Homeland Security: Compendium of Recommendations Relevant to House Committee Organization and Analysis of Considerations for the House, and 109th and 110th Congresses Epilogue
Congressional research reportMar 2, 2007
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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
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This report has been updated with an epilogue on the creation of a standing House Committee on
Homeland Security in the 109th Congress, the election of a new chair September 15, 2005, and the
committee’s organization in the 110th Congress. The original report was not changed; its summary
follows:
The 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks studying homeland security
recommended congressional committee reorganization to increase Congress’s policy and
oversight coordination. This report analyzes selected recommendations relevant to House
committee reorganization.
In the 108th Congress, the House created a Select Committee on Homeland Security, and charged
it with studying the rules of the House with respect to the issue of homeland security. The select
committee recommended a standing Committee on Homeland Security. This report digests the
select committee’s recommendations. Before the select committee made its recommendations,
one of its subcommittees held four hearings on Perspectives on House Reform. To analyze the
content of these hearings, this report organizes the testimony into 10 categories.
One consideration in creating a homeland security committee relates to the concentration or
dispersal of homeland security jurisdiction. The House at different times has made different
decisions about concentrating or dispersing jurisdiction. A second consideration in creating a
homeland security committee relates to implications of jurisdictional changes. Proponents of a
new committee point to the fragmentation of jurisdiction over homeland security. Others point to
the record of Congress as a strong indication that existing committees are capable of action. A
third consideration in creating a homeland security committee is whether such a committee is
sufficient for policymaking. Even if a new committee is created, other committees will still have
jurisdiction over components of homeland security. The House has tended not to change its
committee structure after executive branch reorganizations. This report contains a brief history of
House committees.
Related CRS reports: CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering
Jurisdictional Realignment, by (name redacted); CRS Report RS21901,
House Select
Committee on Homeland Security: Possible Questions Raised If the Panel Were to Be
Reconstituted as a Standing Committee, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL31835,
Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by (name redacted),
(name redacted), and (name redacted); CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee
Structure: History of Changes from 1920-2007, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33061,
Homeland Security and House Committees: Analysis of 109th Congress Jurisdiction Changes and
Their Impact on the Referral of Legislation, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). This
report will not be updated.
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Homeland Security and House Committees in the 107th and 108th Congresses .............................. 2
107th Congress........................................................................................................................... 2
108th Congress........................................................................................................................... 3
108th Congress Hearings on Homeland Security and Committee Organization.............................. 6
Select Committee’s Recommendations for a Homeland Security Committee .............................. 20
What Is Homeland Security? The Homeland Security Act of 2002.............................................. 25
What Is Homeland Security? Commission and Think Tank Recommendations........................... 26
9/11 Commission Recommendations...................................................................................... 27
Bremer Commission................................................................................................................ 29
Gilmore Commission .............................................................................................................. 30
Hart-Rudman Commission...................................................................................................... 33
Brookings Institution............................................................................................................... 35
Center for Strategic and International Studies......................................................................... 37
A Brief History of House Committees and Department Creation ................................................. 38
Analysis of Considerations Relevant to the Creation of a Homeland Security Committee .......... 40
Concentration or Dispersal of Homeland Security Jurisdiction........................................ 42
Implications of Jurisdictional Gains and Losses............................................................... 46
Would a Homeland Security Committee Be Enough?...................................................... 52
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 54
Epilogue......................................................................................................................................... 56
Creation of the Homeland Security Committee in the 109th Congress ................................... 56
Committee Organization in the 110th Congress....................................................................... 61
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Appendix A. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on
Changes to the Rules of the House of Representatives with Respect to Homeland
Security Issues............................................................................................................................ 64
Appendix B. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made by the 9/11
Commission................................................................................................................................ 70
Appendix C. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made by the Bremer
Commission................................................................................................................................ 74
Appendix D. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made by the Gilmore
Commission................................................................................................................................ 76
Appendix E. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made by the HartRudman Commission ................................................................................................................. 82
Appendix F. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made by The Brookings
Institution ................................................................................................................................... 91
Appendix G. Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made By the Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................................................................................. 94
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 95
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s directed by the House,1 the Select Committee on Homeland Security reported to the
House Rules Committee September 30, 2004, its recommendations on “the operation and
implementation of the rules of the House, including rule X, with respect to the issue of
homeland security.” The select committee recommended the creation of a permanent standing
Committee on Homeland Security, with specified jurisdiction.
A
A number of House committees currently have important roles in homeland security
policymaking. The Appropriations Committee’s role related to discretionary spending is clear cut,
and the committee reorganized its subcommittees at the start of the 108th Congress to create a
Homeland Security Subcommittee aligned with the component parts of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
Legislative authority over policy areas and federal agencies included in DHS are principally
within the jurisdiction of several standing House committees: Agriculture, Armed Services,
Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Government Reform, International Relations,
Judiciary, Science, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Ways and Means, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. Some of these committees also have jurisdiction over federal
agencies and components of federal programs included in the department that have nonhomeland-security-related purposes. In the 108th Congress, the Select Committee on Homeland
Security also had jurisdiction over legislation affecting DHS.
In addition, some committees have key roles to play in overseeing homeland-security-related
policy areas and federal agencies not incorporated in the department. These committees are
Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, International Relations, and
Judiciary Committees, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission2 became the latest of a number of commissions, think
tanks, and other entities to weigh in on congressional oversight of the issue of homeland security.
Some of these entities issued reports before the creation of DHS, some before the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and some more recently. In addition, witnesses at House committee
hearings in the 108th Congress held by subcommittees of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security and the Committee on Rules provided additional ideas related to House oversight of
homeland security. These entities’ and witnesses’ recommendations varied, but their variety offers
the House a wealth of perspectives to draw on related to congressional-executive relations,
building knowledge of homeland security policy issues among Members, and other aspects of
congressional handling of the issue of homeland security.
A specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and other entities was creation of a homeland
security committee in each chamber. In addition, a number of witnesses at the House
subcommittee hearings recommended a homeland security committee in the House, and made
recommendations related to jurisdiction, membership, and other factors.
It is a complex question, however, to take the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and
other entities and of witnesses at the House subcommittee hearings and determine the potential
1
H.Res. 5, §4(b)(3). H.Res. 5 was agreed to in the House January 7, 2003.
Among the purposes spelled out in the law creating the commission, the commission was to “make a full and
complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001,” the source of the
commission’s popular name. The commission’s official name was the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States.
2
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meaning and scope of homeland security in considering committee jurisdictions. One difficulty
lies in trying to narrow the term to focus solely on the homeland—within the United States—as
reflected in this statement from the 9/11 Commission report:
America [in the post-Cold War world] stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and
blame. This created a kind of cultural asymmetry. To us Afghanistan seemed very far away.
To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they were more globalized
than we were.3
Homeland security begins with counterterrorism and other initiatives overseas, and it includes
intelligence activities at home and abroad that can help prevent terrorist attacks. In the 9/11
Commission recommendations, those of other entities, and those of some hearings witnesses,
homeland security is a continuum of international and domestic initiatives and activities, all of
which are essential to reducing the likelihood and potential impact of terrorist attacks against the
United States.
Another difficulty lies is the connectedness of homeland security to other policy areas. For
transportation policy, agricultural policy, public health policy, trade policy, and so on, homeland
security is one component of the policy area. Even if homeland security is now recognized as a
critical component, some policymakers see the need for homeland security policy to mesh with
the specific policy area and to be made within the context of the specific policy area.
This report presents and discusses the recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security, the 9/11 Commission, and five other entities relevant to House committee organization
and the issue of homeland security. (Related text from the select committee’s, the 9/11
Commission’s, and other entities’ reports appear in the appendices.) The report also synthesizes
hearings testimony on House committee organization related to homeland security before the
select committee and a subcommittee of the House Rules Committee. Finally, it analyzes the
options and implications of this body of recommendations for House committee organization. The
report is intended to support the House in evaluating potential changes to its oversight of
homeland security as it makes and implements decisions on committee organization in the 109th
Congress.
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Shortly after the convening of the 107th Congress, Speaker Hastert initiated a Working Group on
Terrorism and Homeland Security as a unit of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.4 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Speaker and Minority
3
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington: GPO, July 22, 2004), p. 340. (Available online
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html, visited December 10, 2004.)
4
Rep. Porter Goss, remarks in the House, “Publication of the Rules of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
107th Congress,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 147, March 20, 2001, pp. H990-H994; and Niels C. Sorrells,
(continued...)
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Leader Gephardt announced the elevation of the working group to a subcommittee.5 The
subcommittee was to “coordinate the efforts of various [House] committees” with a claim to
jurisdiction over various aspects of terrorism and to “provide a clearinghouse for legislative
proposals.”6
Subsequently, the jurisdictional complexity of the subject matter of homeland security was
demonstrated by the referral of the House measure to create DHS. That bill, H.R. 5005, was
referred to 12 committees. A thirteenth committee, the Select Committee on Homeland Security,
was created for the 107th Congress to receive these committees’ recommendations and to mark up
and report a bill.7 Additional committees had narrower jurisdictional claims to H.R. 5005, but the
bill was not referred to them.8
Congress also included the following provision related to House and Senate committee
organization in the Homeland Security Act:
It is the sense of Congress that each House of Congress should review its committee
structure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the
establishment of the Department.9
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The sense-of-the-Congress provision on review of committee structure included in the Homeland
Security Act did not require either chamber to take action related to committee organization. The
House, however, responded in adopting its rules for the 108th Congress by creating a Select
Committee on Homeland Security for the duration of the 108th Congress.10 The House vested the
select committee with the following jurisdiction:
(...continued)
“Chambliss Claims Intelligence Seat Surrendered by Bass,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol. 37, February 16, 2001, p. 9.
5
“Terrorism Working Group Now An Intelligence Subcommittee,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol. 37, September 21, 2001, p.
11.
6
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, archived
home page (available online at http://web.archive.org/web/20011011082741/intelligence.house.gov/terrorism.htm,
visited December 10, 2004).
7
H.Res. 449 was agreed to in the House June 19, 2002.
8
See CRS Report RL31449, House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to
Proposed Department of Homeland Security, by (name redacted).
9
P.L. 107-296, §1503; 116 Stat. 2135, 2309.
10
In the Senate for the 108th Congress, jurisdiction over DHS resided in the Governmental Affairs Committee, which
had marked up and reported legislation in the 107th Congress to create the department. Jurisdiction over various
agencies and programs incorporated into the department was to be shared with other committees based on their
jurisdictions. See Sen. Bill Frist, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, January 7, 2003,
p. S26; and Mary Dalrymple, “Homeland Security Oversight Lands at Governmental Affairs,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol.
39, January 8, 2003, p. 5.
Subsequently, on October 9, 2004, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 445, which renamed the Governmental Affairs
Committee as the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and made jurisdictional changes in this and
other Senate committees, effective in the 109th Congress. See Andrew Taylor, “Senators Fight over Turf in Revamp of
Homeland Security Oversight,” CQ Weekly, vol. 62, no. 40, October 16, 2004, p. 2460.
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(1) LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION—The select committee may develop recommendations
and report to the House by bill or otherwise on such matters that relate to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) as may be referred to it by the Speaker.
(2) OVERSIGHT FUNCTION—The select committee shall review and study on a
continuing basis laws, programs, and Government activities relating to homeland security.11
Speaker Hastert explained the purpose of the select committee in remarks to the House following
his reelection as Speaker:
Later on today, we will vote to create a Select Committee on Homeland Security. Members
of this select committee will oversee the creation of the Department of Homeland Security to
make certain that the executive branch is carrying out the will of the Congress. This select
committee will be our eyes and our ears as this critical department is organized. The standing
committees of the House will maintain their jurisdictions and will still have authorization
and oversight responsibilities. This House needs to adapt to the largest reorganization of our
executive branch in 50 years, and this select committee will help us make this transition.12
In its 108th Congress rules changes, the House also amended Rule XII, cl. 2(c)(1) to add the
phrase shown here in italic:
(c) In carrying out paragraphs (a) and (b) with respect to the referral of a matter, the
Speaker—
(1) shall designate a committee of primary jurisdiction (except where he determines that
extraordinary circumstances justify review by more than one committee as though
primary);13
The jurisdiction of the select committee provided the House with a focus for homeland security
legislation and oversight, without immediately changing the jurisdictions of the standing
committees that held jurisdiction over aspects of homeland security.14 The addition to the
Speaker’s referral authority provided him with increased flexibility in referring homeland security
legislation in this context, if needed, and with increased flexibility in referring other legislation
where he deemed it an appropriate form of referral.15
11
H.Res. 5, §4(b)(1) and (2); H.Res. 5 was agreed to in the House January 7, 2003.
Speaker Hastert, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, January 7, 2003, p. H5.
13
H.Res. 5, §2(i).
