Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results for Active and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel

Congressional research reportJun 26, 2015

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of

FY2013 and FY2014 Results for Active and

Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel

-name redactedSpecialist in Military Manpower Policy

June 26, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RL32965

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

Summary

Congress has historically been quite interested in recruiting and retention of personnel in the

nation’s Armed Forces, since maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key

component of military readiness. This report provides a brief overview of the recruiting and

retention results for Active and Reserve Component enlisted personnel during FY2013 and

FY2014.

Recruiting and Retention Metrics

Recruiting performance for enlisted personnel is principally measured in terms of meeting

quantity and quality goals. Quantity goals are based on the projected need for new personnel each

service must bring in over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized endstrength. There are two principal quality goals: at least 90% of new recruits should be high school

diploma graduates and at least 60% should score above average on the Armed Forces

Qualification Test (AFQT). Quality goals are only for recruits without any previous military

service (“non-prior service”). Retention performance for enlisted personnel is principally

measured by meeting one or more quantity goals. For the Active Components, quantity goals are

based on career phase (for example, initial term, mid-career, and career) and are stated in

numerical terms. For the Reserve Components, retention is tracked via overall attrition rates,

which measure the ratio of people who leave in a given year. Reserve Component retention goals

establish a maximum attrition rate or “ceiling” which should not be exceeded. They are stated in

percentage terms and are not broken out by career phase.

Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

In FY2013 and FY2014, all of the Active Components achieved their recruit quantity goals and

recruit quality was high. Nearly all new recruits had high school diplomas, and about threequarters scored above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Recruit quality in the

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in these years has been near the highest levels experienced

since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973; Army recruit quality, as measured by high

school diploma graduates, has been quite high as well, although above-average scores on the

AFQT are just slightly above the DOD benchmark. Retention has remained strong for most of the

services, although the Navy experienced modest shortfalls in both years. Most of the Reserve

Components met or exceeded their quantity goals while quality remained high. The Army

National Guard was slightly below its quantity goals in both of these years, while the Army

Reserve experienced more substantial shortfalls, contributing to a decline in its personnel

strength. Recruit quality for the Reserve Components has been fairly strong, although aboveaverage AFQT scores for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have hovered just slightly

above the DOD benchmark of 60%. Several of the Reserve Components exceeded their attrition

ceilings, although the margins were modest. The Army Reserve finished FY2014 about 3.3%

below its authorized end-strength, indicating a need for stronger recruiting and retention in the

future. It is unclear whether the recruiting shortfalls experienced by the Army Reserve are

specific to that organization or portend broader recruiting difficulties to come.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

Contents

Recruiting ........................................................................................................................................ 2

Active Components ................................................................................................................... 2

Historical Context ............................................................................................................... 3

Reserve Components ................................................................................................................. 6

Historical Context ............................................................................................................... 8

Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 10

Retention ........................................................................................................................................ 12

Active Components ................................................................................................................. 12

Reserve Components ............................................................................................................... 14

Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 15

Historical Perspective: The Post-Cold War Drawdown and Its Impact on Recruiting and

Retention..................................................................................................................................... 17

Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 18

Tables

Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2013

and FY2014 .................................................................................................................................. 3

Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Active Component Enlisted

Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014................................................................................................... 3

Table 3. Accession Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2013

and FY2014 .................................................................................................................................. 7

Table 4. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Reserve Component Enlisted

Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014................................................................................................... 7

Table 5. Retention Data for Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014 .......... 14

Table 6. Attrition Data for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014 .......... 15

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

ongress has historically been very interested in the recruiting and retention of personnel in

the nation’s Armed Forces, as maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key

component of military readiness. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting

and retention goals through its establishment of personnel strength levels for each of the Active

and Reserve Components. It influences the achievement of these goals primarily through setting

military compensation levels (which may include recruiting and retention bonuses, educational

benefits, and separation incentives), establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment and

retention (for example, age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship standards), and by authorizing

and funding recruiting and retention programs (for example, providing for dedicated recruiters

and career counselors, military entrance processing stations, market research, and advertising).

Through its oversight powers, Congress also closely monitors the performance of the executive

branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce.

Since 2001, the United States has conducted major military operations that dramatically increased

the operations tempo of the military services, required the large-scale mobilization of reservists,

and resulted in significant battle casualties. These factors were particularly applicable to the

Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Marine Corps, and Marine Corps Reserve, which

shouldered the bulk of the manpower burden associated with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many observers expressed concern that these factors would lead to lower recruiting and retention

rates and jeopardize the vitality of today’s all-volunteer military, particularly in the FY2005FY2007 timeframe, when the Army had difficulty meeting its recruit quantity goals and began

accepting lower-quality recruits. However, starting in 2008 these concerns were alleviated by the

more favorable recruiting and retention environment brought about by comparatively high

unemployment rates in the civilian economy, the improved security situation in Iraq, and reduced

recruiting goals for the Army and Marine Corps as both of those services completed major

expansions.

In recent year, cuts in active1 and reserve force2 structure have generated less demand for military

manpower, thus allowing the services to set lower quantity goals for recruiting and retention.

