The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Congressional research reportDec 8, 2014
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
(name redacted)
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
December 8, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL33110
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Summary
With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total
$1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and
Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the
war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.
Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:
•
$686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and
other counterterror operations received;
•
$815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn
(OND);
•
$27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security
at military bases; and
•
$81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the
Afghanistan or Iraq wars.
About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign
aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration’s medical
care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities
tangentially-related to war operations.
The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals
$73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for
enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect
the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent
Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents
and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The
Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that
Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0
billion.
In late May 2014, the President announced that troop levels in Afghanistan would fall from
33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015 with the U.S. role focusing on advising Afghan security
forces and conducting counter-terror operations. A year later, by January 1, 2016, the President
stated that the number of troops in Afghanistan would halve to about 4,900 and then by the
beginning of 2017, settle at an embassy presence of about 1,000.
Overall U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq began to decline with the withdrawal of all U.S.
troops from Iraq by December 2011. The troop decline continued with President Obama’s
announcement in February 2013 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from
67,000 to 34,000 by February 2014. Annual war costs also decreased from a peak of $195 billion
in FY2008 to $95 billion enacted in FY2014. After the reversal of the 2009 Afghanistan surge, the
President promised in the 2013 State of the Union address that “our troops will continue coming
home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead [and] our mission will change
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
from combat to support.” He also stated that by “2014, this process of transition will be complete,
and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”
The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war funding at the FY2014
enacted level of $95.5 billion, which exceeds the FY2015 amended request (with OIR) by about
$16.5 billion. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to enact another
CR or an Omnibus appropriations act for the rest of the fiscal year.
Congress may face several budgetary issues about how to respond to the FY2015 war request and
longer-term war cost issues including:
•
assessing the amount, purposes, and level of funding to support U.S. troops
during the post-2014 drawdown;
•
evaluating the Administration proposal for a new flexible funding account that
would provide $5 billion for a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP) to
respond to unspecified “evolving threats from South Asia to the Sahel” by
“building partnership capacity” through Train & Equip programs;
•
defining what is an appropriate war-related cost as opposed to what is in the base,
non-war budget, a choice made more difficult in part by the potential squeeze on
agencies’ base budgets that are subject to Budget Control Act spending limits
(P.L. 112-25);
•
estimating the potential long-term cost of the war, including repairing and
replacing war-worn equipment and maintaining an “enduring presence” that
could entail a substantial footprint in the region; and
•
responding to the November 2014 request for $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent
Resolve, the new operation to counter the Islamic State.
There are some indications that the FY2015 DOD war funding request may be more than is
needed in light of FY2014 experience when expenses for returning troops and equipment have
proven to be lower and the pace faster than anticipated. If expenses are lower and withdrawal is
faster than anticipated, the FY2015 request may also include excess funds that could be used to
pay for part or all of the new $5.5 billion request to counter the Islamic State. Savings in FY2015
could be partly offset by the recent announcement by Secretary Hagel that up to 1,000 U.S. troops
could be kept in Afghanistan until the spring of 2015 to substitute for a delay in NATO troops
being available to provide needed support.
Members have raised various concerns about the broad authorities requested for the new CTPF,
which exceed current authorities for other Train & Equip programs. The conference version of the
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3797, reduces the funding and rejects most of
the new authorities requested. Other concerns include the lack of evidence of success in previous
similar programs, particularly in situations like the complex political-military environment in
Syria and Iraq.
Congress may wish to consider ways to restrict war-funding to exclude activities marginally
related to war operations and support, and to limit the use of ground troops in Operation Inherent
Resolve.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
The FY2015 Request and Potential War Cost Issues ....................................................................... 1
Status of FY2015 DOD Request ............................................................................................... 3
FY2015 Defense Authorization Action ............................................................................... 3
FY2015 Defense Appropriations Action ............................................................................. 5
Cumulative War Funding and the FY2015 Request ........................................................................ 5
By Operation ............................................................................................................................. 6
“Other” War Funding .......................................................................................................... 7
By Agency ................................................................................................................................. 7
U.S. Boots on the Ground, FY2001-FY2015 ............................................................................ 9
Changing Troop Levels in Iraq, 2003-2014 ...................................................................... 10
Changing Troop Levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2017 ......................................................... 10
NATO and Afghan Troops................................................................................................. 12
Location of U.S. Military Personnel Serving in OEF and OIF/OND ...................................... 12
Trends in War Funding by Operation ...................................................................................... 14
Iraq War Funding............................................................................................................... 14
Afghan War Funding ......................................................................................................... 14
Enhanced Security ............................................................................................................. 16
Trends in War Funding by Agency .......................................................................................... 16
Department of Defense...................................................................................................... 16
State Department Diplomatic Operations and U.S. Foreign Aid (USAID) ....................... 17
VA Medical War-Related Funding .................................................................................... 18
War Funding and Budget Controls ................................................................................................ 20
Congressional Concerns .......................................................................................................... 21
Designating Funding as Emergency or OCO .......................................................................... 23
Changes in DOD Definitions of War Funding ............................................................................... 25
DOD’s Regulations on War Funding ....................................................................................... 25
War Expenses Within Regular Accounts ........................................................................... 25
Additional Special Purpose Accounts ............................................................................... 26
Congressional Adds and DOD ‘Must-Pay’ Bills ..................................................................... 26
DOD’s 2006 Guidance Expands Definition of “War-Related”................................................ 27
OMB 2009 Guidance Restores War Funding Limits ............................................................... 28
Force Structure and War Funding ............................................................................................ 30
Reset Requirements ................................................................................................................. 32
Military Construction and Permanent Bases ........................................................................... 34
DOD’s Definition of “Other” Funding .................................................................................... 34
Assessing DOD’s FY2015 War Request ........................................................................................ 35
Has DOD Used All Its War Funds? ......................................................................................... 39
Lapsed War Funds ............................................................................................................. 40
FY2014 War Funds Finance Airstrikes, Ebola Emergency, and Aircraft .......................... 42
War Funds Cut During the FY2013 Sequester .................................................................. 43
Changes in Per-Troop Costs .................................................................................................... 44
Per-Troop Costs Rise with Troop Levels .......................................................................... 44
Increases During Withdrawals .......................................................................................... 46
DOD Drawdown Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan ..................................................................... 46
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Changes in Troop Strength in Iraq and Afghanistan in Earlier Years ................................ 46
Comparing Operational Costs and Strength ...................................................................... 48
Comparing Investment Costs and Troop Strength............................................................. 48
Flexible Funding and the New Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) ................................. 49
Rationales for Flexible Funding .............................................................................................. 50
Flexibility at the Beginning of Hostilities ............................................................................... 55
Congress and the FY2015 Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) ................................. 55
NDAA Draft FY2015 Conference Version........................................................................ 57
Precedents for CTPF Are More Specific ................................................................................. 57
Do Train-and-Equip Programs Work: The Effectiveness Issue ............................................... 59
Training Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces.............................................................................. 61
Assessing Iraq Security Forces ......................................................................................... 62
Assessing Afghan Security Forces .................................................................................... 64
Meeting Unanticipated Wartime Needs Quickly ..................................................................... 65
Wartime Reconstruction Accounts .......................................................................................... 65
Traditional Transfer Authority ................................................................................................. 66
The New Request to Counter the Islamic State ............................................................................. 66
Department of Defense Request .............................................................................................. 67
New Iraq Train-and-Equip Authority ................................................................................ 68
Additional U.S. Military Personnel ................................................................................... 69
Predicting Future Costs ........................................................................................................... 70
Future War Costs and Paying for an “Enduring Presence” ............................................................ 71
Questions That Could Be Raised ............................................................................................. 73
Alternate Residual War Funding Projections........................................................................... 73
Congressional Options to Affect Military Operations ................................................................... 77
The Vietnam Experience ......................................................................................................... 77
Restrictions Proposed More Recently ..................................................................................... 79
Figures
Figure 1. Boots on the Ground In-Country, FY2001-FY2017......................................................... 9
Figure 2. OEF and OIF Deployed U.S. Troops.............................................................................. 13
Figure 3. Estimated War Funding by Operation, FY2001-FY2015 Request ................................. 15
Figure 4. Estimated War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request ..................................... 17
Figure 5. War Funding: Lapsed and Transferred ........................................................................... 41
Figure 6. O&M, Army Monthly Obligations, FY2009-FY2014 ................................................... 42
Figure 7. Changes in Per-Troop Cost Before and After Withdrawals............................................ 45
Figure 8. Changes in Troop Strength and Operational Costs......................................................... 47
Figure 9. Changes in Troop Strength and Investment Cost ........................................................... 48
Figure 10. U.S. Airstrikes in Iraq, August 8, 2014-November 24, 2014 ....................................... 70
Figure 11. U.S. Air Strikes in Syria, September 22-November 24, 2014 ...................................... 71
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Tables
Table 1. FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4435/S. 2410) ................................... 4
Table 2. FY2015 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4870) ................................................................. 5
Table 3. Cumulative War Funding by Operation, FY2001-FY2015 Request .................................. 6
Table 4. Cumulative War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request ...................................... 8
Table 5. Estimated War Funding by Operation, Agency, and Fiscal Year, FY2001-FY2015
Request ....................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 6. DOD’s Non-War Costs, FY2001-FY2015 ....................................................................... 35
Table 7. DOD Funding for OEF and OIF/OND, FY2001-FY2015 Request by Title .................... 38
Table 8. Execution of War Funding, FY2009-May FY2014.......................................................... 40
Table 9. DOD’S Flexible Funds for War ....................................................................................... 51
Table 10. Funding for the ASFF and the ISFF, FY2004-FY2015 Request .................................... 62
Table 11. DOD’s OCO Funding: FY2014 Enacted to FY2015 Supplemental Request ................. 67
Table 12. U.S. Military Strength, FY2014-FY2015, Amended OCO ............................................ 70
Table 13. Alternative Residual War Funding Projections: FY2016-FY2024................................. 75
Table A-1. Boots on the Ground for Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq/
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn .................................................................. 81
Table B-1. Criteria for War/Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Requests ....................... 90
Table C-1. Defense Department, Foreign Operations Funding, and VA Medical Funding
for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Activities, FY2001-FY2014 ................ 93
Table D-1. Functional Breakdown for the Afghan and Iraq Wars ................................................. 98
Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2001-FY2015 ................................. 81
Appendix B. OMB Criteria for War Costs ..................................................................................... 89
Appendix C. War Appropriations by Public Law and Agency ...................................................... 93
Appendix D. War Funding by Function, FY2009-FY2015 ........................................................... 96
Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 100
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 100
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Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Armed Forces, under guidance from the
Department of Defense (DOD), have conducted the following military operations:
•
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and other small Global War on
Terror (GWOT) operations like the Philippines and Djibouti that began
immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continue;
•
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of
troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continued with counter-insurgency
and stability operations until 2010;
•
Operation New Dawn (OND), a successor to OIF that began on September 1, 2010,
when U.S. troops adopted an advisory and assistance role and concluded in
December 2011 when all U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq (though some 13,000
combat-ready troops remain in Kuwait);
•
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases
and other homeland security that was launched in response to the attacks and
continues at a modest level; and
•
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), authorized by the President on August 7, 2014,
beginning with DOD air strikes in Iraq and Syria to “degrade and ultimately
defeat” the Islamic State (IS) without deploying U.S. ground troops.
On May 27, 2014, President Obama’s announced that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan
would decrease from 33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015; would halve again by January 1, 2016, to
about 4,900; and be limited to an embassy presence of about 1,000 thereafter.1 Some unspecified
number of the 60,000 U.S. troops currently providing in-theater support would remain in the region
as an “enduring presence” after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.
The FY2015 Request and Potential War Cost Issues
In June 2014, after the announcement of troop levels for the Afghan withdrawal, the Administration
replaced its earlier $79.4 billion placeholder request for DOD (submitted with the original FY2015
budget in March) with an amended war request of $58.6 billion. 2 Including this amended DOD
request with State Department/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Veterans
1
White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” May 27, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan.
2
See Table S-10 in OMB, Fiscal Year 2015, Budget; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview. “Summary
Tables;” March 10, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/tables.pdf. For
amended request, see Office of Management and Budget, “Estimate #2—FY 2015 Budget Amendments: Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of State and Other International Programs (State/OIP) to update the FY 2015 Overseas
Contingency Operations funding levels; for both DOD and State/OIP to implement the Counterterrorism Partnerships
Fund and the European Reassurance Initiative; and for State/OIP peacekeeping costs in the Central African
Republic.”June 26, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budget_amendments/
final_fy_2015_oco_amendment_-_062414.pdf; OMB, “Fact Sheet: The Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) Request,” June 26, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/factsheet-administration-s-fiscal-year-2015-overseas-contingency-operat.
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Administration (VA( Medical requests, the total FY2015 war request—including the new
November 2014 request for OIR—totals $79.0 billion.
The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war spending levels for this
fiscal year at $95.5 billion, reflecting the FY2014 enacted level. That total is $16.5 billion above the
$79.0 billion amended request that includes OIR. The continuing resolution (CR) exceeds the
request primarily because DOD’s FY2015 request is below the FY2014 enacted level.3 The CR
expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to pass another CR or an Omnibus
Appropriations act to set final FY2015 spending levels.
At that time, Congress may consider the following war budget issues:
•
the amount, purposes, and appropriateness of the FY2015 Department of Defense
(DOD) war cost request reflecting the troop drawdown to 9,800 troops in
December 2014;
•
the utility of an Administration proposal for $5 billion for the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTFP), a broadly-flexible new account intended to respond to
“evolving threats” primarily through “Train and Equip” programs;4
•
whether to rely on OCO-designated funding for all DOD expenses, including
paying for an “enduring presence” of some 60,000 U.S. troops in the region, and
financing Afghan security forces rather than transferring some of these costs to
DOD’s base budget; and
•
responding to the new November funding request of $5.5 billion for Operation
Inherent Resolve, including whether to set restrictions on the use of U.S. ground
forces.
These defense budget issues are discussed below after a summary of the status of the FY2015
request and an accounting of cumulative and annual war funding levels for FY2001-FY2015.
3
CBO, “The Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (H.J.Res. 124), Including the Amendment in Part A of H. Rept.
113-600,” as Approved by the House Committee on Rules on September 15, 2014; http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
hjres124_0.pdf. The CBO figure includes all funding designated as OCO. The CRS total includes VA Medical warrelated funding, which is not designated as OCO.
4
White House, “Fact Sheet: The Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Request,” May 27,
2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/fact-sheet-administration-s-fiscal-year-2015-overseascontingency-operat.; Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Comptroller,
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund and the European Reassurance Initiative, p. 12, June 2014; http://comptroller.
defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/FY2015_OCO_CTPF_and_%20ERI.pdf.
