Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
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Money Laundering: An Overview
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related
Federal Criminal Law
Updated January 29, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33315
SUMMARY
Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. §
1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
RL33315
January 29, 2026
Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in
This report provides an overview of the elements of federal criminal money laundering
statutes and the sanctions imposed for their violation. The most prominent is 18 U.S.C. § American Public Law
1956. Section 1956: outlaws (1) four kinds of money laundering of proceeds generated
by designated federal, state, and foreign underlying crimes (predicate offenses):
promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax evasion laundering (2) when committed
or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e., laundering involving certain financial
transactions, laundering involving international transfers, and stings). Its companion, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, prohibits
depositing or spending more than $10,000 of the proceeds from a predicate offense. Section 1956 violations are
punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years. Section 1957 carries a maximum penalty of
imprisonment for ten years. Property involved in either case is subject to confiscation. Misconduct that implicates
either offense may implicate other federal criminal statutes as well. Federal racketeer influenced and corrupt
organization (RICO) provisions outlaw acquiring or conducting the affairs of an enterprise (whose activities affect
interstate or foreign commerce) through the patterned commission of a series of underlying federal or state
crimes. RICO violations are also twenty-year felonies. The § 1956 predicate offense list automatically includes
every RICO predicate offense, including each “federal crime of terrorism.” A second related statute, the Travel
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), punishes interstate or foreign travel, or the use of interstate or foreign facilities,
conducted with the intent to distribute the proceeds of a more modest list of predicate offenses or to promote or
carry on such offenses when an overt act is committed in furtherance of that intent. Such misconduct is punishable
by imprisonment for not more than five years. Other federal statutes proscribe, with varying sanctions, bulk cash
smuggling, layering bank deposits to avoid reporting requirements, failure to comply with federal anti-money
laundering provisions, or conducting an unlawful money transmission business.
Section 1956’s ban on attempted international transportation of tainted proceeds for the purpose of concealing
their ownership, source, nature, or ultimate location is limited to instances where concealment is a purpose rather
than an attribute of the transportation (simple smuggling is not proscribed as such), as the Supreme Court
explained in Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008). In a second case, the Court held that the “proceeds” of
a predicate offense often referred to the profits rather than the gross receipts realized from the offense. United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). Congress responded by defining “proceeds” for money laundering purposes
as the property obtained or retained as a consequence of a predicate offense, including gross receipts. Fraud
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1627. http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/
bdquery/R?d111:FLD002:@1(111+21)
The citation to the federal statutes discussed, to state money laundering and money transmission statutes, and to federal
predicate offenses with their accompanying maximum terms of imprisonment appear at the end of the report. Related CRS
Reports include CRS In Focus IF11064, U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Other Illicit
Financial Threats, by Rena S. Miller and Liana W. Rosen, and CRS Report R47255, The Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN): Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 Implementation and Beyond, by Liana W. Rosen and Rena S.
Miller.
Congressional Research Service
Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 1956 ............................................................................................................................. 2
Promotion .................................................................................................................................. 3
Financial Transactions ........................................................................................................ 3
International Transmission or Transportation ..................................................................... 7
Stings .................................................................................................................................. 8
Concealment............................................................................................................................ 10
Financial Transactions ...................................................................................................... 10
International Transportation or Transmission .................................................................... 11
Stings ................................................................................................................................ 13
Evading Reporting Requirements (Smurfing)......................................................................... 14
Financial Transactions ...................................................................................................... 14
International Transportation or Transmission ................................................................... 15
Stings ................................................................................................................................ 15
Tax Evasion ............................................................................................................................. 15
Financial Transactions ...................................................................................................... 16
Conspiracy, Attempt, Aiding and Abetting.............................................................................. 16
Consequences .......................................................................................................................... 17
Imprisonment .................................................................................................................... 17
Fines and Civil Penalties ................................................................................................... 18
Forfeiture .......................................................................................................................... 18
Venue ....................................................................................................................................... 20
18 U.S.C. § 1957 ........................................................................................................................... 20
Elements .................................................................................................................................. 20
Conspiracy, Attempt, Aiding and Abetting.............................................................................. 23
Consequences .......................................................................................................................... 24
Imprisonment .................................................................................................................... 24
Fines .................................................................................................................................. 24
Forfeiture .......................................................................................................................... 24
18 U.S.C. § 1952: Travel Act ........................................................................................................ 25
Distribution, Facilitation, and Violence .................................................................................. 25
Travel, etc. ............................................................................................................................... 27
Unlawful Activity .................................................................................................................... 28
Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting ............................................................................................ 29
Consequences .......................................................................................................................... 29
31 U.S.C. § 5322: Reporting Requirements .................................................................................. 30
31 U.S.C. § 5324: Anti-Structuring ............................................................................................... 31
31 U.S.C. § 5332: Bulk Cash Smuggling ...................................................................................... 32
18 U.S.C. § 1960: Money Transmitters ......................................................................................... 33
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) ............................................................ 35
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 38
Congressional Research Service
Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
Congressional Research Service
Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
Introduction
Money laundering is commonly understood as the process of cleansing the taint from the
proceeds of crime.1 In federal criminal law, however, it is more. In the principal federal criminal
money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, and to varying degrees in several other
federal criminal statutes, money laundering involves the flow of resources to and from several
hundred other federal, state, and foreign crimes.2 It consists of:
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engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of certain crimes in
order to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of proceeds they produced;3
engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of certain crimes in
order to promote further offenses;4
transporting funds generated by certain criminal activities into, out of, or through
the United States in order to promote further criminal activities, or to conceal the
nature, source, or ownership of the criminal proceeds, or to evade reporting
requirements;5
engaging in a financial transaction involving criminal proceeds in order to evade
taxes on the income produced by the illicit activity;6
structuring financial transactions in order to evade reporting requirements;7
spending more than $10,000 of the proceeds of certain criminal activities;8
traveling in, or use of the facilities of, interstate or foreign commerce in order to
distribute the proceeds of certain criminal activities;9
traveling in, or use of the facilities of, interstate or foreign commerce in order to
promote certain criminal activities;10
transmitting the proceeds of, or funds to promote, criminal activity in the course of
a money transmitting business;11
1 Money laundering, is “the act of transferring illegally obtained money through legitimate people or accounts so that
its original source cannot be traced,” Money-Laundering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
2 Over 20 years ago, one commentator estimated the number of § 1956 predicate offenses at “250 or so,” Stefan D.
Cassella, The Forfeiture of Property Involved in Money Laundering Offenses, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 612 (2004).
Today, the estimate seems exceptionally conservative. Each of the 50 states outlaws (1) murder, (2) kidnapping, (3)
gambling, (4) arson, (5) robbery, (6) bribery, (7) extortion, (8) dealing in obscene material, and (9) drug dealing. A
felony violation of any one of these is a § 1956 predicate offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1961(1)(A). Each of the
close to 200 countries of the world outlaws many, if not most of, the same types of misconduct (murder, kidnapping,
robbery, and the like) and when they do, these too are § 1956 predicate offenses if they involve a financial transaction
in the U.S. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(B). Yet however daunting the absolute number of § 1956 predicate offenses may be, the
reported cases suggest that a handful of predicate offenses (like mail fraud, wire fraud, and drug dealing) account for
the vast majority of § 1956 prosecutions.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
4 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
5 Id. § 1956(a)(2).
6 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
7 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii); 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
9 Id. § 1952(a)(1).
10 Id. § 1952(a)(3).
11 Id. § 1960(a), (b)(1)(C).
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
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transmitting funds in the course of an unlawful money transmitting business;12
smuggling unreported cash across a U.S. border;13 or
failing to comply with the Department of the Treasury’s anti-money laundering
provisions.14
Money laundering in some forms is severely punished, sometimes more severely than the
underlying crime with which it is associated. The penalties frequently include not only long
prison terms, but the confiscation of the property laundered, involved in the laundering, or
traceable to the laundering. The following is an overview of the elements and other legal
attributes and consequences of violations of §§ 1956 and 1957, as well as selected related federal
criminal statutes.
18 U.S.C. § 1956
Section 1956 outlaws four kinds of laundering—promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax
evasion—committed or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e.,
laundering involving certain financial transactions, laundering involving international transfers,
and stings). More precisely, § 1956(a)(1)15 outlaws financial transactions involving the proceeds
of other certain crimes—predicate offenses referred to as “specified unlawful activities”
(sometimes known as SUA)—committed or attempted (1) with the intent to promote further
predicate offenses; (2) knowing the transaction is designed to conceal the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control of the proceeds; (3) with the intent to evade taxation; or (4) knowing the
transaction is designed to avoid anti-laundering reporting requirements.16
Section 1956(a)(2) outlaws the international transportation or transmission (or attempted
transportation or transmission) of funds (1) with the intent to promote a predicate offense; (2)
knowing that the purpose is to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
funds and knowing that the funds are the proceeds of a predicate offense; or (3) knowing that the
purpose is to avoid reporting requirements and knowing that the funds are the proceeds of a
predicate offense.17
Section 1956(a)(3) covers undercover investigations (“stings”). It outlaws financial transactions
(or attempted transactions) that the defendant believes involve the proceeds of a predicate offense
and that are intended to (1) promote a predicate offense, (2) conceal the source or ownership of
the proceeds of a predicate offense, or (3) avoid reporting requirements.18
12 Id. § 1960(a), (b)(1)(A), (B).
13 31 U.S.C. § 5332.
14 Id. § 5322. Federal law features a wide array of administrative, regulatory, and diplomatic anti-money laundering
provisions that are beyond the scope of this report.
15 As a matter of convenience, this report refers to subsections (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)), paragraphs (18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)), subparagraphs (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)), clauses (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)), and their subclauses as
sections.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii); e.g., United States v. Davis,
122 F.4th 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2024) (per curiam).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii); e.g., United States v. Sherman, 126 F.4 th 224,
230-31 (3d Cir. 2025).
18 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A), (B), (C); e.g., United States v. Han, 105 F.4 th 986, 991 (7th Cir. 2024).
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
Promotion
Financial Transactions
Of the three promotional offenses, only the § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) financial transaction offense
requires use of the proceeds of a predicate offense to promote a predicate offense; the § 1956
international and sting offenses require only a purpose to promote a predicate offense regardless
of the source of the proceeds. Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applies to anyone who:
[K]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such
a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity ... with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.
19
The knowledge element is the subject of a specific definition, which allows a conviction without
the necessity of proving that the defendant knew the exact particulars of the underlying offense or
even its nature; it is enough that he knew that the property came from some sort of criminal
activity and that the property in fact constitutes the proceeds of a predicate offense.20 The
knowledge element cannot be negated by turning a blind eye to reality. Here and throughout §
1956, knowledge may be inferred from facts indicating that criminal activity is particularly
likely.21
Throughout § 1956, a defendant “conducts” a financial transaction when he initiates, concludes,
or participates in initiating, or concluding a transaction.22 The “financial transaction” element has
two obvious components. It must be a transaction and it must be financial. Both components are
defined by statute. Qualifying “transactions” may take virtually any shape that involves the
19 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); Davis, 122 F.4th at 75; United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 849 (5 th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Johnson, 821 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 14–5 (1st
Cir. 2014); United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 548 (9 th Cir. 2011).
20 “The term ‘knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity’ means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some
form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law,
regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7).” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1); United States v. Spita,
136 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 48 n.7 (1 st Cir. 2014); United States v
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1065–68 (6th Cir. 1999).
21 United States v. Ravenell, 66 F.4th 472, 490 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 594 (2d Cir.
2011) (“A conscious avoidance instruction permits a jury to find that a defendant had culpable knowledge of a fact
when the evidence shows that the defendant intentionally avoided confirming the fact.” (quoting United States v.
Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4 th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Haire, 806 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Adorno-Molina, 774 F.3d 116, 124−25 (1st
Cir. 2014); United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 611−13 (5th Cir. 2013); cf. United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d
720, 725 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that willful blindness or conscious avoidance is the legal equivalent to
knowledge.... We therefore examine the constitutionality of Section 1956(a)(1)(B) as applied to a merchant who
actually knew that he was dealing with drug dealers and their money, or deliberately turned a blind eye regarding this
fact.... We conclude that Antzoulatos’ right to liberty under the Fifth Amendment was not violated.”).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2). United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4 th 1091, 1104 (4th Cir. 2021) (word “conduct” carries its
ordinary meaning); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (mere receipt of funds constitutes
“conducting a financial transaction.”). In spite of the breadth of the definition, an individual must be in control at some
point, and in some sense, of the property involved in the transaction, United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1060 (8th
Cir. 2005) (a defendant does not conduct third-party financial transfers which he does not initiate and in which he does
not participate).
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
disposition of something constituting the proceeds of an underlying crime,23 including a
disposition as informal as handing cash over to someone else.24 The “financial” component
supplies the jurisdiction foundation for a § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) crime and each of the other crimes in
§ 1956(a)(1). Qualifying transactions must either involve the movement of funds in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or involve a financial institution25 engaged in, or whose
activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce.26 In either case, the effect on interstate or foreign
commerce need be no more than minimal to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.27
23 “The term ‘transaction’ includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with
respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan,
extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a
safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever
means effected.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3); e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 918 F.3d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 2019); United
States v. Harris, 666 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Diaz-Pellegaud, 666 F.3d 492, 498 (8th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 2009).
