan
HSPD-7 also required DHS to develop a national plan for critical infrastructure and key resources
protection (par. 27), which the agency issued in 2006 as the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP). The NIPP, in turn, required each critical infrastructure sector to develop a Sector
Specific Plan (SSP) that describes strategies to protect its critical infrastructure, outlines a
coordinated approach to strengthen its security efforts, and determines appropriate funding for
these activities. Executive Order 13416 further required the transportation sector SSP to prepare
annexes for each mode of surface transportation with the following information:
•
identification of existing security guidelines, requirements, and gaps,
•
description of how the SSP plan will be implemented for each mode,
•
respective roles of government entities and the private sector,
•
processes for review of information sharing mechanisms, and
•
processes for assessing security guideline compliance and revision.43
In accordance with the above requirements the TSA issued its Transportation Systems Sector
Specific Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex in May, 2007.
TSA Pipeline Security Activities
Pipeline security activities at TSA are led by the Pipeline Security Division (PSD) within the
agency’s Office of Transportation Sector Network Management. 44 According to the agency’s
Pipeline Modal Annex (PMA), TSA has been engaged in a number of specific pipeline security
initiatives since 2003 as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.TSA Pipeline Security Initiatives
Initiative
Description
Participants0
Pipeline Policy and
Planning
Coordination, development, implementation, and monitoring of
pipeline security plans
TSA, DHS, DOT,
DOE
Sector Coordinating
Councils and Joint
Sector Committee
Government partners coordinate interagency and crossjurisdictional implementation of critical infrastructure security
TSA, DOE, Other
agencies, Industry
Corporate Security
On-site reviews of pipeline operator security
TSA, Industry
43
Executive Order 13416, “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security,” December 5, 2006.
These offices were formerly known as the Pipeline Security Program Office and the Intermodal Security Program
Office, respectively.
44
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Initiative
Description
Participants0
Pipeline System Risk
Tool
Statistical tool used for relative risk ranking and prioritizing CSR
findings
TSA, Industry
Pipeline Cross-Border
Vulnerability
Assessment
U.S. and Canadian security assessment and planning for critical
cross-border pipeline
TSA, Canada
Regional Gas Pipeline
Studies
Regional supply studies for key natural gas markets
TSA, DOE, INGAA,
GTI, NETL, Industry
Cyber Attack
Awareness
Training/presentations on Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system vulnerabilities
TSA, GTI
Landscape Depiction
and Analysis Tool
Incorporates depiction of the pipeline domain with risk analysis
components
TSA
International Pipeline
Security Forums
International forums for U.S. and Canadian governments and
pipeline industry officials convened annually
TSA, Canada, Other
agencies, Industry
“G8” Multinational
Security Assessment and
Planning
Multinational-sharing of pipeline threat assessment methods,
advisory levels, effective practices, and vulnerability information;
also develops a G8-based contingency planning guidance
document
TSA, DHS, State
Dept., G8 Nations
Pipeline Security Drills
Facilitation of pipeline security drills and exercises
TSA, Industry
Security Awareness
Training
Informational compact discs about pipeline security issues and
improvised explosive devices
TSA
Stakeholder Conference
Calls
Periodic information-sharing conference calls between key
pipeline security stakeholders
TSA, Other agencies,
Industry
Pipeline Blast Mitigation
Studies
Explosives tests on various pipe configurations to determine
resiliency characteristics
TSA, DOD, Other
agencies
Virtual Library Pipeline
Site
Development of TSA information-sharing Web portal
TSA
Reviews (CSR)
Sources: Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Modal Annex, June 2007, pp. 10-11,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Transportation_Pipeline_Modal_Annex_5_21_07.pdf; Transportation
Security Administration, Personal communication, February 2, 2010.
a.
Key: DHS = Dept. Of Homeland Security, DOE = Dept. of Energy, G8 = Group of Eight (U.S., U.K.,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia),GTI = Gas Technology Institute, INGAA = Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America, NETL = National Energy Technology Laboratory, TSA =
Transportation Security Administration.