14
During debate on the rules changes proposed to the House, Rep. Oberstar, the ranking member of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, observed: “Mr. Speaker, the proposal to create a new Select Committee
on Homeland Security interestingly does not make any changes in the legislative jurisdiction of the committees
outlined in rule 10 of the rules of the House.” He ended his remarks by asking a question of House Rules Committee
Chairman Dreier about referral in the 108th Congress of a bill covering subject matter that, in the 107th Congress, had
been reported by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Chairman Dreier responded: “Mr. Speaker, let me
just say that it is very clear that the Speaker does have authority to refer legislation, and it is his intent to ensure that we
maintain the jurisdiction of those committees.” Rep. James L. Oberstar and Rep. David Dreier, remarks in the House,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, January 7, 2003, p. H15.
15
In explaining the package of rules changes proposed to the House, Rules Committee Chairman Dreier said about this
change: “Section 2(1) permits the joint referral of measures without designation of primary jurisdiction. This change is
meant only as a minor deviation from the normal requirement under the rules for the designation of one committee of
primary jurisdiction and should be exercised only in extraordinary jurisdictionally deserving instances.” Rep. David
Dreier, remarks in House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, January 7, 2003, p. H11.
12
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In the 108th Congress, measures related to homeland security were referred to the Select
Committee on Homeland Security and in addition to other committees, with the select committee
designated by the Speaker as the primary committee. Other measures related to homeland security
were referred in addition to the select committee and other committees, with a committee other
than the select committee designated by the Speaker as the primary committee. Some measures
related to homeland security were not referred to the select committee.16
The House Appropriations Committee responded to the creation of DHS with a reorganization of
its subcommittees. On January 29, 2003, House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bill Young
announced the creation of the Homeland Security Subcommittee to correspond to the agencies
and programs incorporated in the new Department of Homeland Security. The jurisdictions of the
other subcommittees were realigned in order to retain 13 appropriations subcommittees, including
the new subcommittee.17
In addition, five House authorizing committees renamed or reorganized subcommittees to create
homeland security or terrorism subcommittees:
•
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services;
•
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform;
•
Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights,
Committee on International Relations;
•
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the
Judiciary (created in 107th Congress);18 and
•
as mentioned above concerning the 107th Congress, Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Homeland Security, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
16
See, for example, Homeland Security: Bill Referrals in the House, 108th Congress, by (name redacted), CRS
congressional distribution memorandum, April 9, 2003.
17
House Committee on Appropriations, “Chairman Young Announces Homeland Security Reorganization,” news
release, January 29, 2003. (Available online at http://appropriations.house.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=210&Month=1&Year=2003, visited December 10,
2004.) Jurisdictions of the Appropriations Committee’s subcommittees are available on the committee’s website; see,
for example, that of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, http://appropriations.house.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutTheCommittee.Jurisdiction&SubcommitteeId=14, visited December 10, 2004. See also
CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920-2007, by (name red
acted).
On March 4, 2003, Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Stevens and Ranking Member Byrd announced the
committee’s reorganization, which mirrored the House committee’s changes. Senate Committee on Appropriations,
“Appropriations Committee Sets Subcommittee Assignments,” news release, March 4, 2003. (Available online at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/releases/record.cfm?id=190975, visited December 10, 2004.) A crosswalk of federal
agencies and programs to the Senate Appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction is available at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/jurisdiction/juristiction.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.
In addition, the Senate approved S.Res. 445 on October 9, 2004, which in sec. 402 created an intelligence
appropriations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, but allowed the committee to determine the changes to
be made in other appropriations subcommittees in order to retain 13 subcommittees. See “Amendment No. 4015 to
Amendment No. 3981” and “Amendment No. 4042 to Amendment No. 4015,” Congressional Record, daily edition,
vol. 150, October 9, 2004, pp. S10908-S10909, S10917-S10918.
18
Pamela Barnett, “Subcommittee Name Change Reflects Homeland Security Issues,” CongressDaily AM, March 21,
2002, p. 12.
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Finally, the Select Committee on Homeland Security was given another function in the House
rules resolution—to assist the House in determining how it might organize itself in the future visà-vis the issue of homeland security:
(3) RULES STUDY—The select committee is authorized and directed to conduct a thorough
and complete study of the operation and implementation of the rules of the House, including
rule X, with respect to the issue of homeland security. The select committee shall submit its
recommendations regarding any changes in the rules of the House to the Committee on Rules
not later than September 30, 2004.19
The next section synthesizes testimony received at hearings conducted by a subcommittee of the
select committee on the operation and implementation of the rules of the House, including Rule
X. The section following it explains the recommendation of the select committee to the Rules
Committee, and lists developments in the 108th Congress after the release of the select
committee’s recommendations.
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When the Select Committee on Homeland Security organized, it created a Subcommittee on
Rules under the chairmanship of Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart to carry out the study of
House rules. The subcommittee conducted four hearings to support the select committee in
fulfilling the House’s mandate.20
Witnesses at three of the Rules Subcommittee hearings in 2003 unanimously endorsed the
existence of a House committee with legislative and oversight jurisdiction over DHS and the
policy area of homeland security, although there were variations in specific recommendations in
these witnesses’ testimony and responses to subcommittee members’ questions. These public
witnesses—academic experts on Congress, former Speakers Foley and Gingrich, former
Members Robert Walker and Lee Hamilton, and former Departments of Defense and Energy
Secretary James Schlesinger—testified on the importance and uniqueness of homeland security in
explaining their support for a separate legislative committee. The then-House parliamentarian
also testified on May 19, 2003, providing a context for previous House committee reorganizations
and attempted reorganizations.
Witnesses at the Rules Subcommittee’s fourth hearing on March 24, 2004, and at a hearing held
by another subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Technology and the House, on June 16-17,
2004,21 comprised almost exclusively chairs and ranking members of House committees. The
19
H.Res. 5, §4(b)(3).
House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Rules, Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons
from the Past, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 19, 2003 (Washington: GPO, 2004); Perspectives on House
Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., July 10, 2003 (Washington: GPO,
2004); Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 9, 2003
(Washington: GPO, 2004); and Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspective of Committee Leaders, hearings, 108th
Cong., 2nd sess., March 24, 2004 (Washington: GPO, 2004).
21
A subcommittee of the House Rules Committee. House Rules Committee, Subcommittee on Technology and the
House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, hearings, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., June 16-17, 2004 (unprinted)
(available online at http://www.house.gov/rules/108_hear_ruleX.htm, visited December 10, 2004).
20
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Members made a variety of suggestions regarding creation of a House committee on homeland
security with legislative and oversight jurisdiction, and raised a number of issues to be considered
by the House in deciding whether to create a committee and what kind of committee to create,
including the impact on existing committees.
The remainder of this section categorizes key considerations developed in the four Rules
Subcommittee hearings, and synthesizes the testimony from witnesses at those hearings.
Committee chairs and ranking members who testified at the hearing held by the Subcommittee on
Technology and the House presented similar considerations. Cross references to the hearing of the
Subcommittee on Technology and the House are provided in the footnotes in the balance of this
section.22
Most quotations in this section are from oral testimony at the Rules Subcommittee hearings. In
those instances where an excerpt from a prepared statement is used, that is noted.
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In his oral and written statements, former Speaker Gingrich explained the depth and breadth of
the terrorist threat and the potential loss of life that could result from some forms of terrorist
attack.23 In his prepared statement, Speaker Gingrich introduced this explanation by stating:
The risk of potentially losing millions of Americans and even having the very fabric of our
society torn apart is why there is no issue or problem for which Congress must organize and
allocate time and resources which is more important than creating an effective system of
Homeland Security.24
Former Secretary Schlesinger also addressed the threat of terrorist attacks to American democracy
and society.25 Witnesses such as Donald Wolfensberger26 testified on the duration and seriousness
of the terrorist threat as reasons for a “concentrated effort by both the executive and Congress.”27
Aviation Subcommittee28 Chairman Mica explained the congressional environment:
22
For a range of information on committee organization (e.g., options for House committee organization and testimony
by Members), see U.S. Senate, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Background Materials:
Supplemental Information Provided to Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Senate print
103-55, 103rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1993).
23
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp. 9-16.
24
Ibid., p. 13.
25
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, pp. 21, 23. For
additional perspectives on the importance of homeland security, see Select Committee on Homeland Security, Freedom
Defended: Implementing America’s Strategy for Homeland Security, committee white paper, 108th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: Select Committee on Homeland Security, October 5, 2004), available online at http://hsc.house.gov/files/
freedom_defended.pdf, visited December 10, 2004; and Rep. Jim Turner, Winning the War on Terror (Washington:
Select Committee on Homeland Security/Democratic Office, April 27, 2004), available online at
http://www.house.gov/hsc/democrats/issues_winning_war_terror.shtml, visited December 10, 2004).
26
Mr. Wolfensberger was formerly chief of staff of the House Committee on Rules. He serves as director of the
Congress Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.
27
Ibid., pp. 32-33, 35.
28
A subcommittee of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
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The problem has never been a lack of focus or interest by the standing committees. Rather,
the missing ingredient was a national consensus that terrorism should be a top priority.
Congress as a whole reflected the national will and has been unable to make the tough
choices terrorism required. And that, we know, is a part of our history, unfortunately, today.
9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the standing committees had legislation
ready.29
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Witnesses testified on the importance of the new Department of Homeland Security developing
organizationally so that it could successfully carry out its mission. This point was often coupled
with a witness’s perspective on whether a single House homeland security committee was needed.
For example, at the Rules Subcommittee’s July 10 hearing, former Secretary Schlesinger was
asked to summarize the points he had made on why it was important for the House to have a
permanent committee on homeland security:
It is quite simple: It means that you will not be helping this new department to become more
unified on the mission of homeland security, that the agencies that go into that department
will continue more than is necessary to focus on their historic function, and it will tend to
preserve the existing cultures of those agencies.
And on the other hand, all of us have a responsibility for homeland security. Any failure on
the part of the United States to bring these agencies into an effective whole [is] going to be
noticed and exploited by those who wish the country harm.30
Secretary Schlesinger31 and congressional scholar Norman Ornstein testified that fragmentation
of committee jurisdiction over homeland security harmed development of the department. Dr.
Ornstein suggested a cause and effect relationship:
The problem with fragmentation otherwise is, once again, just exactly what we had before
we ended up with a Department of Homeland Security, which is all these other committees
have a longtime interest in their own cultures built around the old functions of these
agencies, and they are going to use their resources and their pressure to push those functions,
which are appropriate functions. But if we don’t have a counterweight to make sure that the
Homeland Security culture takes over, then they are going to have even greater problems
inside the Department making things work.32
Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis testified on the importance of Congress’s
work related to DHS:
Because the success of the Department is vital to the continuing economic recovery and
winning the war on terrorism, we all want it to succeed. Congress must provide the
Department with the proper resources while at the same time maintaining aggressive
oversight to ensure that this massive reorganization and commitment of resources succeeds.33
29
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 77.
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 18.
31
Ibid., p. 24.
32
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 40.
33
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 64.
30
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Public witnesses regularly mentioned the number of committees and subcommittees with
legislative and oversight jurisdiction over DHS and the policy area of homeland security as a
challenge to the development of a coherent homeland security policy. The chairs and ranking
members drew on their experience in Congress to speak favorably about the work that had been
done on homeland security by the existing committees.
Former Secretary Schlesinger, drawing on his time as the secretary of the then-new Department
of Energy as well as his time as the top official in other government agencies, pointed out the
problems of duplication by House committees while acknowledging the proper role of
oversight.34 Former Speaker Foley pointed out the inclination of committees and subcommittees
to use the dispersed jurisdiction they have when focused oversight is what the new department
needs.35 Former Representative Lee Hamilton addressed the blurring of priorities that occurs with
many committees engaged in oversight.36 Former Representative Robert Walker discussed one
committee’s priorities pushing aside another committee’s.37
A number of committee chairs and ranking members addressed the effectiveness of oversight
under the current House committee system. Ranking Member Dingell of the Energy and
Commerce Committee indicated that his experience with committees sharing oversight from their
individual perspectives was positive and that agreements were able to be worked out when
several committees had jurisdiction over a piece of legislation. He also expressed his concern
over having a single committee conduct oversight over DHS, where the relationship might
become comfortable rather than disinterested.38
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner testified that agencies report to more than one
committee and function effectively.39 Like Representative Dingell, Ranking Member Waxman of
the Government Reform Committee expressed the view that oversight by multiple committees
with different perspectives is effective.40
Ȃȱȱ
Public witnesses also expressed their concern with the amount of time that DHS officials might
spend in responding to hearings and requests from the numerous committees and subcommittees
with jurisdiction over the department and the policy area of homeland security. Some committee
chairs and ranking members addressed this concern in different ways.
34
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 13, 14, 24.
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp.7-8, 17. Mr. Foley’s
Speakership included the 102nd and 103rd Congresses, during which the Joint Committee on the Organization of
Congress was created and worked.