24
United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 764 (4 th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Almost any exchange of money between two
parties qualifies as a financial transaction subject to criminal prosecution under § 1956, provided that the transaction
has at least a minimal effect on interstate commerce and satisfies at least one of the four intent requirements.”); United
States v. Roy, 375 F.3d 21, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2004) (exchange between individuals of $100 bills for currency of smaller
denominations to facilitate drug trafficking); United States v. Gough, 152 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 160 (5th Cir. 1998); but see Harris, 666 F.3d at 909 (“[M]ere payment of the
purchase price for drugs by whatever means ... does not constitute money laundering.”).
25 “[T]he term ‘financial institution’ includes—(A) any financial institution, as defined in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31,
United States Code, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; and (B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101).” Id. § 1956(c)(6) (footnote omitted). In § 5312, the term
“financial institution” means—“(A) an insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(12 U.S.C. 1813(h))); (B) a commercial bank or trust company; (C) a private banker; (D) an agency or branch of a
foreign bank in the United States; (E) any credit union; (F) a thrift institution; (G) a broker or dealer registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.); (H) a broker
or dealer in securities or commodities; (I) an investment banker or investment company; (J) a currency exchange, or a
business engaged in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency or funds; (K) an issuer,
redeemer, or cashier of travelers’ checks, checks, money orders, or similar instruments; (L) an operator of a credit card
system; (M) an insurance company; (N) a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels; (O) a pawnbroker; (P) a loan or
finance company; (Q) a travel agency; (R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in
the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for currency, including any person who engages as a
business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the
transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system; (S) a
telegraph company; (T) a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales; (U) persons
involved in real estate closings and settlements; (V) the United States Postal Service; (W) an agency of the United
States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this
paragraph; (X) a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment with an annual gaming revenue of more than
$1,000,000 which—(i) is licensed as a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment under the laws of any State or
any political subdivision of any State; or (ii) is an Indian gaming operation conducted under or pursuant to the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act other than an operation which is limited to class I gaming (as defined in section 4(6) of such
Act); (Y) any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the Treasury determines, by
regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business
described in this paragraph is authorized to engage; or (Z) any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash
transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.” 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).
26 “The term ‘financial transaction’ means (A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign
commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary
instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction
involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce in any way or degree,” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (emphasis added); Fakhuri v. Garland, 28 F.4th 623, 629 (5th
Cir. 2022) (“Thus, the ‘financial transaction’ element is merely a roundabout way of requiring that the crime affect
interstate commerce.”); United States v. Costanzo, 956 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020).
27 Blair, 661 F.3d at 764; United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 336 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d
1021, 1029 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 755 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
The majority of § 1956’s crimes are related in one way or another to the commission or purported
commission of at least one of a list of predicate offenses (“specified unlawful activities”).28 In the
financial transaction promotional offense, the proscribed transaction must involve the proceeds of
a predicate offense and be designed to promote a predicate offense.29 The predicate offenses come
in three varieties: state crimes, foreign crimes, and federal crimes. The list of state crimes is
relatively short and consists of any state crime that is a RICO predicate offense,30 that is, “any act
or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102
of the Controlled Substances Act),31 which is chargeable under state law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.”32
The list of foreign crimes recognized as § 1956 predicate offenses is more extensive than the list
of state crimes, and covers among other things extraditable offenses, although crimes under the
laws of other countries qualify as predicate offenses only if the financial transaction occurs in this
country in whole or in part.33
The list of federal predicate offenses is considerably longer if for no other reason than that the
some qualifying offenses are specifically named and others qualify by cross-reference to the
voluminous RICO predicate offense list.34 The crimes listed by name as predicates include
offenses such as interstate kidnapping, theft of funds from federally supported programs, and
bank robbery.35 RICO predicates also name bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud as predicates.36
28 Conducting or attempting to conduct an international transfer to avoid state or federal reporting requirements must
involve the proceeds of a crime but the property-generating offense need not be a money laundering predicate, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
29 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
30 Id. § 1956(c)(7)(A).
31 21 U.S.C. § 802(6), 802(33), respectively.
32 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
33 Id. § 1956(c)(7)(B) (“[T]he term ‘specified unlawful activity’ means ... (B) with respect to a financial transaction
occurring in whole or in part in the United States, an offense against a foreign nation involving—(i) the manufacture,
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such term is defined for the purposes of the Controlled
Substances Act); (ii) murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, destruction of property by means of explosive or fire, or a
crime of violence (as defined in section 16); (iii) fraud, or any scheme or attempt to defraud, by or against a foreign
bank (as defined in paragraph 7 of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978)); (iv) bribery of a public
official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official;
(v) smuggling or export control violations involving—(I) an item controlled on the United States Munitions List
established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778); or (II) an item controlled under
regulations under the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. pts.730–774); (vi) an offense with respect to which
the United States would be obligated by a multilateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the
case for prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory of the United States; or (vii) trafficking in persons,
selling or buying of children, sexual exploitation of children, or transporting, recruiting or harboring a person, including
a child, for commercial sex acts.”); see, e.g., United States v. Chi, 936 F.3d 888, 897 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Thiam, 934 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 520 F. Supp. 3d 71
(D.D.C. 2020).
34 In a decision, later overturned, involving construction of the Armed Career Criminal Act, Justice Scalia’s dissent
referred, tongue-in-cheek, to the RICO predicate offense list as “a laundry list of nearly every federal crime under the
sun.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 223 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). A
list of federal money laundering predicate offenses appears at the end of this report.
35 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (“the term ‘specified unlawful activity’ means ... an offense under section ... 1201
[interstate kidnapping] ... 666 [theft] ... 2113 [bank robbery].”).
36 Id. § 1961(1) (“As used in this chapter—(1) Racketeering activity means ... (B) any act which is indictable under any
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery) … section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud) ... ”).
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
Moreover, the RICO predicate offense list encompasses by cross-reference the federal crimes of
terrorism cataloged in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(5)(B).37
As for the promotional element, some of the lower courts have concluded that it “may be met by
transactions that promote the continued prosperity of the underlying offense.”38 One circuit has
declared, however, that “the ‘promotion’ element of money laundering promotion cannot be met
simply by demonstrating that the unlawfully earned monies were used to promote the continued
functioning of an ‘otherwise legitimate business enterprise.’ For instance, paying the bills
(payroll, rent, taxes) of a health care provider or a car dealership, even one engaged in frequent
acts of fraud, may not suffice to support the promotion element.”39
The “proceeds” in the proceeds element of the offense is defined to consist of “any property
derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful
activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.”40
37 Id.
38 United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2013) (doctor’s extra payments to employees assisting in a
fraudulent enterprise constitute promotion for money laundering purposes); United States v. Lee, 558 F.3d 638, 642 (7 th
Cir. 2009) (payment of the advertising expenses of a prostitution enterprise); United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888,
901 (10th Cir. 2005) (payment of clinic rent in connection with an ongoing Medicare fraud scheme); United States v.
Iacaboni, 363 F.3d 1, 5, 6 n.9 (1st Cir. 2004) (gambler’s pay off of winning bettors, “nothing makes an illegal gambling
operation flourish more than the prompt payment of winners,” and observing that the “payment of salaries of
employees is a common example of promotion within the meaning of the statute”); United States v. King, 169 F.3d
1035, 1040 (6th Cir. 1999) (drug dealer’s payment for past shipments preserved the defendant’s opportunity to acquire
additional shipments).
39 United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 785 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In examining the question of intent necessary for a
money laundering promotion conviction, this court has held that the Government must present either direct proof of an
intent to promote such illegal activity, or proof that a given type of transaction on its face, indicates an intent to
promote such illegal activity.” (quoting, United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2004)) and United States v.
Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1999)).
40
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9); see, e.g., United States v. Abbas, 100 F.4th 267, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 319
(2024) (mem.); United States v. Toliver, 949 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2020).
Until Congress added this definition, the courts struggled with the precise meaning of the interwoven “proceeds” and
“promotional” elements of the promotional transaction offense. In the Supreme Court’s Santos case, for instance, the
defendant was convicted of running an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Section 1955
requires the government to prove that the defendant has conducted a gambling operation either conducted over a thirtyday period or one which produced gross revenues of at least $2,000 on any given day. Santos was also convicted of
promotional money laundering under § 1956, based upon evidence that during the course of operations he had paid off
his winning customers and paid his employees from the revenue generated by the enterprise. Santos v. United States,
461 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). The court of appeals decided that these were expenses
associated with the commission of the gambling offense, not after the fact profits. Proceeds, they reasoned based on
their earlier decisions, meant profits, net revenues, not gross revenues (profits and expenses). Id. at 891.
Justice Scalia, in the plurality opinion for the Court, noted that the Congress had not at the time explicitly defined
“proceeds” as the term was used in the money laundering statute. Santos, 553 U.S. at 511. In the absence of a statutory
definition, words are thought to have their ordinary meaning. In common parlance, proceeds can mean either profits or
gross receipts. Id. When the words of a criminal statute can be read in either of two ways, the rule of lenity requires
them to be construed in the manner most favorable to the accused. Id. at 514. Recourse to the rule avoids the so-called
merger problem. Id. at 515–16. (“Since few lotteries, if any, will not pay their winners, the statute criminalizing illegal
lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, would ‘merge’ with the money laundering statute. Congress evidently decided that lottery
operators ordinarily deserve up to 5 years of imprisonment, §1955(a), but as a result of merger they would face an
additional 20 years [under the money laundering statute], §1956(a)(1).... The merger problem is not limited to lottery
operators.... Generally speaking, any specified unlawful activity, an episode of which includes transactions which are
not elements of the offense and in which the participant passes receipts on to someone else, would merge with money
laundering.”).
(continued...)
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The definition answers both the profits versus gross receipts question and several others as well.
It makes it clear, for example, that the term includes proceeds from a lawful source, retained
through the commission of a predicate offense.41 It does not necessarily invalidate, however, that
line of lower court decisions which held that proceeds must be “derived from an already
competed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense, before they can be laundered.”42
International Transmission or Transportation
The international promotional offense, § 1956(a)(2)(A), applies to anyone who:
[T]ransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a
monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a place
outside the United States ... with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity.43
“Monetary instruments” is a term defined broadly to include cash, checks, securities, and the
like.44 Since § 1952(a)(2)(A) proscribes both transportation and attempted transportation, charges
may be brought even though no funds were in fact transported internationally, as long as the
government proves a substantial step towards international transportation.45 The section does not
demand that the transported funds flow from a predicate offense or from any other unlawful
source; all that is required is that the offender intends to use them to promote a predicate
Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but not the rationale, of the plurality opinion. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J. concurring
in the judgment). He would presume that Congress intended the word “proceeds” to mean “gross receipts,” except in
those cases, like Santos, where the results would be too “perverse” to support such a presumption. Id. at 551 n.7.
Congress resolved the issue by adding the explicit definition of proceeds to § 1956. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (“[T]he
term ‘proceeds’ means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of
unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activities.” (emphasis added)).
41 United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The narrow issue in this appeal is whether unpaid taxes
unlawfully disguised and retained by means of the filing of false tax returns through the U.S. mails are ‘proceeds’ of
mail fraud for purposes of sufficiently stating an offense for money laundering.... [T]he federal money laundering
statute specifically identifies which criminal offenses constitute ‘specified unlawful activities.’ The term ‘specified
unlawful activities’ covers a broad array of offenses. For example, the fraudulent concealment of a bankruptcy estate’s
assets is categorized as a ‘specified unlawful activity.’ Thus, property which is required to be included in a bankruptcy
debtor’s estate but is instead undeclared and thus retained, is ‘proceeds’ of a bankruptcy fraud offense.... Moreover,
simply because funds are originally procured through lawful activity does not mean that one cannot thereafter convert
those same funds into the ‘proceeds’ of an unlawful activity. United States v. Levine, 970 F.2d 681, 686 (10 th Cir.
1992) (sustaining money laundering conviction where the defendant concealed corporate tax refund checks deposited in
a hidden bank account). Accordingly, we reject the suggestion that to qualify as ‘proceeds’ under the federal money
laundering statute, funds must have been directly produced by or through a specified unlawful activity, and we agree
that funds retained as a result of the unlawful activity can be treated as the ‘proceeds’ of such crime.” (footnote and
citations omitted)).
42 E.g., United States v. Kerley, 784 F.3d 327, 344 (6 th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he primary issue in a money laundering charge
involves determining when the predicate crime becomes a completed offense after which money laundering can occur.”
(quoting pre-Santos decision United States v. Nolan, 223 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2000)); cases arising prior to
Santos included: Yusuf, 536 F.3d at 186; United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 247 (4 th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 770 (1 st Cir. 2000).
43 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A); e.g., United States v. Garcia, 99 F.4th 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Galecki,
89 F.4th 713, 741 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 546 (2024) (mem.); United States v. Hagen, 60 F.4th 932, 937
(5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Ho, 984 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2020).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5).
45 United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 162 n.8 (5 th Cir. 1998).
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offense.46 Where the international promotional offense shares common elements with other §
1956 offenses, they are comparably construed.47 Thus, similar “intent to promote” elements
impose the same requirements of proof upon the government regardless of whether the offense
charged is a § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) financial transaction promotional offense or a § 1956(a)(2)(A)
international transfer promotional offense.48 The statutory list of state, federal, and foreign
predicate offenses (specified unlawful activities) applies to a § 1956(a)(2)(A) offense as it does
for all but one of the § 1956 offenses.49
Stings
The final promotional money laundering offense, § 1956(a)(3)(A), is a variation of the financial
transaction offense, created to cover situations in which law enforcement officials acting
undercover have duped the offender into believing the agent is using the proceeds from a criminal
source to promote a predicate offense, when in fact he is not.50 The offense occurs when an
offender:
[W]ith the intent ... to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity ...
