Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

Order Code RL32541

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Aviation Security-Related

Findings and Recommendations

of the 9/11 Commission

Updated March 30, 2005

/name redacted/

Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Aviation Security-Related Findings and

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

Summary

The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known

weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001

were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded

that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in

cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access

controls at airports.

The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen

aviation security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to

detect explosives on passengers; addressing human factors issues at screening

checkpoints; expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening systems;

intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo; and

deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these

specific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation

security policy asserts that priorities should be set based on risk, and the most

practical and cost effective deterrents should be implemented assigning appropriate

roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private

stakeholders.

In response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, the National

Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) was enacted on

December 17, 2004. The act contains numerous aviation security provisions, many

of which address 9/11 Commission recommendations related to aviation safety.

These provisions build upon prior aviation security-related provisions, contained in

Vision 100 - the Century of Aviation Reathorization Act (P.L. 108-176; 117 Stat.

2490) that was enacted a year earlier on December 12, 2003, addressing many of the

concerns expressed by the 9/11 Commission.

This report will not be updated.

Contents

Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening Systems . . . . . . . . 7

Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation Security Policy . 10

Strategic Plan for Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Cooperation and Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Congressional Actions in Response to the 9/11 Commission

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Vision 100 — Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Possible Continuing Policy Concerns for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Aviation Security-Related Findings and

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383)

established the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States

(the 9/11 Commission). The bipartisan 9/11 Commission was charged with the

responsibilities of examining and reporting on the facts and causes of the September

11, 2001 terrorist attacks and presenting its findings, conclusions, and

recommendations for corrective measures to prevent future acts of terrorism to the

President and the Congress. The 9/11 Commission concluded its investigation and

released its final report on July 22, 2004. This CRS report discusses the 9/11

Commission’s findings and recommendations pertaining to aviation security.

Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security

The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (the

9/11 Commission) found that al Qaeda terrorists exploited weaknesses in the aviation

security system to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Weaknesses in

aviation security exploited by the 9/11 terrorists included

!

!

!

!

!

A pre-screening process that focused on detecting potential aircraft

bombers and not potential hijackers;

Lax checkpoint screening and permissive rules regarding small

knives;

A lack of in-flight security measures such as air marshals and

reinforced cockpit doors;

An industry-wide strategy of complying with hijackers in a nonconfrontational manner; and

A lack of protocols and capabilities for executing a coordinated

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and military response to

multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackers.

The 9/11 Commission found that underlying these specific weaknesses and

vulnerabilities in the aviation system was what they termed a failure of imagination

among senior policymakers and agencies responsible for intelligence, national

defense, and aviation security. The 9/11 Commission concluded that while suicide

hijackings were by no means a far-fetched possibility given al Qaeda’s past methods

and motives, “... these scenarios were slow to work their way into the thinking of

aviation security experts.”1 While some agencies were concerned about hijackings

1

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission

(continued...)

CRS-2

and had speculated about various hijack scenarios, there were no specific

constructive actions taken to defend against these possible threats prior to September

11, 2001. Furthermore, the likelihood of a suicide hijacking scenario was greatly

underestimated. The 9/11 Commission also concluded that, before September 11,

2001, congressional oversight of aviation security was lacking while Congress

focused its aviation oversight activities on airport congestion and passenger service.

Regarding Congress’s aviation related activities prior to September 11, 2001, The

9/11 Commission wrote: “Heeding calls for improved air service, Congress

concentrated its efforts on a ‘passenger bill of rights’ to improve capacity, efficiency,

and customer satisfaction in the aviation system. There was no focus on terrorism.”2

Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress moved quickly to pass the

Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71; 115 Stat. 597).

Designed to correct weaknesses in aviation security exploited by the 9/11 hijackers

as well as other potential vulnerabilities in transportation systems, ATSA established

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a new organization within the

Department of Transportation responsible for security matters in all modes of

transportation. Highlights of ATSA included

!

!

!

!

Establishing a federal security screener workforce under TSA at

airports;

Requiring explosive detection screening of all checked bags;

Deploying air marshals on all high risk flights; and

Hardening cockpit doors.

ATSA also gave the TSA broad authority to assess threats to security in all

transportation modes, primarily focusing on aviation, and implement appropriate

security measures. In this regard, ATSA was seen as a comprehensive legislative

vehicle for addressing transportation security with a specific emphasis on aviation

security.

The following year, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296; 116 Stat.

2135) established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and placed the TSA

within this new department. The act also authorized the arming of airline pilots as

an additional measure to protect aircraft against terrorist hijackers. Additional

aviation security measures were included in the most recent FAA reauthorization act,

Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176; 117 Stat.

2490). Most notably, Vision 100 established an aviation security capital fund to help

pay for placing explosive detection systems (EDS) “in-line” with baggage conveyers

and sorting facilities in an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of

1

(...continued)

Report (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 344.

