Minority Contracting and Affirmative Action for Disadvantaged Small Businesses: Legal Issues

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Minority Contracting and Affirmative Action

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Legal Issues

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April 1, 2010

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RL33284

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Minority Contracting and Affirmative Action for Disadvantaged Small Businesses

Summary

Since the early 1960s, minority participation “goals” have been an integral part of federal policies

to promote racial and gender equality in contracting on federally financed construction projects

and in connection with other large federal contracts. Federal contract “set-asides” and minority

subcontracting goals evolved from Small Business Administration (SBA) programs to foster

participation in the federal procurement process by small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), or

small businesses owned and controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged”

individuals. Minority group members and women are presumed to be socially and economically

disadvantaged under the Small Business Act, while non-minority contractors must present

evidence to prove their eligibility. “Goals” or “set-asides” for minority groups, women, and other

“disadvantaged” individuals have also been routinely included in federal funding measures for

education, defense, transportation, and other activities over much of the last two decades.

The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly approved of congressionally mandated racial preferences

to allocate the benefits of contracts on federally sponsored public works projects, while generally

condemning similar actions taken by state and local entities to promote public contracting

opportunities for minority entrepreneurs. Disputes prior to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson

generated divergent views as to whether state affirmative action measures for the benefit of racial

minorities were subject to the same “strict scrutiny” as applied to “invidious” racial

discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, an “intermediate” standard resembling the test

for gender-based classifications, or simple rationality. In Croson, a 5 to 4 majority resolved that

while “race-conscious” remedies could be legislated in response to proven past discrimination by

the affected governmental entities, “racial balancing” untailored to “specific” and “identified”

evidence of minority exclusion was impermissible.

Until Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, however, a different, more lenient standard was

thought to apply to use of racial preferences in federally conducted activities. The majority there

applied “strict scrutiny” to a federal transportation program of financial incentives for prime

contractors who subcontracted to firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged group

members. Although the Court refrained from deciding the constitutional merits of the particular

program before it, and remanded for further proceedings below, it determined that all “racial

classifications” by government at any level must be justified by a “compelling governmental

interest” and “narrowly tailored” to that end. But the majority opinion, by Justice O’Connor,

sought to “dispel the notion” that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” by

acknowledging a role for Congress as architect of remedies for discrimination nationwide.

Bottom line, Adarand and its progeny suggest that racial preferences in federal law or policy are a

remedy of last resort, which must be adequately justified and narrowly drawn to pass

constitutional muster. In the post-Adarand era, lower federal courts have at times upheld and at

other times struck down federal programs that contain minority contracting preferences. For

example, in Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense, the Federal Circuit

recently held that the Department of Defense’s Small Disadvantaged Business program was

unconstitutional.

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Minority Contracting and Affirmative Action for Disadvantaged Small Businesses

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

The Adarand Decision and Its Progeny .......................................................................................4

Background and History of Adarand .....................................................................................4

The Supreme Court Declines to Decide the Case...................................................................8

Post-Adarand Regulatory Developments ................................................................................... 10

U.S. Department of Transportation Revised Regulations...................................................... 12

Small Business Administration Rules for Women-Owned Businesses .................................. 13

Post-Adarand Judicial Decisions ............................................................................................... 15

Federal Affirmative Action Programs .................................................................................. 15

Minority Contracting By State and Local Government ........................................................ 20

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 25

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 25

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Introduction

It has long been the policy of the federal government to assist minority and other “socially and

economically disadvantaged” small businesses become fully competitive and viable business

concerns. The objective has largely been pursued through the federal procurement process by

allocating federal assistance and contracts to foster disadvantaged business development. Federal

assistance has taken a variety of forms, including targeting procurement contracts and

subcontracts for disadvantaged or minority firms, management and technical assistance grants,

educational and training support, and surety bonding assistance.

Present day set-aside programs authorizing preferential treatment in the award of government

contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs), or socially and economically

disadvantaged small businesses, originated in § 8(a) of the Small Business Act of 1958.1 Initially,

the Small Business Administration (SBA) utilized its § 8(a) authority to obtain contracts from

federal agencies and subcontract them on a noncompetitive basis to firms agreeing to locate in or

near disadvantaged areas and provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed. The § 8(a)

contracts awarded under this program were not restricted to minority-owned firms and were

offered to all small firms willing to hire and train the unemployed and underemployed in five

metropolitan areas, as long as the firms met the program’s other criteria.2 As the result of a series

of executive orders by President Nixon, the focus of the § 8(a) program shifted from job-creation

in low-income areas to minority small business development through increased federal

contracting with firms owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged

persons.3 With these executive orders, the executive branch was directed to promote minority

business enterprise and many agencies looked to SBA’s § 8(a) authority to accomplish this

purpose.

The administrative decision to convert § 8(a) into a minority business development program

acquired a statutory basis in 1978 with the passage of P.L. 95-507, which broadened the range of

assistance that the government—SBA, in particular—could provide to minority businesses.

Section 8(a), or the “Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development” program,

authorizes SBA to enter into all kinds of construction, supply, and service contracts with other

federal departments and agencies. The SBA acts as a prime contractor and then subcontracts the

performance of these contracts to small business concerns owned and controlled by “socially and

economically disadvantaged” individuals, Indian Tribes or Hawaiian Native Organizations.4

Applicants for § 8(a) certification must demonstrate “socially disadvantaged” status or that they

“have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identities as

members of groups without regard to their individual qualities.”5 The Small Business

Administration “presumes,” absent contrary evidence, that small businesses owned and operated

1

P.L. 85-536, § 8(a), 72 Stat. 384, 389-90 (July 18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §637(a)).

Minority Contracting: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Small Business and the House Subcomm. on

Minority Enterprise and General Oversight of the Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1978).

3

E.O. 11625, 3 C.F.R. § 616 (1971), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 631, authorized the Office of Minority Business

Enterprise created by preceding order, E.O. 11458, to provide financial assistance to public or private organizations that

provided management or technical assistance to minority business enterprises. It also empowered the Secretary of

Commerce to coordinate and review all federal activities to assist in minority business development.

4

15 U.S.C. § 637(a).

5

Id. at § 637(a)(5).

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by members of certain groups—including Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian

Pacific Americans—are socially disadvantaged.6 Any individual not a member of one of these

groups must “establish individual social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence” in

order to qualify for § 8(a) certification. 7 The § 8(a) applicant must, in addition, show that

“economic disadvantage” has diminished its capital and credit opportunities, thereby limiting its

ability to compete with other firms in the open market.8 Accordingly, while disadvantaged status

under the SBA includes a racial component, in terms of presumptive eligibility, it is not restricted

to racial minorities, but also includes persons subjected to “ethnic prejudice or cultural bias” who

are able to satisfy specified regulatory criteria.9 It also excludes businesses owned or controlled

by persons who, regardless of race, are “not truly socially and/or economically disadvantaged.”10

The “Minority Small Business Subcontracting Program” authorized by § 8(d) of the Small

Business Act codified the presumption of disadvantaged status for minority group members that

applied by SBA regulation under the § 8(a) program.11 Section 8(d) requires prime contractors on

all federal contracts that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, are performed in the United

States, and are not for personal services to negotiate a “subcontracting plan” with the procuring

agency which includes “percentage goals” for utilization of small socially and economically

disadvantaged firms. Award of the contract hinges upon the contractor’s agreeing to a plan that is

also acceptable to the agency, 12 and each contract must include a clause which states that “[t]he

contractors shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black

Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other

minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the Administration pursuant to §

8(a) ... ”13 Section 8(d) also allows the government to collect liquidated damages from contractors

that fail to comply in good faith with their plans.14

P.L. 95-507, which created these § 8(d) programs further required that all federal agencies with

procurement powers establish annual percentage goals for the award of procurement contracts

and subcontracts to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs).15 A decade later, Congress enacted

the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988,16 directing the President to set

6

13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b).

Id. at § 124.103(c).

8

The statute, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A), defines economic disadvantage to mean “socially disadvantaged individuals

whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit

opportunities as compared to others who are not socially disadvantaged, and such diminished opportunities have

precluded or are likely to preclude such individuals from successfully competing in the open market.”

9

15 U.S.C. §§ 637(a)(5), (d). Criteria set forth in the regulations requires non-minority individuals to prove by “a

preponderance of the evidence,” that they have personally experienced “substantial and chronic social disadvantage in

American society” as the result of “[a]t least one objective distinguishing feature,” including “long-term residence in an

environment isolated from the mainstream of American society,” with a “negative impact” on his or her “entry into ...

the business world.” “In every case ... SBA will consider education, employment, and business history, where

applicable, to see if the totality of circumstances shows disadvantage in entering into or advancing in the business

world.” 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(c).

10

See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 23, Subpt. D, App. C.

11

15 U.S.C. § 637(d). See also 13 C.F.R. § 124.104.

12

15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(D) and (d)(5)(A).

13

15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C).

14

15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(4)(F).

15

See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(2).

16

P.L. 100-656, § 502, 102 Stat. 3887, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1).

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annual, government-wide procurement goals of at least 20% for small businesses and 5% for

disadvantaged businesses, as defined by the SBA. Simultaneously, federal agencies were required

to continue to adopt their own goals, compatible with the government-wide goals, in an effort to

create “maximum practicable opportunity” for small disadvantaged businesses to sell their goods

and services to the government. The goals may be waived where not practicable due to

unavailability of DBEs in the relevant area and other factors.17 Federal Acquisition Act

amendments adopted in 1994 amended the 5% minority procurement goal, and the minority

subcontracting requirements in § 8(d), to specifically include “small business concerns owned

and controlled by women” in addition to “socially and economically disadvantaged

individuals.”18

Additionally, statutory “set-asides” and other forms of preference for “socially and economically

disadvantaged” firms and individuals, following the Small Business Act or other minority group

definition, have frequently been added to specific grant or contract authorization programs.