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented
to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or
facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title.51
The generous statutory definition of “financial transactions,” which embodies a “sale, ... transfer,
delivery, or other disposition” involving a monetary instrument or the use of a financial
46 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A); United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1167 (9 th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2008).
47 United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 315 (5 th Cir. 2010) (“Section 1956(a)(2)(A) contains an identical specific intent
requirement for transportation cases as its § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) transaction counterpart. While the definitive case
authority on specific intent derives from the transaction provision, it is safe to assume the requirement is no less
rigorous under 1956(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the use of identical
language in the transportation and transaction provisions of § 1956 is a strong indicator that they should be interpreted
in the same manner). We conclude that the same stringent specific intent requirement applies in § 1956(a)(2)(A)
cases”).
48 Trejo, 610 F.3d at 315; United States v. Caplinger, 339 F.3d 226, 233 (4 th Cir. 2003).
49 Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (international transfers to avoid state or federal reporting requirements) has no predicate
offense element.
50 “This amendment to the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956, would permit undercover law enforcement
officers to pose as drug traffickers in order to obtain evidence necessary to convict money launderers. The present
statute does not provide for such operations because it permits a conviction only where the laundered money ‘in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.’” 134 CONG. REC. 27420 (1988) (Department of Justice sectionby-section analysis inserted by the bill’s sponsors).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A). E.g., United States v. Davis, 706 F.3d 1081, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Ghali, 699 F.3d 845, 845−46 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Flom, 256 F. Supp. 3d 253, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“In order to prove the crime of money laundering, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1)
the defendant conducted an interstate transaction affecting interstate commerce; (2) the transaction involved money
represented by a law enforcement officer and believed by the defendant to be the proceeds of fraud [or some other
predicate offense]; and (3) the defendant intended to promote the carrying on of the fraud [or some other predicate
offense].”), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2019). The terminology used in the section permits an alternative
construction of the third element. The phrase in question reads “conducts or attempts conduct a financial transaction
involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or
facilitate specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (emphasis added). It is possible to read the portion in
italics as referring to property represented to be property used to conduct a predicate offense or alternatively as
referring to property that in fact constitutes property used to conduct a predicate offense. The first construction seems
more consistent with the purpose for adding the section.
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institution, applies with equal force here and throughout § 1956.52 The “representations” alluded
to are confined to those “made by a law enforcement officer or by another person at the direction
of, or with the approval of, a federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of
this section.”53 In sting prosecutions under other § 1956 subsections, courts have held that the
representation need not be explicit; it is enough that a reasonable person would infer from the
circumstances that funds to be laundered were the proceeds of a predicate offense.54 The same
construction applies to here.55 The qualifying state, federal, and foreign predicate offenses are the
same for all the § 1956 offenses including the § 1956(a)(3)(A) promotional stings offenses.56
Prosecution of § 1956(a)(3) sting offenses might seem to invite entrapment defense claims. As a
general rule, “[w]here the government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense
of entrapment is at issue ... the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by
government agents.”57 Evidence of a defendant’s predisposition may include “(1) the character or
reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal
activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant
showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the government’s inducement.”58 This defense,
however, does not appear to have enjoyed a great deal of success in § 1956(a)(3) cases.59
52 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3), (4).
53 Id. § 1956(a)(3).
54 United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1382 (11 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 327−28 (2d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 892−93 (7th Cir. 1993).
55 United States v. Portalla, 496 F.3d 23, 28−29 (1st Cir. 2007).
56 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
57 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548−49 (1992). The lower federal appellate courts cast the inducement and
predisposition variously, see e.g., United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 846 F.3d 417, 428−29 (1st Cir. 2017) (“A defendant
seeking to present an entrapment defense at trial must satisfy an ‘entry-level burden of production.’ He must ‘produce
evidence which fairly supports the claims’ that: (1) the government agents not only induced the crime but did so
improperly, and (2) that he was not already predisposed to commit the crime.” (quoting United States v. SánchezBerrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76−77 (1st Cir. 2005)); United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2016) (“To
successfully raise a defense of entrapment, the defendant must first produce sufficient evidence that the government
induced him to commit the offense. The burden then shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.”).
58 United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 432 (9 th Cir. 2016). See also United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223,
1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We have rejected creating a ‘fixed list of factors’ for evaluating an entrapment defense, but we
have posited ‘several guiding principles’: Predisposition may be demonstrated simply by a defendant’s ready
commission of the charged crime. A predisposition finding is also supported by evidence that the defendant was given
opportunities to back out of illegal transactions but failed to do so. Post-crime statements will support a jury’s rejection
of an entrapment defense. Existence of prior related offenses is relevant, but not dispositive. Evidence of legal activity
combined with evidence of certain non-criminal tendencies, standing alone, cannot support a conviction. Finally, the
fact-intensive nature of the entrapment defense often makes jury consideration of demeanor and credibility evidence a
pivotal factor.” (quoting United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11 th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Macedo-Flores,
788 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2015) (“In examining a defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense, the court is to
look at, inter alia, (1) the defendant’s ‘eagerness to participate in the transaction,’ and (2) the defendant’s ‘ready
response to the government’s inducement offer.’ Further, ‘[p]redisposition ... focuses upon whether the defendant was
an unwary innocent” or, instead, an “unwary criminal” who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the
crime.’” (alterations in original) (first quoting United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1997); and then
quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)).
59 Examples of unsuccessful claims appear in United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 697 (8 th Cir. 2013); United
States v. al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119−20 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2003); and
United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260−62 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Concealment
Like promotional money laundering, concealment money laundering comes in three varieties;
concealment associated with a financial transaction, concealment associated with foreign
transportation or transmission, and concealment associated with a sting.60
Financial Transactions
Concealment in violation of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) occurs when anyone:
[K]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity ... knowing that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location ... the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity.61
The concealment offense tracks the promotion offense closely and shares several common
elements with the other offenses in § 1956.62 Thus, the defendant must have known that the
transaction, designed to conceal, involved crime-tainted proceeds, but need not have known the
precise offense or its specifics.63 Gross receipts of a predicate offense may serve as qualifying
“proceeds,” for concealment as well as for promotional offenses.64 The actions that amount to
“conduct[ing] or attempt[ing] to conduct” a proscribed transaction—for either concealment or
promotional purposes—“include[] initiating, concluding, participating in initiating, or concluding
a transaction.”65 The broad definition of “financial transaction” found in § 1956(c)(4) (“sale....
transfer, delivery, or other disposition” involving a monetary instrument or a financial institution)
applies throughout the section.66 As with the promotion offenses, the government must show
60 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), 1956(a)(3).
61 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); United States v. Stewart, 854 F.3d 472, 476 (8 th Cir. 2017) (Conviction “requires proof that
‘(1) defendant conducted ... a financial transaction which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce ... ; (2) the
financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal activity; (3) defendant knew the property represented proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity; and (4) defendant conducted ... the financial transaction knowing the transaction was
“designed in whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832,
844 (8th Cir. 2011)); see e.g., United States v. Grady, 88 F.4th 1246, 1261 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2648
(mem.), and cert. denied sub nom. Dillon v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 209 (2024) (mem.), reh’g denied, 145 S. Ct. 1155
(2025) (mem.); United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 116 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4 th 621, 638
(11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 485 (2023) (mem.).
62 United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 850 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Concealment money laundering, which violates §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i), is identical to promotional money laundering, which violates § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), except that
concealment money laundering requires knowledge ‘that the transaction’s design was to conceal or disguise the nature
or source of the illegal proceeds,’ while promotional money laundering requires an ‘intent to promote or further illegal
actions.’” (quoting United States v. Cessa, 785 F.3d 165, 174 n.6 (5 th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v. AyalaVazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2014).
63 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9). United States v. Abbas, 100 F.4th 267, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 319 (2024)
(mem.); United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244, 248 (6 th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2).
66 E.g., Fakhuri v. Garland, 28 F.4 th 623, 629 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Costanzo, 956 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9 th Cir.
2020); United States v. Ledée, 772 F.3d 21, 35 n.19 (1 st Cir. 2014); United States v. Harris, 666 F.3d 905, 909 n.2 (5 th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 804 (9th Cir. 2011).
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more than a financial transaction; proof that the defendant spent tainted funds, without more will
not do.67
The concealment offense requires “a design” to conceal. It is the purpose of the scheme and not
its effect that the element condemns.68 A financial transaction that offers neither the accused nor
the property involved any apparent enhanced secrecy protection cannot be said to satisfy the
intention to conceal element of the offense.69 The fact the defendant made no effort to conceal his
identity is no defense, however, when the transactions were intended to conceal the nature,
location, or origin of the property involved.70
As a general matter:
Evidence that may be considered when determining whether a transaction was
designed to conceal includes ... [deceptive] statements by a defendant probative
[o]f intent to conceal; unusual secrecy surround[ing] the transactions; structuring
the transaction to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank account of
a legitimate business; highly irregular features of the transaction; using third
parties to conceal the real owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating
in the transaction; and expert testimony on practices of criminals.”71 Although the
government need not always prove that a transaction was designed to create the
appearance of legitimate wealth, efforts to create such an appearance often signal
a money laundering violation.72
International Transportation or Transmission
The international concealment offense of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) penalizes anyone who:
transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmits, or transfer a
monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a
67 United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 638–39 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 485 (2023) (mem.); United
States v. Singh, 995 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 845 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 323 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 1999).
68 United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 690 (5 th Cir. 2013); United States v. Heid, 651 F.3d 850, 855 (8 th Cir. 2011).
69 Valdez, 726 F.3d at 690; United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1128–31 (11th Cir. 2004); cf. Adefehinti, 510
F.3d at 323–24.
70 United States v. Delgado, 653 F.3d 729, 737 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1113–14
(9th Cir. 2003); cf. United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8 th Cir. 2010) (“The financial transactions identified
in the indictment were Dvorak’s ‘withdrawal[s] of cash from his Wells Fargo Bank account.’ The provision of
§1956(a)(1)(B)(i) with which we are principally concerned there is whether Dvorak’s withdrawals were ‘designed in
whole or in part [ ] to conceal or disguise ... the location’ of the illegal proceeds. Although cases addressing
§1956(a)(1)(B)(i) often focus upon whether the transaction was intended to conceal the ‘nature’ or ‘source’ of the
funds, a transaction intended to conceal the location of the funds is also a violation of the money laundering statute.”
(alterations in original) (first quoting Indictment at 11, Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2010), and then quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
71 United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1176 (11 th Cir. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1213 n.18 (11 th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 117
(3d Cir. 2023); Singh, 995 F.3d at 1076; United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1141 (10th Cir. 2009); Adefehinti,
510 F.3d at 323 (listing cases illustrating various deceptive devices).
72 United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550
(2008), held that Ҥ 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which prohibits transportation designed to conceal certain attributes of illegally
obtained funds, does not require proof that [the] defendant attempted to create [the] appearance of legitimate wealth,
but recogniz[ed] [that] such attempt may signal [a] violation of [the] money laundering statute and indeed is [a] manner
in which ‘classic money laundering’ occurs.”).
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place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a
place outside the United States ... knowing that the monetary instrument or funds
involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission,
or transfer is designed ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”73
The standard definitions and construction apply to several of the elements of § 1956(a)(2)(B)’s
international concealment offense. It is the deceptive laundering of the proceeds of state, federal,
and foreign predicate offenses that the section proscribes,74 but only when the proceeds come in
the form of “a monetary instrument or funds.”75
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the concealment proscribed refers to the purpose for the
transportation, not its method.76 In 2008, the Court in Cuellar held that evidence that the
defendant attempted to smuggle cash out of the United States was insufficient to support a
prosecution for violation of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), absent evidence of a design to conceal the
ownership, source, nature, or ultimate location of the funds.77 It made it equally clear, however,
that violations are not limited to those instances where the government can establish that the
transportation was intended to create the appearance of legitimate wealth.78
A drafting quirk raises some question concerning the first knowledge element of the §
1956(a)(2)(B) international transfer offense (“knowing that the ... funds involved ... represent the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity”).79 Elsewhere, the statute uses the phrase “knowing
that the property in a financial transaction.”80 The statute then goes on to say that the phrase
“‘knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction’” means that the defendant need
not know that the “unlawful activity” that generates the laundered proceeds constitutes a money
laundering predicate offense; it is enough that he knows that a state, federal, or foreign offense
generates the proceeds.81 For international transfer offenses, the statute provides no comparable
caveat for the phrase, “knowing that the ... funds involved.” Nevertheless, at least one court has
73 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i); Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008); United States v. Sherman, 128 F.4 th 224,
230–31 (3d Cir. 2025); United States v. Raymundi-Hernández, 984 F.3d 127, 144 (1st Cir. 2020).
74 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
75 Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B).
76 Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 563, 566 (“We agree with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not
sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. Our conclusion
turns on the text of §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and particularly on the term ‘design.’ In this context, ‘design’ means purpose or
plan; i.e., the intended aim of the transportation.... ‘There is a difference between concealing something to transport it
and transporting something to conceal it; that is, how one moves the money is distinct from why one moves the money.
Evidence of the former, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the latter.” (quoting United States v. Cuellar, 478 F.3d
282, 296 (5th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 550 (2008)).
77 Cuellar, 553 at 566.; United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 723–25 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d
832, 845 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Cuellar v. United States that the statute’s ‘design’ element
‘requires proof that the purpose—not merely effect—of the transportation was to conceal or disguise a listed attribute’
of the funds. Thus, the Government must show that concealment is an ‘intended aim’ of the transaction [or
transportation]” (citations omitted) (quoting Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 567)); United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573,
584–86 (6th Cir. 2010).