36
Ibid., pp. 41, 43. Mr. Hamilton was co-chair of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in the 102nd and
103rd Congresses.
37
Ibid., p. 45.
38
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 49-50, 53-54.
39
Ibid., pp. 95, 110.
40
Ibid., p. 73.
35
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Former Secretary Schlesinger reported spending half of his time as secretary of energy on Capitol
Hill, “dealing with one problem or another.” He indicated the number of committees and
subcommittees with jurisdiction over DHS would be a burden to a new department, and that staffs
of those committees would add to the department’s workload by requesting individual briefings.41
Congressional scholar James Thurber commented on the lack of effectiveness for both Members
and departmental officials in having multiple hearings scheduled at the same time.42 Former
Representative Hamilton noted: “Congress can make a significant contribution to the
implementation of the Department of Homeland Security simply by simplifying these
overlapping committee structures.”43
Representative Dingell drew on his experience as a Member during the energy shortages of the
1970s to present another perspective:
I went through the energy crisis, in the 1970s, and I have gone through a number of other
problems of similar character, and I never found that there was anything other than benefit to
be achieved by having a large number of committees viewing these questions from the
standpoint of their own experience and expertise. And I would say that this happened very
much during the time of the 1970s when the Energy Administrator or the chairmen of the
regulatory bodies or later the head of the Department of Energy would come up to report to
different committees about how they were conducting their business.44
¡Ȭȱȱ
Several public witnesses discussed a standing homeland security committee in terms of Congress
being able to perform its legislative and oversight role effectively following the reorganization of
the executive branch to create DHS. For example, congressional scholar David King testified:
[N]ow it is a fact that we have [DHS], and it is a fact that there is now a tremendous
imbalance between the executive branch and the legislative branch. And the Congress must
catch up.
I am afraid that some of the people who will oppose the single standing committee of
jurisdiction here are still in their minds back in the days before there was a Department of
Homeland Security, trying to keep those clientalistic relationships that existed before. The
fragmentation is tremendously debilitating. And Congress, as an institution must step up to
the plate....
And far too many [M]embers of Congress, and certainly people in the executive branch,
forget that Article I is about Congress, the most important branch as far as I am concerned, in
the government. And it needs to be on equal footing with the Department of Homeland
Security through a single permanent committee.45
41
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, pp. 9, 11, 12.
Ibid., p. 45.
43
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp. 41, 43.
44
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 49.
45
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 45.
42
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Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton explained a different perspective on
committee organization that was also expressed by several other committee chairs and ranking
members:
Health and Human Services, whose Cabinet Secretary has already testified before my
committee on budget priorities and policy issues, also is subject to the Budget Committee,
the Ways and Means Committee, obviously the Appropriations Committee, the Government
Reform Committee. So they are going to multiple committees. The Environmental Protection
Agency, which is one of the major agencies that we have jurisdiction over, they also have to
report to the Transportation Committee, again the Appropriations Committee, [Agriculture]
Committee, the Government Reform Committee, and the Science Committee. [The]
Department of Energy, in addition to being responsible to the Energy and Commerce
Committee[,] has issues for Armed Services, Government Reform, Science,
[Appropriations], Resources. So most of the Cabinet agencies do report to multiple
congressional committees, and I don’t see why Homeland Security should be any different,
especially if we are doing our job.46
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In indicating his support for a new homeland security committee, former Speaker Foley expressed
a view that was made by the public witnesses:
I think there is the problem that otherwise [than having a new committee], with this diverse
universe of subcommittees and committees, 13 committees, 88 subcommittees, a majority of
the committees of the House, a majority of the subcommittees of the House, I am told almost
rather clear the majority of the Members of the House have some connection with one of
these subcommittees or committees that would otherwise have jurisdiction. So there is not
only a need to bring some focus and scope to the oversight function, but there is a critical
need to avoid the [distraction] of members of this new Department from having to respond
day by day to dozens and dozens of different requests for testimony, and that is predictable.47
Former Representative Walker provided an example from his experience as a member and chair
of the Science Committee, where jurisdiction over the energy policy area was shared with the
Energy and Commerce Committee. He stated: “Those jurisdictional arguments often ended up
with a nonaction in that area....”48 Former Secretary Schlesinger commented: “My problem is that
there is so much duplication when a senior official comes to Capitol Hill and has to deal with
five, six or eight committees. That does not help the House. That does not help the process.”49
In contrast, Agriculture Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Stenholm asked how such a
large department as Homeland Security, with such a diverse portfolio in support of its mission,
could be overseen by one committee. They stated that the Agriculture Committee was concerned
46
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 54.
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 7. See also the testimony
of Select Committee on Homeland Security Committee Chairman Cox, Subcommittee on Technology and the House,
Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 16, 2004.
48
Ibid., p. 45.
49
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 13. Select
Committee Chairman Cox noted during the hearings a coordination role for DHS testimony played by the select
committee: Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 48; and Hearing on
Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 30.
47
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with “both intentional and unintentional threats” to U.S. agriculture, and provided an example of
oversight in working with DHS to overturn a decision to eliminate agricultural inspectors and
assign their duties to Customs and Border Protection officers, who would lack needed expertise to
protect against agricultural threats.50 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Mica and Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Oberstar discussed the importance of the
expertise resident in their committee in policymaking. For example, Representative Mica stated:
It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of the aviation system is required to
produce effective aviation security legislation. The aviation system is based on a careful
balance of highly complex regulations, procedures, infrastructure, engineering. And this
system in fact has produced the world’s safest aviation industry. Preserving that balance is
impossible without the expertise that comes from working on these issues for years.51
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Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein52 and former Representative Hamilton supported their
recommendations for a homeland security committee by pointing out the need for congressional
leadership in helping a culture of homeland security to take root in the new department.
Representative Hamilton’s prepared statement explained:
DHS was created so that 22 agencies of the Federal Government would reorient their
purpose and organization towards the mission of protecting the homeland. DHS is intended
to embody a common mission and culture—indeed, the vital goal of implementation is to
overcome bureaucratic resistance to forging that common culture.53
Former Secretary Schlesinger also discussed cultural change inside the department in stating his
support for a homeland security committee:
We talk about the cultural problems of bringing together agencies that have had a disparate
past and integrating them into a new department. There are the cultural problems up here on
the Hill of these different standing committees that have their traditions and their powers.
And unless we effectively deal with that, the components of the department will not be able
to focus on the newer problems of homeland security[;] those components will continue to
respond to the older standing committees and their interests.54
In their testimony, committee chairs and ranking members identified their concerns with changes
to the committee system that might sever components of existing jurisdiction. For example,
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner discussed law enforcement and civil liberties as
related policy concerns in his committee:
50
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 30, 32, 35, 36-37, 38,
41. See also the testimony of Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Stenholm, Subcommittee on Technology and
the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
51
Ibid., pp. 76, 80-81, 82-83. See also the testimony of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member
Oberstar, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
52
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 40.
53
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 43. See also the testimony
of Select Committee on Homeland Security Ranking Member Jim Turner, Subcommittee on Technology and the
House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 16, 2004.
54
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 17.
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There is more to law enforcement and training than just security. There is an important
balancing to be done between security and civil liberties. It is dangerous to put that balancing
task in a committee, the primary focus of which is security. I fear that civil liberties interest
will be sacrificed.55
With regard to the committee’s jurisdiction over immigration, Chairman Sensenbrenner pointed
out that immigration is within the jurisdiction of four departments, and stated:
Although countering the terrorist threat is of significant importance in implementing our
immigration laws, it is certainly not the only issue. Rather, immigration involves much more
than homeland security[:] reuniting families, providing needed workers for American
businesses, offering havens to refugees, and deporting those aliens who have broken our
laws.56
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas discussed the conflict between security and
commerce:
What has occurred in terms of the coordination of activities at the border I think was
overdue, and it probably took a crisis such as this to require the rethinking and the
integration of those border duties.
I just have to tell you that the period in which we have negotiated with the homeland security
structure has been one that I fully anticipated. That is, when your primary title is security,
you make decisions differently than beings who are in the process of attempting to facilitate
commercial intercourse and have been doing it for several hundred years. The question of
whether or not a potential threat to, say, a port or an airport would require it to be shut down
oftentimes is on the teeter-totter between public security and freedom. Those people who
have security in their title hastily move to make sure that the place is secure.57
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Several committee chairs and ranking members discussed the records of their committees in
holding hearings and reporting legislation related to homeland security. For example, Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman Barton submitted a list of “homeland security
accomplishments” with his prepared statement. In oral testimony, he gave examples of the
committee’s work, for example:
The Energy and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction for security at commercial nuclear
power plants. Everybody, regardless of where your committee is, agrees that securing these
facilities from a terrorist attack or any kind of attack is a very good idea. The conference
report on H.R. 6, the comprehensive energy bill, contains very strong new requirements in
that respect. These requirements were developed in our committee on a bipartisan basis.58
55
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 94, 108.
Ibid., p. 94, 103. See also the testimony of Chairman Sensenbrenner, Subcommittee on Technology and the House,
Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
57
Ibid., p. 114. See also the testimony of Chairman Thomas, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The
Organization of Committees, June 16, 2004, and the testimony of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Chairman Don Young, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June
17, 2004.
58
Ibid., p. 45, 46-47.
56
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Representative Mica, chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, provided the Rules Subcommittee
with a statement by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Young, which listed
that committee’s counterterrorism and homeland security legislation beginning in 1989.
Representative Mica testified:
Back in 1990, we mandated background checks for aviation personnel, began deploying
bomb detection devices at our [airports]; we built FEMA, which helped New York and
Washington respond to 9/11 and much of the rest of the country. We created TSA, fortified
cockpit doors, armed pilots, put marshals back in the sky, developed a whole host of
comprehensive approaches not only to aviation, but also to transportation security. We
established the aviation industry, passed the Maritime Security Act, and created port security
grants.59
Government Reform Committee Chairman Davis stated his committee “maintain[ed] an
aggressive posture when it comes to overseeing DHS.” He testified:
For example, the committee held oversight hearings on topics related to FEMA, TSA, first
responders, critical infrastructure, visa policy, preparedness standards, DHS financial
accountability, border management, port security and product litigation management, to
name just a few. We held markups on Project BioShield, the Presidential Vacancy Act and
the DHS Financial Accountability Act.60
In his opening remarks at the same hearing, Rules Subcommittee member Representative Curt
Weldon listed three examples of homeland security legislation that seemed to be stalled at the
committee stage after being referred to several committees.61 Later in the hearing, select
committee Chairman Cox, sitting as a member of the subcommittee, observed that there was little
overlap in the work of the select committee and that of Energy and Commerce Committee, on
which he also served.62
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Several witnesses made statements that suggested definitions of homeland security, speaking
either specifically of DHS or broadly of the policy area.
Former Secretary Schlesinger responded as follows to a question about a mission for the
department that might be selected from a continuum of possibilities:
Well, I think the department has, in the President’s message [on a national strategy],
indicated that what we must do is to anticipate through intelligence possible attacks on the
United States, to respond to such attacks as quickly as we can and to mitigate the
consequences of those attacks. And that is why we have responded. It is at the one pole [of
the continuum] that you mentioned at the outset, which was, you know, to inform local
governments.
59
Ibid., p. 77, 79.
Ibid., p. 64-65.
61
Ibid., p. 8.
62
Ibid., p. 62.
60
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Those local governments will need help, and only the United States, the Federal
Government, can provide that help.
If we have nuclear detonation in some place in the United States, the local authorities will be
overwhelmed, and we must have an entity that has thought through that problem and will
bring to bear the resources of the Federal Government to help those local governments. It is
not just warning.63
In a later hearing, former Speaker Gingrich responded to a question about the role of the
department:
It is, first, intelligence and prevention. I think you put your finger on the key part: Can we
block something bad from happening defensively inside our own country? Second, ensuring
that the capability exists for response, recovery, and rehabilitation; setting the standards and
monitoring to make sure that those capabilities exist. But it is, third, whenever possible,
contracting out and coordinating those capabilities. For example, the Northern Command in
the Department of Defense is a significant piece of this. The National Guard component of
that is a significant piece. Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control
and the Public Health Service have a significant piece of this. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture in terms of its food inspection.... And then, finally, the cities and States who are
going to have an ongoing everyday first responder....64
Later in the same hearing, Speaker Gingrich responded to a question on committee organization:
...I think the jurisdiction issue is actually fairly easy in principle. The principle ought to be
that this is a mission-driven jurisdiction; that is, when there are questions of activities that are
uniquely homeland security, protection, response, recovery, rehabilitation, this committee
ought to have either sole or lead jurisdiction. But it ought to have the right to claim
concurrent jurisdiction over problems as they impinge on homeland security. And the reason
I say that is, this year the problem may be an issue of how do you change spectrum, the next
year the issue may be one dealing with agriculture. We can’t tell in advance where the
intelligence trail and where the threat is going to take us.65
Sitting as an ex officio member of the Rules Subcommittee, Select Committee on Homeland
Security Chairman Cox expressed his concern over keeping DHS focused on its mission, which
he summarized as follows: “First, to protect; second, to prevent; and third, to respond. Those
three must, it seems to me, define the Department and thus the jurisdiction of any committee that
oversees it to the exclusion of all else.”66
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Witnesses suggested a number of options for a new committee on homeland security. Some
witnesses opposed some possible jurisdictional arrangements for such a committee.
