U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress

Order Code RL33148

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments

and Oversight Issues for Congress

January 26, 2006

name redacted

National Defense Fellow

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and

Oversight Issues for Congress

Summary

On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes

to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now

known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global

Posture Review. Roughly 70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations

from Europe and Asia to bases in the continental United States (CONUS). Other

overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany

and South Korea, while new bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe,

Central Asia, and Africa. In the Department of Defense’s (DOD) view, these

locations would be better able to respond to potential trouble spots. The second

session of the 109th Congress could have to consider approval of the DOD proposal,

or review appropriations requests for construction of infrastructure, increased impact

aid to local communities, and new acquisition programs for mobility and logistics

capabilities (such as airlift). Finally, the Senate may have to consider ratification of

new or revised treaties.

In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of

Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the

“Overseas Basing Commission”) formally reported its findings. It disagreed with the

“timing and synchronization” of the DOD overseas re-basing initiative. It also saw

the initiative as potentially at odds with stresses on the force from operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan, and possibly hampering recruiting and retention. The Commission

questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination had occurred. It expressed

doubts that the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and

noted that DOD had likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the

moves (DOD budgeted $4 billion, the Commission estimated $20 billion). DOD

disagreed with much of the Commission’s analysis. Meanwhile, some have voiced

concern that the DOD plan would harm long-standing alliance relationships, while

others questioned DOD’s plans to accommodate the thousands of troops returning

to the U.S. Critics also argued that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

round, which entered into force on November 9, 2005, and the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR), which is to be completed in early 2006, should have been finalized

before completing the overseas basing plan.

Congress acted on some of its concerns with the re-basing plan in the FY2006

Defense Authorization Act, tasking DOD with follow-on studies of overseas basing

criteria and mobility requirements. It also directs DOD to further examine the state

and local impacts on installations gaining personnel from the re-basing

implementation.

Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further

influence debate on overseas basing. Uzbekistan, one of the test cases for the new

strategy, recently evicted U.S. forces from the base in that Central Asian nation.

Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted by Russia and China, who have

begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in the region. This report

will be updated as necessary.

Contents

Introduction and Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Department of Defense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Re-basing Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Overseas Basing Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Commission Report Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Responses to the Commission Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

International Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Potential Oversight Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Operational Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New

Developments and Oversight Issues for

Congress

Introduction and Issues for Congress

On August 16, 2004, President Bush unveiled one of the most sweeping changes

to the numbers and locations of military overseas basing facilities since the beginning of

the Cold War. Announcing a plan that had been under study for approximately three

years, the Department of Defense would move thousands of personnel from installations

in Europe and Asia to bases within the United States. Simultaneously, the military

would shift its approach away from huge bases such as Ramstein Air Force Base, which

has all of the comforts of the U.S. — family housing, supermarkets, convenience stores,

theaters, and so forth, to reliance on more austere facilities in Central Asia, Africa, and

the Middle East that would be less elaborate and lack most of these benefits. In 2004,

the Congress chartered the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility

Structure of the United States (also known as the Overseas Basing Commission) to

provide an independent assessment of the DOD overseas basing needs.1

The DOD plan could prompt budget and oversight decisions for the second

session of the 109th Congress. These might include approval, modification, or

rejection of the DOD proposal. Congress could also have to consider appropriations

requests for construction of infrastructure at new overseas or expanded continental

United States (CONUS) locations, as well as fund increased impact aid to local

communities. Congress would have to oversee new acquisition programs for

mobility and logistics capabilities (such as airlift) needed for the strategy. Congress

may also consider whether the plan will be executable given the results of the 2005

round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Finally, the Senate may

consider new or revised treaties with new basing partners submitted for its advice

and consent.

1

FY2004 Military Construction Appropriations Act (H.R. 2559/P.L. 108-132 of November

22, 2003), sec. 128. This Commission was chartered to make a “thorough study of matters

relating to the military facility structure of the United States overseas.” This study would

also consider issues pertaining to overseas military construction and facilities, host nation

support payments, training ranges, and opportunities to close or realign overseas bases. It

was specifically chartered to provide “a proposal ... for an overseas basing strategy for the

Department of Defense,” see House of Representatives, Conference Report on H.R. 2559

(H.Rept. 108-342), Making Appropriations for Military Construction, Family Housing, and

Base Realignment and Closure for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending

September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, November 4, 2003; for historical perspective

on the debates that drove the chartering of the Overseas Basing Commission, see CRS

Report RL32310, Appropriations for FY2005: Military Construction, by (name redacted).

CRS-2

Background

The Department of Defense Strategy

The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the

Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to realign

United States overseas forces over a six-to-eight-year period from the bases (basing

“posture”) left over from the Cold War2 to a new posture optimized to support

current allies and confront new potential threats.3 Overall, U.S. installations overseas

would decline from 850 to 550. Roughly 70,000 personnel, mostly from the Army,

would return to the United States. The Congressional Budget Office projects the

initial cost of this relocation effort to be $7 billion, but with a potential savings

payoff of $1 billion per year if the number of U.S. troops permanently based overseas

were reduced to a minimum number needed to receive and host deployments.4

The Defense Department plan envisions three tiers of bases. It would retain

some of the large “main operating bases,”such as Ramstein AFB in Germany, which

have all of the comforts of the United States — family housing, schools,

supermarkets, convenience stores, theaters, and populations in the tens of thousands.5

