The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007

Order Code RL33282

The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007

Updated August 23, 2007

Philip D. Winters

Analyst in Government Finance

Government and Finance Division

The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007

Summary

The Administration’s Mid-Session Review (for fiscal year (FY) 2008, July 2007)

provided updated budget estimates for FY2007. Higher than previously expected

receipts reduced the estimated deficit for FY2007 to $205 billion from the estimated

$244 billion in February 2007.

In the fall of 2006, Congress passed three continuing resolutions (CRs) on

appropriations to fund the nine (of 11) regular appropriations for FY2007 that had

not cleared Congress. Congress passed H.J.Res. 20 (Revised Continuing

Appropriations Resolution) on February 14, 2007 (a day before the third CR expired),

providing funding for those nine regular appropriations for the rest of FY2007. The

President signed the legislation on February 15, 2007 (P.L. 110-5).

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provided new baseline estimates

(January 2007) showing improvement in the FY2007 budget outlook (the baseline

estimates do not assume any policy changes). The baseline deficit estimate fell to

$172 billion from an estimated $286 billion in August 2006. The President’s

FY2008 budget (February 2007) included a FY2007 deficit of $244 billion (including

a substantial military supplemental).

The House and Senate, in late March, passed differing versions of a

supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591) providing, as requested by the President,

over $90 billion for the ongoing military conflicts overseas, unrequested funds for

domestic spending, and a withdrawal timetable for troops in Iraq. The House and

Senate agreed to a conference report (H.Rept. 110-107; on April 25 and 26). The

President vetoed (as he had indicated he would do) the bill on May 1. On May 2, an

attempt to override the veto failed in the House. A new supplemental (H.R. 2206),

without Iraq withdrawal timetables, passed Congress on May 24, 2007. The

President signed it on May 25 (P.L. 110-28)

The President’s original FY2007 budget, released in early February 2006,

included proposals to make the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent; slow the growth

of Medicare spending; hold non-defense, non-homeland security funding to little if

any increase; and introduce, in FY2010, private accounts for Social Security. The

budget did not extend relief from the expanding coverage of the alternative minimum

tax (AMT) or fund current military actions overseas after FY2007.

Both the Senate (S.Con.Res. 83; March 16, 2006) and House (H.Con.Res. 376;

May 18) passed differing versions of the FY2007 budget resolution. An agreement

on the resolutions was not reached. Both the House and Senate adopted (separately)

deeming resolutions, setting the FY2007 dollar amount for appropriations.

This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents

Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Budget Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Budget Estimates and Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Uncertainty in Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Budget Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Outlays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Receipts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Deficits (and Surpluses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Longer Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

List of Figures

Figure 1. Outlays by Type, FY2000-FY2012 (in percentages of GDP) . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 2. Outlays, FY2000-FY2017 (in percentages of GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Figure 3. Receipts by Type, FY2000-FY2012 (in percentages of GDP) . . . . . . . 16

Figure 4. Receipts, FY2000-FY2017 (in percentages of GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 5. Deficits(-)/Surpluses, FY2000-FY2017 (in percentages of GDP) . . . . 20

List of Tables

Table 1. Budget Estimates and Proposals for FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Table 2. Outlays for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Table 3. Receipts for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Table 4. Surpluses/Deficits(-) for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007

Background and Analysis

Presidents submit their budget proposals for the upcoming fiscal year (FY) early

in each calendar year. The Bush Administration released its FY2007 budget (The

Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2007) on February 6, 2006. The

multiple volumes contained both general and specific descriptions of the

Administration’s policy proposals and expectations for the budget for FY2006

through FY2011. It included a section on long-term fiscal issues facing the nation

and provided limited information on the revenue and mandatory spending changes

after 2011. The full set of budget documents (Budget, Appendix, Analytical

Perspectives, Historical Tables, among several other supplemental budget

documents) contained extensive and detailed budget information, including estimates

of the budget without the proposed policy changes (current service baseline

estimates), historical budget data, detailed budget authority, outlay and receipt data,

selected analysis of specific budget related topics, and the Administration’s economic

forecast.1 In addition to their presentation of the Administration’s proposals, the

budget documents are an annual reference source for federal budget information,

including enacted appropriations.

The Administration’s annual budget submission is followed by congressional

action on the budget. This usually includes the annual budget resolution,

appropriations, and, possibly, a reconciliation bill (or bills) as required by the budget

resolution. Over the course of deliberation on the budget, the Administration often

revises its original proposals as it interacts with Congress and as conditions change

in the economy and the world.

The Current Situation

The final budget estimates for FY2007 from the Administration, in the MidSession Review for FY2008 (July 11, 2007) included further reductions in the

expected deficit (to $205 billion from $244 billion in February 2007) and continued

unexpected increases in receipts. CBO’s July monthly budget report indicated that

1

Current services baseline estimates, and baseline estimates in general, are not meant to be

predictions of future budget outcomes, but instead are designed to provide a neutral measure

against which to compare proposed policy changes. In general, they project current policy,

which includes future changes in law, over the next 5 to 10 years. Their construction

generally follows instructions provided in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit

Control Act of 1985 (DCA) and the Congressional Control and Impoundment Act of 1974.

CRS-2

the deficit may be closer to $150 billion than $200 billion (its mid-year budget report

will be released later in August).

Earlier in 2007, Congress adopted supplemental appropriations for FY2007.

Congress responded to President Bush’s request for additional funding for the

ongoing military conflicts and a few other needs by passing a $124 billion funding

bill (H.R. 1591). The House passed the conference report on April 25, with the

Senate following on April 26, 2007 (H.Rept. 110-107). The bill included about $100

billion in military funding and approximately $24 billion in domestic spending, much

of which the President had not requested. It also included a timetable for the

withdrawal of American troops from Iraq beginning later this year. The President

had threatened a veto because of the withdrawal timetable and the additional

spending as the bill was taking shape in the House and Senate. On May 1, the

President vetoed the bill. The House failed to override the veto on May 2.

The House passed a second supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2206) on

May 10, 2007. It contained the funding for the war without the withdrawal deadline,

along with most of the additional domestic spending. The Senate amended the bill

and passed it on May 17. Discussions between the House and Senate led to further

changes. These were incorporated into the bill, which Congress passed on May 24,

2007. The President signed the bill on May 25 (P.L. 110-28).

Budget Totals

Table 1 (below) contains budget estimates for FY2007 from the CBO, the

Administration (the Office of Management and Budget, OMB), and Congress.

Differences in totals can result from differing underlying economic, technical, and

budget-estimating assumptions and techniques, as well as differences in policy

assumptions. The dollar differences in the budget outlook resulting from underlying

policy differences in the President’s proposals or those from Congress are often

relatively small for the upcoming fiscal year compared to the budget as a whole.

These small differences, however, may grow over time — sometimes substantially

— potentially producing widely divergent future budget paths. Budget estimates

generally should be expected to change over time from those originally proposed or

estimated by the President, CBO, or Congress.

Budget Estimates and Proposals

CBO’s first budget report for FY2007, the Budget and Economic Outlook:

Fiscal Years 2007-2016 (January 2006), contained baseline and economic estimates

and projections for FY2006 through FY2016. The report estimated an FY2007

baseline deficit of $270 billion (smaller than the estimated FY2006 baseline deficit

of $337 billion). By FY2011, the CBO baseline deficit estimate had fallen to $114

billion. The next year, FY2012, the increased receipts from the scheduled (in current

law) expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts produced a small baseline surplus

estimate of $38 billion. The small surplus estimates (never exceeding $75 billion,

or 0.4% of GDP) persisted through FY2016.

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Under the baseline assumptions, CBO increases discretionary spending at the

rate of inflation, assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts fully expire after 2010 (as

required under current law), and allows the recently lapsed alternative minimum tax

(AMT) relief to remain lapsed. The effects of these assumptions raise receipts in the

near-term and increase receipts by substantial amounts after FY2010 when most of

the tax cuts from 2001 and 2003 expire under current law. The declining deficit and

appearance of small surpluses over the 10 years in the CBO baseline are largely

explained by the baseline construction rules that CBO follows. The results likely

understate the near-term future size and persistence of the deficit, as CBO

acknowledges in its report.

