Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
Congressional research reportMay 25, 2010
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Liberia’s Post-War Development:
Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
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Specialist in African Affairs
May 25, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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RL33185
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
Summary
This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held
elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building
process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and
ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia’s first
civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized
neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor
forces and became targets of the Taylor regime.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential runoff vote with 59.4% of votes cast
and took office in January 2006, becoming the first elected female president of an African
country. Her runoff rival, George Weah, a former star soccer player, conceded Sirleaf’s win after
initially contesting it. Most observers viewed the vote as orderly, free, and fair. It fulfilled a key
goal of an August 2003 peace accord that had ended the second civil war and led to an ongoing,
U.S.-aided post-war transition process, which is bolstered by the multifaceted peacekeeping and
development-focused U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The next election is scheduled for 2011,
and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia’s security situation is
stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that
preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed; widespread corruption within it was widely
reported. Liberia’s economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with
humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war
reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was
arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war
crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by
the SCSL.
In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia’s post-war peace and reconstruction
processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in
ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses
centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for
successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th
Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey); H.R. 3288 (Olver); S. 656 (Reed); H.R. 2258
(Kennedy); H.R. 2410 (Berman); H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen); S. 1434 (Leahy); and H.R. 2346
(Obey).
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Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
Contents
Recent and Ongoing Developments.............................................................................................1
U.S. Ties .....................................................................................................................................3
Background ................................................................................................................................3
U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).........................................................................................4
Current Strength..............................................................................................................4
Drawdown ......................................................................................................................4
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse........................................................................................6
Transition Process .......................................................................................................................7
2005 Post-War Elections .............................................................................................................7
Conduct of Elections .............................................................................................................9
2005 Election Dispute ................................................................................................... 10
Subsequent Elections .................................................................................................... 10
Sirleaf Government ................................................................................................................... 11
Policy Agenda..................................................................................................................... 11
Economic Renewal ....................................................................................................... 11
Governance................................................................................................................... 12
Foreign Policy............................................................................................................... 12
Women ......................................................................................................................... 12
Corruption .................................................................................................................... 13
Performance........................................................................................................................ 13
Sirleaf Administration: Criticisms and Challenges ............................................................... 14
Security Issues .......................................................................................................................... 17
Security Conditions............................................................................................................. 17
Rubber Sector Reform................................................................................................... 20
Security Sector Reform ....................................................................................................... 21
New Military Created.................................................................................................... 21
Defense Sector Reform and the AFL: Current Issues and Challenges ............................. 23
Coast Guard.................................................................................................................. 27
National Guard State Partnership Program..................................................................... 28
Other Defense Cooperation ........................................................................................... 29
Police and Justice Sector Assistance .............................................................................. 30
Special Security Service...................................................................................................... 32
Humanitarian Conditions .......................................................................................................... 33
Health Issues....................................................................................................................... 34
AIDS .................................................................................................................................. 34
Governance: Background .......................................................................................................... 35
Transitional Government..................................................................................................... 36
Post-NTGL Corruption Trials........................................................................................ 37
Concession Deals ................................................................................................................ 38
New Contracts .............................................................................................................. 40
NTGL Anti-Corruption Efforts ............................................................................................ 41
Key Governance Issues ............................................................................................................. 42
Anti-Corruption Efforts Under Sirleaf ................................................................................. 42
Forestry Sector.............................................................................................................. 42
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Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
Diamonds ..................................................................................................................... 45
GEMAP........................................................................................................................ 46
Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) ........................................ 47
Legislative Branch .................................................................................................................... 48
U.S. Legislative Assistance ................................................................................................. 49
Congressional Role ....................................................................................................... 50
War Crimes, Human Rights Cases, and Transitional Justice....................................................... 51
Taylor Trial ......................................................................................................................... 51
Trial Venue ................................................................................................................... 52
Sirleaf Administration Role........................................................................................... 53
SCSL: U.S. Views and Assistance ................................................................................. 54
Transitional Justice in Liberia.............................................................................................. 56
Potential for War Crimes Tribunal in Liberia ................................................................. 56
Truth and Reconciliation Commission........................................................................... 56
Cases Against “Chuckie” Taylor.......................................................................................... 58
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 60
111th Congress..................................................................................................................... 62
Appropriations .............................................................................................................. 62
Immigration .................................................................................................................. 63
Other Bills .................................................................................................................... 65
110th Congress .................................................................................................................... 65
Immigration Issues........................................................................................................ 67
U.S. Assistance Summary ................................................................................................... 67
Development Assistance and Related Bilateral Cooperation .......................................... 68
Millennium Challenge Corporation ............................................................................... 69
Peace Corps .................................................................................................................. 69
Trade Benefits............................................................................................................... 70
Economic Cooperation and Investment ......................................................................... 70
Air and Communications Links ..................................................................................... 71
Debt Relief, Donor Cooperation, and Related Issues...................................................... 72
U.S. Assistance Levels ........................................................................................................ 73
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Liberia ........................................................................................................... 76
Tables
Table 1. 2005 Election: Legislative Results by Party....................................................................9
Table 2. U.S. Assistance for the Special Court for Sierra Leone ................................................. 55
Table 3. U.S. Bilateral and Related Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2011............................... 73
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 76
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Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
Recent and Ongoing Developments
Liberia’s president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,1 is currently visiting the United States. Her several-day
trip is aimed at deepening her high-level contacts with the Administration of President Barack
Obama, Congress, and other U.S. policy makers.2 Sirleaf, who also maintained warm ties with
former President George W. Bush’s Administration, is scheduled to meet with President Obama,
possibly to be joined by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, on May 27.3 She is expected
to update U.S. policy makers, including interested Members, on Liberia’s progress since her
election, as well as remaining challenges in such areas as security sector reform, anti-corruption
efforts, unemployment, economic growth, and legal system capacity building. Her visit is
expected to include a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program pre-signing
event and a possible U.S. Global Food Security Initiative country program. 4
On March 18, 2010, President Obama extended for 18 months the Deferred Enforced Departure
(DED) status of eligible Liberian U.S. resident aliens, which had previously been set to expire on
March 31, 2010, allowing them to remain in the United States. DED is a special immigration
status that effectively suspends the deportation of eligible U.S. aliens. The presidential directive
ordering the extension, which had been sought by some Members, notably from districts with
significant populations of Liberian origin, also authorized those eligible to work during the
duration of their DED status.5 In addition, two bills introduced in the 111th Congress would allow
certain Liberian aliens to become permanent U.S. residents. (See “Immigration Issues.”)
The trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, which began in mid-2007, but was beset by
procedural delays for a time, is continuing. Cross-examination of defense witnesses by the
Prosecutor’s Office of the U.S.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which began in
November 2009, proceeded in early 2010.6 (See “Taylor Trial.”)
In her late January 2010 annual address to the Liberian legislature, President Sirleaf announced
that she would seek reelection to a second term in 2011, as many observers had expected. Her
announcement came in spite of a recommendation by Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in its draft June 2009 final report that Sirleaf, as one of 49 alleged “political
leaders and financiers of different warring factions” party to Liberia’s civil wars, be “barred from
1
Although her name is widely cited as Johnson-Sirleaf, the Liberian president does not employ a hyphenated form of
her last name. See Wil Haygood, “For Liberia’s ‘Iron Lady,’ Toughness Part of Territory,” Washington Post,
December 16, 2005.
2
Such contacts have included an April 2009 meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, an official visit to Liberia in
August 2009 by Secretary Clinton, and an April 2010 visit to Liberia by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
William J. Burns, which are discussed below; see section on “U.S. Relations”.
3
White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Visit of President Sirleaf of Liberia to the White House,” May
24, 2010; and Reed Kramer and Tami Hultman, “President Reports Progress Amid Problems to U.S. Backers,”
allAfrica.com, May 25, 2010.
4
Liberian Government, “President Sirleaf To Meet US Government Officials in Washington,” May 14, 2010.
5
Administration of Barack H. Obama, Memorandum on Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians, March 18, 2010.
6
Taylor is being tried by the SCSL on war crimes and related charges under an amended, 11-count indictment first
brought against him in 2003. The Prosecutor alleges that he directly aided and abetted diverse crimes allegedly
committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF. Open Society Institute, “Trial Proceedings,” http://www.charlestaylortrial.org;
and SCSL press releases and court documents.
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holding public offices” or “elected or appointed” for 30 years.7 (See “Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.”)
In early 2010, the Unity Party (UP, President Sirleaf’s party), the Liberia Action Party (LAP), and
the Liberia Unification Party (LUP) were in the process of holding party conventions and were all
expected to ratify an April 2009 agreement among them to merge.8
In mid-2010, a full-fledged Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) country program for Liberia is
scheduled to begin. It will build on the work of a special short-term humanitarian service program
that began in October 2008.9 (See “Peace Corps.”)
U.S.-Liberia flights by Delta Airlines are slated to begin in mid-2010. The initiation of the new
route, originally planned for mid-2009, was delayed when the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) announced in June 2009 that due to security deficiencies at Liberia’s international
airport, it would not permit the operation of U.S.-Liberian flights. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), a DHS unit, is providing Liberia with assistance to enhance aviation
security. 10 (See “Air and Communications Links.”)
In May 2009, a jury acquitted former National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)
Chairman Gyude Bryant and four former Liberia Petroleum Refinery Company (LPRC)
executives from the NTGL period of corruption charges in a case involving the alleged
embezzlement of LPRC assets.11 Bryant faces a separate corruption case related his tenure as
NTGL chairman. (See “Post-NTGL Corruption Trials.”)
In late 2009, Liberia held a Senatorial by-election to fill a vacancy created by an incumbent’s
death in which President Sirleaf’s Unity Party lost in a run-off against the opposition Congress
for Democratic Change (CDC). Although the election reportedly featured a low voter turnout, it
was viewed as a dry run of the National Elections Commission’s (NEC) operational capability
ahead of national elections in 2011 because nearly half of Liberia’s electorate was eligible to
participate in it. (See “Subsequent Elections.”)
The Sirleaf government is negotiating or has in recent years entered into several multi-year, large
natural resource or agricultural concession deals, collectively worth multiple billions of dollars
7
TRC, Consolidated Final Report (unedited), Volume II, June 29, 2009.
These party realignments are viewed as part an effort to create a strong political coalition in support of the reelection
of President Sirleaf in 2011. Just prior to the LUP convention in mid-February 2010, a number of politicians from
several smaller parties, some former LUP members, agreed to join the party. The Informer, “Several Cross Carpet to
LUP,” February 12, 2010 via AllAfrica.com; Nana Adu Ampofo, “Major Liberian Parties Merge Ahead of 2011
Election,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 2, 2009; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Liberia, June
2009.
9
Peace Corps, “Liberia,” December 17, 2009.
10
Delta Air Lines, “Delta Expands Africa Presence with First-Ever Flight between Atlanta and Monrovia, Liberia,”
October 22, 2008; Dow Jones News Service, “TSA Blocks Delta Flights To 2 African Cities On Security,” June 3,
2009; and TSA, “TSA and Liberia Partner to Enhance Aviation Security,” April 7, 2009.
11
Two of the other LPRC accused include the former speaker of the incumbent Liberian House of Representatives,
Edwin Swone, Jr., and Senator Richard Devine. C. Emmanuel Johnson, “Court Continues Jurors Selection,” The News
(Monrovia) via AllAfrica.com January 6, 2009; Agence France Presse (AFP), “Former Liberia Leader Faces More
Corruption Charges,” May 17, 2008; The Analyst, “Bryant Pities Country - He, Others Absolved of Sabotage
Charges,” via allAfrica.com, May 8, 2009; and information to CRS provided by the State Department February 2 and 3,
2009.
8
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Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
worth of investment and potential exports, indicating that large foreign investors’ confidence in
the country’s political progress and prospective stability is strong.12 Sirleaf has cited strong
economic growth—which, she said in May 2010, had averaged 7% annually over the past four
years, in spite of a period of global recession—as a key benchmark of advances made under her
administration.13
U.S. Ties
The United States has long-standing ties with Liberia that date back to the founding of the
modern Liberian state by “Americo-Liberians,” black freemen and former slaves from the
Americas who settled in Liberia beginning in 1821. Liberia was also a close U.S. ally, albeit a
relatively minor one, during World War II and the cold war, and the country hosted U.S.
communications facilities in the 1960s and 1970s, and received extensive U.S. development
assistance. The Reagan Administration cultivated ties with the government of President Samuel
K. Doe during the first half of the 1980s, although these later soured. The United States also
provided meditational support and extensive humanitarian assistance for Liberia during its first
and second civil wars. It has also invested substantial amounts of aid in the current United
Nations peacekeeping operation in Liberia, as well as substantial post-war rebuilding and
development assistance. There has generally been strong congressional support for these efforts.
The Administration of former President George W. Bush formed a close and cordial relationship
with the Sirleaf government, and similarly close relations have continued under the Obama
Administration. Contemporary U.S. relations with and policy developments related to Liberia are
discussed in the “U.S. Relations” section of this report.14
Background
Liberia, a small, poor West African country of about 3.4 million people, is undergoing a postconflict transition and peace-building process after its second civil war within a decade. The latter
conflict burgeoned in 2000, after several minor border incursions in 1999. It pitted the forces of
Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two
armed anti-Taylor rebel groups: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and
12
These include several iron ore projects with China Union, $2.6 billion; BHP Billiton, $2 billion; Severstal, $2 billion;
Elenilto; $2.2 billion; and ArcelorMittal, $1.5 billion. ArcelorMittal and BHP Billiton are also in talks to create a joint
venture to export ore from BHP Billiton holdings in Guinea through an ArcelorMittal-controlled rail link to Liberia’s
coast and achieve other business synergies, and Liberia’s government is in talks with Brazil’s Vale, which also owns
concessions in Guinea, regarding a possible iron ore deal. AmLib Holdings, a gold mining firm, owns a $200 million
concession. Recent large agricultural contracts include an $800 million palm oil concession deal with Sime Darby, and
a possible $1.6 billion palm oil with Golden Agri Resources; and two prospective rubber deals, with the Cavalla
Rubber Corporation ($75 million) and the Liberia Agricultural Company ($25 million). Liberia has also recently
entered into several oil exploration contracts worth a total of $60 million. Reuters, “Major Foreign and Local
Investments in Liberia,” May 4 2010; Boakai Fofana, “Liberia: Govt Secures Huge Investment in Palm Oil
Production,” December 1, 2009, AllAfrica.com; Eric Onstad and Philip Blenkinsop, “ArcelorMittal, BHP Discuss
Africa Iron Ore JV,” Reuters, January 19, 2010.
13
allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010.
14
For information on past U.S.-Liberian relations, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by (name re
dacted); and CRS Report RL30933,
Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, by
(name redacted).