2

The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 85-86.

CRS-3

checked baggage screening and expanded the program to arm pilots to include pilots

of all-cargo aircraft.

Despite these actions, congressional and administration oversight of aviation

security has identified several areas of vulnerability that persist. These include air

cargo operations; general aviation; access controls for airport employees; screener

performance; and possible terrorist attacks using shoulder-fired missiles.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission also recognized many of these vulnerabilities. The 9/11

Commission concluded that “[m]ajor vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general

aviation security. These, together with inadequate screening and access controls,

continue to present aviation security challenges.”3 Based on these findings, the 9/11

Commission made specific recommendations regarding improvements to airport

passenger and baggage screening, and air cargo security. While the commission

identified potential threats posed by inadequate access controls to secured areas of

airports and general aviation operations, it did not issue any recommendations

pertaining to these risks. Also, while the 9/11 Commission acknowledged concerns

raised by previous and current administrations over possible shoulder-fired missiles

attacks against commercial airliners, it did not make any specific recommendations

regarding this threat.

The 9/11 Commission delineated its recommendations regarding aviation

security in a section titled “A Layered Security System.” As suggested by this title,

the 9/11 Commission concluded that the TSA must implement a multi-layered

security system that takes into consideration the full array of possible terrorist tactics.

The 9/11 Commission noted that these various layers of security must each be

effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a manner

that creates redundancies to catch possible lapses in any one layer. This conclusion

is consistent with aviation security mandates under ATSA and TSA’s concept of

“concentric rings of security.”4 Since many facets of aviation security have been

addressed through legislation and administration actions since the 9/11 attacks, the

9/11 Commission focused its aviation security recommendations on persisting

vulnerabilities in commercial aviation.

While not all recommendations offered in the 9/11 Commission’s final report

were formally labeled as such, CRS has identified six aviation-specific

recommendations.5 These are: 1) enhancing passenger pre-screening; 2) improving

measures to detect explosives on passengers; 3) addressing human factors issues at

screening checkpoints; 4) expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening

systems; 5) intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous

3

Ibid., p. 391.

4

Transportation Security Administration. Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 2004, March 2003.

5

For clarity, multi-part 9/11 Commission recommendations have been separately identified

in this report.

CRS-4

cargo; and 6) deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition

to these six aviation-specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission also issued an

overarching recommendation for transportation security policy to set priorities based

on risk and implement the most practical and cost effective deterrents assigning

appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as

private stakeholders.

Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening

On September 11, 2001, passenger pre-screening consisted of three measures:

the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), answers to two

security-related questions asked by airline ticketing and gate agents, and the

presentation of photo identification to airline personnel. More than half of the

September 11, 2001 hijackers were identified as “selectees” based on one or more of

these pre-screening techniques. However, there was little consequence to their

selection because, at the time, pre-screening was used solely as a tool to screen for

individuals that might try to bomb a passenger jet using methods similar to those

employed in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. While the CAPPS system is still in

use, its purpose has since been expanded to screen for possible hijackers as well.

CAPPS is maintained directly by the airlines as part of their security program and

uses computer algorithms to identify “selectees” based on matching passengers’

behaviors (e.g., method of ticket purchase) to hijacker and bomber profiles.

The follow-on to CAPPS, dubbed CAPPS II, has been embroiled in controversy

for the past two years over concerns regarding protection of personal data and civil

liberties. As proposed, CAPPS II would implement a two step process to: 1)

authenticate a passenger’s identity using commercial databases; and 2) check that

name against terrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government. If flagged

by the system, passengers could be either denied boarding or selected for secondary

screening. The 9/11 Commission recommended that improved passenger prescreening capabilities should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to

CAPPS continues. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that the prescreening

system should utilize the larger set of watchlists maintained by the federal

government. Both the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY2004 (P.L. 10890; 117 Stat. 1137) and Vision 100 directed the Department of Homeland Security

to address these concerns and limited implementation of CAPPS II to system testing

until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) verifies that adequate steps have

been taken to address these concerns. However, in February 2004, the GAO found

that the TSA had adequately addressed only one of the eight concerns regarding

CAPPS II implementation.6 Continued reluctance by the airlines to provide data for

testing CAPPS II due to liability concerns has also stymied progress. The 9/11

Commission recommended that airlines should be required to supply the information

needed to test and implement passenger pre-screening.

6

U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger

Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385, February

2004.

CRS-5

Recent media reports indicate that the CAPPS II program has essentially been

scrapped over privacy concerns, however Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge

has suggested that a new program with a different name might eventually take its

place.7 In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation to forge forward with

implementing a passenger pre-screening system and the current lack of progress

toward developing such a system, Congress may intensify its oversight of the Secure

Flight program, the successor to CAPPS, and engage in debate over the best way to

proceed. H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require the TSA to take over

responsibility for prescreening from the airlines withing 180 days on enactment and

begin testing of the system by November 1, 2004. This measure is in line with

administration plans for the testing and roll-out of the Secure Flight program.

Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers

Evidence highlighted by the 9/11 Commission indicated that al Qaeda has had

a keen interest in bombing airliners for some time. The 9/11 Commission’s report

describes Ramzi Yousef’s 1994 bombing of a Phillippines Airlines flight bound for

Tokyo as a precursor to a larger operation — the so-called “Bojinka” plot — to

bomb multiple U.S.-bound airliners over the Pacific ocean. In the Philippines

Airlines bombing, Yousef reportedly assembled an improvised explosive device

(IED) in the airplane’s lavatory and hid it under a seat during the previous flight

affixing a digital watch timer he had invented.

Concerns over IEDs were brought to public attention in December 2001, when

Richard Reid attempted to down a transatlantic flight using explosives concealed in

a shoe. Concerns over IEDs were again raised by the media in October 2003 when

a college student, Nathaniel Heatwole, snuck banned items and materials resembling

plastic explosives aboard passenger jets. While neither of these high profile incidents

was cited in the 9/11 Commission report, the 9/11 Commission acknowledged

persisting weaknesses in the ability to detect explosives on passengers by formally

recommending that the TSA and Congress give priority to improving detection of

explosives on passengers. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that, as a

start, all individuals selected for secondary screening undergo explosives screening.

Current screening technologies and procedures offer limited capabilities to

detect explosives carried on passengers. While carry-on items and sometimes shoes

are x-rayed and may be subjected to secondary chemical trace detection screening

methods, passengers are typically only screened by metal detectors. New technology

offers the capability to detect bomb-making chemicals on individuals using trace

detection methods. These systems are being operationally tested in various

transportation settings including ongoing field tests at five airport sites: T.F. Green

State Airport, Providence, RI; Greater Rochester International Airport, NY; San

Diego International Airport, CA; Tampa International Airport, FL; and

Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport, MS . Other possible methods for detecting

explosives on passengers involve body scan imaging using low dose x-ray

backscatter or other techniques. Body scan technology is considered somewhat more

7

Mimi Hall and Barbara DeLollis. “Plan to collect flier data canceled,” USA Today, July

14, 2004.

CRS-6

controversial because it renders a nude image of the scanned individual which is

regarded by some as overly intrusive. Alternative methods to these technologies

include the use of bomb-sniffing dogs and physical searches of individuals. In light

of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may debate whether and how to

implement and fund an initiative for screening passengers using the most effective

means available. (See CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline

Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues.)

Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints

The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the TSA conduct a human factors

study to understand problems in screener performance and set attainable objectives

for improving performance at screening checkpoints. Screener performance

deficiencies were highlighted by a recent DHS Inspector General’s audit that found

poor screener performance among both federal and contract screeners during covert

testing at screening checkpoints.8 The TSA has launched several initiatives to

address these concerns. For example, the TSA has greatly expanded the use of threat

image projection (TIP), a system that tests screener on-the-job performance by

projecting images of threat objects on x-ray monitors. Using data from TIP,

researchers can assess certain human performance needs in aviation security. The

TSA is also examining ways to improve the recurrent training of screeners.

Key human factors issues are likely to include screener selection and training,

fitness for duty, and human interaction with screening technologies. While the TSA

maintains a small cadre of human factors researchers and some ongoing research in

this area is being conducted by universities and contractors, research on aviation

security human factors and funding for these activities pales in comparison to human

factors research programs in the Department of Defense and FAA’s safety-related

human factors activities. Also, there presently is a lack of a comprehensive strategic

plan for addressing human factors in aviation security.

In light of this recommendation and persisting concerns over screener

performance, Congress may conduct oversight to identify areas where TSA’s human

factors research efforts may not be adequately addressing concerns over passenger

and baggage screening performance. Congress may also consider whether to task the

National Academy of Sciences or some other independent body with examining

human factors needs in aviation security. While the National Academy of Sciences

did address human factors in its 1999 assessment of aviation security technologies,

it has not conducted a focused study of human factors needs in the aviation security

system and has not examined this issue since the terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001.9 H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require the TSA to conduct human

8

Statement of Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S.

House of Representatives, April 22, 2004

9

National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation

Security: First Report. Publication NMAB-482-5. Washington, DC: National Academy

Press, 1999.

CRS-7

factors studies to improve screener performance as part of a pilot program to examine

next-generation checkpoint screening technologies.

Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening

Systems

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA expedite installation of inline baggage screening systems. Therefore, Congress may debate the adequacy of

current funding for this activity. While Vision 100 authorizes up to $500 million

annually to be deposited into the aviation security capital fund, only $250 million was

appropriated in FY2004 and requested in FY2005 for this activity. Since the total

cost of integrating EDS equipment at all passenger airports is estimated to exceed $4

billion, it may take several years to complete integration of baggage screening

systems given current funding levels. Letters of intent (LOIs) issued to airports by

the TSA were established as a vehicle to leverage limited federal funding by

stretching obligations over several years. LOIs were created in appropriations

legislation as a means for TSA to convey to airports its intent to obligate future funds

for the purpose of EDS integration. However, the TSA has, thus far, implemented

LOIs by reimbursing airports for expenses as they are incurred. This approach could

further slow the progress of integrating EDS systems at airports.

The 9/11 Commission also recommended that “[b]ecause the aviation industry

will derive substantial benefits from [in-line EDS] deployment, it should pay a fair

share of the costs.”10 However, defining that fair share has been a significant point

of contention. Airlines already indirectly pay the federal share of EDS integration

because the first $250 million annually, all that was budgeted in FY2004 for this

activity, must come directly from aviation security fees paid by the airlines and their

passengers. Airports pay a portion of the costs too, albeit a much smaller one. Under

the scheme adopted by Vision 100, large and medium-sized airports contribute 10%

of the cost while small airports contribute 5%. However, the TSA has proposed to

reduce the federal obligations for these programs and increase the local share to 25%

at large and medium-sized airports and 10% at small airports, a proposal that airports

obviously oppose. The 9/11 Commission did not specifically say what they would

consider to be a more equitable contribution from industry, however their

recommendation implies that they believe industry is not paying its fair share under

the current scheme.

Congress may continue debate over the equity of cost-sharing for EDS

integration in light of this recommendation. The House homeland security

appropriations bill (H.R. 4567) as reported included language to limit the federal

share for airport security projects to 75% at large and medium hubs and 90% at all

other airports, however, this language was stricken by a point of order during floor

debate.

Legislation introduced in the House (H.R. 5121) seeks to double the amount

collected in aviation security fees that must be designated for aviation security capital

fund from $250 million annually to $500 million annually for FY2005 through

10

The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 393.

CRS-8

FY2007. H.R. 5121 also seeks to increase the TSA’s flexibility to meet checked

baggage security screening requirements by allowing it to enter into multi-year

contracts, not to exceed 10-years, with airports or third party vendors to provide EDS

imaging capabilities. While most of the aviation security-related provisions of H.R.

5121 were incorporated into H.R. 10, neither of these measures were included in

H.R. 10.

Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA needs to intensify its efforts

to identify suspicious cargo, and appropriately screen and track potentially dangerous

cargo in aviation as well as in maritime operations.

Stemming from

recommendations of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), a standing

committee of aviation stakeholders, the TSA unveiled a strategic plan for cargo

security in November 2003. That plan consists a multi-layered risk-based approach

with four key strategic objectives: 1) enhancing shipper and supply chain security;

2) identifying elevated risk cargo through pre-screening; 3) identifying technology

for performing targeted air cargo inspections; and, 4) securing all-cargo aircraft

through appropriate facility security measures.11 Goals of the plan include prescreening all cargo shipments in order to determine their level of relative risk;

working with industry and federal partners to ensure that 100% of items considered

to pose an elevated risk are inspected; developing and ensuring that new information

and technology solutions are deployed; and, implementing operational and regulatory

programs that support enhanced security measures.12 The 9/11 Commission

recommendations seem to imply that it concurs with TSA’s overall approach as

outlined in this strategic plan but feels that progress toward achieving these

objectives must be accelerated, and perhaps, augmented. Since the 9/11 Commission

recommendation provides no specific guidance on how to intensify the identification,

tracking, and screening of cargo, Congress may further scrutinize TSA’s efforts on

cargo security and further debate approaches to air cargo security.

Recent debate in Congress over air cargo security has focused on the level of

physical screening or inspection of cargo needed to adequately mitigate the risks

posed by cargo placed on passenger aircraft. While proposals have been offered to

require 100% physical screening or inspection of all cargo placed on passenger

aircraft, Congress has thus far supported TSA’s plan to, instead, implement a riskbased approach that relies heavily on the known-shipper program and database to

assess shipments placed aboard passenger aircraft. Both H.R. 10 and S. 2845 contain

11

12

Transportation Security Administration. Air Cargo Strategic Plan. November, 2003.

There has been considerable confusion regarding the terms screening and inspection as

they pertain to air cargo, and presently no statutory or regulatory definitions of these terms

exist. In general, the TSA refers to screening as a vetting process, such as the use of a

known-shipper database, to assess the level of risk associated with a cargo shipment. TSA

uses the term inspections, on the other hand, to refer to physical scrutiny of cargo though

any of several available means such as canine teams, hand searches, or the use of x-ray

equipment or explosives detection systems. In this report, the term pre-screening has been

used in place of what TSA commonly calls screening to avoid confusion since this does not

refer to a physical screening process.