“Goals” or “set-asides” for minority groups, women, and other “disadvantaged” individuals have

routinely been part of federal funding measures for education, defense, transportation and other

activities over much of the last two decades. 19 Early on, Congress established goals for

participation of small disadvantaged businesses in procurement for the Department of Defense

(DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Coast Guard.20 It also

enacted the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA),21 the Surface Transportation

and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA), 22 the Intermodal Surface

Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),23 and the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st

Century (TEA-21),24 each of which contained a 10% minority or disadvantaged business

participation goal on federally funded projects. Sometimes, Congress has coupled these goals

with authority to meet them, as was the case with the goals for DOD, NASA, and the Coast

Guard. Congress authorized these agencies to apply a price evaluation preference of up to 10% to

bids submitted by businesses other than SDBs in order to meet their goals.25 Recently, however,

the Federal Circuit held that DOD’s SDB program was unconstitutional.26

17

18

See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 26.15 (2007) (setting forth waiver criteria for the Department of Transportation).

P.L. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243, 3374, § 7106 (1994).

19

See CRS Report R41038, Survey of Federal Laws Containing Goals, Set-Asides, Priorities, or Other Preferences

Based on Race, Gender, or Ethnicity , by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

20

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987, P.L. 99-661 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2323).

21

P.L. 97-424, § 105(f), 96 Stat. 2097 (1982).

22

P.L. 100-17, § 106(c), 101 Stat. 132 (1987).

23

P.L. 102-240, § 1003, 105 Stat. 1914 (1992).

24

P.L. 105-178, § 1101, 112 Stat. 107 (1998). TEA-21 lapsed on May 31, 2005, but was extended through FY2009 by

P.L. 109-59, signed into law during the 109th Congress. See § 1101(b) of P.L. 109-59, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,

Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005).

25

Other agencies were briefly given similar authority to apply price evaluation adjustments to bids or offers from

companies other than SDBs. This authority expired at the end of FY2000. See, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act,

P.L. 103-355, § 7102, 108 Stat. 3243, 3368-69 (Oct. 13, 1994).

26

Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For more on Rothe, see

infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.

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The Adarand Decision and Its Progeny

Background and History of Adarand

Litigation surrounding racial preferences in federal contracting has followed a convoluted course

since 1995, when the Supreme Court settled the constitutional parameters of the issue but avoided

a decision of the merits in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I).27 By the time it

returned to the High Court six years later, as Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Mineta, the legal and

factual framework of the case was considerably altered by multiple lower court decisions and

appeals, and by changes in the plaintiff’s legal standing, the details of the challenged federal

program, and regulatory reforms to “amend, not end” federal affirmative action by the former

Clinton Administration. To the chagrin of many legal observers, the Court in 2001 once again

sidestepped the constitutional issues posed by the Adarand case and, after agreeing to reconsider

the controversy, dismissed the appeal as “improvidently granted.” The object of the Court’s latest

action—or inaction—was the Tenth Circuit’s two-part ruling in Adarand Constructors v. Slater

(Adarand III).28 The federal appeals court there invalidated a federal highway program of

financial incentives to promote minority and “disadvantaged” small business utilization in force

at the time of Adarand I. But as revised and amended in 1997, the program was found to be

narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest and passed constitutional muster.

Prior to Adarand, the U.S. Supreme Court had narrowly approved of congressionally mandated

racial preferences to allocate the benefits of contracts on federally sponsored public works

projects in Fullilove v. Klutznick,29 while generally condemning similar actions taken by state and

local entities to promote public contracting opportunities for minority entrepreneurs in City of

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.30 These disputes generated divergent views as to whether state

affirmative action measures for the benefit of racial minorities were subject to the same “strict

scrutiny” as applied to “invidious” racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, an

“intermediate” standard resembling the test for gender-based classifications, or simple rationality.

In Croson, a 5 to 4 majority resolved that while “race-conscious” remedies could be legislated in

response to proven past discrimination by the affected governmental entities, “racial balancing”

untailored to “specific” and “identified” evidence of minority exclusion was impermissible.

Until Adarand, however, a different, more lenient standard was thought to apply to use of racial

preferences in federally conducted activities. The majority there applied “strict scrutiny” to a

federal transportation program of financial incentives for prime contractors who subcontracted to

firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged group members. Although the Court

refrained from deciding the constitutional merits of the particular program before it, and

remanded for further proceedings below, it determined that all “racial classifications” by

government at any level must be justified by a “compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly

tailored” to that end.

27

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).

29

448 U.S. 448 (1980).

30

488 U.S. 469 (1989).

28

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There have been three distinct phases to the Adarand litigation. The case originated with a nowdiscontinued “race-conscious subcontracting compensation clause (SCC)” program conducted by

the Federal Highway Lands Program of the Federal Highway Administration. The SCC did not

allocate or set-aside a specific percentage of subcontract awards for DBEs or require a

commitment on the part of prime contractors to subcontract with minority firms. Rather,

“incentive payments” varying from 1.5% to 2% of the contract amount were paid to prime

contractors whose subcontracts with one or more qualified DBEs exceeded 10% of total contract

value. The program incorporated the racial presumption from the Small Business Act and

regulations, in effect relieving minority group subcontractors of the burden of demonstrating

disadvantaged status imposed upon non-minorities.

Suit was brought by Adarand Constructors, Inc., a white-owned construction firm whose low bid

on a subcontract for highway guard rails was rejected in favor of a higher bidding DBE. Both the

federal trial court and the Tenth Circuit initially upheld the program by applying “lenient” judicial

review—“resembling intermediate scrutiny”—rather than strict scrutiny, requiring far less

remedial justification by the government. Because the program was not limited to racial

minorities, and non-disadvantaged minority group members were ineligible to participate, the

appeals court concluded, the program was “narrowly tailored.” In Adarand I, the Supreme Court

reversed this first round of decisions.

The majority in Adarand I rejected the equal protection approach that applied “intermediate

scrutiny” or some other relaxed standard of review to racial line-drawing by the Congress.

Because the “race-based rebuttable presumption” in the DOT program was an “explicit” racial

classification, the Court determined, “it must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict

scrutiny,” and to survive, must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling governmental

interest.” Adarand I undermined prior judicial holdings, which had afforded substantially greater

latitude to Congress than to the states or localities when crafting affirmative action measures for

racial or ethnic minorities. To “dispel the notion,” however, that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory,

but fatal in fact,’” the Court appeared to reserve a role for the national legislature as architect of

remedies for past societal discrimination. “The unhappy persistence of both the practice and

lingering effects of racial discrimination against minorities in this country is an unfortunate

reality, and the government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.”31 Thus, a majority of

the Court appeared to accept some forms of racial preference by Congress in at least some

circumstances.32 No further guidance was provided, however, as to the scope of remedial

authority remaining in congressional hands or the conditions for its exercise. Indeed, the Court

refrained even from deciding the merits of the constitutional claim before it in Adarand I, instead

remanding the case to the lower courts to determine the outcome.

On remand, the district court in Adarand II decided that the “congruence” required by the Court

did not mean that federal affirmative action must be supported by the same “particularized”

31

515 U.S. at 217.

32

In their separate concurrences, Justices Scalia and Thomas, espoused a far more restrictive view that would foreclose

all governmental classifications by race or ethnicity. Justice Scalia declared that “government can never have a

‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the

opposite direction.” Justice Thomas was of the view that the “racial paternalism” of affirmative action was more

injurious than beneficial to minorities. “In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign

prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial

discrimination, plain and simple.”

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showing of past discrimination as state and local programs. 33 Rather, as the national legislature,

Congress was empowered to enact broad discrimination remedies based on nationwide findings

derived from congressional hearings and statements of individual federal lawmakers. “Congress,”

in other words, “may recognize a nationwide evil and act accordingly, provided the chosen

remedy is narrowly tailored so as to preclude the application of a race-conscious measure where it

is not warranted.” The DOT incentive program failed the “narrow tailoring” test, however,

because it linked a race-based presumption to the award of financial “bonus[es]” to prime

contractors whose choice of a subcontractor was based “only on race.” The racial presumption

was found to be both “overinclusive”—in that its benefits were available to all named minority

group members—and “underinclusive”—because it excluded members of other minority groups

or Caucasians who may share similar disadvantages. Although “more flexible” than a “rigid racial

quota” or mandatory set-aside, the SCC program was tainted by the government-wide 5% goals

and transportation set-asides which it implemented.34

The Tenth Circuit in 2000 issued its decision on the merits of the controversy. 35 The appellate

panel in Adarand III reversed the district court injunction against future implementation of DOT’s

disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) program in Colorado. In so doing, the court of appeals

considered the constitutionality of the program, both as structured at the time of the district court

decision and of later revisions to DBE regulations adopted in 1997. First, it generally agreed with

the district court that the SCC system of financial incentives, in effect at the time of Adarand I,

had not been narrowly enough tailored to satisfy the constitutional requirements of strict scrutiny.

But after lengthy congressional hearings, the financial incentives were eliminated, and other

reforms were adopted to DBE requirements imposed by DOT regulation on state and local

highway aid recipients. As a result, the appeals court ultimately concluded that the DOT

disadvantaged business enterprise program as currently structured—though not the former,

discarded program of financial incentives—passed constitutional muster.