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the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The war led to an extreme deterioration in
political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights conditions. It also affected neighboring
states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces. The Taylor
regime also sponsored or facilitated acts of armed aggression against its neighbors, Guinea, Sierra
Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire.15
A peace accord was signed on August 18, 2003, after months of international mediation. It was
facilitated by two events: Charles Taylor’s resignation of the presidency and departure from
Liberia on August 11, after he was granted political asylum in Nigeria; and the early August
deployment of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention
force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with extensive U.S. and U.N.
assistance, deployed to Liberia to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening humanitarian
crisis in the wake of a failed June 2003 cease-fire. It was tasked with monitoring and securing the
cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid, and preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL).
U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
UNMIL, first authorized by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on September 19, 2003, deployed
to Liberia on October 1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional Government of Liberia
(NTGL) took office on October 14. ECOMIL was dissolved and its military forces absorbed into
UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and socioeconomic assistance
functions in support of Liberia’s transition process. UNMIL provides a military guard force for
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed below, for which it assumed responsibility from the
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), upon UNMIL’s termination in late 2005. U.S.
funding for UNMIL is covered in Table 3.
Current Strength
UNMIL has a current authorized force strength of 14,875 military personnel and 1,240 police. As
of late April 2010, it had a total force strength of 9,644, made up of individual police (449 in
total, 12.9% female); formed police units (845 in total, 16.2% female); military observers (124 in
total, 5.6% female); and contingent military troops (8,226, 1.8% female). As of late April 2010,
U.S. personnel deployed with UNMIL included 10 individual police, 3 military observers, and 5
contingent troops.
Drawdown
A gradual, phased drawdown of the UNMIL force, guided by progress in implementing a series of
benchmarks set out by the Security Council and initiated by a UNSC decision to repatriate 1,000
troops in 2006, is continuing. The benchmarks were first proposed in by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (UNSG) in 2006 (S/2006/159, March 14, 2006), in response to a September 2005
Security Council request for an UNMIL force drawdown plan, to include specific benchmarks
15
This report focuses on current issues and recent events. CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, and
CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, both by (name re
dacted), provide in-depth background on events in Liberia during recent decades, and on the presidential tenure of
Charles Taylor.
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Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance
and a schedule for achieving that end. The UNSG found that it was “too early for a major
drawdown of UNMIL.” He called, instead, for a two-year “consolidation period” during which
UNMIL would implement an “adjusted mandate” defined by an 11-point agenda of “priority
tasks.” These centered on achieving such objectives as maintenance of a stable and secure
environment; completion of ex-combatant, refugees, and internally displaced persons
reintegration; security sector reform; and consolidation of state authority and governance
capacity.
Notwithstanding a need to complete these tasks, he proposed that “in the absence of an immediate
armed threat within Liberia,” the military component of UNMIL be reduced by one infantry
battalion in mid-2006 and another infantry battalion in early 2007, and that a drawdown of the
Mission, beginning in early 2007, security conditions permitting, ensue.
By mid-March 2007, the United Nations
was reporting significant progress in
meeting key benchmarks, including with
For the sake of brevity, the full titles of U.N. documents,
respect to police and military training,
which are often accompanied by extensive sub-titles and
restructuring and reform; management of
meeting session data, are—with some exceptions—not
natural resources; and the creation of a
employed in this report. Instead, the U.N. agency source of
national security strategy and architecture—
such documents is given, followed by the item’s U.N.
though each of these activities faced often
document symbol and date of release, except with respect
to Security Council documents, for which only the
considerable challenges. Progress toward
document symbol and date are given. Security Council
ex-combatant reintegration and the
documents can be readily be identified by their distinct
consolidation of state authority was slower
document numbers, which always begin with the symbol
than planned, however, largely due to
“S/.” In this report, these primarily include periodic reports
resource constraints. Due to these and
on UNMIL by the U.N. Secretary-General, Security Council
Resolutions, and statements by the President of the Security
diverse other reconstruction and
Council The Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
development challenges, and
the United Nations Mission in Liberia, with the U.N. document
notwithstanding areas of progress, in March
symbol S/2006/159, and dated March 14, 2006, for instance,
2007 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
would be cited as S/2006/159, March 14, 2006. The full text
and title of all U.N. documents cited in this report can be
citing what he called “limited progress
found online using the U.N. document symbol search box of
made in meeting the benchmarks for the
the U.N. Official Document System (ODS),
consolidation and drawdown of the
http://documents.un.org.
Mission,” recommended a year-long
extension of the UNMIL’s existing
16
mandate. Assessments of and adjustments to these and a range of subsequent benchmarks, along
with two associated, phased UNMIL force repatriations, have since continued. 17
Note on United Nations Documents and
Usage in this Report
On September 15, 2009, the Security Council passed Resolution 1885 (S/RES/1885), authorizing
a third-phase drawdown, to take place between October 2009 and May 2010. It involves the
repatriation of 2,029 military personnel, 3 attack helicopters, and 72 armored personnel carriers.
Upon completion of this process, UNMIL’s force will include 8,202 military personnel (including
7,952 troops in Liberia and 250 at the Special Court for Sierra Leone), while the UNMIL police
16
S/2007/151, March 15, 2007.
17
On benchmarks, see S/2007/479, August 8, 2007; S/2008/183, March 19, 2008; and S/2009/86, February
10, 2009.
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component will include about 1,344 personnel (465 police advisers, 843 officers in seven formed
police units, 23 corrections officers, and 13 immigration officers).18
Resolution 1885 also reauthorized UNMIL’s
Liberia at a Glance19
mandate through September 30, 2010, and
Geography: Small tropical coastal West African country
ordered that the post-May 2010 UNMIL force
about the size of Virginia
size be maintained until the completion of
Population: 3.4 million (2009)
presidential and legislative elections in late
2011, which it authorized UNMIL to assist in
Ann. population growth rate: 2.67% (2009)
administering. It also permitted UNMIL to
Exchange rate adjusted Gross National Income
reinforce the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(GNI) total: $634.4 million (2008)
(UNOCI) on a contingency basis, if needed
GNI per capita: $170 (2008)
during anticipated elections in Côte d’Ivoire,
External debt: $1.7 billion (2010 )
or vice versa, should the security situation in
Liberia deteriorate. The resolution called the
Key exports: Rubber, timber, iron, cocoa, gold, coffee,
diamonds. Value: $254 million, of which $225 million or
“conduct of free and fair, conflict-free
88.6% of rubber (2008, IMF); and $160 millioin, of which
elections ... a core benchmark for UNMIL’s
$94 million, or 58.8% of rubber (2009 proj.)
future drawdown,” among others, such as the
Languages: English & 29 distinct local languages
further development of “national security and
rule of law institutions that are fully
Ethnic groups: 16 indigenous groups, 95%; and freed
slave descendants from the Americas, 5%
independently operational.” It also requested
that UNMIL submit to the Security Council, in Religions: Christian, 85.6; Muslim, 12.2; Traditional
collaboration with the Liberian government, a
beliefs, 0.6; Other/no Religion, 1.7 (LC). Note: Many
observers view Liberian adherents of world religions as
strategic plan aimed at integrating and
often being heavily influenced by traditional beliefs.
consolidating post-conflict peace-building,
stability, and development efforts in Liberia.
Literacy: Women, 40.8%-46.3%; Men, 65.5%-70.3%
In the meantime, the Security Council remains
Infant and under-5 mortality rate, respectively: 93
cautious about the extent of Liberia’s post-war
and 132 deaths/1,000 live births (2007)
evolution. In passing Resolution 1903
HIV/AIDS adult infection rate: 1.5% (2007)
(December 17, 2009), which renews or alters a
range of Liberia-related sanctions, the Security Life expectancy, years at birth: National average.
41.84 (ave.); Male, 40.71; Female, 43 (2009)
Council declared that “despite significant
progress having been made in Liberia, the
situation there continues to constitute a threat
to international peace and security in the region.”
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
UNMIL has implemented measures to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish acts of sexual
exploitation and abuse (SEA), in line with recent reforms and renewed U.N.-wide regulations
regarding sexual conduct, following abuses in several U.N. peacekeeping missions around the
world, including in Liberia. U.N. Resolution 1626 (2005) bars SEA, and UNMIL has created a
mission conduct and discipline team and investigatory capacity to ensure adherence to these
18
See S/RES/1885, September 15, 2009; and S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
19
Text Box Sources: CIA World Factbook 2009; World Bank World Development Indicators; International Monetary
Fund press release, April 2010; Liberian 2008 Census; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Ethnologue.com; and
Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007; IMF Country Report No. 09/332, December 2009; and UNAIDS.
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rules. 20 In mid-March 2006, five crew members of a UN contractor, who had been under
investigation for alleged rapes and the assault of Liberian police officers, left Liberia after being
released on bond. According to UNMIL, their departure was “highly regretted and the matter is
being brought to the attention of the authorities of the country concerned.”21 There were
reportedly 12 alleged SEA incidents reported between January 1, 2009, and August 31, 2009, and
six such allegations in the period between August 10, 2009, and February 1, 2010.22
Transition Process
The August 30, 2003, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the three warring
factions and 18 political parties, laid out a peace process, provided for the creation of the National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and allocated leadership positions within it.23 The
NTGL was mandated to reestablish functioning government authority and prepare for national
elections that were held in mid-October and November 2005. The elected government of
President Sirleaf replaced the NTGL in late January 2006, as described below. The NTGL
consisted of an executive branch, presided over by a chairman, Gyude Bryant, and an interim
parliament, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. Bryant, a businessman and church
layman who led the Liberian Action Party, oversaw the functions of the central government and
various public corporations, agencies, and commissions. Bryant was given the title of NTGL
“chairman” to differentiate his unelected NTGL role and authority from that of a constitutionally
elected president. The transition faced many challenges, most related to the extremely destructive
effects of many years of war in Liberia. Others included the dominant role within the NTGL of
the three former armed factions, which were prone to internal rivalries; political discord over the
allocation of state positions and resources; very limited state capacities; and reported public
sector corruption.
2005 Post-War Elections
Peaceful Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential elections were held on October 11,
2005, and a presidential runoff vote was held on November 8. The 22-candidate presidential poll
led to a runoff race. It pitted George Manneh “Oppong” Weah, 39 years of age, a former
professional top soccer player whose star status and rags-to-riches history make him a hero to
Liberian youth, against Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, then 67 years of age, a Harvard-trained economist
and former businesswoman who had served as Liberian finance minister and as a United Nations
and World Bank official. On November 15, 2005, the National Elections Commission (NEC)
20
Between January 1, 2004 and June 8, 2006, 17 UNMIL military personnel were repatriated to their home countries
for probable SEA crimes; two UNMIL civilians were dismissed or faced a non-renewal of their contract; three UNMIL
civilians were suspended; and investigations cleared 13 UNMIL military personnel and three UNMIL civilian police.
State Department compilation.
21
See UNMIL, “Statement on the Departure from Liberia of Five Crew Members, Employees of a UN Contractor,”
March 14, 2006.
22
It was not clear, based on information available to CRS as of the date of this report, how much overlap there may
have been in the number of cases reported during these two overlapping periods. State Department compilation of U.N.
Office of Internal Oversight Services data covering the period January 1, 2009 through August 31, 2009; and UNSC,
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
23
CPA text available from U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html.
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declared Sirleaf the winner of the presidential race, with 59.4% of votes against Weah’s 40.6%,
making her the first-ever female president of an African country. Despite its declaration in favor
of Sirleaf, the NEC subsequently probed and later rejected claims by Weah that the election was
fraudulent. A presidential election will next be held in 2011.
In contrast to the presidential race, election results for seats in the bicameral legislature were
disparate; no party received more than 24% of seats in either chamber, and none dominated in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The largest party in the 64-member House, in
which members serve six-year terms, is Weah’s Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), which
won 15 seats. The Liberty Party (LP) won nine House seats, while Sirleaf’s Unity Party (UP) and
the Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) each won eight. Seven other parties each
won between one and five House seats, and seven independent candidates each won a seat. In the
30-seat Senate, in which members normally serve nine-year terms,24 COTOL won seven seats and
the UP won four; all other parties won between one and three seats.25 Political party mergers in
2009 and 2010, discussed below, have changed the allocation of seats among parties.
Notable among the newly elected legislators were several former Taylor regime officials and
leaders of former armed factions or security services. These include senators Jewel HowardTaylor, a former wife of Charles Taylor (NPP; Bong County); Prince Yormie Johnson
(independent, Bong County); and Saye-Taayor Adolphus Dolo (COTOL, Nimba County).
Johnson is the former leader of a faction that splintered from Taylor’s early in the first civil war,
and is infamous for personally presiding over the bloody, videotaped murder of former head of
state Samuel Doe. He returned to run in the election from exile in Nigeria, where he had
professed to have become a born-again Christian evangelist. Dolo is a former pro-Taylor militia
leader, known by the nom de guerre General Peanut Butter, who reportedly committed war-time
atrocities and recruited child fighters, and who is said to have aggressively opposed UNMIL
peacekeeping activities. In the House, they include Edwin Snowe (independent, Montserrado
County); Saah Richard Gbollie (NPP, Margibi County); and Kai G. “White Flower B-50” Farley,
(CDC, Grand Gedeh County). Snowe, who was elected speaker of the House in mid-January
2006 but has since stepped down, is a former Taylor in-law. He is also the former head of the
Liberian Petroleum and Refining Corporation (LPRC), from which Taylor regime officials
reportedly diverted significant amounts of funds, some of which may have benefitted Taylor
during his exile in Nigeria.26 Gbollie is a former Taylor fighter and Taylor administration police
official accused of human rights abuses. Farley is an ex-MODEL commander and NTGL official
accused of threatening the 2003 peace accord. Jewel Taylor, Dolo, Snowe, and Farley are subject
to U.N. travel sanctions.
24
Current junior senators, those who obtained the second highest number of votes in the 2005 elections, will serve a
six-year term. Thereafter, all senators will serve nine year terms.
25
Full election results are available from the NEC at http://www.necliberia.org/results.
26
Coalition for International Justice, Following Taylor’s Money: A Path of War and Destruction, May 2005.
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Table 1. 2005 Election: Legislative Results by Party
(Seats and percentage of vote won)
Senate
Party
House
Seatsa
Vote (%)
Seatsa
Vote (%)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3
10
15
23.4
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
7
23.3
8
12.5
Liberty Party (LP)
3
10
9
14.1
Unity Party (UP)
4
13.3
8
12.5
Independent
3
10
7
10.9
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
3
10
5
7.8
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
3
10
4
6.3
All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
1
3.3
2
3.1
Nation Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
2
6.7
1
1.6
New Deal Movement (NDM)
-
-
3
4.7
National Reformation Party (NRP)
1
3.3
1
1.6
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
-
-
1
1.6
Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia, 2005 Election Results, available at http://www.necliberia.org/
results.
a.