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Box A. Other CRS Reports and Definitions of War Funding
This CRS report defines war costs as those designated as emergency or OCO appropriations for: Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) largely for the Afghan war; Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND) for Iraq;
and, Enhanced Security or Operation Noble Eagle. For State Department, and USAID, CRS includes all appropriations
for activities and programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. CRS includes Budget Authority (BA) for VA Medical costs for
OEF/OIF veterans as identified in budget justification materials. Emergency or OCO-designated funds are exempt from
budget caps.
Other observers and analysts define war costs more broadly than congressional appropriations and include estimates of
the life-time costs of caring for OEF/OIF/OND veterans, imputed interest costs on the deficit, or increases in DOD’s
base budget deemed to be a consequence of support for the war.5 Such costs are difficult to compute, subject to
extensive caveats, and often based on methodologies that may not be appropriate.6
For a discussion of war funding issues for the State Department/USAID FY2015 request, see CRS Report R43569, State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2015 Budget and Appropriations, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name r
edacted). For a description of politico-military developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). For the Islamic State crisis, see CRS Report IF00050, The
Islamic State: Q&A (In Focus), by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted) and CRS Report
R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) et al., and CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and
Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
Status of FY2015 DOD Request
Under the FY2015 Continuing Resolution or CR (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164), enacted September
19, 2014, OCO-designated funding would total $95.5 billion. This total includes $85.8 billion for
DOD, $21.7 billion above the amended request of $64.1 billion including OIR. After the CR expires
on December 11, 2014, Congress is expected to pass either another CR or an Omnibus
Appropriations Act that could adjust these levels. Since it is not clear, at this time, whether
Congress will address the $5.5 billion amended request for OIR during the lame duck session and
whether those funds should appropriately be allocated to Iraq, CRS tables that follow exclude that
amount.
FY2015 Defense Authorization Action
The House-passed version of H.R. 4435, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
included $79.4 billion for DOD war funding, matching the OCO placeholder request included in the
Administration’s original FY2015 budget.7 The House NDAA also adopted an amendment that
required that the Administration’s war funding request meet OMB’s 2010 criteria for DOD war
funding that placed certain limitations on what would be considered war-related (see “War Funding
and Budget Controls”).
5
The most well-known example is the book by Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War (2008).
Another well-known example is Eisenhower Study Group, Costs of War project at Brown University, “The Costs of War
Since 2001: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,” Executive Summary, June 2011; see http://costsofwar.org/article/economiccost-summary.
6
CBO, Director’s Blog, “Comments on Bilmes and Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War (2008);”
http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=79.
7
This level matched the Administration’s FY2014 request before congressional action.
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Table 1. FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4435/S. 2410)
Conference Report
Approval
Subcommittee
Markup
House
Senate
4/30/2014
and
5/1/2014
na
House
Report
House
Passage
Senate
Report
H.Rept.
113-446
Passed 325-98
S.Rept.
113-176
5/8/2014
5/22/14
Senate
Passage
Conf.
Report
House
Public
Law
Senate
H.R. 3979
12-2-14
6/2/2014
Sources: H.R. 4435 and H.Rept. 113-446 and S. 2410 and S.Rept. 113-176.
Reported on June 2, 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2015 National
Defense Authorization Act (S. 1970) did not address either the placeholder OCO request or the
amended request submitted on June 14, 2014. The Senate has not taken up S. 1970 (Table 1).
The House passed a conference version of the NDAA, H.R. 3979, on December 4, 2014, and the
Senate is expected to consider it prior to the adjournment of the 113th Congress. With the exception
of the request for Counterterrorism Partnership Response Fund (CTPF), H.R. 3779 made minor
adjustments to DOD’s entire OCO-designated request. The conference bill reduces the $4.0 billion
DOD request to $1.3 billion. The final NDAA will set a cap on funding levels.
Although H.R. 3979 approves the $1.618 billion requested for a new Iraq Train and Equip account,
it makes several revisions, including sunsetting the authority on December 31, 2016, rather than
September 30, 2017.
The bill endorses the Administration cost-sharing provision in which U.S. obligations are capped at
60% until Iraqi, Kurdish, and tribal security forces contribute 40% of the $1.6 billion total, in cash
or in kind.8
The conference draft also sets a 25% cap on obligations and expenditures that would go into effect
15 days after the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State submit a specific plan identifying,
to the appropriate congressional committee and the House and Senate leadership, the forces to
receive assistance and the retraining and rebuilding for those forces. The plan is to include goals,
concept of operations, timelines, types of training and other assistances, roles of other partners,
number and roles of U.S. military personnel, and additional military support and sustainment, and
other relevant details. Ninety days later, and every 30 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense is to
submit quarterly reports of any changes.9
Instead of the blank waiver of other laws requested, H.R. 3979 permits more limited waiver
authority for the Secretary of Defense of acquisition and arms sales provisions. It also includes a
more general waiver for the President if it is determined to be vital to U.S. national security, and it
can be implemented only 15 days after notification to the appropriate defense committees.10
8
§1236 in Rules Committee print 113-58, House amendment to the text of S. 1847, http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CPRT-113-HPRT-RU00-S1847.pdf
9
Sec. 1236 in Ibid. “Appropriate” committees include armed services, appropriations, and international affairs
committees of both houses.
10
Sec. 1236(j) in Ibid.
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H.R. 3979 also continues the Continuing Resolution provision that funds training of vetted Syrian
opposition forces by reprogramming from other funds. The bill also rejected the broad authorities
requested, and included additional reporting requirements for both the Iraq and the Syria Train and
Equip programs.11
FY2015 Defense Appropriations Action
The House passed H.R. 4870, the FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act on June 20, 2014, providing
OCO-designated funding of $79.4 billion, matching the Administration’s placeholder request.
Funding levels were set at the title level (Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance) rather
than by account, as is customary.
The Senate Appropriations Committee version of H.R. 4870 provided $58.3 billion for DOD, close
to the amended request of $58.6 billion; the Senate version added about $1 billion to both Operation
and Maintenance and procurement accounts that was offset by halving the $4.0 billion requested for
the new flexible Counterterrorism Response Program (CTRP) that would give the Administration
broad discretion to provide funds to countries conducting counter-terror efforts (see Table 2 and
Figure 9).
Table 2. FY2015 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4870)
Subcommittee
Markup
House
Senate
5/30/2014/
7/15/2014
Conference Report
Approval
House
Report
House
Passage
Senate
Report
H.Rept.
113-473
Passed 340-73
S.Rept.
113-211
6/13/2014
6/20/14
Senate
Passage
Conf.
Report
House
Senate
Public
Law
7/17/2014
Sources: H.R. 4870 as passed by the House and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee; H.Rept. 113473 and S.Rept. 113-211.
The section below summarizes cumulative war funding by operation and agency. It also analyzes
the major factors affecting annual funding levels. The tables below do not reflect the $5.5 billion
budget amendment to combat the Islamic State, considered to be a new operation by the
Department of Defense. That request is discussed separately in the section titled “The New Request
to Counter the Islamic State.”
Cumulative War Funding and the FY2015 Request
Based on funding enacted from the 9/11 attacks through FY2014, CRS estimates a total of $1.6
trillion has been provided to the Department of Defense, the State Department and the Department
of Veterans Administration for war operations, diplomatic operations and foreign aid, and medical
care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans over the past 13 years of war.
11
See Sec. 1236 for Iraq Train and Equip and other sections in Title XII for expansion of current Train and Equip
programs rather than the Administration’s proposal; Rules Committee print 113-58, House amendment to the text of S.
1847, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CPRT-113-HPRT-RU00-S1847.pdf.
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By Operation
Allocated by operation, this $1.6 trillion total is made up of:
•
$686 billion for Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations (OEF);
•
$815 billion for Iraq (OIF);
•
$27 billion for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle); and
•
$81 billion in other spending designated as war funding but tangentiallyrelated to
the Afghan and Iraq war (Table 3).12
Table 3. Cumulative War Funding by Operation, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority (BA) and Percent of Total
Cumulative Total
In Billions of $
Fiscal Year/
Operation
As Percent of Total
FY01-14
Enacted
FY2015
Requesta
FY2001-15
Requesta
FY01-14
Enacted
FY2015
Requesta
FY01-15
Requesta
Afghanistan/OEFb
$685.6
$58.1
$743.7
43%
79%
44%
Iraq/OIF/ONDc
$814.6
$5.0
$819.6
51%
7%
49%
Enhanced Securityd
$27.4
$0.1
$27.5
2%
0%
2%
Othere
$81.3
$10.4
$91.7
5%
14%
5%
Total
$1,608.9
$73.5
$1,682.4
100%
100%
100%
Sources: Relevant public laws, House Appropriation Committee tables, conference reports for relevant
appropriations acts for State/USAID and VA Medical, For DOD, CRS calculates splits by operation using DOD’s
Cumulative CW-01-Z data base which reports obligations by operation, fiscal year, account, and type of expense.
In addition to obligations incurred, in more recent years, CRS estimates unobligated balances based on DOD data
on shares by appropriation account; for the FY2015 request, CRS uses figures shown in Department of Defense,
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Amendment, Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations, June 2014;
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/
FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf. State Department/USAID figures reflect enacted levels
and FY2015 request based on appropriation reports, budget justification materials on allocations between
operations, a USAID data base (the “spigot” table), and State Department materials. VA figures are from annual
budget justification materials for Medical Funding; allocated between operations by CRS based on a cumulative
rolling average reflecting in-country troop levels. Excludes OIR. Total percentages may not equal 100 due to
rounding.
Of the total amount appropriated,:
•
43% for the Afghan war;
•
51% for the Iraq war;
12
For State/USAID and VA Medical, these figures include funding in their base budgets, and for DOD funds in both Title
IX of DOD’s appropriations acts, and funds in supplementals. In the case of DOD, these figures also include funds
transferred to war funding from DOD’s base budget.
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•
2% for enhanced security; and
•
5% for “Other war spending,” by DOD and the State Department designated for
war but not part of war operations or direct support (see Table 3 and “War Funding
and Budget Controls”).
As would be expected, the majority of the FY2015 request is for the war in Afghanistan with
•
$58.1 billion for Afghanistan/OEF;
•
$5.0 billion for Iraq/OIF/OND;
•
$100 million for enhanced security; and
•
$10.4 billion for other war-designated costs that are not directly part of war
operations or aid to Afghanistan or Iraq.
If Congress approves the FY2015 war funding request for $73.5 billion for DOD, State/USAID,
and VA Medical (excluding the new OIR request), cumulative funding over the past 15 years would
rise to $1.69 trillion, including $744 billion for Afghanistan/OEF, $820 billion for Iraq/OIF/OND,
$28 billion for Enhanced Security, and $92 billion in “Other” funding (Table 3).
“Other” War Funding
In this report, CRS war funding totals include all funding designated by statute as for emergencies
or for Overseas Contingency Operations or for Afghanistan and Iraq.13 Of the $1.6 trillion total for
FY2001-FY2015 request (excluding OIR), “other” war funding designated as emergency or OCO
but not directly related to Afghan or Iraq war operations, diplomatic support, or foreign aid to
Afghanistan or Iraq countries totals $91 billion or about 5.4% of the total (see Table 3 and “
Changes in DOD Definitions of War Funding”).14
By Agency
Splitting the cumulative total of $1.6 trillion (excluding OIR) appropriated by agency:
•
$1.5 trillion was appropriated to DOD;
•
$92.7 billion to State/USAID, and
•
$17.6 billion to the Veterans Administration (VA) for medical treatment15
13
All DOD war spending has been designated as either emergency or OCO. State Department/USAID spending for
Afghanistan and Iraq has been appropriated in either the base budget or as emergency or OCO funding.
14
CRS calculated this figure using DOD-provided data and “Table 2 – Non-War Programs or Programs Whose Execution
Is Not Included in the DOD Cost of War Report” in Department of Defense (DoD), Estimate of Cost of War Report for
each fiscal year and other information from DOD. CRS did include war-related National Intelligence Funding, which is
war-related but is not implemented or tracked by DOD. All but two of the 24 bills enacted since 9/11 that provided DOD
war funding was designated as either emergency or for OCO based on a CRS review.
15
This figure does not include the cost of benefits for OEF/OIF/OND veterans, which is not available from the VA.
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In terms of shares for the three agencies:
•
92% was appropriated to the Department of Defense for military operations and
support and training Afghan and Iraq forces;
•
6% for the State/USAID reconstruction and foreign aid programs; and
•
1% for VA Medical funding for OEF/OIF/OND veterans (Table 4).
Table 4. Cumulative War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority (BA) and Percent of Total
Cumulative Total
In Billions of $
As Percent of Total
FY2001FY2014
Enacted
FY2015
Requesta
FY2001FY2015
Requesta
FY2001FY2014
Enacted
FY2015
Requesta
FY2001FY2015
Requesta
$1,498.7
$58.6
$1,557.6
92%
80%
93%
State/USAID
$92.7
$9.4
$102.1
6%
13%
6%
VA Medical
$17.6
$5.2
$22.8
1%
7%
1%
$1,608.9
$73.5
$1,682.4
100.0%
100%
100%
Fiscal year/
Agency
DOD
Total
Sources: Relevant public laws, House Appropriation Committee tables, conference reports for relevant
appropriations acts for State/USAID and VA Medical, For DOD, CRS relies on DOD’s Cumulative CW-01-Z data
base, which reports obligations by operation, fiscal year, account, and type of expense. In addition to obligations
incurred, in more recent years, CRS estimates unobligated balances based on DOD data on shares by
appropriation account; for the FY2015 request, CRS uses figures shown in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015
Budget Amendment, Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations, June 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf. State
Department/USAID figures reflect enacted levels and FY2015 request based on appropriation reports, budget
justification materials on allocations between operations, and a USAID data base (the “spigot” table). VA figures are
from annual budget justification materials for VA Medical programs.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. Excludes OIR.
By agency, the FY2015 war request includes:
•
$58.6 billion for the Department of Defense;
•
$9.4 billion for State Department/U.S.AID; and
•
$5.2 billion for VA Medical.
By shares, in the FY2015 request:
•
80% is for DOD;
•
13% for State/USAID, higher than the cumulative share; and
•
7% for VA Medical, also above the cumulative share (Table 4).