Homeland Security Committee Built Incrementally. Congressional scholars Ornstein and
Thomas Mann testified jointly. They suggested moving “gradually,” or “incrementally,” and
63
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 19.
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 21.
65
Ibid., p. 29.
66
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 23.
64
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“strategically” in creating a permanent standing committee with “several areas of jurisdiction.”
They warned that a new committee “with substantial jurisdiction that takes away from other
committees at once” would “fail.” In addition, there would need to be coordination and shared
jurisdiction since there were non-homeland security functions included in DHS and functions that
were closely related to homeland security outside of the department. They suggested “creative use
of the referral process,” including in the designation of “lead actors” for important legislation, and
the Speaker’s involvement in creating a “process of prioritizing” requests for the testimony of
executive officials.67
Dr. Ornstein added that Members would want to retain assignments in addition to service on a
new committee “and we will end up with bigger institutional problems.”68
Former Secretary Schlesinger recommended consolidating committee jurisdiction over DHS as
helpful to the new department, commenting favorably on creating a standing committee.69 He also
called it “useful” to give the committee both oversight and legislative authority.70
No Homeland Security Committee. In response to a question regarding possible “benefits” to
not having a homeland security committee, Dr. Mann responded:
I think there are arguments. One of them is that the House since 1974 has figured out a way
to live with and cope with jurisdictional sprawl, that the leadership working through the
Parliamentarian’s office has developed strategies of joint and sequential referral, of special
rules, of scheduling, in ways that allow them, the leadership, to pull the expertise from
various committees and subcommittees together in coherent pieces of legislation. In doing
so, you don’t disrupt existing patterns of expertise, of historical memory, of staffing, that you
retain some capacity for alternative perspectives on similar problems, that you set up some
competition between teams of members who might see things differently. All those are
advantages in letting the current system go forward as it is.71
Transfer Jurisdiction over DHS to Homeland Security Committee. Dr. Thurber was specific
in his recommendation to create a permanent standing committee on homeland security in House
Rule X, with “jurisdiction directly related to the agencies of DHS and generally to the mission of
reducing the threat [to] homeland security.” He noted that there are agencies outside of DHS that
deal with homeland security, that the new committee needed an “oversight and coordination
relationship” with those activities, and that coordination would be needed with other committees
in order to develop a “comprehensive policy making approach to homeland security.” Dr. Thurber
favored “shared [committee] jurisdiction with primary and secondary responsibilities for the
functions of the entities in DHS” that are not related to homeland security. He recommended the
jurisdictions of other committees over DHS agencies be transferred to the new committee.
Finally, Dr. Thurber recommended that the membership of the new committee include members
67
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, pp. 29, 33, 36-37. In a later
hearing, former Speaker Foley began his testimony by endorsing Dr. Mann’s and Dr. Ornstein’s testimony, Hearing on
Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 7.
68
Ibid., p. 42.
69
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 13.
70
Ibid., p. 24.
71
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 42.
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from committees losing jurisdiction in order to bring to the new committee “knowledge,
expertise, institutional history,” and that there be “transition rules” to facilitate this service.72
Mr. Wolfensberger also favored creation of a permanent standing committee on homeland
security similar to that described by Dr. Thurber. Mr. Wolfensberger added that the committee
should be a “major committee for assignment purposes, if not an exclusive committee.” He stated
that the new committee should work closely with the leadership in “coordinating its oversight
activities with that of other committees,” with oversight agendas “superintended by the bipartisan
leadership.”73 Finally, he suggested coupling the creation of a new homeland security committee
with an increase in committee chairs’ term limits to four consecutive terms from three
consecutive terms. The increase would serve as an incentive to support change as well as allow
more time for a chair to build expertise.74
Both former Representative Walker and former Representative Hamilton also favored creation of
a permanent standing committee on homeland security. Mr. Walker addressed the need to get rid
of “silos” in order to make policy decisions on homeland security issues in support of a “common
goal.” Mr. Hamilton spoke of the value of informed congressional oversight based on “acquired
expertise.”75
A number of committee leaders expressed reservations about or opposition to the transfer of
jurisdiction from committees with long expertise and with perspectives in addition to that of
counter-terrorism security. Agriculture Committee Chairman Goodlatte urged the Rules
Subcommittee to be “cautious in considering [jurisdictional] changes,” citing his committee’s
expertise in agriculture compared to the breadth of expertise that a single committee would need
to cumulate to oversee DHS’s wide and varied scope of responsibilities.76 Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman Barton pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing the relationship of his
committee’s jurisdiction to homeland security from the homeland security jurisdiction of a new
committee, explaining that the “consequences” of terrorist attacks or of other actions or events
may be the same.77 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Mica and Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Ranking Member Oberstar explained the expertise that existed in standing committees
and that was needed to legislate on homeland security within complex systems such as aviation or
emergency management.78
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner, as mentioned above, explained the balance within
law enforcement and immigration between security and civil liberties in the case of law
enforcement and between security and the several purposes of immigration in the case of legal
immigration. He stated the Judiciary Committee should retain its jurisdiction, should the House
create a homeland security committee, since the Judiciary Committee had “experience and
expertise” and had demonstrated a “unified, balanced approach” to the work within its
72
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, pp. 26-28, 29-30.
Ibid., pp. 33, 35-36.
74
Ibid., p. 42.
75
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp. 37, 39, 40-41, 42-44.
76
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, p. 32.
77
Ibid., p. 45.
78
Ibid., pp. 77, 81, 82-83. See also the statement of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Don
Young, pp. 77-79.
73
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jurisdiction.79 Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas explained that his committee’s
jurisdiction over customs functions is essential to U.S. international trade: “The point at which
those [export and import] activities occur have to be allowed to go forward in a very smooth and
efficient manner, with the full understanding of the concerns of security today different than
previously....”80
Split Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Mr. Wolfensberger suggested creating the
new committee by splitting the existing Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, assigning
about a third of its members to the new committee and adding members from the other
committees that currently have jurisdiction over homeland security. The other members of the
existing Transportation and Infrastructure Committee would be assigned to a new transportation
committee. Mr. Wolfensberger made an analogy to the reorganization of the Appropriations
Committees.81
Assign Homeland Security to the Government Reform Committee. Stating that a new
homeland security committee would cause “new jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts,”
Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis and Ranking Member Waxman proposed
that the Government Reform Committee would “oversee the administration of the Department’s
headquarters and departmentwide policies as well as White House efforts to coordinate homeland
security policy” and “current committees would continue to oversee their legacy agencies” that
had been transferred to DHS. They made an analogy to the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee as it exercised jurisdiction over DHS in the 108th Congress.82
Chairman Davis noted that the Government Reform Committee has jurisdiction over “agency
reorganization, human capital, IT security, Federal-State relations, procurement, and the
management and efficiency of government organizations.” He also noted that the committee had
experience in working on legislation with other committees, that the proposal “strengthens the
parallel structures of House-Senate relations,” and that the arrangement ensured coordination
among committees “when no other committee could naturally receive the primary referral” of
“cross-agency proposals.”83
In a statement submitted for the hearing record, Science Committee Chairman Boehlert
suggested:
...giving primary legislative jurisdiction over each directorate of DHS to the appropriate
standing Committee and having the Committee on Government Reform exercise its
traditional jurisdiction across the agency.84
Select Committee. Congressional scholar David King recommended a permanent select
committee on homeland security, with primary jurisdiction over homeland security generally and
over DHS, and with jurisdiction over DHS agencies transferred from existing committees. In a
79
Ibid., pp. 92-95, 103-104, 108..
Ibid., p. 117.
81
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 42.
82
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 65, 67, 68. See also
the testimony of Chairman Tom Davis and Ranking Member Waxman, Subcommittee on Technology and the House,
Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 16, 2004.
83
Ibid., pp. 65-66, 67.
84
Ibid., p. 119.
80
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departure from this recommendation of consolidation, he suggested transferring jurisdiction over
the Coast Guard to the Armed Services Committee. Dr. King recommended that the Speaker
direct the parliamentarian to draft a memorandum of understanding to govern “multiple referrals
for homeland security issues,” and that, on referrals, the Speaker give “primary jurisdiction over
homeland security” to the new committee and “secondary time-limited referrals” to other
committees. Dr. King recommended that the new committee’s members be drawn from
committees losing jurisdiction, with the distribution of committee seats specified; he added that
seniority on the new committee should be “based on time served on the committees contributing
their members.” Dr. King also recommended limiting the committee’s size.85
Intelligence Committee Chairman Goss pointed out the advantages of a permanent select
committee on homeland security, specifically identifying the advantages of leadership selection of
committee members.86
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas made an analogy to the former Select Committee
on Aging as a potential model, with a distinct focus, for an oversight committee on homeland
security. He said such a homeland security committee would have the function “of coordination,
of concern, of observation, of assistance.” He stated that a homeland security committee should
not be vested with jurisdiction in a manner that would “interfere with a [committee] structure that
has been successful through a number of other threats to our security....”87
Ad Hoc Committees. Several witnesses commented on the past use of ad hoc committees,
including creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th Congress to report
legislation establishing DHS.88 Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Stenholm urged the
Rules Subcommittee to “give more life” to the Speaker’s authority under House Rule XII to refer
matters to ad hoc committees. He also suggested that the House work toward achievement of its
rule of limiting each Member to two committee assignments.89
Coordination. A number of public witnesses and committee leaders addressed the need or the
perceived need for coordination of legislation affecting DHS or of requests for hearings testimony
by DHS officials. As mentioned above, former Secretary Schlesinger indicated the number of
committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over DHS would be a burden to the new
department.90 Congressional scholar James Thurber commented on the lack of effectiveness for
both Members and departmental officials in having multiple hearings scheduled at the same
time.91 Former Representative Hamilton noted the contribution Congress could make to DHS’s
implementation by simplifying its committee structures.92
85
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, pp. 38-39, 40-41,
43.
86
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 19, 21. See also the
testimony of Chairman Goss, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees,
June 17, 2004.
87
Ibid., pp. 115, 116.
88
See, for example, the prepared statement of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, Hearing on Perspectives on House
Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, pp. 35-36.
89
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 35-36.
90
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, pp. 9, 11, 12.
91
Ibid., p. 45.
92
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, p. 41.
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Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton observed that a response to the concern over
numerous committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over DHS would be coordination
rather than the creation of a new committee. He suggested a liaison staff member in the Speaker’s
office as an option. He also suggested the possibility of extending the life of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security for one more Congress.93 Energy and Commerce Committee
Ranking Member Dingell stated that the existing committees of jurisdiction could coordinate, as
they have in the past, with the “assistance” of the House leadership. He also noted that House
rules could be amended to assign specified homeland-security functions to the standing
committees.94
Intelligence Ranking Member Harman explained the value of a permanent standing committee on
homeland security as a “mechanism for coordinated review of terrorism” and as a means for
effective oversight of DHS.95 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Mica noted that a homeland
security committee could have a role in coordination over homeland-security activities of
executive entities that were included in DHS and those outside DHS and in marshaling expertise
in the House from among the committees of jurisdiction.96
Budget Subcommittee on Homeland Security. Speaker Gingrich recommended the creation
of a homeland security subcommittee of the Budget Committee to ensure “adequate resources for
Homeland Security before considering any other budgetary matters.” He endorsed the creation of
a permanent standing committee on homeland security, “with the right to claim concurrent
jurisdiction over problems as they impinge on homeland security.” Speaker Gingrich also
recommended adoption of a resolution at the beginning of each Congress that “instructs the
executive branch on who has to report where,” and monitoring interactions by the House with
DHS to prevent “diversions.”97
Homeland Security Subcommittees. As mentioned earlier, six standing committees
reorganized to create subcommittees with jurisdiction over homeland security. In his testimony,
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton suggested that House rules might be
changed to allow standing committees to create an additional subcommittee, to which a
committee could assign jurisdiction over homeland security.98
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On September 30, 2004, the Select Committee on Homeland Security transmitted its
recommendations to the Rules Committee.99 It recommended that a standing and therefore
93
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 45-46, 53.
Ibid., p. 52, 60.
95
Ibid., pp. 16, 17-18.
96
Ibid., p. 91.
97
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp. 12, 16, 29.
98
Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 56, 63. See also the
testimony of Chairman Barton, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees,
June 17, 2004.
99
A majority of members of the select committee signed a letter from Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Jim Turner
(continued...)