This data reflects the 2005 electoral results. Political party mergers in 2009 and 2010, discussed below, have
since changed the allocation of seats among parties.
Conduct of Elections27
With some mostly minor exceptions, the election was reportedly well-administered. About 1.35
million citizens registered to vote in April and May 2005, in a process that was marred by some
minor acts and threats of violence and localized disruptions but was generally peaceful. Attempts
by some NTGL ministers to try to run for office in the 2005 election, in violation of the CPA, also
sparked controversy. About 1.012 million registered voters (74.9%) participated in the October 11
Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential elections, and over 821,000 (60.7%) voted in
the November 8 presidential runoff poll. Results from voter registrations at 2,000 sites guided
decision making about the composition of constituencies, the placement of about 2,900 polling
places, and the distribution of voter education and polling materials. The large number of
presidential candidates (over 50 initially, of whom 22 were ultimately registered) and registered
political parties (30) reportedly proved confusing for some voters. Key election issues included
national reconciliation and unity, corruption, jobs, general economic growth, and social services
and physical infrastructure needs. Polling on both elections dates was peaceful.28
27
Various periodic UNSG progress reports on UNMIL; State Department information, both published and provided to
CRS; and NEC data. The author of this section served as an election observer. In the county where he monitored the
voting process, the election was well-run. Poll workers appeared well trained; voting equipment and materials were
distributed on time and in sufficient quantity; and voting was peaceful and voter turnout rates high.
28
Various periodic UNSG progress reports on UNMIL; and information provided to CRS by USAID.
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U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) elections staff and U.N. agencies provided extensive support
to the NEC and other relevant agencies involved in such activities as media outreach and civic
education, technical elections tasks, and electoral security coordination, as called for under the
CPA. UNMIL aid for the elections reportedly totaled about $8 million, and the European Union
pledged $1 million. Most of $10 million in U.S. elections assistance supported the programs of
the nonprofit democracy strengthening organizations International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), elections technical assistance; National Democratic Institute (NDI), civic
education); and International Republican Institute (IRI), political party training. IRI and NDI, the
latter jointly with the Carter Center, deployed teams to monitor the elections, as did the African
and European Unions, the U.S. and many other governments, and international organizations. 29
The vote was monitored by at least 29 international organizations or governmental entities (369
individuals), as well as 52 civil society groups (over 3,500 individuals) and a roughly equal
number of party observers; and 246 local journalists.
2005 Election Dispute
Weah, who had claimed to have been cheated in the first round, contested his loss in the second
round and called for a re-run of the vote. He pursued his claim though a number of formal
channels, but after the NEC dismissed his claim, after meeting with Sirleaf, and under heavy
international pressure, in late December 2005 he agreed to drop his claim and accept the poll
results. Many observers doubted that systematic or large-scale fraud had marred the election. U.S.
officials viewed the process as having been orderly, largely well-administered, and free and fair,
and such views were shared by most other governments and international entities that observed
the vote. The United States nevertheless called for a probe of Weah’s claims and for any contest
of results to be carried out peacefully and through established legal channels.
Subsequent Elections30
In late 2009, a by-election—the fifth to be conducted after the 2005 election—was held to fill a
vacancy for the Montserrado County Senate seat created by an incumbent’s death. None of 10
participating candidates, five independents and five from political parties, won the 51% of votes
necessary to win the election outright. This outcome triggered a run-off election between the top
two vote winners, a candidate from President Sirleaf’s Unity Party and one from the Congress for
Democratic Change (CDC), the largest opposition party. The CDC candidate emerged as the
victor during the run-off, garnering 56% of votes cast against 46% for the UP candidate. Although
the election reportedly featured a low voter turn-out (20% during the first round and 22.4%
during the run-off), nearly half of Liberia’s electorate was eligible to participate in it, given that
Montserrado is the urban county surrounding Monrovia, where about half of Liberia’s population
lives. As a result, the election was viewed as a dry-run of the ability National Elections
Commission (NEC) to conduct a large election ahead of national elections in 2011.
29
For an assessment of these and subsequent USAID-administered elections and participatory democracystrengthening work, see USAID/Liberia, Liberia Elections and Political Processes Program Evaluation, Final Report,
November 2008.
30
NEC, Statement by Hon. James M. Fromayan, Chairman of the National Elections Commission (NEC) on the
Occasion of the Announcement of the Final Results of the Montserrado County Senatorial By-election Run-Off,
November 26, 2009; IFES-Liberia, “Briefing Note on Liberia’s Successful Senatorial By-election,” December 4, 2009;
and IFES, “IFES Returns to Work with Liberia’s National Elections Commission,” October 7, 2009.
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According to IFES, an electoral capacity-building non-governmental organization that is working
with the NEC, the “process was seen as void of fraud and recognized as free, fair and
transparent.” IFES also reported that conduct of the “first round saw some logistical and
operational challenges,” but “the second round was vastly improved,” and the NEC’s
performance was widely lauded by local election stakeholders and international observers. IFES
is providing technical and financial support to the NEC under a five-year U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID)-supported project called Building Sustainable Election
Management in Liberia. IFES supported the Montserrado by-election by providing the NEC with
election administration materials and technical assistance.31
Sirleaf Government
Policy Agenda
President Sirleaf took office on January 16, 2006, and shortly thereafter nominated a cabinet seen
as dominated by technocrats, professionals, and former opposition or policy activists. In her
inaugural address, she laid out a detailed governance agenda, and launched her tenure with a
series of actions to counter corruption. Sirleaf highlighted what she pledged would be “a new era
of democracy” defined by political inclusion and toleration, non-violence, and safeguarding and
promotion of constitutional and civil liberties and rights. She stressed the need for national
reconciliation as an “urgent” and “compelling” task facing her administration. During the first
150 days of her tenure, in coordination with donors, her government also pursued diverse rapid
impact projects aimed at showing “quick and visible progress.” These were grouped under four
(initially five) “major pillars”: Security; Economic Revitalization; Basic Services and
Infrastructure; and Good Governance. The same pillars continue to define her administration’s
medium- to long-term development efforts. These are spearheaded by an entity called the Liberia
Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), which is composed of four working
committees, each of which supports a separate “pillar.”
Economic Renewal
Sirleaf is pursuing an economic agenda emphasizing the creation of an investment-friendly
climate; the exploitation of Liberia’s rich natural resources; land tenure reform focused on
increasing agricultural production; job creation, notably for youths; and expanded economic and
social infrastructure rehabilitation, particularly in historically economically marginalized areas.
The Sirleaf administration has consistently emphasized the importance of laying the groundwork
for sustained economic growth and job creation. The latter is viewed as key by many observers,
both because formal sector unemployment rates are reportedly high and because unemployment is
a potential source of instability. 32 The economic and educational disenfranchisement of Liberia’s
31
IFES’s $17.5 million project, which runs through 2014, seeks to support the NEC’s elections administration
capabilities and will support its activities as they relate to the 2011 general election, a planned constitutional
referendum, local elections, and any by-elections. Key activities center on boundary delimitation, voter registration
processes, civic and voter education, notably at the community level, and making the NEC’s capacity to undertake its
mandate autonomously in the absence of donor assistance, notably through the provision of technical assistance and
training. IFES, Building Sustainable Elections Management in Liberia, n.d. (current as of late April 2010).
32
Post-war unemployment was often cited in U.N. documents and reports by diverse private research organizations as
standing between 80% and 85%. In late 2007, President Sirleaf stated that previous reports that the unemployment rate
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large youth population is viewed as having fueled Liberia’s armed conflicts, and joblessness is a
continuing source of popular dissatisfaction. In mid-2007, the United Nations reported that the
majority of ex-combatants remained unemployed and that thousands had regrouped in order to
illegally exploit diamonds, gold, and plantation-grown rubber.
Governance
Sirleaf has vowed to take forceful action against corruption, including by requiring all key
officials to declare their assets and follow a national code of conduct. She strongly endorsed and
promised to “enforce” the Governance and Economic Management Program (GEMAP, discussed
below) to deal with “serious economic and financial management deficiencies” and pursue an
“integrated capacity building initiative.” She also vowed to overhaul the “seriously bloated” civil
service, while noting that civil servant pay was poor and in arrears.33 She promised to
institutionalize a meritocratic, performance-based civil service system.
Foreign Policy
Sirleaf declared economic private sector-focused regional integration and security cooperation to
be her guiding foreign policy goal. She vowed to maintain strong international bilateral and
multilateral partnerships. Notably, given recent regional history, she stated that “no inch of
Liberian soil will be used to conspire to perpetrate aggression” against neighboring countries.34
Her government has also shown itself to be open to new foreign ties. Liberia now has diplomatic
relations with Cuba, and it established bilateral relations with China in late 2003, after the
departure from power of President Taylor, who had maintained relations with Taiwan.35
Women
Paying homage to what she said were the special efforts of women in securing her election and
the peace that made it possible—even in the face of war-related “inhumanity,” “terror,” military
conscription, forced labor, and rape—Sirleaf vowed in her inaugural address to “empower
Liberian women in all areas.” She pledged to strengthen laws and law enforcement to protect
women against rape, support the education of children, notably of girls, and to provide programs
to enable women to play a key role in the economic revitalization process.36 Sirleaf has
nominated women to head multiple key ministries and public agencies.
(...continued)
stood at 85% were exaggerated. A 2007 study funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
several U.N. donors, and the Liberian government and undertaken by several Liberian government agencies with with
technical assistance from Macro International Inc. reported a national unemployment rate of 26.5%, 34.2% for women
and 18.8% for men. See Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007, June 2008.
33
President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address of H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, January 16, 2006.
34
President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address, op cit.
35
On China’s diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Overall Developments and Policy
Issues in the 109th Congress.
36
President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address, op cit. According to UNMIL media summaries, local Liberian media reported
that a Liberian women’s group demanded the establishment of a special expedited rape cases court during a late June
2006 public demonstration. See also Katharine Houreld, “Liberia’s Women Fight Back,” Mail & Guardian, June 2,
2006.
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Corruption
Upon taking office, Sirleaf announced an audit of the previous transitional government and
dismissed all transitional government political appointees. She also laid off the entire staff of the
Finance Ministry, pending a screening of employees’ qualifications and level of probity. In
February 2006, she revoked all existing timber concession contracts, which had been widely
criticized for being let in a corrupt fashion and for being executed in an environmentally
unsustainable manner. This action provided the basis, in part, for the U.N. Security Council’s
June 2006 lifting of a ban on Liberian timber exports. Sirleaf later initiated reviews of other
contracts and concession deals granted by the transitional government. In early June 2006, she
fired three sub-cabinet level officials and several mid-level civil servants accused of corruption.
Her administration has also publicly released audit reports of several state agencies.
Performance
In mid-April 2006, in a document entitled 150 Day Action Plan: A Working Document for a New
Liberia, the Sirleaf administration laid out a detailed status report on short-term, quick impact
policy and project implementation efforts and achievements to date. 37 The document, which was
aimed both at increasing government transparency and proving her administration’s adherence to
Sirleaf’s campaign and inaugural pledges, demonstrated that most of her plans were being
implemented in a timely manner. The Executive Mansion, the equivalent of the U.S. White
House, also releases similar documents pertaining to ongoing LRDC activities. Sirleaf has faced
challenges in meeting high voter expectations, for instance, in relation to her election promise to
provide public electricity in Monrovia within six months of being elected, despite the complexity
and great cost of that undertaking. Many voters appeared to have given the new government a
honeymoon period, although expectations remained high following what many saw as
disappointing performance by the transitional government. The public remains eager to see rapid
job growth and rapid improvements in social services and the construction of physical
infrastructure, particularly in support of education, healthcare, and transportation.
In various public comments, Sirleaf has assured Liberians that her government is successfully
continuing to build the groundwork for sustained growth, but has counseled Liberians to be
patient, since many ongoing investments in infrastructure, basic services capacity building, and
foreign investment business projects will take time to generate jobs and incomes. Several road
building projects are currently underway, and the government is examining options for large-scale
electricity generation and long-distance power transmission. Despite the fact that such projects,
which are largely donor-financed, may not generate general economic growth for some time,
Liberia’s economy is growing rapidly. In December 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
reported estimates and projections showing a sharp jump in Liberia’s gross domestic product,
from 5.3% in 2005, to 7.8% in 2006, to 8.5% in 2007, with rates of 9.5% and 11% projected for
2008 and 2009, respectively.38 In March 2008, Liberia is expected to publish a Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP), which expected to guide economic policy and provide the basis an
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a credit and technical assistance
37
Available from PeaceAfrica, a project of the AllAfrica Foundation; see http://allAfrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/
view/00010785.pdf.
38
EIU, Country Report/Liberia, December 2007.
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program for 2008-2010, as well as ongoing cooperation with the World Bank. Liberia is also in
the process of awarding offshore oil exploration contracts.
President Sirleaf has also been an active participant in African Union activities, sometimes taking
stances at odds with other African leaders (e.g., overtly criticizing the June 2008 elections in
Zimbabwe as “not credible” and urging the AU to “declare the results unacceptable”) as well as
those of ECOWAS and the Mano River Union (MRU). 39 She has been particularly been involved
in efforts to strengthen the MRU and in efforts to resolve the political crisis in neighboring
Guinea.40
Sirleaf Administration: Criticisms and Challenges
The general public largely gave Sirleaf a political honeymoon in her first years in office, but she
has since been the target of some criticism, both of a routine political nature by opposition parties
(including Taylor supporters upset by his SCSL trial) and by some human rights and transparency
policy advocates. Although many Liberians and international human rights advocates have
praised Sirleaf’s strongly stated support for such rights and the rule of law, some criticized her
nomination of Kabineh Janneh as a Supreme Court Justice, who was later confirmed in the post.41
Her administration had also been criticized for not creating an Independent National Commission
for Human Rights (INCHR), an institution called for under the 2003 peace agreement. In June
2009, however, the president ratified an amended act passed by the legislature in May 2009, and
in mid-August 2009 forwarded to the Senate seven INCHR nominees. Criticism has since shifted
to the Senate for failing to confirm the nominees.42
In 2006, there were several reports of assaults or harassment of journalists by members of the
Special Security Service (SSS), a Liberian executive branch security agency, and by regular
police. In response, the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) threatened to launch a “news black-out” of
coverage of the government. President Sirleaf reportedly responded to the allegations by stating
that “those who violate the rights of the Liberian people or journalists for that matter will be dealt
with and punished appropriately” and that her “government will not tolerate violation of the rights
of people, including journalists.”43 Information Minister Johnny McClain also met with the PUL
and reemphasized that the Sirleaf administration “is committed to press freedom and that there is
39
Liberian Government, “Liberia: President Sirleaf Urges African Union to Denounce Zimbabwe Election Results,”
July 2, 2008. The MRU is a sub-regional body, originally an economic development entity that later became a forum
for political crisis interventions and dialogue, made up of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, which Cote d'Ivoire
agreed to join in 2008 during a visit by President Johnson-Sirleaf.