Secondly, the military would establish an overseas network of “forward operating

sites,” which would be more austere installations and hosting smaller numbers of

personnel. Military personnel would deploy to these bases for temporary duty

(typically one year or less, unaccompanied by families), in contrast to the permanent

change of station moves in which an entire family moves to a new base for two or

more years. Finally, minimalist “cooperative security locations,” would likely be run

by host nation personnel and would not host U.S. forces on a day-to-day basis. These

locations would be used in the event of a crisis to give U.S. forces access to the

region. They would also allow U.S. forces to train with local allies and participate

in cooperative activities, such as disaster relief or peacekeeping, which could

2

During the Cold War, U.S. troops were positioned to stop an invasion by tanks and aircraft

of the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw pact from Eastern Europe into Western Germany. This

required an extensive infrastructure of bases, runways, and training areas to support large

numbers of conventional forces. The U.S. also maintained large forces in Japan and South

Korea, both to deter the Soviets in Asia and to support security guarantees to the South

Koreans, where to date a formal peace treaty ending the 1951-53 war with North Korea does

not exist.

3

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Congress and the

President, (Department of Defense, 2004), p. 60.

4

Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. to Cut Number of Overseas Bases,” Los Angeles Times, September

24, 2005; “U.S. to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases,” New York Times on the Web,

September 23, 2004; Congressional Budget Office, Options for Changing the Army’s

Overseas Basing, May 2004.

5

For comparison, Ramstein AB in Germany has 14,300 military permanent party personnel

as of May 2005, see “Guide to Air Force Installations Worldwide,” Air Force Magazine 88,

no. 5, (May 2005): 136.

CRS-3

improve military-to-military ties.6 U.S. forces would also rely increasingly on offshore prepositioning and sea basing to provide logistical support.7

The biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter

nearly 200 facilities and ultimately draw down roughly 40,000 troops (from 105,570

as of June 2005).8 Some of the forces remaining in Europe would periodically deploy

from bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations in Romania, Bulgaria, or

Central Asia. Both Romania and Bulgaria have energetically campaigned to win

U.S. bases. Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, Eagle Base in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

Manas Air Field in Kyrgyzstan typify the new forward operating sites. While

representing a full time U.S. presence, these bases would lack the elaborate

infrastructure of the major installations that evolved in western Europe. Overall, the

focus of military basing would shift south and east, closer to current Middle-Eastern

hot-spots and Central Asia.9

For East Asia, the plan advocates consolidating bases in South Korea, with a

drawdown of nearly 12,500 personnel (from a strength of 32,744 troops in June

2005),10 and move headquarters for remaining units out of expensive Seoul to

locations further south. Adjustments are also envisioned for troop dispositions in

Japan. Reports indicate the United States is proposing to move the 1st Army

headquarters from Washington state to Camp Zama, near Tokyo; to reposition the 5th

Air Force headquarters from Tokyo to Guam; and to relocate 7,000 of the 15,000

Marines currently on Okinawa to Guam or to other locations in Japan.11 Other U.S.

6

“U.S. to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases,” New York Times on the Web, September

23, 2004.

7

Maritime prepositioning uses a fleet of cargo ships preloaded with supplies and equipment

located near potential trouble spots. Prepositioning this material reduces the time required

for a military unit and its equipment to deploy to a combat area. The best known example

is stationed near the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. For more information, see

CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship

Programs, Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

8

Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area and

By Country,” June 30 2005, [http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0605.pdf]

9

Vince Crawley, “Pentagon Gives Congress Plan for Overseas Basing,” Air Force Times,

October 11, 2004; Vince Crawley, “European Chief Considers Using Existing, Austere

Bases,” Army Times, January 17, 2005; Ann Scott Tyson, “New U.S. Strategy: ‘Lily Pad’

Bases,” Christian Science Monitor, August 10 2004; Vince Crawley, “Closer to New Allies,

Potential Trouble Spots,” Marine Corps Times, June 6, 2005; Vince Crawley, “Discussions

Push for Bases in Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia,” Army Times, May 16, 2005.

10

Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area and

By Country,” June 30 2005, [http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0605.pdf];

also note that the Korea moves began in 2004 and will continue through 2008, so over 5,000

of the 12,500 have already been moved.

11

Yoshio Okubo, “Moving U.S. Bases Splits Nation,” Daily Yomiuri, December 2, 2004;

“Impatient U.S. Seeks June Talks on Bases,” Financial Times, March 12, 2005; Kuniichi

Tanida, “Locals Up in Arms Over Deal That Leaves Combat Units Untouched,” The Asahi

Shimbun, October 31, 2005; Anthony Faiola, “US Agrees to Relocate Marines On

(continued...)

CRS-4

forces in Asia could potentially deploy to the Philippines, Malaysia, or Singapore for

exercises, training, and as-needed forward basing. Reliance on air and naval

capability would increase in the Pacific given the vast distances in the region.

The U.S. military presence in Africa is expanding.12 Officials view Africa as

an increasingly important region in the war on terror. The U.S. already has

established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with Gabon, Ghana, Namibia,

Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, where the focus would be on training and

cooperation.13 The United States established a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of

Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002, which is currently located at Camp Lemonier in

Djibouti. This task force currently focuses on delivering military-to-military training

and performing public works projects in an area including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The United States hopes to expand these

activities into Uganda and Tanzania. There is even discussion within DOD of

transforming the CJTF-HOA into a unified command with responsibility for all of

Africa. U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command currently split

responsibility for Africa.14

Re-basing Rationale

There are strong arguments motivating the need for a revision to the alignment

of U.S. bases overseas. This structure is a legacy of the Cold War confrontation, and

in some cases the U.S. presence may now be less welcome. In testimony before the

Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed

multiple reasons for reworking the overseas military basing dispositions. He argued

that the current arrangements were “seriously obsolete,” oriented to deter and fight

the large standing militaries of the Warsaw Pact in Europe rather than the current

threats. However, he gave no geographic specifics on where he viewed the new

threats as residing. He stated that updating the military’s global posture was part of

the Department’s larger transformation effort, but his comments did not clarify how

the transformational goals such as speed or precision (in his words, to “do more with

less”) drove the overseas basing strategy decisions. He argued that relocating

11

(...continued)

Okinawa,” Washington Post, October 27, 2005; Kuniichi Tanida, “Locals Up In Arms Over

Deal That Leaves Combat Units Untouched,” Asahi Shimbun, October 31, 2005.