Lower quantity goals also allow the services to be more selective in whom they accept and retain,

thereby enhancing quality levels. However, the future recruiting and retention environment is less

clear. Reductions in strength may be coming to an end,3 which would likely require the services

to increase their recruiting and retention quantity goals in order to stabilize their forces at planned

levels. This could result in the services reducing quality somewhat to meet their quantity goals, or

perhaps require the application of greater recruiting resources (e.g., advertising, recruiters, and

enlistment bonuses) to maintain quality. A strengthening of economic growth could make civilian

work comparatively more attractive than military work, thereby making recruiting and retention

The authorized end-strength for the Active Components for FY2012 was as follows: Army (562,000), Navy

(325,700), Air Force (332,800), and Marine Corps (202,100). The authorized end-strength for the Active Components

in FY2015 is lower for each service: Army (490,000), Navy (312,980), Air Force (310,900), and Marine Corps

(184,100).

The authorized end-strength for Reserve Component for FY2012 was as follows: Army National Guard (358,200),

Army Reserve (205,00), Navy Reserve (66,200), Marine Corps Reserve (39,600), Air National Guard (106,700), Air

Force Reserve (71,400), and Coast Guard Reserve (10,000). The authorized end-strength for the Reserve Components

for FY2015 was lower for all Reserve Components, although in some cases the reductions were small: Army National

Guard (350,200), Army Reserve (202,000), Navy Reserve (57,300), Marine Corps Reserve (39,200), Air National

Guard (105,000), Air Force Reserve (67,100), and Coast Guard Reserve (7,000).

The FY2016 Budget Request proposed additional reductions in Army end-strength (to 475,000 for FY2016, and to

450,000 by FY2018), while holding the other three services at roughly the FY2015 level. However, DOD has argued

that larger reductions would be required if the spending caps of the Budget Control Act of 2011 are not adjusted.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

more challenging. Additionally, the historical experience of the post-Cold War drawdown also

raises some cautionary flags for the current post-drawdown situation: if a perception of limited

career prospects or lower job satisfaction were to develop, it could have a negative effect on

recruiting and retention.

Recruiting

Recruiting has been called the life blood of the military. Without a robust ability to bring new

members into the military, the services would lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission

essential tasks in the near term and would lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to

develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To protect against this, the Active

and Reserve Components set goals for new recruit “accessions”4 each fiscal year. Officer and

enlisted goals are set separately. There are both “quantity”5 and “quality”6 goals for the enlisted

force.

Active Components

The recruiting data presented in Table 1 below show that all of the Active Components met their

enlisted accession quantity goals in both FY2013 and FY2014. The recruiting data presented in

Table 2 show the performance of the Active Components with respect to the Department of

Defense (DOD) enlisted accession quality benchmarks for those same years. The two principal

DOD quality benchmarks are the percentage of non-prior service enlistees who are high school

diploma graduates (HSDG) and the percentage that score above average on the Armed Forces

Qualification Test (AFQT Categories I-IIIA).7 All of the Active Components exceeded their

quality goals in FY2013 and FY2014, often by large margins. In fact, over the past few years, the

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have experienced the highest recruit quality levels achieved

since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. The Army is also experiencing

In the case of the Active Component, “accessions” are individuals who have actually begun their military service, as

distinguished from those who have signed a contract to serve but who have not yet begun their service. Accession for

Active Component personnel usually occurs when an individual is “shipped” to basic training. For the Reserve

Components, the term has a broader meaning: accession can occur shortly after an individual signs a contract, when he

or she is “shipped” to basic training, or when a servicemember transfers from an Active Component to a Reserve

Component.

This “quantity” goal is normally based primarily on the difference between the congressionally authorized end

strength of the Component for a given fiscal year and the projected number of currently serving personnel that

Component will retain through the end of the year. Officer and enlisted accession goals are set separately. To simplify

somewhat, if a Component has an authorized end strength of 200,000 enlisted personnel in a given year, and it projects

that it will retain 175,000 of its current enlisted members through the year, it will set a goal of bringing in

approximately 25,000 new enlisted recruits for that year (actually, the goal will be slightly higher to account for those

new recruits who are discharged early, usually while in initial entry training). The actual number of new enlisted

recruits a Component needs, however, may change during the year as new projections are made about the retention of

currently serving enlisted personnel or if the Component must increase or decrease the total size of its force.

DOD measures enlisted recruit “quality” based on two criteria: graduation from high school and score on the Armed

Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Since FY1993, DOD’s benchmarks for recruit quality stipulate that at least 90% of

new recruits must be high school diploma graduates and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT.

Other metrics that are used less frequently include the percentage of non-prior service enlistees who score well below

average on the AFQT (Category IV) and the number and types of enlistment waivers granted to enlistees. However,

these measures are secondary to HSDG and above average AFQT and, in the case of waivers, there is no official

benchmark.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

historically high recruit quality with respect to the HSDG metric, but its performance with respect

to the AFQT metric is more consistent with its historical average, hovering just slightly above the

DOD benchmark of 60%.8

Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component Enlisted Personnel,

FY2013 and FY2014

FY2013

(Goal)

FY2013

(Achieved)

FY2013

(Percent

of Goal)

FY2014

(Goal)

FY2014

(Achieved)

FY2014

(Percent

of Goal)

Army

69,000

69,154

100.2%

57,000

57,101

100.2%

Navy

40,112

100.0%

33,740

33,765

100.1%

Marine Corps

32,200

32,215

100.0%

26,000

26,018

100.1%

Air Force

26,275

100.0%

24,068

24,070

100.0%

Service

Source: Department of Defense.

Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Active Component Enlisted

Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014

DOD Quality Benchmarks

FY2013

(Achieved)

FY2014

(Achieved)

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

Army

90%

60%

99.9%

62.2%

94.8%

61.7%

Navy

90%

60%

98.9%

84.3%

99.4%

88.6%

Marine Corps

90%

60%

99.7%

73.5%

99.9%

72.1%

Air Force

90%

60%

99.5%

97.7%

99.5%

94.9%

Service

Source: Department of Defense.