DOD funds are used to conduct and support military operations and reset damaged or destroyed
equipment, to train the Afghan and Iraq security forces, and to provide other assistance for
reconstruction, coalition support, and counter-drug operations. State Department funding is for the
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conduct of diplomatic operations and foreign assistance programs ranging from the Economic
Support Fund to counter-drug programs. VA medical funding provides for medical care of
OEF/OIF/OND veterans; this does not include the cost of VA disability payments because VA does
not provide those figures.16
U.S. Boots on the Ground, FY2001-FY2015
Although there are other significant variables, the main factor in determining costs is the number of
U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq at different points in time. Between 2001 and 2014,
troop levels in Iraq and in Afghanistan changed dramatically. Because policy announcements
typically focus on “Boots on the Ground” in-country, Figure 1 shows those figures and excludes
military personnel providing support in the region or conducting other counter-terrorism operations
(see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Boots on the Ground In-Country, FY2001-FY2017
In thousands of U.S. troops
Sources: DOD, Monthly Boots-on-the Ground reports provided to CRS and congressional defense committees,
2001-June 2014. For month-by-month troop levels, both in-country and in-theater, see Table A-1.
Notes: Reflects U.S. troops in-country; excludes troops providing in-theater support or conducting counter-terror
operations outside the region.
For FY2002-FY2007, overall troop levels reflect the combined effect of the gradual buildup in U.S.
troop levels in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq invasion in 2003, followed by the Iraq
surge ordered by then-President George W. Bush from 2007-2008. The next phase includes the
phased withdrawal for Iraq by December 2012 and the gradual buildup resulting from the troop
surge in Afghanistan initiated by then-President Bush in 2008 and continued by President Obama in
16
VA does not distinguish veterans of the first Iraq war in 1991 from those from the Afghan and Iraq wars of the past 13
year in its benefit programs but does in discretionary funding for VA medical care.
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2009. That surge peaked in May 2011 and was followed by a phased withdrawal that is to culminate
in January 2017 with a limited embassy presence (Figure 1).
Changing Troop Levels in Iraq, 2003-2014
Six months after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. troop levels reached 149,000 troops incountry. By December 2003, troop levels fell to 124,000 and remained at about that level for the
next three years. In January 2007, then-President Bush initiated the Iraq surge in response to
growing levels of violence and a request for assistance in fighting insurgents, referred to as the
“Sunni Awakening.” The “Iraq surge” peaked at 165,000 troops in November 2007. As levels of
violence fell by July 2008, then-President Bush began to reverse the surge and troop levels declined
to 147,000 (Figure 1).
After President Obama took office in January 2009, the Administration conducted a strategy review
of both the Afghan and Iraq wars. In that review, the President decided to shift U.S. forces in Iraq
from a combat to an advisory and assistance role, and reduce troop levels from 141,000 in March
2009 to about 50,000 by September 2010. The bilateral security agreement at that time required that
all U.S. troops be withdrawn by December 31, 2011. Although the United States hoped to revise
that agreement and retain some troops beyond 2011, the Iraqi government refused to sign a new
agreement that would shield U.S. troops from local law, so all U.S. troops were withdrawn by
December 31, 2011. There are currently 100 to 200 U.S. military personnel in Iraq to manage arms
sales.17
Changing Troop Levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2017
Compared to Iraq, troop strength in Afghanistan grew more slowly but is falling as rapidly. After
the initial defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, the number of U.S. troops gradually doubled
from 10,000 in 2002 to 20,000 in 2005 as the mission expanded, although violence remained at a
fairly low level. In response to concerns about the deteriorating security situation raised by U.S.
commanding officers, then-President Bush agreed to gradually double U.S. troop levels to about
40,000 between 2007 and 2008. Before leaving office in 2009, then-President Bush agreed to
increase U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 45,000, initiating what became known as the Afghanistan
surge.18
After its strategy review, the new administration decided to continue the surge and add another
20,000 troops by November 2009. After a second review in December 2009 prompted by pressure
from military commanders for additional troops to combat worsening security, President Obama
approved an additional increase of 30,000 troops, bringing the total number of U.S. total to 98,000 by
17
For details, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted). Some 230
U.S. military remain in Iraq as part of the Office of Security Cooperation; that number was expected to have declined to
125 in FY2014; see Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Addendum, Overseas Contingency
Operation, May 2013, p. 9 shows military strength of 230 in FY2013 and 125 in FY2014.
18
See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted),
and Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on Nominations of Admiral Mullen for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” September 15, 2009, p. 6. See also the
White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”
Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-addressnation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
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September 2010.19 At that time, President Obama committed to evaluate current U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan in December 2010 to “allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in
July of 2011.”20 The total peaked at 100,000 in May 2011 (Figure 1).
On July 22, 2011, President Obama announced the surge would be reversed and the U.S. role would
transition from a combat role to a train and assist role in Afghanistan, stating that by “2014, this
process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own
security.” As Afghan troops gradually took the lead, U.S. troop levels declined fairly rapidly from
the May 2011 peak of 100,000 to about 65,000 in September 2012. In February 2013, President
Obama announced that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 65,000 to
33,000 within a year. The President also announced that the “drawdown will continue and by the
end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over.”21
After over a year of speculation about future U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, President Obama
announced on May 27, 2014, that once the U.S. combat role ended by December 31, 2014, some
9,800 troops would remain for another year to train Afghan security forces and conduct counterterror operations. That number would halve to about 4,900 by January 2016, and fall to “an
embassy presence” by January 2017.22
This plan was contingent on the Afghan government signing a new bilateral security agreement
(BSA) with Afghanistan which would shield U.S. troops from Afghan law, a U.S. precondition, and
possibly specify the size and role of the residual force and U.S. funding support for Afghan Security
Forces, subject to congressional appropriations. 23 Although then-President Karzai was unwilling to
sign the agreement, his successor, President Ashraf Ghani signed the agreement on September 30,
2014, the day after taking office.24 The new BSA does not specify U.S. troop levels or require that
19
DOD, “Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Gates,” December 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4333. The 21,000 increase was funded in the FY2009 Supplemental and the
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (Title IX, P.L. 111-118, enacted December 16, 2009).
20
White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”
Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-addressnation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
21
White House, “Remarks by the President on the State of the Union,” February 12, 2013;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-unionaddress.
22
White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” May 27, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan. Reuters, “Obama to Announce Afghanistan Troop Plans Shortly:
Kerry,” May 14, 2014; Foreign Policy, FP’s Situation Report, “Where’s the decision on Afghanistan?” May 22, 2013;
fp@foreignpolicy.com.; USA Today, “White House scaling back military support for Afghan forces,” by Jim Michaels,
June 4, 2013. About 1,800 of these troops would conduct counter-terror operations.
23
White House, “U.S.-Afghan Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement,” May 1, 2012; http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf. CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted).
24
Defense One, “Close to a Deal: U.S., Afghans Agree on Single Text,” by Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, August 3, 2013;
New York Times, “Amid Drawdown, Fears of Taliban Resurgence and Economic Collapse,” by Matthew Rosenberg, May
29, 2014, Pg. A11. CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re
dacted).
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the United States remain in Afghanistan after 2014 or provide for permanent U.S. bases in
Afghanistan.25
NATO and Afghan Troops
In addition to U.S. troops, some 28 NATO and other allies have also deployed troops to Afghanistan
as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Between 2001 and 2008, these allies
contributed roughly the same number of troops as the United States. During the Afghan surge, that
ratio dropped to 50% and has remained at roughly that level since then.26
Location of U.S. Military Personnel Serving in OEF and OIF/OND
Figure 2 shows the number and location of U.S. military personnel serving in either OEF or
OIF/OND as of March 2014 based on DOD documents. As points of comparison, it also shows the
number of U.S. military personnel deployed in the region before 9/11, at the peak of the Iraq surge
in 2008 and the Afghan surge in 2011. These figures differ from the more-commonly cited “boots
on the ground” numbers that include only U.S. military personnel in-country, in Afghanistan, and in
Iraq. The additional personnel shown include those military personnel providing “in-theater
support,” those engaged in other counter-terrorism operations, and those deployed on ships afloat.
Before the 9/11 attacks, the number of U.S. military personnel in the Area of Operations (AOR) for
OEF, OIF, and OND totaled some 30,000 including about 15,000 on ships afloat in the region.
During the Iraq surge of April 2008, U.S. personnel reached a peak of just over 300,000, a 10-fold
increase. That total included some 53,000 for OEF and about 224,000 for OIF as well as 17,000 on
ships afloat (Figure 2).
In May 2011, during the Afghan surge, the number of U.S. military personnel peaked at 278,000,
somewhat below the Iraq surge. That total included 156,000 for OEF, another 86,000 for OIF, and
30,000 afloat. By the end of December 2011, all U.S. troops were withdrawn from Iraq and the Iraq
mission (OND) ended. After December 2011, troops providing in-theater support for Iraq were
transferred to OEF because of the end of the Iraq mission.27
By March 2014, the total U.S. military personnel assigned to OEF had dropped to 138,000,
reflecting the drawdown in Afghanistan (Figure 2).
25
Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Sec. 1230 Report, p. 22,
October 2014; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf.
26
See “Placemat” in International Security Assistance Force, “Facts and Figures,” for ISAF troop levels; http://www.nato/
int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placement.pdf. For current levels, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted).
27
This is reflected in a jump from 28,000 in December 2011 for OEF support to 67,000 in January 2012 when the Iraq
mission ended. The previous month, OIF in-theater support was shown as 42,900, and OIF in-theater support as 28,000.
see DOD, “Boots on the Ground report,” December 2011 and January 2012.
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Figure 2. OEF and OIF Deployed U.S.Troops
In 2000, 2008, 2011, and 2014
Sources: For 2001, Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and By
Country (309A), September 2001; https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=
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milActDutReg; Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 11280–Number of Members Deployed By Country, By
Component and Month/Years, Contingency Tracking System file as of March 31, 2014.
Trends in War Funding by Operation
From the 9/11 attacks until FY2008, total war costs for all three operations—Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other GWOT and enhanced security—rose steeply from $36 billion in FY2001/FY2002 to a peak of
$195 billion in FY2008, primarily because of Iraq war costs. In FY2009, overall war funding fell to
$157 billion, reflecting the decline in troop levels after the Iraq surge, and the beginning of troop
withdrawals.
The decline of total war costs since FY008 due to the Iraq withdrawal was partly offset by the rise
in Afghan war costs because of the FY2009-FY2011 troop surge in Afghanistan. In
FY2001/FY2002, the cost of enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) covered the initial
responses to the 9/11 attacks, repair of the Pentagon, and combat air patrols in the United States.
These costs declined, falling to less than $200 million by FY2008 (Figure 3).
Iraq War Funding
As troop levels in Iraq rose to 149,000 after the invasion in the spring of 2003, war funding for the
year reached $51 billion, rising further to $77 billion in FY2004 and to $79 billion in FY2005 as the
United States established bases in Iraq to support somewhat lower troop levels. With the initiation
of the surge in 2007, costs increased to $131 billion, then peaked at $144 billion in FY2008.
With the reversal of the Iraq surge, Iraq costs declined to $93 billion in FY2009, $65 billion in
FY2010. As the U.S. combat mission was replaced with an “advise and assist” role, costs continued
to fall to $47 billion in FY2011, and $20 billion in FY2012 when all U.S. troops were withdrawn
(Figure 1 and Figure 3).
Afghan War Funding
After dropping from $23 billion in FY2002 to $17 billion in FY2003 and $15 billion in FY2004,
Afghan war costs rose to $19 billion in FY2005 and $31 billion in FY2006 with troop levels around
20,000. By FY2008, Afghan costs increased to $39 billion as both troop levels and the conflict’s
intensity grew. With the initiation of the Afghan troop surge, costs grew to $56 billion in FY2009,
and $94 billion in FY2010, peaking at $107 billion in FY2011 (Figure 3).
As U.S. troop levels declined and Afghan forces have taken the lead in operations, U.S. costs
dropped to $86 billion in FY2013 and $77 billion in FY2014. The current FY2015 request is $58
billion for Afghanistan expenses for DOD, State/USAID, and VA Medical. In addition to higher
troop strength, cost increases reflect substantial amounts to train Afghan security forces and higher
investment levels in response to policy changes.
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Figure 3. Estimated War Funding by Operation, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority
Sources: Relevant public laws, House Appropriation Committee tables on relevant appropriations acts, DOD
budget justification material, DOD, Cumulative CW-01-Z, Cumulative (war obligations data base), March and June
2014. DOD figures are split by operation based on obligations incurred for each operation for funds of each fiscal
year; State Department/USAID figures reflect enacted levels, and budget justification material on allocations
between operations; VA from annual budget justification materials for Medical Funding; allocated between
operations by CRS based on a cumulative rolling average of in-country troop levels.
Notes:
a.
FY2015 reflects June 2014 amended request rather than initial placeholder request of $79.4 billion for DOD;
reflects resources not scoring level. Excludes $5.5 billion requested for OIR in FY2015.
b.
DOD refers to the Afghan war as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), primarily military and other operations
in Afghanistan as well as in-theater support in neighboring countries and other counter-terror operations (e.g.,
Philippines, Djibouti).
c.
DOD refers to the Iraq war as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) until September 1, 2010, when U.S. forces
transitioned from combat operations to advising, assisting, and training Iraqi forces and the mission was renamed Operation New Dawn (OND). OND ended on December 31, 2011 when all U.S. forces left the
country of Iraq; military personnel continuing to provide in-theater support were assigned to OEF. Excludes
new OIR request.
d.
Enhanced security covers cost of 9/11 attacks to the Department of Defense (DOD) and in New York City;
referred to as Noble Eagle by DOD.
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e.
“Other” includes funding in DOD designated as for war emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) that is not tracked by DOD as a war cost, such as congressional adds for childcare centers, barracks
improvements, additional C-130 and C-17 aircraft not requested as well as unanticipated increases in basic
housing allowances, fuel costs, modularity or restructuring of Army brigades, and in recent years, transfers by
Congress of base budget operation and maintenance expenses to Title IX war funding.
Enhanced Security
Funding for Enhanced Security (Operation Noble Eagle) peaked at $13 billion in the first year after
the 9/11 attacks, primarily for one-time costs like Pentagon reconstruction ($1.3 billion), security
upgrades, combat air patrol (about $1.3 billion for around-the-clock coverage), and activating
reservists to guard bases.28 These costs fell to $4 billion in 2003, and then to $2 billion in FY2004.
Beginning in FY2005, DOD funded this operation in its baseline budget rather than as emergency
or Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding. Costs fell to under $1 billion in FY2006, $500
million in FY2007, and about $100 million per year in FY2008 and after (Figure 3).