In 2003, TSA initiated its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program, wherein the agency visits
the largest pipeline and natural gas distribution operators to review their security plans and
inspect their facilities. During the reviews, TSA evaluates whether each company is following the
intent of the OPS security guidance, and seeks to collect the list of assets each company had
identified meeting the criteria established for critical facilities. In 2004, the DOT reported that the
plans reviewed to date (approximately 25) had been “judged responsive to the OPS guidance.”45
As of February 2010, TSA had completed CSR’s covering all of the largest 100 pipeline systems
(84% of total U.S. energy pipeline throughput) and had completed revisits of 41 systems
45
Department of Transportation (DOT), “Action Taken and Actions Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety,” CC-2004061, June 16, 2004, p. 21.
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determined to be at highest risk. The agency plans to conduct 12 additional CSR’s in 2010.46
According to TSA, recent CSR results indicate that the majority of U.S. pipeline systems
“continue to do a good job in regards to pipeline security” although there are areas in which
pipeline security can be improved.47 Past CSR reviews have identified inadequacies in some
company security programs such as not updating security plans, lack of management support,
poor employee involvement, inadequate threat intelligence, and employee apathy or error.48
In addition to the initiatives in Table 1, TSA has worked to establish qualifications for personnel
seeking unrestricted access to critical pipeline assets and has developed its own inventory of
critical pipeline infrastructure.49 The agency has also addressed legal issues regarding recovery
from terrorist attacks, such as FBI control of crime scenes and eminent domain in pipeline
restoration. In October 2005, TSA issued an overview of recommended security practices for
pipeline operators “for informational purposes only ... not intended to replace security measures
already implemented by individual companies.”50 The agency released revised guidance on
security best practices at the end of 2006, and is currently reviewing an updated version for
possible release in 2010.51 The guidelines include a section on cybersecurity developed with the
assistance of the Applied Physics Laboratory of John Hopkins University as well as other
government and industry stakeholders.52
The mission of TSA’s Pipeline Security Division (PSD) currently includes developing security
standards; implementing measures to mitigate security risk; building and maintaining stakeholder
relations, coordination, education and outreach; and monitoring compliance with security
standards, requirements, and regulations. The President’s FY2011 budget request for DHS does
not include a separate line item for TSA’s pipeline security activities. The budget request does
include a $137.6 million line item for “Surface Transportation Security,” which encompasses
security activities in non-aviation transportation modes, including pipelines.53 The PSD has
traditionally received from the agency’s general operational budget an allocation for routine
operations such as regulation development, travel, and outreach. According to the PSD, the
budget funds 13 full-time equivalent staff within the office. These staff will conduct pipeline
security inspections, maintain TSA’s asset database, support TSA’s multi-modal risk models,
develop new security standards, and issue regulations, as required. 54
In January, 2007 testimony before Congress, the TSA Administrator stated that the agency
intended to conduct a pipeline infrastructure study to identify the “highest risk” pipeline assets,
building upon such a list developed through the CSR program. He also stated that the agency
would use its ongoing security review process to determine the future implementation of baseline
46
Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 2, 2010.
Ibid.
48
Mike Gillenwater, TSA, “Pipeline Security Overview,” Presented to the Alabama Public Service Commission Gas
Pipeline Safety Seminar, Montgomery, AL, December 11, 2007.
49
TSA, TSA Multi-Modal Criticality Evaluation Tool, TSA Threat Assessment and Risk Management Program, slide
presentation, April 15, 2003.
50
TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, Pipeline Security Best Practices, October 19, 2005, p. 1.
51
Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 2, 2010.
52
Ibid.
47
53
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011: Appendix,
February 2010, p. 526.
54
Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, February 2, 2010.
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risk standards against which to set measurable pipeline risk reduction targets.55 Provisions in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) require TSA,
in consultation with PHMSA, to develop a plan for the federal government to provide increased
security support to the “most critical” pipelines at high or severe security alert levels and when
there is specific security threat information relating to such pipeline infrastructure (§ 1558(a)(1)).