94
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permanent Committee on Homeland Security be established, with the addition of a new clause 12
to House Rule X.100 Key aspects of the select committee’s recommendations included:
•
a standing committee is to be created, composed of not more than 29 members
and not more than 16 from one party;
•
the Speaker and minority leader to serve ex officio, without voting privileges;
•
jurisdiction is to be granted over “homeland security generally” and over DHS,
except, generally, for non-homeland security matters within the authority of the
department;
•
“exclusive authorizing and primary oversight jurisdiction” is to be granted with
respect to the department’s authorities related to the “prevention of, preparation
for, and response to acts of terrorism within the United States”;
•
authorizations for the department to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of
terrorism must precede appropriations; and
•
referrals of legislation and other matters to the Select Committee on Homeland
Security in the 108th Congress would not be considered precedent for referrals to
the new committee.101
In addition to jurisdiction over homeland security generally and the department (numbered (1)
and (2) in the proposed standing committee’s jurisdiction), the select committee’s
recommendations enumerated eight other specific components of the proposed committee’s
jurisdiction:
(3) The integration, analysis, and sharing of homeland security information related to the risk
of terrorism within the United States.
(4) The dissemination of terrorism threat warnings, advisories, and other homeland securityrelated communications to State and local governments, the private sector, and the public.
(5) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for research and development in support
of homeland security, including technological applications of such research.
(6) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for security of United States borders and
ports of entry, including the Department’s responsibilities related to visas and other forms of
permission to enter the United States.
(7) Enforcement of Federal immigration laws (except for responsibilities of the Department
of Justice).
(...continued)
transmitting the recommendations to the Rules Committee; the letter is available online at http://hsc.house.gov/files/
mini_report_sigs.pdf, visited December 10, 2004. There was not a committee meeting to consider the
recommendations.
100
House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
on Changes to the Rules of the House of Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, 108th Cong., 2nd
sess., September 30, 2004. The select committee also issued Supplementary Materials and Summary of Activities of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security. (Available online at http://hsc.house.gov/files/mini_report_sigs.pdf, visited
December 10, 2004.) See also Appendix A for the text of select committee’s recommendations.
101
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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(8) Security of United States air, land, and maritime transportation systems.
(9) Non-revenue aspects of customs enforcement.
(10) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for Federal, state, and local level
preparation to respond to acts of terrorism.102
These statements provided specificity to discussion in the House of what might constitute
homeland security jurisdiction. The select committee observed in its report: “The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 offers a congressionally-created road map to jurisdictional reform that
focuses on the structure, organization, capabilities, and mission of the Department itself.”103
In addition, the recommendations included proposed changes to the Rule X jurisdictional
statements of other committees to reduce or eliminate overlap of homeland security jurisdiction
with the new committee. The committees that would be affected by the proposed changes were:
102
103
•
Committee on Energy and Commerce, where there was an addition at the end of
its jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s
jurisdiction shall not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security.”
•
Committee on Financial Services, where there was an addition at the end of its
jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s
jurisdiction shall not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security.”
•
Committee on International Relations, where there was an addition at the end of
its jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s
jurisdiction shall not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security.”
•
Committee on the Judiciary, where its jurisdiction over immigration and
naturalization was amended to contain an exception—“(except for Department of
Homeland Security responsibility for security of United States borders and ports
of entry, including the Department’s responsibilities for visas and other forms of
permission to enter the United States, and immigration enforcement)”—and its
jurisdiction over subversive activities was also amended to contain an
exception—“(except for responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security).”
•
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, where its jurisdiction was
amended at five points—
•
the non-homeland security-related missions of the Coast Guard remained within the
jurisdiction of the committee,
•
federal management of natural disasters remained within the committee’s
jurisdiction, although federal management of “emergencies” was not listed,
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
Ibid., p. 2.
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•
•
jurisdiction over related transportation regulatory agencies was amended to contain
an exception—“(except for responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security),”
•
jurisdiction over various forms of transportation and related matters was amended to
contain an exception—“in each case exclusive of the responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security,”
•
jurisdiction over civil aviation was removed from the list of various forms of
transportation, listed separately in a new subparagraph, and stated as follows—“Civil
aviation, including safety and commercial impact of security measures.”
Committee on Ways and Means, where the phrase “Revenue from” was added at
the beginning of the jurisdictional statement “Customs, collection districts, and
ports of entry and delivery.”
Finally, the membership of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was proposed to
include at least one member of the new Committee on Homeland Security; the membership of the
Intelligence Committee already includes members of other committees.
In a news release announcing the issuance of the select committee’s recommendations, Chairman
Cox stated:
We must give the new committee meaningful jurisdiction to legislate and to conduct
congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and related homeland
security programs and activities. I think all of us would agree that it would be better to have
no committee than a committee with jurisdictionally clipped wings, condemned never to take
flight.
In the same news release, the ranking member of the select committee’s Rules Subcommittee,
Representative Slaughter, stated:
Congress ordered the largest reorganization of government when it created the Department
of Homeland Security. Now, Congress must act decisively and create a permanent standing
committee to ensure that DHS becomes the agency that Congress envisioned. Anything less
than that, and Congress will not be fulfilling its duty to the American people.104
These comments echoed the explanation the select committee gave for its recommendation:
The current diffused and unfocused congressional jurisdiction over the Department of
Homeland Security, and homeland security in general, not only imposes extraordinary
burdens on the Department, but makes it far more difficult for the Congress to guide the
Department’s activities in a consistent and focused way that promotes integration and
eliminates programmatic redundancies, and advances implementation of a coherent national
homeland security strategy.105
104
House Select Committee on Homeland Security, “House Homeland Security Committee Recommends Reform of
DHS Oversight,” news release, September 30, 2004. (Available online at http://hsc.house.gov/release.cfm?id=257,
visited December 1, 2004.)
105
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of
Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, pp. 1-2.
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Following the release of the select committee’s recommendations, Chairman Linder of the Rules
Committee’s Subcommittee on Technology and the House issued a “Dear Colleague” letter
soliciting Members’ “opinions on matters relating to homeland security and Rule X, including the
formal recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.”106 In addition,
following past practice near the end of a Congress, the Rules Committee solicited Members’
proposals for House rules changes for the 109th Congress.107
The House also passed H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, containing a
sense of the House provision:
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Committee on Rules should act upon
the recommendations provided by the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and other
committees of existing jurisdiction, regarding the jurisdiction over proposed legislation,
messages, petitions, memorials and other matters relating to homeland security prior to or at
the start of the 109th Congress.108
And, on November 16, 2004, following his renomination to the Speakership by the House
Republican Conference, Speaker Hastert addressed the conference and said this about a House
homeland security committee:
In the last Congress, we created a Select Committee on Homeland Security to help us
coordinate our legislative response to the new Department of Homeland Security. This year,
it is my intention that we make that Committee permanent.109
ȱ
To this point, this report has recounted and synthesized actions in the 107th and 108th Congresses
related to committee organization and the issue of homeland security. Key actions on committee
organization in the 107th Congress were the creation of the Working Group on Terrorism and
Homeland Security within the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and its elevation to a
subcommittee, and the creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security to mark up and
report the bill establishing the Department of Homeland Security.
Key actions on committee organization in the 108th Congress were the creation of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, with jurisdiction over the Homeland Security Act and
106
Rep. Linder, Chair, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Committee on Rules, Dear Colleague letter,
October 4, 2004. See, for example, Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner, letter to Chairman Linder, October
18, 2004; and “Hill Briefs: Homeland Security,” CongressDaily PM, October 22, 2004.
107
Rules Committee, “Proposed Rules Changes for the 109th Congress,” special announcement, October 18, 2004
(available online at http://www.house.gov/rules/108announce_109rulechngs.htm, visited December 10, 2004).
108
Sec. 5027(b) of H.R. 10, passed by the House October 8, 2004. Subsequently, Congress passed and the President on
December 17, 2004, signed into law S. 2845, P.L. 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. In addition, on October 7, 2004, Rep. Maloney introduced H.Res. 837, with five cosponsors, to create a standing
Committee on Homeland Security, among other purposes; the measure was referred to the Committee on Rules.
109
Speaker Hastert, “Speaker Hastert Wins Renomination to Fourth Consecutive Term,” news release, November 16,
2004. (Available online at http://speaker.house.gov/library/misc/041116term.shtml, visited December 10, 2004). See
also Select Committee on Homeland Security, “Speaker Hastert Endorses Homeland Security Committee,” news
release, November 16, 2004. (Available online at http://hsc.house.gov/release.cfm?id=270, visited December 10, 2004).
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responsibility for a study of House rules, including Rule X, with respect to the issue of homeland
security; hearings on committee organization held by a subcommittee of the select committee
and, separately, by a subcommittee of the Rules Committee; recommendations from the select
committee for a standing committee of the House on homeland security; and support voiced by
the Speaker for a permanent homeland security committee in the 109th Congress.
The next two sections of this report distill the provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
and the recommendations of four national commissions and two think tanks relevant to House
committee organization and the issue of homeland security. The section on the Homeland
Security Act focuses on the definitions of homeland security contained in the act. The section on
commission and think tank recommendations captures the specific recommendations related to
committee organization and the context in which the recommendations were made.
These two sections are followed by a brief history of committee reorganization related to
departmental creation, bringing together this record in one place.
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As noted above, the Select Committee on Homeland Security stated in the report on its
recommendations to the House: “The Homeland Security Act of 2002 offers a congressionallycreated road map to jurisdictional reform that focuses on the structure, organization, capabilities,
and mission of the Department itself.” Some of these directions are reflected in definitions of
homeland security that appear in the Homeland Security Act as well as in the President’s national
strategy, which served as a basis for the Homeland Security Act.
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security that President Bush issued in June 2002, the
strategy contained the following:
Definition: Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.110
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as enacted, contained three definitions of homeland security
for three different purposes under the law. First, in the mission of DHS, Congress restated the
definition from the President’s national strategy:
In general.—The primary mission of the Department is to—(A) prevent terrorist attacks
within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; (C)
minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within
the United States....111
110
Office of Homeland Security, Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Homeland Security, June
2002. (Available online at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html, visited September 21, 2004.) For a
discussion of the evolution of the term homeland security, its relationship to the earlier term civil defense, and its
contrast with the terms national security and internal security, see (name redacted), “Homeland Security and
Information,” Government Information Quarterly, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 213-223.
111
P.L. 107-296, §101; 116 Stat. 2135, 2142. In marking up H.R. 5005, the 107th Congress bill to create DHS, the
(continued...)
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Second, in establishing the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Congress
defined homeland security research to explain the purpose of such research:
Homeland security research.—The term “homeland security research” means research
relevant to the detection of, prevention of, protection against, response to, attribution of, and
recovery from homeland security threats, particularly acts of terrorism.112
Third, in directing the President to include in his annual budget submission an analysis of
homeland security spending, Congress provided the following definition for determining what
activities and accounts to include in the analysis:
In this paragraph, consistent with the Office of Management and Budget’s June 2002
‘Annual Report to Congress on Combatting Terrorism’, the term ‘homeland security’ refers
to those activities that detect, deter, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks occurring
within the United States and its territories.113
These definitions are explicit in stating that homeland refers to “within the United States.” A
substantial part of homeland security—American military, intelligence, and diplomatic
activities—relate to actions that occur outside of the United States.
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As noted at the beginning of this report, the 9/11 commission and other commissions and think
tanks recommended a reorganization of congressional committees, specifically recommending the
creation of a homeland security committee in each chamber. These recommendations were not
specific about key aspects of such committees, such as jurisdiction. However, each entity set out
one or more principles that might guide House and Senate reorganization of its committees vis-àvis the policy area of homeland security.
The commissions and think tanks made their recommendations on committee reorganization in
the context of a larger set of recommendations for combating terrorism and securing the
homeland. This context is helpful in understanding how these entities defined homeland security
and how they arrived at a recommendation for committee reorganization.
This section examines the reports of four commissions and two think tanks. It analyzes the
context for each entity’s recommendations for committee reorganization and provides the specific
(...continued)
House Government Reform Committee approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5005 that
contained the following definition of homeland security: “The term ‘homeland security’ means the deterrence,
detection, preemption, prevention, and defense against terrorism targeted at the territory, sovereignty, population, or
infrastructure of the United States, including the management of the programs and policies necessary to respond to and
recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.” Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5005 offered
by Chairman Burton, and approved by the House Committee on Government Reform June 12, 2002.
112
P.L. 107-296, §307; 116 Stat. 2135, 2169.
113
P.L. 107-296, §889; 116 Stat. 2135, 2251. The OMB report is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/combating_terrorism06-2002.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.