Trends in War Funding by Agency
The Department of Defense accounts for $1.5 trillion or 92% of the $1.6 trillion total enacted war
funding. Diplomatic operations and foreign aid programs of the State Department account for
another $93 billion, or 6% of the total. Another $18 billion, or just over 1% of war funding, funds
medical care in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for OEF and OIF veterans. The VA does
not provide figures showing the cost of its benefits for veterans of the two wars (Figure 4).
Department of Defense
DOD’s war funding for the Afghan and Iraq wars primarily pays for deploying and supporting U.S.
troops (e.g., special pays for deployed personnel), conducting and supporting military operations,
repairing war-worn equipment, and transporting troops and equipment to and from the war zone
(O&M activities); buying and upgrading weapon systems (Procurement); conducting Research,
Development, and Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E); Military Construction on site; and conducting
intelligence activities. In addition, DOD war funding finances training for the Afghan and Iraqi
security forces and other reconstruction activities.
DOD funding grew more rapidly than might have been expected based on changes in troop levels
alone. Instead, much of the increase reflects other factors discussed below—higher than anticipated
support costs, an expanded definition of war-related procurement, and the growth of programs to
meet specific needs, such as training Afghan and Iraqi security forces.
28
DOD’s new estimate for ONE is $8 billion rather than the $6.5 billion shown in an earlier DOD briefing. For more
information, see CRS Report RL31187, Combating Terrorism: 2001 Congressional Debate on Emergency Supplemental
Allocations, and CRS Report RL31829, Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq Conflict, Afghanistan, Global War on
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, both by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
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Figure 4. Estimated War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority
Source: Relevant public laws, House Appropriation Committee tables on relevant appropriations acts, DOD
budget justification material, DOD, Cumulative CW-01-Z, Cumulative (war obligations data base), March and June
2014. DOD figures are split by operation based on obligations incurred for each operation for funds of each fiscal
year; State Department/USAID figures reflect enacted levels, and budget justification material on allocations
between operations; VA budget justification materials for each year.
Notes: FY2015 reflects June 2014 amended request rather than initial placeholder request of $79.4 billion for
DOD. Excludes $5.5 billion requested for OIR in FY2015.
State Department Diplomatic Operations and U.S. Foreign Aid (USAID)
The $93 billion in war appropriations enacted thus far for the State Department/USAID funds
diplomatic operations: e.g., paying staff, providing security, building and maintaining embassies,
and funding a variety of foreign aid programs in Afghanistan and Iraq ranging from the Economic
Support Fund to counter-drug activities.29 This figure reflects all funds for Afghanistan and Iraq
provided in the regular base budget or as emergency or OCO-designated appropriations.
Starting in FY2012, the State Department, like DOD, began to designate certain monies in its
regular request as OCO, to fund
29
See for example, Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 1: Department of State
Operations, Fiscal Year 2015; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223495.pdf.
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the extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) operations in the Frontline States of Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan... [identifying] the exceptional costs of operating in these countries that are focal
points of U.S national security policy [as opposed to] the permanent base requirements in the
Frontline States, which will endure after OCO funding is phased out.30
Except for a one-time appropriation of $20 billion for Iraq reconstruction in FY2004, war-related
annual foreign aid and diplomatic operations funding hovered between $4 billion and $5 billion
each year until FY2011 with one exception in FY2010. When the State Department began to
designate spending as OCO, funding levels rose to $11 billion in FY2012 and $9 billion in FY2013,
partly due the budgetary advantage of the designation which exempts this funding from budget
limits. State/USAID funding fell to $6 billion in FY2014 (Figure 4).31
In its FY2015 request of $14 billion, the State Department gives another rationale for OCOdesignated funding—“an important tool that allows the Department to deal with extraordinary
activities that are critical to our immediate national security objectives without unnecessarily
undermining funding for our longer-term efforts to sustain global order and tackle transnational
challenges.”32
VA Medical War-Related Funding
The VA identifies the dollar value of all medical services provided to OEF/OIF veterans who
qualify for care based on statutory criteria. Costs for VA medical services have increased not only as
the number of those eligible grows but also as the criteria for eligibility has expanded since the 9/11
attacks.
In general, veterans who served in combat theater of operations are entitled to five years of VA
health care services following their separation from active duty, regardless of whether they are
eligible for VA services on other grounds, such as service-related medical condition. For combat
veterans who were discharged or released from active service on or after January 28, 2003, they
may enroll in the VA health care system within five years from the date of their most recent
discharge. 33 Most of VA’s medical expenses for OEF/OIF veterans have been funded with regular
appropriations. The VA also provides disability benefits to OEF and OIF veterans but has not
published the amounts attributable to these veterans.
See Table 5 for a more detailed breakdown of the cost of the Afghan and Iraq wars.
30
Executive Budget Summary Function 150 & Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 2012, p. 143;
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183755.pdf. State Department, “Fact Sheet, FY 2012 State and USAID Overseas Contingency Operations,” February 14, 2011; http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/fs/2011/156555.htm.
31
CRS, Foreign Affairs Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Background and Current Issues, November 19, 2014;
http://www.crs.gov/products/if/pdf/IF00063.pdf?Source=search.
32
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Budget Amendment Summary, Fiscal Year 2015, 72-14, p. vi; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228924.pdf.
33
38 U.S.C. §1710(e)(1)(D) states that a veteran who served on active duty in a theater of combat operations (as
determined by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense) during a period of war
after the Persian Gulf War, or in combat against a hostile force during a period of hostilities after November 11, 1998, is
eligible for hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care for any illness, even if there is insufficient medical
evidence to conclude that such condition is attributable to such service.
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Table 5. Estimated War Funding by Operation, Agency, and Fiscal Year, FY2001-FY2015 Request
In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority
Operation/Agency
01&02
03
DOD
State/USAID
VA Medical
Total
22.0
0.8
0.0
22.8
16.7
0.7
0.0
17.4
DOD
State/USAID
VA Medical
Total
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
48.0
3.0
0.0
51.0
DOD
State/USAID
13.0
13.0
6.0
6.0
DOD
State/USAID
Total
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
DOD
State/USAID
VA Medical
Total
35.0
0.8
0.0
35.8
70.7
3.8
0.0
74.4
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
Afghan War or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
13.2
17.9
17.5
29.2
36.1
52.6
88.2
103.1
96.3
80.6
74.0
2.2
2.8
1.1
1.9
2.7
3.1
5.6
3.3
3.5
3.9
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.1
1.4
15.4
20.7
18.7
31.1
39.0
56.0
94.1
106.8
100.6
85.6
77.4
Iraq War or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND)
57.1
77.1
91.9
127.1
140.3
89.6
59.9
42.7
13.5
4.9
1.1
19.5
2.0
3.7
3.2
2.7
2.2
3.3
2.1
4.7
0.7
1.4
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.6
0.9
1.3
1.6
1.8
2.1
2.1
2.3
76.7
79.1
96.0
130.8
143.9
93.1
64.8
46.5
20.3
7.7
4.8
Enhanced Security or Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)
4.0
2.0
1.0
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
4.0
2.0
1.0
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
War-Designated Funding Not War-Related
0.0
6.6
8.0
7.3
12.1
7.5
6.4
5.4
5.4
1.9
10.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.2
4.6
2.6
0.0
6.6
8.0
7.3
12.1
7.5
6.4
5.4
8.6
6.6
12.8
All War-Designated Funding
74.3
103.6
118.4
164.0
188.7
149.8
154.6
151.2
115.3
87.5
85.4
21.7
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.4
5.4
8.9
5.4
11.5
9.2
6.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.5
1.9
2.3
2.9
3.2
3.7
96.0
108.4
123.7
169.7
195.2
156.7
165.4
158.9
129.7
99.9
95.2
15 Req.a
FY01-14
FY01-15
53.3
2.6
2.2
58.1
647.3
33.6
4.7
685.6
700.7
36.2
6.9
743.7
0.5
1.5
3.0
5.0
753.1
48.6
12.9
814.6
753.5
50.2
15.9
819.6
0.1
0.1
27.4
27.4
27.5
27.5
5.1
5.3
10.4
70.9
10.4
81.3
75.9
15.7
91.7
58.9
9.4
5.2
73.6
1,498.7
92.7
17.6
1,608.9
1,557.6
107.1
22.8
1,682.4
Sources: Relevant public laws, House Appropriation Committee tables on relevant appropriations acts, DOD budget justification material, DOD, Cumulative CW-01-Z,
Cumulative (war obligations database), March and June 2014. DOD figures are split by operation based on obligations incurred for each operation for funds of each fiscal
year; State Department/USAID figures reflect enacted levels, and budget justification material on allocations between operations; VA budget justification materials for
each year.
Notes:
a.
CRS-19
Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
War Funding and Budget Controls
Since the 9/11 attacks, some observers have criticized war funding as “off-budget” or a “slush
fund” appropriated largely in emergency supplemental acts or for “Overseas Contingency
Operations” (OCO) where normal budget limits in annual budget resolutions or the Budget
Control Act (BCA) do not apply.34 In recent testimony on September 18, 2014, for example,
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel acknowledged these ambiguities, saying “there’re a lot
of different opinions about whether there should be an overseas contingency account or not and
whether it’s a slush fund or not.”35
Some observers have argued that the tendency to designate funding for activities only tangentially
related to OCO or war has intensified with the threat of sequestration in the BCA. Under that act,
if final appropriations breach separate, annual “defense” and non-defense budget caps, OMB
must administer a largely across-the-board sequestration reducing each account, and sometimes
individual programs, by the same percentage to ensure that caps are met.36 (Should a
sequestration be required, however, all budgetary resources, including war funding, would be
affected by across-the-board cuts.)
Others have suggested that the “OCO” designation has provided a “safety valve” to preserve base
budget programs and help agencies meet BCA caps by designating funding for base budget
programs as OCO.37 For example, Congress transferred $9.2 billion in Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) funds from DOD’s base budget request to the OCO-designated Title I funds
in the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76).38
Under the BCA caps, DOD spending has been constrained to $496 billion in FY2013, FY2014,
and FY2015, with a $3 billion increase to $499 billion in FY2016.39 DOD contends that the BCA
“sequester” caps (the limits that must be reached to avoid a sequester) would require DOD to
make significant cuts from current plans that would affect both readiness and modernization.40
DOD’s current Future Years Defense plan exceeds the BCA limits by $176 billion or 3.3% over
the BCA caps between FY2012 and FY2021.41
34
The statutory definition of “off-budget” refers to Social Security and Postal Service revenues and spending; see
OMB, FY2014 Budget, Analytical Perspectives, p. 138; http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2014/assets/31_1.pdf.
35
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in House Armed Services Committee, Hearing transcript, “U.S. Strategy on
ISIL,” September 18, 2014.
36
CRS Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).
37
The spending limits set in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) were modified in the Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012 (P.L. 112-240) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-73).
38
See DOD monthly Cost of War briefing slides, table entitled “Funding Appropriated Through War-Related Requests,
FY2001-FY2013,” March 2014, and CRS calculation based on tables in Joint Explanatory Statement in Congressional
Record, January 15, 2013, p. H800 to p.H806.
39
CRS estimates reflecting DOD’s 95% share of BCA caps for national defense (budget function 050) in each budget
request.
40
Department of Defense, “Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-Level Funding: Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request;”
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Estimated_Impacts_of_Sequestration-Level_Funding_April.pdf.
41
CRS calculations comparing estimated BCA “sequester” caps with FY2015 Administration DOD plan.
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In addition, departmental spokesmen argue that congressional reluctance to accept DODproposed compensation reforms and weapon system cancellations could create an additional
“hole” of $70 billion in DOD’s current five-year defense plan, which already exceeds sequester
caps by about 4.4%. In both FY2014 and FY2015, the Administration has contended that the
BCA limits for both defense and nondefense should be raised with additional savings achieved
from tax and entitlement reform, proposals that have not been addressed by Congress.42
The OCO or emergency designation can be applied to all or only some accounts within an
appropriation act. There is no single account for war funding in any agency. Generally, war
funding is appropriated in regular appropriation accounts for incremental expenses associated
with war activities or programs. For DOD, war funding designations has been provided in
individual accounts in emergency supplemental, omnibus, or DOD Appropriation Acts for
amounts that cover incremental or additional expenses related to deploying military personnel,
conducting combat or train and assist operations, and supporting troops overseas.43
With BCA spending limits in place until FY2021, some believe that the definition of what
constitutes war funding may continue to be applied broadly. For example, concerned about
DOD’s proposal to end funding for A-10 ground attack aircraft in its base budget, the House
version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act included $635 million in Title XV for
OCO funding to retain A-10 aircraft.44
In a similar way, the State Department has requested emergency or OCO designations for some of
the costs of diplomatic operations or USAID programs associated with Afghanistan and Iraq, such
as the Diplomatic and Consular Programs or the Economic Support Fund. Congress has also
created new accounts or spending caps to fund activities that do not fit neatly into the purposes of
regular accounts and to provide additional flexibility (see Figure 9).
Congressional Concerns
Recently, some Members have expressed concerns about and taken action to limit the tendency
by both the Administration and Congress to apply the OCO designation to activities only
tangentially related to war. For example, in H.R. 4435, the FY2015 National Defense
Authorization Act, the House adopted the Mulvaney amendment to require that the
Administration’s requests comply with OMB’s relatively strict 2010 war spending criteria that are
intended to limit DOD war spending to activities and programs directly related to the incremental
costs of war operations.45 This provision would not apply to congressional decisions to attach an
OCO designation to activities and programs that may be marginally related to those costs.
42
OMB, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget of the U.S. Government, p. 11 and p. 30, March 4, 2014;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/budget.pdf.
43
Within DOD appropriations acts, war-designated funding has been included in Title IX. Additional war-related
military construction has been included in the Military Construction/VA appropriations acts in the same fashion.
44
See Sec. 1503 in H.Rept. 113-446, “Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015,” on H.R. 4435, May 13, 2014, p. 279.
45
See Sec. 1524 in H.R. 4435 as passed by the House, 5-22-14; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr4435eh/
pdf/BILLS-113hr4435eh.pdf. This language reflects OMB’s modified criteria included in a letter from OMB Program
Associate Director, Steven Kosiak, to DOD Comptroller Robert Hale; these criteria have been issued as budget
guidance to the Department of Defense.