The act also requires a recovery protocol plan in the event of an incident affecting the interstate
and intrastate pipeline system (§ 1558(a)(2)). According to TSA, a draft plan has been completed
and is currently under review in the TSA/DHS clearance process. 56
In December 2008, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested a
study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examining TSA’s efforts to ensure
pipeline security. Among other issues, the study will examine TSA’s use of risk assessment and
risk information in securing pipelines, actions the agency has taken to improve pipeline security
under guidance in the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), and the agency’s efforts to
measure such security improvement efforts. GAO anticipates completing its study in June 2010.57
Security Incident Investigations
In addition to the above pipeline security initiatives, the TSA Pipeline Security Division has
performed a limited number of vulnerability assessments and has supported investigations for
specific companies and assets where intelligence information has suggested potential terrorist
activity. The PSD, along with the PHMSA, was involved in the investigation of an August, 2006
security breach at an LNG peak-shaving plant in Lynn, MA.58 Although not a terrorist incident,
the security breach involved the penetration of intruders through several security barriers and
alert systems, permitting them to access the main LNG storage tank at the facility. The PSD also
became aware of the JFK airport terrorist plot in its early stages and supported the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s associated investigation. The PSD engaged the private sector in helping to
assess potential targets and determine potential consequences. The PSD worked with the pipeline
company to keep it informed about the plot, discuss its security practices, and review its
emergency response plans. 59
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
One area related to pipeline safety and security not under either PHMSA’s or TSA’s primary
jurisdiction is the siting approval of new gas pipelines, which is the responsibility of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Companies building interstate natural gas pipelines
must first obtain from FERC certificates of public convenience and necessity. (FERC does not
oversee oil pipeline construction.) FERC must also approve the abandonment of gas facility use
55
Hawley, Kip, Asst. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
56
Transportation Security Administration, personal communication, February 2, 2010.
57
Government Accountability Office, GAO Watchdog, “Transportation Security’s Efforts To Ensure Pipeline
Security,” Assignment No. 440768, Internet database, February 4, 2010.
58
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From a
Security Breach at a Liquefied Natural Gas Facility,” Docket No. PHMSA-04-19856, Federal Register, Vol. 71, No.
249, December 28, 2006, p. 78269; TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, August 30,
2006.
59
TSA, July 6, 2007.
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and services. These approvals may include safety and security provisions with respect to pipeline
routing, safety standards and other factors.60 As a practical matter, however, FERC has
traditionally left these considerations to the other agencies.61
On September 14, 2001, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) notified FERCregulated companies that it would “approve applications proposing the recovery of prudently
incurred costs necessary to further safeguard the nation’s energy systems and infrastructure” in
response to the terror attacks of 9/11. FERC also committed to “expedite the processing on a
priority basis of any application that would specifically recover such costs from wholesale
customers.” Companies could propose a surcharge over currently existing rates or some other cost
recovery method. 62 In FY2005, the commission processed security cost recovery requests from 14
oil pipelines and 3 natural gas pipelines. 63 The FERC’s FY2006 annual report states that “the
Commission continues to give the highest priority to deciding any requests made for the recovery
of extraordinary expenditures to safeguard the reliability and security of the Nation’s energy
transportation systems and energy supply infrastructure.”64 The FY2007 and FY2008 annual
reports do not mention pipeline security.
In February 2003, FERC handed down a new rule (RM02-4-000) to protect critical energy
infrastructure information (CEII). The rule defines CEII as information that “must relate to
critical infrastructure, be potentially useful to terrorists, and be exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.” According to the rule, critical infrastructure is “existing and
proposed systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which
would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.” CEII excludes “information that identifies the location of infrastructure.” The rule
also establishes procedures for the public to request and obtain such critical information, and
applies both to proposed and existing infrastructure.65
On May 14, 2003, FERC handed down new rules (RM03-4) facilitating the restoration of
pipelines after a terrorist attack. The rules allow owners of a damaged pipeline to use blanket
certificate authority to immediately start rebuilding, regardless of project cost, even outside
existing rights-of-way. Pipeline owners would still need to notify landowners and comply with
environmental laws. Prior rules limited blanket authority to $17.5 million projects and 45-day
advance notice. 66
Key Policy Issues
The 111th Congress is overseeing the implementation of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006 (P.L. 109-468) and pipeline security provisions in the Implementing Recommendations of
60
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 18 C.F.R. 157.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), personal communication, May 22, 2003.
62
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-01-38, Washington, DC, September 14, 2001.
61
63
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2005,
2006, p. 19. These are the most recent specific figures reported.
64
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report FY2006,
2007, p. 23.
65
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), News release, R-03-08, Washington, DC. February 20, 2003.
66
Schmollinger, Christian, “FERC OKs Emergency Reconstruction,” Natural Gas Week, May 13, 2003.