33

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D.Colo. 1997).

Two aspects of the district court’s analysis of the “narrow tailoring” requirement were especially unsettling for

federal small disadvantaged business programs. First, the “optional” or voluntary nature of the SCC program was not

enough to save it, notwithstanding the fact that prime contractors were free to accept bid proposals from any

subcontractor, regardless of race or ethnicity. The government’s failure to prevail on this issue cast a long shadow over

other federal minority contracting efforts—e.g., the § 8(a) set-aside, bid or evaluation preferences, and the like—which,

under the district court’s reasoning, may be viewed as imposing a “choice based only on race” at least as “mandatory”

and “absolute” as the incentive payment to prime contractors in Adarand, if not more so. Similarly, the fact that the

SCC program did not expressly incorporate any “goals, quotas, or set-asides” was not sufficient to divorce it, in the

district court’s view, from the percentage goal requirements imposed by statutes the program was designed to

implement. Those statutory provisions—the 5% minimum disadvantaged small business goal in § 8(d) of the SBA and

the parallel 10% requirement in STURAA and ISTEA—were deemed invalid for lack of narrow tailoring. In effect, the

district court ruling questioned much of the federal government’s statutory infrastructure for advancing minority small

business participation in the procurement process by race-conscious means.

35

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Slater (Adarand III), 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). This court of appeals decision was

preceded by an intervening appellate ruling and Supreme Court review confined to procedural questions of standing

and mootness occasioned by the plaintiff’s change in circumstances. After the district decision in Adarand II, the State

of Colorado did away with the racial presumption and certified the non-minority owner of Adarand Constructors Inc. as

disadvantaged. As a result, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case as moot and the vacated the judgment against the

government. Adarand v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court decision was reinstated on January

20, 2000, however, when the Supreme Court rejected the mootness finding because there was nothing to prevent the

government from reviving the abandoned policy, and returned the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Adarand Constructors v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000).

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Initially, the appellate tribunal aligned itself with the district court’s finding that the federal

government had a “compelling interest” in preventing and remedying the effects of past

discrimination in government contracting. And the scope of Congress’s authority to act was not

limited geographically or to specific instances of discrimination—as in the case of the states and

localities under Croson—but extended “‘society-wide’ and therefore nationwide.” The range of

admissible evidence to support racial line-drawing by Congress was both direct and

circumstantial, including post-enactment evidence and legislative history, demonstrating public

and private discrimination in the construction industry. The court was largely dismissive of

individual statements by members or from committee reports as “insufficient in themselves to

support a finding of compelling interest.” Congressional hearings over nearly a two-decade

period, however, depicted the social and economic obstacles—e.g., “old boy networks,” racism in

construction trade unions, and denial of access to bonding, credit, and capital—faced by small

and disadvantaged entrepreneurs, mainly minorities, in business formation and in competition for

government contracts. Moreover, “disparity studies” conducted after Croson in most of the

nation’s major cities compared minority-owned business utilization with availability and “raise[d]

an inference that the various discriminatory factors the government cites have created that

disparity.” This record satisfied the Tenth Circuit panel that Congress had a “strong basis in

evidence” for concluding that passive federal complicity with private discrimination in the

construction industry contributed to discriminatory barriers in federal contracting, a situation the

government had a “compelling” interest in remedying.

The appellate tribunal adopted a two-stage review of the “narrowly tailored” requirement,

focusing on the DBE program both as in effect prior to 1997 and later as revised to comply with

Adarand I. Basically, it determined that many of the constitutional flaws that defeated the

program in the district court’s opinion—an outcome with which the appellate panel largely

agreed—had been eliminated by the government’s regulatory reforms. In effect, the latest

decision lays the old program to rest while reversing the district court’s order insofar as it would

bar implementation of the revised version. The appeals court also clarified the scope of the DBE

program under review. It disagreed with, and specifically reversed, elements of the district court

judgment raising issues beyond the specific DBE program as applied by Colorado officials to

federally funded highway procurements within that state. Because the 5% and 10% goals in the

SBA and underlying transportation authorization measures “are merely aspirational and not

mandatory,” they were not the reason that “Adarand lost or will lose” contracts, and any

challenge to those provisions were outside the scope of the remand in Adarand I. Thus, any

broader potential implications of the district court ruling for § 8(a) set-asides or government-wide

goals for DBE participation under the Small Business Act were largely blunted by the appellate

panel. 36

The constitutional virtues of the revised program over the pre-1996 SCC program at issue in

Adarand I were several. First, race-neutral measures dating back to the 1958 enactment of the

SBA had preceded Congressional adoption of “aspirational goals” and other affirmative action

measures for minority groups in government-wide contracting. DOT had not considered such

alternatives before adopting race-conscious subsidies for prime contractors who select minority

36

Specifically, the Tenth Circuit opinion states: “Subsection 8(a) does not involve the use of SCCs, nor has Adarand

made any showing that it has been injured by non-inclusion in the § 8(a).... This case does not involve, nor has Adarand

ever demonstrated standing to bring, a generalized challenge to the policy of maximizing contracting opportunities for

small disadvantaged businesses set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 637 and 644(g), or to the various goals for fostering the

participation of small minority-owned businesses promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 644(g). Nor are we presented

with any indication that Adarand has standing to challenge ... § 637d.” 228 F.3d at 1152.

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subcontractors. However, this defect was cured by the revised regulations, which specifically

directed recipients to exhaust race-neutral alternatives—bonding, financing, and technical

assistance, etc.—before taking race into account.37 Secondly, the revised regulations incorporated

the time limits and graduation requirements for participation of disadvantaged businesses in the

§§ 8(a) and 8(d) programs, thereby ensuring the later program’s limited duration. 38 The court of

appeals also found that the revised DOT program was more flexible than the mandatory set-asides

in Fullilove and Croson because it was voluntary on the part of the prime contractors and because

the post-1996 revisions adopted an express waiver. 39 Any use of “aspirational goals” by recipients

of federal highway funds had to make “reference to the relative availability of DBEs in the

market” and was restrained in other ways by the new regulations so that “there is little danger of

arbitrariness in the setting of such goals.... ”40 The burden of the revised program on third parties

was mitigated by placing monetary caps on subsidies to prime contractors—limiting the incentive

to hire further DBEs—and by adopting “preponderance of the evidence” for proof of “social

disadvantage” by members of “non-presumed” groups in lieu of the former “clear and

convincing” standard. Finally, the revised program avoided the constitutional vice of over- and

under-inclusiveness by “disaggregating the race-based presumption that encompassed both

‘social’ and ‘economic’ disadvantage” in the former regulation. Thus, an individualized showing

of economic disadvantage is now required of all applicants to the program, minority and nonminority alike. This change, the appeal court believed, effectively satisfied the Croson

requirement of an “inquiry into whether or not the particular MBE seeking a racial preference has

suffered from the effects of past discrimination.”41

The Supreme Court Declines to Decide the Case

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in an appeal from the Tenth Circuit’s final decision,

marking the third High Court appearance by the Adarand case. During oral arguments, the

Justices appeared more concerned with procedural irregularities in the case, as outlined by the

Justice Department, than with the substance of the constitutional claims. In essence, the

government argued that Adarand’s legal challenge was limited to the DOT program and

regulations applicable to direct procurement of highway construction on federal lands, like the

contract denied, not to the separate regulatory scheme governing federal highway assistance to

states. Petitioner Adarand Constructors, Inc., made a parallel argument—but for a different

reason—that the court of appeals misconceived the scope of the appeal. In particular, petitioner’s

brief contended, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis considered revisions to DOT regulations applicable

to federally assisted state and local highway projects, which are irrelevant to the separate set of

37

49 C.F.R. § 26.51(a),(b)(1999).

Participation in the § 8(a) program is limited by statute and regulation to nine years, and each DBE is re-evaluated,

and may be graduated from the program, based on the submission of financial and other information required annually.

39

49 C.F.R. § 2615 (1999)(allowing recipients to seek waivers and exemptions, despite the already non-mandatory

nature of the program).

40

The court of appeals found that the SCC had been based in part on an ill-defined 12-15% goal apparently adopted by

the Federal Highway Administration, for which “it could find no explanation in the record.” This alone would have

warranted summary judgment for Adarand, it concluded.

41

The current regulations impose additional requirements on applicants with regard to individualized showing: they

must submit a narrative statement describing the circumstances of that purported economic disadvantage. 13 C.F.R. §

124.104(b)(1)(2008). See also, 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(1)(2007)(providing a $750,000 net worth limit for DBEs under

transportation programs); id. § 26.65(b)(stating that businesses exceeding a certain amount of gross receipts are

ineligible for the DBE program).

38

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rules governing direct federal procurement, thereby undermining the court’s conclusion that the

SDB program was narrowly tailored. Because the race conscious aspects of the original financial

incentive program had been suspended in Colorado and several other states as the result of

administration reforms to affirmative action rules after Adarand I, counsel for the company had

difficulty arguing that its client “is still unable to compete on an equal footing” or had “lost a

single contract under the provisions they are now challenging.” Further complicating Adarand’s

position, the Tenth Circuit had rejected its earlier attack upon the entire statutory framework for

federal small disadvantaged business programs, a ruling not appealed to the Supreme Court. The

government, therefore, contended that Adarand’s lawsuit had “outlived the program that provoked

it,” and in oral arguments to the Justices, the Solicitor General urged the Court to dismiss the

petition for certiorari as improvidently granted.