Notes: HSDG = High School Diploma Graduate; AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test; CAT I-IIIA =

Categories I-IIIA (above average scores).

Historical Context

In the three years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 2001—which saw a dramatic

increase in the use of U.S. military forces—all of the services achieved their quantity goals while

increasing their quality levels. In fact, recruit quality for all the services in the FY2003-FY2004

time frame reached levels not seen since the low accession goals of the post-Cold War drawdown

(early to mid-1990s) allowed the services to be highly selective in who they allowed to join. This

was followed by the very challenging recruiting environment of FY2005-FY2007, when a variety

of factors forced some of the services to accept a lower level of recruit quality in order to meet

For historical data on recruit quality, see this table entitled “Recruit Quality Over Time” from the Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/docs/

Quality%20by%20FY%20from%201973.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

their quantity goals. This decline in quality was most notable with respect to the Army. As the

Army’s recruiting difficulties were the primary source of concern during that time, a specific

discussion of its recruiting challenges and performance is provided below, followed by a brief

summary of the other services’ results.

Army

In FY2004, the Army slightly exceeded its quantity goal of 77,000. Of these individuals, 92% had

high school diplomas (above the DOD benchmark of 90%) and 72% scored above average on the

Armed Forces Qualification Test or AFQT (well above the DOD benchmark of 60%). Only 0.5%

of Army recruits had AFQT scores in Category IV (the 10th through 30th percentile). The HSDG

figure was about the same as the Army had experienced for the preceding seven years, while the

AFQT figure was about the same as that of the preceding year, but higher than the Army had

experienced in the 10 years prior to that (FY1993-FY2002). However, for a number of reasons—

including the challenge of recruiting during wartime, competition from civilian employers during

an economic boom, and an effort to expand the size of the Army that necessitated bringing in

more recruits—the Army struggled to meet its recruiting goals from FY2005 to FY2007. In

FY2005, it failed to meet its quantity goal by 8% and the quality of its recruits fell. While

achieving its quantity goals in FY2006 and FY2007, Army recruit quality continued to slide. By

the end of FY2007, the Army reported that only 79% of its recruits were high school diploma

graduates and 61% had scored above average on the AFQT, levels not seen since the 1980s.

Additionally, the proportion of Category IV recruits rose from less than 1% in FY2003-FY2004

to about 4% in FY2005-FY2007.9 This decline in recruit quality occurred at a time when the

Army applied extraordinary resources to its recruiting efforts: it added over 2,500 recruiters to the

existing recruiting force, increased its advertising budget, raised the maximum age for enlistees

from 35 to 42,10 relaxed some existing standards (such as the prohibition on tattoos on the neck

and hands), increased enlistment bonus maximums from $20,000 to $40,000,11 and increased the

number of medical and conduct12 waivers being granted.13

DOD regulations require that no more than 4% of an annual enlistment cohort may be Category IV (10th -30th

percentile on the AFQT). In addition, no one in Category V (1st-9th percentile on the AFQT) may be admitted. DOD

Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower, September 20, 2005, paragraph 4.1,

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/114501p.pdf.

P.L. 109-163, §543, increased the maximum allowable age for enlistment from 35 to 42.

P.L. 109-163, §635.

Conduct waivers are used for a wide range of pre-enlistment misconduct. Until 2008, conduct waivers included drug

use, traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies, although each of the services had different rules for categorizing

specific types of misconduct and different criteria for granting conduct waivers. DOD established an enlistment waiver

policy effective at the start of FY2009 that revised the waiver categories, standardized the definitions of the various

types of misconduct across the services, made drug use its own waiver category, and set minimum standards for

requiring drug and conduct waivers. See Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 – Enlistment Waivers, June 27,

2008, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-018.pdf.

The following are the number and the percentage of Army non-prior service accessions enlisted accessions with a

waiver of any type in the cited fiscal year: FY2003 (8,836/12.7%); FY2004 (8,918/12.3%); FY2005 (10,185/ 15.7%);

FY2006 (13,518/19.5%); FY2007 (14,820/22.0%); FY2008 (14,929/21.5%). The percentage of non-prior service

enlisted accessions with waivers was relatively stable for the other three services during this period. The Army waiver

figures for subsequent years are as follows: FY2009 (9,938/15.6%); FY2010 (6,080/8.7%); FY2011 (6,653/10.7%),

FY2012 (6,014/10.1%), FY2013 (8,009/11.8%), FY2014 (6,739/12.0%). However, these figures are not directly

comparable to those of previous years due to a change in the methodology for counting waivers (see discussion in

footnote 12)

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

The Army began to reverse this quality decline in FY2008 when it met its accession quantity goal

while also increasing the proportion of recruits who were high school diploma graduates to 83%

and slightly increasing the proportion who scored above average on the AFQT to 62%.

Additionally, the Army allowed fewer Category IV recruits (3.5%) and was able to reduce the

number of individuals who were enlisted with waivers for conduct by about 10%.14

Improvements in Army recruit quality accelerated markedly in FY2009 and FY2010. Aided by a

more favorable recruiting environment—generated by comparatively high unemployment rates

and an improved security situation in Iraq—and needing fewer recruits due to the completion of

the major force expansion which occurred during FY2004-FY2008, the Army was able to be

more selective. As a result, the Army was able to exceed its quantity goal in FY2009 by 8% while

recruit quality shot up dramatically: 95% of new accessions were high school diploma graduates,

66% scored above average on the AFQT, and just 1.5% were Category IV. For FY2010, 100% of

the Army’s recruits were high school diploma graduates, 64% scored above average on the AFQT,

and less than 1% were Category IV. Army recruit quality in FY2011-FY2013 was nearly the same

as FY2010. Army recruit quality dropped from FY2013 to FY2014: the percentage of recruits

with high school diplomas dropped from nearly 100% to a still robust 95%, while the percentage

of recruits scoring above-average on the AFQT edged down from 62.2% to 61.7%.