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the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). It is also considering several new legislative
proposals, further discussed below. In its ongoing oversight of federal pipeline safety and security
activities, Congress may examine a number of key issues which have drawn particular attention
in policy debate.
Pipeline Damage Prevention
According to PHMSA statistics, excavation damage was the single greatest cause of accidents
among all pipeline systems between 1989 and 2008.67 Some policy makers have proposed the
establishment of federal civil penalties for violations of state “one-call” notification programs to
prevent excavation damage to underground pipelines. Other stakeholders have argued that such
enforcement is best performed by state regulators responsible for administering one-call programs
rather than by the federal government, unless the federal government determines that a state’s
enforcement efforts are ineffective. 68 Consistent with this approach, P.L. 109-468 prohibits
federal enforcement in states already imposing such penalties (§ 2). The act also authorizes grants
to states (and certain municipalities) for improving damage prevention programs if the states have
been certified (under 49 U.S.C. § 60105-60106) or can demonstrate that they are establishing an
“effective” program, as subsequently defined (§ 2).
On October 29, 2009, PHMSA issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR)
seeking comments on proposed regulations which would establish criteria for determining
adequate state enforcement of pipeline damage prevention laws. 69 According to one legal
analysis, this ANOPR “is the first step in a rulemaking process that could lead to the
implementation of new civil penalty enforcement authority against excavators who may cause
damage to pipelines” in the absence of enforcement action by the state where the events occurred.
Comments on the ANOPR were due by December 14, 2009. The agency has not yet issued a final
rule. The timing and effectiveness of PHMSA’s new regulations may be an oversight
consideration for Congress.
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations
Pipelines operated at less than 20% of the specified minimum strength of the material from which
they are constructed are classified as “low-stress” pipelines under 49 C.F.R. § 195.2. The
regulation of low-stress pipeline regulations has come under greater Congressional scrutiny since
March 2006, after a spill from a BP oil pipeline led to the partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay
area oil field on the North Slope of Alaska. In its March 15, 2006, Corrective Action Order,
PHMSA found that BP’s pipelines met the definition of a “hazardous pipeline facility” under 49
U.S.C. § 60112(a), which grants general authority under the statute, but that specific federal
pipeline safety regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195 did not apply at that time because BP’s
pipelines were classified as “low-stress” and fell under the exception in 49 C.F.R. § 195.1(b)(3).70
67
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., “Damage Prevention,” Web page, October 14, 2009,
http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/DamagePrevention.htm?nocache=403.
68
Felt, T., President and CEO, Explorer Pipeline, Statement before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act, July 27, 2006.
69
Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration, “Pipeline Safety: Pipeline
Damage Prevention Programs,” 74 Federal Register 55798, October 29, 2009.
70
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Admin. (PHMSA), Corrective Action Order in the Matter of BP Exploration
(continued...)
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P.L. 109-468 required PHMSA to promulgate final regulations for low-stress hazardous liquids
pipelines by December 31, 2007 (§ 4). The agency issued the final regulations effective July 3,
2008.71 In overseeing the implementation of PHMSA’s final criteria for low-stress pipeline
regulation, Congress may consider the balance between the potential safety benefits and the
potential costs of stricter safety programs in light of BP’s pipeline problems and potential
problems among similar pipeline systems elsewhere in the United States.
PHMSA Safety Enforcement
The adequacy of the PHMSA’s enforcement strategy has been an ongoing concern of Congress,
particularly after the fatal pipeline accidents in Washington and New Mexico. Provisions in the
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355) put added scrutiny on the effectiveness
of the agency’s enforcement strategy and assessment of civil penalties (§ 8). In March 2006
testimony before Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that PHMSA
had adopted measures that appeared to be responsive to earlier concerns about enforcement,
although the GAO had not reviewed the strategy or its implementation in depth. 72
In April 2006, PHMSA testified before Congress that the agency had institutionalized a “toughbut-fair” approach to enforcement, “imposing and collecting larger penalties, while guiding
pipeline operators to enhance higher performance.”73 According to the agency, $4.6 million in
proposed civil penalties in 2005 was three times greater than penalties proposed in 2003, the first
year higher penalties could be imposed under P.L. 107-355 (§ 8(a)).74 P.L. 109-468 required the
agency to issue monthly summaries of PHMSA enforcement actions including violation and
penalty information for each action, and provide a mechanism for pipeline operators to make
response information available to the public (§ 6). To meet these requirements, PHMSA has
established an Internet portal with pipeline safety enforcement information. 75 Proposed penalties
totaled $6.5 million in 2009 including a reported $2.3 million fine—the largest single fine in the
agency’s history—levied against El Paso Corporation stemming from a 2006 fatal pipeline
accident near Cheyenne, Wyoming. 76
(...continued)
(Alaska), Inc., Respondent, CPF No. 5-2006-5015H, March 15, 2006.