It came as no great surprise, therefore, that the Justices complied with the government’s request

and dismissed the case. 42 In a per curiam opinion, the Court emphasized technical flaws with the

present appeal, as framed during oral arguments. First, Adarand was challenging a by now

defunct aspect of the program that the Tenth Circuit had not ruled upon, asking “whether the

various race-based programs applicable to direct federal contracting could satisfy strict scrutiny.”

Nor had the company sought review of those aspects of the DOT statute and regulations

respecting the state and local procurement program on whose constitutionality the appeals court

had spoken. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of a controversy

regarding which neither the parties nor the courts below appeared to be reading from the same

page.

Left unanswered, therefore, were two major questions presented by the petition for review. First

was “whether the court of appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard in determining if

Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of past

discrimination.” The Tenth Circuit found that Congress had a “solid basis in evidence” for

concluding race-conscious action necessary based on its dissection of hearing testimony,

legislative reports, and state and local disparity studies. Generally, its approach conformed to

earlier rulings, which have stressed deference to congressional fact-finding under section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment. As the national legislature, Congress may not be constrained by the same

requirements of specificity in regard to regional scope and classes of individuals benefitted by

race conscious programs.

But later Court rulings parsing the scope of congressional § 5 power to override state sovereign

immunity under a variety of federal civil rights laws have emphasized the need for “congruence

and proportionality” of the remedy to any problem perceived by the Congress.43 The

ramifications of this principle for § 5 race discrimination legislation is undetermined, and

questions remain. Conversely, some would argue, the affirmative grant of congressional authority

42

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).

See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)(Congress could not abrogate state sovereign

immunity to suit for compensatory damages under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act since historical record

“fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the

disabled,” and the rights and remedies provided against the state “raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and

proportionality” as found in previous cases.); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)(Applying

“congruence and proportionality” standard, the Court determined that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was

not “appropriate legislation” under § 5); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)(Court invalidated provision of

Violence Against Women Act, providing victims of gender-motivated violence with a civil damages remedy, since

even as a “prophylactic measure,” it was “overbroad” and applied uniformly throughout the nation, rather than merely

in states with congressionally documented records of this type of gender discrimination.).

43

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to legislate remedies for equal protection violations by states conferred by § 5 is even broader

than its power to place similar conditions on direct spending for federal procurements, which is

limited by Fifth Amendment due process.

The second aspect of strict scrutiny analysis would have required the Court to determine whether

the means chosen by DOT to promote minority group participation in the federal procurement

process is “narrowly tailored.” In this regard, the Tenth Circuit found that after eliminating

financial bonus or subsidy, the adoption of “aspirational goals” for utilization of disadvantaged

firms based on “good faith efforts,” as required by current regulations, was a more flexible and

narrowly tailored alternative. That conclusion, however, has been questioned by other courts,

which have found that governmentally required goal-setting, coupled with enforcement

sanctions—in Adarand’s case, liquidated damages under § 8(d)—is inherently coercive and

encourages racial quotas. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has invalidated a California affirmative

action statute that required bidders on state contracts to subcontract a percentage of their work to

female- and minority-owned firms or document a “good faith” effort to do so.44 Similarly, in

Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,45 the D.C. Circuit blurred the distinction between socalled “inclusive” and exclusive “affirmative” action. FCC regulations required broadcast license

holders (1) to engage in “critical self-analysis” of minority and female underrepresentation, and

(2) to undertake affirmative outreach by using minority and female-specific recruiting sources.

Strict scrutiny was held to be appropriate and the regulations were unlawful since beyond simple

outreach, their effect was to influence ultimate hiring decisions; that is, the threat of government

enforcement “coerced” stations to maintain a workforce that mirrors racial breakdown of the

labor area.

The Court’s disposition of the final Adarand appeal means that a definitive review of federally

mandated affirmative action must be postponed to another day. That day, however, may not be too

far distant. Percolating in the lower federal courts are cases that pose similar questions regarding

the power of Congress to enact racial preferences in federal contracting as were bypassed by the

Court’s inconclusive determination in Adarand.

Post-Adarand Regulatory Developments

Federal regulatory reforms put forward by the former Clinton Administration sought to “narrowly

tailor” federal minority and disadvantaged small business programs in line with Adarand. The

Justice Department in 1996 proposed a structure for reform of affirmative action in federal

procurement, setting stricter certification and eligibility requirements for minority contractors

claiming “socially and economically disadvantaged” status under § 8(a) and § 8(d) of the Small

Business Act. 46 The plan suspended for two years set-aside programs in which only minority

firms could bid on contracts. Statistical “benchmarks” developed by the Commerce Department

and adjusted every five years were made the basis for estimating expected disadvantaged business

participation as federal contractors, in the absence of discrimination, for nearly 80 different

industries. Where minority participation in an industry falls below the benchmark, bid and

evaluation credits or incentives are authorized for economically disadvantaged firms and prime

44

Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc denied, 138 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1998).

45

141 F.3d 344 (D.C.Cir. 1998).

46

61 F.R. 26042, Notice, Department of Justice, Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement.

(May 23, 1996).

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contractors who commit to subcontract with such firms. Conversely, when such participation

exceeds an industry benchmark, the credit would be lowered or suspended in that industry for the

following year. The system is monitored by the Commerce Department, using data collected to

evaluate the percentage of federal contracting dollars awarded to minority-owned businesses, and

relies more heavily on “outreach and technical assistance” to avoid potential constitutional

pitfalls.

The Justice Department’s response to comments on its proposal, together with proposed

amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to implement it, were published in

1997.47 Several procurement mechanisms interact with benchmark limits pursuant to the FAR

regulation jointly promulgated by DOD, the General Services Administration, and NASA. An

“evaluation factor” applies to bids by non-minority prime contractors participating in joint

ventures, teaming arrangements, or subcontracts with such firms, and contracting officers may

employ “monetary incentives” to increase subcontracting opportunities for disadvantaged firms in

negotiated procurements. “Benchmarking” by the Commerce Department is the key feature of the

program, designed to narrowly tailor the government’s use of race-conscious subcontracting in

line with Adarand. The Commerce recommendation relies “primarily on census data to determine

the capacity and availability of minority-owned firms.” As explained by DOJ:

[A] statistical calculation representing the effect discrimination has had on suppressing

minority business development and capacity would be made, and that calculation would be

factored into benchmarks.... The purpose of comparing utilization of minority-owned firms

to the benchmark is to ascertain when the effects of discrimination have been overcome and

minority-owned firms can compete equally without the use of race-conscious programs. Full

utilization of minority-owned firms in [an] SIC code may well depend on continued use of

race-conscious programs like price or evaluation credits. Where utilization exceeds the

benchmark, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy may authorize the reduction or

elimination of the level of price or evaluation credits, but only after analysis has projected

the effect of such action.48

Final regulations implementing Justice Department recommendations with respect to the § 8(a)

business development and small disadvantaged business program were issued by the SBA in

1998.49 The reforms included a new process for certifying firms as small disadvantaged

businesses50 and, in place of set-asides, a price evaluation adjustment program administratively

tied to the Commerce benchmarks. In the past, the government relied on self-certification for

purposes of “disadvantaged” eligibility, which allowed firms to identify themselves as meeting

certification requirements. Under the new procedure, SBA, or where SBA deems appropriate,

SBA-approved state agencies, or private certifiers make a threshold determination as to whether a

firm is actually owned or controlled by specified individuals claiming to be disadvantaged. After

47

Response to Comments to Department of Justice Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement,

62 F.R. 25648 (1997).

48

Id. at 25650-52. An interim rule incorporating proposed DOJ revisions to the FAR regulation became effective in

1998. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Reform of Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement; Interim rule with request

for comment, 63 F.R. 52426 (1998).

49

63 F.R. 35726, 35767 (1998).

50

In 2008, the Small Business Administration moved to abandon its role in the certification process by issuing an

interim final rule under which other agencies can certify firms as SDBs for prime contractors and firms can self-certify

as SDBs for subcontracting purposes. SBA, Interim Final Rule: Small Disadvantaged Business Program, 73 F.R. 57490

(Oct. 3, 2008).

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ownership or control is established, the application is reviewed by SBA for purposes of a

determination of disadvantaged status.

The definition of social and economic disadvantage remains largely intact under the SBA

regulation. Members of designated minority groups participating in disadvantaged small business

programs continue to enjoy a statutory presumption of social disadvantage. They are required,

however, to state their group identification and meet certification criteria for economic

disadvantage and are subject to third-party challenge under current administrative mechanisms.

Individuals who are not within the statutory presumption may qualify by proving that they are

socially and economically disadvantaged under SBA standards. Under prior SBA § 8(a)

certification standards, however, persons not members of presumed disadvantaged groups had to

prove their status by “clear and convincing evidence.” The revised SBA regulations ease this

burden on non-minority applicants by adopting a “preponderance of evidence” rule.

U.S. Department of Transportation Revised Regulations

Similarly, USDOT responded to Adarand Constructors and its progeny by issuing revised

regulations to implement minority set-aside provisions in current federal transportation

authorization measures. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), as enacted

by Congress in 1998, provided that

[e]xcept to the extent that the Secretary [of Transportation] determines otherwise, not less

than 10 percent of the amounts made available for any program under titles I, III, and V of

this Act shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially

and economically disadvantaged individuals.51

One in a succession of laws dating back more than two decades, TEA-21 lapsed on May 31,

2005, but was extended by P.L. 109-59, signed into law during the 109th Congress.52 The new law

continued through FY2009 the longstanding DOT policy of setting aside 10% of federal highway

and surface transportation funds for small disadvantaged firms “[e]xcept to the extent the

Secretary of Transportation determines” otherwise.