Table 1. Budget Estimates and Proposals for FY2007

(in billions of dollars)

CBO, BEO Baseline, 1/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OMB, Budget Proposals, 2/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OMB, Budget, CSB, 2/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Senate Budget Res. (S.Con.Res. 83) 3/06 . . . .

House Budget Res. (H.Con.Res. 376) 5/06 . . .

OMB MSR 7/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Update Baseline 8/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO BEO Baseline, 1/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OMB, Budget Proposals, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OMB, Budget, CSB, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB 3/21/07 . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sen. Budget Res. (S.Con.Res 21) 3/23/07 . . .

House Budget Res. (H.Con.Res. 99) 3/29/07

OMB MSR 7/11/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Receipts

Outlays

2,461

2,416

2,444

2,431

2,433

2,422

2,459

2,515

2,542

2,540

2,550

2,533

2,538

2,542

2,574

2,732

2,770

2,701

2,766

2,795

2,771

2,798

2,801

2,714

2,784

2,735

2,747

2,750

2,751

2,779

Deficit (-)/

Surplus

-270

-354

-257

-335

-363

-348

-339

-286

-172

-244

-185

-214

-212

-209

-205

BEO — The Budget and Economic Outlook, CBO.

CSB — The Administration’s current services baseline.

MSR — Mid-Session Review, OMB

Update — The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO

CBO’s annual budget reports generally include estimates of the effect on the

deficit (or surplus) of selected policies not included in the baseline estimates. These

policy alternatives usually reflect policies under discussion or of high interest, such

as making the 2001, 2003, and other expiring tax cuts permanent; addressing the

expanding coverage of the AMT; assuming a rate of growth other than the inflation

rate for discretionary spending; and assuming additional expenditures for military

activities overseas beyond the next year.

In CBO’s January 2006 report, making the tax cuts permanent increased the

five-year (FY2007-FY2011) cumulative deficit (including higher debt-service costs)

by $372 billion, and by a cumulative $2.3 trillion over the 10-year period (FY2007FY2016). CBO’s estimate of the revenue loss from reforming the AMT produced

a $317 billion five-year cumulative increase in the deficit and a $691 billion increase

over 10 years. If discretionary spending were to grow at the rate of GDP, rather than

CRS-4

at the rate of inflation, the five-year cumulative deficit would increase (in CBO’s

report) by an estimated $356 billion, and the 10-year cumulative deficit would

increase by an estimated $1.6 trillion. CBO estimated that freezing discretionary

appropriations at the FY2006 level would reduce the five-year cumulative deficit by

$317 billion and the 10-year cumulative deficit by $1.4 trillion.

President Bush’s FY2007 budget (February 2006) called for extending and

making permanent most of the tax cuts adopted in 2001 and 2003, as well as

extending other expiring tax provisions. The budget showed extending the 2001 and

2003 tax cuts would reduce receipts by an estimated $179 billion between FY2007

and FY2011, and by an estimated $1.4 trillion between FY2007 and FY2016 (these

estimates do not include the resulting higher debt-service costs resulting from the

change).2 The Administration’s total receipt proposals would reduce five-year

receipts by $280 billion, and 10-year receipts by $1.7 trillion. Cumulative receipts

over the 5- and 10-year periods total approximately $13,823 billion and $32,496

billion respectively, without the proposed changes.

The Administration’s budget provided a limited amount of information for the

years beyond FY2011. The budget did include estimates of the cumulative proposed

revenue changes and proposed mandatory spending changes for the periods FY2007

through FY2011, and FY2007 through FY2016, but these projections contained no

information for the individual years after FY2010. Nor were estimates provided for

other components of the budget or for budget totals beyond FY2011.

Although not included in the budget documents (it was made available on

February 9, 2006), the President proposed the elimination of, the reduction in, or the

reform of approximately 141 discretionary programs. The Administration reports

that these changes would produce an estimated $20 billion in budget authority (not

outlay) savings in FY2007 compared to FY2006. How much these savings would

affect the FY2007 deficit was left unclear.

The FY2007 budget also proposed reductions (mostly in the rates of increase)

in mandatory programs over the next five years. The proposed net savings totaled

$71 billion over five years, but this is only a partial accounting of the President’s

mandatory proposals. The other proposals include user fee increases ($3 billion in

savings), program “augmentations” ($9 billion in increases), Social Security personal

accounts ($82 billion in increases in FY2010 and FY2011), the outlay effects of

extending the tax cuts ($6 billion in increases), and other mandatory proposals ($1

billion in savings). The net effect increases mandatory outlays by $21 billion over

five years. Over the same five years, cumulative mandatory spending, excluding the

Administration’s proposals, totaled an estimated $8,385 billion.

The

Administration’s mandatory proposals would have increased it 0.3% above the

mandatory spending baseline estimates.

2

The changes are measured from OMB’s current services baseline estimates, excluding

policy proposals the Administration included in its revenue baseline. OMB included the

extensions of expiring tax cuts in its baseline. This set of assumptions produced a current

services revenue estimate substantially smaller than CBO’s baseline revenue estimate,

particularly in the second half of the 10-year period.

CRS-5

CBO released its analysis (with contributions from the Joint Committee on

Taxation) of the President’s budget proposal on March 15, 2006 (a preliminary

analysis was published on March 3). The analysis involved plugging the

Administration’s policy proposals into CBO’s underlying budget assumptions and

budget estimating methods. The results produced smaller deficits in FY2006 and

FY2007 than the President’s budget, but larger than CBO’s baseline deficit estimates

(see Table 1). CBO’s reestimates and the Administration’s deficits were similar for

the remaining years projected (through FY2011). (CBO extended its reestimates

through FY2016, showing the deficit, under the Administration’s policies, growing

slightly as a percentage of GDP from FY2012 through FY2016.)

The Administration provided its annual Mid-Session Review (for the FY2007

budget; MSR) on July 11, 2006. The report updated the Administration’s budget and

economic estimates for FY2006 through FY2011. For FY2007, the changes from the

February budget estimates were relatively small. The deficit fell by 4.2% (to $339

billion), receipts grew by 1.8% (to $2,459 billion), and outlays grew by 1.0% (to

$2,798 billion). As shares of GDP (the estimates of GDP also were revised), the

deficit fell from 2.6% of GDP in February 2006 to 2.4% of GDP in July. Receipts

fell by 0.1% of GDP to 17.6% of GDP. Outlays remained unchanged at 20.1% of

GDP.

The somewhat improved short-term budget outlook in the Administration’s

MSR had little effect on the long-term budget imbalance facing the country. The

rapid growth in receipts then expected in FY2006 was not necessarily going to

continue in future years. The Administration’s assumption about future spending

restraint is also not assured. Even if the Administration’s short-term assumptions

prove correct — without substantial changes to the programs that will expand rapidly

as the baby boom retires or other large policy changes occur — the long-term budget

imbalance remained (and remains) in place.

CBO’s August 2006 release of The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update

also showed fairly dramatic improvement in the deficit for FY2006, but showed little

change for the other years from its earlier budget reports (January and March 2006).

The adoption of a FY2006 supplemental appropriation in the spring of 2006 —

which CBO, under the baseline rules it follows, includes in its baseline estimates for

subsequent years — generated much of the baseline outlay estimate increase for

FY2007 in the Update. Revisions showing higher receipts in FY2007 limited the

effect of the increased outlays on the deficit, with the combined changes raising the

deficit by $21 billion above CBO’s March 2006 baseline estimate.

CBO’s August revisions showed a slightly worsened long-term budget outlook

under its baseline assumptions, even with the improved expectations for FY2006.

The cumulative deficit in CBO’s August baseline ($34.5 trillion) was $1.3 trillion

larger than CBO’s March baseline estimates ($33.2 trillion).

The initial FY2008 budget documents from CBO and OMB in January and

February 2007, respectively, contained an improved outlook for the FY2007 budget.

CBO’s report (The Budget and Economic Outlook: FY2008-2017) had a FY2007

baseline deficit estimate of $172 billion (1.3% of GDP), over $100 billion below

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CBO’s August 2006 baseline estimate.3 The President’s FY2008 budget (February

5, 2007), with a FY2007 deficit estimate of $244 billion (1.8% of GDP), included a

request that would result in an estimated additional $37 billion in outlays (from about

$100 billion in requested budget authority) for the ongoing war efforts.