71
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “Protecting Unusually Sensitive Areas From
Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering Lines and Low-Stress Lines: Final Rule,” PHMSA—RSPA—2003—
15864, Federal Register, Vol. 73, June 3, 2008. p. 31634.
72
Siggerud, K. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines hearing on Pipeline Safety, GAO-06-474T,
March 16, 2006, p. 11.
73
Gerard, S.L., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Admin.(PHMSA), Testimony before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee hearing on Pipeline Safety, Serial No. 109-84, April 27,
2006, p. 14.
74
Ibid.
75
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA), “PHMSA Pipeline Safety Program:
Enforcement,” Web page, May 15, 2007. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/Enforcement.html
76
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (PHMSA), “Civil Penalty Cases: Nationwide,” Web page, January
25, 2010. http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/CivilPenalty_opid_0.html?nocache=4013; “Colorado
Pipeline Company Fined 2.3 Million After Explosion,” Clean Skies News, December 1, 2009.
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TSA and PHMSA Cooperation
Congress has long raised questions about the appropriate responsibilities and division of pipeline
security authority between PHMSA and TSA.77 Both PHMSA and TSA have played important
roles in the federal pipeline security program, with TSA the designated lead agency since 2002. In
2004, the DOT and DHS entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning their
respective security roles in all modes of transportation. The MOU notes that DHS has the primary
responsibility for transportation security with support from the DOT, and establishes a general
framework for cooperation and coordination. The MOU states that “specific tasks and areas of
responsibility that are appropriate for cooperation will be documented in annexes ... individually
approved and signed by appropriate representatives of DHS and DOT.”78 On August 9, 2006, the
departments signed an annex “to delineate clear lines of authority and responsibility and promote
communications, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort through cooperation and collaboration
between the parties in the area of transportation security.”79
In January, 2007, the PHMSA Administrator testified before Congress that the agency had
established a joint working group with TSA “to improve interagency coordination on
transportation security and safety matters, and to develop and advance plans for improving
transportation security,” presumably including pipeline security. 80 According to TSA, the working
group developed a multi-year action plan specifically delineating roles, responsibilities, resources
and actions to execute 11 program elements: identification of critical infrastructure/key resources
and risk assessments; strategic planning; developing regulations and guidelines; conducting
inspections and enforcement; providing technical support; sharing information during
emergencies; communications; stakeholder relations; research and development; legislative
matters; and budgeting.81
P.L. 109-468 required the DOT Inspector General (IG) to assess the pipeline security actions
taken by the DOT in implementing its 2004 MOU with the DHS (§ 23). The Inspector General
published this assessment in May 2008. The IG report stated that
PHMSA and TSA have taken initial steps toward formulating an action plan to implement
the provisions of the pipeline security annex.... However, further actions need to be taken
with a sense of urgency because the current situation is far from an “end state” for enhancing
the security of the Nation’s pipelines.82
77
For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006.
78
Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. of Transportation (DOT), Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation on Roles and Responsibilities, September 28,
2004, p. 4.
79
Transportation Security Admin. and Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., “Transportation Security
Administration and Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials Transportation Security,” August 9, 2006.
80
Barrett, T.J., Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Testimony before
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface
Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
81
Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, July 6, 2007.
82
U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Actions Needed to Enhance Pipeline Security, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Report No. AV-2008-053, May 21, 2008, p. 3.