The revised DOT regulations track the Small Business Act in defining disadvantaged business

enterprises (DBEs), including the presumption regarding designated minority groups and women,

except that any small business owner with more than $750,000 in assets—or who is otherwise

shown not to be socially or economically disadvantaged—is disqualified. Members of nondesignated groups (i.e., a white male) may qualify for DBE status if the individual demonstrates

social and economic disadvantage in fact.53

Describing the 10% goal as merely “aspirational,” the regulations de-centralize administration of

the DBE program by delegating implementation to state agencies receiving federal transportation

funds. A two-step process is established for states to determine “the level of DBE participation

[that] would [be] expect[ed] absent the effects of discrimination.”54 First, the relative availability

51

§ 1101(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 113.

See § 1101(b) of P.L. 109-59, the “Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for

Users” (SAFETEA-LU), 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005).

53

49 C.F.R. pt. 26 (2007).

54

Id. at § 26.45.

52

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locally of “ready, willing, and able” DBEs must be calculated. This baseline figure is then

adjusted upward or downward to reflect other capability factors and evidence of discrimination

against DBEs drawn from statistical “disparity” studies. The final adjusted figure represents the

portion of federal transportation funding that a state must allocate to DBEs for that year.

A state must meet the maximum feasible portion of this goal through race- (and sex-) neutral

means. Race-conscious contract goals must be applied to achieve any portion of the utilization

requirement not attainable by other means.55 Even when race-conscious measures are necessary,

however, the regulations do not require that DBE goals be included in every contract—or that

they be set at the same level in every contract where used—as long as the overall effect is to

obtain the required DBE participation level. Prime contractors to whom a state awards federally

funded transportation contracts must undertake good faith efforts to satisfy any included goal by

allocating the designated percentage of funds to DBEs.56 States are prohibited from instituting

rigid quotas that do not account for a prime contractor’s good faith efforts to subcontract works to

DBEs.57

Small Business Administration Rules for Women-Owned

Businesses

During the Bush Administration, the SBA issued proposed regulations in 2007 that would have

implemented Section 811 of the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000,58 which added a

new section 8(m) to the Small Business Act authorizing set asides for industries in which womenowned small businesses (WOSBs) are underrepresented or substantially underrepresented in

federal procurement. Under the legislation, SBA was required to conduct a study to identify such

industries, and the resulting study identified 28 different approaches for determining

underrepresentation and substantial underrepresentation. In its proposed rule, the SBA announced

the approach it had selected, identifying four industries in which WOSBs were underrepresented

or substantially underrepresented in federal procurement.59 However, the agency was criticized

for adopting this approach by critics who claimed that the SBA unjustifiably selected the most

restrictive methodology available under the study and instead should have chosen an approach

that recognized a broader range of industries, including one methodology that would have

classified 87% of industries as underrepresented. In response to this criticism, the SBA issued a

final rule but delayed a final determination regarding industries that are underrepresented until it

had solicited additional public comment and further examined the methodological issues at

stake. 60 Subsequently, the agency announced that it was extending the comment period yet again

55

Id. at § 26.51.

Id. at § 26.53(a).

57

Id at § 26.43(a).

58

P.L. 106-554, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 637(m).

59

Small Business Administration, Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Procedures, 72 F.R.

73285, December 27, 2007. The four industries identified were national security and international affairs; coating,

engraving, heat treating, and allied activities; household and institutional furniture and kitchen cabinet manufacturing;

and other motor vehicle dealers. After re-examining the data, the SBA subsequently revised its proposed rules and

identified thirty-one industries in which women were underrepresented or substantially underrepresented. Small

Business Administration, Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Procedures, 73 F.R. 57014, Oct.

1, 2008.

60

Small Business Administration, The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Procedures, 73

F.R. 56940, 56941-42, October 1, 2008.

56

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in response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of

Defense,61 which is discussed in the next section of this report.

Although the SBA’s final regulations did not identify industries in which WOSBs are

underrepresented or substantially underrepresented in federal procurement, the new regulations

do contain another controversial provision that requires a federal agency implementing the

program with regard to a particular industry to determine whether the set-aside is substantially

related to remedying sex discrimination in that industry and to conduct an analysis of its own

procurement history to establish whether the agency itself had discriminated against WOSBs in

the relevant industry. According to the SBA, this requirement is necessary in order to comply

with constitutional equal protection standards that require the government to “establish probative

evidence of discrimination in the relevant economic sphere in order to justify sex-based

contracting preferences.”62

In 2010, the Obama Administration issued new proposed regulations for the set-aside program for

WOSBs.63 These proposed regulations would do two things: (1) withdraw the never-finalized

October 1, 2008 proposed rule that identified thirty-one industries in which women were

underrepresented or substantially underrepresented; and (2) establish a new methodology for

identifying eligible industries and eliminate the requirement for an agency-by-agency

determination of discrimination.

The SBA does not explicitly address Rothe in its introductory comments to these proposed

regulations. However, it notes that comments on earlier proposed rules indicated that the

“disparity study analysis” conducted in identifying industries eligible for set-asides “is sufficient

to satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard that applies to the WOSB Program.”64 It also states

that:

The means chosen by Congress to implement the WOSB Program ensure that the Program is

substantially related to its goals. Congress expressly limited application of the WOSB

Program only to industries in which women are substantially underrepresented or

underrepresented in contracting.65

The SBA may or may not be correct in stating that the set-asides for women-owned small

businesses would survive intermediate scrutiny if challenged, although the disparity studies

underlying the determinations of eligible industries would likely be the focus of any potential

constitutional challenges.

61

Small Business Administration. The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Procedures:

Eligible Industries, 74 F.R. 1153 (Jan. 12, 2009).

62

Small Business Administration, The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Procedures, 73

F.R. 56940, 56943, Oct. 1, 2008.

63

Small Business Administration, Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program: Proposed Rule, 75 F.R.

10029 (Mar. 4, 2010). Implementation of the set-asides for women-owned small businesses was also temporarily

delayed by a provision of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, which precluded SBA from using funds appropriated

under the act to implement a proposed rule on set-asides for women-owned small businesses issued by the SBA on

October 1, 2008. See P.L. 111-8, Administrative Provisions—Small Business Administration, § 522. Similar provisions

do not appear to have been included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117.

64

Id. at 10043.

65

Id.

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Post-Adarand Judicial Decisions

Federal Affirmative Action Programs

Since Adarand, several lower federal courts have addressed the issue of congressional authority

to fashion affirmative action remedies. Courts in these cases have, with one exception, generally

concluded from the record of committee hearings and other documentary evidence before

Congress that the government had a compelling interest for the program in question. However, in

applying the constitutional demand for a “narrowly tailored” remedy, there is a divergence of

judicial opinion as to whether states or localities must independently justify the use of racial

preferences to implement federal mandates within their individual jurisdictions.

The Supreme Court in 2004 refused to revisit issues left unsettled by Adarand when it denied

review of the Eighth Circuit’s consolidated ruling in Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota

Department of Transportation and Gross Seed Company v. Nebraska Department of Roads.66 The

Sherbrooke court joined the Tenth Circuit in upholding the DBE program under current DOT

regulations and, beyond that, approved specific state plans to implement that program. Pursuant

to TEA-21 and the DOT revised regulations, state highway departments in Minnesota and

Nebraska established specific goals for the award of federally-funded contracts to DBEs. In both

states, white-owned contractors had submitted the low bid on DOT funded subcontracts, but were

passed over in favor of a presumptively disadvantaged minority competitor. Petitioners

challenged DBE contract awards, alleging unconstitutional race discrimination and that continued

enforcement of the programs would deny them the right to compete on an equal basis for future

contracts. Federal district courts in both states upheld the program.

The government conceded that the federal highway DBE program, on its face and as applied, is

subject to strict scrutiny because it uses a race-based rebuttable presumption to define its

beneficiaries and employs race conscious remedial measures. Such governmental consideration of

race is constitutional only if narrowly-tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.

Neither Sherbrooke nor Gross Seed disputed that the federal government has “a compelling

interest in not perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination in its own distribution of federal

funds and in remediating the effects of past discrimination in the government contracting markets

created by its disbursements.” Rather, petitioners argued that Congress and DOT have no “hard

evidence” of widespread intentional discrimination in the contracting industry; they relied instead

on a Justice Department summary of over 50 documents and 30 congressional hearings on

minority-owned businesses prepared in response to the Adarand decision.67 The Eighth Circuit

nonetheless agreed with the Tenth Circuit conclusion in Adarand that “Congress has spent

decades compiling evidence of race discrimination in federal highway contracting,” and

petitioners failed to meet the burden of showing that no remedial action was necessary.

Nor were the Minnesota DOT and Nebraska road department required to independently satisfy

the compelling government interest aspect of strict scrutiny review. To be narrowly tailored,

however, a national program must be limited to those parts of the country where its race-based

measures are demonstrably needed. “To the extent the federal government delegates this tailoring

66

345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1041 (2004).

See Appendix—The Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, 61

F.R. 26050 (May 23, 1996).

67

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function, a State’s implementation becomes critically relevant to a reviewing court’s strict

scrutiny.” Under the current DOT program, the opinion notes, race-conscious methods cannot be

used unless race-neutral means are projected to fall short of achieving the overall goal, and racial

preferences or set-asides are limited to those instances “when no other method could be

reasonably expected to redress egregious instances of discrimination.” In addition, because the

goals for DBE participation are tied to the relevant labor markets, have built in durational limits,

and are subject to “good faith” waiver and exemptions, the programs were deemed narrowly

tailored on their face. Finally, the court reviewed Minnesota’s and Nebraska’s implementation,

including each state’s reliance on findings by independent consultants in setting goals for

minority-owned business participation, and concluded that the DBE program was narrowly

tailored as applied at the state level.

