Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options
Congressional research reportOct 5, 2006
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Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A
Survey of Options
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October 5, 2006
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RL32359
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options
Summary
Increasingly, Congress and the Bush Administration are looking to utilize nonproliferation
assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help reduce the risk of terrorist
access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million
of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former
Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania
($38.5 million) for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the
9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away
from terrorist groups. This report, which will be updated as needed, analyzes the range of possible
applications of CTR funds, the kinds of assistance that might be supplied, and describes legal,
financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance.
A key underlying issue is that the countries posing the greatest risks may be the least amenable to
cooperative approaches. A second issue is that there is an array of U.S. domestic and international
legal restrictions on the most useful kinds of cooperation. Both the executive branch and
Congress may need to consider domestic and international legal and political restrictions on
cooperation with states outside the nonproliferation regimes, low levels of transparency exhibited
by most of the potential recipient states, and the lack of incentives for many of these states to
pursue threat reduction measures. In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether potentially
expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs. One
school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there
is now an opportunity to focus on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.
This report complements CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union; CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat
Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; and CRS Report RS21840, Expanding Threat
Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions.
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Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Connecting CTR and WMD Terrorism ..................................................................................1
Congressional Role ...............................................................................................................2
Background ................................................................................................................................3
The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism .................................................................................4
State Sponsors of Terrorism...................................................................................................6
Cuba ...............................................................................................................................6
Iran.................................................................................................................................6
Libya ..............................................................................................................................7
North Korea ....................................................................................................................8
Sudan..............................................................................................................................9
Syria ...............................................................................................................................9
States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs .............................................................. 10
How Significant Is the Nexus? ............................................................................................ 11
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent................................................................. 12
Kinds of Assistance................................................................................................................... 13
Weapons Security................................................................................................................ 14
Site Security........................................................................................................................ 14
Material Security................................................................................................................. 15
Personnel Security .............................................................................................................. 16
Tailoring Assistance to Countries .............................................................................................. 16
Tier I: North Korea and Iran................................................................................................ 17
Tier II: Cuba, Sudan, and Syria ........................................................................................... 18
Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities on their Soil........................ 19
Constraints on Assistance.......................................................................................................... 21
Political Constraints ............................................................................................................ 21
Technical Constraints .......................................................................................................... 22
Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations.................................................................................. 23
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) ......................................................................... 24
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)......................................................................... 25
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ....................................................................... 25
Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws............................................. 25
Nonproliferation Laws .................................................................................................. 30
Anti-terrorism Laws...................................................................................................... 30
Nuclear Cooperation/Nuclear Weapons Cooperation ..................................................... 31
Dual-Use Exports.......................................................................................................... 32
Costs and Benefits of Assistance ............................................................................................... 33
Impact on Nonproliferation Regime .................................................................................... 33
Issues for 110th Congress........................................................................................................... 34
Sea Changes in Policy? ....................................................................................................... 34
Recent Legislation .............................................................................................................. 35
Costs................................................................................................................................... 36
Certifications ...................................................................................................................... 36
Other Considerations........................................................................................................... 37
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Tables
Table 1. WMD Capabilities and Terrorism...................................................................................5
Table 2. Priorities for Assistance to States within Terrorism-WMD Nexus ................................. 16
Table 3. Assistance to Tier I States............................................................................................. 17
Table 4. Assistance to Tier II States ........................................................................................... 18
Table 5. Assistance to Tier III States .......................................................................................... 19
Table 6. Applicable Laws for Proliferation and Terrorism .......................................................... 27
Appendixes
Appendix. ................................................................................................................................ 38
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 38
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Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options
Introduction
Nonproliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in combating the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. 1 The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the
Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. Begun in 1991, CTR
initially aimed to help Russia meet its START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. 2
Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 3 Experts realized that Russia needed to protect its Cold
War overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who might exploit insider
opportunities and who had incentives (particularly financial) to sell WMD technology to anyone.
Now, however, many analysts support expanding cooperative threat reduction programs beyond
Russia to other geographic areas. The Bush Administration stated in early 2003 that it had
“expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.4
In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308), Congress
authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of
September 2006, the Administration had spent $38.5 million in Albania for the purpose of
eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. 5 The report of the 9/11 Commission called for
continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups.
This report surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a WMD and terrorism
threat. It describes potential recipients of such funding (those states with WMD programs and
terrorism problems); the kinds of assistance that may be possible; potential legal, political, and
technical constraints on assistance; and potential costs and benefits to the United States of
providing such assistance. The report begins with a brief review of why CTR programs might be
considered applicable to the threat of WMD terrorism and then takes a more detailed look at the
threat of WMD terrorism. It reviews how certain kinds of CTR assistance might help defuse the
threat and presents some options tailored for specific countries. The report also looks at
constraints involved in providing assistance and broader implications of such assistance.
Connecting CTR and WMD Terrorism
The belief that terrorists were growing more interested in WMD grew after the 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States, despite no obvious link, and continued to grow as U.S. policy
statements drew further linkages. In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush
highlighted Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis of evil” states—those that support terrorism and
also have WMD. Later that year, both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation highlighted the connection between terrorists
1
This report was updated with the assistance of Jill Marie Parilla, research associate.
2
See CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet
Union, by (name redacted), for a comprehensive review.
3
“WMD” in this paper includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and excludes the missiles that can delivery
such weapons, and radiological weapons.
4
U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates, February 2003. p. 1.
5
Personal communication on September 14, 2006, with official in Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy Office,
OUSD/Policy.
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and WMD. In 2003, the U.S. went to war with Iraq, justifying this action primarily on the
grounds that Iraq had WMD and a connection to terrorists associated with 9/11. More recently,
the exposure of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network in Pakistan, which provided sensitive nuclear
weapons technology (including a bomb design) to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, has raised
concerns not just about what could be traded clandestinely, but also about potential terrorist
access to WMD. Khan’s sale of technology to three state sponsors of terrorism, allegations of ties
to a terrorist organization, and the Pakistan government’s precarious relationship with terrorist
groups on its soil have prompted some to call for assistance to Pakistan to reduce the threat of
terrorist access to WMD.
A key strategy in limiting the risk of terrorist access to WMD is to cut off access at the source.
For some, Russia should continue to be the main focus of efforts to prevent and deter terrorists
from acquiring WMD because of Russia’s vast Cold War overhang of WMD technologies,
material, and personnel. Others see September 2001 as a watershed after which cooperation
should be extended to problem states, such as Pakistan, Syria, Libya, and Iran. Still others see
nonproliferation assistance programs as a way to bring states outside the nonproliferation regime,
like North Korea and Pakistan, under some restraints.
The Bush Administration has advocated the use of traditional and new tools to counter WMD
proliferation, including interdiction, preemption, diplomacy, and assistance. In a key
nonproliferation speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush introduced seven new initiatives,
including expanding CTR. In particular, Bush noted that such funds could be used for retraining
weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya or for reducing uranium enrichment levels in foreign
research nuclear reactors.6 (In fact, however, programs to retrain such scientists have used State
Department Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund monies.)
A few underlying issues may influence the ultimate success of CTR-like approaches. One is the
“cooperative” element in the U.S. relationship with the state in question. A state’s willingness to
cooperate may hinge on calculations of the WMD program’s importance to its security and other
geopolitical considerations. A second issue may be that state’s perception of CTR assistance—is
this just another name for arms control, U.S. unilateralism, or bribery? More broadly, there is the
question of whether globalizing CTR may spread resources thinly at a time when there is still
significant work to be done in Russia and the former Soviet states.
Congressional Role
Since 1991, Congress has authorized CTR funds specifically for use in the Soviet Union, and
later, in Russia and former Soviet Union (FSU) states. Before FY2004, agencies used other
sources of funding for nonproliferation assistance programs applied outside of Russia and the
6
At the National Defense University, President Bush unveiled six other initiatives to combat WMD: (1) expand the
Proliferation Security Initiative to include “shutting down facilities, seizing materials, and freezing assets”; (2) pass
U.N. Security Council resolution requiring all states “to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure
all sensitive materials within their borders”; (3) encourage states to renounce uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing by ensuring reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for civilian nuclear reactors and make NSG
enrichment- and reprocessing-related nuclear exports available only to states that already have a fully operational
capability; (4) make signature of the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for any nuclear imports; (5) create a special
committee of the IAEA Board of Governors for safeguards and verification; and (6) disqualify any state currently under
investigation from serving on the IAEA Board. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/200402114.html.
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FSU. In FY2004, the Bush Administration was able to use $50 million of unobligated CTR funds
outside the FSU. The “Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act” was passed as part of the FY2004 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136) to “assist the United States in resolution of critical
emerging proliferation threats and to permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities
to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals.” The final language of the act requires the
President to determine, and notify Congress in writing within 10 days after obligating funds, that
the: (a) project/activity will help the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging
proliferation threat; or permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve
long-standing nonproliferation goals; (b) Department of Defense is the government agency most
capable of carrying out the project/activity; and (c) project/activity will be completed in a short
period of time. Conferees noted that they expected the President to assign projects to the most
appropriate agencies.7
On February 8, 2005, Senator Lugar introduced S. 313, “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperation Threat
Reduction Act of 2005,” which sought to remove restrictions associated with using CTR funds
outside of the FSU. In brief, the legislation would have lifted CTR program-wide restrictions on
spending the money (including certifications), removed the $50-million cap, removed restrictions
on spending money for chemical weapons destruction, and provided “notwithstanding” authority.
The bill was referred to the Armed Services Committee. Of the provisions in S. 313, only the
repeal of certification requirements was adopted as an amendment in the Senate’s FY2007
National Defense Authorization bill (Section 1304, S. 2766). However, this provision was not
incorporated in the bill agreed to in conference on September 20, 2006 (H.R. 5122).
Background
The threat of terrorist access to WMD is a relatively new concern for nonproliferation experts.
First, the nonproliferation regime has always focused on controlling ingredients at the source as
the most effective first line of defense. Such an approach already addresses two kinds of terrorist
threats: that an insider might collaborate to sell or give a terrorist some materials and that
terrorists might seek to steal materials themselves from facilities. Second, the regime has controls
for transfers to anyone (not just states) outside the regime. Third, apart from Aum Shinrikyo’s use
of sarin gas on the Tokyo subway, few non-state actors have conducted or attempted to conduct
an attack with a functional nuclear, chemical or biological weapon. 8
On the other hand, the perception of an increased threat of terrorist use of WMD has grown since
the September 2001 attacks on the United States. There is evidence that Al Qaeda assigned a high
priority to acquiring a WMD capability and some observers believe that chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) capabilities are increasingly available. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
estimated that “the threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) materials remained high” in 2003 [note the use of the word “materials,” not weapons].
The CIA also concluded that “terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven
7
In a separate action, Rep. Schiff introduced H.R. 2063, for the same purpose. Schiff’s bill specifically named
Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq as potential recipients of CTR assistance.
8
Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 1998), p. 30.