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The FY2015 House Budget Resolution report contends that the OCO designation for war costs
“has created a loophole that could be used to circumvent discretionary spending limits” and warns
that “the Budget committee will be vigilant that the OCO/GWOT cap adjustment is not abused as
a means of evading the statutory caps on discretionary spending.”46 During a July 17, 2014,
hearing by the House Budget Committee on the FY2015 OCO request, both Democratic and
Republican members raised concerns about ever-broader definitions of war costs. For example,
ranking member Congressman Chris Van Hollen noted a tendency for
creeping allocations from the base budget into the OCO budget. And I have to say, this is not
just on the side of the administration. In fact, I think if you look at the record, Congress has
actually been a greater offender in this area. But the reality is we have to work together—the
executive branch, the congressional branch—to make sure that we have clear and transparent
budgeting.47
In a similar vein, Congressman Bill Pascrell emphasized
it’s important that the committee ensure that the caps on spending in that law are respected or
renegotiated. No one is innocent here. The administration, the Congress have used the OCO
budget in the past to skirt the Budget Control Act’s caps ... But it’s critical that emergency
spending be just that. For emergencies. And not just an accounting gimmick that undermines
the budget discipline we've all agreed on.48
While acknowledging that BCA budget limits have made DOD planning “complicated and
difficult,” Congressman Adam Smith suggested that “a substantial portion of this OCO request
really is not directly related to the war in Afghanistan [and] has been spread out amongst a variety
of different other funds.” 49 DOD witness Deputy Secretary Robert Work agreed that
there’s is an awful lot in this request that is outside Afghanistan, but that supports
Afghanistan or is an integral part of our operations in Afghanistan. But I’d also like to make
the point that as sequester has impacted the department, it has really squeezed our ability to
absorb within the department unanticipated operations.50
While House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Bud McKeon called for a more expansive
definition of war costs to cover “readiness shortfalls” developed over “a decade of war,” Deputy
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Winnefeld, responded that
Mr. Chairman, in trying to stay true and faithful to what the concept of overseas contingency
operations really means, we didn’t view that kind of [full-spectrum] training necessarily as
falling into that category. It’d be tempting to do that. We’d love to do that. But we really
wanted to stay faithful and really reset this OCO idea into what it really is supposed to be.51
46
See p. 100 in H.Rept. 113-403, report on H.Con.Res. 96, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, Fiscal Year,” April 6,
2015, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt403/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt403.pdf.
47
Transcript, House Budget Committee, “Hearing on President Obama’s Funding Request for Overseas Contingency
Operations,” July 17, 2014.
48
Ibid.
49
Transcript, House Armed Services Committee, “Hearing on President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Supplemental
Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations,” July 16, 2014.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
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With the prospect of smaller war budgets as U.S. troop levels fall and as BCA caps continue
through FY2021, Congress is likely to continue to face the question of what is appropriately
designated as emergency or OCO.
The two key questions in assessing the use of emergency or “OCO” designations are:
•
What is necessary for funding to qualify as “emergency” or “Overseas
Contingency Operations” that exempts it from budget caps?
•
How are war costs defined by the Administration, DOD, and the State
Department?
Designating Funding as Emergency or OCO
Current budgetary law provides that any funding designated by Congress in statute and by the
President in writing as “emergency” or “Overseas Contingency Operations” does not count
against budget caps. In other words, what qualifies as “emergency” or “OCO” funding is its
designation by Congress and the President.
The Chairs of the respective budget committees are required to raise budget limits to
accommodate that spending, which effectively exempts that funding from spending limits set in
either annual budget resolutions or more recently, the BCA (see Box B.).52
According to budget law, “emergency” spending is to be “unanticipated,” meaning that it is
“sudden ... urgent ... unforeseen ... and temporary” (See § 102 (4) (20) in Box B.). Although a
Member can raise a point-of-order challenge to the emergency designation on the Senate floor,
the challenge would have to be sustained by 60 votes, which has has seldom happened.53
The OCO designation was added in the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25), presumably to provide
Congress with an alternate way to designate war funding than the “emergency” designation,
which no longer seemed appropriate after over ten years of wars.54 There are no criteria for the
OCO designation nor is there a similar point of order to challenge it (Box B.).
In the initial years of the Afghan and Iraq wars, most war-related funding was provided in
supplemental emergency appropriations. Starting in FY2004, DOD received some of its war
funding in Title IX of its regular appropriation act to ensure that war funding was available at the
beginning of the fiscal year but these funds were also designated as emergency; this funding was
thus exempt from budget limits. DOD monies were first designated as “OCO” in FY2012 and
also were exempt. When war funding needs were higher than anticipated, the Administration
submitted additional emergency or OCO supplemental requests.55
52
Ibid.
The Senate point of order is section 314(e) of the Budget Act of 1974. See also, CRS Report R41564, Emergency
Designation: Current Budget Rules and Procedures, by (name redacted)
54
See footnote 5 in CRS Report R41564, Emergency Designation: Current Budget Rules and Procedures, by (name
redacted) Congress first permitted an OCO designation language in the 2006 budget resolution.
55
The concern first arose when the Army appeared to be running out of the ability to “cash flow” war costs by using its
base budget funds temporarily until Congress passed the FY2004 supplemental; see CRS Memo, “Adequacy of Army’s
FY2004 Funding for Iraq,” by (name redacted), May 5, 2014; available from author. Starting that year, Congress began to
include some but not necessarily all war funding in Title IX of DOD’s regular appropriations. These funds were to act
(continued...)
53
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Box B. Designating Funds as Emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations:
Budget Control Act of 2011 (italics added)
SEC. 251. (b) (2)(A) ENFORCING DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS
(b) ADJUSTMENTS TO DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS.—
(1) CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS.—When the President submits the budget under section 1105 of title 31, United
States Code, OMB shall calculate and the budget shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits (and
those limits as cumulatively adjusted) for the budget year and each outyear to reflect changes in concepts and
definitions. Such changes shall equal the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using up-to-date
concepts and definitions, minus those levels using the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes. Such
changes may only be made after consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the Budget of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, and that consultation shall include written communication to such committees
that affords such committees the opportunity to comment before official action is taken with respect to such
changes.
(2) SEQUESTRATION REPORTS.—When OMB submits a sequestration report under section 254(e), (f), or (g) for a
fiscal year, OMB shall calculate, and the sequestration report and subsequent budgets submitted by the President
under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, shall include adjustments to discretionary spending limits
(and those limits as adjusted) for the fiscal year and each succeeding year, as follows:
(A) EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS; OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS/GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM.—If, for any
fiscal year, appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted that—
(i) the Congress designates as emergency requirements in statute on an account by account basis and the President
subsequently so designates, or
(ii) the Congress designates for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism in statute on an
account by account basis and the President subsequently so designates, the adjustment shall be the total of such
appropriations in discretionary accounts designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency
Operations/Global War on Terrorism, as applicable.”
Definitions of Emergencies
SEC. 251. ENFORCING DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMITS
(c) DISCRETIONARY SPENDING LIMIT
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS
(20) The term ‘emergency’ means a situation that—‘‘(A) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new budget
authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or
property, or a threat to national security; and
(B) is unanticipated.
(21) The term ‘unanticipated’ means that the underlying situation is—
(A) sudden, which means quickly coming into being or
not building up over time;
(B) urgent, which means a pressing and compelling
need requiring immediate action;
(C) unforeseen, which means not predicted or anticipated as an emerging need; and
(D) temporary, which means not of a permanent duration.
(...continued)
as a “bridge” to cover ongoing war costs in the initial months of the fiscal year. Congress continued, however, to
designate these funds as emergency so that they were not subject to budget limits. See discussion in CRS Report 98721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, coordinated by (name redacted)
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Changes in DOD Definitions of War Funding
DOD definitions of what constitutes war-related activities and expenses have shifted over the
years. Because of the flexibility of the emergency or OCO designations, some have questioned
whether there are any limitations on what could be counted as war funding. The only check on the
amount of funding that can be designated as either “emergency” or “OCO” is the requirement that
Congress and the Administration agree.
Shifts in DOD definitions have reflected differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and
duration of the Afghan and Iraq wars and the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) as well as growing
budget pressures. Over the years, both Congress and the President have adopted sometimes more
and sometimes less expansive definitions to accommodate the needs and pressures of the
moment.
DOD’s Regulations on War Funding
DOD’s financial management regulations appear to specify fairly clearly the types of activities
that would be considered related to contingency operations. Since the 1990s Bosnian war, DOD
regulations have defined war costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs “that
would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported (italics
added).”56War costs would not cover, for example, base pay for troops or normal training
activities since those are normal peacetime expenses, or planned equipment modernization.
Only those costs in addition to DOD’s normal peacetime activities such as those incurred because
troops are deployed for war are to be considered OCO. To identify these activities, the guidance
requires that the services show how additional wartime deployments and operations affect
peacetime assumptions about troop levels and operational tempo. Investment costs were only to
be included if “necessary to support a contingency operation.” 57
War Expenses Within Regular Accounts
Under these regulations, the following types of expenses were considered war costs:
•
Military personnel funds to cover special pay for deployed personnel (e.g.,
imminent danger and separation pay) and the additional cost of activating
reservists to full-time status;
•
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds to transport troops and their equipment
to Iraq and Afghanistan, conduct military operations, provide in-country support
at bases, provide medical services for deployed troops, and repair and return warworn equipment;
•
Procurement funding to buy new weapons systems to replace war losses;
56
DOD, Financial Management Regulations, Chapter 12, Sec. 23, “Contingency Operations,” p. 23ff;
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf.
57
DOD, Financial Management Regulations, Chapter 12, Sec. 23, “Contingency Operations,” p. 23ff;
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf.
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•
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funds to develop more
effective ways to combat war threats such as improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) or roadside bombs;
•
Working Capital Funds to expand inventories of spare parts and fuel to ensure
wartime support;
•
Military construction for facilities in bases in Iraq or Afghanistan or neighboring
countries; and
•
National and military intelligence (NIP and MIP) activities to gather and analyze
war-related intelligence collected through surveillance and reconnaissance.
Additional Special Purpose Accounts
In addition, the Administration initiated several programs and accounts designed to fund specific
war-related activities that do not fit into traditional accounts. These programs and accounts
include:
•
the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund
(ISFF) to pay the cost of training, equipping and expanding the size of the
Afghan and Iraqi armies and police forces;
•
coalition support to reimburse regional allies (primarily Pakistan) for logistical
costs of conducting counter-terror operations supporting U.S. efforts;
•
the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) to give individual
commanders funds for small reconstruction projects and to pay local militias in
Iraq and Afghanistan to gain support from local populations and counterinsurgent groups;
•
the Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to finance larger reconstruction projects
than under the CERP program and the Task Force for Business Stability
Operations (TFBSO) to support privately-funded reconstruction activities;
•
Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund to develop, buy, and
deploy new devices to improve force protection for soldiers against roadside
bombs or IEDs; and
•
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP), Rapid Equipping Force, and Urgent
Operational Needs funds to purchase critical war equipment quickly.
Congressional Adds and DOD ‘Must-Pay’ Bills
As often occurs in supplemental appropriations, DOD added funds for unanticipated “must pay”
bills and Congress added funds for programs that were designated as “emergency” or “OCO.” For
DOD, examples included unanticipated increases in basic housing allowances, incentive pays,
fuel prices and base support expenses. Before the 9/11 attacks, such expenses would often be
offset by reductions in other programs.
Congress added funds for childcare centers and barracks improvements to improve morale, post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) as urgently-needed mental
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health programs, C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft facing production line cut-offs, and National
Guard and Reserve equipment.
In recent years, Congress has transferred funds requested in base budget accounts to Title IX wardesignated funding, ranging from monies for Mission and Other Operations funding training to
base support of state-side facilities; in FY2014, Congress moved $9.2 billion in Operation and
Maintenance funds requested in DOD’s base budget to Title IX war funding.58 The effect was to
ease the limits of BCA spending caps.
DOD’s 2006 Guidance Expands Definition of “War-Related”
In its initial July 19, 2006, guidance to the services for developing the FY2007 Supplemental and
FY2008 war cost requests, DOD reiterated that war funding must comply with financial
regulations limiting expenses to incremental costs or strictly war-related procurement. For
example, this guidance specifically prohibited including the Army’s modularity funds to
reorganize units as war funding “because it is already programmed in FY2007 and the outyears,”
and warned that the services would have to demonstrate that investment items were “directly
associated with GWOT operations,” rather than to offset “normal recurring replacement of
equipment.”59 In addition, the services would have to show that reset (the repair or replacement of
war-worn equipment) plans were executable in FY2007, indicating it was urgently needed for war
operations.
On October 25, 2006, however, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued revised
guidance for requesting war funds to the services that significantly changed these criteria. New
requests were to be submitted within two weeks that reflected the “longer war on terror” rather
than strictly the requirements for war operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other counter-terror
operations.60 There was no definition of what types of expenses might be covered by the “longer
war on terror.” Presumably, this change reflected presidential policy. Since the longer war on
terror was an integral part of DOD’s national strategy, some might argue that these types of
expenses would more appropriately be included in DOD’s regular base budget, where they would
compete with other defense needs.61
In response to this new guidance, the services expanded the types of programs and activities
considered to be war-related. Examples included acceleration of planned equipment upgrades,
modernization of the Army’s Bradley fighting vehicles, M-1 tanks and its truck and vehicle fleet,
and state-side base support. The effect of this policy change can be seen in the doubling of war58
See DOD monthly Cost of War briefing slides, table entitled “Funding Appropriated through War-related Requests,
FY2001-FY2013,” March 2014, and CRS analysis of congressional reports on supplementals and other war funding,
and CRS calculation based on tables in Joint Explanatory Statement in Congressional Record, January 15, 2013, p.
H800 to p.H806.
59
Under Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, “Fiscal Year (FY) 20082013 Program and Budget Review,” July 19, 2006, p. 34-49, specifically pp. 36, 39, 41.
60
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, “Ground
Rules and Process for FY’07 Spring Supplemental,” October 25, 2006.
61
See Chapter III, p. 19ff in White House, “National Security Strategy,” May 2010; https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/
cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/strategy&CISOPTR=8929&REC=1;
See Chapter III in White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” March 2006;
https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/strategy&CISOPTR=5286&REC=2.
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funded procurement from $22.9 billion in FY2006 to $49.5 billion in FY2007, with a peak of
$65.9 billion in FY2009. The peak year also reflects a congressional decision to add $16.8 billion
in a special account to quickly purchase mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, a
heavy truck with a V-shaped hull that increased soldier survivability against roadside bombs or
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (Table 7).
Overall, between FY2001 and FY2014, DOD’s war-designated procurement added almost $300
billion, or about 25%, to the $1.2 trillion in procurement funds appropriated to the base budget.62
Although some war funding for procurement net was unanticipated, new wartime needs, such as
uparmored Humvees for force protection, other war procurement funding converted Army
brigades to modular units, and upgraded and purchased equipment sooner than planned.