CBO’s March 2007 Analysis of the President’s Budget Proposals for Fiscal

Year 2008 contained CBO’s estimates of the Administration’s proposals and

reestimates of CBO’s January 2007 baseline estimates. CBO estimated that the

FY2007 deficit would be $214 billion using the President’s policy proposals, $30

billion smaller than OMB’s February 2007 estimate. CBO’s baseline deficit estimate

for FY2007 grew slightly (by $5 billion) from its January 2007 estimate to $177

billion.

The President’s FY2008 Mid-Session Review (July 11, 2007) included updated

estimates for FY2007 showing a continuing decline in the expected deficit. The

Administration attributed the fall to higher-than-expected receipts, which were

primarily due to higher corporate income tax and excise tax collections. The fasterthan-expected growth in receipts tapers off in the estimates for subsequent years. The

budget report hinted that the actual deficit for FY2007 could be lower than indicated

in the report. A subsequent CBO monthly budget report (from July 2007) expected

the deficit to be closer to $150 billion for FY2007. The improvements in the deficit

outlook and in receipts are not the result of policy changes, but mostly the result of

changes in economic assumptions and technical changes in the estimates.

Uncertainty in Budget Projections

All budget estimates and projections are inherently uncertain. Their dependence

on assumptions that are themselves subject to substantial variation over short time

periods makes budget estimates and projections susceptible to fairly rapid and

dramatic changes.4 Small changes in economic conditions, particularly the rate of

GDP growth (from those assumed in the estimates) can produce large changes in the

budget estimates. According to CBO, a persistent 0.1% increase in the real growth

rate of GDP would reduce the deficit (including interest costs) by $58 billion

cumulatively over a five-year period and by $272 billion over the next 10 years.

Reductions in the rate of GDP growth would increase the deficit by similar amounts

over the same time periods. Policy changes that are likely, such as supplemental

appropriations for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but which are not included in

3

According to CBO’s January 2007 budget report, outlays for FY2007 fell by $86 billion

and receipts increased by $28 billion since CBO’s and OMB’s summer 2006 respective

budget reports. About half of the revenue changes and 60% of the outlay changes were

technical in nature, having nothing to do with policy changes adopted during the fall of

2006.

4

Some of the underlying components of budget estimates are known with some certainty.

Demographics are one known component. In the next decade, the expected retirements in

the baby boom generation will rapidly increase the spending for Medicare and Social

Security as well as other federal activities benefitting the elderly. Because virtually all those

who will become eligible for these benefits are alive today, estimating the growth in the

populations eligible for these programs is relatively straightforward.

CRS-7

CBO’s baseline, can also change the budget outlook, both for the current budget year

and for future years.

The President’s (FY2007) budget included a chapter in the Analytical

Perspectives volume titled “Comparison of Actual to Estimated Totals.” The chapter

examined the causes of the changes from the initial budget estimates for FY2005

(February 2004) through the actual results for that year. OMB extended its analysis

to find upper and lower bounds to the deficit or surplus estimates over a five-year

period, based on data going back to FY1982. It found that the upper and lower

bounds ranged over $1.1 trillion at the end of a five-year period. In other words, the

Administration’s deficit estimate for FY2011, $205 billion, could range from a

surplus of approximately $300 billion to a deficit of approximately $700 billion (with

a 90% chance of the budget balance falling between those two numbers). Even the

Administration’s deficit estimate for FY2007 has a 90% chance of being as small as

$86 billion or as large as $622 billion.

Budget projections are dependent on the underlying assumptions about the

direction of the economy, expected policy and policy changes, and how these

interact, along with other factors (such as changing demographics) that affect the

budget. Any deviation from the assumptions used in the budget estimates, such as

faster or slower economic growth, higher or lower inflation, differences from the

expected or proposed spending and tax policies, or changes in the technical

components of the budget models can have substantial effects on the budget

estimates and projections, particularly over longer periods.

Budget Action

Congressional committees began hearings on the President’s FY2007 budget

shortly after it was released. The Senate Budget Committee reported its version of

the congressional budget resolution for FY2007 (S.Con.Res. 83) on March 9. After

amending the resolution, the Senate passed it on March 16. As passed, the resolution

had higher outlays and a larger deficit for FY2007 than proposed by the President.

It assumed the extension of numerous expiring tax cuts (but did not include a fix,

temporary or otherwise, for the Alternative Minimum Tax beyond FY2006), and did

not include reductions in mandatory spending.

The House Budget Committee passed its version of the FY2007 budget

resolution (H.Con.Res. 376) on March 29. The House Budget Committee’s

resolution had smaller discretionary spending caps than the Senate-passed resolution,

among other differences. The House, after an extended delay, passed the Budget

Committee’s version of the budget resolution on May 18. The House resolution had

budget totals for FY2007 that were in most respects similar to those proposed in the

President’s budget.

Substantial differences between the House- and Senate-passed budget

resolutions, along with the relatively late adoption of the House resolution in an

election-year-shortened legislative session, may have reduced the chances of a

successful conference. In the expectation of a very difficult-to-achieve House-Senate

CRS-8

agreement on a FY2007 budget resolution, both the House and Senate adopted

deeming resolutions.5 The deeming resolutions established the discretionary

spending levels for FY2007 (the House and Senate both used $873 billion) for use

by the Appropriation Committees in both chambers. The House adopted its deeming

resolution shortly after it passed its version of the budget resolution; the Senate

attached its deeming resolution to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for

FY2006 (H.R. 4939), which became law (P.L. 109-234) on June 15, 2006. The

discretionary level in the Senate deeming resolution was almost $16 billion below the

discretionary level in the Senate-passed budget resolution.

Following the adoption of the deeming resolutions, the Appropriation

Committees in the House and Senate began considering and reporting the annual

appropriation bills for FY2007. When Congress left in August, no regular

appropriation had passed. The House had passed 10 of its 11 appropriations; the

House Committee on Appropriations had cleared all 11 of the appropriations. The

Senate had yet to pass any of its 12 appropriations; the Senate Committee on

Appropriations had cleared all 12. Congress passed the Defense (H.R. 5631) and

Homeland Security (H.R. 5441) appropriations at the end of September 2006 in

advance of the October 2006 start of FY2007, but none of the others. The Defense

appropriation included a continuing resolution on appropriations (a CR) that funded

all the activities not in the two adopted appropriations, through November 17, 2006.

Funding under the CR would be at either the House-passed, Senate-passed, or last

year’s (FY2006) funding levels, whichever was the lowest. (Because the Senate had

only passed the Defense and Homeland Security appropriations, the funding level

chosen was the lower of the House-passed or FY2006 levels.)

Congress returned after the election on November 13, with little time to adopt

the remaining appropriations for FY2007. Action on the remaining appropriations

in the Senate bogged down quickly. To avoid a possible lapse in funding, Congress

adopted a second CR (P.L. 109-369; H.J.Res. 100) on November 15, 2006. The new

CR provided funding through December 8, 2006.

In its post-Thanksgiving session, Congress adopted a third CR (P.L.109-383;

H.J.Res. 102) very late on December 8, 2006, extending the existing CR through

February 15, 2007. Congress also passed legislation that included an extension of

numerous regularly extended tax breaks (H.R. 6111) and also included trade and

health savings account modifications among other provisions.

On January 31, 2007, the House passed H.J.Res. 20, which would fund the

remaining FY2007 appropriations for the rest of the year (9 of the 11 regular

appropriations for FY2007 did not clear Congress before the 109th Congress ended

in December 2006). Most activities, with numerous exceptions, would be funded at

or near FY2006 funding levels. The Senate passed the legislation without

amendment on February 14. The President signed it on February 15 (P.L. 110-5).

5

The deeming resolutions serve as an annual budget resolution to establish enforceable

budget levels in the absence of an actual congressionally adopted budget resolution. For

additional information, see the CRS Report RL31443, The “Deeming Resolution”: A Budget

Enforcement Tool, by Robert Keith.