40
On Guinea, see CRS Report R41200, Guinea’s New Transitional Government: Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy, by
(name redacted) and CRS Report R40703,
Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by (name redacted)
and (name redacted).
41
Janneh was the transitional government’s justice minister and is a former leading member of the LURD rebel group.
Critics see Janneh as responsible, in part, for violence committed by LURD fighters against civilians during the
Liberian war and view his nomination as counter to the goals and spirit of the TRC. Michael Kpayili, “Liberia: Liberian
Senate Confirms Kabineh Jan’eh As Associate Supreme Court Justice,” The Liberian Times, May 9, 2006.
42
The Analyst, “Gov't Reconstitutes Human Rights Commission,” August 18, 2009; Executive Mansion,
“Commissioners of Independent Human Rights Commission Named,” August 18, 2009; and International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “Liberia: Delay of Human Rights Commission Undermines Human Rights and
Accountability,” February 19, 2010.
43
The Analyst (Monrovia), “Liberia: President Promises to Probe Manhandling of Journalists,” June 19, 2006.
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a standing policy of respect and cordiality toward the press.”44 The international press rights
advocacy organization Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) stated in an open letter to President
Sirleaf that it was “troubled” by the alleged attacks on the press and that “despite an Information
Ministry statement [ ... ] affirming the government’s commitment to press freedom, there has
been no evidence of an investigation into these incidents nor any public effort to punish those
responsible.” The CPJ also stated in an open letter to President Sirleaf that
While there is no evidence that these incidents are the result of government policy, your
administration has a responsibility to restrain security forces from attacking or harassing
journalists who are trying to do their jobs. As an organization of journalists dedicated to
defending the rights of our colleagues worldwide, CPJ respectfully urges you to make good
on your pledges to uphold press freedom by ensuring a prompt and transparent investigation
into these cases.45
Some critics have alleged that the Sirleaf government, like its predecessors, is corrupt, but the
Sirleaf Administration rejects such accusations, citing its record of anti-corruption actions.46
Given the historically embedded presence of public sector corruption in Liberia, the government’
approach to addressing the problem combines a continuing series of law enforcement actions,
institutional reforms, and education and training programs. It may, however, face difficulties in
prosecuting indictments, given the limited capacity of Liberia. Another challenge is to ensure that
it pursues enforcement actions in a professional and apolitical manner, as recent Liberian history
has been marked by the use of corruption prosecutions as a tool for achieving political retribution.
The Liberian government under the Sirleaf Administration has recorded a number of successes in
fighting corruption, but it remains a key, abiding challenge, as President Sirleaf has publicly
acknowledged on many occasions. During her May 2010 visit to the United States, she described
corruption in Liberia as a “systemic” and “societal” phenomenon attributable to a decades-long,
entrenched
value system which could be characterized as one of dependency and dishonesty ... [and as] a
means of survival for many of the people who did not have jobs, were conscripted into
warring factions, who had no skills and had never been to school ... [and] were placed into
the civil service.47
In late August 2008, President Sirleaf signed into law a bill establishing a Liberia Anti-Corruption
Commission (LACC). In September 2008, she appointed as its chair Frances Johnson Morris, a
former minister of Justice and Commerce and the former head of the National Elections
Commission, and a Sirleaf relative. 48 Her Administration has also highlighted reported progress in
44
James Butty, “Liberian Media Reports Government Harassment of Press,” VOA, June 16, 2006; CPJ, “Liberia:
Journalist Assaulted by Security Forces,” May 24, 2006; and CPJ, “Liberia: Sports Editor Assaulted,” March 10, 2006,
among others.
45
Ann Cooper, Exec. Dir, “Liberia: CPJ Urges President to Probe Attacks on Press [open letter],” CPJ, June 16, 2006.
46
See Tristan McConnell, “Persistent Corruption Threatens Liberian stability,” Christian Science Monitor, September
25, 2008; and FrontpageAfrica.com, “Liberian Govt. Responds to ‘Persistent Corruption Threatens Stability’,” January
10, 2008 [response to McConnell article published on third party website by Dr. Laurence Bropleh, Minister of
Information, Culture & Tourism and Chief Spokesperson].
47
allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010.
48
The Inquirer (Monrovia), “Liberia: Ellen Signs Anti-Corruption Act, Commissions Several Officials,” via
AllAfrica.com, August 26, 2008; Nana Adu Ampofo, “Liberian President Signs Anti-Corruption Commission Act into
Law,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 27, 2008; Africa Confidential, Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, May
(continued...)
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fighting corruption, for instance by citing the country’s rapid positive progress as measured by the
World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.49 The government as also strongly
supported the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) and the
Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI), both discussed below. A
government Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) is also pursuing a range
of efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in government purchases and contracts.
Sirleaf has also highlighted increased public sector compensation and ongoing capacity-building
in the judicial sector, particularly with respect to increasing the prosecution of corruption-related
crime, as key to furthering her Administration’s efforts to combat corruption. 50
Despite such efforts, some Sirleaf Administration officials have periodically been accused of
corruption. In September 2008, President Sirleaf appointed a special seven-member independent
corruption commission, the so-called Dunn Commission, named after its chair, Dr. D. Elwood
Dunn. It was charged with investigating allegations that certain current and former Sirleaf
Administration officials had received contract renewal bribes from the U.S. head of the Liberian
International Ship Corporate Registry (LISCR) aimed at preventing a competitive bid for the
work, as well as allegations of other corrupt actions, in several cases associated with former
Acting State and Presidential Affairs Minister, Willis Knuckles. The Administration also faced
allegations that it had attempted to cover up the issue by bribing journalists not to report the
story.51 The Commission, which hired the James Mintz Group as an expert technical investigator,
issued a public report of its findings in January 2009.52
There have also been a series of other cases of apparent actual or alleged corruption involving top
officials, in many cases uncovered by investigations by the independent General Auditing
Commission (GAC). Led by Auditor-General, John Morlu, who has publicly criticized the Sirleaf
Administration’s record on corruption, the GAC has released reports indicating several million
(...continued)
14, 2010; and Liberian Presidency, “Cllr. Frances Johnson Morris Appointed Head of Anti-Corruption Commission,”
September 1, 2008.
49
See “Liberia Shows Dramatic Improvement in Controlling Corruption,” document posted on Liberian presidential
website, no date (likely circa mid-2008).
50
allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010.
51
LISCR administers Liberia’s widely used flag of convenience ship registry, which under the Taylor regime was
alleged to have been a source of corruptly diverted funds. Prior to the allegations that led to the appointment of the
Dunn Commission, the Sirleaf Administration had faced a sex scandal associated with the Acting State and Presidential
Affairs Minister, Willis Knuckles, that was linked in the press to a corruption probe associated with the ouster of
former Liberian House Speaker, Edwin Melvin Snowe (see below). See Nana Adu Ampofo, “President Appoints
Special Corruption Commission in Liberia,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, September 4, 2008; Liberian Presidency,
“Executive Mansion Reacts to Purported Email Exchanges—Distances President Johnson Sirleaf,” August 24, 2008;
James Butty, “Under Pressure, Liberian Government Appoints Special Corruption Commission,” VOA, September 3,
2008; and Ugochukwu Ejinkeonye, “The Willis Knuckles Saga,” SaharaReporters.Com, March 7, 2007, among others.
52
Its findings were complex, due to the alleged nature of the allegations. In some cases, it refuted the allegations, while
in others it found partial or clear proof of wrong-doing. It found that there “were violations and breaches of Liberian
laws and policies by some” government officials, private individuals, and private businesses investigated, but was not
able to fully investigate all matters under its purview because some of its subjects refused to cooperate with the
Commission. See Report of the Ad-Hoc Independent Commission on the E-Mail Saga, January 7, 2009; and Liberian
presidency, “ECOWAS Summit on Guinea and Dunn Commission Report Take Center Stage at Press Conference,”
January 12, 2009.
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dollars worth of unaccounted spending within the Health, Education, Mines and Finance
ministries.53 Prominent cases involving key officials, among others, include
•
the suspension in October 2009, resignation in January 2010, and current
prosecution of the former information minister, Lawrence Bropleh, over
allegations of his involvement in a “ghost worker” fund diversion scheme;
•
a procurement irregularities case that led to the February 2010 resignation of the
then-internal affairs minister, Ambulai Johnson, Sirleaf’s brother, and questions
over the origins of his personal assets;
•
the September 2009 dismissal of Harry Greaves, a former Sirleaf advisor, as
managing director of the Liberian Petroleum Refinery Corporation (LPRC) over
a case involving Greaves’ alleged involvement in the allocation of a contract to a
firm in exchange for compensation more than double as large as the estimated
value of the contract by another bidder, and allegations of bribery pertaining to an
ensuing investigation of the contract award; and
•
the resignation in 2009 or removal of serving ministers, including Agriculture
Minister Christopher Toe, Public Works Minister Luseni Donzo, and Justice
Minister Philip Banks, in cases involving alleged fiscal mismanagement,
administrative irregularities, or other matters, and there have been allegations of
mismanagement and possible corruption regarding the administration of county
development funds, of which, as a result, the presidency has taken control. 54
Security Issues
Security Conditions
Liberia’s security situation has improved markedly since August 2003. It is currently “generally
stable, but fragile,” and is subject to periodic volatility and localized instability.55 Public security
and police authority are formally entrusted to the Liberia National Police (LNP), who are advised
and supported by UNMIL civilian police (CIVPOL). LNP patrols in the capital reportedly
increased in the latter half of 2009, leading to a marked decrease in armed robbery, but rates some
other serious crimes, including rape, notably of juvenile females, have remained high.56
Despite increasing LNP capacity, the LNP continues to face serious challenges, and the public
often perceives public security as being guaranteed by UNMIL CIVPOL, who earlier during
UNMIL’s deployment played more direct roles in ensuring that end. The LNP is reportedly
making progress in building up its capabilities, but reportedly remains beset by operational
deficits and absenteeism, has a limited presence and mobility in many rural areas, and some LNP
53
Africa Confidential, “Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, “ May 14, 2010; and GAC, multiple documents available
from GAC website, http://www.gacliberia.com/.
54
Africa Confidential, “Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, “ May 14, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Report Liberia, March 2010; Agence France Presse, “Liberia’s Agriculture Minister Resigns Amid Caterpillar Crisis,”
April 5, 2009; and The Analyst, “Sirleaf Draws the Dagger,” September 9, 2009.
55
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
56
S/2008/88, February 17, 2010.
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members reportedly engage in acts of bribery. In addition, the capacity of the judicial sector
remains limited, and public confidence in the judicial system is low; according to the State
Department, the “Liberian public views the police and other formal justice institutions with fear,
skepticism, and mistrust.”57 There have also been clashes between police, other security agency
units, and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and. Some AFL members have reportedly violently
assaulted or robbed civilians. As a result of public mistrust in the capabilities and of the LNP,
other security agencies, and the judicial sector, vigilantism and periodic mob violence present
continuing problems.58
A key post-war source of instability in Liberia, former fighters associated with various armed
factions, was largely neutralized in the year after the August 2003 peace agreement was signed.
More than 101,000 ex-combatants (22% women and 10.8% children), were demobilized under a
disarmament program administered by UNMIL and the NTGL that ended in late 2004. Some
demobilized fighters remain a periodic source of sometimes violent protest, mostly related to the
status of generalized joblessness among ex-combatants and the demands of those who are owed
reintegration job training and subsistence assistance. A small minority of ex-combatants have
reportedly turned to crime, including armed robbery and the illegal exploitation of natural
resources.59
Public protests relating to severance and pension payments by former members of the Liberian
military and members of security services not included in demobilization programs have
generally subsided. Other public security threats include a wave of armed robbery in Monrovia,
which the government is attempting to suppress, and periodic civil unrest related to
socioeconomic grievances, predominantly involving students, workers, civil servants, and jobless
youth. Price increases for rice, fuel, and cement are also sources of public dissatisfaction. In her
annual address to the legislature in January 2008, Sirleaf stated that she would temporarily
suspend a $2 tax on bags of rice, the Liberian staple food, pending consideration of a legislative
tax reform proposal. Periodically, ritual-related killings by so-called “heartmen” provoke public
safety fears and sometimes mob violence against alleged perpetrators.60
Community-level property dispute conflicts have repeatedly occurred throughout Liberia, but
notably in Nimba County in northern Liberia between members of the Gio/Mano and Mandingo
57
State Department/International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau, Fiscal Year 2010 Program and
Budget Guide.
58
S/2008/88, February 17, 2010; S/2009/640, December 11, 2009; State Department, Liberia Country Specific
Information [Travel Information], August 10, 2009; and Magnus Jörgel and Mats Utas, The Mano River Basin Area:
Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Swedish Defence Research Agency,
2007.
59
In mid-2009, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that “many of the 14,000 deactivated Armed Forces of Liberia
soldiers also maintain viable command and control structures, which are utilized to organize recurrent, sometimes
violent, demonstrations to challenge the legality of their deactivation or demand benefit arrears owed by the
Government.” S/2009/299, June 10, 2009.
60
“Heartmen” is a Liberian English term for killers whose purpose is to remove various body organs for uses, including
consumption, in traditional occult ceremonies that participants believe bestow supernatural powers, allowing
beneficiaries to increase their personal wealth, power over others, and achieve other ends. Such practices, known as
gboyo in southeast Liberia, have been reported to increase during times of armed conflict, notably in situations in which
combatants have harvested organs from dead enemies in order to increase their chances of further military victory.
Analagous occult practices occur in some other African countries. New Dawn, “More Arrest in “Gbo-yo” Business,”
March 29, 2010; Christopher Melville, “Riots and Ritual Killings in South-Eastern Liberia Highlight Paradox of
Improving Security,” WMRC Daily Analysis, January 26, 2005; and Stephen Ellis, “Mystical Weapons: Some Evidence
from the Liberian War,” Journal of Religion in Africa, 31: 2, May, 2001, among others.
