"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007

Congressional research reportFeb 21, 2006

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Order Code RL32347

CRS Report for Congress

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“Bunker Busters”: Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007

Updated February 21, 2006

Jonathan Medalia

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

“Bunker Busters”: Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

Issues, FY2005-FY2007

Summary

Earth penetrator weapons, often called “bunker busters,” burrow into the ground

some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried

targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The

current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain

types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air

Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more

effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).

While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in 2003 that RNEP was a study,

NNSA’s FY2005 budget document showed a five-year total of $484.7 million if

RNEP were to proceed beyond the study phase. NNSA said no decision had been

made to proceed, and out-year figures were shown to meet congressionally-mandated

budgeting requirements and were not a request. RNEP requests are, of course,

subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification. The five-year figure

sparked congressional debate. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act

contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. The House and Senate both rejected

amendments to that bill that would have eliminated RNEP funds. However, P.L.

108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, appropriated no funds for

RNEP. As a result, NNSA could not work on RNEP in FY2005.

The FY2006 RNEP request was $4.0 million for NNSA for studies, and $4.5

million for the Department of Defense (DOD) to study integrating RNEP onto the

B-2 bomber. The House passed the FY2006 Energy and Water Development

Appropriations Bill, H.R. 2419, with no NNSA RNEP funds. The House passed the

FY2006 National Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 1815, providing the requested

DOD funds and transferring the NNSA funds to DOD. The House Appropriations

Committee’s mark of H.R. 2863, the FY2006 DOD Appropriations Bill, provided

$4.0 million for a conventional (nonnuclear) penetrator study. Committee staff

indicated that the bill included the $4.5 million for DOD, and that the committee’s

intent was that DOD use the money to study integration of a conventional penetrator

onto the B-2. The bill as passed by the House retained these provisions. The Senate

Armed Services Committee’s mark of S. 1042, the FY2006 National Defense

Authorization Bill, recommended providing the NNSA funds as requested but

denying the DOD funds on grounds that the DOD program should await completion

of NNSA’s feasibility study. The Senate provided $4.0 million for NNSA for RNEP

in H.R. 2419, rejecting an amendment by Senator Feinstein to delete the funds. The

Senate Appropriations Committee’s mark of H.R. 2863 recommended eliminating

DOD funds requested for RNEP. On October 25, Senator Domenici said that NNSA

had dropped its RNEP request and planned to focus earth penetration on conventional

weapons technology, so, he said, energy and water conferees agreed to drop funding

for RNEP. H.R. 1815 as signed into law (P.L. 109-360) provided no funds for

RNEP, but $4.0 million for DOD for a conventional penetrator study.

For FY2007, NNSA requested no funds for RNEP, and has closed out the

project. Accordingly, this report will not be updated further.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Developments in the FY2005 Budget Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The FY2005 Budget and Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Criticisms, Questions, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Programmatic Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

RNEP Budget and Need for Congressional Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Is There a Military Requirement for RNEP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Legislative Activity on RNEP, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Developments in the FY2006 Budget Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The FY2006 RNEP request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Clarification of Key Points in FY2006 Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Developments in the FY2007 Budget Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

“Bunker Busters”: Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007

Background

Potential adversaries and others have built hardened underground facilities to

protect key assets. Conventional weapons are unable to destroy many such facilities,

though opinions differ on whether nonnuclear means can disable or isolate them.

Surface-burst nuclear weapons would have limited effectiveness against deeply

buried facilities. In contrast, a nuclear weapon that burrows into the ground a few

meters before detonating would be more effective because it would transfer much

more of its energy into the ground.

The United States has one type of nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb,

which was accepted into the stockpile in September 2001.1 That weapon, though,

according to an article by several scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory,

“cannot survive delivery into certain types of terrain in which such [hardened

underground] facilities may be located.”2 The Administration proposes RNEP as a

study of modifications to convert existing B83 nuclear bombs to an earth penetrator

configuration. Another bomb, the B61, had also been under consideration earlier.

The Air Force has been leading the study, which started in May 2003, with NNSA

in charge of studying modifications of specific warheads. Accordingly, the

Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration

(NNSA), which is the Department of Energy (DOE) agency in charge of the U.S.

nuclear weapons program, requested funds to study the Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator (RNEP).

RNEP has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for

the past few years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried

targets (such as leadership bunkers or WMD production facilities) in countries of

concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert

that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other

nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003 that RNEP “is a study. It is nothing more and

nothing less.”3 The plan was that the RNEP study would cost $15 million a year for

“B61-11 Enters the Stockpile,” Weapons Insider: A Publication of the Nuclear Weapons

Program, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sept./Oct. 2001, p. 2.