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The report recommended that PHMSA and TSA finalize and execute their security annex action
plan, clarify their respective roles specifically in LNG facility security, and jointly develop a
pipeline security strategy that maximizes the effectiveness of their respective capabilities and
efforts.83 According to TSA, working with PHMSA “improved drastically” after the release of the
IG report; the two agencies began to maintain daily contact, share information in a timely manner,
and collaborate on security guidelines and incident response planning.84 According to the agency,
TSA and PHMSA “continue to enjoy a 24/7 communication and coordination relationship in
regards to all pipeline security and safety incidents.”85
While TSA and PHMSA appear to have recently improved their cooperation under the terms of
the pipeline security annex, questions remain regarding what this cooperation entails and the
ongoing roles of the two agencies with respect to pipeline security. In particular, given the limited
staff in TSA’s pipeline security division, and the comparatively large pipeline safety staff
(especially field inspectors) in PHMSA, Congress may consider whether the TSA-PHMSA
pipeline security annex optimally aligns staff resources across both agencies to fulfill the nation’s
overall pipeline safety and security mission. H.R. 2200 would require a study reexamining the
roles and responsibilities of DHS and DOT with respect to pipeline security (§ 406).
Pipeline Security Regulations
As noted earlier in this report, federal pipeline security activities to date have relied upon
voluntary industry compliance with PHMSA security guidance and TSA security best practices.
By initiating this voluntary approach, PHMSA sought to speed adoption of security measures by
industry and avoid the publication of sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset lists) that
would normally be required in public rulemaking.86 Provisions in P.L. 109-468 require the DOT
Inspector General to “address the adequacy of security standards for gas and oil pipelines” (§
23(b)(4)). P.L. 110-53 similarly directs TSA to promulgate pipeline security regulations and carry
out necessary inspection and enforcement—if the agency determines that regulations are
appropriate (§ 1557(d)). Addressing this issue the 2008 IG report states that
TSA’s current security guidance is not mandatory and remains unenforceable unless a
regulation is issued to require industry compliance.... PHMSA and TSA will need to conduct
covert tests of pipeline systems’ vulnerabilities to assess the current guidance as well as the
operators’ compliance.87
Although TSA’s FY2005 budget justification stated that the agency would “issue regulations
where appropriate to improve the security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,” the agency
has not done so for pipelines, and is not currently working on such regulations.88 The pipelines
industry has expressed concern that new security regulations and related requirements may be
83
Ibid. pp. 5-6.
Transportation Security Administration, Personal communication, February 2, 2010.
85
TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, July 6, 2007.
86
GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication Needed, GAO-02-785,
August 2002, p. 22.
87
U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, May 21, 2008, p. 6.
84
88
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration Fiscal Year 2005 Congressional
Budget Justification, Washington, DC, February 2, 2004, p. 20; TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal
communication, February 17, 2009.
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“redundant” and “may not be necessary to increase pipeline security.”89 The PHMSA
Administrator in 2007 testified that enhancing security “does not necessarily mean that we must
impose regulatory requirements.”90 TSA officials have questioned the IG assertions regarding
pipeline security regulations, particularly the IG’s call for covert testing of pipeline operator
security measures. They have argued that the agency is complying with the letter of P.L. 110-53
and that its pipeline operator security reviews are more than paper reviews. 91 In accordance with
P.L. 110-53 (§ 1557 (b)), has been implementing a multi-year program of pipeline system
inspections, including documentation of findings and follow up reviews.92 In its oversight of
potential pipeline security regulations, Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of the current
voluntary pipeline security standards based on findings from the TSA’s CSR reviews, pipeline
inspections, and future DOT Inspector General reports.
TSA Pipelines Security Resources
Congress has been critical in the past of TSA’s funding of non-aviation security activities,
including pipeline activities. For example, as one Member remarked in 2005, “aviation security
has received 90% of TSA’s funds and virtually all of its attention. There is simply not enough
being done to address ... pipeline security.”93 At its current staffing level, TSA’s Pipelines Security
Division has limited field presence for inspections and possible enforcement of future regulations.
In conducting a pipeline corporate security review, for example, TSA typically sends one to three
staff to hold a three- to four-hour interview with the operator’s security representatives followed
by a visit to only one or two of the operator’s pipeline assets.94
TSA’s plan to focus security inspections on the largest pipeline and distribution system operators
seeks to make the best use of its limited resources. However, there is concern that the agency’s
CSRs as currently structured may not allow for rigorous security plan verification nor a credible
threat of enforcement, so operator compliance with security guidance may be inadequate, leaving
the pipeline network as a whole less secure than it might be with more universal inspection and
enforcement coverage. The limited number of CSRs the agency can complete in a year is also a
concern. According to a 2009 GAO report, “TSA’s pipeline division stated that they would like
more staff in order to conduct its corporate security reviews more frequently,” and “analyzing
secondary or indirect consequences of a terrorist attack and developing strategic risk objectives
required much time and effort.”95
89
American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and
American Public Gas Association (APGA), joint letter to members of the Senate Commerce Committee providing
views on S. 1052, August 22, 2005.