12

Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” Foreign Affairs 82,

no. 2 (September/October 2003): 95-103; Robert L. Maginnis, “Calling Troops Home,”

Washington Times, August 14, 2005; Andrew Krepinevich, “The New Pax Americana:

Restructure Base Strategy, Defense Program,” Defense News, September 20 2004; John T.

Bennett, “DOD in Talks with South, West African Nations About Basing Rights,” Inside

the Pentagon, October 21 2004; Andrew Koch, “U.S. Basing Plans in Africa Gain Clarity,”

Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 1, 2005.

13

CRS Report RL32758, U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:

Afghanistan, Africa, the Phillippines, and Columbia, by (name redacted), includes detailed

discussion of some of the recent U.S. military initiatives in Africa.

14

Joshua Kucera, “Djibouti: US Foothold In Africa,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 26,

2005; Gordon Lubold, “Officials Look to Put Africa Under One Watchful Eye,” Army

Times, January 23, 2006.

CRS-5

personnel and facilities in some cases could reduce frictions with host governments

and enhance cooperation with allies. He also indicated that nations that imposed

restrictions or conditions on the use of U.S. forces from their territory would be

viewed as less satisfactory locations.15 He did not specifically cite the countries he

saw as sources of friction with respect to the presence of U.S. forces or the conduct

of U.S. operations. However, it was widely assumed he was referring to friction with

Germany over the invasion of Iraq and German restrictions on U.S. training

exercises.

During his June 2005 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Military

Construction Subcommittee, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

Ryan Henry echoed many of Secretary Rumsfeld’s themes. He noted an increased

reliance on pre-positioned equipment and forces that move to forward operating sites

on a temporary basis, but did not explain the anticipated mix between these forces

and permanently stationed forces, or what the department would need for airlift and

sealift to sustain this approach. He also suggested that the new strategy would

improve military families’ quality of life because they would experience fewer

disruptive overseas moves, and the military member would have a more predictable

deployment schedule. However, the strategy’s reliance on more frequent short

deployments which would increase the frequency of family separations would seem

to some to contradict this assertion.16

Deputy Undersecretary Henry also claimed a linkage with the 2005 BRAC

round and the anticipated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) study, a study that

Congress mandates DOD to accomplish every four years to allocate missions and

guide military procurement.17 He did not, however, address the criticism that the first

QDR performed after 9/11 should precede a realignment of global basing structure,

rather than trail it by over a year. Likewise, the interaction of impacts from the rebasing and from the relocations driven by the 2005 BRAC process have not been

clearly articulated. While it is possible that basing arrangements optimized for Cold

War adversaries may not be suitable to counter current threats, the selection criteria

for new base locations have not been delineated.

15

Department of Defense, “Global Posture,” Testimony as Prepared for Delivery by

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, September

23, 2004, [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html].

16

U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Military Construction and Veterans’

Affairs Subcommittee, “Statement by Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of

Defense,” June 28, 2005.

17

“Statement by Ryan Henry,” June 28, 2005.

CRS-6

The Overseas Basing Commission

Commission Report Findings

On August 15, 2005, the congressionally chartered Overseas Basing

Commission released its final report. The Commission visited with senior military

leaders, defense analysts, and senior officials from other government agencies, and

traveled extensively for site visits. While the Commission concurred with the need

to reshape the structure of U.S. overseas basing, in general, the report was critical of

the DOD’s overseas restructuring process and proposal.18

There were several areas in which the Commission’s report concurred with

DOD. It lauded the concept of transforming of the military from a Cold War

structure to meet new requirements. It agreed that the shifting of forces in South

Korea and the return of most Army heavy forces from Central Europe was

appropriate. It also supported the concepts of forward operating sites and cooperative

security locations, with their reduced personnel and smaller infrastructure. The

Commission agreed that these arrangements would give more options in a crisis and

more opportunities to work with new allies, thus expanding positive U.S. influence.

However, the report’s major finding held that “the timing and synchronization of the

global re-basing initiatives must be rethought.”19

Chairman Cornella argued that DOD’s plan overemphasized a purely military

perspective, and neglected to fully reflect the concerns of all members of the national

security interagency community. For example, State Department concerns about

opportunities to enhance alliance relationships through exercises and exchanges and

to exert political and diplomatic influence in the regions under review were allegedly

given inadequate attention. The Commission believed the desire to implement base

withdrawals quickly, rather than specific strategic decisions and coordination,

seemed to be driving the selections. Further, the report held that the locations were

picked based on today’s threats rather than a long term threat assessment. It

expressed concern that the plan disregards the politics and values of some of the new

potential allies, which might not dovetail with U.S. interests.20

The report questioned the timing of the moves in a environment of fast-paced

current military operations. The Commission expressed concern that the strain of

conducting this sweeping series of moves, while also conducting major conflicts in

Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to threaten the capability of the force. Forces

would either be preparing to deploy, deployed, or returning from deployment, while

18

“New Report on Overseas Basing Plans Remains Critical of Pace, Timing,” Inside the

Pentagon, August 18, 2005; U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Military

Construction and Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee, “Opening Statement of Al Cornella,

Chairman, Overseas Basing Commission,” June 28, 2005.