CRS-9

measures to improve the screening and tracking of cargo. S. 2845 would specifically

require the TSA to double the amount of air cargo screened within one year. (see

CRS Report RL32022, Air Cargo Security).

Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers

In addition to these measures to improve cargo security, the 9/11 Commission

specifically recommended the deployment of at least one hardened cargo container

on every passenger aircraft that also hauls cargo to carry suspicious cargo. The

National Research Council examined this very concept in 1999 and concluded it

would cost $125 million to acquire a sufficient number of hardened containers.13

They also estimated that the annual industry-wide cost of lost revenue due to reduced

aircraft revenue payload and increased fuel burn would total $11 million. Thus, even

if a proposal were made to federally fund this initiative, passenger airlines may

oppose it because it would increase operational costs.

It is likely that opponents of deploying hardened cargo containers would also

argue that, if recommended initiatives are implemented to improve the identification,

tracking, and screening of cargo, then hardened cargo containers are not needed. On

the other hand, proponents of deploying hardened cargo containers may argue that

doing so creates a redundant layer of defense, analogous to a hardened cockpit door,

that is consistent with the overarching goal of establishing a multi-layered security

system with built-in redundancies.

However, using just one hardened cargo container per passenger aircraft still

leaves the system open to potential vulnerabilities that are directly tied to the

effectiveness of measures to conduct risk-based assessments of cargo and flag

suspicious cargo. For this reason, the TSA currently requires that all cargo from

shippers that have not been properly vetted and verified through the known-shipper

program be carried in all-cargo airplanes and not aboard passenger airplanes. While

TSA is working on expanding its capabilities to detect high risk cargo, it is unclear

how this system could be adapted to assign risk levels that would permit certain

suspect cargo to travel in hardened cargo containers on board passenger airplanes.

Also, from a policy standpoint, it is unclear what criteria could be used to permit

shipment of suspicious cargo on passenger aircraft in hardened cargo containers

instead of offloading that shipment from passenger aircraft altogether. Congress may

debate whether deployment of hardened cargo containers could provide an effective

layer of security to protect against potential cargo bombings. A key policy issue in

this debate is likely to be the possible implications of allowing suspicious cargo to

travel on passenger aircraft even if they are secured in hardened cargo containers.

H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require TSA to carry out a pilot

program to evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for carrying baggage and

cargo on passenger airliners. While S. 2845 does not contain a similar provision,

legislation passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003 (S. 165), would require the DHS in

13

National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation

Security: First Report.

CRS-10

coordination with the FAA to submit a report evaluating blast-resistant cargo

container technology.

Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation

Security Policy

In addition to the aviation specific recommendations discussed above, the 9/11

Commission also issued an overarching recommendation that risk-based priorities

for protecting all transportation assets be established. Based on this assessment of

risks, the 9/11 Commission recommended that TSA select the most practical and cost

effective approaches for implementing defenses of transportation assets and develop

a plan, budget, and funding to implement this effort. The plan, according to the 9/11

Commission, should assign roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities,

as well as to private stakeholders.

Strategic Plan for Aviation Security. The risk-based approach to aviation

security is nothing new and has been viewed for some time as the principal policy

tool for allocating limited resources. What is lacking, however, is a unified strategic

plan for aviation security. To some extent, ATSA has set the strategy for aviation

security following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The TSA’s initial

focus was on meeting the mandates of ATSA, particularly deploying air marshals and

federal screeners. Now that TSA has achieved some level of normal operations, it

should be better poised to focus on developing a more formal strategy for national

aviation security policy. Based on TSA’s strategic approaches to date, particularly

in addressing air cargo security needs, it is likely that a risk-based multi-layered

approach to aviation security will form the core of future aviation security policy.

This appears to be largely in step with what the 9/11 Commission is recommending.

In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may consider whether

to formally task the TSA with developing a national strategy for aviation security that

addresses funding needs, budgetary implications, and the appropriate roles of federal,

local, and state authorities, and industry stakeholders. While some may argue that

such a plan already exists in various TSA program plans and budget documents,

others may argue that a more formal strategic planning document for aviation

security needs to be developed.

Cooperation and Integration. While aviation security relies extensively on

cooperation and the integration of shared responsibilities, challenges persist in

defining roles and allocating resources for state and local participation and industry

involvement. At airports, the local role is defined in the airport security program

which is tailored for each airport location. Physical security of the airport site is

ultimately the role of local jurisdictions carried out by airport operators, while TSA

maintains the overall role of security oversight and enforcement as well as direct

responsibility for passenger screening. The role of local governments, and in some

cases state authorities, in aviation security often involves both law enforcement

support for airport site security and law enforcement presence at screening

checkpoints. Passenger air carriers must also participate in security through

procedures and training for controlling access to aircraft and secured areas of

airports, carrying out security inspections of aircraft, and so on. In air cargo and

general aviation, security measures rely heavily on the direct participation of aircraft

CRS-11

owners and operators, while the federal role is one of oversight and enforcement of

aviation security requirements.