Similarly, the issue presented in Western States Paving Co., Inc. v. Washington State Department

of Transportation68 is whether TEA-21—which allocates 10% of certain federal transportation

funds for small disadvantaged and minority contractors—is unconstitutional on its face, or as

applied by the State of Washington. As discussed above, DOT regulations “presume”

disadvantaged status for minority groups and women, provided the small business owner has a

net worth of less than $750,000, but members of other groups are eligible if they can demonstrate,

in fact, that they are “socially and economically disadvantaged.” A three-judge panel of the Ninth

Circuit agreed with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits that race and sex preferences for highway

contractors under TEA-21 are facially valid. The compelling interest was in ensuring that federal

funding is not distributed in a manner that reinforces the effects of either public or private

discrimination within the transportation construction industry. The evidence relied on by

Congress and reviewed by the court demonstrated a continuing pattern of race and sex

discrimination in the industry.

The court further determined that the TEA-21 racial preferences were narrowly tailored to further

compelling federal governmental interests. In this regard, the court pointed to several factors.

First, the revised DOT regulations “explicitly prohibit the use of quotas” and require a state to

“meet the maximum feasible portion of [its] overall goal by using race-neutral means.”69 Where

racial goals are not met, the state may yet comply with federal standards by showing “good faith

efforts” to achieve its goals. Moreover, “durational limitations” imposed by the legislative

reauthorization process “ensure that Congress regularly evaluates” whether continuing need exists

for the minority preference program. The regulation also makes clear that the statute’s 10% DBE

goal is “aspirational” only, with individual state goals determined by “the realities of [each

state’s] own labor market” and the availability locally of qualified minority contractors.

But these findings did not shield the Washington State program from Fourteenth Amendment

challenge. Because the record was “devoid of any evidence suggesting that minorities currently

suffer—or have ever suffered—discrimination” in the award of transportation infrastructure

contracts within Washington State, the court found that the state’s implementation program “is not

narrowly tailored to further Congress’ remedial objectives.” A narrowly tailored remedy “depends

on the absence or presence of discrimination,” the court urged, and it was not enough “simply

[that] the state complied with the federal program’s requirements.” Thus, each of the six principal

minority groups identified in Washington’s DBE program must be shown to have suffered

contract award discrimination.

68

407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).

69

49 C.F.R. § 26.51(a).

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The ruling of another post-Adarand appellate tribunal imposes a heavier burden on the federal

government for demonstrating a “strong basis in evidence” to establish a compelling

governmental interest in support of minority contracting preferences. In Rothe Development

Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense,70 a business owned by a non-minority woman,

challenged the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 2323, the statutory authority for DOD’s SDB

program, after losing a DOD contract to a business owned by Korean-Americans. Rothe argued

that 10 U.S.C. § 2323 unconstitutionally deprived it of due process both as applied and on its

face. Rothe’s as-applied challenge focused upon 10 U.S.C. § 2323 in its 1992 reenactment, which

governed the DOD’s award of the contract to Rothe’s competitor, while Rothe’s facial challenge

focused upon the 2006 reenactment of 10 U.S.C. § 2323, which was in effect at the time when the

court heard the case.

The challenged SDB program in Rothe incorporates the SBA definition of small disadvantaged

business, including the racial presumption, and establishes a 5% participation goal for such

entities in DOD contracts.71 The § 1207 program also authorizes DOD to apply a price evaluation

adjustment of up to 10% in order to attain the 5% goal. 72 In effect, this means that DOD may

raise the bids of non-DBEs by 10% in order to give disadvantaged entrepreneurs a preference.

The statutory goal-setting provision in §1207 was reauthorized in 1989, and again in 1992, 1999,

2002, and 2006.

After lengthy litigation and a complicated procedural history, which included repeated

appearances before both the district court and the Federal Circuit, the trial court ultimately held

that the DOD program was unconstitutional as applied because DOD failed to demonstrate that

there was sufficient statistical evidence of discrimination before Congress when the statute was

reenacted in 1992. In contrast, the district court held that the statute was facially constitutional

because there was sufficient statistical evidence of discrimination before Congress when the

statute was most recently reenacted in 2002.73 However, the Federal Circuit reversed with respect

to the facial challenge, holding that DOD’s SBD program was unconstitutional on its face

because Congress lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that race-conscious

remedies were necessary when reenacting 10 U.S.C. § 2323 in 2006.74 The district court had

70

545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

10 U.S.C. § 2323. Although only some subsections of § 1207 were challenged, the district court’s order

implementing the Federal Circuit decision struck down § 1207 in its entirety, meaning that several other provisions

were affected, including technical and infrastructure assistance programs for certain minority-serving institutions.

Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 606 F. Supp. 2d 648 (W.D. Tex. 2009). The 111th Congress responded to the

district court’s decision, in part, by establishing a new program to assist such institutions in performing “defenserelated research, development, testing, and evaluation activities.” P.L. 111-84, § 252 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2362).

72

Later legislation, however, limited DOD’s authority to apply the 10% price evaluation adjustment in pursuit of its 5%

goal. Under the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, DOD was precluded from

using the price evaluation adjustment in any fiscal year when the Secretary of Defense determines, at the start of that

fiscal year, that DOD had achieved its 5% contracting goal in the most recent fiscal year for which data are available.

P.L. 105-261, § 801, 112 Stat. 1921, 2080-81 (Oct. 17, 1998).

73

Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 324 F. Supp.2d 840 (W.D.Tex. 2004).

74

Rothe Dev. Corp., 545 F.3d at 1050. In order to establish a compelling governmental interest in remedying a history

of past discrimination, the governmental entity creating racial classifications must (1) identify public or private

discrimination with some specificity before resorting to race-conscious remedies and (2) establish a “strong basis in

evidence” to conclude that race-conscious remedies are necessary before enacting or implementing those remedies.

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d

950, 958 (10th Cir. 2003). As regards the “strong basis in evidence” requirement, the government has the burden of

producing statistical evidence sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 958.

Once the government has done this, the plaintiffs challenging the governmental action have the burden of persuasion in

(continued...)

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found that six state and local disparity studies, along with other statistical and anecdotal evidence,

constituted a “strong basis in evidence,”75 but the Federal Circuit disagreed.76 It found that the six

state and local disparity studies77—which had been the “primary focus of the district court’s

compelling interest analysis and of the parties’ arguments on appeal”78—did not constitute a

“strong basis in evidence” because they did not provide the “substantially probative and broadbased statistical foundation ... that must be the predicate for nationwide, race-conscious action.”79

The Federal Circuit found significant methodological flaws with all of the disparity studies: two

of the six studies failed to exclude unqualified businesses in calculating the number of minority

businesses available for government contracts, and five of the six studies failed to account for the

relative capacity of minority-owned small businesses in contracting with the government. 80 These

flaws, coupled with the fact that the studies’ findings addressed only six of the more than three

thousand counties and equivalent regions making up the United States, prompted the Federal

Circuit to find that the studies were insufficient to constitute a “strong basis in evidence” for the

nation-wide SDB program. 81 The Federal Circuit also suggested, although reached no final

holding on the issue, that the studies had not been “before Congress” at the time when 10 U.S.C.

§ 2323 was reenacted because they were (1) mentioned by name or discussed only in two floor

speeches and (2) Congress did not make any findings concerning them. 82

Other statistical data and anecdotes discussed by the parties and the district court proved similarly

insufficient to constitute a “strong basis in evidence” for the SDB program, according to the

Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit discounted the remaining statistical evidence because it was

mentioned only in floor speeches, without being the subject of congressional findings, or being

“sufficiently described ... for [the Federal Circuit] to locate [it], let alone subject [it] to detailed,

(...continued)

refuting the government’s evidence and establishing race-neutral explanations for the apparent disparity. Plaintiffs can

do this by, among other things, (1) showing that the government’s statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrating that the

disparities shown by the government’s statistics are not significant; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data of their

own. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 1991).

75

Rothe Dev. Corp., 545 F.3d at 1036.

76

Id. at 1045-46.

77

A disparity study is a “study attempting to measure the difference—or disparity—between the number of contracts or

contract dollars actually awarded to minority-owned businesses in a particular contract market, on the one hand, and

the number of contracts or contract dollars that one would expect to be awarded to minority-owned business given their

presence in that particular contract market, on the other hand.” Id. at 1037 (emphases in the original).

78

Id.

79

Id. at 1040. See also id. at 1045 (“To be clear, we do not hold that the defects in the availability and capacity analyses

in these six disparity studies render the studies wholly unreliable for any purpose. ... But we hold that the defects we

have noted detract dramatically from the probative value of these six studies, and, in conjunction with their limited

geographic coverage, render the studies insufficient to form the statistical core of the ‘strong basis in evidence’ required

to uphold the statute.”) (emphasis in the original).

80

Id. at 1042-43.

81

Id. at 1046.

82

Id. at 1039-40 (noting that the studies had been mentioned by title, author, and date in two floor speeches—one by

Senator Ted Kennedy and one by Representative Cynthia McKinney—but had been neither discussed in congressional

hearings nor the subject of congressional findings). The Federal Circuit also suggested that the currency of the studies

upon which Congress relies is relevant to the analysis of whether a “strong basis in evidence” exists. However, the

Federal Circuit rejected Rothe’s argument for a per se rule that studies more than five years old cannot constitute a

“strong basis in evidence.” Id. at 1038. The Federal Circuit suggested, instead, that Congress can rely upon the most

recently available studies so long as these studies are reasonably up-to-date. Id. at 1039.