For example, a 2007 CBO study found that more than 40% of the Army’s spending for reset—the
repair and replacement of war-worn equipment—was not for replacing lost equipment or
repairing equipment sent home. Instead, Army funds were spent to upgrade systems to increase
capability, to buy equipment to eliminate longstanding shortfalls in inventory, to convert new
units to a modular configuration, and to replace equipment stored overseas for contingencies.63
Such investment funding contributed to DOD’s modernization. In the case of the Army,
particularly, war funding paid and accelerated the modernization of “nearly its entire fleet of
ground combat vehicles [e.g., Abrams tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicles] and ...
dramatically increased its stocks of small arms and support vehicles [e.g., Humvees, trucks].”64 In
this way, DOD war funding, in fact, financed some modernization requirements sooner than
anticipated, effectively reducing funding that would otherwise be financed in DOD’s base budget.
OMB 2009 Guidance Restores War Funding Limits
In 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration, OMB issued new guidance outlining the
criteria for war funding that largely restored earlier regulations. This guidance was modified in
2010 (Appendix B).
While the new OMB guidance restored some of the earlier limits on what would be considered
“war-related” expenses, it adopted a broad geographic span for war-related activities. The theater
of operations for “combat or direct combat support operations ... [for] non-classified war overseas
contingency operations funding ... [is] to include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf and Gulf nations, Arabian Sea, the Indian
Ocean, the Philippines, and other countries on a case-by-case basis.”65 The criteria permitted the
Administration to add other countries “on a case-by-case basis,” as appears to be the case with the
use of OCO funds for recent Syrian operations.
62
CRS calculation based on Table 2-1 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2015, April 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2015/FY15_Green_Book.pdf.
63
CBO, Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used In Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program by Frances M.
Lussier, September 2007, p. ix, pp. 35-37; available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=8629&sequcence=0&
from=7.
64
Stimson Center, (name redacted), What We Bought: Defense Procurement from FY01 to FY10, p. 9, October 28,
2011; http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/what-we-bought-defense-procurement-from-fy01-to-fy10/
65
Ibid.
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Under this new guidance, procurement requirements were limited to:
•
war losses excluding items currently scheduled for replacement;
•
upgrades directly supporting war operations; and
•
put on contract within 12 months.
Operational requirements were confined to:
•
transport to, from and within the theater of operations;
•
incremental costs to directly support operations with indirect costs to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis; and
•
fuel costs for plus “sufficient cash” to ensure combat operation.
War-related military construction was designed for
•
the minimum to meet operational requirements; and
•
”for temporary use” at non-enduring locations; with
•
exceptions, on a case-by-case basis for construction at “enduring locations,” tied
to surge operations or major changes in operational requirements.
Certain items were to be funded in the base budget rather than OCO (as had been the case):
•
regular training equipment,
•
acceleration of upgrade programs,
•
base closure projects,
•
family support initiatives, childcare facilities, support for service members’
spouses’ professional development,
•
recruiting and retention bonuses to maintain end-strength, and
•
basic pay to maintain authorized end strength (italics added; see Appendix B).66
At the same time, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pushed to move some war costs to the
base budget that reflected long-term requirements for counter-terrorism operations, such as
expanding special operations forces and higher funding for mental health. Some $8 billion was
transferred from the war to the base budget in FY2010, and smaller amounts in FY2011.67 DOD
also included some funding for the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) in
its base budget to cover research and procurement costs to counter IEDs or homemade land
mines, with the rationale that this threat was likely to persist beyond the Afghan and Iraq wars.
Congress, however, chose to move this funding to war-related Title IX of the DOD
Appropriations Act.
Partly in response to this revised guidance, war procurement levels dropped from the peak of
$65.9 billion in FY2008 to $34.6 billion in FY2009 to $32.6 billion in FY2010 and $29.8 billion
66
67
OMB, “Criteria for War/Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Requests,” February 26, 2009, revised 2010.
CRS Report R40567, Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations, coordinated by (name redacted).
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in FY2011. Along with the new guidance, the end of U.S. combat operations and the withdrawals
from Iraq and Afghanistan caused war procurement to fall to $16 billion in FY2012, $8 billion in
FY2013, $7 billion in FY2014, and $6 billion in the FY2015 request (Table 7).
Force Structure and War Funding
Another area with shifting definitions of what is and what is not considered war funding are
changes in force structure over the past decade. In FY2005 and FY2006, the Army requested and
received $10 billion in war funding over two years to pay for the Army’s ongoing modularity
initiative to redesign and modernize its brigades. The Army claimed the initiative would extend
the time between deployments (“dwell time”), which would reduce stress on those units that were
frequently deployed. Studies by CBO and RAND questioned this conclusion, finding that
modularity would only marginally improve rotation schedules.68 DOD does not count modularity
as a war cost (see Table 6).
The Army acknowledged that the distinction between war and base budget needs is murky “since
modularity requirements mirror the equipment requirements the Army already procures for its
units, the ability to precisely track modularity funds is lost.”69 Congress included the funds in the
FY2005 and FY2006 war appropriations acts (effectively giving the Army more room in its
regular budget for other things) but with the understanding that DOD would rely on the regular
budget after FY2006 and set aside $25 billion in future years to cover these costs.70
The 2006 England guidance reversed this decision.71 The FY2007 Supplemental included $3.6
billion to convert two Army brigade teams and create an additional Marine Corps regimental
combat team, and the FY2008 war request included $1.6 billion to accelerate the creation of more
modular brigades plus additional funds for equipping them (see “DOD’s 2006 Guidance Expands
Definition of “War-Related”’”).72
In addition to modularity, war funding was also used to pay for the cost to equip an additional
30,000 soldiers temporarily added to the Army in FY2004 to help reduce the frequency of
wartime rotations for certain units. In January 2007 in light of war experience, DOD decided that
Army and Marine Corps ground forces were needed for the long term and increased them by
92,000 from pre-war levels over the next several years so that the United States would be able to
deploy substantial numbers of troops to conduct “stability operations” for prolonged periods of
time.
68
CBO estimated that the Army’s modularity initiative would only make available an additional 6,000 to 7,000 troops.
The RAND study argued that the types of units created were not those most needed. RAND, Stretched Thin: Army
Forces for Sustained Operations, 7-15-05; http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG362.pdf. CBO, An
Analysis of the Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: an Update, October 5, 2005; http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/66xx/doc6682/10-05-05-IraqLetter.pdf.
69
Secretary of the Army, “Sec. 323 report required by the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-364,”
February 14, 2007, p. 4.
70
Program Budget Decision 753, “Other Secretary of Defense Decisions,” December 23, 2004, p. 1.
71
Ibid., and CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). CBO
estimated that adding two divisions to the Army—roughly equivalent to the President’s proposal—would require an
additional $108 billion between FY2008 and FY2017. CBO, Budget Options, February 2007, pp. 9-10,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7821/02-23-BudgetOptions.pdf.
72
DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Amendment, October 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/Supplemental/FY2008_October_Global_War_On_Terror_Amendment.pdf, pp. 48 and 49.
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The Army’s pre-war level of 482,000 would increase by 65,000 in this “Grow the Army”
initiative while the Marine Corps pre-war level of 175,000 would grow by 27,000 active-duty
forces. The FY2007 Supplemental included $4.9 billion to cover the cost of 22,000 additional
military personnel plus $1.7 billion for equipment and infrastructure although DOD promised that
other funding for this force structure growth would be included in the regular budget starting in
FY2009.73
In new strategic guidance issued in January 2012, after the death of Bin Laden and passage of the
Budget Control Act mandating lower defense spending levels for the next decade, President
Obama reversed this plan to size ground forces to conduct long-term stability operations, arguing
instead that
the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to
address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability
operations ... [and that] U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations.74
In 2013, as part of the changes to meet the first tranche of BCA reductions, the President
announced that the size of the Army would be reduced from its wartime peak of 570,000 to
490,000 while the Marine Corps could be cut from 202,000 to 183,100—both close to pre-war
levels. DOD then argued that the cost of gradually shedding Army and Marine Corps personnel
because of this change should be considered a war cost, and included $6.0 billion in FY2013,
$4.6 billion in FY2014, and $2.4 billion in FY2015 in its war request to cover the “over strength”
or excess personnel on-board because of the change in strategic guidance.75
Unlike other war-related military expenses, this funding did not pay for troops deployed overseas
in a war zone. Some may argue that these transition costs should be funded in the base budget
since the decision reflected a choice about the appropriate size of all ground forces.
73
CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size for the United States?, by (name redacted).
See also DOD, “President Bush’s FY 2008 Defense Budget Submission,” February 5, 2007, which notes that $12.1
billion was included in the FY2008 request for these increases and $1.6 billion in the FY2008 Global War on Terror
requests.
74
Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century,” p. 6, January 2012;
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
75
White House, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,“ Washington, DC, May 23, 2013;
White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
See also, Table 4 in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Amendment, Overview, Overseas Contingency
Operations, June 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/
FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf. Until these lower personnel levels were achieved, DOD
requested and received OCO funding to pay for 49,700 Army and 15,200 Marine Corps personnel active-duty strength
that are “over strength” or “above the projected end state needed by these Services [in 2017] to support the new defense
strategy.” See Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
Fiscal Year 2013 Overview, February 2012, pp. 6-7; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/
FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. DOD’s policy called for these decreases to occur gradually over
several years, primarily through attrition rather than involuntary separations, also a policy choice.
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Reset Requirements
Another type of expense affected by the changing definitions of war funding is reset or
reconstitution—the amount of funds needed to “reset” or restore the services’ equipment to prewar levels, the “process of bringing a unit back to full readiness once it has been rotated out of a
combat operation.”76 Reset funds consist of both depot maintenance costs to repair equipment and
replacement when repair is not worthwhile. Between FY2004 and FY2008, reset accounted for
the largest increase, not only because ongoing operations had built up wear and tear on
equipment, but also because of the 2006 Deputy Secretary of Defense England policy decision to
broaden the definition of what was considered a war-related cost.77
Estimates of reset costs have changed frequently. In March 2005, CBO estimated that annual
repair and replacement costs would run about $8 billion a year based on the current pace of
operations and service data.78 According to 2007 testimony by then-Army Chief of Staff, General
Peter J. Schoomaker, and other military spokespeople, Army reset was estimated to be $12 billion
to $13 billion a year as long as the conflict lasted at the current level and “for a minimum of two
to three years beyond.”79
There is some evidence that DOD front-loaded (funded in advance of need) its reset needs in
2007, a fact acknowledged by then-OMB Director Robert Portman in testimony at the time.80
Congress has generally funded, if not added to, Army and Marine Corp reset requests.81The
FY2007 Supplemental and the FY2008 war request both appear to include an extra year of Army
76
For total through FY2008, see Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Steve Kosiak, Cost of Wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan and Other Military Operations, 12-15-08; http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
R.20081215.Cost_of_the_Wars_i/R.20081215.Cost_of_the_Wars_i.pdf; for FY2009, see Table 5-11 in DOD, Fiscal
Year 2010: Summary Justification, May 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf; for FY2010 and FY2011, see Table 8-5 in
DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
For definition, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress, Ground Force Equipment Repair, Replacement,
and Recapitalization Requirements Resulting from Sustained Combat Operations, April 2005, p. 8; see also GAO-06-604T,
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, p.
3. DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, Table 3; http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf hereinafter, DOD, FY2008 GWOT
Request.
77
CRS, Statement of (name redacted) before the House Budget Committee, “The Growing Cost of the Iraq War,” October
24, 2007 http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf.
78
CBO Testimony by Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, “The Potential Costs Resulting from Increased Usage of Military
Equipment in Ongoing Operations,” before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, April
6, 2005, p. 2.
79
Statement of Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, before the House Armed Services
Committee, “Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, p.2; see also testimony of
Brigadier General Charles Anderson, U.S. Army, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces Hold, transcript, “Joint Hearing on Costs and Problems of Maintaining Military
Equipment in Iraq,” January 31, 2007, p. 6.
80
Testimony of OMB Director Robert Portman before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on the FY2008 DOD
Budget, February 6, 2007, p. 41 of transcript.
81
See table inserted by Senator Stevens in Congressional Record, August 2, 2006, p. S8571 showing $23.7 billion for
reset, including $14 billion in procurement; total funded also provided $4.9 billion for unfunded FY2006 requirement;
see also DOD’s Report to Congress, Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs, September 2006.
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and Marine Corps reset requirements; GAO has also questioned the accuracy of DOD’s reset
requirements.82
Another indication of frontloading reset is when procurement obligations rates are slower than
normal (generally about 90% in the first year), resulting in large carryovers of war-related
investment from earlier appropriations. As of the beginning of FY2008, for example, DOD had
$45 billion in war-related carryover that had not been obligated or placed on contract.83 As of
April 30, 2010, about 40% of FY2009 war procurement funds remained unobligated.84
As mentioned, Army and Marine Corps spokesmen have also frequently predicted that reset
funding would be needed two to three years after U.S. troops leave. Frontloading may reflect
DOD desires to include reset funding before troop levels fall, anticipating greater difficulties in
getting funding after U.S. troops leave. This frontloading practice may help explain why reset
funding initially fell less rapidly than troop strength in Iraq but declined rapidly once all U.S.
troops left.
In Iraq, reset funding halved from $16.5 billion in FY2009 to $8.5 billion in FY2010 while troop
strength dropped one-third, perhaps reflecting the effects of the Iraq surge. In FY2011, the
following year, reset funding remained at $8.9 billion while troop levels fell by another third. In
FY2012 when troop levels fell to 9,200, Iraq reset funding fell steeply to $1.6 billion, then to $1.3
billion in FY2013 when troop levels in-country fell to zero. (Table D-1).
Reset funding for the Afghan war appears to lag troop reductions. Afghan reset funding decreased
from $12.7 billion in FY2011 to $11.3 billion in FY2012 as troop strength dropped modestly
from the 98,000 peak to 89,000, a decrease of close to 10% for both. By FY2013, however, with
troop strength one-third below the peak, reset funding declined modestly to $9.9 billion. Despite
another halving in troop strength between FY2013 and FY2014, reset decreased by $1.5 billion to
$8.4 billion. And in the FY2015 request, Afghan troop funds increased to $9.2 billion while troop
strength fell to 11,660 (Table D-1). This pattern could suggest frontloading of reset requests.
Over the war years, reset funding to repair, upgrade, and replace war-worn equipment contributed
to both DOD’s modernization and depot maintenance requirements for its equipment inventory.
This war funding effectively filled some of DOD’s base budget requirements by repairing and
replacing equipment sooner than anticipated, potentially cushioning flattening and decreases in
DOD budgets in recent years.