While implementing aviation security already involves federal, state, local, and

industry participation, what appears to be lacking is a unified plan or strategy for:

assigning roles and missions to each stakeholder based on careful consideration of

logistics and costs; and adopting a systems approach to define how each element

contributes to the overall security strategy.

In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress and the TSA may

consider ways to improve the strategic planning, resource allocation, and integration

of federal, state, local, and private-sector resources for aviation security. Congress

and the TSA may also consider how the specific strategies and approaches to aviation

security may be integrated with an overarching transportation security strategy that

encompasses rail, maritime, and highway security as well and addresses logistics,

funding, and resource allocation to meet security needs in all modes of transportation.

H.R. 10 requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prepare and update

a transportation security plan and modal security plans including a modal plan for

aviation to: set risk-based priorities; select the most practical and cost-effective

methods for protecting aviation assets; and assign roles and missions to Federal,

State, regional, and local authorities, and aviation stakeholders.

Congressional Actions in Response to the 9/11

Commission Recommendations

Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report, Congress has given

considerable attention to the recommendations contained in the report. The Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation held a hearing on the 9/11

Commission recommendations regarding transportation security on August 16, 2004,

and the House Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing reviewing the aviation

security recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

The 108th Congress passed two major pieces of legislation containing numerous

provisions pertaining to aviation security: Vision 100 — Century of Aviation

Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176), which was enacted prior to the 9/11

Commission’s final report, and the National Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 108-458;

118 Stat. 3638) which was enacted, in large part, in response to the 9/11

Commission’s recommendations..

Vision 100 — Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act

Before the 9/11 Commission had completed its report, several aviation securityrelated provisions were included in Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization

Act (P.L. 108-176) which was enacted on December 12, 2003.

Vision 100 established a redress process for pilots, mechanics or other licensed

aviation professionals whose certification is denied, suspended, or revoked on the

grounds that they pose a risk to aviation security. Vision 100 also requires the

CRS-12

Federal Aviation Administration to provide a justification to Congress when

establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around cities where pilots are

required to use special communications and operating procedures to enable air traffic

controllers to identify potential security threats.

Vision 100 also modified existing requirements for security training of airline

flight and cabin crew members. Under these provisions, the airlines are responsible

for providing mandatory basic training in security for crews, while the TSA was to

develop and provide a voluntary advanced self-defense training program for crew

members.

Vision 100 also required the Department of Homeland Security to study and

report to Congress on the effectiveness of the aviation security system, including the

air marshal program, hardening of cockpit doors, and security screening of

passengers, checked baggage, and cargo. The report was to include

recommendations, including legislative recommendations, for improving the

effectiveness of aviation security.

Vision 100 also created the Aviation Security Capital Fund. The act authorizes

up to $500 million per year through FY2007 to be appropriated to this fund and

requires that the first $250 million in aviation security fee collections be deposited

in this fund each year through FY2007. The act also provided the Undersecretary for

Border and Transportation Security with the authority to issue grants to airports for

projects to integrate baggage explosive detection systems with baggage conveyer

systems; reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install explosive detection

systems; deploy explosive detection systems behind the ticket counter, in baggage

sorting areas, or in line with baggage handling systems; and for other aviation

security-related capital improvement projects. Vision 100 set the federal share of

costs for such projects at 90% for large and medium hub airports, and at 95% for all

other airports and set guidelines for the allocation of Aviation Security Capital Fund

monies for these projects.

Vision 100 also required the implementation of security programs for air charter

operators who use aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff

weight.

Vision 100 also required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to

review the proposed CAPPS II passenger prescreening system and prevented the TSA

from fully implementing this program until the Undersecretary for Border and

Transportation Security certified that a variety of enumerated issues pertaining to

civil liberties, privacy, data protection, system security, system performance, and

system oversight had been adequately addressed. The TSA has since scrapped the

CAPPS II program and is developing an alterative prescreening system called

“Secure Flight.”

Vison 100 also authorized flight crew members of all-cargo airlines to

voluntarily participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program that trains and

deputizes armed pilots to guard aircraft cockpits against hostile attacks. Vision 100

also expanded the program to include other flight crew members, such as flight

engineers, in addition to pilots.

CRS-13

Vision 100 also requires the promulgation of regulations to ensure the security

of foreign and domestic aircraft repair stations. The act also requires the TSA, in

coordination with the FAA, to complete a security review and audit of foreign repair

stations that work on air carrier aircraft and components.