19

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing Structure of the United

States, “Report to the President and the Congress,” August 15, 2005, pp. i-xii,

[http://obc.gov/documents].

20

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. ix, 4-11.

CRS-7

also trying to reestablish their unit’s support structure, military personnel, and

families at new bases. Further, it viewed the pace of the aggressive time line

proposed by DOD, projected as 2006 through 2011, as overly ambitious.21

The Commission noted that mobility and equipment prepositioning were key to

the success of the re-basing strategy. However, it expressed concern that current and

projected strategic airlift and strategic sealift were inadequate for the Defense

Department’s concept, which relies heavily on transporting troops to crisis areas

rather than permanent forward basing. It also held that sufficient prepositioned

supply stocks do not now exist. Most importantly, it argued that future budget plans

for projected sea and airlift procurement did not account for the re-basing plan’s

needs.22

The report highlighted claims that the re-basing plan would harm the quality of

life of volunteer military personnel. It noted that the military has insufficient plans

to ensure both that required support facilities at U.S. bases gaining personnel are in

place for new personnel on arrival, and that facilities are preserved at the losing base

overseas until the last person is gone. These support facilities include commissaries,

exchanges, hospitals, and child care capacity on base, and off base support capability

provided by the local and state communities such as schools and housing. Without

this support, young military families with limited incomes may suffer in areas of

spouse employment, family health, and cost of living. The Commission also argued

that the heightened tempo of temporary overseas rotations that is central to the plan

will result in frequent family separations over the course of a career that could

threaten retention and recruiting. The decision to stay in the military is very much

a family decision, and when many child growth milestones are missed, or a spouse

experiences enough home emergencies and worry while the military member is

deployed overseas, the decision can tip to separation from the military.23

Significantly, the report contended that the DOD might have underestimated the

total cost to implement their base realignment process. The Commission’s

independent analysis calculated a $20 billion bill for the moves, while the DOD has

only budgeted $4 billion through 2011. The danger is that the services will need to

spend from their operations and maintenance budget accounts (which should

normally be used to buy day-to-day material such as expendable equipment, fuel, or

ammunition) to cover the difference. This could result in potential damage to force

readiness, given the concurrent budget demands caused by combat operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan.24

21

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. ix-x, 11-16.

22

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. x,16-20. The

Congressional Budget Office recently completed a study comparing strategic mobility

alternatives, including an examination of new types of systems like heavy lift airships

(blimps). See Congressional Budget Office, Options for Strategic Military Transportation

Systems, September 2005.

23

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. x-xi, 20-25.

24

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xi, 25-29.

CRS-8

The Commission, given all its reservations, recommended a slowing and

reordering of the pace of overseas re-basing until that the acquisition of key

capabilities, such as mobility and prepositioned supplies, required to support the new

strategy had occurred. It also maintained that better budget support for establishing

forces at new locations (mainly back in the U.S.), such as funding for the movement

of people and equipment and building at these locations is required. Further

preparatory activities were needed for local communities to absorb thousands of new

military families, such as support for additional schools and roads.25

In general, the Commission held that a coherent national strategy did not

sufficiently guide the overseas posture review and that a formal national debate on

the larger scope of American security post-Cold War should precede further re-basing

moves. It argued that completion of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Base

Realignment and Closure Commission report, and the Mobility Capabilities Study26

were key to providing an overall architecture for updating our overseas posture. The

Commission strongly recommended diligent Congressional oversight of this process

to ensure a cohesive basing strategy.27

Responses to the Commission Report

The Defense Department responded to the Commission’s report upon its release

in May 2005. Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Ryan Henry and Acting

Under Secretary of the Army Ray Dubois met with the press and delivered specific

counterpoints to many of the report’s findings. Mr. Henry rebutted the

Commission’s critique of the DOD choices for strategic dispositions. Where the

Commission viewed the DOD selections as based on today’s threats, he asserted that

the concept strove to base the forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed

of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment.28 Critics may contend,

however, to simply assert that future threats are unpredictable sidesteps the challenge

of articulating a strategic vision, which includes a projection of anticipated threats.

Mr. Henry also took issue with the Commission’s argument that DOD had not

sufficiently coordinated the Global Posture Review across government agencies. He

cited meetings with the regional combatant commanders that began shortly after the

2001 QDR, as well as consultations with the Department of State, the National

Security Council, and 45 briefings to Members of Congress and to committee staffs.

25

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xi-xii, 29-32.

26

The Mobility Capabilites Study is a Department of Defense project to analyze how much

airlift and sealift will be required for the future. It relies on computer modeling of multiple

deployment scenarios to determine how much capacity will be needed. In turn, that data

will be used to guide procurement programs for new airlift aircraft, air refueling aircraft, fast

sealift ships, and maritime prepositioning assets. See CRS Report RL32887, Strategic

Mobility Innovation: Options and Oversight Issues, by Jon D. Klaus, for an overview of the

Mobility Capabilities Study and options under consideration.

27

28

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xii-xiii.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Department Special Briefing,” May 9, 2005,

[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050509-2701.html].