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conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings.”9 By February 2006, the Director of
National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress that
Today, we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists using weapons or agents of mass
destruction than states, although terrorists’ capabilities would be much more limited. In fact,
intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist organizations, insurgencies, or cults
have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear agents or weapons. Many are capable of conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such
as poisonings, or using improvised chemical devices.10
However, Negroponte provided no further evidence to support those claims.
The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism
According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, “rogue states” are those that:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the
rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate
international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or
offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the
globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it
stands.11
The CIA has reported a growing concern that traditional state recipients of WMD technology
“may follow North Korea’s practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise
to other countries or non-state actors.”12 When those states are designated state sponsors of
terrorism, there is the possibility they may provide the terrorist organizations that they support
with WMD materials or weapons. While there is very little evidence to support this assumption, it
cannot be ruled out. Because these countries tend to be “pariah” states, however, they may offer
few footholds for cooperation. Nonetheless, some of the new and reinvigorated cooperation in
counterterrorism since 2001 may help spur cooperation in other areas. Equally risky is the
category of states that have terrorist activity on their soil and WMD programs. These pose a
different kind of risk: that terrorists may gain access to WMD without the authority or knowledge
of the host government, either through insider ties or through instability engendered by terrorist
activity.
Table 1, below, cross-references WMD capabilities and terrorist activities. Estimates of WMD
capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA unclassified reports to Congress (per Section 721 of
9
Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 June Through 31 December 2003. Report pursuant to
Section 721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/
721report_july_dec2003.pdf.
10
John D. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/
2006_hr/060202-negroponte.htm.
11
White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.html.
12
CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2002.
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the FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act), “Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions.” For the purposes of analysis, terrorism activity is divided into “state sponsors” of
terrorism (per Section 6j of the Export Administration Act of 1979); and those with activity
(terrorist incidents) on their soil. It could be argued that the list of state sponsors of terrorism
corresponds poorly with the threat because most of the formal state sponsors of terrorism provide
support, or used to provide support, for older groups and not necessarily those that appear to be
most threatening now. However, such a list provides a starting point for analysis.
Table 1. WMD Capabilities and Terrorism
Nuclear
Weapons
Biological
Weapons
Chemical
Weapons
Terrorism
Threat
Algeria
——
Research?
Suspected
Cuba
——
Reported
Egypt
R&D
India
Treaty Adherence
NPT
CWC
BWC
Activity
Y
Y
Y
—
State sponsor
Y
Y
Y
R&D
Likely
Activity
Y
N
Ya
Known
——
Has Had
Activity
N
Y
Y
Indonesia
——
——
Sought
Activity
Y
Y
Y
Iran
Seeking
Likely
Has Had
State sponsor
Y
Y
Y
Iraqa
Ended
Ended
Ended
Ended
Y
N
Y
Israel
Known
Likely R&D
Likely
Activity
N
Ya
N
Kazakhstan
——
——
Suspected
——
Y
Y
N
Libyab
Ended
Declared none
Ended
Ended
Y
Y
Y
Y
Ya
Ya
N
N
Y
Myanmar
——
——
Likely
——
North Korea
Assumed
Likely
Known
State sponsor
Pakistan
Known
——
Likely
Activity
N
Y
Y
Saudi Arabia
——
——
Suspected
Activity
Y
Y
Y
South Africa
Ended
Ended
Suspected
——
Y
Y
Y
South Korea
Ended
——
Suspected
——
Y
Y
Y
Sudan
——
——
Suspected
State sponsor
Y
Y
Y
Syria
——
Seeking
Known
State sponsor
Y
N
Ya
Taiwan
Ended
Suspected
Likely
—
N
N
Y
Thailand
——
——
Suspected
Activity
Y
Y
Y
Vietnam
——
——
Likely
——
Y
Y
Y
Yugoslavia/
Kosovo
——
——
Suspected
Activity
Y
Y
Y
(NPT withdrawal)
Sources: CRS. Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per sec. 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act.)
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Notes:
Y = party to treaty
NPT = Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Y* = signed but not ratified treaty
CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention
N = not party to treaty
BWC=Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
a.
Iraq was removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List on October 20, 2004.
b.
Libya renounced its WMD programs on December 19, 2003 and was removed from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List on June 29, 2006.
State Sponsors of Terrorism
Per Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 (j)), the U.S.
Secretary of State currently designates five countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Iraq was removed from the list on October 20, 2004, and Libya
was removed from the list on June 29, 2006.13
Cuba
Cuba was first designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982. Although it has ratified all 12
counterterrorism conventions, it has remained opposed to the U.S. global war on terrorism.14 The
CIA judged in August 2003 that “We have no credible evidence, however, that the Cuban
government has engaged in or directly supported international terrorist operations in the past
decade, although our information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has
occurred.”15
The Administration’s assertions concerning Cuba’s WMD programs, which some observers
dispute, focus on limited biological weapons research and development. Construction at the
Juragua nuclear facility (two incomplete Russian nuclear power reactors) was indefinitely
postponed in 1997.
Iran
According to the State Department, “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism [in
2005].”16 Although it is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many observers
believe that it has active nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed 18 years worth of undeclared nuclear
activities in Iran.
13
See CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by (name redacted). Presidential
Determination for Libya, No. 2006-14, May 12, 2006. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/
20060515-5.html.
14
See CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
15
CIA’s unclassified responses to Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat Hearing of February 11, 2003,
dated August 18, 2003, p. 145 [hereafter CIA unclassified responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003].
16
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, released April 2006. Available at http://www.mipt.org/
pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2005.pdf.
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Faced with possible referral to the UN Security Council, Iran suspended its enrichment program
and allowed for IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol in October 2003.17 In 2004 Iran
resumed both construction of centrifuge components and conversion activities. The EU-3
(France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) brokered a deal with the Iran to suspend enrichment
activities, but Iran broke the suspension in August 2005 putting an end to negotiations. The IAEA
Board of Governors passed a resolution on September 24, 2005 that found Iran to be in
noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement.18 Iran ended its voluntary adherence to the
Additional Protocol in February 2006, and resumed uranium enrichment research and
development. In March 2006, the UN Security Council passed a Presidential Statement calling on
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, implement the Additional Protocol, and comply with all
other IAEA demands. Iran failed to both meet the Council’s demands and respond in due time to a
proposal offered to it by the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (the
P5+1). The Council subsequently adopted UNSCR 1696 in June 2006. UNSCR 1696, passed
under Article 40 of the UN Charter, gave Iran a new deadline of August 31 to comply with
Security Council requests or face stronger Council action in the form of sanctions under Article
41. To date, Iran has evaded demands that it halt uranium enrichment.
The United States believes that Iran “continues to seek chemicals, production technology,
training, and expertise from abroad...[and that it] has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking
agents,” and aired these concerns at the First Review Conference of the CWC in April 2003.19
Iran, which ratified the CWC in 1997, first admitted it had a past CW program in 1998, but it has
not acknowledged its use of chemical weapons against Iraq. Iran also reportedly provided Libya
with chemical weapons that were later used in Chad.20 The CIA has reported to Congress that Iran
has continued to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese
entities. The CIA also believes that Iran has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents and
probably has nerve agents. In addition, the CIA reported in 2003 that Iran continued to seek dualuse biotechnical material, equipment and expertise, from which its offensive BW program could
have benefitted. 21 The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported in April
2003 that “Iran probably has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a
limited ability to weaponize them.”22 In August 2005, the State Department reported to Congress
that “based on all available information, Iran has an offensive biological weapons program in
violation of the BWC.”23
Libya
Libya was designated a state sponsor of terrorism from 1979 to 2006. Over time, Libya’s
involvement in supporting international terrorism declined as its cooperation in the West
17
Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, but the Majlis (parliament) never ratified it.
September 24, 2005 IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, GOV/2005/77. Available at http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
19
U.S. National Statement, First Review Conference of the CWC; Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Stephen G. Rademaker; April 28, 2003.
20
U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997.
21
CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
18
22
INR’s (Assistant Secretary Carl Ford) unclassified responses to questions submitted for the record from the February
11, 2003 Worldwide Threat Hearing, p. 191, April 30, 2003.
23
U.S. State Department, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments,” June 2005. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm#chapter1.
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increased. Early in 2003, Libya proposed a sequential process by which the families of victims of
the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988 would be compensated, in return for a lifting of U.N. sanctions,
U.S. sanctions, and removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list.
In 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate all elements of chemical and nuclear weapons programs;
eliminate all chemical weapons stocks/munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons
Convention; declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA, accept “international inspections” to
ensure compliance with the NPT and sign the Additional Protocol; eliminate ballistic missiles
with ranges exceeding Missile Technology Control Regime standards (300km; 500kg payload);
and allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify these actions.24 On February 5, 2004,
Libya signed the CWC and destruction of its CW program began on February 27, 2004. On
March 10, 2004, Libya signed the Additional Protocol to its nuclear safeguards agreement, but
removal and destruction of nuclear-related items began in January 2004.
On May 15, 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced that the US was restoring full diplomatic
relations with Libya. This would include, installation of an U.S. embassy in Tripoli, removal of
Libya from the list of designated state sponsors of terrorism, and omission of Libya from the
annual certification of countries not cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism efforts.
“We are taking these actions in recognition of Libya’s continued commitment to its renunciation
of terrorism and the excellent cooperation Libya has provided to the United States and other
members of the international community in response to common global threats faced by the
civilized world since September 11, 2001.”25
North Korea
North Korea was added to the terrorism list on January 20, 1988 and remains on the list although
it is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. According to the State
Department, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in the war on terrorism in
2002. The State Department’s report on terrorism reports that North Korea continued to maintain
ties to terrorist groups in 2005.26 North Korea has become party to 6 of the 12 international
conventions. However, it has sold conventional weapons to several terrorist groups and reportedly
continues to provide safe haven to some terrorists, which is one of the conditions that puts a
country on the list.27
North Korea’s WMD programs are a high priority threat for the Bush Administration. Its nuclear
program and ballistic missile capabilities are well-documented; it has a known chemical weapons
capability and is considered likely to have a BW capability. 28 North Korea withdrew from the
NPT in April 2003 and has been found to have repeatedly violated U.S. missile nonproliferation
laws. Statements from North Korea on its capabilities are a bit misleading: in 2003, North Korea
24
Fact Sheet, “The Presidents’ National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s Announcement,” The White
House, December 19, 2003.
25
Statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, May 15, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2006/66235.htm.
26
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, released April 2006. Available at http://www.mipt.org/
pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2005.pdf.
27
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 81.
28
See CRS Report RS21582, North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options, by (name redacted), and CRS Report
RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by (name redacted).
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repeatedly stated that it has reprocessed all its spent fuel, that it has nuclear weapons, and on one
occasion, North Korean officials threatened to export nuclear weapons.29 In January 2004, North
Korean officials reportedly told an unofficial U.S. delegation that they did not have nuclear
weapons or a uranium enrichment program. 30 There is no public evidence that North Korea has
offered nuclear material for sale, whether produced in the early 1990s or more recently.