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skeptical, non-deferential analysis.”83 It likewise discounted the anecdotal evidence, even though

this evidence had been introduced at congressional hearings, because “anecdotal evidence is

insufficient by itself to support [10 U.S.C. § 2323].”84 The Federal Circuit further noted that the

anecdotal evidence, including that compiled by the district court, did not address “a single

instance of alleged discrimination by DOD in the course of awarding a prime contract, nor a

single instance of alleged discrimination by a private contractor identified as the recipient of a

prime defense contract.”85 The Federal Circuit found this lack of evidence of discrimination in

DOD contracts significant because it suggested that the government might not be able to prove

“passive participation” in discrimination, within the meaning of Croson, by the DOD as a

justification for the Department’s SDB program.86

Ultimately, the Rothe decision is of particular significance for several reasons. First, although the

decision is binding precedent only within the Federal Circuit, Rothe now governs all future

constitutional challenges to minority set-aside programs arising within the context of bid protests

related to federal procurements because the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act gave the Court

of Federal Claims—whose appellate court is the Federal Circuit—exclusive judicial jurisdiction

over bid protests related to federal procurements arising after 2001. Moreover, Rothe appears to

be the latest in a long line of cases that place an increasingly heavy evidentiary burden on

Congress when it enacts race-conscious legislation. In the immediate aftermath of the Court’s

landmark decision in Adarand, the federal courts generally stressed deference to congressional

authority to conduct fact-finding and to enact remedial legislation pursuant to section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment. This deference to congressional authority has eroded over the years. As a

result, Congress must now support any race-conscious measures it enacts by developing a strong

record, as demonstrated in hearings and legislative findings, of methodologically sound, broad

statistical evidence of discrimination capable of withstanding searching judicial inquiry.

Meanwhile, courts have also considered challenges to SBA’s § 8(a) program for socially and

economically disadvantaged businesses. While upholding the constitutionality of the § 8(a)

program on its face, the district court in Cortez III Service Corporation v. NASA required federal

officials “to decide whether there has been a history of discrimination in the particular industry at

issue” before applying a race-based set-aside. 87 Other courts, however, have denied firms or

individuals standing to challenge the racial presumption in the SBA statute and regulations on the

rationale that they were disqualified from contract consideration because of inability to

demonstrate “social and economic disadvantage,” and not race.88 Currently, a legal challenge to

the § 8(a) program is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.89

83

Id. at 1047.

Id. at 1048.

85

Id.

86

Id. Under Croson, when a government seeking to use a racial classification is not remedying its own prior

discrimination, it can still use the classification if it can show that it has become a “passive participant” in a system of

racial exclusion practiced by a local industry. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).

87

950 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1996). See also Klaver Constr. Co. v. Kansas Dep’t of Transp., 211 F. Supp.2d 1296

(D.Kan. 2002).

88

See Interstate Traffic Control v. Beverage, 101 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D. W.Va. 2000); Ellsworth Associates v. United

States, 926 F.Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1996).

89

See Dynalantic Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 503 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying parties’ motions for

summary judgment).

84

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Minority Contracting By State and Local Government

With increasing frequency, state and local affirmative action programs have met with

constitutional objection from courts applying strict judicial scrutiny. Several federal circuit courts

have addressed the legality of racial preferences in employment and public contracting programs

since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Croson.90 Croson emphasized the obligation of state and local

governments to anchor their affirmative action efforts by identifying with specificity the effects of

past discrimination. This meant that the governmental entity has to have a “strong basis in

evidence”—just short, perhaps, of that required to establish a “prima facie” case in a court of

law—for its conclusion that minorities have been discriminatorily excluded from public contracts

in the past.

In Croson, a 30% set-aside for minority subcontractors adopted by the City of Richmond failed

this constitutional test. First, the program was premised on a comparison of minority contractor

participation in city contracts with general minority population statistics rather than the

percentage of qualified minority business enterprises (MBEs) in the relevant geographic market.

There was, moreover, no evidence of discrimination in any aspect of city contracting as to certain

groups—i.e., Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts—who nonetheless were granted a

preference under the plan. With respect to “narrow tailoring,” the 30% “quota” was deemed “too

inflexible” and had been implemented by the city without any prior consideration of “raceneutral” alternatives. Finally, the “waiver” built into the Richmond plan was too “rigid” because it

focused solely on minority contractor “availability” with “no inquiry into whether or not the

particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past discrimination by

the city or prime contractors.”

The heightened standards of proof articulated by Croson and further developed by Adarand led

many states, counties and municipalities to reevaluate existing minority business enterprise

programs. Judicial challenges followed, and while several race-conscious programs survived,91

many others were less successful, either because they lacked a compelling remedial justification

or were not sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to withstand strict judicial scrutiny. As to the former,

local jurisdictions primarily sought to establish a “strong basis in evidence” with “disparity”

studies depicting the extent of minority exclusion from public contracting activity within the

jurisdiction, coupled with any available “anecdotal” evidence. After the Court’s 1995 Adarand

decision, such studies were generally poorly received in the courts. Almost universally cited as

the basis for judicial rejection of such statistical proof was over-reliance by the governmental unit

on general or undifferentiated population data that failed to adequately reflect minority contractor

availability or to account for contractor size and other factors relevant to contractor

qualifications.92 Other major faults have been failure to “narrowly tailor” the remedy—whether a

minority participation goal, preference, set-aside, or other “sheltered” bidding arrangement—to

90

488 U.S. 469 (1989).

See, e.g., Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass’n v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 1999); Associated Gen.

Contractors of California v. Coalition, 950 F.2d 1401, 1416-18 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 585 (1992); Coral

Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).

92

See, e.g., Builders’ Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Cook County, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001); Associated Gen.

Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148 ( 2001); W.H. Scott

Constr. Co., Inc. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999); Engineering Contractors Ass’n v. Metro. Dade

County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998); Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City

and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 196 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1004 (1995); O’Donnell Constr. Co. v.

District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

91

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any disparities revealed by statistics and anecdotal proof of discrimination;93 the failure to

properly limit the program in scope and duration;94 the absence of a “waiver” provision;95 or

neglecting first to consider race-neutral alternatives, such as bonding and credit assistance

programs, to ameliorate minority underutilization. 96

The courts, however, have yet to resolve several important issues. As noted, the first relates to

whether different fact-finding standards pertain to independent state or local minority contracting

initiatives or to state plans explicitly adopted in aid of enforcing federal law. Notwithstanding

Croson, decisions by three different circuit courts suggest that no independent findings may be

required to establish a “compelling” governmental interest where the state agency acts not on its

own authority, but pursuant to federal mandate requiring remedial state or local action to

counteract the effects of past or present discrimination on federally funded projects.

Compelling government interest looks at a statute or government program on its face. When

the program is federal, the inquiry is (at least usually) national in scope. If Congress or the

federal agency acted for a proper purpose and with a strong basis in the evidence, the

program has the requisite compelling government interest nationwide, even if the evidence

did not come from or apply to every state or locale in the Nation.97

The principle here seems to be that the evidentiary record compiled by Congress to find a

compelling interest for the federal program provides the factual leverage necessary to sustain

supporting action at the state and local level.

Likewise, in Western State Paving Co. v. Washington DOT, the Ninth Circuit reviewed “as

applied” challenges to state programs mandated by federal law. 98 As discussed earlier, the court

followed the Eighth Circuit in finding the 10% DBE set-aside of federal transportation funds

under TEA-21 facially constitutional.99 But even if Washington demonstrates compliance with

TEA-21 and its implementing regulations, it must separately meet strict scrutiny to survive an as93

See, e.g., Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997); Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D.

Md. 2000); Main Line Paving Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989).

94

See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); Kornhass Constr., Inc. v.

State of Oklahoma, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (W.D. Okla, 2001); Webster v. Fulton County, Ga. 51 F. Supp.2d 1354 (N.D.

Ga. 1999); Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 948 (D. Conn. 1992).

95

Associated Gen. Contractors, 214 F.3d 730. Compare Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 298 F.

Supp. 2d., 725, 740 (finding DBE plan not to be narrowly tailored where waivers were “rarely or never granted”) with

N. Contr., Inc. v. Illinois, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19868 (D. Ill. 2005), aff’d 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 320 (7th Cir.

2007)(state transportation funding plan approved where flexibility assured by “the employment of individualized DBE

goals on a contract-by-contract basis, and through the maintenance of a waiver provision to account for those situations

in which achievement of the set DBE goals is not reasonably possible.”).

96

See, e.g., Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 586; Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, 214 F.3d

730; Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 86 F. Supp 2d 1042 (D.Colo. 2000).

97

Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 1041 (2004).; see also Milwaukee County

Paver Ass’n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1991)(“If the state does exactly what the statute expects it to do, and

the statute is conceded for the purposes of the litigation to be constitutional, we do not see how the state can be thought

to have violated the Constitution.”).

98

407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).

99

Generally, the court determined that Congress had a compelling interest in creating a remedial scheme to overcome

effects of past discrimination in the transportation contracting industry. Further, TEA-21 was narrowly tailored to this

end because it created no quotas, it is limited in duration (Congress must periodically re-authorize it), and it contains

income limits to lessen the burden on non-minority firms.

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applied challenge. Thus, the majority found that while the state does not have to re-establish a

compelling state interest, it still has to show that its program is narrowly tailored. That, in turn,

“depends upon the presence or absence or discrimination in the state’s transportation contracting

industry.”