78 Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 557–61; id. at 555 n.1 (noting earlier that “[s]everal Courts of Appeals have considered this
requirement as relevant, or even necessary in the context of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)”).
79 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added)).
80 “[K]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity.” Id. § 1956(a)(1) (emphasis added)).
81 Id. § 1956(c)(1).
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held that the same caveat applies to § 1956(a)(2)(B) international offenses notwithstanding the
differences in terminology.82
Stings
The sting concealment offense in § 1956(a)(3)(B) is much like the promotional sting offense and
occurs when an offender:
[W]ith the intent ... to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership,
or control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity ...
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property
represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to
conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity.”83
For purposes of the concealment element of § 1956(a)(3)(B), exchanging small bills for larger
ones may evidence an intent to conceal the location of the proceeds of a predicate offense since a
large bill is more easily concealed than the small bills representing an equal amount.84 Other
indicia of an intent to conceal include (1) “unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction,” (2)
“structuring the transactions to avoid attention,” (3) “depositing illegal funds with a legitimate
enterprise,” (4) “highly irregular features of the transaction,” (5) “using third parties to conceal
the real owner of the funds,” and (6) “unusual financial moves.”85
The sting proscriptions are based on a belief rather than knowledge that the proceeds involved are
those of a predicate offense.86 Nevertheless, the doctrine of conscious avoidance precludes a
defendant from turning a blind eye to representations indicating that the proceeds may have a
predicate offense taint.87
The “financial transaction” element of the offense demands, as in other § 1956 offenses, either a
transaction that affects interstate or foreign commerce or a transaction involving the use of a
financial institution engaged in or whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce.88 To
satisfy the “financial institution” prong of the “financial transaction” element of the offense, the
government need only establish that the transaction involved “the use of a financial institution”
with an interstate or foreign commerce nexus, not that the institution was itself an integral or
essential part of the transaction.89 To satisfy the “transaction” prong, the government need only
establish a minimal effect on interstate commerce.90
The representational element does not require undercover agents to have told the defendant in so
many words that the transaction involves the proceeds of a predicate offense; it is enough that
82 United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)).
83 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). E.g., United States v. Johnson, 105 F.4 th 988, 991 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v.
George, 761 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2011).
84 United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11 th Cir. 2001).
85 United States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 760–61 (10th Cir. 1998).
86 United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2006).
87 Id. at 314–16; United States v. Estrada-Lopez, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1368 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
88 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (“As used in this section ... (4) the term ‘financial transaction’ means.... ”).
89 United States v. Oliveros, 275 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2001).
90 United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 764 (4 th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 336 (2d
Cir. 2006); United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1029 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 755 (1st
Cir. 1999).
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they “made the defendant aware of circumstances from which a reasonable person would infer
that the property was [the proceeds of a predicate offense].”91
Evading Reporting Requirements (Smurfing)
Early anti-money laundering efforts sought to enlist the assistance of financial institutions. They
were to report large cash transactions to the government.92 To avoid disclosure of their activities,
money launderers sent forth a swarm of subordinates (“smurfs”) who scurried from bank to bank
where they engaged in layered or structured transactions so that no single transaction exceeded
the threshold amount of the financial institution’s reporting requirements.93 There are three antistructuring 18 U.S.C. § 1956 offenses: one involving financial institutions; one involving
international transactions; and one involving stings.94 The volume of case law, however, suggests
that structuring prosecutions are more often brought under 31 U.S.C. § 5324, discussed infra.
Financial Transactions
The most common of the structuring offenses is one that involves a financial transaction. Section
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), which penalizes someone who:
[K]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such
a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity ... with the intent to ... avoid a transaction reporting requirement under
State or Federal law.95
Implicit in the intent element is the obligation of the government to establish that the defendant
knew of the reporting requirements.96 Section 1956’s definitions apply to each offense, including
the Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) structuring offense. The phrase “knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that
the offender must know that the proceeds are derived from some violation of state, federal, or
foreign law, but need not know they come from a predicate offense.97 “Conducts” includes the
initiation or participation in a transaction.98 The required “financial transaction” is any disposition
that either affects interstate or foreign commerce or involves either a financial institution engaged
91 United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1382 (11 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 327 (2d
Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 893 (7th Cir. 1993)); Kaufmann, 985 F.2d at 892–93.
92 Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1122, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1122 (1970 ed.).
93 Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring
Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 288 (1989) (“[T]he government’s opening salvo against laundering, [was] a statute
requiring financial institutions to report cash transactions over $10,000 to the government. To skirt this law, launderers
began to conduct multiple cash transactions just below the $10,000 reporting threshold. The army of persons who
scurried from bank to bank to accomplish these transactions became known as ‘smurfs’ because, like their little blue
cartoon namesakes, they were pandemic.” (footnote omitted)).
94 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1956(a)(3)(C).
95 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii); United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1117 (8 th Cir. 2000); United States v. Morales, 108
F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Lopez, 75 F.4th 1337, 143–44 (11th Cir. 2023).
96 Bowman, 235 F.3d at 1118.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1); United States v. Spia, 136 F.4 th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. George, 761
F.3d 42, 48 n.7 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Hill, 167
F.3d 1055, 1065–68 (6th Cir. 1999).
98 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2).
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in, or whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce.99 The “specified unlawful activities”
that must in fact have produced the proceeds involved in the transaction are the same state,
federal, and foreign predicate offenses that trigger liability for other offenses in Section 1956.100
International Transportation or Transmission
The international smurfing offense of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) is unusual in that it does not require the
presence of proceeds of a predicate offense, as long as the funds are proceeds of some criminal
offense. It penalizes anyone who:
[T]ransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer
a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a
place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a
place outside the United States ... knowing that the monetary instrument or funds
involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission,
or transfer is designed ... to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State
or Federal law.101
Stings
The sting structuring provision, in contrast, has a predicate offense element:
1. with the intent to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement
2. A. conducts or
B. attempts to conduct
3. a financial transaction
4. involving property represented to be
A. the proceeds of specific unlawful activity or
B. property used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity.102
The representation element may be satisfied by “hints” from undercover officers that the property
involved in the transaction comes from a predicate offense; the officers need not have said so in
so many words.103
Tax Evasion
The tax evasion money laundering offense must be tethered to a financial transaction, 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(A)(ii); there is no international or undercover counterpart.
99 Id. § 1956(c)(3), (4).
100 Id. § 1956(c)(7).
101 Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii); United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 1997). The want of recently
reported cases on point suggests infrequent prosecution.
102 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C); United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9 th Cir. 1995) (“To prove a violation of this
section, the government must prove (1) that the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction, (2)
with the intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement, and (3) that the property involved in the transaction was
represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” (quoting United States v.
Breque, 964 F.2d 381, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1992)).
103 Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1041 (citing other representation cases to the same effect).
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Financial Transactions
Money laundering for tax evasion purposes occurs whenever a person:
[K]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such
a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity ... with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201
[attempt to evade or defeat tax] or 7206 [tax fraud or false tax statements].104
A tax evasion, laundering prosecution requires the government to show that the defendant acted
intentionally rather than inadvertently, but not that the defendant knew that his conduct violated
the tax laws.105
Conspiracy, Attempt, Aiding and Abetting
Each of the ten criminal proscriptions found in § 1956 outlaws both the completed offense and
the attempt to commit it.106 Attempt eliminates the need to proof each of the elements of the
underlying offense. It requires no more than intent to violate the underlying offense and a
“substantial step” towards that end.107
Conspiracy to commit a federal crime is a separate federal offense punishable by imprisonment
for not more than five years.108 In addition, § 1956(h) declares that “[a]ny person who conspires
to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the
conspiracy.”109 A casual reading might indicate that § 1956(h) simply changes the penalty to
match the other penalties for violating § 1956. Section 1956(h), however, creates a separate
crime.110 The distinction matters because violation of the general conspiracy statute is not
complete until one of the conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance of the scheme.111
104 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii); e.g., United States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814, 844–45 (10th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Morris, 791 F.3d 910, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 1999).
105 Id. at 77–88.
106 “Whoever ... conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction ... ” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); “Whoever ...
transfers or attempts to ... transfer a monetary instrument ... ”; id .§ 1956(a)(2); “Whoever ... conducts or attempts to
conduct a financial transaction involving property represented to be ... ” Id. § 1956(a)(3).
107 United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 605 (9 th Cir. 2002) (attempt to commit promotional money laundering in
violation of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)); United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 314–15 (7th Cir. 2000) (attempt to commit
concealment money laundering with an undercover officer in violation of § 1956(a)(3)(B)); Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042–44
(attempt to commit the offense of avoiding reporting requirements with an undercover officer in violation of section
1956(a)(3)(C)).
108 18 U.S.C. § 371. See CRS Report R41223, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, by Charles Doyle.
109 “To prove a conspiracy to launder money, the government must ‘demonstrate that [the defendant] was knowingly
involved with two or more people for the purpose of money laundering and that the defendant knew the proceeds used
to further the scheme were derived from an illegal activity,’” United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gracia, 272 F.3d 866, 873 (7 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Greenidge,
495 F.3d 85, 100 (4th Cir. 2007). When the defendant joins an existing conspiracy, however, he cannot be held
criminally liable for offense committed in the name of the scheme before it joined it. Cf. United States v. Rice, 776
F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The government concedes that the sentence, restitution, and forfeiture imposed by the
district court were based on a loss amount that included money laundered before Rice joined the conspiracy. In light of
this concession, we remand for resentencing and recalculation of restitution and forfeiture.”).
110 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214–18 (2005).
111 “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
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Section 1956(h) has no such overt act requirement.112 Conspiracy to violate § 1956 carries with it
the prospect of liability for any foreseeable offenses committed by co-conspirators in furtherance
of the scheme.113
The confluence of the language of § 1956(h) and that of the substantive offenses in § 1956, each
of which contains an attempt component, raises the possibility of a prosecution of conspiracy to
attempt a violation of one of the substantive offenses. Although the case law is sparse, the courts
appear to have acknowledged that “conspiracy to attempt” may constitute an indictable offense
both as a general matter and in the case of § 1956.114 The cases, however, do not discuss the
offense’s precise elements. Attempt ordinarily requires proof of an intent to commit the
underlying offense and a substantial step towards that objective; conspiracy to attempt, whether in
the absence of an overt act requirement or not, presumably requires something less.
As a general matter, anyone who commands, counsels, or aids and abets the commission of a
federal crime by another is equally culpable and equally punishable.115 “In order to aid and abet
another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associated himself with
the venture, that he participated in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by
his action to make it succeed.”116
Consequences
Prison terms, fines, restitution, confiscation, and civil penalties may follow as a consequence of
conviction of a money laundering offense.
Imprisonment
Any violation of § 1956 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.117 The
first sentencing guidelines reflected the fact that § 1956 was a twenty-year felony and the
anticipation that the section would apply primarily in cases in which drug trafficking and
organized crime offenses were the predicate offenses.118 Thereafter, the Sentencing Commission
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18
U.S.C. § 371 (emphasis added).
112 Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 219; see also United States v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1358 (11 th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175, 1191 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing in accord Whitfield and United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
372 (4th Cir. 2010)); United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 2010).
113 United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 614 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1169 (9 th Cir.
2010) (each citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946)).
114 United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074–75 (2d Cir. 1981) (conspiracy to attempt to export a firearm illegally
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 22 U.S.C. § 2778); United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir. 1974)
(conspiracy to attempt to burglarize a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113); United States
v. Sierra-Garcia, 760 F. Supp. 252, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (conspiracy to attempt money laundering in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 1956).
115 18 U.S.C. § 2
116 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); see also United States v. Seng Tan, 674 F.3d 103, 110 (1 st
Cir. 2012); United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 765 (4th Cir. 2011).
117 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
118 U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, 52 FED. REG. 44714 (Nov. 20, 1987). The sentencing guidelines were originally considered
binding, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), but now only guide the court’s sentencing discretion, United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.... [T]he appellate court must review the sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. It must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
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became concerned about the application of the initial guidelines in cases involving less severely
punished predicate offenses such as mail fraud.119 Subsequent amendments to the guidelines120
and penalty increases in some of the predicate offenses121 address that concern. Defendants
sentenced to a term of imprisonment may also be subject to a term of supervised release of up to
three years to be served upon their release from prison.122
Fines and Civil Penalties
Violations of § 1956(a)(1) and (a)(2), the financial institution and interstate or foreign
transmission offenses, are punishable by a fine of no more than the greater of $500,000 or twice
the value of the property involved in the offense.123 Sting violations are punishable by a fine of
not more than the greater of $250,000 ($500,000 for an organization) or twice the amount
involved in the offense.124 Violators of any provisions of § 1956 are subject to a civil penalty of
no more than the greater of $10,000 or the value of the property involved in the offense.125
Forfeiture
Forfeiture is the confiscation of property to the government as a consequence of the property’s
proximity to some form of criminal activity.126 The government’s claim to the property can be
secured by default or through judicial proceedings conducted either civilly and ordinarily in rem
(against the property itself) or as part of the criminal proceedings against the property owner.127
The proceeds of a confiscation are generally shared among the law enforcement agencies that
participate in the investigation and prosecution of the forfeiture.128
Section 1956 provides a vehicle for civil or criminal confiscation in two very distinct ways. First,
the “proceeds” of any § 1956 predicate offense (and any property traceable to such proceeds) are
subject to confiscation without the necessity of proving any actual violation of § 1956.129 This
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.... ”). For a discussion of the
operation of the guidelines, see CRS Report R41696, How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work: An Overview, by
Charles Doyle.