CRS-9

Along with his FY2008 budget, the President requested $103 billion in

supplemental appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and for additional

hurricane recovery on the Gulf Coast. The 2007 supplemental (most of which was

for defense and international affairs ($99 billion) would be spent in both FY2007 and

FY2008. The House passed its version of the legislation (H.R. 1591) on March 23,

2007. In addition to the funding requested by the President, the bill contained an

additional $20 billion for domestic purposes. It also included instructions to remove

U.S. troops from Iraq (under certain conditions) during 2008. The Senate approved

its version of the legislation on March 29, 2007. It contained $21 billion in spending

for domestic programs not requested by the President. It also included instructions

to remove troops from Iraq in 2008. The President threatened to veto the bills in

their current forms because of the requirements for troop withdrawal and the

additional unrequested domestic spending.

A conference on the bill reached agreement (H.Rept. 110-107) on April 24,

2007. The agreement included the additional domestic funding and the withdrawal

timetables, as well as the funding for the military. The House passed the agreement

on April 25 and the Senate passed it on April 26. The President received the bill on

May 1 and, as promised, vetoed it. The House failed in its attempt to override the

veto.

The House and Senate began discussions about a new supplemental shortly after

the veto. The House passed a new supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2206)

funding military and domestic spending on May 10. The bill did not contain a

timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. The Senate amended the legislation with a

“place-holder” to facilitate a conference, on May 17. After leadership discussions,

an agreement was reached that passed the House and Senate on May 24. The

President signed the bill on May 25 (P.L.110-28).

Outlays

The Administration’s FY2007 budget (February 2006) proposed $2,770 billion

in outlays for FY2007, rising to $3,240 billion in FY2011, the last year shown in the

President’s budget. The proposals would boost funding for defense and homeland

security spending, restrain or cut most other discretionary spending, and make

modest growth-slowing changes to Medicare. In FY2010 and FY2011, it would raise

spending by tens of billions of dollars to fund private accounts for Social Security.

The Administration’s proposals, which the budget assumes are adopted, would raise

outlays by $61 billion (2.2%) above the Administration’s revised FY2006 outlay

estimate, and by 17.0% from FY2007 to FY2011.

Measured against the Administration’s FY2007 current services baseline outlay

estimates, the proposed level of outlays would grow by $69 billion (2.6%).6 The

6

The current services baseline estimates, like CBO’s baseline estimates, are designed to

provide “a neutral benchmark against which policy proposals can be measured.” For

outlays, the modified baseline used this year by OMB assumes emergencies are one-time

only, that federal pay adjustment assumptions reflect the (usual) first full pay period in

(continued...)

CRS-10

difference between the current services baseline outlay estimate and proposed outlays

for FY2007 indicates the “cost” of the Administration’s proposed policies. The yearto-year change (the $61 billion increase) combines the “costs” of proposed policy

changes for FY2007 with the relatively automatic growth in large parts of the budget

from FY2006 to FY2007. These relatively automatic increases include cost-of-living

adjustments in many federal programs, growth in populations eligible for program

benefits, and inflation-driven costs of goods and services bought by the government.

Table 2. Outlays for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016

(in billions of dollars)

FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2016

CBO Baseline, 1/06 . . . . . . . . . . 2,472 a

President’s FY07 Budget, 2/06 . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY07 CSB, 2/06 . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Revised Baseline, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . . .

S. Bud. Res. (S.Con.Res. 83) 3/06 . . . . . . .

H. Bud. Res. (H.Con.Res. 376) 5/06 . . . . .

OMB, MSR 7/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Update Baseline 8/06 . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Baseline, 1/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 Budget, 2/07 . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 CSB, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB 3/21/07 . . . . . . . . .

2,649

2,709

2,669

2,675

2,648

2,675

2,675

2,696

2,663

2,654 a

—

—

—

2,732

2,770

2,701

2,766

2,726

2,795

2,771

2,798

2,801

2,714

2,784

2,735

2,747

2,857

2,814

2,798

2,820

2,849

2,843

2,825

2,847

2,945

2,818

2,902

2,752

2,905

2,984

2,922

2,925

2,906

2,968

2,923

2,914

2,929

3,079

2,926

2,985

2,866

3,002

3,105

3,061

3,050

3,017

3,099

3,030

3,022

3,053

3,217

3,038

3,049

2,973

3,046

3,252

3,240

3,210

3,167

3,256

3,164

3,157

3,224

3,382

3,179

3,157

3,166

3,156

4,046

—

—

4,044

3,822

—

—

—

4,211

3,892

—

—

3,943

S. Bud. Res. (S.Con.Res 21) 3/23/07 . . . . .

—

2,750

2,927

3,041

3,093

3,201

—

H. Bud. Res. (H.Con.Res. 99) 3/29/07 . . . .

—

2,751

2,933

3,051

3,106

3,217

—

OMB, MSR 7/11/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

2,779

2,918

3,016

3,078

3,184

—

a. Actual outlays for FY2005 and FY2006.

CSB — The Administration’s current services baseline (not strictly comparable to CBO’s baseline).

MSR — Mid-Session Review

Update — The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO

From FY2006 to FY2007, the Administration’s original FY2007 budget made

a number of assumptions, including the following: a $19 billion increase in

undistributed offsetting receipts (that reduce outlays) resulting from the proposed

sales of a portion of the radio spectrum; a reduction ($23 billion) in disaster and relief

spending for hurricane relief efforts that the Administration expects to wind down in

FY2007; a $22 billion reduction in federal education funding, mostly for support of

higher education; substantial increases in outlays in net interest ($27 billion) as both

the debt and interest rates rise; a rise in Social Security spending by an expected $31

billion; and a rise in Medicare spending by an expected $49 billion, which included

the Administration’s proposals to slow its growth. As shares of gross domestic

product (GDP), the Administration’s proposals would reduce outlays from 20.8% of

6

(...continued)

January rather than October 1, and the debt service (interest payment) changes resulting

from these (and revenue-related) modifications are included in the baseline. These

modifications reduced the reported current services baseline outlay estimate by

approximately $45 billion in FY2007 and by $86 billion in FY2011.

CRS-11

GDP in FY2006 to 20.1% of GDP in FY2007. By FY2011, the Administration

projected that outlays would have fallen to 19.1% of GDP.

CBO’s January 2006 baseline estimates showed outlays falling very slowly from

19.8% of GDP in FY2007 to 19.4% of GDP in FY2011 and, after falling slightly in

the intervening years, returning to 19.4% of GDP in FY2016. Under a selection of

CBO’s alternative scenarios for spending — including the assumption that there is

a phase-down in activities in Iraq and Afghanistan over a number of years, that total

discretionary spending increases at the rate of nominal GDP growth (rather than the

rate of inflation), and including higher interest costs from the larger deficits and debt

resulting from these changes (and from extending the tax cuts) — outlays would fall

from 20.1% of GDP in FY2007 to 20.0% of GDP in FY2011 before rising to 21.2%

of GDP in FY2016.

The President’s budget indicated that Department of Defense (DOD) spending

would increase by 6.9% from FY2006 to FY2007. This increase ($28 billion, from

$411 billion to $439 billion) is based on budget authority (BA) for those two years

and excluded enacted and proposed supplementals for the DOD. The President’s

budget showed outlays, the actual expenditures of the DOD, dropping from FY2006

($512 billion) to FY2007 ($505 billion), a 1.4% reduction in spending.7 (Total

outlays, not BA, and total revenues determine a year’s surplus or deficit.) With the

uncertainty surrounding the financing needs for the ongoing military action in Iraq

and Afghanistan, FY2007 defense outlays seem unlikely to match the proposals.

CBO’s baseline estimates for defense spending (which include extending previously

adopted supplemental funding) increase BA (by 2.5%) and lower outlays (by less

than 1%) between FY2006 and FY2007.8

Non-defense discretionary outlays in the President’s FY2007 budget would

grow by just under 1% ($5 billion) from FY2006 to FY2007, from $500 billion in

FY2006 to $505 billion in FY2007. The President’s budget showed non-defense

discretionary BA falling by 4.2% ($18 billion) between those two years. Most of that

change resulted from the boost in FY2006 spending resulting from the

Administration’s proposed $18 billion hurricane relief supplemental. Excluding that

amount, non-defense discretionary BA, as a whole, would barely change from

FY2006 to FY2007. CBO’s January 2006 baseline non-defense discretionary outlay

estimates grow by less than 1% between FY2006 and FY2007, from $499 billion to

$502 billion, similar to the change in the President’s budget. The President’s budget

left unspecified his called-for future year reductions in discretionary spending.