Marine Corps

While the Marine Corps experienced some of the same recruiting pressures as the Army in the

FY2005-FY2007 timeframe—heavy involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with a major

force expansion that required a greater number of new recruits—the impact on quantity and

quality was not as great. In FY2004, 97% of Marine Corps recruits were high school diploma

graduates and 69% scored above average on the AFQT. These figures dropped slightly to 95%

and 65%, respectively, by FY2007 but were still well above the DOD benchmarks and not

substantially different from the quality levels achieved by the Marine Corps since the mid-1990s.

The Marine Corps did, however, increase the proportion of Category IV recruits to 3% in

FY2007, the highest level it had accepted since 1985, and it did accept more individuals with

records of serious misconduct (although its overall ratio of waivered individuals remained

relatively stable). Marine Corps recruiting in FY2008 showed some small improvements in

quality, while FY2009 saw much larger improvements. In FY2009, 99% of Marine Corps recruits

were high school diploma graduates and 71% of them scored above average on the AFQT. In

FY2010, 100% were high school diploma graduates, 72% scored above average on the AFQT,

and less than 1% were Category IV. Marine Corps recruit quality in FY2011-FY2014 was nearly

the same as FY2010.

Navy and Air Force

The Navy and the Air Force were the least affected by the recruiting stresses of the FY2005FY2007 time frame. While deeply involved in the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,

While the FY2008 conduct waiver figures were still above the levels for FY2006 – and well above the levels for

FY2003-FY2005 – the downward movement from FY2007 was noteworthy. Of particular significance, in FY2008 the

Army reduced the number of waivers for felony convictions from 511 to 372. With the change in methodology brought

about by Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 (see footnote 12), directly comparable conduct waiver data for

subsequent years is not available. Under the new methodology, the Army reported 220 waivers for “Major Misconduct

(Conviction)” in FY2009, just 7 in FY2010, and none in FY2011- 2014.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

their role in these conflicts resulted in far fewer casualties than experienced by the Army and

Marine Corps. Additionally, both of these services were undergoing force reductions, in contrast

to the force expansions of the Army and Marine Corps. As such, they experienced less pressure to

trade off quality to achieve quantity goals, enabling both services to meet their quantity goals

while suffering little change in their quality metrics.

The Navy’s HSDG rate declined from 96% in FY2004 to 93% in FY2007, but its above-average

AFQT rate improved from 70% to 73%. The Air Force’s HSDG metric remained at 99% between

FY2004 and FY2007, while its AFQT metric dropped from 82% to 79%. Neither service allowed

in any Category IV personnel during this period.

The Navy and the Air Force both met their accession quantity goals during FY2008-FY2014 and

both experienced improvements in recruit quality. The Navy’s HSDG rate rose from 93% in

FY2007 to 99% in FY2011-FY2014, while its above-average AFQT rate rose from 73% in

FY2007 to 89% in FY2011 and 90% in FY2012, tapered off to 84% in FY2013, and then rose to

nearly 89% in FY2014. The Air Force’s HSDG rate remained between 98% and 100% in

FY2008-FY2014, while its above-average AFQT rate rose from 79% in FY2007 to 99% in

FY2011 and 98% in FY2012-FY2013. This metric declined to about 95% in FY2014, although

this is still exceptionally high from a historical perspective.15

Reserve Components

The recruiting data presented in Table 3 show the performance of the Reserve Components in

meeting their enlisted accession quantity goals in FY2013 and FY2014. The recruiting data

presented in Table 4 show the performance of the Reserve Components with respect to the

enlisted accession quality benchmarks for those same years.16

All of the Reserve Components met their quality goals in FY2013 and FY2014. Most of the

Reserve Components also met their quantity goals in these years, the exceptions being the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve. The Army National Guard shortfalls were fairly small and

do not appear to be significant in light the Army Guard’s ability to maintain a personnel strength

quite close to its authorized level, and the recent reduction of authorized strength.17 The Army

Reserve fell short of its quantity goal by about 800 in FY2012, 3,700 in FY2013, and 2,500 in

FY2014. These shortfalls were greater concern as they coincided with a decline of Army Reserve

strength from 204,803 at the end of FY2011 to 195,438 at the end of FY2014.18 The Army

Reserve has taken steps to reverse this trend, and early data from 2015 indicate that its strength is

The Air Force’s above-average AFQT rates of 99% in FY2011, 98% in FY2012-2013, and 95% in FY2014 are

unusually high, even given the exceptionally strong recruiting environment. These four years represents the highest

above-average AFQT accession cohorts of any service since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973.

Previously, the highest scoring accession cohort was the Air Force in FY2010, with 90% above-average on the AFQT.

Prior to that, the highest scores were achieved by the Air Force’s post-Cold War drawdown cohorts of FY1991 and

FY1992, in which 86% of new Air Force accessions scored above-average on the AFQT.

See the section entitled “Active Components” earlier in this report for a description of the DOD quality benchmarks.