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ethnic groups. Contested claims over home and land occupancy and ownership rights are often at
the center of such disputes, which sometimes take on ethnic dimensions. Such disputes often have
origins in property occupations and appropriations that occurred as a result of war-time
population displacements and movements. Lack of land rights documentation, property fraud,
often involving state officials, and the absence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms have
aggravated such problems. A Presidential Commission created to probe such disputes in Nimba
County recommended that a process of community reconciliation and dispute resolution be
pursued, and President Sirleaf ordered that contested properties in Nimba be returned to their
legal owners. In addition, an act creating a national Land Commission charged with pursuing
reforms in land tenure and ownership policy, laws, and administration, in part to resolve and
prevent land conflicts, was signed into law in August 2009. The Commission, which was formed
in late 2009 and became operational in early 2010, has a five-year mandate. It is receiving
capacity-building assistance from the U.N. Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT).61
Political parties who lost in Liberia’s elections and the attendant realignment of Liberian political
forces remain a potential source of instability or violent acts. The family of a witness in the SCSL
trial of former president Charles Taylor (see “Taylor Trial”), for instance, was reportedly targeted
with death threats in early 2008. Prior to his capture, U.N. and U.S. officials and many Members
of Congress had been concerned about persistent, credible reports that Taylor had periodically
interfered in Liberian affairs from exile in Nigeria through a network of political, military, and
business associates, which Taylor denied. These alleged actions were seen as destabilizing and
threatening to the consolidation of peace (see section on Taylor below). There had been some
speculation that former Taylor administration officials would make large gains in the 2005
elections and that he would be able to use them as proxies to influence the new government.
There was no such general outcome, but several close Taylor associates were elected (see “2005
Post-War Elections”). In July 2007, George Koukou, the transitional government house speaker,
Charles Julu, a top military officer under former president Samuel Doe who was accused of
wartime human rights abuses, and several associates were arrested and charged with treason for
allegedly plotting the ouster of the Sirleaf government. They were acquitted, however, in May
2008.
Liberia remains under U.N. sanctions, which were first imposed to counter the Taylor regime’s
alleged regional destabilization efforts and other activities counter to international law and U.N.
policy goals. Under the current sanctions, individuals associated with the Taylor regime’s
activities remain subject to a U.N. travel ban and, in some cases, asset freezes. 62 Liberia also
remains subject to a partial arms embargo. 63 Bans on the export of Liberian timber and diamonds
61
Amos Sawyer, “Land Governance Challenges: The Case Of Liberia,” World Bank presentation, n.d./circa 2008; and
S/2009/640, December 11, 2009; Executive Mansion, “Special Land Commission Presents Report to Liberian
President,” May 24, 2009; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Liberia: Land Commission Act Approved,” July 24, 2009; and
UN-HABITAT, “A New Land Programme in Liberia, December 21, 2009.
62
These sanctions were first imposed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), which prohibited trade in
arms and diamonds with Liberia, and the travel of certain designated individuals, mostly members or associates of the
Taylor regime. Some of the listed individuals are also subject to financial asset freezes mandated by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1532 (2004).
63
Liberia remains under an arms embargo, with an exception for government purposes, although all arms transfers to
the government must occur under a Security Council notification and control regime; see Resolution 1903
(S/RES/1903, December 17, 2009). When the war ended in 2003, Liberia was subject to a general arms embargo, but
the Security Council gradually amended it to allow certain vetted and trained police and security forces to be trained
and armed, and for military training purposes. UNMIL regularly inspects government security force weapons armories;
see S/2009/290, June 5, 2009.
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have been lifted. The threat to Liberia from instability in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, which posed
a significant external threat to the stability of Liberia and to sub-regional security for several
years, according to United Nations reports, waned after the signing of a political accord in that
country.64 Widespread violent general strikes in neighboring Guinea in early 2007 and political
instability in Guinea in 2009, following a coup d’état in late 2008 after the death of thenPresident Lansana Conté, was also viewed as potential external threat to Liberia. The
appointment of a new transitional government in Guinea following the signing of an early 2010
accord, however, appears to have substantially lessened any threat to Liberia.65
Although there have been currently no specific publicly reported personal security threats against
President Sirleaf, the United States provided her with a personal State Department Diplomatic
Security team at the start of her tenure and supported training efforts for the Special Security
Service, Liberia’s presidential and VIP protection service; see below. An electrical fire in the
Executive Mansion in July 2006 during a visit by neighboring heads of state highlighted Liberia’s
general lack of emergency services. Firefighters from UNMIL, the Firestone rubber company, and
the international airport, the latter two based about 45 minutes out of the capital, were called in to
fight the blaze, since National Fire Service largely lacks the capacity to respond to fires in the
capital. That lack of capacity was again illustrated in August 2006, when the U.S. Navy’s Apache,
an ocean tug boat, helped to extinguish a fire on a commercial freighter in the Port of Monrovia,
and later rescued a fishing crew at sea. The Apache crew was in Monrovia to conduct repairs on
the city’s main commercial pier and survey the harbor. Following the Apache’s departure from
Liberia, marine safety experts from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) undertook an
assessment of Liberia’s search and rescue capabilities. 66
Rubber Sector Reform
Rubber has traditionally been a key source of state export revenues and employment in Liberia.
The presence, however, of ex-combatants on several rubber plantations, some armed, undermined
the industry’s post-war redevelopment. In the years after the 2003 peace agreement, rubber
workers and local residents near plantations reported that former fighters robbed them and
coerced them into selling rubber latex at sub-market prices, in the process earning revenues that
were reportedly not taxed.67 Ex-combatant control of plantations also reportedly resulted in
unsustainable harvesting practices, various human rights abuses, and environmental degradation.
To address this situation, in 2006 the government and armed UNMIL troops took possession of
Gutherie, a major rubber tree plantation in western Liberia, from former LURD ex-combatants
who had squatted on it, tapping rubber and in some cases controlling local rubber sales. Gutherie
was reportedly the site of forced child labor and diverse violent crimes against persons. The
repossession was one of the objectives of a joint government-U.N. task force created to make the
64
The accord is the Ouagadougou Political Agreement of March 2007, which lays out political and military
disarmament processes leading to elections, which have repeatedly been delayed.
65
For further information, see CRS Report R40703, Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by
(name redacted) and (name redacted).
66
Navy News Stand, “Navy Tug Fights Fire Aboard Freighter in Liberia,” August 11, 2006 and “Navy Tug Rescues
Liberian Fishermen,” August 16, 2006; U.S. Embassy-Monrovia, “U.S. Navy Tug Begins Repair Work in Liberian
Harbor,” August 10, 2006; and Karfa Jamanka, “Maritime Receives Assessment Team,” The Inquirer, September 22,
2006.
67
Marcus Malayea, “Gunmen Seize Cocopa, Claim Right of Inheritance,” The Analyst, August 18, 2006, among others.
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rubber industry transparent, environmentally sound and sustainable, subject to state governance
and regulation, and a source of legal jobs—including for the ex-combatants from whom control
of Gutherie was seized. UNMIL plans called for a similar seizure of another key ex-combatantoccupied rubber plantation in the southeast county of Sinoe, though ex-combatants at the
plantation reportedly met with local officials and agreed to vacate the site peacefully. 68 In May
2006, the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS) studied Liberia’s rubber sector
and published a series of key findings and recommendations pertaining to the sector.69 Issues that
it examined included human rights concerns pertaining to the industry; post-conflict business
practices and corruption; the status of and role of commercial rubber concession and management
agreements; worker, child, and community rights; implications of plantation agriculture and
sectoral industrial practices for the environment; and the rule of law within the rubber sector,
including issues relating to ex-combatant occupation of plantations.
While the normal peacetime functioning of the rubber sector has largely resumed and the sector
has been brought under state regulatory control, in February 2010 UNMIL reported that
The situation in and around Liberia’s rubber plantations continued to be of concern. Labour
disputes, including over salary and severance payments, prompted demonstrations at the
Guthrie and Cavalla plantations, with the conflict over control of rubber at Sinoe Plantation
continuing to be a major security concern.70
In addition, in November 2009 the president and general manager of a large-scale rubber
plantation and rubber processing firm, who also served as the chairman of Liberia’s national
Public Procurement and Concession Commission was murdered, “allegedly by disgruntled
workers” near the firm’s work site. 71
Security Sector Reform
New Military Created
With U.S. assistance, Liberia has created a new military made up of approximately 2,000 initial
recruits.72 The force is commanded, on an interim basis, by officers from other countries in West
68
Executive Mansion, “Liberian Leader Concludes Visit to Sinoe,” May 5, 2009; Rebecca Murray , “Liberia: Wild
West - the Sinoe Rubber Plantation,” Inter Press Service, April 8, 2009; IRIN, “Liberia: Gov’t Reclaims Rubber
Plantation from Former Fighters,” August 16, 2006; Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia takes rubber estate back from exrebels,” Reuters, August 15, 2006; IRIN, “Liberia: UN Vows to Repossess another Troubled Rubber Plantation,” 23
August 23, 2006; and D. Sonpon Weah II, “Ex-Combatants at SRC Ready to Leave,” The Analyst, September, 27,
2006.
69
UNMIL, Human Rights in Liberia’s Rubber Plantations: Tapping into the Future, May 2006.
70
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
71
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. Nine indicted grand jury defendants went on trial for the murder in February 2010.
Marcus Zoleh, “Liberia: Keith Jubah Murder Trial to Resume Tomorrow,” The Informer (Monrovia), February 16,
2010, inter alia.
72
The size of the force reflects a compromise between the need to build a force that can be sustainably funded over the
long-term, taking into account Liberia’s high rate of poverty and relatively small national budget; field a force capable
of defending against possible regional threats; start with a relatively moderately sized force and potentially gradually
enlarge it in response to emergent need; and create a force over which civilian control can be maintained, in part by
limiting its size and rate of growth.
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Africa, including Nigeria, Ghana, and Benin. 73 The recruit pool was drawn from across Liberia
and includes members from diverse ethnic groups to ensure ethno-regional balance. A goal that
20% of the total force be female was not met; less than 5% of the force is female.74 Selection of
volunteer enlistees, for purposes of screening out human rights abusers, began in early 2006, and
less than 20% of applicants were accepted. Prospective recruits underwent a vetting process
administered by U.S. contractors that included reviews of selectees’ records by personnel from
the U.S. embassy, UNMIL, and other donor governments, and Liberian civil society and
government representatives. 75 As of late January 2009, recruiting of 2,057 personnel had been
completed, and basic training for all elements was completed in late 2009.76 As of mid-August
2008, 45 recruits had been commissioned as officers. 77 Despite having received commissions and
training, in mid-2008, UNMIL officials viewed the “command effectiveness” of the officer corps
as limited and in need of further development. Military restructuring was initially hindered by a
need to demobilize and verify the severance pay eligibility of over 13,000 irregular forces and
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. Funds for this purpose were initially scarce, but all
irregular and regular forces were demobilized. 78
U.S. assistance for these post-war military security sector reform (SSR) activities was
administered by the State Department and carried out primarily by the defense services
contractors DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). DynCorp was
charged with helping to vet, recruit, and provide basic training and equipment for the new force.
It also refurbished and provided operations and maintenance services for two AFL bases, Camp
Sandee Ware (formerly known as VOA Camp) and Barclay Training Center (BTC), and provided
73
In mid-February 2006, President Sirleaf, stating that “our country currently lacks the technical and tactical capacities
and proficiency to provide for its own defense and national security,” appointed Major-General Luka Yusuf, a Nigerian
UNMIL officer, to be Liberia’s military Chief of Staff heading the rebuilding of the armed forces. He was later
replaced by another Nigerian, General Suraj Abdurrahman. The appointment of a Nigerian head of the army drew
criticism from former Liberian military elements, who called it unconstitutional and an insult to Liberia’s national
pride. See Agence France-Presse, “Liberian Leader Names Nigerian to Head Military,” February 13, 2006 and
Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Leader Gets Flak for Hiring Nigeria General,” Reuters, February 14, 2006.
74
Female recruitment reportedly faced substantial cultural and gender biases against the participation of women in the
military. Jonathan Paye-Layleh, “Liberia Begins Recruiting Women Soldiers,” Associated Press, June 5, 2006;
International Crisis Group (ICG), Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, January 13, 2009; and Mark
Malan, Security Sector Reform In Liberia: Mixed Results From Humble Beginnings, U.S. Army Strategic Studies
Institute, March 2008.
75
CRS field visit, 2006; Dorina Bekoe and Christina Parajon, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Domestic
Considerations and the Way Forward,” Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention/USIP, April 2007; and The
Inquirer (Monrovia), “Liberia: Public Vetting for Army Recruits Begins Monday,” June 23, 2006. For more detailed
information on recruitment and vetting, see ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress.
76
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and President Sirleaf, annual message to the legislature, January 26, 2009.
77
A number of officers and other personnel underwent training at Nigeria’s Command Army Staff College. The United
States, China, and Germany, among other donor governments, have also provided specialist training to some personnel.
See S/2008/553, August 15, 2008; and S/2008/183, March 19, 2008.
78
Total demobilization costs totaled approximately $15 million, and the process was the subject of some local
controversy. In late April 2006, 400-500 former AFL soldiers claiming nonpayment of salary arrears and retirement
benefits conducted a violent protest outside the defense ministry and clashed with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to contain
the unrest. Some of these soldiers reportedly later received some back pay, although some arrears remain. “President
Authorizes Defense Ministry to Pay Salary Arrears to Former Soldiers,” UNMIL media summary citing ELBS Radio
and Star Radio, June 14, 2006; USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.,” May
11, 2007; Executive Mansion, “Leadership of Demobilized AFL Soldiers Assure President Sirleaf of Unwavering
Support,” February 24, 2010; periodic U.N. reports on the progress of UNMIL and developments in post-war Liberia;
and State Department information (email communication April 2, 2010).
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O&M for the two bases.79 PAE provided construction services and specialty training, equipment,
logistics, and base services.
State Department expenditures for U.S. assistance for military SSR and the training of the
reconstituted post-war AFL are estimated at $240.56 million through the end of FY2009, when
the bulk of new AFL training had been completed. Part of this funding supported base
reconstruction and operations and maintenance. Additional funding for these and related purposes
may be provided in FY2010 and FY2011, respectively; $5.2. million had been obligated as of
early FY2010 (see below). FMF and IMET Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)administered assistance programs for Liberia, which are not formally a component of U.S.
military reform/restructuring assistance programs, have bolstered and complemented these
efforts.
U.S. assistance for military restructuring was also accompanied by efforts to help Liberia build
the capacity of its Ministry of Defense (MOD) and establish a defense policy framework,
although lapses in funding for this effort reportedly resulted in mixed results and a loss of
capacity-building opportunities.80 Two results of these efforts were the approval of a new Liberian
national security strategy in January 2008 and the passage in August 2008 of a new national
defense act.
Defense Sector Reform and the AFL: Current Issues and Challenges
In early 2010, U.S. assistance for defense sector reform, which is in general facilitated by the
existence of a U.S.-Liberia military cooperation agreement, entered a new phase. 81 Initial training
of the founding units of the new AFL ended in December 2009, by when the force had achieved
operational status and undergone an Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The
Liberian MOD assumed full formal control of the newly trained force in early 2010.82 U.S.