Vision 100 also modified the background check requirements for foreign pilots

seeking flight training in the United States. The act transferred the duties of

conducting these background checks from the Department of Justice to the DHS. The

provisions require flight schools or instructors to provide notification and

identification information for individuals seeking training in smaller aircraft,

weighing less than 12,500 pounds, and require background checks be completed

before training can be initiated in larger aircraft. The legislation authorizes fee

collections to offset the costs of conducting these background checks.

For further discussion see CRS Report RL32498, Vision 100: An Overview of

the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176).

The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004

The National Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 108-458) contains numerous

provisions related to aviation security, many directly addressing the concerns and

recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

The act requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop, prepare,

implement, and update as needed, a National Strategy for Transportation Security as

well as modal-specific security plans including a plan for aviation security. The

modal security plan for aviation is to include a threat matrix outlining each threat to

the United States civil aviation system and the corresponding layers of security in

place to address these threats and a plan for mitigation and reconstitution of the

aviation system in the event of a terrorist attack.

The act requires the TSA to issue guidance for the use of biometrics in airport

access control systems and establish a biometric credential and authentication

procedures to identify law enforcement officers authorized to carry firearms aboard

passenger aircraft. The act authorizes $20 million, in addition to any other authorized

amounts, for research and development of biometric technologies for aviation

security. The act also authorizes $1 million to establish a center of excellence in

biometric technologies.

The act required the TSA to begin system testing of an advanced passenger

prescreening system by January 1, 2005. Although the act does not provide a

deadline for the completion of testing the prescreening system, it requires the TSA

to begin to assume the role of passenger prescreening and checking passenger names

against watch lists no later than 180 days after completing that testing. The act

requires the TSA to establish redress and remedy procedures for passengers who are

delayed or denied boarding because of being falsely identified or targeted by the

system, and requires the TSA to ensure that the number of such false positives is

minimized. The act also requires the TSA to establish an oversight board and

implement safeguards to ensure the security and integrity of the system and address

CRS-14

and resolve any privacy concerns. The act also requires that the DHS prescreening

of international flights to or from the United States be conducted prior to departure.

The act further requires that individuals seeking FAA certificates, such as pilots

and mechanics, as well as individuals requesting unescorted access to airport secure

areas and air operations areas be screened against the consolidated and integrated

terrorist watch list. The act also requires the TSA to establish a process where air

charter and leasing companies can voluntarily submit information regarding

prospective customers seeking to use aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds for

prescreening.

The act requires the Security Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland

Security to report on the impact of the automatic selectee and no fly lists on privacy

and civil liberties and the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, to

report on the criteria and standards applied in placing the names of individuals on the

consolidated screening watch list.

The act also directs the DHS to give high priority to developing, testing,

improving, and deploying airport checkpoint screening technologies to detect

nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and explosives on

passenger and carry-on items and requires the DHS to create a strategic plan for the

deployment and use of explosive detection equipment at airport screening

checkpoints. The act requires the TSA to initiate a pilot program to test advanced

airport checkpoint screening systems at five or more airports by March 31, 2005 and

authorizes $150 million per year in FY2005 and FY2006 to carry out this pilot. The

act also requires the TSA to carry out and report on a human factors study to better

understand problems with screener performance and take such action as may be

necessary to improve the job performance of airport screening personnel.

The act requires the Federal Air Marshal Service to continue operational

initiatives to protect the anonymity of Federal air marshals. The act also provides for

training law enforcement officers authorized to carry firearms on passenger aircraft

in inflight counterterrorism and weapons handling procedures and in the

identification of fraudulent identification documents such as passports and visas.

The act also encourages the President to pursue international agreements to enable

the maximum deployment of Federal air marshals on international flights, and

authorizes the DHS to provide air marshal training to foreign law enforcement

personnel.

The act authorizes the TSA to take necessary action to expedite the installation

and use of in-line baggage screening equipment at airports. The act further requires

the TSA to establish a schedule to expedite this activity and study cost-sharing

options among federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector for

integrating in-line baggage screening systems. The act increases the authorization

for the aviation security capital fund by authorizing up to $400 million per year

through FY2007, in addition to the initial $250 million deposited from aviation

security fee collections set forth in Vision 100.

CRS-15

The act directs the TSA to study the application of readily available wireless

communication technologies to enable cabin crew members to discreetly notify the

pilot in the case of a security breach or safety issue occurring in the cabin.

The act requires the FAA to begin issuing tamper resistant pilot licences with

a photograph of the bearer. The licence is to be capable of accommodating a digital

photograph, a biometric, or any other unique identifier considered necessary for

identification purposes.