The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) lowered the Army National Guard’s authorized endstrength from 358,200 to 354,200. It’s actual strength at the end of FY2014 was 354,072. The FY2015 National

Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) lowered the Army National Guard’s authorized end-strength from 354,200

to 350,200. See footnote 23 for additional National Guard strength data.

See footnote 24.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

now on the upswing,19 but it may take some time to restore its authorized strength.20 It is unclear

whether the recruiting shortfalls experienced by the Army Reserve are specific to that

organization or portend broader recruiting issues, as occurred in the first half of the last decade

when the Army Reserve and Army National Guard experienced recruiting problems two years

before the active Army.

Table 3. Accession Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel,

FY2013 and FY2014

Reserve

Component

FY2013

(Goal)

FY2013

(Achieved)

FY2013

(Percent

of Goal)

FY2014

(Goal)

FY2014

(Achieved)

FY2014

(Percent

of Goal)

Army National Guard

49,650

49,299

99.3%

47,900

47,062

98.3%

Army Reserve

29,880

26,191

87.7%

29,313

26,815

91.5%

Navy Reserve

5,504

5,584

101.5%

3,853

3,987

103.5%

Marine Corps Reserve

8,798

100.0%

8,333

100.0%

Air National Guard

10,500

10,737

102.3%

9,154

10,011

109.4%

Air Force Reserve

5,817

7,846

134.9%

4,875

6,952

142.6%

Source: Department of Defense.

Table 4. Accession Data (Quality) for Non-Prior Service Reserve Component

Enlisted Personnel, FY2013 and FY2014

DOD Quality Benchmarks

FY2013

(Achieved)

FY2014

(Achieved)

Reserve Component

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

HSDG

AFQT

CAT I-IIIA

Army National Guard

90%

60%

95.7%

62.8%

94.9%

61.2%

Army Reserve

90%

60%

95.6%

60.7%

94.9%

60.8%

Navy Reserve

90%

60%

97.7%

87.7%

97.8%

88.2%

Marine Corps Reserve

90%

60%

99.7%

76.2%

99.8%

76.9%

Air National Guard

90%

60%

100%

77.1%

100.0%

76.2%

Air Force Reserve

90%

60%

99.4%

79.6%

99.5%

79.6%

Source: Department of Defense.

The Army Reserve’s strength was 198,106 as of April 2015.

The Army Reserve’s authorized end-strength for FY2015 is 202,000, a decrease from its FY2014 authorized endstrength of 205,000.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

Historical Context

The recruiting trends for the Reserve Components were similar to those of their Active

Component counterparts, although the indicators of recruiting difficulties appeared earlier

(FY2003) than for the Active Components and began rebounding earlier as well (FY2006). The

Reserve Components of the Army—the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—

experienced the most significant recruiting problems particularly in meeting their quantity goals

from FY2003 to FY2005. The Marine Corps Reserves met their quantity goals in those years

while seeing a slight decline in one of the quality metrics. The Air Force Reserves and Air

National Guard briefly experienced some recruiting difficulties as well. Reserve Component

recruiting has been generally strong in FY2009-FY2014, although the Army Reserve has

experienced difficulties in meeting its quantity goals in the past several years, and both the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve are just above the DOD benchmark with regards to aboveaverage AFQT.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve

Recruiting difficulties for the Army National Guard began in FY2003, when it fell short of its

recruit quantity goal of 62,000 by 13%; it also missed its FY2004 recruit quantity goal of 56,002

by 13%. In FY2005, both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve missed their quantity

goals by 20% and 16%, respectively. Largely as a result of these shortfalls, both the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve were well below their congressionally authorized endstrength at the end of FY2005.21 There were also declines in recruit quality during this period.

The Army National Guard’s HSDG rate declined from 86% in FY2002 to 83% in FY2005, while

its above-average AFQT metric dropped from 60% to 57%. During this same period, the HSDG

rate for the Army Reserve dropped from 94% to 88% and its above-average AFQT rate declined

from 69% to 67%.

Recruiting results for the Army National Guard began improving in FY2006. From FY2006 to

FY2009, the Army National Guard met, or came close to meeting, robust recruit quantity goals.

This allowed it to slightly exceed its authorized end-strength by FY2007, and to significantly

exceed22 its authorized end-strength in FY2008 and FY2009. For FY2010 and FY2011, retention

was strong enough in the Army Guard that it cut back on its recruiting in the last few months of

the year in order to keep from exceeding its authorized end-strength by too great a margin, and

the recruiting goal for FY2012 was markedly lower than the preceding two years for the same

reason.23 Recruit quality also improved during this time frame, with the HSDG metric rising from

The term “end-strength” refers to the authorized strength of a specified branch of the military at the end of a given

fiscal year. (The term authorized strength means “the largest number of members authorized to be in an armed force, a

component, a branch, a grade, or any other category of the armed forces”). As of September 2005, the actual personnel

strength of the Army National Guard was 333,177—about 95% of its authorized end-strength of 350,000. The actual

strength of the Army Reserve was 189,005 in September, 2005—about 92% of its authorized end-strength of 205,000.

While end-strengths for the Reserve Components are maximum strength levels, not minimum strength levels, the

inability to maintain a force at the authorized end-strength level can be an indicator of strength management problems.

10 U.S.C. 115 (f) allows the Secretary of Defense to vary the authorized end-strength of the Selected Reserve of any

of the reserve components “by a number equal to not more than 3 percent of that end strength.” 10 U.S.C. 115(g)

allows the Service Secretary to increase the authorized end-strength of the Selected Reserve of a Reserve Component

under his or her jurisdiction “by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of such authorized end strength.”