Mandatory spending, federal activities that generally do not need an annual

appropriation, would grow by 3.9% ($64 billion) from FY2006 to FY2007, including

the Administration’s proposed $1.7 billion in mandatory spending reductions for

7

These outlay numbers include both discretionary and mandatory outlays for the DOD.

Mandatory spending for the DOD is less than $2 billion in both years.

8

CBO’s defense category matches the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) defense category,

a somewhat larger collection of defense related activities than is covered by the DOD alone.

CRS-12

FY2007 under the President’s original proposals.9 This would raise mandatory

spending, the largest broad category of federal spending, from $1,457 billion in

FY2006 to $1,494 billion in FY2007. CBO’s January 2006 baseline estimates of

mandatory spending showed it rising from $1,432 billion in FY2006 to $1,488 billion

in FY2007, a 3.9% increase.

The Administration proposed $36 billion in Medicare savings (from baseline

levels) through FY2011, which would slow, slightly, the expected increase in

Medicare spending. Medicare spending over the five years totaled an estimated

$2,207 billion. The Administration’s proposed Medicare reduction amounts to a

1.6% cut from total Medicare baseline spending over the five years (no legislation to

reduce Medicare spending was adopted in 2006). The budget also included in its

mandatory proposals, personal accounts for Social Security (beginning in FY2010)

that would increase spending by $82 billion over the two years, FY2010 and FY2011.

The net effect of the Administration’s mandatory proposals, which included both

increases and decreases, would increase spending by $21 billion over the five years,

FY2007 through FY2011.10

The large deficits and an expected rise in interest rates change the interest

payments the government must make on its growing debt. Both the President’s

budget and CBO’s baseline estimates had net interest rising by 12% from FY2006

to FY2007. Continued large deficits that rapidly increase the debt, combined with

expected higher interest rates, would continue to raise the government’s annual

interest payment. Net interest as a share of total outlays was expected to grow from

7.4% in FY2005 to 8.2% in FY2006, and to 8.9% of total outlays in FY2007.

In the early spring of 2006, the Senate passed its verison of the FY2007 budget

resolution (S.Con.Res. 83; March 16, 2006). If followed, it would have increased the

proposed level of outlays by $120 billion (4.5%) between FY2006 and FY2007. The

resolution’s FY2007 outlays were $69 billion larger than CBO’s FY2007 baseline

outlay estimate and $25 billion above the President’s proposed FY2007 outlays.

Under the Senate resolution, outlays would fall as a percentage of GDP, from 20.3%

of GDP in FY2007 to 18.9% of GDP in FY2011.

The House-passed version of the FY2007 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 376;

May 18, 2006) followed most of the policies of the President’s budget proposal. The

resolution had a slightly smaller deficit and slightly higher outlays than in the

President’s proposal for FY2007. Outlays in the resolution would increase by $95

billion (3.6%) from FY2006 to FY2007. The outlays were $45 billion higher than

CBO’s FY2007 baseline outlay estimate and less than $1 billion above the

President’s FY2007 outlay proposal. In the resolution, outlays would fall from

20.1% of GDP in FY2007 to 18.8% of GDP in FY2011. (Congress did not adopt a

budget resolution for FY2007.)

9

The Administration’s reductions include increased user fee offsets as well as reductions

in mandatory spending.

10

The mandatory proposals would increase spending by an estimated $551 billion over the

10-year period, FY2007 through FY2016, according to the budget documents.

CRS-13

The Administration’s July 2006 Mid-Session Review (MSR) increased the

FY2007 outlay estimate by $28 billion. Most of the increase came from higher

estimates for the Administration’s global war on terror and the effect of the FY2006

supplemental (P.L. 109-234) on outlays in FY2007. Somewhat lower spending

estimates in a variety of other programs moderated the overall increase. Over the

five years covered in the MSR, the changes in estimates between February 2006 and

July 2006 would raise cumulative outlays by $45 billion, a barely noticeable amount

given that cumulative outlays approach a projected $12 trillion over the five years.

CBO’s August 2006 mid-year budget report (The Budget and Economic

Outlook: An Update), reflecting budget legislation adopted to that point along with

economic and technical adjustments to the underlying budget estimates, boosted

baseline outlays for FY2007 by $75 billion (to $2,801 billion) over its January 2006

baseline estimates. Much of the increase reflected legislation that increased spending

for the war effort and hurricane recovery.

The January 2007 CBO budget report (The Budget and Economic Outlook:

FY2008-FY2017) reduced expected FY2007 outlays by $87 billion (to $2,714

billion)below its August 2006 budget estimates. About 30% of the reported change

came from legislative actions taken since the August 2006 estimates. The remaining

change came from technical reestimates and shifts in the underlying economic

forecast. The President’s FY2008 budget (February 2007) also lowered the expected

FY2007 outlays (by $14 billion) compared to OMB’s July 2006 Mid-Session Review.

Figure 1. Outlays by Type,

FY2000-FY2012

(in percentages of GDP)

12%

10%

8%

6%

M andatory

National Defense

Nondefense

Net Interest

The Administration’s July 2007 MSR

slightly lowered (by $5.6 billion) the

FY2007 outlay estimate below the FY2007

outlay estimate in the President’s FY2008

budget proposal (February 2007).

Reestimates reducing discretionary

spending were responsible for most of the

change (legislation adopted since February

2007 raised outlays slightly while other

reestimates both raised and reduced outlays

from the February levels).

Figure 1 shows the Administration’s

estimates for spending by category as

4%

revised in the July 2007 MSR. The actual

outlays are shown for the fiscal years 2000

through 2006 and the July 2007 estimates

2%

are shown for the fiscal years 2007 through

2012, all as percentages of GDP. The

7/2007

general slide in nondefense discretionary

0%

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 spending after FY2005 reflects the

Administration’s efforts to limit its growth

(in dollars) over its time in office and beyond. Defense spending begins falling as a

percentage of GDP (and in dollars) after FY2008, when the Administration no longer

includes full funding estimates for the ongoing overseas military operations.

CRS-14

The proposed reductions in some mandatory programs in the President’s

FY2008 budget have little to no effect on FY2007 mandatory spending, but could,

if enacted, moderate the near-term growth in mandatory spending as a share of

GDP.11 Longer-term, mandatory spending begins growing again as a percentage of

GDP as the baby boom generation begins retiring in large numbers. The President’s

FY2008 budget had mandatory spending growing at an annual rate of 5.4% (from

FY2007 to FY2012). Over the same period, total spending would grow by 3.1%

annually.

Figure 2 shows several possible paths for total outlays as percentages of GDP

for FY2007 through FY2013 or FY2017 (actual outlays are shown for FY2000

through FY2006). The paths include the President’s FY2008 budget proposal, an

alternative outlay path derived from CBO

data, CBO’s March 2007 reestimate of the

Figure 2. Outlays,

P r e s i dent ’s p r o p o s a l , a n d t h e

FY2000-FY2017

Administration’s July 2007 Mid-Session

(in percentages of GDP)

Review. Average outlays for the FY1966

Average, FY1966-FY2006

25%

through FY2006 period (20.6% of GDP)

Actuals, FY2000-FY2006

24%

are also shown in the figure.

Alternative Estimate 1/07

23%

CBO Reestimates 3/07

OMB 2/07

OMB 7/07

The alternative estimate shown here is

based on selected policy alternatives

22%

estimated by CBO (in its January 2007

21%

budget report, The Budget and Economic

Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008-20017) that

20%

were not included in CBO’s baseline. It

19%

incorporates several assumptions that may

better reflect future budget policy than the

18%

policy assumptions used to produce the

17%

baseline.

One is that discretionary

spending

grows

at the rate of nominal GDP

16%

growth (a higher rate of growth than the

7/2007

15%

inflation adjustment used in the baseline).