79
Camp Sandee Ware was formerly known as VOA Camp, named for a nearby former Voice of America and U.S.
government communcations transmission tower, now scrapped. Sorbor George, “VOA Military Camp renamed ‘Camp
Sandee Ware’,” Star Radio, July 22, 2007.
80
According to one observer, at one point, due to “U.S. Government funding shortfalls, the MOD Reform program was
terminated following completion of civil servant training but prior to the implementation of a planned five-month
mentoring and ‘on the job’ training phase. Consequently, new civil servants had no source of advice or assistance as
they assumed their official duties in the newly restructured Ministry of National Defense. The failure to follow through
with the mentoring component of MOD Reform missed a valuable opportunity to shape the operation of the new MOD
as an institution.” See Thomas Dempsey, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense
Reform,” Perspectives on Peace & Stability Operations (Issue Paper No. 2008), Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1, 2008. Liberian defense officials were sometimes critical about the manner in
which U.S. SSR resources were used by contractors, notably with regard to subcontracting issues, and sometimes
complained of a lack of information or consultation regarding assistance-related communications between U.S. SSR
contractors and U.S. embassy officials in Monrovia. USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister ... ”; Jake
Sherman, Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa, Center on International Cooperation, New York
University, March 2009; Charles Crawford, “Samukai Destests Awarding of Feeding Contract of New Army to
Foreigners,” The Inquirer, August 22, 2006; The Inquirer, “Delay Over Army Training?,” January 29, 2007; Michael
M. Phillips, “In Liberia, an Army Unsullied by Past,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2007; and The Inquirer, “Who’s
Responsible for Soldiers’ Outburst,” April 14, 2008
81
The document signed is an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), one of at least 90 worldwide,
which permits “the exchange of logistics, support, supplies and services,” between the United States and Liberia. U.S.
EUCOM, “U.S.-Liberia Agreement Meant to Ease Acquisition Process,” Press Release, April 24, 2007.
82
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and The Analyst, “Liberia: From the Cold - AFL Marches Gallantly,” February 12,
2010.
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support to the new AFL has shifted from a program of contractor-based basic training and
capacity building to one centering on military-to-military mentoring and advice, bolstered by
some continuing assistance in support of AFL base operations and maintenance (O&M) and
certain other functions. DynCorp International has been contracted to provide $5.2 million worth
of support for electrical power generation, water supply, waste disposal, and vehicle maintenance
at two AFL bases during the first half of 2010.83 The Army Corps of Engineers also tentatively
plans to fund the “design, construction, upgrade and revitalization of several arms storage and
ammunition storage facilities” at AFL bases.84 UNMIL troops are also pursuing joint training with
specialized AFL units, e.g., engineering, military police, and signal and headquarters staff.85
The mentoring mission, supported with State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
funding under a program dubbed Defense Sector Reform (DSR) Phase I, began in early 2010 and
is slated to run for five years. It is being undertaken by a Marine-led team of approximately 60
U.S. Africa Command military personnel drawn predominantly from the Marines but also
incorporating members of other services. Their collective deployment and activities are known as
Operation Onward Liberty. Activities under the DSR program are vetted and authorized by the
U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, although day-to-day work is undertaken
by the designated AFRICOM officer in charge (a Marine Forces Africa [MARFOAF] officer),
who reports to AFRICOM and the Ambassador via the embassy-based DOD Office of Security
Cooperation (OSC). The objective of Operation Onward Liberty is to help the Liberian
government “build a professional military that is apolitical, subordinate to civilian leadership, and
respectful of human rights.”86 Team members will advise AFL units at various command levels as
they pursue continued locally led training, particularly at the unit level. Such continuing training
is viewed as a critical follow-up to previous basic training; according to the UNSG, “it is assessed
that the Armed Forces of Liberia will not be independently operational before 2012, given that the
Force’s officer corps needs significant additional experience before it is able to take command.”87
The DSR program is to be complemented by a program of assistance by the Defense
Department’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) that is slated to focus on improving the
capacity of the MOD and Liberia’s defense policy structure.88 The DIRI Liberia program is
83
The work is being undertaken under a five-year, State Department PKO account-funded indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity [IDIQ]) defense services, support, and capacity-building contract called the Africa Peacekeeping Program
(AFRICAP). Awardees under AFRICAP include DynCorp International, PAE Government Services, AECOM, and
Protection Strategies Incorporated. See Business Wire, “DynCorp International Wins $20 Million AFRICAP Task
Order in Liberia,” January 28, 2010; and documents pertaining to State Department Africa Peacekeeping Program
contract solicitation SAQMMA08R0237 (“AFRICAP Recompete”) available from the Federal Business Opportunities
(FBO) website, https://www.fbo.gov.
84
The projected contract for this work would be worth between $.25 million and $.5 million. See Army Corps of
Engineers, Ammunition/Arms Facility Design and Upgrade Liberia, Africa LI-B-HAB [Pre-Solicitation Synopsis],
solicitation number W912GB10-R0029, March 11, 2010, available from the FBO website.
85
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and S/2009/411, August 10, 2009.
86
The U.S. mentoring team is complemented by a United Kingdom Ministry of Defense-level advisor. Lydia M.
Davey, “ONWARD LIBERTY Provides U.S. Mentors to Armed Forces of Liberia,” Marine Forces Africa press
release, February 24, 2010; and AFRICOM, US Africa Command Contribution to Defense Sector Reform in Liberia,
January 15, 2010.
87
The 2009/10 fiscal year national budget totaled $371.9 million. S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
88
DIRI is a DOD-led program designed initiated in FY2010 to help selected foreign governments to “develop
accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ their forces and
the capabilities developed through U.S. security cooperation programs.” While DOD-led, it “supports broad USG
security sector reform objectives and whole-of-government approaches. The program primarily supports activities
related to defense policy and strategy formulation, and planning, budgeting and resource management; civilian and
(continued...)
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currently being formulated. An initial consultative DIRI team visit to Liberia (part of what DIRI
terms its “Requirements Determination”) took place in September 2009 and a follow-up program
assessment and implementation visit (part of a DIRI “Program Development” process) followed
in March 2010. The Liberian MOD has established a Liberian working group to collaborate with
the U.S. DIRI team, which DIRI officials interpret as indicating “strong Liberian interest in, and
ownership of, the project.” A key initial area of planned activity is work to finalize National
Defense Strategy (NDS), integrating inter-agency and AFL inputs, “that would empower the
Ministry to effectively develop policy, budgets, and resource management plans, and manage
logistics, personnel issues, and public relations.” A further U.S. DIRI team was slated to take
place in mid-April and at six-week intervals thereafter. A longer-term program roadmap, with
associated benchmarks, will also be designed and implemented. These activities will be assessed
every 12-18 months.89
While the United States is currently continuing to provide operations and maintenance support to
the AFL, as defense sector capacity-building proceeds, the long-term success and sustainability of
the effort will increasingly rely on the ability of the Liberian government to adequately manage
and fund the new AFL. Funding, in particular, may pose a significant challenge, given Liberia’s
modest annual national budget. 90 Defense Minister Brownie Samukai, Jr., however, has asserted
that the government intends to keep the defense budget at a 9% or less share of the overall
national budget, suggesting that the government is taking measures to ensure that defense reform
is both adequately funded and fiscally sustainable. 91 Competing development and reconstruction
priorities in the long-term, however, may decrease the availability of resources for the defense
sector, particularly if advocates of increased social welfare expenditures successfully argue that
non-defense investments are more likely to produce larger and more productive, tangible benefits
for a larger number of Liberians than the defense sector.92
While some may contend that Liberia can ill afford to unilaterally fund a national military, the
need for continued AFL and MOD professionalization is widely viewed as crucial, for multiple
reasons. Prominent among these is a core national defense rationale: Liberia lies within a subregion that has experienced substantial political instability and cross-border armed conflict in
recent decades, and must be able to defend its territorial integrity. Such investments are also seen
as being necessitated by a need to prevent a recurrence of the politically destabilizing role that
Liberia’s military and state security forces have played in the past. Training and constitutionally
based military institution-building are seen as necessary in order to ensure that the new AFL does
not intervene in civilian politics or engage in other extra-legal activities.
(...continued)
military defense sector human resource development and training; logistics and infrastructure capacity-building; civilmilitary relations; and interagency coordination. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Fiscal Year 2011
Budget Estimates, February 2010; and DOD/Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Institution Reform Initiative
Fact Sheet, September 1, 2009.
89
Information from DIRI Liberia Program officer current as of April 13, 2010.
90
S/2009/640, December 11, 2009
91
USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.,” May 11, 2007.
92
Defense Minister Samukai has suggested that in the long-term, public investments in the AFL are likely to contribute
to non-defense related national development, as members of the AFL with specialized functional training enter the
civilian sector upon retiring from the AFL. USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai,
Jr.,” May 11, 2007
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While there are no indications that the new AFL—which is explicitly designed to function as an
apolitical, professional force—is a likely to reprise such a destabilizing role, there have been
occasional problems of AFL absenteeism, rank and file protests about living conditions, and some
reports of indiscipline among some AFL members, in some cases of a violent or criminal nature,
or involving intoxicants.93 While the scope of such phenomena have been limited to date and do
not threaten state stability, the contemporary history of civil-military relations in the West Africa
suggests that, if not addressed, they may have the potential to develop into more serious threats.
Military absenteeism and indiscipline, both within Liberia and in the surrounding sub-region,
have historically underpinned negative outcomes ranging from military ineffectiveness to abuse
of civilians by diverse military units, and military protests over pay and living conditions have
spurred state instability and played a causative role in several coups d’état and putsches. It is
notable that, as of early 2010, while U.S. defense equipment has been donated to the Liberian
MOD, weapons and ammunition reportedly continued to be under U.S. control.94
Sector Reform: Challenges of Balancing Foreign Support for and National
Ownership of Security
As described elsewhere in this report, the Liberian security sector reform (SSR) process has relied heavily on U.S.
and other external assistance, which has often been provided through the use of foreign contractors. Adapted U.S.
institutional models, norms, and policy objectives have also played an influential role in shaping the SSR process. In the
view of a number of observers, such external inputs were essential because rapid military reform was widely seen as
crucial to building long-term stability, and post-war Liberia largely lacked requisite financial, human, and other
resource capacities. Similarly, the strong American role was seen as apropos because Liberia has long drawn from
U.S. legal and institutional models in defining its state structure. The extensive foreign role in Liberia’s SSR process,
however, may also pose challenges for the long-term sustainability of the outcomes of the SSR process since, while
historically U.S.-influenced, Liberia’s state and society are the unique product of local history, ethno-social make-up
and culture, and geographic scale, among other factors. As a result, to the extent that the institutions and processes
that SSR produces were not initially organically or integrally defined by local cultural norms and socio-political
authority, interests, and needs, over the long-term, these influences may reshape the resulting institutions, potentially
in a manner at odds with their original formal purposes. Similarly, to the degree that their design did not incorporate
adequate public input, their political legitimacy might be called into question.95 Furthermore, while many criticisms and
problems associated with SSR in Liberia have been cited in the research literature, including lack of adequate
participation by the broad public, sequencing of institution-building and associated law and policy-making, a number of
93
UNMIL reports that there have been continuing tensions between the AFL and civilian security agencies, including
at least eight confrontations, some violent, since September 2008, and that there have been several “aggravated
assaults” by AFL members on civilians, including at least two stabbings. See S/2010/88, February 17, 2010, along with
Julius Kanubah, “AWOL Soldiers Begin Returning to Base,” Star Radio, May 5, 2008; and Rebecca Murray, “Liberia:
New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,” Inter Press Service, December 26, 2009.
94
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
95
Louise Andersen, Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership - The Case of Liberia,
Danish Institute for International Studies, July 2006; Sean McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp
International as Sovereign Agent,” Review of African Political Economy, December 1, 2008; and Alan Bryden, Linkage
between DDR and SSR, Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa/U.N. Office of the Special
Adviser on Africa (OSAA), June 12-14, 2007.
96
David C. Gompert, Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns, Keith Crane, and Kevin Jack Riley, Making Liberia Safe:
Transformation of the National Security Sector, RAND, June 2006. RAND is a U.S. think tank and policy research
organization that often carries out sensitive U.S. government contract work. Quotation from Adedeji Ebo, “Local
Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of Outsourcing in Liberia,” in Timothy Donais (Ed.), Local
Ownership and Security Sector Reform, LIT Verlag, 2008. See also Alexander Loden, “Civil Society and Security
Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes,” The International Journal of
Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 2007.
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researchers have also pointed out that substantial efforts were undertaken to ensure that the SSR process was
shaped by Liberian interests and views. For instance, while some observers were concerned that a 2006 U.S.-funded
report by the RAND Corporation was overly influential in shaping the design of national security structures, after it
was released, the Liberian government facilitated a “participatory and democratic security reform process.”96 This
included a “widely consultative” national security review led by a Liberia’s Governance Reform Commission (GRC).97
While not without its critics and problems, the review included input from a range of civil society and political actors,
and reportedly critically informed a subsequent government-drafted national security strategy.98
Coast Guard99
In order to protect Liberia’s 360 mile coast line and associated 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zone against periodic poaching by foreign trawlers, potential drug trafficking, human
trafficking, piracy, and illicit maritime dumping, as well as the need for search and rescue
capacities, Liberia is developing a coast guard. The effort is dependent, in large part, on the
provision of U.S. training and technical assistance funded primarily with State Department
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funding through Defense Security Cooperation Agency in
collaboration with AFRICOM. The field program is coordinated and carried out by the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), with some assistance from U.S. Navy elements.
In August 2008, in response to a 2007 request from the Liberian government and a subsequent
request from AFRICOM, and in coordination with the U.S. embassy in Monrovia, a USCG team
conducted an in-country technical needs assessment to identify Liberia’s potential coast guard
needs and capacities. It subsequently produced an assessment report and recommendations based
on its findings, which it presented to the U.S. embassy in Monrovia and the Liberian Minister of
Defense in early 2009. Following this presentation, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) identified a
pool of Liberian Coast Guard (LCG) personnel composed of new AFL members who had already
undergone background vetting and basic military training. In February 2009, a delegation of
Liberian MOD and U.S. Embassy personnel visited USCG facilities in Washington and Virginia
to discuss prospective LCG development plans and to make field visits to small-scale USCG
stations viewed as comparable in size and function to future LCG stations.
The assessment report, which was comprehensive and included a number of core
recommendations, was intended to function as a guideline for the creation of a more detailed
(...continued)
97
The GRC, later called the Governance Commission (GC), was created under the 2003 peace accord to assess and
reform public sector institutions with respect to such outcomes as operational effectiveness, transparency,
accountability, and public participation and access.