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recommendation. Citations to additional studies related to committee reorganization are provided
in the footnotes of this section.114
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Former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean (R) chaired the 9/11 Commission; former
Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) served as vice chair. The commission’s official name was
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
reported to the President and Congress on July 22, 2004.115
¡ȱ
In explaining the potential meaning and scope of homeland security, the 9/11 Commission
summarized its proposed strategy as follows:
The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a broad politicalmilitary strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to
•
attack terrorists and their organizations;
•
prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and
114
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks related to changes in Congress’s
oversight of intelligence are not discussed in this report, nor are recommendations related to policy options requiring
congressional action. However, the excerpts from the reports provided in the appendices contain all analyses and
recommendations related to congressional organization.
In addition, the commission and think tank reports summarized in this CRS report are representative of a large number
of studies by various private, governmental, and congressional entities.
For example, see also recommendations by the Heritage Foundation on congressional committee reorganization:
Michael Scardaville, “The New Congress Must Reform Its Committee Structure to Meet Homeland Security Needs,”
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, November 12, 2002 (available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/bg1612.cfm, visited December 10, 2004); James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, “What the
9/11 Commission’s Report Should Contain: Four Recommendations for Making America Safer,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder, July 13, 2004 (available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1778.cfm,
visited December 10, 2004); James Jay Carafano, “Lack of Congressional Reform Leaves America Less Safe,”
Heritage Foundation Web Memo #579, September 30, 2004 (available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/wm579.cfm, visited December 10, 2004); and James Jay Carafano, “Homework: Congress Needs
To Return with a Better Plan to Reform Homeland Security Oversight” Heritage Foundation, Web Memo #587,
October 14, 2004 (available online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/
wm587.cfm?renderforprint=1, visited December 10, 2004).
For additional recommendations on policies and organization of the federal government, see also, for example, Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study
Task Force on DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, vol. I (Washington, October 1997) (available online at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/trans.pdf, visited December 10, 2004); and Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, report, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 107-792
(Washington: GPO, December 2002) (available online at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html, visited
December 10, 2004).
115
Among the purposes spelled out in the law creating the commission, the commission was to “make a full and
complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001,” the source of the
commission’s popular name. See Appendix B for the citation in law to the commission’s creation and for the full text
of its analysis and recommendations related to congressional organization.
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•
protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.116
The commission made numerous recommendations in the final two chapters of its report.
It stated the purpose of these two chapters as follows:
The United States should consider what to do—the shape and objectives of a strategy.
Americans should also consider how to do it—organizing their government in a different
way.117 (Emphasis in original.)
The commission’s recommendations related to congressional organization were made in the
context of its recommendations for governmentwide organization. In introducing the chapter on
“how to do it,” the commission summarized its recommendations for government organization:
The United States has the resources and the people. The government should combine them
more effectively, achieving unity of effort. We offer five major recommendations to do that:
• unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists
across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
•
unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;
• unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in
a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental
boundaries;
• unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and
accountability;
•
strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.118
ȱ
With regard to intelligence, counterterrorism, and homeland security, the 9/11 Commission stated
in its report to the President and Congress that congressional committee reorganization was
critical to a “unity of effort” across the federal government. For intelligence oversight, it
recommended a joint committee of the two houses of Congress, or a single committee in each
chamber with authorizing and appropriating authority. With regard to homeland security, the
commission stated:
The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and
subcommittees of Congress.119 One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told
us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department’s successful
development. The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated. The Senate does not have even this.
116
The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 363.
Ibid., p. 361.
118
Ibid., pp. 399-400.
119
For a discussion of the number of committees and subcommittees that could purportedly claim jurisdiction over
homeland security, see House Committee Jurisdiction over Entities and Functions Transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), CRS congressional distribution memorandum, April
7, 2003, p. 2.
117
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Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear
authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and
the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security. Through not more than one
authorizing committee and one appropriating subcommittee in each house, Congress should
be able to ask the secretary of homeland security whether he or she has the resources to
provide reasonable security against major terrorist acts within the United States and to hold
the secretary accountable for the department’s performance.
Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review
for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should
have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have
the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee
should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.120
ȱȱ
The Bremer Commission took its name from its chair, then-managing director of Kissinger
Associates and former U.S. ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism L. Paul Bremer III. Its
official name was the National Commission on Terrorism. The commission reported to the
President and Congress on June 7, 2000.121
¡ȱ
The commission’s recommendation on congressional organization was part of a report that
warned of an increasing and changing terrorist threat. The Bremer Commission focused its
attention particularly on the intelligence and international components of counterterrorism and
protection of the homeland, stating:
•
International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America.
•
Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat requires significantly stepping up
U.S. efforts.
•
Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
communities must use the full scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding
terrorist plans and methods.
•
U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support terrorists.
•
Private sources of financial and logistical support for terrorists must be subjected to the
full force and sweep of U.S. and international laws.
120
The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 421.
See Appendix C for the citation in law to its creation and for the full text of its analysis and recommendations
related to congressional organization.
121
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•
A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or
radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire
nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an event.
•
The President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing and funding
departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that the activities and programs of
various agencies are part of a comprehensive plan.122
The report contained a series of recommendations related to laws, an unratified treaty, policies,
and guidelines. In some instances the commission recommended ratification or implementation;
in others it recommended change or repeal. These recommendations outlined specific actions that
could help the U.S. government prevent terrorist acts, reduce their likelihood, and prepare for
their possibility.
ȱ
In its report to the President and Congress, the Bremer Commission recommended that Congress
“should develop mechanisms for coordinated review of the President’s counterterrorism policy
and budget, rather than having each of the many relevant committees moving in different
directions without regard to the overall strategy.”123
ȱȱ
The Gilmore Commission took its name from its chair, then-Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore
III (R). Its official name was the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Gilmore Commission made five reports
annually in December to the President and Congress, from December 1999 through December
2003.124
¡ȱ
The Gilmore Commission’s principal recommendation, which it examined in each of its five
annual reports, was the promulgation of a national strategy to combat terrorism, “impelled by a
stark realization that a terrorist attack on some level inside our borders is inevitable and the
United States must be ready.”125 In the commission’s view, a federal strategy would be a
component of the national strategy.126 And, by addressing its own organization, Congress would
122
National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, transmitted to the
President and Congress June 7, 2000, pp. iv-v. (Available online at http://www.gpo.gov/nct, visited December 10,
2004.)
123
Ibid., p. 35.
124
See Appendix D for the citation in law to its creation and for the full text of its analysis and recommendations
related to congressional organization.
125
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
December 15, 2000, letter from the chairman. (Available online at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel, visited
December 10, 2004.)
126
Ibid. pp.3-5.
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be able to address the national strategy for counterterrorism and homeland security in a “cohesive
way.”127 The Gilmore Commission made numerous other recommendations.
The Gilmore Commission chose to establish a strategic vision that in five years—by 2009—
would describe “in both appearance and reality an acceptable level of awareness, prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities to cope with the uncertain and ambiguous threat
of terrorism as part of dealing with all hazards.”128 The commission called its strategic vision
“America’s New Normalcy,” and stated that it presented a “carefully balanced approach to the
difficult question of whether to place more or less emphasis on reducing the terrorist threat
versus lessening American vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.” (Emphasis in original.) The
commission said the following about the strategic vision:
America’s New Normalcy in January of 2009 should reflect:
•
Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual freedoms in the context of
measurable advances that secure the homeland.
•
Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability of all levels of government,
the private sector, and our citizens to prevent terrorist attacks and, if warranted, to
respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats faced by the nation.
•
A standardized and effective process for sharing information and intelligence among all
stakeholders—one built on moving actionable information to the broadest possible
audience rapidly, and allowing for heightened security with minimal undesirable
economic and societal consequences.
•
Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local government and the private
sector with corresponding processes that provide an enterprise-wide national capacity to
plan, equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards.
•
Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and acceptable uses of the military
domestically—that strengthens the role of the National Guard and Federal Reserve
Components for any domestic mission and ensures that America’s leaders will never be
confronted with competing choices of using the military to respond to a domestic
emergency versus the need to project our strength globally to defeat those who would
seek to do us harm.
•
Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels of government, and others in
rapidly developing and implementing research, development, and standards across
technology, public policy, and other areas needed to secure the homeland—a process that
focuses efforts on real versus perceived needs.
•
Well-understood and shared process, plans, and incentives for protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructures of government and in the private sector—a unified approach to
managing our risks.129 (Emphasis in original.)
127
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, December 15, 2002,
p. 50. (Available online at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel, visited December 10, 2004.)
128
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty, Fifth Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, December 15, 2003, p. i. (Available online at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel, visited
December 10, 2004.)
129
Ibid., p. iv.
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The Gilmore Commission put its strategic vision in a context somewhat different from that of
other commissions, perhaps reflecting the significant representation of state and local officials,
including officials with first-responder duties. The commission emphasized that the strategic
vision was “fully consistent with an all-hazards approach,” stating:
As our experience with SARS, West Nile Virus, monkeypox, the recent fires in California,
and the current influenza epidemic have demonstrated vividly, we must be able to handle a
wide variety of threats.130
In each of its reports the Gilmore Commission, among several commissions and other entities,
addressed two additional major topics enmeshed in homeland security. The topics were
“protecting civil liberties” and “empowering state and local government.” With regard to civil
liberties, the commission’s report stated:
Rather than the traditional portrayal of security and civil liberties as competing values that
must be weighed on opposite ends of a balance, these values should be recognized as
mutually reinforcing. Under this framework, counterterrorism initiatives would be evaluated
in terms of how well they preserve all of the unalienable rights that are essential to the
strength and security of our nation: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. While these
fundamental rights are cited in our Declaration of Independence and imbedded in our
Constitution, they should not be confused with privileges, which may be imposed upon to
protect national security. However, even privileges should not be imposed upon lightly; they
are fundamental to our quality of life. For example, the opportunity to fly may be viewed as
a privilege rather than a right, but overly stringent and arbitrary security measures not only
have an economic impact but could also increase public skepticism about security measures
generally.131
Regarding the states and localities, the commission stated:
To achieve a truly national strategy, the Federal government must empower States and local
governments by providing a clear definition of preparedness and a strategic plan and process
to implement the objectives of a longer-term vision across the entire spectrum from
awareness through recovery.... Officials at the Federal level should lead the development of
an enterprise architecture to institutionalize intelligence and information sharing, risk
assessments, better integrated planning and training, and effective requirements generation in
close coordination with State and local governments and the private sector. Only through
true cooperation will we achieve some sustainable measure of preparedness for the uncertain
threat of terrorism.132 (Emphasis in original.)
130
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4. Yet another entity that has recommended congressional committee reorganization, the Markle
Foundation, put its recommendation in the context of “Oversight: Protecting Civil Liberties and Sustaining an Effective
Homeland Security Mission,” in Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age (New York: The Markle
Foundation, October 2002), pp. 75-77. (Available online at http://swandive.securesites.net/resources/
reports_and_publications/national_security/index.php, visited December 10, 2004.)
132
Ibid., p. 7. In a follow up report to the Hart-Rudman Commission (see next section), a task force of the Council on
Foreign Relations recommended congressional committee reorganization in order to have one place in the House and
Senate where emergency responder programs are authorized. Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded,
Dangerously Unprepared (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 19. (Available online at
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Responders_TF.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.)
131
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In the first two of its five annual reports, the Gilmore Commission recommended creating a
committee in each chamber or a joint committee of the House and Senate that would have
jurisdiction over counterterrorism and homeland security. It recommended that these committees
comprise representatives of the principal authorizing committees and the Appropriations
Committees, but that the new committees have their own expert staff. The commission explained
the purpose of these committees:
First, it would constitute a forum for reviewing all aspects of a national strategy and
supporting implementation plans for combating terrorism, developed and submitted by the
National Office for Combating Terrorism. [The office was proposed earlier in the
commission’s second annual report.] As part of that process, the joint or each separate
committee should develop a consolidated legislative plan, including authorizing language
and corresponding budget and appropriations ‘benchmarks’ in response to the national
strategy to combat terrorism and accompanying program and budget proposals.
Second, it would serve as the ‘clearinghouse’ for all legislative proposals for combating
terrorism. For separate bills (unrelated to the omnibus package related to the strategy), the
committee should have first referral of such legislation, prior to the referral to the appropriate
standing committee.133
In its fourth report, the Gilmore Commission’s recommendation evolved further:
Recommendation: That each House of the Congress establish a separate authorizing
committee and related appropriation subcommittee with jurisdiction over Federal programs
and authority for Combating Terrorism/Homeland Security.134
Ȭȱȱ
The Hart-Rudman Commission took its name from its co-chairs, former Senators Gary Hart (DCO) and Warren B. Rudman (R-NH). Its official name was the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century. The Hart-Rudman Commission issued three reports, in September
1999, April 2000, and February 2001.135
¡ȱ
Over the course of two years, the Hart-Rudman Commission published three reports: one
assessing the global security environment over the next 25 years, one detailing a strategy of
national security/homeland security in that time frame, and a final report on institutional change
to support the recommended strategy. The commission envisioned an era of rapid, profound
change driven by scientific and technological development and other change.136 It proposed a
133
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
December 15, 2000, p. 18. (Available online at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel, visited December 10, 2004.)