2000

2005

2010

2015

The second is that funding for the military

activities in Iraq and Afghanistan are

phased down more rapidly than the baseline assumes. The third is that, because of

larger deficits and debt resulting from other alternative assumptions, the

government’s interest costs are larger than in the baseline. And the fourth is that, as

in the baseline, mandatory spending is expected to grow faster than GDP. Outlays

under the alternative estimate wander a bit as a percentage of GDP in the near future

(from 20.1% of GDP in FY2007 to 20.3% of GDP in FY2011 and to 19.9% of GDP

in FY2012) before rising steadily to 21.1% of GDP in FY2017.

11

FY2006 mandatory spending was boosted, temporarily, by spending on hurricane

recovery.

CRS-15

Receipts

Receipts would rise 5.7% from FY2006 to FY2007 in the Administration’s

original FY2007 budget proposal (February 2006), including the effect of extending

the alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief through FY2007. (The most recent

Administration budget estimate from July 2007 shows receipts rising by 6.9% from

FY2006 to FY2007.) Over the five years forecast in the President’s budget, receipts

would rise from $2,416 billion in FY2007 to $3,035 billion in FY2011, a 25.6%

increase.

Table 3. Receipts for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016

(in billions of dollars)

FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2016

CBO Baseline, 1/06 . . . . . . . . . .

2,154a

President’s FY07 Budget, 2/06 . . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY07 CSB 2/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Revised Baseline, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . . . .

S. Bud. Res. (S.Con.Res. 83) 3/06 . . . . . . . .

H. Bud. Res. (H.Con.Res. 376) 3/06 . . . . . .

OMB, MSR 7/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Update Baseline, CBO 8/06 . . . . . . . .

CBO Baseline, 1/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 Budget, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 CSB, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB 3/21/07 . . . . . . . . . .

S. Bud. Res. (S.Con.Res 21) 3/23/07 . . . . . .

2,312

2,285

2,301

2,304

2,313

2,303

2,303

2,400

2,403

2,407 a

—

—

—

—

2,461

2,416

2,444

2,431

2,461

2,433

2,422

2,459

2,515

2,542

2,540

2,550

2,533

2,538

2,598

2,590

2,597

2,585

2,598

2,593

2,590

2,659

2,672

2,720

2,662

2,715

2,679

2,678

2,743

2,714

2,729

2,712

2,743

2,725

2,723

2,772

2,775

2,809

2,798

2,833

2,787

2,825

2,883

2,878

2,901

2,852

2,883

2,870

2,869

2,930

2,890

2,901

2,955

3,022

2,877

2,959

3,138

3,035

3,064

2,964

3,139

2,986

2,994

3,098

3,156

3,167

3,104

3,297

3,007

3,130

4,113

—

—

3,794

4,114

—

—

—

4,118

4,084

—

—

3,873

—

H. Bud. Res. (H.Con.Res. 99) 3/29/07 . . . . .

—

2,542

2,720

2,810

2,901

3,167

—

OMB, MSR 7/11/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

2,574

2,659

2,803

2,954

3,095

a. Actual receipts for FY2005 and FY2006.

CSB — The Administration’s current services baseline (not strictly comparable to CBO’s baseline).

MSR — Mid-Session Review

Update — The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO

The Administration’s proposal to extend and make permanent many of the tax

cuts adopted in the Administration’s first term would have little effect on FY2007

revenues. Most of the budgetary effect of extending the tax cuts would occur after

FY2010. (Because the Administration incorporated the effect of making the tax cuts

permanent in both its proposed and current services baseline estimates, there is no

upward bump in the current services receipt estimates in FY2010 or FY2011.)

The Administration estimated that making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts

permanent would reduce cumulative receipts by $179 billion between FY2007 and

FY2011 and by $1.4 trillion between FY2007 and FY2016. The effect of these

extensions and the Administration’s other proposals for receipts would reduce

receipts (from baseline levels) by $280 billion in the first five years and by $1,667

billion over 10 years.

—

CRS-16

CBO’s January 2006 budget report estimated that extending the expiring

provisions of the major tax cuts passed in 2001 and 2003 would reduce revenues by

an estimated $346 billion over the first five years and by $1,606 billion over 10 years.

Extending all the tax cuts that expire over the 10-year period would reduce revenues

(from CBO baseline levels) by $582 billion in the first five years and by $2,644

billion over the full 10 years of the forecast.12 CBO’s baseline estimates, following

current law, assume that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts expire in 2010 as scheduled.

7/2007

The estimated reductions in revenues from extending tax cuts do not reduce

year-to-year revenues. The Administration projected that receipts would rise from

$2,285 billion in FY2006, to $2,416 billion in FY2007, and to $3,035 billion in

FY2011 (including the effect of the Administration’s proposals). CBO’s revised

baseline estimates (March 2006) showed revenues increasing from an estimated

$2,312 billion in FY2006, to $2,461 billion

Figure 3. Receipts by Type,

in FY2007, to $3,139 billion in FY2011,

FY2000-FY2012

and to $4,114 billion in FY2016. The

(in percentages of GDP)

Administration’s MSR (July 2006), with

12%

revised receipt estimates, also showed total

Individual

Social Insurance

receipts rising over this period, from

Corporate

$2,400 billion in FY2006, to $2,459 billion

Other

10%

in FY2007, to $3,098 billion in FY2011.

Excise

(The Administration’s FY2002 budget

documents, published in April 2001,

8%

projected total receipts of $2,643 billion for

FY2007, almost $200 billion more than

6%

estimated in the MSR.)

Figure 3 shows the President’s July

2007 receipt estimates and projections by

type (from the FY2008 Mid-Session

Review) for the fiscal years 2000 through

2%

2012. Actual receipts are shown for

FY2000 through FY2006. All are shown

0%

as percentages of GDP. In the revised

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

estimates, as in the original FY2007

budget, excise and other receipts remain

near or below 1% of GDP. Corporate income taxes, after rising through FY2006,

decline slowly and steadily as a share of GDP under the Administration’s projection.

Social insurance receipts vary little throughout the period. Individual income tax

receipts, having fallen over 3.3% of GDP between FY2000 and FY2004, are shown

regaining some of their lost share, but remain below their FY2000 level.13

4%

12

These amounts from CBO do not include the outlay effects (usually interest costs

associated with larger deficits and debt) of the extensions.

13

Individual income tax receipts fell from 10.3% of GDP in FY2000, the highest level on

record, to 7.0% of GDP in FY2004, the lowest level since FY1951. Individual income tax

receipts averaged 8.3% of GDP between FY1966 and FY2006.

CRS-17

The Administration’s original proposals (February 2006) included extending the

current relief from the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for fiscal years 2006 and

2007. Without further extensions of or a permanent fix to the AMT, a growing

number of middle-class taxpayers would find themselves subject to the AMT.14 CBO

estimated (January 2007) that providing annual AMT relief would reduce receipts by

$279 billion between FY2008 and FY2012, and by $569 billion between FY2008 and

FY2017. Without adjustment to the AMT, it will eventually recapture much of the

tax reduction provided in the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.15

The Administration’s July 2006 MSR showed a jump in receipts as a share of

GDP in FY2006 (to 18.3% of GDP from 17.5% of GDP in the President’s February

2006 budget), but the two sets of estimates are relatively close in the other years. The

large increase in receipts expected (at that time) in FY2006 and possibly into FY2007

(mostly from corporate income and non-withheld individual income taxes) appeared

to be limited and had little effect on receipts in subsequent years.

The CBO August 2006 Update also reflected the expected jump in FY2006

receipts (from 17.7% of GDP in CBO’s March 2006 budget report to 18.3% of

GDP), an increase that dissipates over the 10-year forecast. By FY2011, the August

2006 baseline receipt estimate was 0.2% of GDP larger than CBO’s March 2006

baseline receipt estimate (18.9% of GDP versus 18.7% of GDP). The expected jump

in FY2007 receipts was smaller, rising from 17.9% of GDP in the January 2006

estimates to 18.2% of GDP in the August 2006 estimates.

The revised estimates for FY2007 in the CBO January 2007 budget report and

the OMB FY2008 budget both showed still higher receipts in FY2007 (18.6% and

18.5% of GDP respectively). A large component of the increase, as with the outlay

estimate changes, was technical. Revisions to underlying assumptions by both OMB

and CBO produced much of the change in the revenue estimates for FY2007, not

legislation or changes in the economic outlook. The increase in near-term receipts,

as shares of GDP, persisted, but generally diminishes over time.