90
Barrett, T.J. January 18, 2007.
91
Sammon, John, Transportation Security Administration, Testimony before the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee hearing on Implementation of
the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006, June 24, 2008.
92
TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, February 17, 2009.
93
Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
hearing on the President’s FY2006 Budget Request for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), February 15,
2005.
94
Department of Homeland Security, “Intent to Request Approval from OMB of One New Public Collection of
Information: Pipeline Corporate Security Review,” 74 Federal Register 42086, August 20, 2009.
95
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger
Internal Controls Needed to Help Infrom TSA Resource Allocation, GAO-09-492, March 2009, p. 30,
(continued...)
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P.L. 110-53 specifically authorizes funding of $2 million annually through FY2010 for TSA’s
pipeline security inspections and enforcement program (§ 1557(e)). It is an open question whether
$2 million annually is sufficient to enable TSA to meet congressional expectations for federal
pipeline security activities.
Additional Issues
In addition to the issues mentioned above, Congress may consider several issues related to
proposed legislation or otherwise raised by pipeline stakeholders.
Distribution Integrity Management
As noted earlier in this report, integrity management programs were mandated for oil
transmission pipelines in 2001 and for natural gas transmission pipelines in 2003. Congress and
other stakeholders have since sought to extend these regulations to natural gas distribution
pipelines, such as those operated by regional natural gas utilities. Because distribution pipelines
are designed and operate differently from transmission lines, PHMSA has been developing
approaches to structuring unique regulations for distribution systems. Natural gas distribution
companies have sought flexible, risk-based options in any future integrity management
regulations directed at distribution systems.96 P.L. 109-468 mandated the promulgation by
PHMSA of minimum standards for integrity management programs for distribution pipelines by
December 31, 2007 (§ 9). PHMSA issued final regulations requiring operators of natural gas
distribution pipelines to adopt integrity management programs similar to existing requirements
for gas transmission pipelines on December 3, 2009.97 As PHMSA’s implementation of
distribution integrity management continues, Congress may pay particular attention to whether
compliance requirements balance the potential benefits of improved pipeline safety with the
potential costs to distribution pipeline operators.
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires that natural gas pipeline operators subject
to the act perform integrity management reassessments at least every seven years after an initial
baseline assessment (§ 14a). Some pipeline operators believe that this reassessment interval may
be too prescriptive and may not be appropriate for all pipelines. Operators argue that assessing
pipelines too frequently is costly and inefficient, diverting limited safety resources from other
uses with greater pipeline safety benefits.98 Based on assessments conducted through 2005, “and
the generally safe condition of gas transmission pipelines,” the GAO concluded in 2006 that the
seven year reassessment interval “appears to be conservative.”99 The GAO recommended that
(...continued)
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09492.pdf.
96
E. F. Bender, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006, p. 10.
97
U.S. Department of Transportation, “DOT Issues Much-Anticipated Rules to Enhance Pipeline Safety,” Office of
Public Affairs, Press release, December 3, 2009.
98
J. L. Mohn, Panhandle Energy, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on pipeline Safety, March 16, 2006, p. 9.
99
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Risk-Based Standards Should Allow
(continued...)
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Congress permit pipeline operators to reassess gas transmission pipelines at intervals based on
risk factors, technical data, and engineering analyses. The agency believed such a revision would
allow PHMSA more flexibility to establish longer or shorter reassessment intervals as warranted
by pipeline conditions. 100 According to PHMSA testimony in June 2008, the Secretary of
Transportation has corresponded with House Energy and Commerce committee regarding the
agency’s plans for exempting pipeline operators from the seven year interval requirement, but this
correspondence has not been released publicly.101 PHMSA has since concurred with the GAO’s
recommendation for extending reassessment intervals and is reviewing its authority to do so
through the grant of special permits to individual operators.102 S. 1333 would allow pipeline
integrity reassessment intervals to be changed from seven years to intervals based on “technical
data, risk factors, and engineering analysis” (§ 401).