119 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SENTENCING POLICY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES,
INCLUDING COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT (1997), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/money-laudering-topics/19970918_RtC_Money_Laundering.pdf https://perma.cc/
VKQ6-DHZ3.
120 U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1.
121 E.g., Mail fraud, once a five-year felony, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 ed.), is now punishable by imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; see also id. § 641 (theft of more than $1000 in federal property, maximum
term of imprisonment: ten years); id. § 201 (bribery of federal officials, maximum term of imprisonment: fifteen years).
122 Id. § 3583.
123 Id. § 1956(a)(1), 1956(a)(2).
124 Id. §§ 1956(a)(3), 3571, 3581.
125 Id. § 1956(b)(1).
126 See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R. 97-139, CRIME AND FORFEITURE (2023).
127 E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 881, 853 (relating to the civil and criminal confiscation of certain property associated with
violations of the Controlled Substances Act).
128 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(e), 982(b); 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(e), 853(i)(4); 19 U.S.C. § 1616a.
129 “The following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States ... (C) Any property, real or personal which
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to ... any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined
in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or conspiracy to commit such an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. §
2461(c) (“If a forfeiture of property is authorized in connection with a violation of an Act of Congress, and any person
is charged in an indictment or information with such violation but no specific statutory provision is made for criminal
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permits the confiscation of property derived from crimes that might form the basis for a money
laundering offense without having to prove that a money laundering offense occurred.130 Second,
property “involved” in a § 1956 money laundering offense (or property traceable to such involved
property) may be confiscated.131 Involved property obviously includes more than the proceeds of
the predicate offense, since the proceeds are separately forfeitable already. “Property eligible for
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) includes that money or property which was actually
laundered ... , along with ‘any commissions or fees paid to the launderer[ ] and any property used
to facilitate the laundering offense.’”132
In theory, confiscation might dip into both sides of a tainted transaction, the proceeds from the
predicate offense and the cashier’s check, real estate, jewelry, or sports car purchased with the
proceeds in a laundering transaction. In practice, however, involved property has been construed
to mean untainted property joined with the proceeds of a predicate offense as part of the
laundering transaction.133 Property acquired in exchange for the proceeds or for the proceeds and
other involved property is forfeitable as traceable property. The government may confiscate the
property on either side of the transaction, but not the property on both sides.134
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits excessive fines. Fines are excessive if
they are grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offender’s misconduct.135 While the
Excessive Fines Clause may impose limits upon the permissible extent of the confiscation for
failure to comply with anti-money laundering reporting statutes,136 forfeitures under § 1956 are
not ordinarily considered excessive because of the gravity of the offense and of its predicate
offenses.137
forfeiture upon conviction, the government may include the forfeiture in the indictment or information ... and upon
conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property.... ”).
130 United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2011) (“18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) states: The following
property is subject to forfeiture to the United States ... (C) Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is
derived from proceeds traceable to ... any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity (as defined in section
1956(c)(7) of this title)’.... In turn 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) provides that ‘the term ‘specified unlawful activity’ means—
(D) an offense under ... section 2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft).’ Because Newman
pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113, criminal forfeiture is available pursuant to § 981(a)(1) (C) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c).”); see also United States v. Omidi, 125 F.4th 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 2025); United States v. Bodouva, 853 F.3d
76, 77–78 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), aff’d, 684 F. App’x 5 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Hernandez, 803 F.3d 1341,
1342–43 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Khan, 771 F.3d 367, 379 (7 th Cir. 2014).
131 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).
132 United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1368 (11 th Cir. 2009) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1153 (11th Cir. 2003).
133 United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 970 (7 th Cir.
2000); United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1134 (5th Cir. 1997). The term also includes “‘any commissions or fees
paid to the launderer, and any property used to facilitate the laundering offense,’” United States v. Bornfield, 145 F.3d
1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1134.
134 Stefan D. Cassella, The Forfeiture of Property Involved in Money Laundering Offenses, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 583,
627 n.104 (2004) (citing United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 1998)) (The “government may get a
money judgment for the amount involved in the conversion of [tainted] proceeds to consumer goods, or it may forfeit
the converted property itself, but it cannot forfeit both.”).
135 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
136 Bajakajian found an attempted forfeiture, based on anti-money laundering reporting statute, excessive, Id.
137 United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1371 (11 th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337) (“A forfeiture
order violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it ‘is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.’ To
make this determination, we principally look at three factors: (1) whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at
whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the legislature (or the Sentencing
Commission); and (3) the harm caused by the defendant.” (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337)); see also United
(continued...)
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Venue
The Constitution guarantees the accused the right to trial in the state in which the crime charged
was committed and before a jury from the state and district in which the crime was committed.138
In United States v. Cabrales,139 the defendant was tried in Florida for laundering the proceeds of a
Missouri drug trafficking ring. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires money
laundering charges to be tried in the state and district where the laundering occurred; trial in the
state where the predicate offense drug trafficking occurred was not a permissible alternative. 140
The Court suggested, however, that trial in Florida would have been permissible if the launderer
were a co-conspirator in drug trafficking scheme or if he had participated in the transfer of the
laundered property from the place where the predicate offense occurred (Missouri) to the place
where the laundering occurred (Florida).141 Congress quickly expanded § 1956’s venue provision,
covering §§ 1956 and 1957, in light of the Court’s decision.142
18 U.S.C. § 1957
Elements
Unless there is some element of promotion, concealment, or evasion, § 1956 does not make
simply spending or depositing tainted money a separate crime. Section 1957 does.143 It outlaws
otherwise innocent transactions contaminated by the origin of the property involved in the
transaction.144 Using most of the same definitions as § 1956, the elements of § 1957 cover anyone
who:
States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 640 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo, 668 F.3d 7, 16–17 (1st Cir.
2012); United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 303 (5th Cir. 1999).
138 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3; amend. VI.
139 524 U.S. 1 (1998).
140 Id. at 3–4.
141 Id. at 9.
142 Uniting And Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, § 1004, 115 Stat. 392, now, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i) (“(1) Except as provided
in paragraph (2), a prosecution for an offense under this section or section 1957 may be brought in—(A) any district in
which the financial or monetary transaction is conducted; or (B) any district where a prosecution for the underlying
specified unlawful activity could be brought, if the defendant participated in the transfer of the proceeds of the
specified unlawful activity from that district to the district where the financial or monetary transaction is conducted. (2)
A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under this section or section 1957 may be brought in the district
where venue would lie for the completed offense under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act in
furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place. (3) For purposes of this section, a transfer of funds from 1 place to
another, by wire or any other means, shall constitute a transaction. Any person who conducts (as that term is defined in
subsection (c)(2)) any portion of the transaction may be charged in any district in which the transaction takes place.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 76 F.4th 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Hoskins, 44 F.4th 140, 157 (2d
Cir. 2022); United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1107 (4th Cir. 2021).
143 “[Section] 1957 is often called the ‘money spending statute.’ Its purpose is to make the criminal’s money worthless,
by making it a felony for him to spend it, or for anyone else to take it, if he knows of its illegal source,” Stefan D.
Cassella, The Forfeiture of Property Involved in Money Laundering Offenses, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 614 (2004).
144 United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291 (9 th Cir. 1997) (“The description of the crime [under section 1957]
does not speak to the attempt to cleanse dirty money by putting it in a clean form and so disguising it. This statute
applies to the most open, above-board transaction.”); United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The
crux of the argument is that section 1957 is a rather novel statute, in that it criminalizes conduct by a person once
removed from that of the person who generated the criminally derived property. Thus, he argues, the proscribed
(continued...)
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1. A. in the United States,
B. in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
or
C. outside the United States if the defendant is an American,
2. “knowingly”
3. A. “engages or”
B. “attempts to engage in”
4. “a monetary transaction”
5. A. “in or affecting U.S. interstate or foreign commerce”, or
B. committed by a U.S. national outside the U.S.
6. “in criminally derived property of a value”
A. “greater than $10,000” and
B. “is derived from specified unlawful activity.”145
The courts often supply an abbreviated statement of the crime’s elements. So, it is said that “In
order to be found guilty of money laundering, ‘a defendant must (1) knowingly engage, or
attempt to engage in a monetary transaction, (2) know that the funds involved in the transaction
are criminally derived, (3) use criminally derived funds in excess of $10,000 in the transaction,
and (4) use funds derived from specified unlawful activity.’”146
At the heart of any § 1957 offense lies a monetary transaction. A monetary transaction for
purposes of § 1957 is any deposit, withdrawal, or transfer of funds, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, and involving a financial institution.147 Numbered among the qualifying
financial institutions are banks and credit unions, but also car dealerships, jewelers, casinos,
stockbrokers, travel agents, and pawnbrokers, to mention a few.i Section 1957 only applies to
transactions involving $10,000 or more at the time of the transaction.148 The government’s
jurisdictional burden is comparable to the one it must bear for § 1956 (a transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce) and demands evidence of only a slight impact on
commerce.149
conduct is not likely to appear unlawful to an ordinary citizen.... Section 1957 is but another in a substantial line of
federal criminal statutes whose only mens rea requirement is ‘knowledge’ of the prior criminal conduct that tainted the
property involved in the proscribed activity.”).
145
18 U.S.C. § 1957.
146 United States v. Persaud, 866 F.3d 371, 385 (6 th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Young, 266 F.3d 468, 476 (6 th
Cir. 2001)); see also Annor v. Garland, 95 F.4th 820, 828 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ruan, 56 F.4th 1291, 1301
(11th Cir. 2023) (Section “1957 criminalizes the knowing execution of ‘monetary transaction[s]’ over $10,000 that use
money ‘derived from specified unlawful activity.’” (quoting § 1957(a)); United States v. Davis, 53 F.4 th 833, 843 (5th
Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 72 (2023) (mem.).
147 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1), e.g., United States v. Ravenell, 66 F.4 th 472, 488 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
1344 (2024) (mem.); “[T]he term ‘monetary instruments’ means (i) coin or currency of the United States or of any
other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or
negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.” 18 U.S.C. §
1956(c)(5), e.g., United States v. Huff, 641 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10 th Cir. 2011); “[T]he term ‘financial transaction’ means
... (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4)(B).
148 United States v. Wright, 651 F.3d 764, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2011); cf. Davis, 53 F.4th at 843–44, cert. denied, 144 S. S
Ct. 72 (2023) (mem.).
149 United States v. Vega, 813 F.3d 386, 400 (1 st Cir. 2016) (“Section 1957 requires only a de minimus effect on
interstate commerce.”); see also United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1030–31 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1386 (4th Cir. 1996).
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The government must prove that the defendant knew the funds or other property in the transaction
was “criminally derived property,” 150 that is, the proceeds, or funds derived from the proceeds, of
criminal activity.151 The government need not show that the defendant knew that proceeds were
the product of a “specified unlawful activity,”152 but the proceeds must in fact be derived from a
specified unlawful activity (predicate offense).153 The proceeds may consist of the gross receipts
of crime (not merely its profits).154
When does spending money from a mixed pot (tainted and untainted funds) constitute a spending
violation of § 1957? Must the government trace “dirty dollars” from criminal activity to a
defendant’s expenditures? A 2025 Sixth Circuit case suggests that the lower federal appeals courts
have yet to agree on a single answer.155
Section 1957 contains an attorney’s fee exception. It excludes from the “monetary transaction”
element of the offense “any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.”156 The exception, however, reach no
150 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a); United States v. Erker, 129 F.4th 966, 969 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4 th
292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024); Davis, 53 F.4th at 843; United States v. Dingle, 862 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2017).
151 “[T]he term ‘criminal derived property’ means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a
criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2). United States v. Rivera-Izquierdo, 850 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2017) (“To make
the case that Rivera, in using money taken from those [gambling] winnings to buy the cars [the laundering monetary
transaction], used ‘criminally derived property,’ the government needed to prove only that the money that he used from
the gambling winnings constituted property ‘derived from’ the [predicate offense] fraud’s ‘proceeds.’”).
152 “In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that
the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. §
1957(c); Davis, 53 F.4th at 844; United States v. Van Dorn, 800 F.3d 998, 1103 n.6 (8 th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Carucci, 364 F.3d 339, 343 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.
Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor need the defendant be charged with or convicted of the predicate
offense, United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 768 (1st
Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[k]nowledge may be demonstrated by showing that a defendant either had actual knowledge or
‘deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him concerning the fact in question,’”
Flores, 454 F.3d at 155 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999).
153 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a); United States v. Abbas, 100 F.4 th 267, 283 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 319 (2024)
(mem.); Annor v. Garland, 95 F4th 820, 828 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Diamond, 378 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.
2004) (“In order to find Diamond guilty of this offense [under § 1957], the government needed to prove that she
‘derived property from a specified unlawful activity and that [s]he engaged in a monetary transaction.... ’”).
154 “Criminally derived property” means “proceeds.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2). “Proceeds” includes “gross receipts.” Id.