On July 5, 2006 North Korea tested 7 ballistic missiles, including an intercontinental missile that
apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after it was launched. On July 15, the UN Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695 demanding that North Korea suspend all related
ballistic missile activity and return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions.31
According to two chemical and biological weapons experts, “North Korea has an estimated
2,500-5,000 tons of blister and nerve agents, much of which is weaponized in artillery shells and
rockets within firing range of Seoul.”32
Sudan
Sudan has ratified all twelve international counterterrorism conventions and publicly foresworn
support for terrorism. In 2001 the United Nations lifted its sanctions in recognition of Sudan’s
positive steps against terrorism. In addition, Ambassador Black, the State Department’s
counterterrorism coordinator, underscored Sudan’s cooperation in 2003, which included improved
access to individuals of interest, financial institutions, and records. Nonetheless, the CIA
estimated in 2003 that al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, PIJ,
and Hamas continued to operate in Sudan.33 The FBI reportedly believes that Sudan is a
“permissive environment and a transit point for Islamic extremists who engage in recruiting,
training, fund-raising, and logistical support for terrorist activity worldwide.”34 According to the
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report, Sudan has “deepened its cooperation with the U.S.
government” to apprehend terrorists, but some concerns remain.
Sudan is suspected of having a chemical weapons program, despite being a party to the CWC.
The most recent CIA assessment states that “although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the
US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from
abroad.”35 Sudan is not thought to have nuclear or biological weapons programs.
Syria
According to the Patterns in Global Terrorism 2003 report, despite some cooperation on al Qaeda
and the Taliban, Syria continues to provide political and material support to “Palestinian
rejectionist groups,” including Hezballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. While in
29
30
CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
“North Korea Denies It Has a Warhead,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2004.
31
Security Council Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/
sc8778.doc.htm.
32
“A long way to go in eliminating chemical weapons,” Boston Globe, 5/1/2006.
33
CIA unclassified responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003. p. 138.
34
FBI’s unclassified responses to Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat Hearing of February 11, 2003,
p. 237.
35
CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
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Damascus in May 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Syria to withdraw support from
terrorist organizations, and Syria announced that Hamas, PIJ the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine—General Command, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had
“voluntarily” closed their offices there. On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed into law
P.L. 108-175, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which would
impose sanctions on Syria until it ceases support for terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ends WMD development, and ceases facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq. On May 11,
2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, which implemented sanctions, including a
ban on munitions and dual-use items, as well as a ban on exports other than food and medicine
and Syrian aircraft flights to or overflights of the United States.36 In 2006 Congress amended the
Iran Nonproliferation Act to include Syria (P.L. 109-112).
With respect to WMD, Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be seeking biological
weapons. According to one press account, “It is the worst kept secret in the Middle East that
Damascus has one of the largest stockpiles of chemical agents in the region.”37 Syria is not a
party to the CWC, and has signed but not ratified the BWC. Syria also has an arsenal of shortand medium-range ballistic missiles. It is a party to the NPT and, despite having signed nuclear
cooperation agreements with Russia in 1998 and 2000, few believe it has serious nuclear weapons
aspirations.
States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs
In addition to the state sponsors of terrorism that have WMD programs, there are other states with
WMD programs that have terrorist activity on their soil. Pakistan, India, and Israel fit in this
category. The fact that none is a member of the NPT could limit cooperation in the nuclear area.
All are members of the CWC, but many observers believe Israel and Pakistan have covert CW
programs. India declared its CW program in 1997, after initial declarations that it had no CW.
India has already destroyed 46% of its Category 1 CW stockpile and all of its Category 2
weapons; it must destroy the rest by 2007. Pakistan and India are members of the BWC and are
not thought to have BW programs; Israel has not joined the BWC and many believe that it has
carried out BW research and development.
In addition to those three, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are likely concerns for CW programs
and potential terrorist access; of those three, only Egypt is not a party to the CWC. Egypt is also a
concern because it is known to have a BW program; it has signed but not ratified the BWC. The
Defense Intelligence Agency reported in April 2003 that “we do not believe that Saudi Arabia is
trying to acquire biological or chemical agents or weapons from foreign sources.”38 In January
2005, the IAEA investigated reports that Egypt had conducted some nuclear reprocessing at a
laboratory-scale level, but did not conclude that Egypt violated its safeguards agreement. 39
36
See CRS Report RL32727, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After the Iraq War, by
(name redacted) and (name redacted).
37
“We Won’t Scrap WMD Stockpile Unless Israel Does, Says Assad,” London Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2004.
38
Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) unclassified responses to questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat
Hearing of February 11, 2003, dated June 30 2003, p. 223.
39
Report by IAEA Director General (GOV/2005/2).
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How Significant Is the Nexus?
Two factors should be considered in assessing the severity of a threat of terrorist access to WMD:
intention and opportunities. First, terrorists operating in certain countries that have WMD
programs do not necessarily have an interest in acquiring WMD. Most of the terrorist groups with
an interest in WMD tend to be more internationally rather than domestically focused. 40 To date,
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Aum Shinrikyo have demonstrated
interest in developing weapons of mass destruction. Although the following countries have
terrorist activities on their soil, terrorists active on their soil have not demonstrated WMD
intentions: Algeria, India, Thailand, and Yugoslavia/Kosovo.
Second, the states in question present different opportunities for terrorists to gain access. In some
cases, facilities may be remotely located, with good surveillance capabilities and good security. In
addition, some facilities may be under military control. The level of security in a country like
North Korea or Israel may be much higher than, for example, in Algeria or Egypt. Even in a
country like Russia, which many observers believe presents significant opportunities for stealing
nuclear material, the ability of terrorists to acquire material is not a given. The CIA has judged
that none of the sixteen seizures of Russian weapons-usable nuclear material since 1992 was
connected to terrorists.41 On the other hand, the inability of a state to control either its people or
its territory (which may or may not be defined as a “failed” state) may present opportunities for
terrorists to move freely within a country and take advantage of available resources.
The dual-use nature of many materials and technologies associated with WMD may present
terrorists with the ability to enhance their WMD capabilities in countries that do not have an
obvious WMD program. In the case of nuclear programs, for example, South Africa could be an
attractive target for terrorists because it had a nuclear weapons program and has HEU in metal
form under IAEA safeguards. Of course, this attractiveness could be mitigated by good security
and low terrorist activity on South African soil. It appears that the Bush Administration has taken
the position that weapons-usable material, even if it is under IAEA safeguards, may not be secure
enough.42 One of the seven initiatives highlighted in President Bush’s speech on nonproliferation
on February 11, 2004 was spending more money to bring back HEU from foreign countries and
in May 2004, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, which consolidates and accelerates several existing programs to reduce this threat.
In large part, revelations about Iran’s nuclear program and the role of Pakistan in supplying
uranium enrichment equipment and technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea has revived a
decades-old debate about whether or not certain processes and materials should be controlled
internationally or banned altogether. Not since the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s has
international storage of plutonium, or enriched uranium, or international control of enrichment
and reprocessing facilities been in vogue. However, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei, suggested just such an approach in 2003 and convened an experts group to
study options for multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle. 43 The basic objective of these
options would be to restrict sensitive technology in the hands of a few states, while providing
40
This report does not cover domestic U.S. groups that have attempted to acquire WMD-related capabilities, because of
the focus on providing assistance to foreign countries on terrorism and counterproliferation.
41
CIA unclassified responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003, p. 152.
42
State Department interview.
43
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, October 18-24, 2003.
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assured fuel supplies for nuclear reactors to other states. In 2004, President Bush proposed that
enrichment and reprocessing technology should not be spread any further than it already is, and
that export controls (national and multilateral agreements) should be tightened to eliminate this
possibility.44 The G-8 adopted voluntary moratoriums on such transfers in 2004. In 2006, the
Bush Administration proposed a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions
cooperation in developing a proliferation-resistant new kind of spent fuel reprocessing. Such new
technology, according to some observers, may not be ready for decades.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent
For over a decade, U.S. government agencies (particularly the Departments of Energy and State)
have spent nonproliferation assistance funds in countries outside of the former Soviet Union
(FSU). Given the relatively new ability to expend DOD’s CTR funds outside of the FSU,
however, it may be useful to examine the CTR program for precedents, including the origin of the
program, its objectives, kinds of work funded, and problems encountered.
Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991,
addressing, in Senator Lugar’s words, “the dominant international proliferation danger: the
massive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union.”45
As the Soviet Union began to dissolve, Russia could not meet its obligations to reduce strategic
nuclear weapons under the START treaty. Further, it became clear that the unraveling of the
military industrial complex could have security consequences that transcended the former Soviet
Union’s borders. The initial legislation allowed the Department of Defense to use unobligated
funds to destroy and dismantle strategic nuclear weapons, make transportation and storage of
weapons no longer in the stockpile secure, and convert former WMD facilities and scientists.
The CTR program had four key objectives:
•
Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
•
Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their
destruction;
•
Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their
components, and weapons-usable materials; and
•
Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weapons
programs in other nations.
Destruction and dismantlement activities included removing warheads, deactivating missiles and
eliminating launch facilities for strategic weapons under the START I agreement. Efforts to
improve the safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials have included
providing storage containers, bullet-proof blankets, secure rail cars, and building a plutonium
storage facility at Mayak. Demilitarization projects have included defense conversion projects
44
See http://www.whitehouse.gov for text of speech.
45
CTR was an amendment to the implementing legislation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (P.L.
102-228), sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar, in the form of the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.”
For more information, see “The Lugar Doctrine,” http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.html.
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and International Science and Technology Center projects to help WMD scientists pursue work
with peaceful objectives and military-to-military contacts.
CTR programs have evolved and expanded over time, adjusting to Russian, FSU states, and U.S.
priorities, as well as to changing perceptions about which threats posed the greatest risk. The
programs have also bowed upon occasion to bureaucratic intransigence and practical
considerations. In one notable incident, Department of Energy officials provided blankets to
facility guards who were leaving their posts to collect wood to build fires. As the economy
worsened in Russia in the mid-1990s, CTR projects sought to provide alternative employment
and sources of income for unpaid or out-of-work WMD scientists. Increased reports of attempts
to steal nuclear material highlighted the need for CTR to address material protection, control and
accounting (MPCA) measures for nuclear material, consolidation of nuclear weapons and
material, and secure transportation. The United States developed a practical approach: “quickfixes,” like bars on windows, blast-proof doors, fences, followed by a second stage that included
more sophisticated security measures like sensors, cameras, and personnel access measures.46
The idea that two former adversaries could cooperate on such sensitive matters as nuclear
weapons and material security was radical in 1991, but so too was the prospect of Russia’s WMD
infrastructure unraveling. The circumstances surrounding CTR’s inception were unique: there
was previous agreement under the START treaty to destroy nuclear weapons, agreement on both
sides that those legitimate weapons needed to be secured before they were destroyed, and absence
of international inspections because of Russia’s status as a nuclear weapons state. Russia had
already agreed to destroy weapons—the only questions were how to implement those reductions
quickly and who would pay for them. That Soviet nuclear weapons had been targeted at the
United States for so many years presented a compelling reason for the United States to help. The
same situation arose years later when Russia signed the CWC and CTR funds were used to help
destroy those weapons. An issue that could arise in the context of expanding CTR’s scope is
whether states with stocks of chemical weapons that are bound to destroy them by 2007 under the
CWC (India and one anonymous state) will see this as an opportunity to have their obligations
paid for by the United States.