82
Testimony of General Michael Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant before the House Armed Services Committee,
“Army and Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, p. 41. GAO-07439T, Testimony of William Solis before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, House Armed
Services Committee, January 31, 2007, pp. 2 and 3. In a September 2006 report to Congress, for example, annual reset
requirements in FY2008 were estimated to be $13 billion for the Army and about $1 billion for the Marine Corps; see
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to the Congress, “Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs,” September 2006,
pp. 24 and 25. Months earlier, in the spring of 2006, the Army estimated that reset requirements would decrease from
$13 billion a year to $10.5 billion a year for the next two years and then decline to $2 billion a year if troops were
withdrawn over a two-year period; see Army Briefing, “Army Equipment Reset Update,” May 18, 2006, p. 8.
83
CRS, Statement of (name redacted) before the House Budget Committee, “The Rising Cost of the Iraq War,” October
24, 2007; http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf.
84
CRS calculations based on DOD, “Cost of War Execution Report,” April 30, 2010.
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Military Construction and Permanent Bases
The scope of military construction raised concerns with some policy makers about whether
extensive construction indicated DOD intentions to set up permanent U.S. bases in Iraq and in
Afghanistan. Because of that concern, both defense appropriation and authorization acts include
provisions that prohibit the United States from establishing permanent bases in either Iraq or
Afghanistan.85
Over the past decade of war, DOD built up an extensive infrastructure to support troops and
equipment in and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Military construction funding for this purpose
more than doubled from $0.5 billion in FY2005 to a peak of $4.2 billion in FY2008,then dropped
to zero in FY2012 (Table 7). In response to congressional concerns, DOD guidelines reemphasized building that was “re-locatable” rather than permanent in Iraq and Afghanistan
though some construction could be classified both ways. With the U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and
Afghanistan, bases have been either returned to the host country or demolished.86
DOD’s Definition of “Other” Funding
In its monthly war cost tracking, DOD, lists “non-war” costs, including “must-pay” bills,
modularity, and congressional additions and transfers. DOD does not include “excess over
strength” as a non-war cost though some observers would count that as well.
Based on DOD’s definition, “non-war” costs between FY2001 and FY2014 totaled $70.9 billion
(Table 6). This total reflects growth from $6.6 billion in FY2005 to a peak of $12.1 billion in
FY2008, dropping from $5 billion to $7 billion for FY2009 through FY2013, and then rising
again to $10 billion in FY2014.87 The amount of “non-war” costs could be considered higher than
shown by DOD depending on definitions.
85
See for example, Sec. 314 and Sec. 315 and Sec. P.L. 110-32 in the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act
applying to “this or any other act,” and Sec. 1237 and Sec. 2806, P.L. 111-84, the FY2010 National Defense
Authorization Act; see also section, “More Spending for Bases in Afghanistan Raises Questions of Permanency and
Execution,” in CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other
Programs, coordinated by (name redacted). These prohibitions
were repeated in annual DOD appropriation and
authorization acts.
86
See for example, Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Sec.
1230 Report, October 2014, Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan;
p. 5-p. 6, October 2014; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf.
87
DOD data provided to CRS for FY2001-FY2008 and tables included in DOD’s monthly cost of war reports for
September 2009 to June 2014.
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Table 6. DOD’s Non-War Costs, FY2001-FY2015
In Billions of Dollars
Category
Total, FY2001-FY2014
Modularity
10.0
Fuel - Non-War
9.5
Other Non-War
51.4
TOTAL
70.9
Sources: DOD data provided to CRS and Cost of War Report, June 2014.
Notes: Includes costs that DOD does not track as war obligations except for war-related “non-DOD”
intelligence, or National Intelligence Program programs, which are under the jurisdiction of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Assessing DOD’s FY2015 War Request
DOD’s initial FY2015 war request submitted in February 2014 was a “placeholder” figure
because the President had not yet decided about the pace of future withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan. In June 2014, DOD submitted a specific FY2015 request for $58.6 billion for the
Afghan war and post-war Iraq activities reflecting two policy announcements by President
Obama about U.S. withdrawal plans.
In his February 2013 State of the Union address, the President announced that U.S. troops in
Afghanistan would decrease to 33,000 by February of 2014, and that by the end of 2014, “our war
in Afghanistan will be over,” with later activities focusing “on two missions—training and
equipping Afghan forces so that the country does not again slip into chaos, and counterterrorism
efforts that allow us to pursue the remnants of al Qaeda and their affiliates.”88
On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced further reductions in the number of U.S. troops in
Afghanistan during the transition to an “advise and assist” role with decreases from
•
33,000 in February 2014 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015;
•
by another halving to about 4,900 by the January 1, 2016; and
•
the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be an “embassy presence,” of
about 1,000 according to press reports by January 1, 2017.89
Recent press reports suggest that the decrease to 9,800 U.S. troops may be delayed from January
1, 2015, to at least the spring of 2015 as U.S. troops fill the “train and assist” role of some allied
nations who are still finalizing their contributions. 90 Another pressure to retain more U.S. troop
could also be posed by the recent decision by President Obama to allow DOD to provide more
88
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Uolsternion Address,”
February 12, 2013; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.
89
White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” May 27, 2014; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan; White House, Press Release, “Fact Sheet: Bringing the U.S. War in
Afghanistan to a Responsible End,” May 27,2014.
90
Washington Post, “U.S. plans extra troops for Afghanistan,” by Missy Ryan, December 5, 2014.
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extensive support for Afghan operations through air support and sometimes accompanying
Afghan troops on ground operations.91
These figures do not include over 60,000 U.S. troops located primarily in the region who provide
“in-theater” support to war operations as well as headquarters and presence (Figure 2 and
Appendix A). The size of a U.S. “enduring presence” in the region after the withdrawal from
Afghanistan remains a key policy question to be decided with significant cost implications.
DOD’s FY2015 war request is $26.6 billion, or 31% below the FY2014 enacted level, while troop
strength in Afghanistan falls by 69%92 (Table 7). In testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Department of Defense Comptroller, Mike McCord, stated that the decrease in
FY2015’s request reflects “a continued downward trajectory of our war-related spending as we
conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan after 13 years of war ...” but argues that DOD is also
“faced with covering the costs of returning, repairing and replacing equipment ... [and] the costs
associated with our broader presence in the Middle East, from which we support a number of
critical missions in-country from FY2014 to FY2015.”93
In justifying both its FY2014 and FY2015 requests, DOD contended that war expenses would not
fall proportionately with troop levels because the cost of closing bases; returning, repairing, or
disposing of equipment; and maintaining some 60,000 troops in the region offset some of the
lower cost of deploying fewer troops at lower operating tempo.94 In addition, DOD Deputy
Secretary Robert Work argued that costs remained high because of
continued support for the Afghan national security forces, our coalition partners in theater,
and pay for the retrograde equipment and personnel will continue to reset the forces to enable
a truly vast range of support activities, including logistics, intelligence, and will support a
portion of the temporary Army and Marine Corps in strength that supports OEF, which has
been approved by Congress. 95
The FY2015 DOD OCO request also includes $4 billion for DOD’s Counterterrorism Partnership
Fund (CTPF), a controversial, new transfer fund intended to provide “a flexible mechanism that
allows the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Government as a whole to respond
more nimbly to evolving terrorist threats from South Asia to the Sahel.” It also includes $925
million for a European Reassurance Fund (ERI) to “reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to
their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance” in response to Russian
91
Washington Post, “Afghan mission for U.S. to continue under new authorities,” by Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan;
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-gives-commanders-broader-authority-to-supportafghan-troops/2014/11/22/8741f2fc-724e-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html.
92
CRS calculations based on Figure 1 and Table 1 in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Amendment,
Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations, June 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2015/amendment/FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf.
93
Testimony of DOD Comptroller, Mike McCord before the House Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Hearing
on President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Supplemental Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations,” July
16, 2014.
94
Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Addendum, Overseas Contingency Operation,
May 2013, p.1.
95
Testimony of Robert Work before House Budget Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on President Obama’s Funding
Request for Overseas Contingency Operations,” July 17, 2014–Final.
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moves in the Ukraine.96 (The Administration requests another $1 billion for the State
Department’s CTPF account.)
96
Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Amendment, Overview, Overseas Contingency Operations, June
2014; p. 2, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/
FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf.
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Table 7. DOD Funding for OEF and OIF/OND, FY2001-FY2015 Request by Title
In Billions of Dollars and Percent Change
Annual Change in War Funding and
Average Troop Strength In-Country
By Title in Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority (BA)
In-Cntry % Annual % Annual
Troops
Chge
Chge
in 000s
in $Bs
in Stgth
RDT&E
Mil.
Con.
Fam.
Hsg.
CTPFa
ERIa
Resc.b
Total
in $Bs
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$22.9
na
na
na
0.0
1.2
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$16.9
5.2
-26%
na
52.8
0.0
3.7
0.8
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$72.5
78.1
330%
1391%
19.1
61.8
2.1
6.9
0.3
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$90.8
145.8
25%
87%
2005
17.4
37.5
1.5
17.4
0.6
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$75.6
161.0
-17%
10%
2006
16.5
72.4
3.0
22.9
0.8
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$115.8
159.1
53%
-1%
2007
18.9
93.6
1.1
49.5
1.5
1.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$166.3
181.5
44%
14%
2008
19.1
93.3
2.7
65.9
1.6
4.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$186.9
186.6
12%
3%
2009
19.9
87.3
0.9
34.6
0.3
2.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$145.7
184.0
-22%
-1%
2010
16.9
108.3
1.5
32.6
1.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$162.4
175.8
11%
-4%
2011
15.6
110.2
0.5
29.8
1.4
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$158.8
144.9
-2%
-18%
2012
11.3
86.8
0.4
16.1
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$115.1
95.8
-28%
-34%
2013
12.1
61.5
0.0
8.1
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$82.0
63.4
-29%
-34%
2014
8.1
69.7
0.3
7.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
na
$85.2
37.2
4%
-41%
2015
Req.c
5.5
42.1
0.1
6.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.9
-0.1
$58.6
11.7
-31%
-69%
House
Passedd
5.1
60.1
0.0
14.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0
$79.40
11.7
-7%
-69%
Senate
Reptede
5.4
43.1
0.1
7.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
1.0
-0.6
-0.6
$58.90
11.7
-31%
-69%
na
$1,496.80
na
na
na
-0.1
$1,555.40
na
na
na
Fiscal
Year
Mil.
Pers.
O&M
Rev.
Fds
Proc.
2001
0.0
21.8
0.0
2002
0.2
15.4
2003
15.0
2004
Enacted, 2001-FY2014
Title
190.2
972.4
14.1
296.8
9.2
14.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Total w/ FY2015 Req.
Title
195.6
1014.5
14.2
302.9
9.3
14.1
0
0.9
-0.1
Sources: CRS calculations based on Table 2-1 in Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2015, April 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/FY15_Green_Book.pdf. Average strength calculated from DOD’s
monthly “Boots on the Ground” reports, 2001-June 2015; see Appendix A.
Notes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI).
Rescissions are applied to relevant fiscal year after request and shown separately in requests.
Reflects Administration’s amended June 2014 request.
H.R. 4870 as passed by the House reflects initial placeholder request.
H.R. 4870 as reported by the Senate Appropriations committee reflects Administration’s amended June
2014 request.
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Some ways to evaluate DOD’s FY2015 request for war funding which Congress may consider as
part of the appropriations and authorization process may include:
•
reviewing whether DOD has spent all the war funds appropriated over the past
several years;
•
comparing operational and troop costs experienced during the Iraq drawdown
with the proposed FY2015 costs of the Afghanistan drawdown; and
•
comparing the Administration’s new CTPF proposal to expand funding for “Train
and Equip” counterterrorism training programs with previous similar programs.
Passed in June 2014, the House-passed version of the DOD Appropriations bill, H.R. 4870,
reflected the Administration’s initial OCO placeholder request, while the Senate-reported version
of H.R. 4870 marked up DOD’s amended request.
Neither the House nor the Senate version includes the additional $5.5 billion requested for DOD
in November 2014 to combat the Islamic State by conducting air strikes in Syria and Iraq and reinstituting training of Iraqi security forces. That request is discussed separately below because the
request is for a new military operation with different purposes (“The New Request to Counter the
Islamic State”).
Has DOD Used All Its War Funds?
One standard measure to evaluate whether the budget authority (BA) appropriated is sufficient or
in excess of the amount needed is to examine an agency’s previous obligations history
(obligations reflect when contracts to purchase goods or services are signed and when military
and civilian personnel are paid). If funds are not obligated within their specified life, they are
presumably not needed during that time. The funds then lapse and are returned to the Treasury,
and reduce the deficit.97
Funds to cover day-to-day expenses and activities like military personnel and Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) funds are available for one year, while procurement monies to buy weapon
systems are available for three years because the contracting process takes more time. 98 As
contracts are executed, funds are then disbursed.
Amounts designated for war (as emergency or OCO) are specified in Title XV of the defense
authorization and Title IX of the DOD appropriation acts. These funds are separately tracked by
DOD in its accounting systems, and reported to Congress. DOD has some flexibility to move
funds from base budget accounts to those designated for war. DOD can also transfer funds from
one emergency or OCO-designated account to other war-designated accounts. If funds are
inadequate, DOD can transfer funds from base budget accounts to emergency or OCO-designated
accounts, also within caps set in law. 99
97
Monies can be obligated or de-obligated after their lives expire to adjust already-signed contracts for up to five years,
though the adjustments are generally minor.
98
Statutory language in appropriation acts set the availability or “life” of funds in each account.
99
Congress sets caps each year in DOD appropriations acts on the overall amount that can be transferred from base
budget accounts and separately for Title IX war-designated accounts. See for example, Sec. 8005 in P.L. 113-76,
FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act; “SEC. 8005. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such
(continued...)
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Using DOD sources, CRS analyzed DOD’s obligations of war funds appropriated between
FY2008 and FY2014 to see how much of that funding lapsed after its life expired, and the
amounts that DOD transferred from the base budget to meet war needs because war funding was
inadequate.
Lapsed War Funds
Between FY2008 and FY2013, a total of $17.2 billion in funds designated for war lapsed. The
amount of war funding that lapsed made up 2.3% of the total available. At the same time, DOD
transferred a total of $9.8 billion from its base budget funding to meet war needs or 0.9% share of
available war funds (Table 8).
Table 8. Execution of War Funding, FY2009-May FY2014
In Billions of Dollars and % of Total
Status of War Funds
Cumulative
Amount in
Billions of $
As % of Total
Lapseda
$17.2
2.3%
Added from base budgetb
$9.8
0.9%
Source: CRS calculations based on DOD, Table, “Backup Material in Cost of War Execution Reports,”
September of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and May 2014.