CRS-9

He maintained that Congress had indicated satisfaction with the amount of oversight

consultation to this point. He also highlighted visits to the leadership in over 20

foreign countries that could be affected by the relocations. While he noted the

number of meetings, he did not indicate whether the briefings were in-depth or

ongoing, nor the state of progress, particularly regarding the delicate status of forces

agreements that guide basing rules with the foreign countries. He stated that the

Global Posture Review was intended to serve as a starting point to feed the 2005

QDR, as well as the 2005 BRAC and the Mobility Capability Study, all of which

were to be coordinated in parallel. Therefore, it would fall to the QDR to address the

timing of lift procurement and other needed equipment acquisition to ensure it

supports the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). However,

since the QDR is intended to be the keystone document outlining DODs future

strategic vision, selecting how the military will align its bases before determining the

strategy they are trying to achieve raises questions of appropriate sequence.

Mr. Dubois disputed the Commission report’s concerns that DOD was

shortchanging military families’ quality of life. He responded that the re-basing

plan’s decisions were incorporated into the BRAC analysis. He noted that the DOD

held discussions with the Department of Education, as well as state governors and

leaders of communities that would be vital partners in supporting returning personnel

and dependents. He did not, however, indicate if additional impact aid for these

communities was planned. He also did not address plans to expand infrastructure on

or near affected installations. He held that the re-basing would give other payoffs to

improve quality of life; noting that the number of family permanent changes of

station (PCSs) would be fewer, thus reducing the turmoil of overseas moves.

Although reducing the number of PCS moves may offer greater stability, it assumes

that all military bases are of equal desirability in their geographical location and

facilities, which is often not the case. DOD also appears to assume the overseas

stationing in permanent European bases (such as Germany, Italy) are undesirable to

military families, which is also often not the case. In fact, the opportunity to

periodically live overseas is, for some, an advantage of a military career. Mr. Dubois

also did not address, however, the stress that increased unaccompanied overseas

deployments would place on families, or the troops deployed at isolated, “barebones” locations. Neither official addressed the potential impact on recruiting or

retention.

Finally, Mr. Henry downplayed the disparity between the Defense Department’s

and the Commission’s cost figures. He suggested that the Commission’s study

included costs that other programs in the defense budget covered, while DOD figures

only focused on the additional costs driven specifically by the moves. Mr. Dubois

also noted that the military would eventually accrue savings in operations and

maintenance accounts as they drew down from maintaining expensive overseas

locations. Yet even if these costs will be covered by other programs in the budget,

there is no indication that the department has proposed an increase for those budget

items, such as construction, airlift procurement, or sealift procurement. Further, it is

unclear that the compensation the U.S. would get from the new host nations would

offset that currently received from established allies. Commonly, countries in which

U.S. bases are located provide various forms of “host nation support.” This could

include basic utility services, construction, and even cash payments in recognition of

the benefit to local economies. However, many of the new locations, such as

CRS-10

Kyrgyzstan, are demanding payments from the U.S. to allow basing in their

countries.

Reaction to the Pentagon’s plan continued to emerge from beyond the

Commission. Alliance relationships formed one topic for debate. Historically,

European allies have been especially desirous of keeping a significant U.S. presence,

which they view as supporting European stability and integration. Security

guarantees to other allies have encouraged their support of non-proliferation regimes.

Some critics, such as Philip H. Gordon at the Brookings Institution, fear that moving

forces away from long term allies to basing in nations less likely to restrain U.S.

military operations would give the Administration more latitude to take unilateral

military action in future crises without consultation, thus further harming

relationships and the U.S. image.29 Others have reinforced the concern that the

moves could erode ties with traditional, long term American allies, with particular

focus centered on the relationship with Germany. Some, such as (name redacted) at the

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, even suggested that the moves were

intended as punishment of Germany by the Bush administration for its opposition to

U.S. operations in Iraq.30 At the same time, it bears recognition that land restrictions

and real estate costs for some U.S. allies has led to limitations on training and

exercises. Further, prudent U.S. relocations could reduce frictions with local

populations, especially in Okinawa and South Korea.

Advocacy groups for military personnel and families echoed the report’s

warnings regarding the impact of the re-basing strategy on quality of life. Some, like

Joyce Raezer of the National Military Family Association, suggested that DOD’s

record of preparation for past unit moves showed that services were not ready for

families at new locations, and that services closed before old locations were empty.

Likewise, they fear the strain on civilian infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and

housing, could cause problems with the relocations. For example, as a new brigade

recently assumed posting at Fort Drum (Watertown, New York), soldiers had to

move up to 75 miles away for housing.31 Such long commutes will strain soldiers on

shift work or delay their response in a crisis. Scarce housing also could harm troops’

standard of living, particularly for families where both adults are active duty

members, or single parent households. It could also drive up rent costs for junior

enlisted members and could limit civilian spouse employment opportunities. For

example, schools in Watertown became overcrowded, and the single hospital in town

lacked capacity for the new patients. However, other larger communities, such as El

Paso Texas, have expressed enthusiasm for the job growth and homebuilding surge

these moves would prompt.32

29

Ronald Brownstein, “Turnabout on Troops Abroad,” Los Angeles Times, August 18, 2004.

30

Dave Moniz and Steven Komarow, “Pullback Could Alter Ties With Allies,” USA Today,

August 17, 2004.

31

32

Gordon Trowbridge, “Unease on Family Front,” Marine Corps Times, June 6, 2005.

Mark Sappenfield, “A Rush to Make Room for Returning Troops,” Christian Science

Monitor, August 15, 2005.