Kinds of Assistance
CTR assistance to states outside the FSU might use four types of programs: those that help secure
weapons, sites, materials, and personnel. These correspond roughly to the CTR missions of
weapons destruction, ensuring transportation safety, verifiably safeguarding against proliferation,
and preventing diversion of scientific expertise. A few differences stand out from the Soviet case:
1) not all of the countries of concern here have actual weapons; 2) some that do have weapons
programs belong to treaties that they may be currently violating; and 3) others that have weapons
programs have no international restrictions on them and may not have any interest in giving up
their weapons. These differences will affect the kinds of assistance the United States might want
to provide to those countries and possibly also the kinds of assistance it can legally provide.
46
See remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, former Deputy UnderSecretary for Defense and Nonproliferation in the
Department of Energy, in a transcript of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nonproliferation Roundtable,
held on September 23, 2001, entitled “Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma,” http://www.ceip.org/files/events/
Paktranscript.asp.
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Weapons Security
U.S. assistance to most states is unlikely to emphasize weapons security as it did with Russia and
the FSU, primarily because potential recipient states will not be as highly armed as Russia. In the
nuclear area, measures to improve the chain of command and custody and secure transportation
for nuclear warheads would likely be highly controversial if extended to a state outside the NPT.
Nonetheless, some observers have advocated assistance to improve nuclear weapons security with
the objective of ensuring that weapons could not be stolen or detonated by an unauthorized
person. The simplest measures would be funding and training armed guards. However, potential
recipient states are likely already aware of the advantages of protecting their nuclear weapons.
Advice or equipment to ensure no unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, such as permissive
action links (PALs), would require access to nuclear weapons, which is unlikely to be granted.
General information on PALs, such as concepts or approaches, is publicly available and would
not require access to weapons. In all likelihood, however, India, Pakistan, and Israel probably
have exhausted public sources of information on that topic, but North Korea may not have.
Measures to ensure that command and control systems work would also help ensure no
unauthorized use, but could possibly enhance operational capabilities and therefore may be
undesirable.
Assistance in destroying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads is a different matter. It is
assumed that the priority for BW and CW would be destruction, because the respective treaties
unequivocally ban those weapons. Temporary security (weeks or months, or perhaps years in the
chemical weapons case) of biological and chemical weapons security might be appropriate prior
to destruction. In the case of chemical weapons, a non-state party to the CWC presumably could
adhere to the guidelines set out under the CWC for destruction, or join the convention, as Libya
has decided to do.
Site Security
The CTR programs developed for Russia vary in their goals for site security across the WMD
spectrum. For nuclear sites, security measures focused on helping guard against the theft of
weapons or materials by insiders or outsiders. Site security with respect to chemical weapons has
focused primarily on destruction of weapons capabilities. Finally, site security for biological
weapons has focused on dismantlement, safety, and security at facilities for biological pathogens.
Measures include perimeter security, such as gates and other barriers like barbed wire and
personnel identification systems, which can help minimize the risk of unauthorized entry. Sensors
to detect unauthorized actions (movement, tampering) can help against both insider and outsider
threats. Measures to protect against inside theft include checks on personnel leaving facilities
(typically onerous without technical detection measures for material or components), cameras in
sensitive areas, and accounting and access procedures. Armed guards could help, as would
operational and administrative controls.
In Russia, U.S. officials toured sites and conducted vulnerability assessments. In other cases, even
perimeter visits could be viewed as too sensitive. However, the United States could offer
information or briefings on how security is conducted at sensitive facilities in the United States.
Such information would need to be presented in general terms, not specific to particular facilities,
to protect U.S. national security. Ideally, assistance could cover types of requirements for
personnel vetting and training and development of a security culture. Assistance of this kind in
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the nuclear area is beginning to be provided under IAEA auspices to India and Pakistan. If the
United States wanted to install cameras or sensors at sensitive facilities, licenses might be
required for some of them, given restrictions on materials going to sensitive sites (particularly if
the state has a history of proliferation). It is more likely, however, that potential recipients would
use commercially available security systems, installing them themselves.
Material Security
In the biological area, there are no international standards for pathogen security. While rejecting
the Protocol developed by BWC states, the United States proposed that national authorities
develop such measures.47 Nonetheless, the United States is just beginning to implement such
measures in this country.48 Moreover, even under the rubric of CTR, the United States has not
been successful in implementing measures within Russian facilities to guard against the insider
threat of theft of pathogens. 49 As many observers have noted, the sample size of biological agents
is so small that it would be quite difficult to provide 100% assurance of no material losses. Ken
Alibek, who defected from the Soviet BW program in 1992, has noted that some Russian BW
labs required laboratory personnel to strip all their clothes off before leaving the working zones of
the building, but even this did not prevent a few from attempting to smuggle out samples.50
Under the CWC, state parties are required to secure CW stocks and agents, and account for
quantities of specified chemicals. Most of the verification measures, however, pertain to
destroying CW, including continuous monitoring and seals. There is a material accounting system
requiring annual reports on destruction, transfer, and use of controlled chemicals. Further,
declared sites are subject to challenge inspections.
In the nuclear area, measures to enhance material security in Russia and other FSU ranged from
removing material (like highly enriched uranium, HEU, in Kazakhstan and Georgia), blending
HEU down into low-enriched uranium so that it would not be usable in a weapon, to permanent
storage of plutonium, and finally, to better material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A)
measures. Where nuclear material is no longer intended for use, it can be secured at a storage site
with tamper-proof seals, cameras, and other monitoring techniques. When it is intended for
legitimate industrial or research processes, a system of accounting and control that can follow
material flows is used. International nuclear safeguards rely heavily on state systems of
accounting and control (SSACs) in measuring physical inventories of materials. Some technical
exchanges in these areas may be possible. Some new techniques for securing material in place
could be shared (one innovative approach used in Russia was placing heavy cement blocks over
plutonium containers). The IAEA and Sandia National Laboratory conduct programs on physical
protection of nuclear material. It is also possible to provide equipment for physical protection
(cameras, seals, locks, or barriers) under license.
47
Statement by President George W. Bush, November 1, 2001. He proposed that all BWC parties “establish sound
national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic engineering of pathogenic organisms.”
48
Remarks of Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2002, referring to the USA Patriot Act
(2001) and the Public Health Security and Bio-terrorist Preparedness and Response Act (2002).
49
U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GA0-03-482, March 2003.
50
Talk before congressional staff by Ken Alibek.
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Personnel Security
In the case of the Soviet Union, chaos and poverty combined to create incentives for Soviet
scientists to proliferate WMD technology. The U.S. approach generally has been to encourage
them to stay in their own country and redirect their work in non-weapons-related areas. U.S.
programs have provided financial support through research grants to individual scientists or
through the international science centers.51 Yet, programs also need ultimately to provide secure
jobs, interesting work, and an awareness of or commitment to nonproliferation. Programs could
also establish a database of relevant scientists in certain states, either to target funding or to track
their activities.
Tailoring Assistance to Countries
There is currently no coordinated plan for prioritizing expanded CTR assistance. Table 2, below,
summarizes potential assistance to critical states in the nexus of WMD and terrorism, divided into
three tiers. The first tier includes the two “axis of evil” states (North Korea and Iran); the second
includes other state sponsors of terrorism (Cuba, Sudan, and Syria); and the third includes states
with WMD programs and terrorist activity on their soil.
Table 2. Priorities for Assistance to States within Terrorism-WMD Nexus
TIER I
TIER II
TIER III
Weapons
Security
Site Security
Material
Security
Personnel
Security
Terrorism
Threat
North
Korea
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
?
State sponsor
Iran
Chem Bio?
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
?
State sponsor
Cuba
None
Bio?
Bio?
Less Urgent
State sponsor
Sudan
Chem?
Chem?
Chem?
Less Urgent
State sponsor
Syria
Chem Bio?
Chem Bio?
Chem? Bio?
?
State sponsor
Pakistan
Nuclear Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
Urgent
Activity
India
Nuclear Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
?
Activity
Israel
Nuclear Chem
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
Nuclear Chem
Bio?
?
Activity
Algeria
Chem?
Chem? Bio?
Chem? Bio?
Egypt
Chem?
Chem? Bio?
Chem? Bio?
?
Activity
Saudi
Arabia
Chem?
Chem?
Chem?
?
Activity
Activity
51
These include the State Department’s Bioredirect Program, and DOE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the Initiative for
Proliferation Prevention.
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Sources: CRS. Estimates of WMD capabilities are based on semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
(per sec. 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act.)
Note on Personnel: The gradation from urgent, to less urgent, to questionable (?) is based on a loose
assessment of indigenous scientific and engineering capabilities. More urgency is accorded to states with a known
indigenous S&T base and less urgency to states with little or no indigenous capabilities.
Tier I: North Korea and Iran
For North Korea and Iran, there may be equal emphasis placed on all four kinds of assistance.
Certainly in the case of North Korea there is a requirement to secure weapons (if not actual
nuclear weapons, then certainly chemical and biological weapons), sites, material, and personnel.
Many observers believe that the threat posed by North Korea with respect to terrorists and WMD
is that the regime itself would sell excess nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched
uranium). Given the extreme isolation of the country, the potential for scientists “freelancing”
their WMD wares is probably low. However, North Korea might pose a similar problem as did
Russia and the FSU in the 1990s because it does not have an existing market economy. Therefore,
interim measures might be needed to sustain former WMD workers on a broad scale. Much
would depend on the scope of change that would allow cooperative threat reduction measures to
be implemented. For example, one could imagine vastly different programs depending on
whether or not North Korea completely dismantled its WMD programs, whether there was a
change in government, and/or whether reunification with South Korea was imminent.
Table 3. Assistance to Tier I States
Tier I
Weapons
Security
Site
Security
Material
Security
Personnel
Security
North
Korea
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
?
No inspections now under BWC, only treaty
which NK belongs to. Threat from personnel
unlikely now, given extreme isolation of
regime, but measures should be considered if
regime gives up WMD.
Iran
Chem Bio?
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
?
Iran has undergone enhanced inspections
under Additional Protocol to NPT. Challenge
inspections under CWC?
Notes
Sources: CRS. Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per sec. 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act).
Iran poses very different issues. It appears fairly evident that although Iran had made great strides
toward putting in place the technical capabilities to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon,
it is unlikely so far that there are actual nuclear weapons to secure. There is limited experience in
applying enhanced inspections under interim application of Iran’s Additional Protocol, from
December 2003 to January 2006. Should Iran become a candidate for CTR-like assistance,
ratification of its Additional Protocol would be necessary. IAEA inspections can also provide
feedback on nuclear personnel issues, as inspectors develop relationships with scientific
personnel. Iran is known to have chemical weapons and thought likely to have biological
weapons. In this context, measures to secure such weapons, their sites, and materials could be
useful, if political agreement could be reached on their eradication. As a member of the CWC,
however, declaring and inspecting weapons before their destruction would be required.