98
Quote from Ebo, “Local Ownership ... ,” who discusses this process at length. On challenges associated with the
GRC-led process, see also Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Notwithstanding the GRC’s role, executive
branch domination of the SSR process and lack of public access to it has been a central point of criticism; in early
2009, for instance, the International Crisis Group reported that “more than halfway through Johnson-Sirleaf’s term, the
official national security strategy has yet to be made public, though a supposedly final version is circulating among
Liberian and international officials.” See International Crisis Group, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector
Reform, Africa Report 148, January 13, 2009, as well as Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia and Ebo, “Local
Ownership ... ”
99
This account is based on a 2008 U.S. Coast Guard assessment report, discussed below; a discussion with a
representative of the Office of International Affairs, Security Cooperation Office, U.S. Coast Guard on March 31, 2010
and subsequent email communications; and CRS research.
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LCG development plan. 100 It provided a discussion of common pitfalls often associated with
nascent coast guard development efforts, and recommended, in the interest of program
sustainability, that Liberia take a staged approach to developing and initiating LCG operations. It
urged that Liberia fully construct and staff LCG primary headquarters facilities at Freeport,
Monrovia’s main port, prior to establishing additional LCG stations, and that the LCG carefully
coordinate the timing of training, facilities and infrastructure preparation, and equipment
acquisitions. A crucial overarching recommendation was that LCG development be guided by a
full-time, well experienced advisor or advisory team. The Liberian government concurred with
these recommendations and initiated development of a LCG with a mission to carry out scaled
down versions of applicable USCG functions (e.g., law enforcement, fisheries protection, and
search and rescue).
As a result of consultations between the Liberian government, AFRICOM, U.S. embassy
personnel, and the USCG, an AFRICOM-funded USCG maritime/LCG advisor was deployed to
Monrovia in September 2009.101 LCG personnel, who number under 50 members, subsequently
began basic maritime operations, law enforcement and engineering training provided by USCG
Mobile Training Teams (MTT) in Liberia. Further MTT training is expected to continue for
multiple years and may be periodically supplemented by U.S. Navy training. A small cadre of
selected LCG members, both officers and enlisted, are undergoing additional USCG technical and
managerial training in the United States. An activation ceremony for the new LCG attended by
President Sirleaf was held in February 2010.102
U.S. training efforts have been complemented by a U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Sea Bee)
team, which is building waterfront facilities (e.g., a boat ramp and a related pier) at Freeport.103
The Liberian government has also rehabilitated or constructed a headquarters and barracks at
Freeport. Two 25-foot Defender-class boats for use in harbor and near-coast operations are
expected to be provided to the LCG by the United States in late 2010, along with approximately
two years worth of associated equipment. The duration of U.S. assistance to the LCG will depend
on LCG development progress, and has not been determined; informal projections, based on the
record of similar U.S. assistance programs in Georgia and Haiti, however, suggest that the effort
is likely to last at least five years.
National Guard State Partnership Program
Liberia was added to the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) in 2009, making it the
eighth African SPP partner country out of 62 globally. Liberia has been twinned with the
Michigan National Guard (NG).104 The SPP pairs U.S. state National Guard contingents with
foreign militaries in support of diverse civil-military and security cooperation partnership,
100
It dealt with issues including LCG legal authority; personnel and staffing; training (technical, leadership, and
management); infrastructure needs; vessels, equipment, and supplies; technical assistance and mentoring; and planning
and development.
101
The maritime advisor is attached to the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Liberia.
102
President Sirleaf, Goodwill Message [2010 Armed Forces Day speech], February 11, 2010.
103
Jason Morris, “APS, Seabees Bolster Liberia’s Coast Guard,” Africa Partnership Station [APS] Public Affairs, U.S.
Navy, October 20, 2009.
104
Patrick McCollum, “National Guard Adds State Partnership in Liberia,” National Guard Bureau, August 13, 2009;
and National Guard (NG), written communication to CRS, April 5, 2010.
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training, and exercise activities, depending on mutual partner needs and capacities. 105 The
program is designed “to concentrate a small component of the U.S. defense structure—a state’s
National Guard—on a single country or region in support of U.S. Government policies” in
support of “the development of long term personal relationships and interagency coordination
mechanisms that would not otherwise exist.”106
The Michigan-Liberia SPP partnership program remains at a formative stage. The process leading
to its creation began in May 2009, when after agreeing to a Liberian request for an SPP state
partner, AFRICOM requested that the NG Bureau (NGB) recommend a state to fulfill the request.
The NGB provisionally decided to make Liberia a SPP partner in August 2009, and Michigan was
selected as Liberia’s U.S. state SPP partner in October 2009.107
While a specific Michigan-Liberia SPP country engagement plan has yet to be finalized, it is
anticipated that the partnership program would build on and complement existing AFRICOM and
State Department/U.S. Embassy-Monrovia country plans. A next step in creating an SPP
engagement plan, based on past SPP experience in other countries, is likely to include a Michigan
NG field visit to Liberia, during which Michigan NG would consult with U.S. embassy-based
State and DOD officials and Liberian MOD officials. Based on provisional findings and planning,
a Michigan Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) would then be assigned through AFRICOM to the
embassy’s DOD Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). The BAO would act as a key liaison and
consultant in further formulating a SPP engagement plan. Reciprocal senior leadership country
consultative visits between the Michigan NG and Liberian MOD would then occur, and a
partnership plan would be finalized.108
Other Defense Cooperation
The Liberian government has voiced support for the new U.S. Africa Command, and offered to
host it in the region, although most observers see this as unlikely, given the poor state of Liberian
infrastructure and limited state capacity and resources.109
105
According to the National Guard, the SPP mission is to “enhance combatant commanders’ ability to build enduring
civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all
levels of society.” SPP “states and their partners participate in a broad range of strategic security cooperation activities
to include homeland defense/security, disaster response/mitigation, consequence/crisis management, interagency
cooperation, border/port/aviation security, combat medical, fellowship-style internships, and bilateral familiarization
events that lead to training and exercise opportunities. All activities are coordinated through the Combatant
Commanders, U.S. Ambassadors’ country teams, and other agencies as appropriate to ensure National Guard
cooperation is tailored to meet U.S. and international partners’ objectives.” National Guard, written communication to
CRS, April 7, 2010 [NG to CRS hereafter].
106
NG to CRS, April 7, 2010.
According to the NGB, the pairing followed “a comprehensive review and selection process, analyzing state port
security operations, military development, agriculture development, engineer operations, medical services delivery,
crisis management, and State Partnership Program events with previous partners and while considering geographical,
economic, military, and political factors with respect to Liberia.” McCollum, “National Guard Adds,” op cit.; and NG
to CRS, April 7, 2010.
107
108
NG, written communication to CRS, April 8, 2010.
109
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “AFRICOM can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves,” allAfrica.com, June 25,
2007. Also see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in
Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
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Liberia has received multiple U.S. Africa Partnership Station (APS) ship visits, most recently in
the fall of 2009. Missions have included Liberian Coast Guard Assistance (see above), U.S.
Marine training for the AFL, humanitarian and development material and medical services
donations, and cultural programming. 110 A U.S. Navy-led effort, the APS program conducts ship
visits to ports in the region during which a variety of training, capacity-building, humanitarian,
and cultural activities are undertaken. The APS program, housed on U.S. navy ships, is designed
to function as a “maritime university” housing diverse training and assistance resources.111 It
integrates personnel from other U.S. armed services, civilian agencies, and non-governmental
organizations to provide diverse types of maritime safety and security training, as well as
humanitarian and development assistance. 112
Liberia is the signatory of a ship boarding agreement with the United States under the
Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S. effort to prevent trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction and related materiel “to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern.”113
Police and Justice Sector Assistance
The United Nations reports that police reform and restructuring efforts have made significant
progress but that significant challenges remain. As of mid-August 2008, 3,661 Liberian National
Police (LNP) officers, of which 9% were female, had been trained as part of an effort to complete
recruitment and training of an initial target of 3,500 police officers by July 2007. While a full
complement of LNP officers has been trained, the United Nations has reported that LNP
110
Jason Morris, “APS, Seabees Bolster Liberia’s Coast Guard,” APS/U.S. Navy, October 20, 2009; APS/U.S. Navy,
“Liberian President Accepts Donation from HVS Swift,” via DOD Live, September 8, 2009; Dan Meaney, “APS Swift
Army veterinary team in Liberia,” U.S. Army news release, September 16, 2009; Elsa Portillo, “U.S. Marines, Soldiers
and Sailor Join With Liberian Soldiers, for AFL Rebuilding,” Marine Forces Africa, March 2, 2009; Elsa Portillo,
“Marines Partner With Liberian Soldiers to Deliver School Supplies,” Marine Forces Africa, March 3, 2009; Marine
Forces Africa, “Flagship Brings Musical Approach to APS Mission,” October 26, 2009; and Jason Morris, “Africa
Partnership Station and Project Hope Team Up in Liberia,” APS/U.S. Navy, March 27, 2008.
111
J. D. Hood, Enhancing Maritime Safety and Security in Africa/Africa Partnership Station, U.S. Navy, November
2009.
112
The goal of the APS program, a component of the Navy’s larger Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) and the Global
Fleet Stations security cooperation efforts, is to bolster U.S. security relations and coastal security and related maritime
capabilities in African countries. APS cooperation, which began in West Africa and now is being undertaken in East
Africa, is responsive to U.S. and African-identified training and capacity needs, and incorporates contributions by
selected foreign donor nations. Training is tailored to specific country needs and takes place over repeated port calls by
APS vessels, which are capable of housing and deploying multiple training teams, platforms, and mechanisms.
Training is diverse, pertaining to such areas of activity as port management and security capacity building; law and
regulatory enforcement; engineering and logistics; maritime skills and professionalization education; search and rescue;
and disaster response. APS personnel also provide humanitarian and limited development assistance, sometimes inland.
Hood, Enhancing Maritime Safety, op cit; Gene Porter, “Global Maritime Partnerships - GMP,” Office of Global
Maritime Situational Awareness Wiki, January 4, 2010; David B. Waidelich, A New Twist to an Age Old Naval
Tradition: the Maritime Strategy and its Impact on Humanitarian Assistance and Maritime Security Operations
[Master of Military Studies thesis], Marine Corps University, 2008/9; U.S. Marine Corps, Global Fleet Stations
Concept, July 30, 2007; and Ploch, Africa Command (CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa), op cit.
113
Such agreements allow boarding by security officials of each signatory country and certain third countries of a ship
flagged and registered under the other signatory country’s laws, if the vessel is suspected of engaging in illicit
proliferation activities. See State Department, “Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with
Liberia,” signed and provisionally applied as of February 11, 2004; entered into force December 9, 2004; and State
Department, “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),” Fact Sheet, May 26, 2008.
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operational capacity remains weak. LNP deployment to the field, particularly up-country, is
limited and has faced constraints, such as lack of basic infrastructure and police equipment,
including vehicles, fuel, and communication gear, for which the LNP is largely dependent on
donor support.114 In recent years, the United Nations has also reported that there are high rates of
LNP absenteeism and other disciplinary problems, such as corrupt practices involving judicial
and law enforcement officials, and that LNP leadership and specialized skills are limited. In part
due to limited police and broad justice sector operational weaknesses, incidents of mob violence
and vigilante justice remain common. 115 The “practical import” of such weaknesses, the UNSG
reported in mid-2008,
is that the United Nations police advisers and formed police units are daily called upon to
support the Liberian National Police in mounting operations critical to the maintenance of
law and order and to sustain the emerging peace and stability in Liberia.116
While the challenges facing the LNP remain substantial, diverse efforts to address them are being
pursued, including the development of a Professional Standards Division to effectively
investigate complaints of LNP misconduct and efforts to prevent absenteeism by vetting LNP
payroll records and the duty status of officers. In mid-2008, the LNP, in collaboration with U.N.
partner agencies, held a workshop to examine the long-term strategic development of the LNP,
including with regard to professional standards, logistics and maintenance systems, human
resource development, and effective management.117 In mid-2009 and again in September 2009,
the LNP presented to donor government a strategic plan and 18 proposed capacity building
projects estimated to jointly cost $18 million. Little donor support had been provided to fund the
plans as of early 2010, but in 2009 the UNDP established a Liberia Justice and Security Trust
Fund, and some donors are reportedly interested in funding police needs though it or on a
bilateral basis.118
Due to previous U.N. Security Council arms embargos, the LNP is unarmed, with the exception
of a Police Support Unit (PSU) and an Emergency Response Unit (ERU). 119 The PSU, originally
slated to include 600 personnel, currently has a force size of 200. It is intended to provide armed
backing for regular LNP officers and respond to situations of public disorder. The ERU is
designed to provide mobile capacity to respond rapidly and robustly to critical threats to internal
security or public safety, particularly in anticipation of the eventual departure of UNMIL from
Liberia. The ERU has a current strength of 287, with an additional 47 staff expected to join the
force after completing training in March 2010. Originally envisioned as a 500-person force, in
response to the current level of tactical demands on the unit, it will not be further expanded in the
short-term. While the ERU has been a key recipient of foreign capacity building assistance, its
long term sustainability and effectiveness may be curtailed by resource constraints and lack of
equipment and vehicles necessary to reach remote parts of Liberia, notably after the eventual
termination of UNMIL. Due to very poor road conditions in many parts of Liberia, the unit is
114
S/2009/411, August 10, 2009.
See periodic reports on UNMIL and Liberia by the U.N. Secretary-General; and Andreas Mehler, The Production of
Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic, GIGA Working Paper
114, November 2009, among others.
116
S/2008/553, August 15, 2008; see also S/2008/183, op cit.
117
S/2008/553, August 15, 2008, op cit.
118
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010.
119
The SSS is also armed. UNSC Resolution 1903 (S/RES/1903, December 17, 2009) allows the controlled shipment
of arms and related materiel to the Liberian government.
115
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heavily “dependent on UNMIL air assets to deploy quickly, particularly during the rainy
season.”120
The United States is continuing to provide the LNP and its ERU with training assistance through
UNMIL, as it has for several years, primarily through U.S. civilian police (CIVPOL) seconded to
UNMIL, who provide training, mentorship, and advice. The U.S. police training contingent, the
size and focus of which has varied from year to year, has typically consisted of 10 to 20 U.S.