§§ 1957(f)(3), 1956(c)(9); e.g., Abbas, 100 F.4th at 283. For cases arising before the statutory “Santos fix” in §
1956(c)(9), some courts read narrowly the holding in Santos that “proceeds” meant “profits” at least in the case of some
predicate offenses. E.g., United States v. Kerley, 784 F.3d 327, 345 (6 th Cir. 2015) (construing United States v. Santos,
553 U.S. 507 (2008)).
155 United States v. Erker, 129 F.4th 966, 974–77 (6th Cir. 2025) (“In sum, modern private law doctrines have rejected a
first-in-first-out approach and proportional method. What’s left standing? The lowest intermediate balance test and the
proceeds-first approach.... The Fifth Circuit requires prosecutors to prove that ‘the aggregate amount withdrawn from
an account containing commingled funds exceeds the clean funds.’ ... Other circuits have come to different
conclusions. The majority view is that § 1957 doesn’t require any sort of tracing. Under this framework, courts assume
that placing any dirty money in an account renders the whole account dirty. Indeed, the Second, Third, and Eleventh
Circuits have made this rule explicit. And the First, Four, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have at least hinted they
don’t require tracing ... On balance, though, the majority rule is that the government doesn’t have to trace funds at all.
Instead, these circuits merely point to a withdrawal from an account that contains commingled funds.... All told, there’s
significant debate about what § 1957 means.... Despite that significant ambiguity, however, we find it easy to reject the
Ninth Circuit’s approach ... That court’s precedent could be read to adopt a blanket presumption that the government
must trace every charged transaction to ‘criminally derived proceeds.’ ... So, while we might not be entirely sure what §
1957 means, we can say with certainty that it does not require strict tracing.” (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2000)).
156 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1).
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more than an individual’s payment of services covered by the Sixth Amendment.157 It creates a
safe harbor against prosecutions for spending under § 1957, but is no defense to a charge of
promotional, concealment, or evasive money laundering under § 1956.158
As noted earlier, § 1956(i) covers venue for either § 1956 or § 1957 offenses.159
Conspiracy, Attempt, Aiding and Abetting
Section 1957 proscribes attempts to violate its provisions.160 As a general rule, attempt requires
proof of an intent to commit the underlying offense and the commission of a substantial step
towards its completion.161 The general rules apply with respect to attempts to commit the offenses
under § 1956,162 and there is every reason to believe they apply to attempts to commit a violation
of § 1957.
Section 1956(h) outlaws conspiracy to violate § 1957.163 A conviction for conspiracy to violate
the section requires the government to prove: “(1) there was an agreement between two or more
persons to commit money laundering and (2) that the defendant joined the agreement knowing its
purpose and with the intent to further the illegal purpose.”164 Section 1956(h) creates a crime
which requires no proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.165 In addition to the
conspiracy offense, conspirators are liable for the foreseeable offenses committed by co-
157 United States v. Ravenell, 66 F.4th 472, 487 (4th Cir. 2023); (“‘[T]he scope of the safe harbor provision is shaped by
the Supreme Court’s ongoing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.’ Thus, ‘anyone seeking to benefit from § 1957(f)
must tie his conduct to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.’”) (quoting United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 771 (4 th
Cir. 2011)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1344 (2024) (mem.)); United States v. Velez, 586 F.3d 875, 877 (11 th Cir. 2009)
(“Accordingly, the exemption is limited to attorneys’ fees paid for representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
in a criminal proceeding and does not extend to attorneys’ fees paid for other purposes.”); United States v.
Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Correctly read, the statute offers a defense where a defendant
engages in a transaction underlying a money laundering charge with the present intent of exercising Sixth Amendment
rights. This allows a defendant to preserve her rights without undermining the prosecution of those the statute seeks to
punish. Since Hoogenboom did not clear out her accounts to pay her attorney—the evidence is that she engaged in the
transaction to prevent the FBI from seizing the money—she cannot squeeze within the slim Sixth Amendment
exception to the statute’s broad definition of what constitutes a monetary transaction.”).
158 United States v. Elso, 422 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2005); cf. Ravenell, 66 F.4th at 487 (the defense is only
available with respect to payment for legal services).
159 “18 U.S.C. § 1956(i); see, e.g., Abbas, 100 F.4th at 174; United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4 th 1091, 1107 (4th Cir. 2021).
160 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (“Whoever ... engages or attempts to engage.... ”).
161 E.g., United States v. Resendez-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 (2007); see also United States v. Vavra, 127 F.4 th 737,
743 (8th Cir. 2025); United States v. Howald, 104 F.4th 732, 742 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 781 (2024) (mem.);
United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 177 (4th Cir. 2024).
162
E.g., United States v. Anderson, 932 F.3d 344, 350 (5 th Cir. 2019); United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 314 (7th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9 th Cir. 1995).
163 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); e.g., United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Boedigheimer, 831 F.3d 954, 955–56 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Green, 818 F.3d 1258, 1279 (11 th Cir. 2016).
164 Vinson, 852 F.3d at 356; United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4 th 357, 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, IglesiasVillegas v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 268 (2023) (mem.); United States v. Ravanell, 66 F.4 th 472, 490 (4th Cir. 2023),
cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1344 (2024); United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v.
Jaimez, 45 F.4th 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2022).
165 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 211 (2005); see also United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4 th 292, 309 (4th Cir.
2024); United States v. Matthews, 31 F.4th 436, 447 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1358 (11 th
Cir. 2015).
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conspirators in furtherance of the scheme.166 Those who aid or abet the money laundering of
another are likewise liable as though they had committed the offense themselves.167
Consequences
Imprisonment
Violation of § 1957 and conspiracy to violate § 1957 are each punishable by imprisonment for not
more than ten years.168 Under the recommendations of the Sentencing Guidelines, many offenders
will be ineligible for a sentence of probation even as part of a split sentence.169 Where probation
is available and imposed, the term must be not less than one nor more than five years.170 If
imprisoned, offenders may also be subject to a term of supervised release of up to three years to
be served after they leave prison.171
Fines
Violation of Section 1957 and conspiracy to violate Section 1957 are each punishable by a fine of
not more than the greater of $250,000 ($500,000 for an organization) or twice the amount
involved in the transaction.172 Violators of Section 1957 are also subject to a civil penalty of no
more than the greater of $10,000 or the value of the property involved in the offense.173
Forfeiture
Any property involved in a violation of § 1957 or traceable to property involved in a violation of
§ 1957 is subject to confiscation under either civil or criminal procedures, and the applicable law
is essentially the same as in the case of § 1956.174
166 United States v. Hills, 27 F.4 th 1155, 1182 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 961 (11 th Cir.
2015) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946)); United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 614 (5th
Cir. 2013).
167 18 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 50 (1 st Cir. 2014) (“For those not in the know, an aider and
abetter is (broadly speaking) someone who knowingly assisted a crime’s commission, wanting it to succeed.”); e.g.,
United States v. Nsahlai, 121 F.4th 1052, 1057 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Carr, 83 F.4th 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2023).
168 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(b)(1), 1956(h). However, the greater maximum penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 670 will apply if the
offense involves an experimental drug or device (“pre-retail medical products”). The maximum sentences for theft of
an experimental drug or device under § 670 range from three to thirty years in prison. Id. § 670(c).
169 Offenders convicted of an offense carrying a maximum penalty of twenty-five years or more are ineligible for
probation by statute,. Id. §§ 3561(a)(1), 3581(b). Under the guidelines, even a first-time offender whose offense level is
more than ten is ineligible for probation and a first-time offender whose offense level is nine or ten is only eligible as
part of a split sentence, U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1, Sentencing Table. The money laundering sentencing guideline calls for a
base offense level equal to that of the predicate offense if ascertainable or otherwise a base offense level of 8; the base
offense level is increased by one level for a violation of § 1957 and another two levels if offense involved sophisticated
laundering, id. § 2S1.1.
170 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1).
171 Id. § 3583.
172 Id. §§ 1957(b), 1956(h), 3571, 3559.
173 Id. § 1956(b)(1).
174 Id. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), 982(a)(1)(A).
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18 U.S.C. § 1952: Travel Act
The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, is one of the money laundering related criminal statutes. While
§§ 1956 and 1957 punish transactions involving promoting, concealing, spending, and depositing
tainted funds, the Travel Act punishes interstate or foreign travel (or use of the facilities of
interstate or foreign commerce) conducted with the intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of a more
modest list of predicate offenses (“unlawful activity”), (2) promote or carry on such offenses
when there is an overt act in furtherance of that intent, or (3) commit some violent act in their
furtherance. The first two variants bear some resemblance to the concealment and promotion
offenses of § 1956 and somewhat more remotely to the deposit/spending proscriptions of § 1957.
The violent crime component of the Travel Act is only coincidentally related to money laundering
and consequently will be covered in this report only in passing.
The Travel Act’s elements cover anyone who:
1. A. “travels in interstate or foreign commerce,” or
B. uses “any facility in interstate or foreign commerce”, or
C. “uses the mail”
2. with intent
A. to “distribute the proceeds of an unlawful activity”, i.e.,
i. “any business enterprise involving unlawful activities gambling,
moonshining, drug dealing, or prostitution; or
ii. “extortion, bribery, or arson”; or
iii. “any act which is indictable” as money laundering; or
B. commit an act of “violence to further an unlawful activity”; or
C. “to otherwise”
i. “promote,”
ii. “manage,”
iii. “establish,”
iv.” carry on,” or
v. “facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on
any unlawful activity;” and
3. thereafter
A. distributes or attempts to distribute such proceeds, or
B. commits or attempts to commit such act of violence, or
C. promotes, manages, establishes, carries on, or facilitates the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on such unlawful activities or
attempts to do so.175
Distribution, Facilitation, and Violence
The courts often abbreviate their statement of the Travel Act’s elements to encompass only
whichever of the versions—distribution, promotion, or violence—is at issue:
Distribution—The essential elements of a violation under section 1952(a) are: “(1)
travel in interstate or foreign commerce; (2) with the specific intent to distribute
175 Id. § 1952.
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the proceeds of an unlawful activity; and (3) knowing and willful commission of
an act in furtherance of that intent.”176
Promotion—The government must prove that the defendant “(1) traveled in
interstate or uses an interstate facility, (2) with the intent to promote, manage,
establish, or carry on ... unlawful activity and (3) thereafter attempted to or did in
fact engage in one of the proscribed activities.”177
Violence—“The statute required the government to prove (1) that Lott traveled in
interstate commerce; (2) with the specific intent to commit any crime of violence
to further unlawful activity; and (3) that Lott committed the crime of violence
subsequent to the act of travel in interstate commerce.”178
The accused need not have been guilty of the unlawful activities that generated the distributed
proceeds.179 “Distribution” in § 1952(a)(1) “carries a connotation of distribution of illegal
proceeds to persons in organized crime conspiracies. Certainly the person receiving them must be
entitled to them for reasons other than normal and otherwise lawful purchase and sale of goods at
market prices.”180 Distribution, however, does include distribution to “pay off” criminal
associates,181 as well as the interstate transfer of criminal proceeds to a confederate for the
purchase of a controlling interest in a bank in order to facilitate subsequent laundering.182 Actual
distribution is not necessary for conviction; the offense simply involves interstate commerce;
intent to distribute; and a subsequent attempt to distribute, meaning some action—perhaps
incomplete or unsuccessful—in furtherance of the intent to distribute.183
The dimensions of the promotional offense are comparable. In addition to interstate travel or the
use of interstate facilities with the requisite intent, it requires the performance or attempted
performance of some subsequent overt act in furtherance of the intent to “promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment or carrying on” of a
predicate offense such as a business enterprise involving drug dealing.184 Since the statute
176 United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Shah, 95 F.4th 328, 357 (5th
Cir. 2024) (“The Travel Act prohibits use of a ‘facility in interstate ... commerce with [the] intent to ... distribute the
proceeds of an[ ] unlawful activity; or ... otherwise ... facilitate ... an[ ] unlawful activity.’ To convict, the Government
must prove that the defendant used facilities of interstate commerce with the specific intent to engage in or facilitate an
unlawful activity in furtherance of a criminal enterprise.”) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1952(a), cert. denied sub nom., Rimlawi v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 518 (2025) (mem.).
177 United States v. Garcia Rodriguez, 93 F.4th 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 2024).
178 United States v. Lott, 53 F.4 th 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2022).
179 United States v. Corona, 885 F.2d 766, 773 (11th Cir. 1989).
180 United States v. Lightfoot, 506 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); see also United States v. Cole, 704
F.2d 554, 558 (11th Cir. 1983).
181 United States v. Stewart, 854 F.3d 472, 474–75 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Schroeder testified that he gave Stewart his portion
of the profits by various means—through the mail, by driving it or flying with it to California [from Nebraska], by
wiring it, or by depositing it in a jointly-held bank account.”); see also United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 728–29
(1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 980 (11th Cir. 1985).
182 Corona, 885 F.2d at 774 (“Ray Corona helped Fernandez buy controlling interest in a bank under extremely
dishonest circumstances with laundered drug money. Such a purchase is in reality part of the laundering process. For
his role in the purchase and in running the bank for Fernandez, Ray received a percentage ownership without paying
any of the purchase price. In essence, Fernandez bought the bank with drug proceeds and gave a portion of it to Ray....
Although Ray Corona was the recipient, he nonetheless was responsible under 18 U.S.C. § 2 as principal in the
distribution of proceeds.”); see also United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 93 F.4th 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 2024).
183 United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
184 United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 538 (6 th Cir. 2002) (“By associating with Green in Kentucky and by
(continued...)
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condemns attempt and promotion rather than commission of a predicate act, the overt act need not
constitute a completed predicate offense.185 The promotional travel offense encompasses forms of
promoting, managing, and carrying on a predicate offense other than those that resemble money
laundering, such as the interstate transportation of controlled substances or use of a cell phone (a
facility in interstate commerce) to promote a predicate offense.186
Travel, etc.