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Iraq is no longer covered in this report as a Tier I state because it was removed from the state
sponsors of terrorism list in October 2004. However, the United States budgeted $900 million to
the Iraq Survey Group (in FY2003 and FY2004 supplemental requests) to find and destroy
weapons of mass destruction. Although no actual weapons were uncovered, sites and material
were secured, and a program was established to retrain Iraqi WMD scientists, beginning with a
$2M effort by the State Department to provide alternative employment.
Tier II: Cuba, Sudan, and Syria
Cuba, Sudan, and Syria comprise the second tier of state sponsors of terrorism with WMD
capabilities.52 Of these four, Cuba and Sudan may pose less serious WMD threats. Concerns over
Syria’s WMD focus largely on chemical weapons. Table 4, below, breaks out these capabilities
and potential areas of assistance.
Table 4. Assistance to Tier II States
Tier II
Weapons
Security
Site
Security
Material
Security
Personnel
Security
Notes
Cuba
None
Bio?
Bio?
Less Urgent
Intelligence mixed on Cuba’s bio program.
Sudan
None
Chem?
Chem?
Less Urgent
Chemical weapons aspirations are
suspected, even though a signatory to
CWC. Challenge inspections?
Syria
Chem Bio?
Chem Bio?
Chem Bio?
?
Strong capabilities in chemical weapons; less
certain about bio. Repressive regime may
make “freelancing” difficult for scientists
Sources: CRS. Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per sec. 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act).
The WMD threat from Cuba focuses mostly on dual-use biotechnology capabilities. Although
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation John Bolton has highlighted
Cuba’s BW capability, some intelligence estimates have cast doubt on both Cuba’s intentions and
capabilities in that area. In short, the intelligence is mixed here. If such a capability were put up
for negotiation with the United States, measures would likely focus on site and material security.
Sudan has featured less prominently in Bush Administration descriptions of the threat of terrorism
and WMD, and has been lauded for its counterterrorism cooperation. As noted earlier, the most
recent CIA unclassified assessment states that “although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the
US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from
abroad.”53 Any assistance would likely focus on site and material security; with few indigenous
capabilities, personnel security is less likely to be an urgent issue.
Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be seeking biological weapons. Should it agree
to give up its chemical weapons, assistance could run the gamut from weapons to personnel
security. It is not known to what extent Syrian scientists may have cooperated (with or without
52
53
Libya, before June 2006, was designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism and had previously been included in this tier.
CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
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government approval) with other states or possibly terrorist organizations. As in other cases of
repressive regimes, however, it is possible that “freelancing” opportunities for scientists may
have, until now, been quite limited. In the biological area, assistance could focus on site and
material security.
Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities on
their Soil
Table 5, below, summarizes kinds of assistance that might be critical to states with WMD
capabilities and terrorist activities on their soil, but which are not state sponsors of terrorism.
Table 5. Assistance to Tier III States
Tier III
Weapons
Security
Site
Security
Material
Security
Personnel
Security
Notes
Pakistan
Nuclear
Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
Urgent
Nuclear weapons, site, material & personnel
security; perhaps most urgent proliferation
problem today. Political instability adds to
threat. Although a member of CWC,
suspected CW capability.
India
Nuclear
Nuclear
Chem?
Nuclear
Chem?
?
Like Pakistan, also not a member of the NPT.
Generally less concern than in the case of
Pakistan about terrorist access to nuclear
capabilities. CW destruction ongoing as
declared under CWC.
Israel
Nuclear
Chem
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
Nuclear
Chem Bio?
?
Presumed tight security on nuclear weapons.
CW unknown but thought likely. Bio in R&D
stage?
Algeria
Chem?
Chem?
Bio?
Chem?
Bio?
?
Suspected CW capability; Bio R&D.
Egypt
Chem?
Chem?
Bio?
Chem?
Bio?
?
Likely CW capability; reported BW research.
Saudi
Arabia
Chem?
Chem?
Chem?
?
Suspected CW capability, despite CWC
membership.
Sources: CRS. Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions (per sec. 721 of FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act.)
In Pakistan, repeated assassination attempts on President Musharraf, allegations and admissions
of nuclear assistance to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and a continuous battle with terrorist
elements within the country, have made Pakistan the most crucial node of the nexus of terrorism
and WMD proliferation. In addition, a combination of doctrinal preference (for first use of
nuclear weapons) and conventional force inferiority has given Pakistan strong incentives to
forward-deploy its nuclear forces, leading many observers to conclude that assistance to secure
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could be critical. 54 With respect to the known nuclear program and
54
See CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan, for a discussion of the pros
and cons of such assistance.
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chemical weapons, assistance could run the range of options, from weapons to personnel security.
Recent revelations about Pakistani assistance to the Iranian nuclear program also have heightened
longstanding concerns regarding proliferation by prominent scientists, with or without Pakistani
government approval. Nonetheless, Pakistani officials’ repeated statements to the press about the
security of their arsenal appear to reflect a “hands-off” attitude, implying that Pakistan is quite
able to protect and secure its own weapons.55 More importantly, however, the sensitivity
surrounding nuclear weapons in the past has been such that even between the closest of allies—
for example, the United States and the United Kingdom—proposals to share permissive action
links (PALs, which only allow authorized parties to arm the warhead) reportedly were met with
disinterest.56
The proliferation potential of the Indian nuclear program appears to be less severe than it is for
Pakistan. However, multiple Indian suppliers have been sanctioned by the Bush Administration
for supplying chemical weapons precursors to countries such as Iraq and Iran.57 India is currently
destroying its chemical weapons under the CWC, but some assistance could possibly help speed
that process. In both the case of India and Pakistan, assistance in the nuclear area is likely to be
severely curtailed by their non-NPT status (see discussion on constraints). Nonetheless, on
January 12, 2004, President Bush announced a new strategic partnership with India that would
focus on three areas of cooperation: civilian nuclear technology, space technology and hightechnology trade.58 U.S. officials reportedly stated that any space technology must not be used in
India’s ballistic missile program and civilian nuclear technology must not be used in India’s
nuclear weapons program. 59
Israel fits into a similar category as India and Pakistan, but there are several key differences.
Israel has adhered to a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear weapons capabilities (which likely
would limit its receptivity to assistance) and has not been subject to U.S.-proliferation-related
sanctions. Israel has not ever been named as a proliferator by U.S. government sources and few
have expressed concerns about the safety or security of its WMD arsenals. Some assistance in
securing its nuclear program would likely be curtailed, as in the case of India and Pakistan, by
international and U.S. laws prohibiting assistance to states outside the NPT. Assistance in the CW
and BW areas could probably focus on site, material, and personnel security.
Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all have significant problems with terrorism on their soil and all
three are suspected of having chemical weapons capabilities. Algeria and Egypt additionally are
thought to have conducted BW research. Algerian and Saudi CW capabilities could be handled by
the OPCW (Secretariat for the CWC), but Egypt is not a member of the CWC.
55
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued the following statement: “Our nuclear assets are 100% secure, under multiple
custody.” Kyoto News Service, October 2, 2001.
56
Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links,
Center for Science and International Affairs, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 2, Harvard University, 1987, p. 86. Stein and
Feaver wrote that the United States attempted to describe PAL technology to the British, who did not show much
interest.
57
See http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15231.htm.
58
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html for press release.
59
“U.S. to Send India Nuclear, Space Technology,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004. See CRS Report RL33016,
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, for a description of the status of US-India nuclear
cooperation and issues for Congress.
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Constraints on Assistance
There may be political, technical, and legal constraints on U.S. assistance to some of the states
mentioned above. Above all, these countries have to be willing to negotiate with the United States
on reducing the WMD threat. In the best possible world, that would mean abandoning their WMD
programs (like Libya has done); less desirable would be for them to curtail such programs. And in
some cases, it may even be difficult for countries to admit they have such programs. States would
need to calculate the value of such WMD programs to the state’s national security, prestige, and
regional stature, the potential benefits for abandoning such programs, and the likelihood of
punitive actions by the United States (and/or the world community) if it does not abandon such
programs. Such political constraints may pose the most formidable hurdles to U.S. assistance.
Technical hurdles are clearly secondary constraints, but they can lead to questions about the
effectiveness of verifying threat reduction programs. CTR programs in the former Soviet Union,
despite political willingness to participate in the CTR program, have been dogged for years by
questions about their effectiveness for both political and technical reasons. Technical constraints
stem primarily from incomplete knowledge of a country’s WMD program, which makes it
difficult to scope and prioritize the proliferation problems. Lastly, there may be legal hurdles in
providing assistance, both because of U.S. treaty obligations and domestic laws prohibiting
assistance to proliferators and state sponsors of terrorism.
Political Constraints
In some cases, no amount of pressure from the United States is likely to convince some states to
give up certain WMD programs—for example, the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, and
Israel. These states perceive nuclear weapons as crucial to balancing regional security, and
ultimately, to their own survival. Barring a change in the regional balance of power that would
make nuclear weapons unnecessary, there likely will be strong resistance to efforts to increase
transparency of those weapons programs. And, in fact, transparency may not always improve
stability in some regions, nor may it be perceived to help a country’s national security. One could
argue that in the case of North Korea, ambiguity has served its national security better than the
relative transparency of the Agreed Framework years. In the Middle East, countries such as Israel,
Iraq, and Iran have relied on ambiguity or outright deception to mask their WMD programs. In
the case of Pakistan, which has taken fewer pains to hide its nuclear program, its history of
clandestine foreign procurement and sales of sensitive technologies could make greater
transparency politically painful. In short, a culture of secrecy, which was not easily overcome in
the case of Russia, may be as difficult, if not more difficult, to overcome in the case of other
states. On the other hand, professional pride on the scientific or military levels may provide for
some cooperation.
Other countries may perceive direct and indirect benefits to foreswearing WMD programs. Such
countries are unlikely to be lured merely by the promise of nonproliferation assistance, but
adhering to the nonproliferation regime may bring greater political acceptance, more technical
assistance in other areas, and the lifting of sanctions. Many observers believe that Libya was
largely motivated to foreswear its WMD programs because it was one of the last major
concessions required before lifting U.S. sanctions. In addition, however, Libyan leaders may have
perceived their WMD programs as no longer vital to Libya’s national security, regional stature, or
prestige. Some might argue that Libya gave up its WMD precisely because they were not very
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successful programs. This is exactly the kind of cost-benefit analysis U.S. nonproliferation efforts
seek to promote.