The end-strength figures for the Army National Guard are as follows: FY2006 (350,000 authorized, 346,288 actual);

FY2007 (350,000 authorized, 352,707 actual); FY2008 (351,300 authorized, 360,351 actual); FY2009 (352,600

authorized, 358,391 actual), FY2010 (358,200 authorized, 362,015 actual), FY2011 (358,200 authorized, 361,561

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

83% in FY2005 to 92%-96% in FY2010-FY2013. Its proportion of recruits with above average

AFQT scores remained just under the DOD benchmark of 60% in FY2006-FY2008, but jumped

dramatically to 76% in FY2009 and gradually dropped to 61% by FY2014.

The Army Reserve also improved its recruiting from the perspective of quantity from FY2006 to

FY2011, meeting or nearly meeting all of its quantity goals in these years. This allowed the Army

Reserve to stabilize its strength at around 190,000 personnel in FY2006 and FY2007 (about 7%

below its authorized end-strength), and to begin increasing its personnel strength in FY2008. In

FY2009, the Army Reserve was finally able to meet its authorized end-strength after four years of

operating under-strength, and it maintained this during FY2010-FY2011. However, in FY2012FY2014, the Army Reserve again experienced strength declines, which averaged about 3,000

soldiers per year.24 The quality of Army Reserve recruits declined from FY2006 to FY2008, with

the HSDG metric remaining close to the FY2005 level of 88% and the percentage of recruits

scoring above-average on the AFQT declining from 67% in FY2005 to 58% in FY2008. Recruit

quality improved dramatically in the next few years. The percentage of recruits with a high school

diploma shot up to 96%-100% in FY2009-FY2014. The percentage scoring above average on the

AFQT increased to 63% in FY2009 and continued upward to 71% in FY2010, before dropping to

69% in FY2011, 64% in FY2012, and 61% in FY2013-FY2014. The AFQT figure for FY2013

and FY2014 is just slightly above the DOD benchmark of 60%, which raises some concerns,

particularly when coupled with the Army Reserve’s shortfalls in recruit quantity (although, the

Army Reserve has shown improvement in this area during the first half of FY2015). The causes

of the Army Reserve’s recruiting shortfalls are not entirely clear and may be specific to that

organization.25 However, it is also possible that they are an early symptom of recruiting

challenges that may affect other Reserve and Active Component forces.

Other Reserve Components

The remaining Reserve Components appear to have been much less affected by the recruiting

stresses of the FY2003-FY2005 period; they likewise saw less of a rebound afterwards. The

Marine Corps Reserve and Air Force Reserve met their quantity goals in every year from FY2003

to FY2014. The Air National Guard missed its quantity goals by an average of about 7% from

FY2004 to FY2007, but nonetheless maintained a fairly stable strength level consistent with its

authorized end-strength. The Navy Reserve missed its quantity goals in FY2005 and FY2006, but

(...continued)

actual); FY2012 (358,200 authorized, 358,078 actual); FY2013 (358,200 authorized, 357,735 actual); FY2014

(354,200 authorized, 354,072 actual).

The end-strength figures for the Army Reserve are as follows: FY2006 (205,000 authorized, 189,975 actual);

FY2007 (200,000 authorized, 189,882 actual); FY2008 (205,000 authorized, 197,024 actual); FY2009 (205,000

authorized, 205,297 actual); FY2010 (205,000 authorized, actual strength 205,281); FY2011 (205,000 authorized,

204,803 actual); FY2012 (205,000 authorized, 201,166 actual); FY 2013 (205,000 authorized, 198,209 actual); FY2014

(205,000 authorized, 195,438 actual). The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) lowered the

Army Reserve’s authorized end-strength to 202,000.

Analysts with the Army Reserve have noted a number of factors that contributed to these shortfalls. Several factors

were specific to the organization: for example, an attempt to decrease recruitment of non-prior-service individuals and

increase recruitment of soldiers leaving the Active Component Army, which was not fully successful, and enactment of

an internal policy that limited the ability of recruiters to “overman” units (subsequently changed). However, other

factors related to the recruiting environment more broadly, including an improving economy and a limited pool of

youth who could meet military entrance standards. Author’s discussions with USAR manpower analysts, July 2014.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

the significance of this shortfall should be assessed in light of the reductions in the size of the

Navy Reserve related to restructuring initiatives.26

Recruit quality in the Reserve Components overall has exhibited a positive trend in recent years,

though this trend may be fading somewhat. In FY2003, two Reserve Components failed to meet

one or both of its quality goals. That dropped to one Reserve Component in FY2004, rose to three

in FY2005 and FY2006, and dropped back to two in FY2007 and FY2008. For FY2009-FY2014,

every Reserve Component met both of its quality goals, in many cases by substantial margins.

However, for FY2013 and FY2014, the AFQT metric for the Army’s Reserve Components (the

Army National Guard and the Army Reserve) was only slightly higher than the goal of 60%.27

Analysis

Concerns about the health of military recruiting efforts were substantial in the FY2005-FY2007

timeframe, but these concerns have been mitigated by the more favorable results experienced in

subsequent years. Taken as a whole, FY2009-FY2014 have been strong recruiting years, most

clearly with regards to recruit quality.

There are a number of likely causes for this recruiting success. One factor that has a powerful

impact on military recruiting is the state of the economy. Military recruiting is generally easier in

times of high unemployment and more difficult in times of low unemployment. Historical data

indicate that the unemployment rate dropped from 2003 through 2007 (falling from 6.0% in 2003

to 4.6% for 2006 and 2007) and then climbed to 5.8% in 2008, 9.3% in 2009, and 9.6% in 2010.