The Administration revised receipt estimates in its July 2007 MSR. The

revisions raised expected receipts as percentages of GDP above the February 2007

Administration receipt estimates. In dollars, the July estimates were below those

from February. The Administration revised its estimates of GDP over the next five

years, reducing it in each of the years. This produced the somewhat unusual result

of receipts rising as a percentage of GDP while falling in dollars (in the same years

— receipts continue rising from year-to-year).

14

For discussions of the AMT issue, see CRS Report RL30149, The Alternative Minimum

Tax for Individuals; and CRS Report RS22100, The Alternative Minimum Tax for

Individuals: Legislative Initiatives and Their Revenue Effects, both by Gregg A. Esenwein.

15

See CRS Report RS21817, The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT): Income Entry Points

and “Take Back” Effects, by Gregg A. Esenwein, for more information on the interaction

of the AMT and the tax cuts.

CRS-18

Figure 4 uses data from the January 2007 CBO budget report, the President’s

FY2008 budget documents (February 2007), and the Administration’s July 2007

Mid-Session Review to show a variety of

Figure 4. Receipts,

paths that receipts might follow in the next

FY2000-FY2017

decade. The figure shows receipts as

(in percentages of GDP)

percentages of GDP for fiscal years 2000

25%

through 2017 (projected). Actual receipts

Average, FY1966-FY2006

are shown for fiscal years 2000 through

24%

Actuals, FY2000-FY2006

2006, as are average receipts (18.3% of

Alternative Estimate 1/07

GDP) for FY1966 through FY2006.

23%

CBO Reestimates 3/07

22%

OMB 2/07

OMB 7/07

21%

20%

19%

18%

17%

16%

7/2007

15%

2000

2005

2010

2015

The Administration’s February 2007

estimates showed receipts remaining

relatively stable over its five-year forecast,

near the long-term average of 18.3% of

GDP. They then rise to 18.6% of GDP in

FY2012. The Administration’s revenue

estimates include a one-year AMT patch

(for FY2007) and the assumption that

many expiring tax provisions, particularly

from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, will be

extended. This has the effect of reducing

revenues below what they would have been

without these policy proposals.

CBO’s March 2007 reestimates of the Administration’s proposals show higher

receipts early in the FY2007-FY2012 period, then closely track the President’s

budget estimates. Beyond FY2012, the extension of the reestimates shows receipts

rising through FY2017 as percentages of GDP.

The alternative estimate, based on data provided in CBO’s January 2007 budget

report, showed receipts falling to near 17.5% of GDP by FY2011 and rising slowly

after that. The alternative assumes that the AMT is adjusted to eliminate its growing

coverage and that most expiring tax provisions, as in the Administration’s estimate,

are extended. This last adjustment to the baseline is most apparent after FY2010.

Under these assumptions, the alternative path for receipts remains below the 40-year

(FY1966-FY2006) average for receipts as a percentage of GDP (18.3% of GDP).

Deficits (and Surpluses)

Deficits and surpluses are the residuals left after Congress and the President set

policies for spending and receipts. Surpluses, in which receipts are greater than

outlays, reduce federal debt held by the public, which can lead to lower net interest

payments (among other effects). Deficits, in which outlays exceed receipts, increase

government debt held by the public, generally increasing net interest payments. The

government had its last surplus in FY2001 ($128 billion and 1.3% of GDP).

CRS-19

The President’s original FY2007 budget proposed a FY2007 deficit of $354

billion (2.6% of GDP). The Administration’s budget showed the deficit shrinking

in dollars and as a share of GDP through FY2010 before rising slightly in FY2011.

(Since that proposal, the expected deficit for FY2007 has fallen to near $200 billion.)

Table 4. Surpluses/Deficits(-) for FY2005-FY2011 and FY2016

(in billions of dollars)

FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2016

CBO Baseline, 1/06 . . . . . . . . .

-318 a

President’s FY07 Budget, 2/06 . . . . . . . .

President’s FY07 CSB 2/06 . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Revised Baseline, 3/06 . . . . . . . . . .

S. Budget Res. (S.Con.Res. 83) 3/06 . . . .

H. Budg. Res. (H.Con.Res. 376) 5/06 . . .

OMB, MSR 7/06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO, Update Baseline 8/06 . . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Baseline, 1/07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 Budget, 2/07 . . . . . . . .

President’s FY08 CSB, 2/07 . . . . . . . . . .

CBO Analysis of OMB 3/21/07 . . . . . . . .

S. Bud. Res. (S.Con.Res 21) 3/23/07 . . . .

-337

-423

-367

-371

-336

-372

-372

-296

-260

-248 a

—

—

—

—

-270

-354

-257

-335

-265

-363

-348

-339

-286

-172

-244

-186

-214

-212

-259

-223

-201

-236

-250

-250

-235

-188

-273

-98

-239

-80

-226

-249

-241

-208

-196

-194

-224

-197

-191

-157

-304

-116

-187

-33

-215

-216

-222

-183

-149

-165

-216

-160

-153

-123

-328

-137

-94

95

-169

-134

-114

-205

-146

-204

-117

-178

-164

-127

-227

-12

-54

288

-149

-71

67

—

—

-250

70

—

—

—

-93

192

—

—

-70

—

H. Bud. Res. (H.Con.Res. 99) 3/29/07 . . .

—

-209

-213

-241

-205

-50

—

-89

—

OMB, MSR 711//07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

-205

-258

-213

-123

a. Actual deficit for FY2005 and FY2006.

CSB — The Administration’s current services baseline, Budget Enforcement Act basis.

MSR — Mid-Session Review

Update — The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO

The Administration asserted that the FY2007 budget would further the

President’s oft-repeated goal of cutting the deficit in half by FY2009. To achieve this

result, the Administration reached back to its February 2004 deficit estimate for

FY2004 (4.5% of GDP) as the starting point, which was when it first articulated this

goal.16 The FY2007 budget showed the deficit falling below 2% of GDP by FY2008

and to 1.4% of GDP in FY2009.

Achieving the Administration’s deficit reduction goals would require, during the

five years in the budget, strict limits on the growth in domestic discretionary

spending (if not actual reductions), a slowing in the growth rate of some entitlements,

and letting AMT relief lapse after 2007. Some of the President’s proposals would

increase spending or reduce receipts, requiring larger spending reductions in other

areas of the budget to reduce the deficit, since the Administration has steadfastly

16

The actual deficit for FY2004 was 3.6% of GDP. Since 2002, the Administration has

consistently overestimated the size of the current or the next year’s deficit in each year’s

budget.

CRS-20

opposed the use of tax increases to reduce the deficit.17 Holding to these spending

and revenue levels may prove difficult. The President’s FY2008 budget (February

2007) repeated many of these proposals. Higher-than-expected receipts in FY2006

and during much of FY2007 and somewhat slower outlay growth in both years

improved the deficit outlook for FY2007. The last Administration budget estimate

before the end of FY2007, the July 2007 Mid-Session Review (MSR), reduced the

expected deficit in FY2007 to $205 billion (1.5% of GDP). (The MSR showed the

budget reaching a small surplus, $33 billion, in FY2012.)

CBO’s January 2007 baseline estimates and projections showed the deficit

steadily falling in dollars and as a percentage of GDP through FY2011, after which

small surpluses appeared over the remaining years of the projection. The

requirements and assumptions that CBO follows in producing the baseline estimates

accounts for almost all of this improvement in the deficit/surplus outlook. These

assumptions included the expiration of the tax cuts as currently scheduled and the

expanding coverage of the alternative minimum tax (AMT)

Under a selection of alternative policies not included in the baseline (but

included in CBO’s January 2007 budget report) the deficit does not shrink and a

surplus does not appear. Instead, the deficit grows almost continuously throughout

the 10-year period in dollars and, after

Figure 5. Deficits(-)/Surpluses,

FY2012, grows as a share of GDP (see the

FY2000-FY2017

alternative estimate in Figure 5).