Assuming, whether coerced or persuaded, a country has ended its WMD programs, some
constraints may still arise. In the case of Iraq, the U.S. search for WMD-related items and to
provide for site, material, and personnel security, has been hampered by the chaos caused by the
war and a decade of deception. For example, there is a significant gap in information about midlevel Iraqi WMD scientists, which complicates decisions about who should receive assistance. In
general, incomplete knowledge of a country’s WMD program can complicate provision of
assistance. In the case of Russia, political willingness to accept assistance did not extend to all
areas of Russia’s WMD programs. For example, U.S. officials have never gained access to the
four military facilities associated with Russia’s biological weapons program. With respect to
nuclear material protection, control, and accounting programs, most of the material, according to
one report, remains outside of the program because the United States cannot gain access to
sensitive facilities.60 It is not difficult to imagine that the same levels of secrecy encountered in
the case of Russia might be encountered in other states. It is possible that more secrecy may be
attached to biological and nuclear weapons programs than for chemical weapons programs. In
addition, it may be possible to know about some kinds of sites (dual-use facilities like chemical
production sites, uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing) but not others—for example,
weapons machining or assembly sites.
If a country has made a decision to end one but perhaps not other WMD programs (e.g., Pakistan
decides to give up chemical weapons but not nuclear weapons), the need to preserve secrecy
about the other WMD program(s) may limit transparency. If a country accepts some assistance for
an ongoing WMD program (e.g., Pakistan accepts security assistance for its nuclear warheads but
does not give them up), providing such assistance could raise the question of whether the United
States tacitly accepts that WMD program. In fact, some kinds of assistance (like permissive
action links to make nuclear weapons safe from unauthorized use) could be viewed as actively
helping a WMD program and would likely be prohibited by U.S. and international laws (see
Legal Constraints discussion below).
The existing level of cooperation between the United States and some of these countries will
likely affect some aspects of assistance. A country that has not been cooperating with the United
States on counterterrorism may be less likely to cooperate on nonproliferation. On the other hand,
a country like Pakistan, which has been cooperating closely with the United States in the war on
terrorism, may be given a “free ride” on proliferation, for fear of eroding antiterrorism
cooperation and jeopardizing delicate political balances in the region.
Technical Constraints
There are two basic technical constraints in providing assistance: getting accurate information and
being able to verify it and ensuring that assistance does not aid or benefit a WMD capability that
will continue to exist.
Information about weapons of mass destruction programs is closely held even in the most open of
societies. While U.S. intelligence assets can pick up remarkable details about WMD programs,
60
U.S. General Accounting Office, WMD: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet Union: An Update,
GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995.
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the recent U.S. government assessments of WMD capabilities in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and
Libya point strikingly to the fact that what we know is just a small fraction of the entire picture.
Even for advanced WMD programs that have existed for years, details are few. For example, a
senior Bush administration official described on Pakistan’s nuclear program, saying “It’s what we
don’t know that worries us, including the critical question of how much fissile material Pakistan
now holds—and where it holds it.”61 More recently the Washington Post reported that Pakistan
was building a new plutonium production reactor, sparking a debate about how much U.S.
officials really knew about the reactor.62
Although the United States is certain that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program, it has
only been able to narrow down the location of an enrichment plant to three sites. For chemical
and biological weapons programs, which rely on extensive dual-use materials and facilities, there
may be even fewer details on which to base assessments. Information from the defector Ken
Alibek revealed a far more extensive Soviet BW program than previously thought and even
though the U.S. CTR program has elements for BW site, material, and personnel security, there
are few who would agree that we know the full extent of the program even today.
In general, it may be possible to know more about material production sites than about weapons
production/assembly or weapons storage sites. Without knowledge of where vulnerabilities lie, it
will be difficult to target even the most rudimentary assistance. In the case of Russia and the NIS,
U.S. government officials have complained for years that Russia has not provided the kinds of
access necessary for the United States to ensure that its goals are being met. With respect to the
material protection, control and accounting programs, most of the material, according to one
report, remains outside of the program because the United States cannot gain access to sensitive
facilities.63
A second technical hurdle is ensuring that U.S. assistance does not improve WMD capabilities.
Some kinds of assistance do not run this risk—for example, providing physical security barriers
for facilities or improving personnel reliability testing. Improving weapon transportation and
storage security, however, might run such a risk. Some innovations may have unintended
consequences. For example, permissive action links, which were developed by the United States
in the 1960s, were designed so that unauthorized users would not be able to produce a nuclear
yield from the weapon. At the same time, however, it was recognized that weapons with PALs on
them are more deployable. Such devices, if given to India and Pakistan in the name of decreasing
the possibility that such weapons could be stolen and used, could also increase those weapons’
operational readiness.
Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations
Treaty obligations may play a role in limiting assistance, both from the perspective of U.S.
obligations and for the states in question. The relevant treaties are the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC). The United States is a party to all three treaties. Each of these treaties
61
“A Nuclear Headache: What if the Radicals Oust Musharraf?” New York Times, December 30, 2003.
“Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, July 24, 2006.
63
U.S. General Accounting Office, WMD: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet Union: An Update.
GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995.
62
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contains language that generally prohibits transferring such weapons, assisting, encouraging or
inducing any other state (under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states) to manufacture or acquire
weapons. (For the text of the relevant language in each treaty, see Appendix A.) In addition, the
United States is prohibited by the NPT from helping non-nuclear weapon-states “control” nuclear
devices (with the term “control” left undefined) and prohibited under the CWC from engaging in
preparations to use chemical weapons, which could be broadly interpreted.
In general, questions of treaty compliance were not publicly raised by U.S. assistance to Russia
and the FSU. Nuclear assistance to the Soviet Union, because it was a nuclear weapons state by
the terms of the NPT, was never questioned. In the CW area, most of the assistance to Russia has
focused on helping Russia comply with the CWC (primarily in destruction). While some CW
scientists may have participated in the International Science Centers, there has been no public
criticism that assistance has helped the Russian CW program. With respect to Russia’s biological
weapons program, there has been some uncertainty about whether assistance to BW scientists in
certain institutes could benefit the Russian BW program, but no one has publicly suggested that
the United States has not complied with its BWC obligations.64
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Under Article I of the NPT, the United States is prohibited from transferring to any state (nuclear
weapon state, non-nuclear weapon state, party or non-party to the Treaty) nuclear weapons,
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly. It is not
readily apparent what is meant by “control” over such weapons; a narrow interpretation would
focus on the ability of another state to use such a weapon.65 A broader interpretation might
conclude that better safety, security, or command and control measures would provide another
state with improved control of its nuclear weapons, perhaps violating this obligation not to
(indirectly) transfer control.
The second part of the obligation lies in not assisting, encouraging or inducing non-nuclear
weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The negotiators of the NPT reportedly
intended to interpret “manufacture” broadly, from the beginning of the acquisition cycle to the
end. 66 Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT are obligated not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of such weapons under Article II. 67 Presumably, this would cover
64
U.S. General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses
New Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, April 2000. See discussion of risks of assistance, which include sustaining Russia’s
existing BW infrastructure, maintaining or advancing Russian scientists’ skills to develop offensive BW and potential
misuse of U.S. assistance to fund offensive research, pp. 29-34.
65
During the negotiation of the NPT, concerns about transferring “control” focused on allies (e.g. NATO) making
command and control decisions for U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. See Willrich, Nonproliferation Treaty,
p. 71 ff. Stein and Feaver argue that Permissive Action Links were introduced as a result of congressional concern
about loose command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. See also Feaver, Peter Douglas, Guarding the
Guardians, (NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 199ff.
66
Willrich, Nonproliferation Treaty, pp. 91-93.
67
“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.” Article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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assistance that enhanced command and control of weapons, including permissive action link
(PAL) technology. India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea would not be bound by such an
obligation since they are not parties to the NPT. Iran, on the other hand, would be bound by that
obligation.
The U.S. State Department has not made a public finding on what might constitute a violation of
Article I under the NPT, but its legal advisors have examined precedents in the application of
U.S. domestic law. In general, they have advised that the closer assistance is attached to the
nuclear weapons programs, the more likely it could run afoul of U.S. legal obligations, both under
international treaty obligations and domestic law. Thus, some kinds of aid (e.g., food or
humanitarian aid) could be considered, in the extreme, to be assisting or encouraging a nuclear
weapons program because they free up resources that the target government can put towards a
nuclear weapons program but are permitted in practice because they do not have a close
association with a nuclear weapons program. If assistance took the form of transferrable funds,
however, the possibility of linkage to a nuclear weapons program might be considered to be
greater.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
There are two provisions in Article I of the CWC that might affect U.S. assistance: first, the
prohibition on engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and second, the
prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. Although U.S. assistance clearly would not aim
to contravene the treaty, some actions, even temporary, could be interpreted as violating that
obligation if they resulted in greater security of chemical weapons and not immediate destruction.
If weapons security measures were implemented (e.g., security from terrorist access), they would
need to be accompanied by demilitarization measures (separation from weapon launchers, etc.).
As evidenced by delays in the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, destruction
could take years. Any such activities with non-CWC parties (Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria,
for purposes here) could be interpreted as falling under the prohibition against assisting,
encouraging, or inducing...anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
As in the cases of the NPT and CWC, a key provision here may be the prohibition on assistance,
encouragement, or inducing of any State, group of States or international organization to acquire
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery prohibited by the Convention.
Measures that included just assistance to scientists but not BW destruction, or measures that
included weapons and site security but no destruction might fall into that category. The likelihood
is small, but future recipients may be just as reluctant as the Russians have been to allow access
to the most sensitive BW-related sites, accepting assistance at lesser sites.
Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws
U.S. domestic laws contain the following restrictions that may be relevant to providing assistance
to the states covered in this report: restrictions on financial assistance, exports (defense and dualuse) to states that have poor proliferation records (as recipients or suppliers of proliferationrelated goods and technology); restrictions on financial assistance, exports to states on state
sponsors of terrorism list; and restrictions on nuclear material and nuclear weapons cooperation.
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Many of these restrictions overlap in the legislation. For example, the Foreign Assistance Act
carries prohibitions for both proliferation- and terrorism-related activities. Table 6, below, lists
the key legislation.
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Table 6. Applicable Laws for Proliferation and Terrorism
Title
Proliferation
Sanctions
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
(P.L. 79-173; P.L. 107-189)
X
Sec 2 (b) (4)
Nuclear
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L.
83-703)
X
Nuclear, Sec. 129
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(P.L. 87-195)
X
Sec 620 E (e)
(Pressler)
Terrorism
Sanctions
X
X
Sec 620 A
Sec 620 G
Sec 620 H
Sec 620 (y)
Arms Export Control Act (P.L.
90-629); as amended by Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act 1994
(P.L. 103-236, Title VIII)
CRS-27
X
WMD & missiles
Chapters 7 & 8
Effect
Countries Affected
Financing cutoff for those who violate
nuclear safeguards agreement and those
who detonate nuclear explosive device
after 1977.
North Korea, Iraq
(waived), Iran, Cuba, Libya
(waived), Sudan, Syria,
Pakistan (waived), India
(waived)
Yes
No nuclear cooperation w/nuclear
cooperation agreement. Non-nuclear
weapon states must have full scope
safeguards.
North Korea, Pakistan,
India, Israel
Yes
Aid cutoff
No foreign/food aid, Ex-Im bank for
states on terrorism list
No military assistance if detonate nuclear
weapon
North Korea, Iraq
(waived), Iran, Cuba,
Libya*, Sudan, Syria,
Pakistan (waived)
Yes
*waived in P.L. 108-447.