While the unemployment rate subsequently dropped to 8.9% for 2011, 8.1% for 2012, and 7.4%

in 2013, it was likely still high enough to benefit military recruiting efforts.28

Another factor contributing to strong recruiting was likely the cumulative effect of the substantial

increases in military compensation that have occurred over the past decade or so. In most years

between FY2001 and FY2010, Congress increased basic pay by an amount that was at least 0.5%

higher than the annual increase in the employment cost index (a common measure of increases in

wages for private-sector employees). Congress initiated a multi-year reform of housing

allowances between FY1998 and FY2005 to raise housing allowance rates in order to bring them

line with actual housing costs. Congress also increased the amount of hostile fire pay and family

separation allowance in 2002, authorized premium-based TRICARE coverage for non-activated

The authorized end-strength for the Navy Reserve has declined by nearly 26,000 from 2003 through 2013, dropping

from 88,156 at the end of FY2003 to 62,444 at the end of FY2013, with the largest declines occurring in FY2004-2006.

According to testimony by Navy leaders before Congress, this was largely the result of force realignments related to

greater integration of the Navy and the Navy Reserve. However, this testimony also indicated that the Navy Reserve

had recruiting difficulties in some of these years related to a lower flow of recruits from the Navy due to high retention

among active duty sailors, competition from the Army and Marine Corps, and low civilian unemployment. See

testimony of Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, Chief of Navy Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel

Subcommittee on March 31, 2004; April 13, 2005; and March 30, 2006. See also testimony of Vice Admiral Dirk J.

Debbink, Chief of Navy Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on March 3, 2009.

The components failing to meet one or both quality metrics were as follows: the Army National Guard and the Navy

Reserve in FY2003; the Army National Guard in FY2004; the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Air

Force Reserve in FY2005; the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Navy Reserve in FY2006; the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve in FY2007 and FY2008.

Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

reservists in 2006, and enacted a generous new educational benefit in 2008. Cumulatively, these

changes have made the military compensation package much more attractive.

A third important factor was likely the improved security situation in Iraq, which resulted in a

rapid decline in casualties. From 2004 to 2007, roughly 700 servicemembers were killed in action

each year while serving in Iraq, with about 70% of them serving in the Army and its Reserve

Components. However, as security improved in Iraq, the number of those killed in action in Iraq

dropped to 218 in 2008, and to 34 in 2011 when the U.S. combat mission in Iraq formally

ended.29 While casualties in Afghanistan rose significantly between 2008 and 2010, the increase

was substantially less than the decline in casualties in Iraq. Combat deaths in Afghanistan

declined after 2010, with 38 in 2014.30

One more factor that positively affected recruiting in FY2009 and subsequent years was the

completion of the major multi-year efforts by the Army and the Marine Corps to increase their

personnel strength, followed by very substantial strength reduction for those two services. The

growth initiatives carried out between FY2005-FY2008 required those services to set higher goals

for the number of new accessions. With the successful completion of its “Grow the Army”

initiative, the Army was able to lower its accession goal from 80,000 per year in FY2005-FY2008

to an average of about 68,000 per year in FY2009-FY2011. Likewise, the Marine Corps was able

to reduce its accession goal from 37,967 in FY2008 to an average of about 30,000 per year in

FY2009-FY2011. Then, in FY2013-FY2015, Congress approved substantial reductions in endstrength for the Army and the Marine Corps, which continued to limit the need for new enlisted

accessions.

However, some of the factors that helped to generate a strong recruiting environment in FY2009

and subsequent years have been fading in significance. Most notably, the civilian unemployment

rate is much improved from the 9.3% rate in FY2009. At present, the unemployment rate (5.5% in

May 2015) is at a level where it could have a detrimental effect on recruiting; that is, competition

with civilian employers might undercut military recruiting efforts. Additionally, in contrast to the

increases of the previous decade, Congress and the Administration have sought to rein in military

compensation raises in recent years, most notably by holding the 2014 and 2015 increases in

basic pay below the rate of increases in civilian compensation and by slightly reducing housing

allowance rates in 2015. Further changes in the military compensation package are being

contemplated as well, most notably the restructuring of the military retirement system proposed in

the House and Senate versions of the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act. Finally, looking

to the experience of the post-Cold War drawdown, the substantial reductions Army and Marine

Corps force structure, and in defense spending overall, could have a negative effect on how

potential recruits view the prospects of a military career.

DOD casualty data for Iraq available https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oif_month.xhtml (for Operation

Iraqi Freedom) and https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_ond_month.xhtml (for Operation New Dawn). The

U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended in December 2011, although a small residual force remained to provide embassy

security and security cooperation. Subsequently, starting in 2013, additional military personnel were assigned to Iraq as

observers and trainers in response to the military success of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

From 2005 to 2007, about 70 servicemembers on average were killed in action each year while serving in

Afghanistan; that figure rose to 131 in 2008, 271 in 2009, and 437 for 2010, before declining to 360 in 2011, 237 in

2012, 91 in 2013, and 38 in 2014. DOD casualty data for Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) available at

https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

Retention

The term retention refers to the rate at which military personnel voluntarily choose to stay in the

military after their original obligated term of service has ended.31 Imbalances in the retention rate

can cause problems within the military personnel system. A common retention concern is that too

few people will stay in, thereby creating a shortage of experienced leaders, decreasing military

efficiency, and lowering job satisfaction. This was a particular concern during the middle part of

the last decade, as the stress of combat deployments raised concerns about the willingness of

military personnel to continue serving. The opposite concern—more salient today in light of

reductions in force structure—is that too many people will stay in, thereby decreasing promotion

opportunities and possibly requiring involuntarily separations in order to prevent the organization

from becoming “top heavy” with middle and upper level leaders or to comply with end-strength

limitations. Each of these outcomes can have a negative impact on recruiting by making the

military a less attractive career option.