The act requires the TSA to develop and report to Congress on standards for

determining appropriate screener staffing levels at airports that provide necessary

levels of security and keep passenger wait times to a minimum. The DHS is also to

study the feasibility of integrating operations of the screening workforce and other

aviation security-related DHS functions to coordinate these activities and increase

their efficiency and effectiveness. The act also authorizes the expenditure of $100

million for research and development of improved explosive detection systems and

directs the TSA to develop a plan and guidelines for implementing these systems.

The act also requires the TSA to prohibit airline passengers from carrying

butane lighters and any other objects considered by the TSA to be inappropriate

carry-on items.

The act also directs the President to urgently pursue international treaties to limit

the availability, transfer, and proliferation of Man-portable Air Defense Systems

(MANPADSs), such as shoulder-fired missiles, worldwide. The act further directs

the President to continue to pursue international arrangements for the destruction of

excess, obsolete, and illicit MANPADS stockpiles worldwide. The act requires the

President to report on diplomatic efforts to address MANPADS non-proliferation and

requires the Secretary of State to provide the Congress with annual briefings on the

status of these efforts. The act also requires the FAA to establish a process for

expedited certification of airworthiness and safety for missile defense systems that

can be mounted on commercial aircraft. The act also requires the DHS to provide a

report within one year assessing the vulnerability of aircraft to MANPADS attacks

and plans for securing airports and aircraft from this threat.

The act requires that a pilot program be established to evaluate the use of

blast-resistant cargo containers. The act authorizes $2 million to carry out this pilot

program. The act also authorizes $200 million each year through FY2007 for

improved air cargo and airport security related to the transportation of cargo on both

passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft, and $100 million per year through FY2007

for the research, development, and deployment of technologies to better identify,

track, and screen air cargo. The act establishes a grant program to encourage the

development of advanced air cargo security technology. The act also requires the

TSA to issue a final rule regarding its proposed regulations for the security of cargo

operations for both passenger and all-cargo aircraft. Finally, the act requires the

DHS, in coordination with the Department of Defense and the FAA, to report on the

threats posed by international cargo shipments bound for the United States and

provide an analysis of the potential for establishing secure facilities along established

international aviation routes for the purposes of diverting and securing aircraft

believed to pose a security threat.

CRS-16

In addition to the air-cargo security provisions in the National Intelligence

Reform Act of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005

(P.L 108-334, Sec. 513) directs the DHS to research, develop, and procure certified

systems to inspect and screen air cargo on passenger aircraft at the earliest date

possible and amend security directives and procedures to, at a minimum, triple the

percentage of cargo inspected on passenger aircraft

Possible Continuing Policy Concerns for Congress

Since the 108th Congress enacted several major provisions pertaining to aviation

security, many directly reflecting the concerns and recommendations of the 9/11

Commission, there are few policy concerns that were not addressed at all during the

108th Congress. However, two areas where some may consider that policy concerns

were not adequately addressed through legislation in the 108th Congress include

general aviation security and air cargo security procedures and oversight.

The 9/11 Commission made brief reference to concerns over the security of

general aviation operations, however it did not make any formal recommendations

to address this concern. During the 108th Congress, legislation on the security of

general aviation operations focused on airport and airspace restrictions and

examining ways to alleviate what some believed to be unnecessary constraints on

certain operations. For example, a provision in Vision 100 required the DHS to

develop and implement a security plan allowing general aviation flights to resume

at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport but set no timetable for carrying out

this provision. In appropriations language, on the other hand, temporary flight

restrictions over stadiums and other venues during major outdoor sports events were

kept in full force and made permanent. Arguably, the legislation pertaining to

general aviation security enacted during the 108th Congress was viewed by many as

not being as cohesive and comprehensive as legislation addressing other aviation

security concerns. Some have expressed renewed concerns over the risk posed by

general aviation corporate jets, private planes, and helicopters in response to a recent

assessment prepared jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the

DHS and widely reported in the press.14

Some may also argue that comprehensive legislation pertaining to air cargo

security operations and oversight and expansion of the known-shipper program were

not adequately addressed during the 108th Congress. Specifically, comprehensive

measures that had been passed by the Senate in S. 165 (108th Congress) were stripped

from the final version of the National Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004 and replaced

by language directing the TSA to make final proposed rulemaking addressing these

issues. This was presumably done because the TSA’s regulatory proposals largely

reflected the intent of the proposed legislation. However, because Congress did not

formally enact several of these specific provisions pertaining to air cargo security

operations and oversight, the 109th Congress may be particularly interested in

oversight of the TSA’s implementation of its air cargo security rules and its air cargo

strategic plan to ensure that they meet desired objectives.

14

Eric Lichtblau. “Security Report on U.S. Aviation Warns of Holes,” The New York Times,

March 14, 2005.

EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the

Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on

issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The

reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to

the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts

who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made

any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in

the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without

permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a

third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or

otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public

understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in

connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim

copyright on any CRS report we have republished.