134
IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, p. 50.
135
See Appendix E for the citation to the Secretary of Defense charter creating the commission and for the full text of
its analysis and recommendations related to congressional organization.
136
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st
(continued...)
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strategy wherein the United States would “lead in the construction of a world balanced between
the expansion of freedom, and the maintenance of underlying stability.”137 Finally, the
commission recommended extensive changes in institutional arrangements and policies in the
executive and legislative branches. It found: “The problem is that the current structures and
processes of U.S. national security policymaking are incapable of such management [of the
opportunities and dangers in implementing the recommended strategy].”138
The Hart-Rudman Commission summarized its proposal for U.S. national security strategy as
follows:
We believe that American strategy must compose a balance between two key aims. The first
is to reap the benefits of a more integrated world in order to expand freedom, security, and
prosperity for Americans and for others. But second, American strategy must also strive to
dampen the forces of global instability so that those benefits can endure and spread.139
The commission stated six objectives that underlie this strategy:
•
First, to defend the United States and ensure that it is safe from the dangers of a new era.
•
Second, to maintain America’s social cohesion, economic competitiveness, technological
ingenuity, and military strength.
•
Third, to assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia, and India,
into the mainstream of the emerging international system.
•
Fourth, to promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy and improve
the effectiveness of international institutions and international law.
•
Fifth, to adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which
America’s partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility.
•
Sixth, to help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an
era of change.140
The commission summarized the reasoning behind its objectives and the strategy the objectives
support:
These six objectives, and the Commission’s strategy itself, rest on a premise so basic that it
often goes unstated: democracy conduces generally to domestic and international peace, and
(...continued)
Century, Major Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, September 15, 1999. (Available online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/nwc.pdf, visited
December 10, 2004.)
137
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, April 15, 2000, p. 15. (Available online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseII.pdf , visited
December 10, 2004.)
138
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for
Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001, p. 7.
(Available online at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/index.html, visited December 10, 2004.)
139
Ibid., p. 5.
140
Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report on a
U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century, pp. 8-13.
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peace conduces to, or at least allows, democratic politics. While this premise is not a ‘law,’
and while scholars continue to study and debate these matters, we believe they are strong
tendencies, and that they can be strengthened further by a consistent and determined national
policy.141
Finally, the Hart-Rudman Commission encapsulated its recommendations for organizational
change into five components, which it listed as:
•
ensuring the security of the American homeland;
•
recapitalizing America’s strengths in science and education;
•
redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;
•
overhauling the U.S. government’s military and civilian personnel systems; and
•
reorganizing Congress’s role in national security affairs.142
ȱ
The Hart-Rudman Commission detailed several recommendations regarding congressional
organization, including:
•
The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State Department in a
single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign assistance
programs and activities as well as all expenses for personnel and operations.143
•
Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that it best serves U.S.
national security objectives; specifically, it should merge the current authorizing
committees with the relevant appropriations subcommittees.144
•
The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign policy and national
security consultation with Congress and devote resources to it. For its part, Congress
must make consultation a higher priority and form a permanent consultative groups of
Congressional leaders as part of this effort.145
•
The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of
the Legislative Branch relationship to national security and foreign policy.146
ȱ ȱ
Brookings Institution scholars prepared a report in 2002 and, in 2003, updated it with a lengthy
preface.147
141
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century, p. 6.
142
Ibid., p. viii. The Council on Foreign Relations created a task force headed by former Senators Hart and Rudman to
do a follow up report: America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
(Available online at http://www.cfr.org/pub5099/gary_hart_warren_b_rudman_stephen_e_flynn/
americastill_unprepared_still_in_danger.php, visited December 10, 2004.)
143
Ibid., p. 58.
144
Ibid., p. 112.
145
Ibid., p. 113.
146
Ibid., p. 110.
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The 2003 preface added to the report summarized the accomplishments in homeland security in
the intervening year and laid out an “unmet agenda.” The Brookings recommendations were
made within the context of a homeland security strategy involving “border protection, domestic
prevention, domestic protection, and consequence management.” The update focused on an
“unmet agenda” broader than the creation of DHS and the other steps taken after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.148 The 2003 preface concluded with a summary of the unmet
homeland security needs that suggested the scope of homeland security as the Brookings scholars
perceived it:
The first priority relates to resources. Congress and the president enacted an inadequate level
of funding in 2003 for homeland security. In addition to rectifying that problem, they need to
turn promptly to the 2004 budget and redress vulnerabilities not yet given sufficient priority.
These include the use of information technology, where federal funding to date has been a
pittance of what is required. They also include public-private cooperation on protecting
assets such as chemical facilities, hazardous materials trucking, and the air intakes of
skyscrapers. Finally, a number of existing capabilities and capacities need dramatic and rapid
augmentation. Such strengthening has already occurred in areas such as airport security and
airplane marshals; it now is needed for the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, train travel,
airliner protection against surface-to-air missiles, and many state and local capacities (such
as first responder teams and hospitals) as well.
Another major part of the challenge is making real what Congress and President Bush have
created on paper, but not yet in reality—a new and huge federal Department of Homeland
Security. Tom Ridge and his management team face a mammoth reorganization task—larger
in many ways than anything ever attempted in government. And they must undertake that
task without in any way reducing their attention to the demanding effort of securing America
against a future terrorist attack. It is therefore crucial that Ridge sets clear reorganization
priorities—focusing on those areas that need the most immediate attention such border
security and information analysis (and leaving others, such as federal emergency response,
until later). Ridge’s undersecretary candidates will need to display strong organizational and
managerial abilities, particularly in areas such as infrastructure protection, where whole new
capacities need to be created and where little has been accomplished to date, despite the
heightened attention given to homeland security since 9/11.
Finally, the government needs to organize itself much more effectively to monitor terrorists
and try to determine where their next attacks may come. A stronger domestic
counterterrorism entity is needed, including a new agency independent from the FBI. At
present, we are hoping to get lucky by identifying and apprehending individual terrorists
before they can strike. We also need to develop an alternative approach that allows us to
address the “unknown unknowns,” using “red teams” to prepare for what terrorists might do
next even if they have shown no proclivity for such attacks to date.149
(...continued)
147
See Appendix F for the full text of the Brookings analysis and recommendations related to congressional
organization.
148
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Ivo H. Daalder, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, Peter R. Orszag, I.M. Destler, James M.
Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2002), pp. x, xii. (Available online at http://brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/homeland/
newhomeland.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.)
149
Ibid., pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
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In 2002, the Brookings scholars recommended that Congress create homeland-security
appropriations subcommittees in each chamber and, as a interim step until homeland-security
authorizing committees were established, a joint study and oversight committee for homeland
security policy.150 In updating their report a year later, after the creation of DHS, these scholars
specifically recommended that Congress create homeland security authorizing committees in each
chamber to “maximize the efficacy of congressional oversight.” They explained the
recommendation:
Much of the benefit of consolidating the homeland security mission within the executive
branch will be lost if our national legislature fails to reflect that reorganization in its own
structure.151
ȱȱȱȱ ȱŗśŘȱ
Scholars at the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a white paper in 2002. A task
force organized by CSIS issued a subsequent white paper in December 2004.
¡ȱ
The CSIS scholars’ recommendations were part of an agenda of recommendations that included
the need to state a “national strategy for homeland security that defines the mission as well as the
capabilities and processes necessary to perform that mission”153 as well as numerous specific
actions. Scholars at CSIS sounded a theme similar to that contained in the Brookings report:
Although creating a Department of Homeland Security is an important step, it must be
viewed as only one part of the answer to the management challenges of the homeland
security mission. No single structural fix can resolve what is a massive, long-term strategic
problem.
Six broad considerations should inform the efforts of homeland security decision makers:
•
Articulate a Homeland Security Strategy...
•
Conduct a Comprehensive Threat and Vulnerability Assessment...
•
Strengthen White House Coordination...
•
Craft an Effective Implementation Strategy...
•
Balance Other Critical Concerns...
150
Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid., pp. xxviii, xxx.
152
See Appendix G for the full text of the CSIS analysis and recommendations related to congressional organization.
153
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Meeting the Challenges of Establishing a New Department of
Homeland Security: A CSIS White Paper, 2002, p. 6. (Available online at http://www.csis.org/features/
hamrefinalpaper.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.)
151
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•
Seize an Historic Opportunity to Reform Government....154
ȱ
Scholars at CSIS recommended Congress create select committees on homeland security in each
chamber comprising the chairs and ranking members of committees and subcommittees that
exercised jurisdiction over agencies included in DHS. They also recommended new
“subcommittees of oversight” in each chamber’s Appropriations Committee.155
In a subsequent white paper issued in December 2004, a CSIS task force observed:
We believe that partial reform or piecemeal efforts will be ineffective. The Department of
Homeland Security will be insufficiently accountable unless true reforms are made to place
the majority of oversight responsibility in one committee in each chamber of Congress. The
current situation poses a clear and demonstrable risk to our national security.156
The task force followed this observation with a recommendation:
We recommend that both the House and the Senate create strong standing committees for
homeland security, with jurisdiction over all components of the Department of Homeland
Security. We recommend that these committees have a subcommittee structure that maps
closely to the core mission areas outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security,
not simply to the individual directorates of DHS. Further, we recommend that these
committees be established pursuant to developing a small, expert cadre of members who can
exercise oversight and craft legislation taking into account the full spectrum of homeland
security requirements—not simply one narrow element of the domestic war against
terrorism. [The core mission areas were listed as ‘Intelligence and Warning, Border and
Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting Critical Infrastructures and
Key Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, Emergency Preparedness and
Response.’]157
ȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ
ȱȱ
Since World War II, when confronted with an opportunity to create or reorganize its committees
to correspond to new Cabinet departments, the House has responded differently to the creation of
various departments. This section of this report chronicles the response of the House in its
committee organization following creation of new departments, collecting this information in one
place.158
154
Ibid., pp. 6-10.
Ibid., pp. 19-21.
156
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Business Executives for National Security, Untangling the Web:
Congressional Oversight and the Department of Homeland Security: A White Paper of the CSIS-BENS Task Force on
Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security, December 10, 2004, pp. 3-4. (Available online at
http://www.csis.org/hs/041210_DHS_TF_WhitePaper.pdf, visited December 10, 2004.)
157
Ibid., p. 4.
158
See also CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment, by
(continued...)
155
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The House’s creation of the Armed Services Committee occurred by merger of the separate
Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees, pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946,159 and preceded by one Congress the creation of the National Military Establishment, later
redesignated the Department of Defense.160 The Armed Services Committee’s jurisdiction was
updated in 1953 to reflect the existence of the department.161
When Congress in 1953 approved President Eisenhower’s reorganization plan creating the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,162 the House did not make changes in its
committee organization to parallel the department.163
The then-House Committees on Banking, Public Works, Education and Labor, and Veterans’
Affairs were created or reorganized long before the creation of the Departments of Housing and
Urban Development, Transportation, Education, and Veterans Affairs, respectively.164
The reorganization of House committee jurisdictions to reflect the 1977 creation of the
Department of Energy165 followed the department’s organization by three years. On March 25,
1980, the House agreed to H.Res. 549, to be effective with the next Congress, redesignating the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee as the Energy and Commerce Committee and
giving it jurisdiction over national energy policy generally and over many components of energy
policy.
Still, the jurisdiction of the now-Science Committee over such related matters as energy research
and development was expanded by H.Res. 549. The Ways and Means Committee continued to
have jurisdiction over tax and trade laws, even as they affected energy policy. The nowTransportation Committee had jurisdiction over oil and other pollution of navigable waters, and
the now-Resources Committee had jurisdiction over mineral resources on public lands.
(...continued)
(name redacted). For a history of Appropriations
Committee subcommittee changes, see CRS Report RL31572,
Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920-2007, by (name redacted).
159
60 Stat. 812.
160
63 Stat. 578.
161
H.Res. 5, which was agreed to in the House January 3, 1953.
162
67 Stat. 18.
163
Following the creation of major new agencies by executive action, such as the Environmental Protection Agency
(Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Executive Order 12127 of
March 31, 1979, implementing Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978), Congress did not act to realign committee
jurisdictions.
164
79 Stat. 667; 80 Stat. 931; 93 Stat. 668; and 102 Stat. 2635, respectively. In his prepared statement for the hearing of
the Select Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Rules, then-House Parliamentarian Charles Johnson
explained the subsequent evolution of the Public Works Committee, now the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, after the formation of the Department of Transportation: “I recall the creation of the Department of
Transportation in the late 1960s. Incrementally thereafter, the House in adoption of its rules from the majority caucus
on opening day accomplished a consolidation of committee jurisdiction. Whereas at the time of creation of the
Department, Public Works had jurisdiction over highways and civil aviation, Banking had jurisdiction over urban mass
transit, Commerce had jurisdiction over railroads and Merchant Marine and Fisheries had jurisdiction over maritime
transportation, those various aspects have been gradually consolidated under the umbrella of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure following the demise of certain transportation regulatory independent agencies that
remained in place after the creation of DOT.” Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May
19, 2003, p. 11.