CRS-11

Recent Developments

Department of Defense

Other Department of Defense transformational programs that interact with the

IGPBS continue to progress. The 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure

findings entered into force on November 9, 2005. The BRAC Commission reviewed

Pentagon proposals to close or realign over 800 installations. Most of the DOD

BRAC list remained unchanged, with the Commission adopting 86% of the DOD’s

proposal. Congress did not approve a resolution that would have prevented the

BRAC results from automatically entering into force (H. J. Res 65). However, DOD

will not have implementation plans ready until early 2006. Closings must start by

2007, and must be complete by 2011.33

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is under final review and

scheduled to be sent to Congress on February 6, 2006. To spur movement on the

contentious QDR study, acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England

recently directed Pentagon leadership to focus their analysis on three core missions:

homeland defense, global war on terrorism, and conventional major warfare in order

to streamline deliberations from more than 160 issues originally nominated for

consideration. Ensuring sufficient “enabler” forces, which include logistics and

mobility functions, remains a point of contention and is a critical aspect of QDR

linkage with the Global Posture Review. With regard to force structure, reports

indicate that in order to free funds for a potential QDR call to increase Army and

Marine forces for the war on terror, the Navy might drop from 11 to 10 carrier battle

groups. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had proposed this idea as early as September

2004, but it would also seem to cut into the power projection and mobility concepts

pivotal to the global re-basing strategy.34

The Mobility Capabilities Study was completed at the end of July 2005 and

DOD has been briefing the results to Congressional defense committees and staffers.

33

David S. Cloud, “Panel on Base Closings Wraps Up Work,” New York Times, August 28,

2005; 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, “BRAC Commission Delivers

Final Recommendations to the President,” press release, September 8, 2005,

[http://www.brac.gov/docs/PressRelease_8Sep2005.pdf]; Rick Maze, “Move to Block Base

Closings Is Defeated,” Air Force Times, November 7, 2005; John M. Donelly, “House

Refuses to Block BRAC Decisions, Paving Way for Base Closures,” CQ Today, October 27,

2005; Donna Miles, “BRAC Deadline Expires, DOD to Begin Closures, Realignments,” US

Department of Defense Information, November 10, 2005; “BRAC Implementation Plan On

Schedule,” FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, December 12, 2005.

34

Michael Sirak, “Senior DOD Official Provides Insights Into Forthcoming QDR,” Defense

Daily, January 18, 2006; “England Sets QDR Endgame; Giambastiani Joins Review,”

InsideDefense.com Defense Alert, August 16, 2005 at [http://www.insidedefense.com];

Elaine M. Grossman, “Defense Leaders Put Final Touches on New Force-Planning

Mechanism,” Inside the Pentagon, August 18, 2005, at [http://www.insidedefense.com;

Elaine] M. Grossman, “Army, Marine Corps Seen as Early Winners in Quadrennial

Review,” Inside the Pentagon, August 18, 2005, at [http://www.insidedefense.com]; Richard

Mullen, “Rumsfeld Says Navy Can Operate With Fewer Carrier Groups,” Defense Today,

September 24, 2004.

CRS-12

Despite assumptions of a changed threat environment, the study finds that the

currently planned program, which was shaped before the September 11, 2001 attacks,

is sufficient to support national strategy. It argues that no additional airlifters, sealift

ships, or aerial refueling tankers are needed and calls for ending purchases of C-17

and C-130J transports. It also requires retaining and modernizing all Air Force C-5

transports, which historically have a poor availability rate.35 The recommendation

to end C-17 construction contradicts recommendations from former U.S.

Transportation Command commander General John Hardy, who called for at least

42 more aircraft.36 A September 2005 Defense Science Board report also questioned

the sufficiency of airlift and tanker capabilities and proposed that DOD should “keep

open the option to acquire additional C-17s” given the unpredictable threat and

budget environment.37 In examining the DOD methodology behind the Mobility

Capabilities Study, the Government Accountability Office also expressed concerns

regarding the validity of the modeling and simulation tools used in developing the

results.38

Congressional Action

Congress incorporated its concerns regarding the Global Posture Review into

the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (PL 109-163). Congress directed

the DOD to submit a report by March 30, 2006. This report would address selection

criteria, a process for analyzing alternative locations, and descriptions of minimum

infrastructure for each the types of facilities envisioned. The legislation requires

DOD to detail funding for these overseas locations in the annual budget submission.

Congress also ordered DOD to notify congressional defense committees when basing

agreements are completed with foreign governments. One unidentified congressional

staffer expressed concern that the information DOD had forwarded to Congress has

been too “subjective.”39

The FY2006 Authorization specifically addressed the mobility requirements for

the overseas basing plan and seemed to express skepticism regarding the findings of

35

Michael Bruno, “Mobility Capability Study Analysis Done, Under Review,” Aerospace

Daily & Defense Report, July 29, 2005; Megan Scully, “Mobility Study Unlikely to Impact

Budget,” National Journal’s CongressDaily, October 25, 2005; Jason Sherman, “Study:

DOD Has the Sealift, Airlift Capacity to Execute Military Strategy,” Inside Defense,

November 7, 2005.

36

Amy Butler, “Sunset for Airlifters?” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 31,

2005.

37

Jason Sherman, “Advisory Panel to Rumsfeld suggests More C-17s Are Required,” Inside

the Air Force, November 11, 2005.

38

United States Government Accountability Office, “Defense Transportation: Opportunities

Exist to Enhance the Credibility of the Current and Future Mobility Capabilities Studies,”

September 14, 2005.

39

United States House of Representatives, “Conference Report to Accompany HR 1815,

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,” H Rept 109-360, December 18,

2005, sect. 1233, pp. 338-339; Sebastian Sprenger, “Defense Authorizers Ask for DOD

Report on Overseas Basing Choices,” Inside the Pentagon, December 22, 2005..