Active Components

The data presented in Table 5 show that the Army exceeded its retention goals for enlisted

personnel in FY2013 and FY2014. These results are a continuation of a strong retention trend in

the Army over the past decade, which has been particularly remarkable in light of the heavy stress

placed on Army personnel during that time by combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

Marine Corps likewise shouldered a heavy share of the manpower burden associated with

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it too exhibited strong retention over the past decade.32

The Marine Corps exceeded its retention goals in FY2013, although it fell short in both categories

in FY2014. However, the FY2014 goal did not fully reflect the reduced manning needs brought

about by the drawdown of Marine Corps force structure and, therefore, the retention rate was

sufficient for the service’s actual needs.33

After some difficulties in FY2008,34 the Air Force met, or nearly met, all of its reenlistment goals

in FY2009. It met, or nearly met, two of three reenlistment goals in FY2010. Its results for Zone

The obligated term of service for enlisted personnel is determined by their initial enlistment contract. The normal

service obligation incurred is eight years, which may be served in the Active Component, in the Reserve Component,

or some combination of both. For example, an individual may enlist for four years of service in the Active Component,

followed by four years of service in the Reserve Component. See 10 U.S.C. 651 and DOD Instruction 1304.25.

It did fall about 13% short of its “first term” goal in FY2008 and about 8% short in FY2007, but this was due to

exceptionally high retention goals associated with increasing the size of the Marine Corps rather than poor retention.

While the Marine Corps had a “first term” retention goal of 5,892 in FY2006, it was increased to 8,298 in FY2007 and

to 9,507 in FY2008. While it did not meet these sharply increased retention goals, it nonetheless achieved a much

higher retention rate than it did in FY2006. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee

on Military Personnel, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request on Military Personnel

Overview, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 21, 2009, Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman, Deputy

Commandant for Manpower & Reserve Affairs, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/MP052109/

Coleman_Testimony052109.pdf, p. 6.

Author’s conversation with Headquarters, Marine Corps retention specialist. The Marine Corps also used short term

extensions to fill manning gaps. (Extensions prolong an existing enlistment contract, typically for about 12 to 18

months, while a new enlistment contract usually lasts two to six years).

The Air Force missed all three of its FY2008 retention goals by large margins, although the magnitude of this

shortfall appears to have been distorted by the implementation of new goal-setting and achievement-measuring

methodologies. Specifically, the Air Force changed its goal setting methodology from one based on historical

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

A (initial term) reenlistments in FY2010 were substantially below goal, but Air Force analysts

pointed out that the Air Force was trying to reduce its force at this time in order to stay under its

end-strength limits. To achieve these reductions, several thousand airmen were given incentives

to separate from the Air Force. In FY2011, the Air Force exceeded its goals for Zone A and Zone

B (mid-career) personnel, but was slightly short of its goal for Zone C (career) personnel, while in

FY2012 it exceeded all of its goals. In FY2013, the Air Force fell slightly short of its Zone A and

Zone B retention goals, but exceeded all of its retention goals in FY2014.

The Navy exceeded its retention goals in FY2009 by comfortable margins and by even larger

margins in FY2010 and FY2011. It changed its methodology for setting retention goals and

measuring achievement about midway through FY2012 in order to focus solely on those who

were completing their term of obligated service in that fiscal year.35 The Navy showed strong

reenlistment behavior in Zone A and Zone C for FY2012, with reenlistments in Zone B about 5%

below goal. In FY2013 and FY2014, the Navy showed weaker retention in its Zone A and Zone B

goals, in part due to a substantial increase in planned force structure that required higher retention

goals. Navy personnel analysts noted that while these results for FY2013 were significantly

below goal, the service had moved closer to achieving its goals in FY2014, and it was able to

mitigate the shortfalls with short-term extensions of additional personnel.36 They also noted that

the attrition of those not up for reenlistment37 had decreased. Taken together, these factors

allowed the Navy to maintain an actual strength at the end of FY2014 (326,054) above its

authorized end-strength (323,600).

(...continued)

reenlistment rates to goals based on specific skill and grade needs, and narrowed the criteria for counting whether a

reenlistment “counted” towards a goal. This new counting methodology reportedly failed to count thousands of actual

reenlistments towards the Air Force’s goals. (Author’s discussion with Air Force enlisted analysis staff). The Air Force

tripled its funding for new Selective Reenlistment Bonuses in FY2009 and refined its methodology for counting

reenlistments to include some previously omitted.

Under its previous methodology, those who were scheduled to complete their term of obligated service in later years,

but who chose to reenlist early, were considered when setting annual goals and calculating goal achievement. One

effect of this new methodology was to lower the total numeric goal and the total number reenlisted for FY2012 and

subsequent years; as such, the raw numbers from these years are not directly comparable to previous years.

Author’s discussion with Navy personnel analysts June 18, 2015.

Attrition in this context refers to those who are separated from the service before completion of their enlistment; for

example, due inability to complete basic training or as a result of injury or hardship.

Congressional Research Service

Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results

Table 5. Retention Data for Active Component Enlisted Personnel,

FY2013 and FY2014

Service/

Retention