Notes:
a.
For up to five years after the end of their statutory life, BA can be used to make adjustments to signed
contracts; most adjustments reduce reported costs so lapsed amounts would be higher than shown here.
b.
DOD can transfer funds appropriated for its base budget to war funding as needed.
In terms of dollar amounts, lapsed funding ranged from a low of $1.2 billion in FY2009 to a high
of $5.8 billion in FY2010. The largest dollar amount of lapsed funds came from one-year monies
for military personnel and O&M, while the highest shares of lapsed funding came from three-five
year funds primarily for procurement (Figure 5).
(...continued)
action is necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, transfer
not to exceed $5,000,000,000 of working capital funds of the Department of Defense or funds made available in this
Act to the Department of Defense for military functions (except military construction) between such appropriations or
funds or any subdivision thereof, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and for the same time
period, as the appropriation or fund to which transferred.“ See also vol. 12, chap. 23 in Department of Defense,
Financial Management Regulations, Contingency Operations; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/
12_23.pdf.
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Figure 5. War Funding: Lapsed and Transferred
In billions of dollars and % of total available
Source: CRS calculations based on tables in September reports for FY2008-FY2014 (as of June, 2014).
Notes: Lapsed funding reflects monies whose life has expired except to adjust signed contracts. Adjustments in
later years generally reduce the amount obligated. For FY2012 and FY2013, DOD data is as of June 2014 and so
lapsed funds only reflect monies with a one-year life. At this time, it is unknown whether FY2012 and FY2013
funds that are available for two or three years will be obligated before their life expires.
There are other indications that war obligations in FY2014 may be more than needed. Based on
DOD’s June 2014 war cost report, some obligations are slower than the experience of the past
five years. For example, while O&M, Army obligations averaged 65% as of June over the past
five years, the share obligated in June, 2014 made up 60% of available BA (Figure 6).
If obligations in the last quarter of FY2014 followed the pattern of the past five years, then O&M,
Army obligations would total $22.7 billion out of $29.7 billion available. That would leave some
$6.7 billion in available BA that could lapse unless DOD transferred the funds for other uses.100
100
CRS analysis of data in DOD’s cost of war execution reports and its cumulative database as of June 2014.
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Figure 6. O&M, Army Monthly Obligations, FY2009-FY2014
As percent of funds available
Source: CRS calculations based on Cumulative CW-01-Z, Cumulative [war obligations data base] as of June
2014.
FY2014 War Funds Finance Airstrikes, Ebola Emergency, and Aircraft
In August and September 2014, DOD submitted three requests to the four congressional defense
committees to transfer a total of $2.66 billion in FY2014 O&M, Army war funds to pay for other
expenses:
•
$165 million in unanticipated expenses of conducting airstrikes against the
Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria;
•
$1.0 billion to provide humanitarian assistance for the Ebola crisis in several
nations in West Africa; and
•
$1.5 billion to finance buys of Joint Strike Fighters and AH-64 helicopters to
replace war losses.
Transfer provisions require that war funds can only be used to finance other more urgent war
needs. In all three cases, the funds transferred were to be used for other OCO needs, including the
Ebola response, which was “deemed” an OCO requirement. 101
DOD received congressional approval to transfer O&M, Army funds to pay for the Navy’s
additional aviation fuel and maintenance for ships deployed to support Navy airstrikes in Iraq and
Syria in the Middle East as well as the cost of replacing Hellfire missiles. To finance this
unanticipated expense, DOD tapped O&M, Army monies that were not needed because aviation
units deployed in Central Command to support Afghanistan were sent home sooner than
anticipated.
101
DOD, Comptroller, “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request, Various Appropriations, FY14-13 PA,”
September 8, 2014 (ISIL campaign); http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
execution/reprogramming/fy2014/prior1415s/14-13_PA_OCO_Request.pdf.
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DOD also received approval to provide $750 million in humanitarian assistance for the Ebola
crisis, using additional O&M, Army funds that were available because of lower support costs for
units re-deployed home sooner than planned.102
DOD also asked to transfer an additional $1.5 billion from O&M, Army war funds not needed
because re-deployments occurred earlier than planned to finance the purchase of:
•
21 AH-64 helicopters to replace 21 OH-58F helicopters lost in 2012;
•
6 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to replace 6 AV-8Bs lost in 2012; and
•
2 JSFs to replace two F-15 aircraft lost in 2012-2013. 103
Congress denied these requests because the replacement purchases were already included in
DOD’s future budget plans, violating one of the OMB criteria for war funding (see “OMB 2009
Guidance Restores War Funding Limits” and Appendix B).104
War Funds Cut During the FY2013 Sequester
Another potential indicator of previous excess war funding is DOD’s implementation of the
FY2013 sequester that was levied on all accounts, both base and war.105 In January 2013, before
the March sequester order, Deputy Secretary Ashton Carter issued guidance to the services to
“fully protect all wartime operations,” and “protect investments funded in Overseas Contingency
Operations if associated with urgent operational needs.”106 In May 2013, Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel warned that “because our wartime budget is also subject to sequestration, we must
utilize funds originally budgeted for other purposes in order to provide our troops at war with
every resource they need.”107
Under sequester rules, DOD’s individual accounts for O&M funds and individual weapon system
programs must be cut by the amounts specified in the OMB order. Because both base and OCO
funds are generally in the same accounts, DOD has the flexibility to allocate sequester reductions
to base or OCO-designated funds as long as the overall sequester savings are achieved. So, DOD
could have assigned all of the sequester cuts to base accounts to protect war funding.
102
DOD, Comptroller, August 2014, Various Appropriations, Ebola, 9-8-14; Ebola FY14-14 PA,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/fy2014/prior1415s/1414_PA_August_2014_Request.pdf. DOD, Comptroller, “Additional Ebola Response,” Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster Assistance, 14/15 and Operation and Maintenance, Army, 14/14, 9-5-14; $500 million, Ebola, deemed OCO;
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/fy2014/prior1415s/1417_PA_Ebola_Response.pdf. Although the three reprogrammings totaled $1.0 billion, the four Congressional defense
committees capped the total at $750 million.
103
DOD, Comptroller, “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request, Various Appropriations, FY14-13 PA,”
September 8, 2014 (ISIL campaign); http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/
fy2014/prior1415s/14-13_PA_OCO_Request.pdf. Congress ultimately placed a $750 million cap on DOD’s Ebola
humanitarian assistance. These factors would presumably also reduce costs anticipated in FY2015.
104
See Appendix B, OMB, “Revised War Funding Criteria,” September 2010.
The BCA (P.L. 112-25) required a sequester in FY2013.
106
Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter to the services and defense agencies, “Planning for
Uncertainty,” January 10, 2013.
107
Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel to the Services and defense agencies, “Furloughs,” May 14,
2013.
105
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Instead, DOD directed $5.3 billion of its total sequester cut of $37.2 billion to war funding, a
proportional share with both base and OCO funding cut by 6%. OCO-designated O&M accounts
were cut by 6% and OCO-designated procurement funds by10%.108 DOD may have believed that
OCO-designated funds could absorb these cuts without jeopardizing war operations.
Changes in Per-Troop Costs
Another metric that might be used to assess DOD requests is to examine the cost per troop over
time. Conceptually, per-troop costs would be expected to decrease with higher troop levels,
reflecting economies of scale. This has generally not been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As the number of troops decrease during withdrawals, per-troop costs would be expected to rise
temporarily because support costs remain high as bases stay open to support remaining troops,
and because one-time costs must be paid to close bases, ship home and repair equipment retained
in-theater, and dispose of equipment.109 Although per-troop costs increased in both Iraq and
Afghanistan during withdrawals, the increase has been steeper in Afghanistan (Figure 7).
At the same time, such increases could be at least partially offset by lower costs to support fewer
U.S. troops and conduct the less-costly train-and-assist mission.110
To capture costs likely to rise or fall with troop strength, CRS defined per-troop costs as
•
operational costs to conduct combat operations and support deployed troops;
•
investment for war-related procurement, RDT&E, and military construction; and
•
excluding special purpose, flexible accounts such as training Afghan and Iraq
security forces, which would not necessarily change with deployed troop
strength.
Per-Troop Costs Rise with Troop Levels
The cost per deployed troop—operational and investment—rose from $490,000 in FY2005 to
$800,000 in FY2008 in Iraq, a 63% increase. During the same period, the per-troop cost in
Afghanistan rose from $580,000 in FY2005 to $820,000 in FY2008, a 41% increase (Figure 7).
When the cost per troop rises substantially, questions may be raised about the reasons.
108
CRS calculations based on table provided by DOD tracking individual accounts from BA enacted to post-sequester
funding levels, September 2013.
109
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Overview,
Overseas Contingency Operations, p. 2-p.3, June 2014; http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2015/amendment/FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pdf. See also, Testimony of
Michael McCord, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller before House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on
President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Supplemental Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations, June
16, 2014, pp. 3- 4, July 16, 2014.
110
With fewer troops, the services will not need to rely on as many reservists, with the additional activation costs.
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Figure 7. Changes in Per-Troop Cost Before and After Withdrawals
In Iraq and in Afghanistan
Sources: CRS calculated average strength from DOD’s monthly “Boots on the Ground” reports, and
operational costs from DOD’s Cost of War reports. Operational costs include war-designated military
personnel and operation and maintenance obligations excluding funds to train Afghan and Iraq security forces,
coalition support and other flexible funds set up to meet special war needs; investment costs include wardesignated procurement, RDT&E and military construction from DOD’s monthly Cost of War reports.
A variety of factors may help explain increases in per-troop costs, including:
•
rising intensity of operating tempo;
•
unanticipated need for more force protection (e.g., armored Humvees);
•
growth in base support facilities for soldiers in-country and in the region;
•
higher command, communications, control, computers and intelligence support;
•
expanded war-related benefits;
•
cumulative effects of war usage on equipment;
•
DOD policy decisions to expand the definition of war costs (see section on
“DOD’s 2006 Guidance Expands Definition of “War-Related””); and
•
deficient wartime contracting practices and corruption in DOD’s purchase of
war-time goods and services.111
111
See CRS, Statement of (name redacted) before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on “The Rising Cost of the Iraq
War,” October 24, 2007; http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf; Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “At What Cost: Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Interim
Report, pp.34, June 2009; http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-1009.pdf. Commission on wartime Contracting, Final Report, 8-31-11; http://www.sigar.mil/.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Increases During Withdrawals
Per-troop costs increased more steeply during U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan than
during other phases of the operations. In Iraq, per-troop costs doubled from $800,000 in FY2008
to $1.6 million in FY2012 when the last U.S. troops left the country. In Afghanistan, per-troop
costs fluctuated between $820,000 and $910,000 between FY2008 and FY2011. Based on the
FY2015 request, per-troop costs in Afghanistan are to increase by 345% or over three-fold from
$870,000 in FY2011 to $3.9 million in FY2015. This growth in Afghanistan is steeper than in
Iraq in terms of both dollars and rate of increase (Figure 7).
In previous years, Congress has reduced DOD’s request based on similar analysis of trends in pertroop costs. For example, in FY2011, Congress transferred over $5 billion to the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) after the House Appropriations report found
excessive growth, and in FY2013 war appropriation, Army Operation and Maintenance was cut
by $500 million because of “unjustified growth in average operations per troop.”112
DOD Drawdown Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan
Another way to gauge the funding in the FY2015 war funding request is to compare the
withdrawal experiences in both countries for operational and investment costs separately.113 The
trends described below suggest that DOD’s FY2015 request for operational expenses in
Afghanistan may be higher than would be expected in light of the experience during the Iraq
withdrawal.
Changes in Troop Strength in Iraq and Afghanistan in Earlier Years
Between FY2005 and FY2008, troop strength in Iraq rose gradually from 143,000 to 157,000, a
10% increase. From FY2005 to FY2009, troop strength in Afghanistan more than doubled from
18,000 to 43,800, a more rapid increase than in Iraq.
The peak strength in Iraq was 156,000 during the surge in FY2008 while the peak strength in
Afghanistan was 100,000 during the troop surge. In both countries, the rate of decrease from
these peaks was similar.
112
See Congressional Record, Joint Explanatory Statement for H.R. 933, “Department of Defense, Military
Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013,’’ p. 998 and p. 1240. See also
troop reduction cut of $380.1 million shown on p. 794 in H.Rept. 112-331. See also congressional action in P.L. 113118 (H.Rept. 111-118) to transfer $5.0 billion from DOD military personnel and O&M accounts to the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) because “The nature of military action in Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is expected to change significantly in fiscal year 2010. Therefore, the Services cannot
accurately budget for these operations. The OCOTF account provides flexibility to transfer funds to the needed
appropriation account once costs are known.” (H.Rept. 111-230, p. 424)
113
Operational costs include war funds for military personnel and O&M excluding programs like coalition support and
training of Afghan and Iraq security forces; investment funds include war-designated procurement, RDT&E, and
military construction.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Figure 8. Changes in Troop Strength and Operational Costs
In Iraq and in Afghanistan, FY2005-FY2015 Request
Sources: CRS calculated average strength from DOD’s monthly “Boots on the Ground” reports, and
operational costs from DOD’s Cost of War reports. Operational costs include military personnel and operation
and maintenance obligations excluding funds to train Afghan and Iraq security forces, coalition support, and other
flexible funds set up to meet special war needs.
Compared to the peak in FY2008, U.S. troop levels in Iraq dropped by
•
about 10% to 140,000 in FY2009;
•
one-third to 94,000 in FY2010;
•
two-thirds to 47,000 in FY2011; and
•
over 90% to 9,200 in FY2012 as all U.S. troops left Iraq.
The pace of the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan is similar to Iraq. Compared to the peak troop
strength of 98,300 during the Afghan surge in FY2010, troop levels dropped by
•
9% to 90,000 in FY2012;
•
about one-third to 63,000 in FY2013;
•
almost two-thirds to 37,000 in FY2014; and
•
almost 90% to 12,000 in FY2015 request.
So, in both operations, compared to peak strength during their respective troop surges, during
their respective withdrawals, the number of U.S. troops initially declined gradually and then fell
by roughly a third, two-thirds, and then 90% from the peak level before the final withdrawal
(Figure 8).114
114
CRS calculations, based on figures shown in Figure 7.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Comparing Operational Costs and Strength
Total operational costs in Iraq rose steadily while troop strength remained fairly stable. At the
same time, operational costs in Afghanistan closely mirrored changes in troop strength. In both
cases, operating tempo rose before and during troop surges.
Both wars included fairly s
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