Washington admitted that no statistical studies were done to establish the existence of

discrimination in the highway contracting industry. What arguments the state did make regarding

discrimination—based on estimates of minority contractor participation in state transportation

contracting—were rejected. The court concluded that those percentages proved little because they

failed to account for factors affecting the capacity of minority contractors to undertake

contracting work; for example, DBEs could be smaller, less experienced or concentrated in a

particular part of the state. Moreover, the court observed that historical minority participation on

contracts with affirmative action components “does not provide any evidence of discrimination

against DBEs” in a race-neutral market. Washington also lacked anecdotal evidence of

discrimination, which could not be inferred from statistics alone. Finally, “even when

discrimination is present within a State, a remedial program is narrowly tailored if its application

is limited to those minority groups that have actually suffered discrimination.”100

In a more recent ruling, Northern Contracting Inc. v. State of Illinois,101 the Seventh Circuit

reached a result similar to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Western States Paving. In affirming the

district court, the Seventh Circuit “considered the question of whether the federal government’s

interest in remedying discrimination in highway contracting provided sufficient justification for

the state to engage in a federally mandated DBE program, and ... concluded that it did.” As a

result, the only question that remained was whether the state highway contracting program was

narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest. After reviewing the statistical evidence and

evaluating the state’s compliance with federal regulations, the court determined that the state’s

program was narrowly tailored and therefore passed constitutional muster.

By contrast, a more restrictive evidentiary approach is represented by a different Seventh Circuit

ruling in Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook,102 a case that involved a

locally adopted minority contracting program rather than a federal program. The district court

there held that Cook County had failed to establish a compelling interest supporting its contract

set-aside program. In defense of its program, the County presented anecdotal evidence that prime

contractors failed to solicit minority- and women-owned subcontractors at the same rate as

similarly situated firms owned by white males. In addition, the County put forward statistical data

demonstrating that a number of firms rarely or never solicit minority- or women-owned firms for

subcontract work. This evidence, however, failed to persuade the court of a systematic refusal to

solicit such firms for subcontract work because it was based on the practice of a mere thirteen

general contractors. In affirming the decision, the appeals court also noted that the program failed

to link its set-aside levels (30% minorities, 10% women) to evidence of their availability on the

relevant market.

Western States Paving and related cases may have important implications for future challenges

against both state and federal affirmative action programs. Under the Ninth Circuit’s rationale,

while federal programs may be insulated by appropriate congressional fact-finding, state

100

Id. at 998.

473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

102

123 F.Supp.2d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001).

101

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affirmative action in furtherance thereof must be supported by proof of discrimination on a stateby-state basis. Moreover, even federal programs could fall under question as the statistical

foundation for their enactment becomes strained by the passage of time, perhaps necessitating

renewed evidentiary justification. Meanwhile, DOT has issued guidance concerning the effects of

the Western States Paving decision on recipients in the Ninth Circuit. 103

Another issue that has divided the federal circuit courts since Croson is whether post-enactment

evidence of discrimination is sufficient to justify minority set-asides and preferences. 104 In 1996,

the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Hunt ruled that, in the context of racial gerrymandering, a

legislature must have sufficient evidence to support a racial distinction “before it embarks on an

affirmative action program.”105 Shaw demanded a “strong basis in evidence” for race-based

governmental action, which has been interpreted by the Federal Circuit to mean that “the

quantum of evidence that is ultimately necessary to uphold racial classifications must have

actually been before the legislature at the time of enactment.”106 In this view, proof that the

legislature had a constitutionally permissible intent requires strong pre-enactment evidence. But

the Tenth Circuit decision in Adarand III allowed consideration of post-enactment evidence in

addition to congressional findings because the defendants had gathered it in response to the

Supreme Court’s application of strict scrutiny to the statutes in question. 107 The Supreme Court

chose not to address this and other issues when it declined an appeal from the Tenth Circuit ruling

in Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver.108

In Concrete Works, the federal circuit court examined a city ordinance establishing goals for

participation in the construction industry by minority- and female-owned businesses. In 1990, the

Denver City Council passed Ordinance 513 to promote participation by minority-owned business

enterprises (MBEs) and women-owned business enterprises (WBEs) in public work projects “to

an extent approximating [their] availability and capacity.” The city determined availability and

capacity by conducting periodic studies of minority participation in each contract area. The

Ordinance also directed the Office of Contract Compliance (OCC) to establish MBE and WBE

participation goals on each individual city contract. The statutory goals for total annual

expenditures were 16% for MBEs and 12% for WBEs. According to the ordinance, if the OCC

established an individual project goal, all bidders had to either meet the goals or demonstrate their

good faith efforts to do so. The city revised the program in 1996 and 1998, reducing the annual

goals for MBEs and WBEs in construction contracts to 10% and prohibiting M/WBEs from

counting self-performed work towards the goals.

103

A notice describing DOT’s implementation of the guidance was published in the Federal Register on Aug. 21, 2006.

71 F.R. 48579. Questions and answers regarding Western States Paving are available on the DOT website at

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/civilrights/dbe_memo_a5.htm.

104

See, e.g., Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United States DOD, 262 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Associated Gen. Contrs. of

Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122

F.3d 895, 911-13 (11th Cir. 1997); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 605 n.21 (3rd

Cir. 1996); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1994);

Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 60 (2nd Cir. 1992); Coral Constr. Co. v. King

County, 941 F.2d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991).

105

517 U.S. 899 (1996).

106

Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United States DOD, 262 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

107

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).

108

321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003).

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Concrete Works of Colorado, a construction firm owned by a white male, sued the city in 1992,

alleging that it had been denied three contracts for failure to meet the goals or to make good faith

efforts, and sought injunctive relief and money damages. The city relied on three categories of

evidence to demonstrate a compelling remedial purpose for the ordinance. First, major studies—

in 1990, 1995, and 1997—revealed large disparities between M/WBE availability and utilization

on city projects without goals. Census data revealed like patterns of minority and female

underutilization as contractors and subcontractors in state-wide construction, public and private.

At trial, M/WBEs also testified to discrimination they confronted in qualifying and bidding on

private sector jobs, in obtaining capital and credit, in dealing with suppliers, and of harassment

suffered at work sites, including physical assaults.

The principal issue presented by Concrete Works was whether the government’s statistics and

other evidence established a remedial justification for racial and gender preferences in public

contracting. The circuit court adopted an expansive approach, finding that “irrefutable or

definitive” proof of the city’s own “guilty” actions was unnecessary where the city’s “passive”

participation in marketplace discrimination by its spending practices was shown.

Denver’s only burden was to introduce evidence which raised the inference of discriminatory

exclusion in the local construction industry and link its spending to that discrimination....

Denver was under no burden to identify any specific practice or policy that resulted in

discrimination. Neither was Denver required to demonstrate that the purpose of any such

practice or policy was to disadvantage women or minorities. To impose such a burden on a

municipality would be tantamount to requiring proof of discrimination and would eviscerate

any reliance the municipality could place on statistical studies and anecdotal evidence.109

Croson’s admonition against relying on “mere societal discrimination” did not apply, the opinion

states, where evidence of discrimination in the industry targeted by the program is shown—

whether motivated by an attitude “shared by society” or “unique to the industry” is

constitutionally irrelevant. The trial court was wrong to require Denver to “show the existence of

specific discriminatory policies and that those policies were more than a reflection of societal

discrimination.”

The trial court also faulted the city’s disparity studies, in part, for failure to control for firm size,

area of specialization, and whether the firm had actually bid on city contracts. Such factors were

thought important because, due to their generally smaller size, M/WBEs might lack the requisite

experience and qualifications, diminishing their availability and capacity to perform on city

construction projects. The Tenth Circuit accepted the studies, nonetheless, reasoning that small

firms can expand and contract to meet their bidding opportunities, and because size and

experience are not race or gender-neutral variables: “M/WBE construction firms are generally

smaller and less experienced because of discrimination.” The disparities, moreover, were not

shown to disappear when such variables were controlled for, or held constant, and taking the

number of city bidders into account might distort the picture by including unqualified firms.

Likewise, “lending discrimination” and “business formation” studies were properly relied on by

the city for the “strong link” they demonstrated between disbursement of public funds and the

“channeling” of those funds due to private discrimination. Private barriers precluded entry of

M/WBEs into the market “at the outset” and made impossible “fair competition” for public

contracts by minority firms that did submit bids.

109

Id. at 973.

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An appeal from the Tenth Circuit ruling, filed by petitioner Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc.,

was denied by the Supreme Court.110 In an unusual move, Justice Scalia was joined by Chief

Justice Rehnquist in filing a written dissent from the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari. The

dissenters argued that Denver’s policy violated the standards of proof required by the Court’s

1989 decision in Croson and “invites speculation that case has effectively been overruled.”

According to their view, there must be some evidence that discrimination was so pervasive that

any minority business would have suffered: “Absent such evidence of pervasive discrimination,

Denver’s seeming limitation of the set-asides to victims of racial discrimination is a sham, and the

only function of the preferences is to channel a fixed percentage of city contracting dollars to

firms identified by race.” In declining review, Justice Scalia opined that his fellow Justices had

“abandoned” their former insistence on a “strong basis in evidence,” relying instead on the “good

faith” of local governments to act responsibly when using racial preferences.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Legislative Attorney

[redacted]@crs.loc.g

ov, 7-....

Acknowledgments

Portions of this report were originally written by (name redacted), Legislative Attorney.

110

Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, cert. denied 540 U.S. 1047 (2003).

Congressional Research Service

25

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