Common to each of the three offenses is the jurisdictional element: interstate or foreign travel or
the use of the mail or some other facility of interstate or foreign travel. When the Travel Act’s
jurisdictional element involves mail or facilities in interstate or foreign commerce, rather than
interstate travel, evidence that a telephone was used,187 the Internet,188 or an ATM,189 or the
facilitates of an interstate banking chain190 will do.191 The government is not required to show that
the defendant used the facilities himself or that the use was critical to the success of the criminal
venture. It is enough that he caused them to be used192 and that their employment was useful for
his purposes.193 “Substantive cases brought under [18 U.S.C.] § 1952 have been uniform in their
remaining in the car that Green intended to use to leave the scene of the drug sale at the Newport bar [following their
trip from Ohio], Jordon placed himself in the position to (1) receive immediate payment from Green after the sale in
Kentucky, (2) provide surveillance support, and (3) physically aid Green should any danger arise. Thus, Jordon acted,
while in Kentucky, in furtherance of the intended unlawful act there.”); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 773 (10th
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he illegal activity charged was possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant traveled into
Oklahoma from Maryland, Virginia, and Tennessee. He performed various overt acts in furtherance of the crime
charged after arriving in Oklahoma, including possessing and transporting a quantity of marijuana with the intent to
distribute it.”).
185 Welch, 327 F.3d at 1092 (“[A]n individual may violate the Travel Act simply by attempting to perform a specified
‘unlawful act’ so long as that individual has the requisite intent.”); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 538 (6th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he Zolicoffer court made clear that its holding should not be interpreted ‘to say that the government must
prove that the defendant committed an illegal act after the travel, but only that a plain reading of the statute shows that
it must prove some conduct after the travel in furtherance of the unlawful activity.’” (quoting United States v.
Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1989)).
186 United States v. Robinson, 829 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376, 389–90 (5th Cir.
2013). For other examples see United States v. Lustig, 830 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Lustig pled guilty to three
counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) by using a cell phone [i.e., a facility in interstate commerce] to facilitate a
prostitution offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591.”); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1327 (10 th Cir. 2014) (same);
United States v. Mergen, 764 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Mergen ... agreed to plead guilty to a Travel Action
violation (i.e., the trip to New Jersey [from New York] to get gasoline for the arson [committed in New York])”).
187 United States v. Halloran, 821 F.3d 321, 342 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205, 214 (3d
Cir. 2014); United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 717–22 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 15
(1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Graham, 856 F.2d 756, 76061 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1988). Moreover, “[p]urely intrastate use of an interstate facility is sufficient to violate the Travel
Act.” Halloran, 821 F.3d at 342 (citing Nader, 542 F.3d at 717–22)).
188 Halloran, 821 F.3d at 342; Brinson, 772 F.3d at 1327; United States v. Shah, 95 F.4 th 328, 359 (5th Cir. 2024).
189 United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275 (8 th Cir. 1996).
190 United States v. Rogers, 387 F.3d 925, 935 (7 th Cir. 2004); United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407, 410 (7 th Cir.
1990).
191 nterstate travel and interstate shipment will do, as well. United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 676 (7 th Cir. 2001);
cf., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 240–42 (1972).
192 Halloran, 821 F.3d at 342; Baker, 82 F.3d at 275; Auerbach, 913 F.2d at 410.
193 Baker, 82 F.3d at 275–76; United States v. McNeal, 77 F.3d 938, 944 (7 th Cir. 1996); United States v. Houlihan, 92
F.3d 1271, 1292 (1st Cir. 1996).
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holdings that it is unnecessary to prove a defendant had actual knowledge of the jurisdictional
element, and that he actually agreed and intended to use interstate facilities to commit a crime.”194
Unlawful Activity
The Travel Act’s proceeds-distribution, promotional, and violence-in-furtherance offenses all use
the same list of predicate offenses (“unlawful activity”). The Travel Act’s predicate offenses come
in three stripes—money laundering offenses; extortion-bribery-arson offenses; and offenses of the
gambling, prostitution, drug dealing, and bootlegging “businesses.” The first, the money
laundering predicate offenses include Sections 1956 and 1957 as well as the currency transaction
reporting offenses.195
The second class of Travel Act predicate offenses consists simply of the crimes of extortion,
bribery, or arson committed in violation of state or federal law.196 The terms “extortion,”
“bribery,” and “arson” as they appear in the Travel Act are generic; they mean what they were
commonly understood to mean when the Travel Act was enacted, even if the common law
definition is more restrictive or if the state law that proscribes them uses a different name.197
The final class of Travel Act predicates is more restrictive. It encompasses gambling, prostitution,
drug dealing, and certain forms of tax evasion only when committed in conjunction with a
“business enterprise.”198 A criminal business enterprise, as understood in the Travel Act,
“contemplates a continuous course of business—one that already exists at the time of the overt
act or is intended thereafter. Evidence of an isolated criminal act, or even sporadic acts, will not
suffice,”199 and it must be shown to be involved in an unlawful activity outlawed by a specifically
identified state or federal statute.200
194 United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1150 (2d Cir. 1978)).
195 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(3) (“any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title”); United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
196 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2); e.g., United States v. Lott, 53 F.4th 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Ferriero, 866
F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2017); Halloran, 821 F.3d at 342.
197 United States v. Buselli, 106 F.4 th 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 2024); United States v. Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, 115
F.4th 1167, 1182 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-855 (U.S. June 23, 2025), 2025 WL 1727387 (mem.); United
States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 294–96 (1969); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 (1979); Scheidler v. NOW,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2003).
198 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1); United States v. Anderson, 932 F.3d 344, 348 (5 th Cir. 2019); United States v. Dailey, 24
F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Congress chose to attack organized crime through selectively defining the term
‘unlawful activity.’ Congress made certain offenses in areas typically associated with organized crime, i.e., gambling,
liquor, narcotics, and prostitution, ‘unlawful activit[ies]’ only if engaged in by a ‘business enterprise.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(i)(1)).
199 United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1094 (5 th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. James, 210 F.3d 1342, 1345
(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1993) (“If the defendant engages in a
continuous course of cocaine distribution rather than a sporadic or casual course of conduct, then the statutory
requirement of a business enterprise involving narcotics is satisfied.”); United States v. Iennaco, 893 F.2d 394, 398
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
200 United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284, 287–88 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 433–36 (7th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533, 536–39 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting
Attempting to violate the Travel Act is not a federal offense.201 It is a crime to conspire to do
so,202 however, or to aid and abet another to do so.203 The principles of accomplice and coconspirator liability, discussed earlier, apply with equal force to the Travel Act. Coconspirators
are liable for the crimes of their confederates committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.204 “To
support aider and abettor liability, [the] [d]efendant must have had ‘general knowledge regarding
the activities prohibited under the [Travel Act] and the intent to assist those activities.’”205
Consequences
The money laundering-like distribution and facilitation offenses of the Travel Act, § 1952(a)(1)
and § 1952(a)(3), are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years.206 Offenders
subject to a fine of the greater of not more than $250,000 ($500,000 for organizations) or twice
the gain or loss associated with the offense.207 If imprisoned, offenders may also be subject to a
term of supervised release of up to three years to be served upon their release from prison.208
Property associated with a violation of § 1952 is not subject to confiscation solely by virtue of
that fact,209 although the property may be confiscated by operation of the laws governing a § 1952
predicate offense or by operation of RICO or the money laundering provisions. For example,
interstate travel conducted with the intent to distribute drug trafficking proceeds involving an act
in furtherance of that intent is a violation of § 1952. The proceeds are not subject to forfeiture as a
consequence, but they are subject to confiscation by operation of the forfeiture provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act.210 Moreover, Travel Act violations have been designated RICO
predicate offenses and consequently qualify as money laundering predicates under §§ 1956 and
1957.211 Thus, to the extent that Travel Act proceeds are involved in a financial transaction or
monetary transaction in violation of § 1956 or § 1957, they are subject to confiscation.212
201 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
202 Id. § 371; e.g., United States v. Unpradit, 35 F.4 th 615, 622 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Halloran, 821 F.3d 321,
325 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2013).
203 18 U.S.C. § 2; e.g., United States v. Law, 990 F.3d 1058, 1061 (7 th Cir. 2021); United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255,
258 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Tragas, 727 F.3d 610, 618 (6 th Cir. 2013).
204 United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d
407, 410 (7th Cir. 1990).
205 Tragas, 727 F.3d at 618 (third alteration in original).
206 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(A). The crime of violence offense is punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty
years, or by imprisonment for life or any term of years if death results. Id. § 1952(a)(B).
207 Id. §§ 3571, 3559.
208 Id. § 3583.
209 Id. §§ 1952, 981, 982.
210 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881.
211 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B), 1956(c)(7)(A), 1957(f)(3).
212 Id. §§ 981((a)(1)(A), 982(a)(1); see e.g., United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 13, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding a
forfeiture incurred as a consequence of conviction for “interstate travel to promote prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the
Travel Act); inducement to instate travel to engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (the Mann Act); conspiracy to
violate the Travel Act and the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and
1957.”); United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 23 (1 st Cir. 2005) (noting confiscation as a consequence of a
conviction of “one count of RICO conspiracy, as well as numerous substantive ... counts of money laundering and
related offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1956, and 1957.”).
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31 U.S.C. § 5322: Reporting Requirements
Section 5322 penalizes willful violation of several monetary transaction reporting requirements
found primarily in title 31 of the United States Code. The section’s coverage extends to violations
of the following sections and their attendant regulations:
31 U.S.C. § 5313—financial institution reports of cash transactions involving $10,000 or
more;
31 U.S.C. § 5314—reports by persons in the U.S. of foreign financial agency transactions;
31 U.S.C. § 5316—reports by any person taking $10,000 in cash out of the U.S. or bringing
it in;
31 U.S.C. § 5318—suspicious transaction reports by financial institutions;
31 U.S.C. § 5318A—special measures record keeping and reports by financial institutions
relating to foreign counter-money laundering concerns;
31 U.S.C. § 5325—reports by financial institutions issuing cashier’s checks in amounts of
$3000 or more;
31 U.S.C. § 5326—cash transaction reports by financial institutions and/or various trades
or businesses pursuant to Treasury Department geographical orders;
31 U.S.C. § 5331—reports of trades and businesses other than financial institutions of cash
transactions involving $10,000 or more;
12 U.S.C. § 1829b—record keeping requirements of federally insured depository
institutions; and
12 U.S.C. § 1953—record keeping by uninsured banks or similar institutions.
Section 5322 does not cover violations of § 5315 (relating to foreign currency transaction reports)
which are subject to the civil penalty provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5321 or of § 5324 (relating to
structuring financial transactions), which carries its own criminal penalties.
In order to establish “willful” violation of § 5322, the government must prove that the accused
knew that his breach of the statute was unlawful.213
Simple violations of § 5322 are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, a fine
of not more than $250,000, or both.214 Violations committed during the commission of another
federal crime or as part of a pattern of illegal activity involving more than $100,000 over the
course of a year are punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years; a fine of not more
than $500,000 (not more than $1 million for a special measures violation (31 U.S.C. § 5318A)) or
a violation involving a breach of due diligence with respect to private banking for foreign
customers or foreign shell banks (31 U.S.C. § 5318(i), (j)); or both.215
Section 5322 is a Travel Act predicate offense. It is also a RICO predicate offense,216 but unlike
most RICO predicates is not a § 1956 or § 1957 money laundering predicate offense.217 Property
associated with violations of two of the sections within its coverage is subject to confiscation.218
213 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994); United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9 th Cir. 2007).
214 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
215 Id. §§§ 5322(b), (d).
216 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(b)(3), 1961(1)(E). See e.g., United States v. Brady, 644 F.3d 1213, 1294 (11th Cir. 2011).
217 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1957(f)(3).
218 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c).
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Under § 5317(c), property becomes forfeitable when it is involved in, or traceable to, a violation
of 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (reports relating to cash transactions involving $10,000 or more) or of 31
U.S.C. § 5316 (reports relating to taking $10,000 or more out of the U.S. or to bring it into the
U.S.). The confiscation, however, may be subject to a constitutional limitation on excessive fine
limitation.219 In United States v. Bajakajian,220 the Supreme Court held that the confiscation of
$357,144 for a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5322 occasioned by a failure to comply with the reporting
requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5316 would constitute an unconstitutionally excessive fine—in the
absence of evidence that the money was derived from, or destined to facilitate, some other
criminal activity. In later cases involving the failure to report transported cash, the courts have
occasionally ordered confiscation of less than all of the unreported cash if the total was
substantial and the cash was otherwise untainted.221 In most instances, however, Bajakajian
appears to pose little obstacle to total or near total forfeiture.222
31 U.S.C. § 5324: Anti-Structuring
Structuring is organizing financial transactions or reports relating to financial transactions so as to
evade reporting requirements, for example, by dividing a $12,000 bank deposit into three separate
$4,000 deposits in order to evade the $10,000 reporting requirement. Section 5324 condemns
three categories of structuring: one is devoted to transactions involving banks, credit unions, car
dealerships, jewelers, casinos, and the other similar entities classified as financial institutions;223
another to cash transactions of $10,000 or more involving nonfinancial institutions;224 and a third
to bringing $10,000 or more in cash into the country or taking it out of the country.225 There is no
requirement that the funds in question were derived from criminal activity,226 or that the
defendant knew that the structuring was illegal.227 Moreover, § 5324 “focuses on an individual’s
219
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
220 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
221 United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the confiscation
of $10,000 of the $100,348 originally seized); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (overturning as an
excessive fine the forfeiture order for $138,794 in unreported cash); United States v. $120,856.00 in U.S. Currency
More or Less, 394 F.Supp.2d 687, 692–96 (D.V.I. 2005) (holding that confiscation of more than $7500 of the
unreported $120,856 would constitute an excessive fine); United States v. $293,316 in U.S. Currency, More or Less,
349 F.Supp.2d 638, 650 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering the confiscation of $48,000 of the $490,000 of unreported cash
seized).