CIVPOL officers, as well as equipment and contractor-based logistical support, in addition to
other police capacity-building support.121 This aid, which is administered by the State
Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL), is aimed at
developing the LNP “into a credible and competent police service that respects human rights and
the rule of law” and “bolstering the operational and administrative capacity of the LNP,” which
the United States views as “a critical precursor” to eventual draw-down of UNMIL. Improved
police-community relations and human rights abuse prevention are keystones of this training. A
another component of INL support is the deployment of a U.S. police Senior Advisory Team
(SAT), which works with UNMIL “to help the LNP leadership improve and establish personnel
policies, internal affairs, logistics, payroll, discipline, promotion, and civilian oversight” both
through the provision of technical advice and through leadership mentoring. In FY2010, the
Obama Administration plans to deploy additional ERU advisors to provide field training and
mentoring program for the ERU; provide training and equipping for the PSU; and provide nonlethal equipment and support police infrastructure improvements.122
U.S. and UNMIL assistance efforts also support the rehabilitation of the judicial and penal
systems. U.S. efforts are provided under the INL-administered Justice Sector Support Liberia
(JSSL) project, as well as by USAID-funded rule of law programs. The general aims of the JSSL
program are to improve the administration of justice and bolster adherence to the rule of law
generally and respect for human rights. The JSSL deploys justice sector legal and technical
advisors, provides training, professional mentoring, and equipment, and helps develop and
strengthen justice sector effectiveness and infrastructure. The program focuses on the judicial
system broadly, including the Ministry of Justice, the corrections system, and other rule of law
organizations. It has helped create Liberia’s first ever public defender program, train prosecutors,
renovate the main judicial building in Monrovia, create a case-numbering system slated to be
scaled up nationally, and enhance LNP-prosecutor linkages, as well as providing some vehicles
and equipment in support of such functions. Current efforts seek to expand capacities outside of
Monrovia.123
Special Security Service
The Special Security Service (SSS), which provides executive branch and VIP close protection
services, is undergoing a process of restructuring and professionalization. It was a roughly 1,252member presidential protection unit that functioned under the NTGL and the Taylor government.
Under Taylor, the SSS—which was run by Benjamin Yeaten, a former Taylor militia commander
120
S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and President Sirleaf, annual message to the legislature, January 26, 2009.
There were 10 U.S. UNMIL CIVPOL officers in February 2010, according to the United Nations.
122
INL, FY2010 Program and Budget Guide.
123
See S/2007/151, March 15, 2007; other Secretary-General’s reports on Liberia; and INL Program and Budget
Guides for FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010.
121
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who is currently being sought by the Sirleaf government for alleged treasonous activities—gained
a reputation for brutality. The SSS has continued to have a sometimes troubled reputation. Some
members of the leadership that initially served under the Sirleaf Administration were viewed by
informed observers as unprofessional and corrupt. Multiple acts of arbitrary violence committed
by SSS officers have been reported.
As part of the restructuring process, a substantial number of SSS members were decommissioned;
on May 1, 2006, UNMIL announced that 841 SSS members had accepted U.S. and UK-funded
buyout packages and been deactivated in April. There are press reports, however, that allege that
some decommissioned SSS officers had not received their severance packages, and there have
been protests associated with such claims. Some protesting claimants, however, are reportedly
ineligible to receive severance payments.
The restructuring process, which seeks to correct reported leadership weaknesses and
professionalize all aspects of SSS organization and operations, is being undertaken with the
assistance of the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). Using a mix of
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects (NADR) and other foreign
assistance funds, DSS directly provided close protection services for President Sirleaf during the
first few months of her tenure, while about 100 SSS agents underwent specialized DSS close
protection training in Liberia and in the United States. About 300 SSS agents received basic close
protection support and perimeter training in Liberia. About 600 SSS officers have also reportedly
received general UNMIL police training.124
Humanitarian Conditions
Humanitarian conditions are much improved from the context of severe and widespread post-war
need that was prevalent in the years after the war, but high rates of poverty remains endemic.
Liberia continues to receive substantial international food aid and is highly donor-dependent.
International assistance is, however, increasingly supporting resettlement and socioeconomic
recovery, rather than emergency humanitarian needs. According to a U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) briefing note, about 200,000 Liberian refugees had repatriated by midFebruary 2006. By late April 2006, over 321,000 Liberian internally displaced persons (IDPs),
including over 59,000 families, had returned to their places of origin or resettled. Most had
received resettlement assistance, usually consisting of basic non-food items, transport aid, and
two months of food supplies. U.N. agencies, together with non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and NTGL ministries have implemented a wide range of reconstruction and capacity
building projects relating to nutrition, water and sanitation, primary health care services, and
transport infrastructure. Numerous schools have reopened nationwide, with extensive assistance
from UNICEF.
Nearly all child ex-combatants were reportedly been reintegrated into their communities of
origin, and many received follow-up aid in the form of social services. In mid-March 2006, the
124
In 2006, DSS planned to continue to assist the SSS on an interim basis, and proposed provision of a more structured
two-year-long assistance package. The proposal called for DSS to provide five U.S. contract-based presidential security
advisors who would help run SSS operations on an interim basis and at the same time help the SSS to enhance its
operational and administrative capacities. It also called for some equipment and training to be provided under the
package, projected to cost about $3 million per year.
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U.N. Secretary-General reported (S/2006/159, March 14, 2006, op. cit.) that 65,000 of 101,495
demobilized ex-combatants had benefitted from donor-financed reintegration and rehabilitation
projects, and that about 37,000 were still waiting to be placed in such programs. The SecretaryGeneral reported that although funding was available for most of these ex-combatants, about $5
million was “urgently needed” to provide such assistance to some 5,125 ex-fighters.
Health Issues
Liberia faces substantial public health challenges. Malaria is endemic, water-born stomach
illnesses are common, tuberculosis cases often go uncured, and there are periodic outbreaks of
diseases like Yellow Fever, measles, and cholera, but Liberia lacks an adequate health
infrastructure for combating such illnesses.125 Medical supplies and trained staff are in chronic
short supply. A number of donor-backed initiatives help improve health care capacity, however.
UNICEF is aiding the reopening of health clinics nationwide, and a UNICEF/WHO polio
vaccination campaign that began in October 2004 has reached some 1.2 million children. WHO
coordinates a U.N./government/NGO/USAID technical group that is working to improve the
national health system, notably regarding HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (see below). WHO
and FAO are also helping the government to create an avian flu surveillance and response plan.
AIDS
The threat of HIV/AIDS in Liberia is gaining increasing attention, though recent survey
information indicates that HIV prevalence rates are lower than had been commonly assumed
previously. A 2007 demographic and health survey showed that the national adult HIV infection
rate was 1.5%, and indicated that infection rates varied from 2.5% in urban areas to 0.8% in rural
ones, with the highest prevalence rate, 2.6%, in and around Monrovia.126 Previous estimates of
infection rates, albeit not based on national surveys, had ranged between 5.9% and 8.2%, with
some observers positing that the rate could be as high as 12% in some population sub-groups.127
The UNMIL HIV/AIDS Adviser’s Office is supporting public education-related AIDS prevention
and national planning efforts focused on care of orphans and vulnerable children, among other
activities. The World Health Organization, in coordination with other U.N. agencies and the
NTGL, is developing project proposals to fight AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and build health
system capacity. The U.N. Population Fund supports several AIDS awareness and prevention
programs. Liberia receives Global Fund assistance, but its application for further assistance under
the Fund’s recent Round 5 funding project assessment process was reportedly rejected. 128
125
War-related psycho-social trauma is also seen as widespread. The preliminary findings of a September 2005
WHO/Liberian government sexual and gender-based violence survey found that 91.7% of women and girls interviewed
had been the victims of multiple violent acts during Liberia’s war (Security Council, S/2005/764, December 7, 2005).
The transitional legislature made all rape illegal in December 2005 (only gang rape had previously been illegal) and
laid out punishments for rape-relation violations, but activists say increased sexual violence-related law enforcement is
needed. See U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN hereafter), “Liberia: Sexual Abuse of Children Still
Rampant, Report Says,” February 22, 2006, inter alia.
126
UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2007.
127
IRIN PLUSNEWS, “Youth Not Putting HIV Prevention Lessons into Practice,” October 27, 2005 and USAID,
Health Profile: West Africa-HIV/AIDS, n.d.
128
For background on the Global Fund, see CRS Report RL31712, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria: Background, by (name redacted).
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USAID implements several AIDS-related programs in Liberia on behalf of the Office of the U.S.
Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC). These include the 2007 demographic health survey, in
partnership with other donors, which includes HIV surveillance; targeted behavior change efforts
focusing on youth and other groups; and support for home-based care and related assistance. In
her inaugural speech, in which she cited a 12% HIV infection rate, President Sirleaf vowed to
“tackle this national scourge.” At a February 2006 House International Relations Committee
hearing on Liberia (see below), Members suggested to then-USAID Assistant Administrator for
the Bureau for Africa Lloyd O. Pierson that Liberia be considered for U.S. assistance under the
Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in South Africa (PEPFAR). Liberia has received
about $.7 million a year in Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) account funds in recent years.
Governance: Background
Liberia’s supreme law is its 1984 constitution, effective since 1986. It provides for a political and
legal system that is substantially modeled on that of the United States, though not entirely; for
instance, federalism is absent. Liberia’s government is made up of three branches that exercise
separate powers and authorities: a bicameral legislature, which consists of a 64-member House
and a 30-member Senate; a presidentially led executive branch that controls multiple line
ministries and several independent agencies; and a judiciary. Legislators are directly elected by
voters in each of Liberia’s 15 counties, while the president is directly elected by universal
suffrage. The President and House Members are each elected to six-year terms, and Senators
serve nine-year terms, except in cases of irregular vacancies of elected positions. Presidents may
serve up to two terms. Although the Sirleaf government’s mandate is derived from the
constitution, that of the NTGL was extra-constitutional. During its tenure, those provisions of the
Constitution and laws of Liberia that were inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003
Comprehensive Peace Agreement were suspended, though all other provisions of the constitution
remained in force.
Although Liberia’s constitution provides for a system of checks and balances among the three
branches of government, in practice the executive branch has historically exerted extensive
influence over the legislature, the judiciary, and local governments. Historically, Liberian
presidents have wielded exceptional, sometimes extra-constitutional powers and closely
controlled the legal system, the security forces, and the economy, as well as headed majority
ruling parties. Liberia has also long suffered from the effects of public sector corruption and a
tradition of political patronage. This often resulted in uneven, urban-centered socioeconomic
development and often deprived large segments of the population, notably the rural indigenous
majority, of access to public goods and services.
Given this history, President Sirleaf could have attempted to aggregate predominant power in her
office, but doing so would have run counter to her emphasis on building national unity,
constitutional and institutionally robust governance, fighting corruption, and institutionally
developing the state. Her emphasis on developing state institutions and processes, rather than
exerting presidential command authority may mean that she is both less likely and less able to
rule in the largely unilateral manner of her predecessors. However, she also came to power with a
weaker electoral mandate than those of past presidents; neither Sirleaf’s Unity Party nor any other
party commands a legislative majority. Similarly, no candidate was able to command majority
support in the initial 22-candidate presidential first round presidential vote.
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The relative strength of opposition parties in the parliament initially led some observers to
hypothesize that Liberia’s legislators might bridge their party differences and cooperate in
furtherance of their collective institutional power vis-à-vis the executive branch, and take on a
more engaged and assertive role in policy-making than has been traditional. To date, however,
President Sirleaf has often been able to dominate the national policy agenda. This is attributable,
in part, to a tradition of strong executive leadership; limited capacity within the legislature; the
limited legislative experience of many current legislators; the fractionalized party make-up of the
legislature; and to the governing experience of Sirleaf and many in her cabinet. Most bills
continue to be originated by the executive branch and passed with presidential priorities intact. A
notable exception to this pattern was the legislature’s September 2007 rejection of the asset
seizures bill targeting former president Taylor and his associates.
Transitional Government
A key impetus for the Sirleaf administration’s policy emphasis on anti-corruption initiatives was
the mixed governance record of its predecessor, the NTGL. The NTGL was able to successfully
carry out most of the basic functions assigned to it under the August 2003 peace accord, but its
efforts to restore state authority and the rehabilitate state institutions were hampered by central
government ministry inefficiencies, widespread resource constraints, and lack of institutional and
financial system capacities and trained manpower. Despite such challenges, it did make
significant progress during the last half of its tenure. During this time, many revenue, customs,
immigration, and local officials were deployed to sites outside Monrovia. Regional Central Bank
offices were also opened, permitting salary payments without recourse to time-consuming travel
to Monrovia. The process of deploying government officials upcountry was supported by USAID,
which has supported the rehabilitation of administrative buildings in several key counties.
Among the most challenging issues facing governance capacity-building efforts were persistent
reports of corruption within the NTGL, in some cases on a large scale. Alleged acts were
particularly notable in the context of import-export transactions, government contracts and
budgeting, and the issuance of commodity marketing or land, natural resource, and associated
concession rights.129 The U.N. Secretary-General reported in mid-March 2005 that there was a
“lack of [NTGL] transparency in the collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some
government and public corporation officials to reforms and audits aimed at fighting corruption”
(S/2005/177). The World Bank and bilateral donors made similar observations and called for
transparency measures. National fiscal and budget obligation mechanisms and voucher recordkeeping systems under the NTGL were chaotic and subject to manipulation by key officials in
some cases.130 In some government agency budgets, the miscellaneous expense budget account
category “Other” was reportedly substantial in many cases, and expenditures of such “Other”
funds were said to have been carried out in an ad hoc manner, with few controls. Actions by the
transitional legislature either to appropriate for private use or pay very nominal lease fees for
expensive vehicles that each legislator was given drew local and foreign condemnation. In
November 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia stated that the U.S. government was
129
See, for instance, The Analyst, “NTGL’s Past Haunts Bryant, Others,” March 9, 2006, regarding Liberian
parliamentary investigations into the transitional government’s budget and EU audits of key Liberian parastatals,
available through FrontPage Africa http://www.frontpageafrica.com.
130
Discussion with U.S. embassy official.
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shocked and disappointed by the recent incidents of transfers of Liberian Government
property and resources into private ownership. This drains vital government resources that
could otherwise be used for critical developmental programs, and sends the wrong signal to
international donors who finance such programs. It also perpetuates the culture of abuse of
public trust and impunity that has contributed to two decades of decline in Liberia. The U.S.
Embassy considers these transfers unscrupulous, irresponsible, and contrary to the public
interest of the people of Liberia. Liberian government resources are for the benefit of the
Liberian people and should not be misappropriated for private use.131
Citing a 2004 presidential proclamation, it stated that Liberian government officials who engage
in “violations of the public trust” and persons who abet such actions might, along with their
families, be ineligible for U.S.-funded programs and services, including consideration for
Diversity Visa, Immigrant Visa, and other visa services.132
Post-NTGL Corruption Trials
In January 2009, jury selection began in a corruption case involving the alleged embezzlement of
Liberia Petroleum Refinery Company (LPRC) funds by former National Transitional Government
of Liberia (NTGL) Chairman Gyude Bryant and four former LPRC executives from the NTGL
period. 133 Bryant is separately being tried on charges of economic sabotage relating to the alleged
embezzlement of $1.3 million during his tenure as chairman. The charges stem from a Sirleaf
administration investigation that began in January 2007 in the wake of an Economic Community
of W
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