Presidential
Waiver?
Anti-terrorism,
humanitarian,
narcotics, IMET,
peacekeeping OK
Ended if joins NPT,
nuclear safeguards,
nuclear safety
Third-party sanctions for aid to Cuba’s
nuclear program
X
40 A (not
cooperating fully
with anti-terrorism
measures)
Exports, aid cutoff
Sanctions for engaging in export activities
that contribute to proliferation (Section
821)
Role of international financial institutions
(Section 823)
Prohibition on assisting nuclear
proliferation through provision of
financing (Section 824)
North Korea, Iraq
(waived), Iran, Cuba, Libya
(waived)*, Sudan, Syria,
Pakistan (waived), India
(waived)
Yes
*waiver for Libya in
Pres. Determ’n No.
2005-39
Title
Proliferation
Sanctions
Terrorism
Sanctions
Effect
Countries Affected
Export Administration Act 1979
(P.L. 96-72)
X
Sections 5, 6, 11
for WMD &
missiles
X
Sec 6 (j) terrorism
list
1. Export controls for national security &
foreign policy reasons, including
terrorism
2. No US govt contracts with Wassenaar
violators
3. No export licenses for missile
proliferation violations
4. US govt contract/import sanctions for
CBW exports
North Korea, Iraq, Iran,
Cuba, Libya, Sudan, Syria
Yes
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182, Title
III)
X
Chem, bio
Sanctions if CW or BW used
None yet
Yes?
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title
XVI)
X
Third-party sanctions, consistent with
existing laws
States, persons supplying
Iran, Iraq with WMDrelated items
Yes
Iran & Libya Sanctions Act (P.L.
104-172); P.L. 109-267; extended
duration to September 2011 by
P.L. 109-293.
X
Third-party sanctions, consistent with
existing laws
States, persons supplying
Iran & Libya68 with WMDrelated items or advanced
conventional weapons
Yes
Iran and Syria Nonproliferation
Act (P.L. 109-112); amended by S.
3728 (no public law number yet
available)
X
Third-party sanctions, consistent with
existing laws
States, persons supplying
WMD-related items to or
receiving items from Iran,
Syria, or North Korea.
Yes
North Korea Threat Reduction
Act of 1999(Title VIII, PL 106113)
X
Nuclear
Prohibited assistance to DPRK & KEDO
under Agreed Framework;
Strengthened requirements for nuclear
cooperation agreement
North Korea
Yes
68
X
Presidential
Waiver?
A presidential determination terminated ILSA for Libya on April 23, 2004. The President determined that Libya fulfilled requirements of all U.N. resolutions relating to the
downing of Pan Am 103. See CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), by (name redacted) and Presidential Determination No. 2004-30, Available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-10.html.
CRS-28
Title
Proliferation
Sanctions
Foreign Operations, Export
Financing-Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L.
108-199)
Syria Accountability Act of 2003
(P.L. 108-175)
CRS-29
X
Terrorism
Sanctions
Effect
Countries Affected
Presidential
Waiver?
X
Sec 507 prohibits direct funding to state
sponsors of terrorism
Sec 527 prohibits bilateral assistance
under this act to any country which the
President determines a) grants sanctuary
to terrorists; b) otherwise supports
international terrorism
Sec 507: Cuba, North
Korea, Iran, Syria
Sec 527: others?
No waiver for Sec.
507
Yes for Sec 527 for
national security or
humanitarian reasons;
X
Export controls: no munitions list or
dual-use items
Choice of 2 of 6 sanctions
Syria
Yes
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Nonproliferation Laws
Nonproliferation laws generally seek to prohibit sensitive technologies from going to states that
are suspected proliferators and to impose sanctions on states and individuals for objectionable
proliferation behavior. Many of these laws have provisions for a waiver if the President
determines that U.S. national security interests are better served by engagement rather than
restrictions. (A complete list of legislation is available in CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, and CRS
Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.)
In brief, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, (42 USC 2053 et seq) ensures that U.S.
nuclear technology will not go to proliferators; for the most part, it is unlikely that the kinds of
assistance the United States might offer under an expanded CTR program (for weapons, site,
material, or personnel security) would fall under the categories covered by these laws. The
Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act punish proliferators by prohibiting U.S.
military sales and economic or military assistance. The Export Administration Act of 1979
restricts exports of goods and technologies, including dual-use technologies, for foreign policy
and national security reasons, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 includes restrictions on
the extension of credit for proliferation and terrorism reasons. It should be noted that all
proliferation-related sanctions against Pakistan and India stemming from the 1998 nuclear
explosive tests have been lifted; many of these constraints can be lifted by Presidential waiver. In
2005, the Energy Policy Act (P.L. 109-58; Section 632) amended the Section 129 of the Atomic
Energy Act to include a cutoff of nuclear exports to states that are designated state sponsors of
terrorism.
Anti-terrorism Laws
Sanctions against other countries for their support for international terrorism are four basic types:
•
ban on arms-related exports and sales
•
controls on dual-use item exports (requires 30-day congressional notification)
•
prohibition on economic assistance
•
miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including U.S. opposition to World
Bank, IMF loans, and ban on DOD contracts over $100,000.69
The specific laws that contain these bans have been described in great detail in other CRS
reports.70 In general, Cuba, Libya, and Iran are all subject to comprehensive embargoes; North
Korea is subject to economic sanctions, and Sudan and Syria are subject to specific sanctions. In
addition, Iran is subject to the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.
69
Patterns in Global Terrorism 2002, p. 77.
See, for example, CRS Report RL32727, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After the
Iraq War; CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses; CRS Report RL32604, Libya: Legislative
Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions; CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, CRS Report RL32251,
Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
70
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Perhaps the most salient legislation is what has become known as the “state sponsors of terrorism
list,” as provided for in Section 6 (j) (1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
App. 2405(j)l). States can be removed from that list in two ways. First, the President could submit
a report to Congress certifying that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and
policies of the government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not supporting acts of
international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances that it will not support
acts of international terrorism in the future. The second option is for the President to submit a
report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed recision will take effect, justifying the
recision and certifying that (1) the government concerned has not provided any support for
international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and (2) the government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Both Iraq
and Libya have been removed from the list in the last few years.
In addition, however, two other “terrorism lists” may apply. The first is Section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act, which prohibits the export of munitions to governments that repeatedly
provide support for international terrorism, and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, which prohibits most assistance to countries supporting international terrorism. Section 40
of the AECA has a specific procedure for Congress to consider a joint resolution to block the
President’s removal of a country from the terrorism list. Both Section 40 of the AECA and
Section 620A of the FAA include presidential waiver authority for national security interests or
humanitarian reasons. It is likely that a sweeping lift of sanctions would occur only in the context
of overall improved relations and with Congressional concurrence that the sanctions regime ought
to be undone.
Nuclear Cooperation/Nuclear Weapons Cooperation
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) governs nuclear cooperation and restricts sharing of information
related to nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that the United States would include “significant”
nuclear cooperation with any of the states in question under an expanded CTR program (e.g.,
sales of nuclear reactors, nuclear material, or major reactor components). 71 Significant nuclear
cooperation with states such as India, Pakistan, Israel, or North Korea would require that they
abandon their nuclear weapons programs and adopt full-scope safeguards.72 Moreover, Section
129 of the AEA states that
No nuclear material and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported to: (1)
any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to have, at any time after March
10, 1978 a) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or b) terminated or abrogated IAEA
safeguards; or c) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or d) engaged in
activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which,
in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities...
Some states are additionally subject to country-specific restrictions on nuclear cooperation
agreements. For example, the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 stipulated that no
71
Major reactor components include primary coolant pumps, pressure vessels, control rod drive systems, and on-line
fuel charging and discharging equipment for CANDU reactors.
72
In 2005, however, President Bush proposed to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. On July 27,
2006, the House passed H.R. 5682, which authorizes the President to create an exception for India from current
restrictions on nuclear cooperation.
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significant nuclear cooperation could occur with North Korea unless relevant congressional
committees were informed that North Korea: a) was in full compliance with its nuclear
safeguards agreement; b) gave the IAEA full access to nuclear sites; c) took steps to implement
the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; d) had no enrichment or
reprocessing activities and made no significant progress in acquiring, testing, producing, or
deploying a nuclear explosive device; and e) had no nuclear weapons. In addition, the President
must notify Congress that the transfer of key nuclear components was in the national security
interests of the United States. Some of these requirements are already contained in existing laws,
but others are not—for example, implementing the joint declaration.
In the event that the United States contemplates sharing sensitive nuclear information (e.g.,
information related to safety and security of nuclear weapons), Section 144 of the AEA stipulates
that the Secretary of Energy may release Restricted Data on various aspects of the nuclear fuel
cycle except those related to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. The Secretary of
Defense may exchange Restricted Data if it is necessary to a) develop defense plans; b) train
personnel in employing and defending against nuclear weapons; c) evaluate the capabilities of
potential enemies in employing nuclear weapons; d) develop compatible delivery systems for
nuclear weapons.
The President can authorize the Secretary of Energy, with the assistance of the Department of
Defense, to exchange Restricted Data on atomic weapons with another country provided that a)
communication of Restricted Data is necessary to improve that nation’s nuclear weapon design,
development, or fabrication capability; and b) that nation has made “substantial progress in the
development of atomic weapons.” When the language on “substantial progress” was added in
1958, the only nation that met the qualification was the United Kingdom. In general, most
weapons-related data, including some on safety, security, fuze and firing, are classified as
restricted data or formerly restricted data. It is unlikely that the President would authorize such an
exchange of Restricted Data under this provision of the Atomic Energy Act, particularly to states
such as India and Pakistan.
Dual-Use Exports
Transfers of nuclear-related equipment or nuclear material that do not meet the requirement for an
agreement of cooperation could possibly still require full-scope safeguards as a condition of
supply under the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) guidelines. Since 1992, NSG member states
have required full-scope safeguards as a condition for supplying items on the NSG “trigger list.”73
In addition, the Department of Commerce requires a license for exporting items on the NSG’s
dual-use list (those with nuclear and other applications) to states outside the NSG. Many of the
states that could be potential recipients of U.S. CTR assistance are not members of the NSG.
More broadly, the Commerce Control List specifies what items are regulated and why, but an
equally important consideration is the question of the end-user. One technique for streamlining
73
The “trigger list” governs the “export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These include
(i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment therefor; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and
equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water
production; and (v) technology associated with each of the above items.” The “dual-use” list governs the export of
nuclear related dual-use items and technologies, that is, items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded
nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry. See
http://www.nsg-online.org/guide.htm.