CRS-13

the Mobility Capabilities Study. Congress included authorization for the Air Force

to purchase up to 42 additional C-17 airlifters. However, exercise of that authority

is contingent on the DOD first conducting a re-assessment of airlift requirements for

national defense. This assessment must specifically take into account the structure

proposed by the IGPBS. The legislation tasks DOD to submit this assessment with

the QDR, or up to 45 days after the QDR is delivered to Congress, if more time is

required.40

Congress also gave direction regarding the stateside infrastructure needs that

would arise from returning forces. The FY2006 Authorization legislation also

requires the Secretary of Defense to consult with state and local governments, as it

develops its global posture implementation plans, regarding infrastructure and

support needs driven by personnel returning from overseas basing.41 The legislation

also included a Sense of the Congress that the quality-of-life support facilities should

be ready at bases gaining personnel before they arrive, and maintained at closing

bases until the personnel have departed.42 Lastly, the FY2006 Authorization

incorporated a Sense of the Congress that roads leading to military installations that

gain significant numbers of personnel from the IGPBS or BRAC should be

designated as defense access roads.43 This section also directs the Secretary of

Defense to conduct a study of the surface transportation infrastructure around bases

affected by BRAC and the IGPBS and its adequacy to support the gains from

redeployments. That report is due to Congress by April 15, 2007.44

International Arena

There have been several recent positive events that help the implementation of

the Global Posture Review to move forward. On December 6, 2005, Secretary of

State Rice signed an agreement with Romanian Foreign Minister Razvan Ungureanu

to station U.S. forces at the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base near Constanta, on the

Romanian Black Sea coast. U.S. forces would also be able to use the Babadag,

Smardan, and Cincu training ranges. The new location would house the Eastern

European Task Force, with roughly 1,500 personnel. Reports indicate that

negotiations for basing in Bulgaria are also nearing conclusion.45 The United States

also concluded an agreement with Japan regarding operations on Okinawa. The

40

H Rept 109-360, sect. 131, pp. 27-28.

41

H Rept 109-360, sect. 2835, pp. 389-390.

42

H Rept 109-360, sect. 2836, pp. 390.

43

Defense access roads include the roads, bridges, tubes, and tunnels that provide access to

military reservations, defense industries, defense industry sites, or sources of raw materials,

which the Secretary of Defense certifies as important to national defense. DOD receives

funds which it may use to reimburse states and localities for use and upkeep of these roads.

See 23 US Code Section 210.

44

45

H Rept 109-360, sect. 2837, pp. 390-391.

Gordon Lubold, “Deal With Romania Signals New European Base Strategy,” Air Force

Times, December 19, 2005; “US Signs Deal for First Permanent Military Base in Ex-Soviet

Block,” Agence France Presse, December 6, 2005.

CRS-14

agreement would relocate the 3, 000 Marines at Futenma to land to be reclaimed offshore at Camp Schwab.46

Other recent international developments potentially cast shadows on key

assumptions underlying the Global Posture Review. There might be indicators of an

international shift in the degree of welcome extended by other countries to basing

U.S. forces. For example, a statement by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun

would seem to place limits on the United States ability to employ forces stationed in

Korea to missions beyond the peninsula.47 In another case, Kyrgyzstan has demanded

a 100-fold increase (from $2 million to $200 million) in the rent the United States

pays for use of Manas air base. Kyrgyz President Bakiyev had also been trying to

charge the United States an additional $80 million for jet fuel. The United States had

already paid for this fuel, but the payment was allegedly misappropriated by former

President Akayev. The DOD has refused this additional charge, claiming the

corruption is a Kyrgyz internal problem. The Kyrgyz government has also begun

agitating for compensation for claimed environmental damage due to aircraft

emergency fuel dumping.48 In yet another instance, Russian officials quickly

expressed dismay at the recently concluded U.S. basing agreement with Romania.

Russian Defense Minister Ivanov suggested that the move put the future of the

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in doubt and appeared to threaten

withdrawal from the treaty. The State Department countered that the U.S. agreement

was in compliance with CFE and other understandings with Russia.49

Of particular concern to the re-basing plan are recent developments in

Uzbekistan. On July 29, 2005, the United States was formally notified that it had 180

days to leave its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, in Uzbekistan. This base has served

as a vital hub for missions flown to support operations in Afghanistan, and was

prototypical of the cooperative security locations envisioned in the Pentagon rebasing plan. The last contingent of U.S. troops departed on November 21, 2005,

ending four years of operations there. One reason for this eviction might have been

State Department pressure on the Tashkent government regarding recent human

46

Anthony Faiola, “US Agrees to Relocate Marines On Okinawa,” Washington Post,

October 27, 2005; Kuniichi Tanida, “Locals Up In Arms Over Deal That Leaves Combat

Units Untouched,” Asahi Shimbun, October 31, 2005.

47

“Roh Tells U.S. to Stay Out of Regional Affairs,” Washington Times, March 11, 2005.

48

Demetri Sevastopulo, Hubert Wetzel, “Kyrgyz Rent Rise Intensifies US Battle over Base

Pentagon Dispute,” Financial Times, December 15, 2005; “Kyrgyzstan’s Base Proposal,”

Washington Times, December 27, 2005; Nathan Hodge, “Base Hypocrisy,” Slate Magazine,

December 8, 2005.

49

“US Seeks to Reassure Russia Over Military Bases,” Defense News, December 7, 2005.