Natural Gas Distribution Excess Flow Valves
Excess flow valves are safety devices located in pipelines which can automatically shut off the
pipeline flow in the event of a pipeline rupture. In this way, the valves can minimize the release of
hazardous liquids or gases during a pipeline accident, thereby reducing the likelihood or severity
of a fuel fire or explosion. P.L. 109-468 required PHMSA to promulgate minimum standards for
natural gas distribution systems requiring the installation of excess flow valves on new gas
distribution lines in single-family homes (§ 9). The agency issued final regulations for excess
flow valves as part of its final rule for natural gas distribution integrity management programs on
December 3, 2009.103 Some in Congress have proposed the extension of excess flow valve
requirements beyond single-family homes. 104
TSA Pipeline Security Information Collection
In 2009, TSA proposed collecting security-related information from pipeline operators, including
reports about security incidents (via the Transportation Security Operations Center). Among the
types of incidents that would be reported on a voluntary basis are “theft of pipeline company
vehicles, uniforms, or employee credentials” and various incidents or activities of a “suspicious”
nature.105 Some in industry have expressed concern that TSA’s proposed incident reporting
(...continued)
Operators to Better Tailor Reassessments to Pipeline Threats, GAO-06-945, September 8, 2006. p. 3.
100
Ibid. p. 6.
101
Gerard, Stacy, Asst. Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Testimony
before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Subcommittee hearing on Implementation of the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006,
June 24, 2008.
102
E. Komiskey, Office of Pipeline Safety, “High Consequence Areas and Pipeline Assessment Intervals,” Pipeline
Safety – What More Needs To Be Done?, Pipeline Safety Trust Conference, New Orleans, November 20, 2008.
103
U.S. Department of Transportation, “DOT Issues Much-Anticipated Rules to Enhance Pipeline Safety,” Office of
Public Affairs, Press release, December 3, 2009.
104
Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Nominations Hearing, 111th Cong., 1st sess., September 23, 2009.
105
Department of Homeland Security, “Intent to Request Approval from OMB for One New Public Collection of
Information: Pipeline Operator Security Information,” 74 Federal Register 37723, July 29, 2009.
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standards would expose them to civil liability and include “overbroad and unnecessary data
categories,” especially with respect to the term “suspicious,” which TSA does not define.106
In another 2009 filing, TSA proposes new procedures for members of the public to report to the
agency a problem, deficiency, or vulnerability regarding transportation security, including
pipeline transportation.107 The proposal would fulfill requirements for such a reporting
mechanism in P.L. 110-53(§ 1413, 1521, and 1536). H.R. 4016 would establish a working group
for the purpose of improving the collection and use of information about hazardous material
transportation incidents (§ 203) and would increase PHMSA staffing by 84 employees (§ 304) to
carry out its safety program. These provisions would apply to all modes of transportation,
presumably including pipelines. As Congress continues its oversight of federal pipeline security
and safety activities, it may seek to ensure that agencies are collecting pipeline incident
information efficiently and consistently without creating an undue burden on the providers or on
agency resources designated to utilize and maintain that information.
Conclusion
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security
since 2001. Although pipeline impacts on the environment remain a concern of some public
interest groups, both federal government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline
programs have been on the right track.
As oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues, questions may be raised
concerning the effectiveness of state pipeline damage prevention programs, the promulgation of
low-stress pipeline regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, the relationship between
DHS and the DOT with respect to pipeline security, and particular provisions in federal pipeline
safety regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the
various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation’s overall
strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. For example, diverting pipeline resources away
from safety to enhance security might further reduce terror risk, but not overall pipeline risk, if
safety programs become less effective as a result. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve
many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline
operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common
goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.
106
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, “Re: Intent to Request Approval from OMB of One New Public
Collection of Information: Pipeline Operator Security Information,” Letter to the Transportation Security
Administration, September 28, 2009, http://www.ingaa.org/cms/30/9093.aspx.
107
Department of Homeland Security, “Reporting of Security Issues,” 74 Federal Register 43088-43091, August 26,
2009.
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Author Contact Information
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
pparfomak@crs.loc.gov, 7-0030
Congressional Research Service
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.