222 United States v. $293,316, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 648–49 (listing 168 instances where unreported cash was forfeited and
noting that in a vast majority of cases, at least 90% of the cash was confiscated).
223 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a); see, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 278–79 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Simmerman, 850 F.3d 829, 831–32 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Leon, 841 F.3d 1187, 1190–91 (11th Cir. 2016)
(describing the difference between an offense under § 5324(a)(1) and one under § 5324(a)(3)).
224 31 U.S.C. § 5324(b).
225 Id. § 5324(c); United States v. Suarez, 966 F.3d 376, 383 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To prove a structuring offense the
government must prove the defendant (1) engaged in structuring, (2) did so with the knowledge that the financial
institutions involved in the transaction were obligated to report currency transactions involving more than $10,000, and
(3) intended to evade this reporting requirement.”).
226 United States v. Thomas, 847 F.3d 193, 206–07 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Aunspaugh, 792 F.3d 1302, 1311
(11th Cir. 2015) (citing in accord Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136 (1994)).
227 Thomas, 847 F.3d at 205; United States v. Taylor, 816 F.3d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 2016) (“To violate § 5324, (1) the
defendant must, in fact, have engaged in acts of structuring; (2) he must have done so with knowledge that the financial
institutions involved were legally obligated to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000; and (3) he must have
acted with the intent to evade this reporting requirement); United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 470 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir.
2005); United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 314–15 (5th Cir. 2005).
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intent to evade the reporting requirements, not on whether he succeeds in doing so,” and thus
success is not an element of the offense.228
Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years (not more than 10 years if
committed in conjunction with another federal offense or if committed as part of a pattern of
activity involving $100,000 or more) and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than
$500,000 for organizations), with the fine maximum doubled if the offense is committed in
conjunction with another federal crime or as part of a pattern of activity involving $100,000.229
Any property involved in a structuring violation of the section is subject to confiscation.230 Such
forfeitures do not offend the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause unless they are grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.231
31 U.S.C. § 5332: Bulk Cash Smuggling
After the Supreme Court held in Bajakajian that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment precluded confiscation of $300,000 of unreported, but otherwise untainted, cash,232
Congress enacted the bulk cash smuggling provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5332. The section outlaws
carrying or attempting to transport more than $10,000 in unreported, “concealed” cash across a
U.S. border with the intent to evade 31 U.S.C. § 5316 reporting requirements.233 The section has
been used to prosecute those who attempted to bring unreported cash into the United States, as
well as those who attempted to smuggle cash out of the country.234 The fact that the money was
neither derived from criminal activity nor intended for criminal purposes may be relevant for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, but it is no defense to the
underlying offense.235 The proscribed methods of concealment seem to envelop any method short
of public display.236 The offense carries a prison term of not more than five years, but also calls
for confiscation of the cash and related property in lieu of a fine.237 The section was apparently
228 United States v. Souza, 749 F.3d 74, 84 (1 st Cir. 2014) (citing in accord Sweeney, 611 F.3d at 471 and Van Allen,
524 F.3d at 825).
229 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d).
230 Id. § 5317(c)(2); United States v. $79,650.00, 650 F.3d 381, 383 n.3 (4 th Cir. 2011).
231 United States v. Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 851–55(11th Cir. 2011) (forfeiture order in the amount of almost $1.9
million was not excessive considering, among other factors, that the Sentencing Guidelines would permit a fine of $1.3
million).
232 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
233 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a).
234 E.g., United States v. Tenorio, 55 F.4th 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Freitas, 904 F.3d 11, 16 (1 st Cir.
2018); United States v. $132,245 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9 th Cir. 2014); United States v. ZorrillaEchevarria, 723 F.3d 298, 298 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 400 (6th Cir. 2006).
235 United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007); cf., $132,245 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.3d 1055, 1058–
59 (9th Cir. 2014).
236 31 U.S.C. § 5332(b) (“For purposes of this section, the concealment of currency on the person of any individual
includes concealment in any article of clothing worn by the individual or in any luggage, backpack, or other container
worn or carried by such individual.”) See e.g., United States v. Morla, 123 F. Supp. 3d 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
(“Those officers uncovered $370, 830 in U.S. currency in Morla’s checked bags.”). In fact, the Money Laundering
Threat Assessment Working Group report noted in 2005 that the largest bulk cash smuggling seizures, both in terms of
numbers of seizures and amount seized, involve cash that was “unconcealed,” U.S. Money Laundering Threat
Assessment, 39 (561 seizures ($243 million) of unconcealed cash versus the next highest category (515 seizures ($83.8)
from luggage)), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/246/mlta.pdf https://perma.cc/AN78-E5UD.
237
31 U.S.C. § 5332(b)(2)–(4), (c).
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enacted to overcome the consequences of Bajakajian.238 Initially, there may have been some
question whether the effort had succeeded.239
18 U.S.C. § 1960: Money Transmitters
Section 1960 outlaws conducting or owning an unlicensed money transmitting business.240
“Money transmitting” is defined broadly by way of a nonexclusive list of examples, such as
checks and wire transfers,241 and includes cryptocurrency.242 The term “business” restricts the
238 “[I]n response to the Bajakajian decision, the Department of Justice proposed making the act of bulk cash
smuggling itself a criminal offense, and to authorize the imposition of the full range of civil and criminal sanctions
when the offense is discovered. Because the act of concealing currency for the purpose of smuggling it out of the
United States is inherently more serious than simply failing to file a Customs report, strong and meaningful sanctions,
such as confiscation of the smuggled currency, are likely to withstand Eighth Amendment challenges to the new
statute.” H.R. REP. NO. 107-250, at 37 (2001); see also United States v. $293,316, 349 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); “In 2001, Congress expressed its displeasure with the Bajakajian decision and created a new ‘bulk cash
smuggling’ offense, 31 U.S.C. 5332, that is designed to permit forfeiture of one hundred percent of the smuggled
currency in most circumstances, whether or not the government can establish a nexus between the smuggled money and
another criminal offense. Enacted as part of the post-September 11 effort to address terrorist financing specifically, and
intentional money laundering generally, in Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, the new law recognizes the central role
that bulk cash smuggling plays in the globalization of crime.” Stefan D. Cassella, Bulk Cash Smuggling and the
Globalization of Crime: Overcoming Constitutional Challenges to Forfeiture Under 31 U.S.C. 5332, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 98, 106 (2004).
239 “This statute included a forfeiture provision that was a precursor of the present version of 31 U.S.C. 5332. The
statutory language was modified as part of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, by moving the forfeiture provisions from
18 U.S.C. 982 (the statute authorizing the forfeiture in Bajakajian) to 31 U.S.C. 5332 (the statute authorizing Ely’s
forfeiture). The government advances this modification as a basis for us to find Bajakajian inapplicable. However, the
forfeiture language of the two provisions is virtually identical, and even if Congress could circumvent the Eighth
Amendment’s limitations on excessive fines by modifying a statute, which would make little sense, cutting and pasting
a provision of the United States Code from one chapter to another cannot be viewed as a meaningful change. Ely, 468
F.3d at 402 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006); but see United States v. Jose, “Congress, in enacting section 5332, responded to
Bajakajian in a way that it believed would, in most circumstances, constitutionally permit the full forfeiture of currency
not reported to authorities as required by section 5316 ... Section 5332 makes clear that Congress has now prohibited
what it calls ‘bulk cash smuggling,’ and that it considers this to be a very serious offense. Congress has thus tipped the
forfeiture equation in favor of the prosecution in bulk cash smuggling cases. Bajakajian itself stated that ‘judgments
about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.” 499 F.3d 105, 110–
11(1st Cir. 2007); “A violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316 is ‘solely a reporting offense’ and does not constitute a serious
crime under the Excessive Fines Clause. In contrast, § 5332 criminalizes the act of bulk cash smuggling into or out of
the United States ... Congress also attached purposes to § 5332, which included the need ‘to emphasize the seriousness
of the act of bulk cash smuggling. We refuse to second-guess Congress determination that bulk cash smuggling is a
serious crime.” $132,245 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325 and Pub. L. No,
107-56 § 371(b)(3)).
240 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (“Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an
unlicensed money transmitting business shall be fined in accordance with this title and imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both.”).
241 “‘[M]oney transmitting’ includes transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not
limited to transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or courier.” Id. §
1960(b)(2). “[O]n behalf of the public” refers to a transmission “‘made for third-parties or customers as part of a
commercial or business relationship instead of with one’s own money or for family or personal acquaintances.’” United
States v. Singh, 995 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir, 2021) (quoting United States v. $215,587.22 in U.S. Currency, 306 F.
Supp. 3d 213, 218 (D.D.C. 2018)).
242 United States v. Carter, 93 F.4 th 581, 585 (1st Cir. 2024); United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 707–10
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing, among others, S. REP. NO. 101-460 (1990) and United States v. Budovsky, No. 13-CR-368, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015).
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offense to an enterprise conducted for profit and one engaged in more than a single qualifying
transmission.243
The section recognizes three categories of transmitting businesses.244 One consists of any
transmission business operating in a state that requires it to be licensed and criminalizes the
failure to do so.245 Here, the government must prove that the defendant knew that he was
conducting a money transmitting business and that it was unlicensed.246 It need not prove the
defendant knew that the state in which the defendant operated the business required him to seek a
license or that the state outlawed transmission without a license.247
The second category of unlicensed money transmitting businesses consists of any transmitting
business operating in a manner that fails to comply with Department of the Treasury regulations
governing such enterprises.248 Here, the government need not show that the defendant knew of
federal regulatory requirements,249 but it must show that the defendant knew that he was
operating a transmitting business.250 The third category consists of any licensed business that
transmits money known to be derived from or intended to finance criminal activity even if the
transmitter is duly licensed.251
Section 1960 offenses are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine
of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations).252 Property “involved in”
243 United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (“[T]o find a defendant liable for
operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, a jury must find that he participated in more than a single,
isolated transmission of money. Likewise, giving the term ‘business’ its plain and unambiguous meaning under § 1960
a business is an enterprise that is carried on for profit or financial gain.”).
244 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1).
245 “[U]nlicensed money transmitting business’ means a money transmitting business which affects interstate or foreign
commerce in any manner or degree and—(A) is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a State
where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under State law, whether or not the defendant knew
that the operation was required to be licensed or that the operation was so punishable.” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A).
246 United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 133 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563, 568 (4 th Cir.
2006); United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, 607 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 621 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2010)
(conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “1.) Mazza knowingly conducted, controlled, managed,
supervised, directed, or owned, 2.) a money-transmitting business that, 3.) affected interstate or foreign commerce, and
4.) was not in compliance with applicable licensing requirements under either state or federal law.”).
247 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A).
248 Id. § 1960(b)(1)(B) (“‘[U]nlicensed money transmitting business’ means a money transmitting business which
affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and ... (B) fails to comply with the money transmitting
business registration requirements under section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed under
such section.”); United States v. Bankman-Fried, 680 F. Supp. 3d 289, 311 (S.D. N.Y. 2023) (“Thus, an ‘unlicensed
money transmitting business’ comprises (i) ‘a money transmitting business’ that (ii) ‘affects interstate or foreign
commerce in any manner or degree’ and (iii) ‘fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration
requirements.... ’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1960).
249 Talebnejad, 460 F.3d at 568.
250 United States v. Uddin, 365 F.Supp.2d 825, 828–30 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
251 “‘[U]nlicensed money transmitting business’ means a money transmitting business which affects interstate or
foreign commerce in any manner or degree and ... (C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds
that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or
support unlawful activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C).
252 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3571, 3553.
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Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law
violation of the section is subject to civil and criminal forfeiture.253 The section has withstood
challenges arguing that it is unconstitutionally vague.254
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO)
As noted earlier, all RICO predicate offenses are by definition money laundering predicate
offenses under §§ 1956 and 1957.255 The crimes that suggest the possibility of a RICO offense
also suggest the possibility of money laundering. In some money laundering cases, although there
is no separate RICO violation, prosecution is possible by virtue of the RICO shared predicate
offense list.256 In a number of other cases, money laundering is one of several predicate offenses
of a larger RICO enterprise,257 the RICO enterprise is devoted primarily to money laundering, 258
or the two are complimentary conspiracies. 259
RICO makes it a federal crime for any person to:
1. conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
2. the affairs of an enterprise
3. engaged in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce
4. A. through the collection of an unlawful debt, or
B. through a pattern of racketeering activity (predicate offenses).260
In other words, “[f]or a defendant to convicted of a substantive RICO offense [under § 1962(c)],
the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence
of an enterprise; (2) that affected interstate commerce; and (3) that the defendant associated with
253 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), 982(a)(1); see e.g., United States v. Approximately $252,140 in U.S. Currency, 532 F.
Supp. 3d 344, 340 (W.D. N.C. 2021); United States v. $715,031.27, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277–78 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
254 United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 406, 414–15 (7th Cir. 2008); Talenejad, 460 F.3d at 568.
255 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1957(f)(3). For a general discussion of RICO see, CRS Report 96-950, RICO: A
Sketch, by Charles Doyle.(2025).
256 Mail
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