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the export control system and making it more understandable for exporters was the development
of the entities lists. The Department of Commerce maintains a list of entities subject to license
requirements (see Supplement 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations). At
present, the entities of proliferation concern are located in China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and
Russia. Exports of items controlled for nuclear proliferation and missile technology reasons are
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Under the 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), the Department of Commerce
can impose licensing requirements on exports and reexports of goods and technology that would
normally be uncontrolled where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to activities related to
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or missile proliferation. U.S. exporters are required to
apply for a license if they have knowledge of or have reason to know that such exports will be
used directly or indirectly in any one of the following activities: nuclear explosive activities,
unsafeguarded nuclear activities, or safeguarded and unsafeguarded activities to produce special
nuclear material (through reprocessing or enrichment), produce heavy water or fabricate nuclear
fuel that uses plutonium. Section 744.2 of the Export Administration Regulations provides eight
criteria for assessing license applications. Potentially, the most significant of these criteria is the
nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, which include whether the state adheres to
the NPT, has full-scope safeguards, and has an agreement for cooperation with the United States
and whether the actions, statements, and policies of the state support nuclear nonproliferation. 74
Costs and Benefits of Assistance
The United States has provided nonproliferation assistance to many countries over many years. In
some instances, the United States funded projects or programs because the country in question
did not have the resources to fix proliferation problems. However, as the United States looks
increasingly to bilateral “fixes,” two questions need to be raised: are there enough resources for
the United States to tackle these multiple problems, and do bilateral approaches undermine the
multilateral nonproliferation regime? Two potential costs of undermining international institutions
are decreased global pressure on proliferators and possibly decreased international support for
U.S. policy objectives in other areas. A bilateral approach may risk capturing the “easy”
proliferation problems—like Libya—and undermining support to tackle the “hard” proliferation
problems—like Pakistan and North Korea. Without clear disarmament steps, assistance could be
seen as rewarding bad behavior, which has been a recent U.S. concern in the case of North Korea.
Impact on Nonproliferation Regime
For states that are parties to the NPT, BWC, and/or CWC, some treaty compliance issues may
arise. In the case of the BWC, which does not have an inspection regime, there likely will be less
controversy about bilateral inspections superceding or undermining the treaty. Likewise, there
may be less pressure to bring noncompliance issues to light. For example, Russia, a party to the
74
Paragraph 744.2 (d) License Review Standards for Restrictions on Certain Nuclear End-Uses, Part 744 of Export
Administration Regulations. The assessment of nonproliferation credentials is based on a) adherence to NPT or
international nuclear nonproliferation agreement; b) full-scope safeguards or equivalent; c) agreement for cooperation
with US; d) whether state supports nuclear nonproliferation; e) degree to which state cooperates in nonproliferation
policy; and f) intelligence data on state’s nuclear intentions and activities.
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BWC, declared that it had an offensive BW program in 1992, twenty years after it signed the
treaty.
In the case of the CWC, compliance issues might be handled differently. Under the CWC, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Israel have not openly declared stockpiles or capabilities and
yet all are suspected of having CW. For example, if Pakistan has a covert chemical weapons
stockpile that it is willing to dismantle with U.S. help, should Pakistan be declared in violation of
the CWC? Further, would destruction be verified bilaterally or multilaterally under the CWC? In
the case of Libya, the OPCW is overseeing CW destruction, but the United States has taken on
the destruction tasks related to Libya’s nuclear program. If U.S. or other sanctions were
applicable, would they need to be waived?
Hard-core nuclear proliferators pose a different challenge. These states have remained steadfastly
outside the treaty regime and are unlikely to dismantle their arsenals (with the possible exception
of North Korea). If assistance were accepted, would this confer acceptance of their nuclear
weapons status? Would such acceptance be good or bad for the nonproliferation regime? For
example, on January 2, 2004, President Bush stated that “he believes the [Pakistani nuclear]
weapons “are secure.” “That’s important,” he said. “It’s also important that India, as well, have a
secure nuclear weapons program.”75 The President’s proposal to engage in peaceful nuclear
cooperation with India has sparked significant criticism that the deal legitimizes India’s nuclear
weapons program. On the other hand, it is clear that nuclear weapons status will not be awarded
to Iran, and North Korea’s case still seems ambiguous.
For some observers, the impact of assistance to “new nuclear states” on the nonproliferation
regime is moot because the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran, and,
formerly, Libya, prove that the regime is broken. Some observers also believe that CWC or BWC
treaty compliance is essentially impossible to verify and that new tools should be used to mitigate
the threat wherever possible.
Issues for 110th Congress
Sea Changes in Policy?
Many U.S. administrations have fought both proliferation of WMD and terrorism but few have
connected or coordinated the two. A policy that seeks to eliminate the nexus of terrorism and
WMD confronts more than a few challenges. One particular challenge is obtaining active
cooperation from a diverse group of states around the world, many of which are not traditional
allies of the United States. According to one observer, the United States hasn’t made really clear
“how...a former state supporter of terrorism stand(s) with the United States and with the rest of
the international community in dealing with that common scourge.”76 Libya may provide an
unfolding example of how a former state supporter of terrorism can be redeemed.
An equally challenging question may be how states that were considered former proliferators
stand with the United States and the rest of the international community. Here, Libya may not
75
76
“Bush Says Pakistan’s Arsenal is Secure,” Washington Post, January 2, 2004.
PBS Newshour interview with David Mack on Libya, August 18, 2003.
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offer the best example. Although a long-time successful supporter of international terrorism
(albeit with waning activity in the last decade), Libya was at best a mediocre proliferator, and
decided to give up both activities in exchange for the lifting of burdensome economic sanctions.
A more troubling example is states that retain their WMD programs but not the stigma of being a
proliferator. Pakistan raises the largest issue for the Bush Administration in its matrixed war
against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation: has one goal assumed priority
over the other? There have been ample statements from administration officials since 2001 to the
effect that Pakistan has not been pressed on its proliferation activities because of its strong
support in the war against terrorism. Despite evidence of sales of uranium enrichment equipment
to Iran and Libya (and, the Bush administration maintains, to North Korea), Pakistani
proliferation activities since 2001 are no longer reported to Congress in the semi-annual
unclassified Section 721 (of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) reports on the acquisition
of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.
The sea change in nonproliferation policy can be traced to the September 2002 National Security
Strategy, in which President Bush noted that “The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the
crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction.” A few months later, the December 2002 Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction opened with the statement, “Weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists
represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.” [emphasis added]
Focusing on the terrorism axis has shifted policies to combat WMD proliferation away from
global approaches (at least rhetorically) to tailored approaches. Paradoxically, this focus on
hostile states and terrorists may leave the global community vulnerable to the proliferation
activities of friendly states, whoever those happen to be at the time.
Recent Legislation
The 109th Congress considered the following legislation that could restrict the provision of CTR
assistance to some countries. The State Department’s annual foreign operations appropriations
bill, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
includes provisions that prohibit assistance to certain countries. Section 507 of the FY2006
foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102) states that no funds will be “obligated or
expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, or
Syria.” The FY2007 bill passed in the House (H.R. 5522) and awaiting passage in the Senate
includes the same provision. The Iran Freedom Support Act, introduced in both the House and the
Senate (H.R. 282/S. 333), could make supplying CTR assistance to Iran more difficult. The IranLibya Sanction Act (P.L. 104-172) has been extended through September 2011, pursuant to the
Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). Sudan has been severely limited from receiving U.S.
assistance since 1997 by a combination of executive order and U.S. law. These include Executive
Order 13067, Section 520 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102), the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-497) and The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245).
The 109th also considered legislation that could affect third party states, or any state that could
potentially receive CTR assistance, to the extent such states are considered for these initiatives.
For example, Section 542 of the FY2006 foreign operations bill (P.L. 109-102) prohibited
assistance to countries that provide lethal military equipment to State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Other examples include P.L. 109-267 which extended the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the Iran
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Nonproliferation Amendments Act (P.L. 109-112), which added Syria to that Act, and the North
Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (S. 3728), which added North Korea to the Iran—Syria
Nonproliferation Act.
Costs
In its oversight capacity, Congress may wish to consider whether or not expanding CTR
assistance could have a “snowball” effect, particularly if the United States insists on using its own
resources rather than existing multinational inspectorates. Costs of assistance are likely to be
minimal the first one or two years, but these could escalate, depending on the objectives of the
program. In the nuclear area, the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are
far smaller than Russia’s and unlikely to incur the kinds of costs that the CTR program has thus
far incurred. On the other hand, data are scarce on the state of nuclear materials in those
countries, so it is difficult to determine the scope and time-frame of such a program. At a
minimum, however, such a program is likely to be incrementally implemented. Costs could be
minimal if a quick-fix, low-technology, information-oriented approach is taken or they could be
more substantial if a sophisticated, high-technology approach is taken that would incorporate
cameras, encryption, remote monitoring, and other means. The same is true in the BW and CW
areas; the scope of the undertaking in Russia greatly outweighs the combination of programs of
relevant states. However, the management of multiple programs could present particular
difficulties.
Certifications
In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that U.S. assistance in
destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its
republics, or successor entities unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed
recipient is committed to:
•
making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying
such weapons;
•
forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements or
is designed to replace destroyed WMD;
•
forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclear
weapons in new nuclear weapons;
•
facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S. money;
•
comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and
•
observe internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of
minorities.
Certifications, according to some Administration officials, allow the United States to hold the
recipient states’ “feet to the fire,” providing a source of leverage. In the view of others, however,
they pose unnecessary and even dangerous delays in implementing CTR programs. In the
FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163), Section 1303 of Title XIII extended
the three-year authority to waive certification requirements indefinitely. Section 1304 of S. 2766,
the Senate’s version of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act, would have repealed all
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certification requirements. However, the version of the defense authorization act passed in
conference (H.R. 5122) does not include provisions to repeal restrictions.
Other Considerations
Congress may wish to consider the implications of providing U.S. assistance to countries that are
not democratically governed. Section 508 of the Foreign Operations bill (P.L. 109-102) in the
109th Congress prohibited direct assistance “to the government of any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed by decree or military coup.” Most of the six state sponsors of
terrorism would fall in this category. In addition, Pakistan has been subject to such restrictions.
P.L. 107-57, which exempted Pakistan from existing restrictions prohibiting foreign assistance to
any country governed by a military that overthrew a democratically elected regime, requires the
President to determine that foreign assistance “facilitates the transition to democratic rule in
Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of
international terrorism.”77 Pakistan’s exemption was to run out by October 1, 2003, but this was
extended through the end of FY2004 by language in the emergency supplemental bill (P.L. 108106), and then through subsequent foreign operations bills. Currently it is extended through the
foreign operation FY2006 appropriation bill (P.L. 109-102) until the end of FY2006, and would
be extended through FY2007 if the foreign operation FY2007 appropriation bill passes Congress
in its current form (H.R. 5522). The law raises two pertinent issues: will President Musharraf
restore democracy to Pakistan and if not, how would continued military leadership in Pakistan
affect U.S. cooperative efforts, particularly if new military leadership emerges? In the absence of
regime change, similar questions might be raised about efforts conducted with Cuba and Syria.
77
See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions.
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Appendix.
Relevant treaty texts relating to obligations not to assist non-weapon states in acquiring nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons capabilities.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article I:
The NPT states in Article I that nuclear weapon states commit:
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article XX
The CWC extends the prohibition to all states, stating that
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer,
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to
a State Party under this Convention.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Article III
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever,
directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of
States, or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.
Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
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