165
91 Stat. 565.
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Appropriations for the Energy Department were generally contained in an energy and water
appropriations bill, which through 1978 had been called a public works appropriations bill, and in
an interior appropriations bill. Other committees retained other energy-related jurisdiction.166 This
arrangement was in part due to the retention of energy programs in other departments after the
creation of the Department of Energy.
ȱ
The House has tended to continue its committee organization following congressional creation of
a new department or a major reorganization in the executive branch. In action after creation of the
Department of Energy, the House established the Energy and Commerce Committee as the lead
energy policy committee, but it also continued a jurisdictional structure that gave other
committees a role in energy policymaking. The merger of the Military Affairs Committee and the
Naval Affairs Committee into the Armed Services Committee was the exception to the House’s
pattern, but it took place within a wholesale and fundamental consolidation of House and Senate
committees.
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ
The 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks define homeland security to be a
continuum of international and domestic initiatives and activities, all of which have a role
reducing the likelihood and potential impact of a terrorist attack against the United States. The
themes behind these initiatives and activities include:
•
disabling terrorists overseas,
•
winning friends in Islamic and other countries,
•
counterterrorism and homeland security as the principle and purpose of American
diplomatic and military strategy,
•
good intelligence abroad and at home, shared appropriately within the federal
government and between the federal government and state and local governments
and the private sector,
•
commitment abroad and at home to freedom and civil liberties,
•
maintaining a national strategy for homeland security,
•
organizing the federal executive to carry out the strategy,
•
defining the military’s domestic role in homeland security,
•
organizing Congress to contribute to and oversee the strategy and its
implementation, particularly the ongoing development of DHS to prevent attacks,
reduce vulnerability, and respond to and recover from attacks,
166
For a legislative history of the creation of executive departments after World War II, see CRS Report RL31497,
Creation of Executive Departments: Highlights from the Legislative History of Modern Precedents, by (name redacted).
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•
including state and local governments and the private sector in carrying out the
strategy,
•
federal funding of components of the strategy, and
•
preparing the American citizenry for possible additional terrorist attacks.167
The Select Committee on Homeland Security recommended the creation of a permanent
Homeland Security Committee that would have jurisdiction over domestic components of
homeland security, reporting to the House Rules Committee on September 30, 2004, as required
by H.Res. 5.168 That jurisdiction in itself is wide ranging and requires expertise in a large number
of policy areas, including intelligence analysis, public health, border control, transportation
security, first responders, information technology, protection of critical infrastructure, and
homeland security-related research, among other policy areas. The recommended jurisdiction
includes DHS and, presumably, the national strategy issued by the President in 2002 and any
changes to that strategy.
Among many policy areas, the select committee’s recommendation would leave jurisdiction over
the intelligence community principally in the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
Committee, the armed forces in the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, relations with
foreign nations in the jurisdiction of the International Relations Committee, and money
laundering and other financial arrangements in the jurisdiction of the Financial Services
Committee.
In addition, the policy-area jurisdiction of the proposed committee could overlap with the policyarea jurisdictions of other committees; so, for example, legislation dealing with information
technology or public health might be within the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security
Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and possibly other committees. Overlaps in
some areas, such as with the Agriculture Committee on border issues and with the Science
Committee on research and development, were not addressed in the select committee’s
recommendations.
Under the select committee’s recommendations, activities within DHS that are not homelandsecurity-related would remain within the jurisdiction of standing committees already having
jurisdiction. For example, the non-homeland-security missions of the Coast Guard and natural
disaster preparedness and response would remain under the jurisdiction of the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee; the revenue functions of the Customs Service would remain under the
jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee; and immigration and naturalization policy that is
not related to homeland security would remain under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee.
The select committee’s recommendations would also leave jurisdiction over appropriations in the
Appropriations Committee. As mentioned above, the Appropriations Committees in each chamber
realigned their subcommittees to create one subcommittee that parallels the programs and entities
of DHS, which leaves funding decisions for other homeland security-related programs and
167
For a comparison of the commissions’ specific policy recommendations, see CRS Report RL32519, Terrorism: Key
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Recent Major Commissions and Inquiries, by (name redacted).
168
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of
Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, p. 7.
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agencies in the jurisdiction of other appropriations subcommittees. (However, discussion of
subcommittee jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations could lead to further realignment.)
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The 9/11 Commission and the other commissions and think tanks recommended alternative
committee arrangements: a joint committee, an authorizing committee in each chamber of
Congress, or a combined authorization-appropriation committee in each chamber that would have
jurisdiction over homeland security, as the 9/11 Commission explained its recommendation, in
order to achieve a “unity of effort.” The recommendations for a consolidation of jurisdiction in
Congress were based on a desire for coherent congressional policymaking vis-à-vis the new
Department of Homeland Security or a national homeland-security strategy or both.
The commissions and think tanks that made recommendations after the President proposed the
creation of DHS, including the select committee, argued that the department would have the best
chance of developing with clear lines of authority in Congress. As the 9/11 Commission stated:
Through not more than one authorizing committee and one appropriating subcommittee in
each house, Congress should be able to ask the secretary of homeland security whether he or
she has the resources to provide reasonable security against major terrorist acts within the
United States and to hold the secretary accountable for the department’s performance.169
Or, as the select committee stated in its recommendations:
The current diffused and unfocused congressional jurisdiction over the Department of
Homeland Security, and homeland security in general, not only imposes extraordinary
burdens on the Department, but makes it far more difficult for the Congress to guide the
Department’s activities in a consistent and focused way that promotes integration and
eliminates programmatic redundancies, and advances implementation of a coherent national
homeland security strategy.170
The commissions that made recommendations prior to the President’s proposal to create DHS
recommended a consolidation of committee jurisdictions so that the House and Senate could
oversee a national strategy, rather than have separate committees pursue separate interests.
Some of the commissions and think tanks were explicit in their desire to ensure that the executive
was accountable to Congress for its management of homeland security. As the Hart-Rudman
Commission stated:
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an Executive Branch problem. Congress
should be an active participant in the development of homeland security programs as well.
Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and solutions. Individual members should
develop expertise in homeland security policy and its implementation so that they can fill in
policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice in times of crisis. Most important,
169
The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 421.
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of
Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, pp. 1-2.
170
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using its power of the purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have
sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated, efficient, and effective.171
The select committee took this perspective a step further in arguing that it was essential for
Congress to reorganize its committees in order to exercise its role in homeland security
policymaking, stating:
Terrorism is now a first-order priority in Congress, the Executive branch, and among the
American people. Global terrorism is recognized as a fundamental threat to our people,
territory, and way of life for the foreseeable future. The Executive branch has been
reconfigured in light of that reality. Congress, however, has not. The result has been
uncoordinated oversight and conflicting legislative guidance—effecting a tacit enhancement
of Executive branch authority over homeland security policy, programs, and activities.
Congress must, in short, fundamentally reform itself or become largely irrelevant where
homeland security matters are concerned.172
In testimony before the select committee’s Rules Subcommittee, several witnesses explained in
concrete terms what they believed Congress would gain from committee reorganization, enabling
it in turn to better exercise its policymaking role. For example, for Representative Hamilton
testified:
[R]eal congressional expertise on homeland security will come about better I think if you
have a permanent committee. My guess is that everybody on [the select] committee has
learned an awful lot about homeland security in the last few months, a lot more than they
knew when they began work on that committee. That is the strength of the Congress,
developing expertise on a difficult subject, and this is one of the key reasons why you should
have a permanent committee.
There is no substitute for expertise focused on the task at hand; and I think then expertise has
to be cultivated, it has to be developed. You have got so many other things that demand your
attention, and serving on the committee will make you focus on it and make you do the job
of oversight and will develop expertise that the Congress badly needs. But, more important,
it will develop the expertise that is critical for the operation of the department itself, the
executive branch.173
On this same point, congressional scholar Wolfensberger testified about an obstacle to developing
new expertise in the current committee alignment:
Both branches are still wedded to traditional, pre-9/11 arrangements and relationships
internally, and with their counterparts in the other branch, what some have referred to in the
past as the iron triangle of subcommittees, agencies and their private and public sector
clienteles.
You need a separate committee that is willing to set a new course and way of doing things;
exercise tough oversight, employ innovative thinking and exert constant pressure on the new
department to set the right priorities and pursue them rigorously.174
171
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century, p. 26.
172
Supplementary Materials [of the Select Committee on Homeland Security], p. 16.
173
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, September 9, 2003, pp. 40-41.
174
Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July 10, 2003, p. 33.
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However, the House has made different decisions in different situations regarding the
organization of its committees to oversee a policy area or even a Cabinet department. If the
House were to organize a permanent homeland security committee, it could do so in a way that
allowed more committee and Member participation in the formulation of homeland security
policy, or that allowed integration of homeland-security-related and non-homeland-securityrelated components of a policy area. The House might choose an alternative to the
recommendations of the various commissions and think tanks and its own select committee. Such
a choice would be consistent with a number of past decisions on committee jurisdiction over a
department or agency or policy area or components of a policy area.175
As described in a previous section, the House has tended not to follow reorganization in the
executive branch with reorganization of House committees. Creation of the Armed Services
Committee occurred from merger of two committees and preceded reorganization of what
became the Department of Defense by one Congress. While the Armed Services Committee
seems to represent the kind of “unity of effort” in committee organization sought by the 9/11
Commission, the committee’s creation occurred within the context of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, under which virtually the whole House and Senate committee
structure was reorganized. The new committee’s jurisdiction was also distinct from the
jurisdictions of the other committees organized under the act.
The House’s renaming of the Interstate and Foreign Committee as the Energy and Commerce
Committee and the designation of that committee as the House’s lead committee on energy
occurred three years after the creation of the Department of Energy, following a review of
committee jurisdiction. (This review is described further below.) The designation was
accomplished in the same House resolution that enhanced the energy research jurisdiction of what
is now the Science Committee. And, the jurisdiction of what is now the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee evolved only incrementally over a number of years after the creation of
the Department of Transportation.
The House has also chosen not to concentrate all aspects of a policy area in a single committee,
choosing instead openness and differing policy perspectives. For example, the Education and the
Workforce Committee has jurisdiction over “education or labor generally,”176 but jurisdiction over
the education of veterans is vested in the Veterans’ Affairs Committee, over mining schools in the
Resources Committee, over international education in the International Relations Committee, and
over agricultural colleges in the Agriculture Committee.177 Jurisdiction over the federal civil
service is vested in the Government Reform Committee, and over transportation labor in the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.178 Although the Government Reform Committee
has jurisdiction over the federal civil service, the Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction over
“pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces,”
and the House Administration Committee has jurisdiction over “Employment of persons by the
House, including staff for Members, Delegates, the Resident Commissioner, and committees; and
reporters of debates....”179
175
For an analysis of House decisions on jurisdiction realignment, see CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A
Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment, by (name redacted).
176
House Rule X, cl. 1(e)(6).
177
House Rule X, cl. 1(r)(3), cl. 1(l)(14), cl. 1(j)(8), and cl. 1(a)(4), respectively.
178
House Rule X, cl. 1(h)(1) and cl. 1(q)(20), respectively.
179
House Rule X, cl. 1(c)(10) and cl. 1(i)(3), respectively.
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The House has also tended to choose dispersal of at least components of a policy area rather than
a concentration in one committee, with very large exceptions such as Appropriations and, with
regard to taxation, Ways and Means. The House might choose such an arrangement to overcome a
committee’s bias in favor of a department or agency and too much deference to it; too close an
alignment of a committee, a department or agency, and interest groups; or too concentrated power
over a policy area. Due in part to dissatisfaction in the 1970s with the Armed Services
Committee’s and other committees’ conduct of intelligence oversight, the House created what
ultimately became the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.180 The House abolished the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1977, dispersing its jurisdiction to several committees. By
the 1970s, public health and environmental concerns were part of the policy debate over nuclear
energy’s future, and the joint committee was criticized for its closeness to the nuclear power
industry.181
The House has also chosen to redistribute a committee’s jurisdiction when it has perceived that
the jurisdiction is too broad, that components of the jurisdiction are closely related to the
jurisdiction of another committee, or that a redistribution of jurisdiction would better distribute
House committees’ workload. For example, in adopting rules for the 104th Congress, the House
redistributed specific parts of the Energy and Commerce Committee’s jurisdiction to three other
standing committees.182
Nonetheless, the House cleared up what might have been perceived as duplication of the work of
the standing committees by abolishing four select committees in the 103rd Congress and what
might have been perceived as committees with redundant or too narrow jurisdiction by abolishing
three standing committees in the 104th Congress.183 It also over the course of four Congresses
transferred jurisdiction over sev
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