The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) places national and regional limits on

troops and equipment that may be permanently stationed or temporarily deployed by

member states. It also requires advanced notification of significant force movements. For

further information, see CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, by (name redacted).

CRS-15

rights abuses.50 Another reason for the eviction might have been encouragement

from China and Russia, who have indicated increasing unease regarding U.S.

military activity in the Central Asia region — a region seen by the United States as

strategically vital to the war on terror. Commentators contend that Russia, and

particularly China, are exploiting the perception of U.S. support for democratic

revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine as examples of a U.S. threat to the power of

the area’s authoritarian leaders, such as President Karimov in Uzbekistan. During

the demonstrations that prompted the harsh Uzbek government response and

attendant U.S. criticism, China publicly expressed support for Karimov’s actions.

Furthermore, shortly before the United States’ eviction, Karimov visited Beijing,

where he garnered $1.5 billion in contracts and agreements between China and

Uzbekistan.51

Finally, the political and security climate in some locations proposed for U.S.

forward bases could require a disproportionate amount of manpower be dedicated to

local security requirements. For example, while President Hamid Karzai has signaled

a desire for a permanent U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, an upsurge of

violence killed seven U.S. troops in a four day period in August 2005. This increase

of attacks also wounded two embassy staffers, four years after the defeat of the

Taliban.52 Other countries reported to be under consideration for, or already hosting

U.S. troops confront significant terrorist threats of their own. For example, the

“Lord’s Resistance Army” continues to stage brutal attacks in Uganda, with a limited

cease-fire having failed at the beginning of the year. In Turkmenistan, a country

under consideration to host the U.S. forces removed from Uzbekistan, government

crackdowns on terrorists have led to accusations of major violations of human rights

and civil liberties curtailments.53

Potential Oversight Issues for Congress

The Overseas Basing Commission pointedly emphasized the importance of

Congressional oversight of the overseas basing realignment process. Some of the

issues Congress may wish to consider include the following:

50

Robin Wright, Ann Scott Tyson, “ U.S. Evicted from Air Base in Uzbekistan,”

Washington Post, July 30, 2005; Will Dunham, “US Pulls Out of Uzbekistan Base After

Eviction,” Reuters News, November 21, 2005.

51

Christopher Brown, “Uzbekistan Signals,” Washington Times, August 14, 2005.

52

Halinma Kazem, “Karzai Hints at Permanent U.S. Military Basing,” Los Angeles Times,

April 14, 2005; Jonathan S. Landay, “4 GIs Killed as Afghan Attacks Increase,” Pittsburgh

Post-Gazette, August 22, 2005.

53

U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004,” at

[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/c14818.htm]; John T. Bennett, “DOD in Talks with South,

West African Nations About Basing Rights,” Inside the Pentagon, October 21, 2004;

Interfax, “Transfer of US Base from Uzbekistan to Turkmenistan ‘Possible,’” BBC

Monitoring Central Asia, August 29, 2005, [http://global.factiva.com].

CRS-16

Strategy

Does the IGPBS have adequate linkage to an overarching strategic framework

agreed upon by all key government parties in the national security strategy process?

While most may agree that a revision of the overseas basing structure left from the

Cold War is overdue, some would argue that developing a re-basing strategy without

completing the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review and achieving

buy-in across government agencies and with Congress is premature. These moves

may have major impacts across many aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy.

The lack of overarching strategy and analysis may also be construed by some to miss

vital linkages in execution timing and schedule, which could lead to implementation

pitfalls in the future.

Cost

Are the Defense Department’s cost projections for the overseas realignment

accurate? Will projected savings outweigh the cost of realignment and associate

systems procurement? The DOD and the Overseas Basing Commission disagree on

these points. Others might also contend that proposing a re-basing strategy before

completing the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round and the Mobility

Capabilities Study could result in mismatches of supporting infrastructure or mobility

assets. The consequence could be a shift of these unfunded requirements onto the

services, which are already under pressure from the cost of ongoing combat

operations.

Operational Tempo

Is it feasible to conduct the basing realignment moves given the deployment

tempo driven by ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Units

returning from combat deployments, only to immediately pack up families and

relocate, can put immense burdens on an already stressed force. This burden is

exacerbated if the bases receiving new troops lack sufficient supporting

infrastructure. Can the services permanently sustain the long term pace of frequent

deployments required by the strategy? At some undetermined point, members may

experience enough degraded quality of life for their families, and endure such

frequent separations, that retention or recruiting begin to suffer.

Diplomacy

What will be the effect of the re-basing on the relationship with long term U.S.

allies, such as Germany, where a drawdown is proposed? Lack of presence could

find the United States reducing its voice in European or Asian affairs, and finding it

harder to motivate international coalitions or support when needed. Have sufficient

legal arrangements, such as status of forces agreements and overflight rights, been

negotiated in advance of the arrival of U.S. forces in new host nations? The

Overseas Basing Commission argued that the preliminary diplomatic legwork had

not been fully accomplished. Do the political climates in the new host nations

support U.S. values of democracy and human rights? While some nations, such as

Romania, have actively sought a U.S. presence, others, such as Uzbekistan, have

CRS-17

ended those arrangements as soon as they begin to annoy or lose their profitability.

Is the re-basing proposal affected by standing treaties to which the U.S. is a state

party, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty? Early evidence may

indicate that DOD and the State Department need to further examine potential treaty

impacts.

EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the

Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on

issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The

reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to

the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts

who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made

any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in

the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without

permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a

third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or

otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public

understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in

connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim

copyright on any CRS report we have republished.