(in percentages of GDP)

5%

4%

3%

2%

Average, FY1966-FY2006

Actuals, FY2000-FY2006

Alternative Estimate 1/07

CBO Reestimates 3/07

OMB 2/07

OMB 7/07

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

-4%

7/2007

-5%

2000

2005

2010

Figure 5 shows deficit or surplus

estimates as shares of GDP for FY2000

through FY2017. The actual surpluses or

deficits are shown for FY2000 through

FY2006. For the future years, the figure

shows the President’s February 2007

proposals (from the FY2008 budget), the

alternative estimate based on data in the

CBO January 2007 budget report, CBO’s

reestimates (from its March 2007 budget

report) of the President’s February 2007

budget proposals, and the estimates and

projections from the Administration’s July

2007 MSR. The figure also shows the

average deficit (2.3% of GDP) for FY1966

through FY2006.

2015

The President’s proposals (from

February and July 2007) show a steady

reduction in the deficit (it moves upward in Figure 5) over the five years covered by

17

The Administration’s current services baseline estimate, which assumes current policy,

has smaller deficits throughout the five-year period than the deficits in the President’s

proposed budget. The cumulative five-year deficit would be smaller without the President’s

proposed policy changes than with them.

CRS-21

the reports. CBO’s reestimates of the Administration’s proposals follow the same

pattern through FY2012, then show little reduction in the deficit through FY2017.

The alternative estimate in Figure 5 is based on the alternative policies

estimated by CBO (that reflected faster-than-the-baseline-assumed discretionary

spending growth, extension of the expiring tax cuts, continuation of the existing

relief for the middle class from the expanding coverage of the alternative minimum

tax (AMT), and incorporation of the increased debt servicing costs). Under these

assumptions, the deficit estimates, after a slight fall in FY2007 (to -1.3% of GDP),

increase to -3.6% of GDP in FY2017.

Although not shown in Figure 5, the CBO baseline deficit estimate (January

2007) assumed the expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts in 2010, no future

adjustments to lessen the expanding coverage of the AMT, an annual inflation

adjustment to discretionary spending, along with a number of other assumptions.

The result was growing receipts, falling outlays, and a rapid fall in the deficit as a

share of GDP after FY2010 that would reach a surplus in FY2012. CBO put the

FY2007 baseline deficit estimate at $177 billion (-1.3% of GDP) in its March 2007

estimates. This was $5 billion higher than its January estimates, but over $100

billion smaller than its August 2006 baseline deficit estimate of $286 billion (-2.1%

of GDP).

Previous budget reports during the FY2007 budget cycle tended to show

shrinking deficit estimates for FY2007 (with less improvement, if any, in the surplusdeficit outlook for subsequent years) compared to the President’s original budget

proposal (see Table 4). A combination of higher-than-expected revenues and

somewhat lower levels of spending produced much of the change.

The Senate’s FY2007 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 83; March 2006) contained

a slightly larger proposed deficit in FY2007 than in the President’s budget and was

$30 billion larger than CBO’s March 2006 reestimate of the President’s proposed

deficit. Compared with CBO’s revised March 2006 baseline, the Senate’s budget

resolution deficit is almost $100 billion larger, implying that no policy changes

would produce a smaller deficit than the policy change assumptions included in the

budget resolution. As shares of GDP, the deficits in the Senate budget resolution fall

from 2.6% in FY2007 to 1.0% of GDP in FY2010 before rising to 1.1% of GDP in

FY2011.

The House budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 376: May 2006) for FY2007 had a

slightly smaller proposed deficit than the President originally proposed (by $6

billion) and generally smaller deficits in subsequent years. Compared to the March

2006 CBO estimates, the House budget resolution deficit for FY2007was$80 billion

larger than CBO’s baseline deficit and almost $15 billion larger than CBO’s

reestimate of the President’s FY2007 proposal. As with the Senate resolution,

making no policy changes would produce a smaller deficit in FY2007 than adopting

the policy changes assumed in the House budget resolution. (Congress did adopt a

budget resolution for FY2007.)

CRS-22

The Longer Run

Both OMB and CBO agree that over a longer time period, one beginning in the

next decade and lasting for decades, demographic pressure will so badly distort

current policies as to make them unsustainable. The future, under current policies,

will lead to growing and persistent deficits. A CBO report on The Long-Term Budget

Outlook (December 2005) states

Over the next half-century, the United States will confront the challenge of

conducting its fiscal policy in the face of the retirement of the baby-boom

generation.... Under current policies, the aging of the population is likely to

combine with rapidly rising health care costs to create an ever-growing demand

for resources to finance federal spending for mandatory programs, such as

Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.... [A]ttaining fiscal stability in the

coming decades will probably require substantial reductions in the projected

growth of spending and perhaps also a sizable increase in taxes as a share of the

economy.18

The Administration indicated similar concerns about the outlook for the budget

over the long term in the President’s FY2007 budget (February 2006).

...the long-term picture presents a major challenge due to the expected growth in

spending for major entitlement programs. In only two years, the leading edge of

the baby boom generation will become eligible for early retirement under Social

Security. In 5 years, these retirees will be eligible for Medicare. The budgetary

effects ... will be muted at first. But if we do not take action soon to reform both

Social Security and Medicare, the coming demographic bulge will drive Federal

spending to unprecedented levels and threaten the Nation’s future prosperity.

No plausible amount of cuts to discretionary programs or tax increases can help

us avert this major fiscal challenge.... By 2070, if we do not reform entitlement

programs to slow their growth, the rate of taxation on the overall economy would

need to be more than doubled....19

The short-term budget outlook can change when it is buffeted by all types of

unexpected events, such as the hurricanes last year or deteriorating economic

conditions. The long-term budget outlook, although susceptible to these types of

events, will largely be determined by the interplay of current policy and

demographics. The retirement of the baby boom generation, rapidly expanding the

population eligible for federal programs serving the elderly, will put enormous

pressure on the federal budget. Without policy changes, these programs could

overwhelm the rest of the budget. Not only will the programs themselves be stressed,

but their growth would be likely to impede the government’s ability to meet its

obligations and the ability of the economy to provide the resources needed.

18

19

CBO, The Long-Term Budget Outlook, December 2005, p. 1.

OMB, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2007, February 2006, p.

18.

CRS-23

For Additional Reading

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years

2007-2016. Washington, January 27, 2006.

——. The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update. Washington, August 2006.

——. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008-2017. Washington,

January 25, 2007.

——. The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington, December 2005.

U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. The Economic Report of the President.

Washington, GPO, February 2006.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The Budget of the United States

Government for Fiscal Year 2007. Washington, GPO, February 6, 2006.

——. Fiscal Year Mid-Session Review, Budget of the United States Government.

Washington, July 11, 2006.

——. The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2008.

Washington, GPO, February 5, 2007.

CRS Products

CRS Report RS22550, The Federal Budget: Sources of Movement from Surplus to

Deficit, by Marc Labonte.

CRS Report RS21992, Extending the 2001, 2003, and 2004 Tax Cuts, by Gregg

Esenwein.

CRS Report RL30149, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals, by Gregg

Esenwein.

CRS Report RS22100, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals: Legislative

Initiatives and Their Revenue Effects, by Gregg Esenwein.

CRS Report RL30239, Economic Forecasts and the Budget, by Brian W. Cashell.

CRS Report RL31235, The Economics of the Federal Budget Deficit, by Brian W.

Cashell.

CRS Report RL31414, Baseline Budget Projections: A Discussion of Issues, by

Marc Labonte.

CRS Report 98-560, Baselines and Scorekeeping in the Federal Budget Process, by

Bill Heniff Jr.

CRS-24

CRS Report RS20095, The Congressional Budget Process: A Brief Overview, by

James V. Saturno.

CRS Report RL30297, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Selected Statistics and

Information Guide, by Bill Heniff Jr.

CRS Report RL33291, Congressional Budget Actions in 2006, by Bill Heniff Jr.

CRS Report 98-720, Manual on the Federal Budget Process, by Robert Keith and

Allen Schick.

CRS Report RL30708, Social Security, Saving, and the Economy, by Brian W.

Cashell.

CRS Report RS22390, FY2007 Budget Documents: Internet Access and GPO

Availability, by Jennifer Teefy.