Bryan Fearey, Paul White, John St. Ledger, and John Immele, “An Analysis of Reduced

Collateral Damage Nuclear Weapons,” Comparative Strategy, Oct./Nov. 2003, p. 312.

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing — Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen.

(continued...)

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FY2003-FY2005. While Congress appropriated the FY2003 request of $15.0

million, the FY2004 request met much criticism. The House rejected an amendment

by Representative Tauscher to transfer funds from RNEP to conventional means of

attacking buried targets. The Senate tabled an amendment by Senator Dorgan and

another by Senator Feinstein to bar funds for RNEP, and adopted an amendment by

Senator Nelson (FL), and a similar amendment by Senator Reed, to require

congressional authorization to start development engineering (discussed below) or

later phases of RNEP. (The Nelson amendment became Section 3117 of P.L. 108136, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act.) Congress reduced the

FY2004 appropriation to $7.5 million.

In response to this reduction, NNSA planned to spend almost all of the $7.5

million to study the B83 as an RNEP candidate, and little on the B61 study.4 The

B83 study was being conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in

Livermore, CA, and Sandia National Laboratories’ Livermore branch; the B61 study

was the responsibility of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, and

Sandia National Laboratories’ headquarters site in Albuquerque, NM. For FY2005,

Congress eliminated RNEP funding. For FY2006, the Administration requested $4.0

million for NNSA to conduct a sled test, in which a penetrator body would be shot

down a test track and slammed into a material, such as a concrete block, to help

design and evaluate penetrators. For FY2006, the Administration also requested $4.5

million for DOD to study linking RNEP to the B-2 bomber. The appropriation was

$4.0 million for DOD to conduct the sled test.

To address some technical issues that have arisen in the RNEP debates, the Bob

Stump National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003, P.L. 107-314, Section 1033,

called for a National Academy of Sciences report on effects of nuclear and

conventional earth penetrator weapons (EPWs). The report, released in April 2005,

had nine key conclusions: (1) many high-value buried facilities can be held at risk by

nuclear but not conventional EPWs; (2) penetration to a depth of 3 meters captures

most effects of EPWs on buried targets; deeper penetration puts the weapon at greater

risk; (3) EPWs cannot penetrate deeply enough to contain nuclear weapon effects

fully; (4) casualties from a nuclear weapon burst at shallow depth or on the surface

are essentially the same; (5) detonating a nuclear weapon at shallow depth increases

the energy transmitted to a buried target, permitting a reduction in yield by a factor

of 15 to 25; (6) attacks using nuclear EPWs near urban areas could produce

thousands to over a million casualties, or hundreds to several hundred thousand for

attacks in rural areas; (7) a nuclear EPW could reduce civilian casualties in an urban

area by a factor of 2 to 10 compared to a surface-burst weapon with 25 times the

yield; (8) a nuclear weapon would have to detonate within a chamber where chemical

or biological agents were stored to destroy the agents; the same is true of nonnuclear

“thermobaric” bombs, which generate high heat and pressure; and (9) in a nuclear

attack on a chemical weapon facility, nuclear effects would probably kill many more

civilians than would the released chemical agent, while a nuclear attack on a

(...continued)

Myers,” May 20, 2003. At [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030520

-secdef0207.html].

Information provided by NNSA staff, Feb. 10, 2004.

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biological facility could kill similar numbers of civilians from nuclear effects and

released biological agents, depending on weapon yield and amount of agent.5

This report discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration

for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles. For a more extensive history and

technical background, see CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives:

Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness, and CRS

Report RL32599, ‘Bunker Busters’: Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear

Earth Penetrator Debate, both by Jonathan Medalia. Any consideration of RNEP

in the second session of the 109th Congress may hinge on whether the Administration

requests funds for the program in the FY2007 budget.

Developments in the FY2005 Budget Cycle

The FY2005 Budget and Plan

Congress required NNSA — and DOE before NNSA was created — to provide

a five-year budget projection (current year plus four out-years) in the National

Defense Authorization Acts for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201, Section 3155), FY2000 (P.L.

106-65, Section 3253), and FY2001 (P.L. 106-398, Sections 3154 and 3155). The

FY2005 budget cycle was the first in which NNSA presented detailed out-year

projection with the current request. In the FY2005 request, the projected figures for

RNEP were: FY2005 (request), $27.6 million; FY2006, $95.0 million; FY2007,

$145.4 million; FY2008, $128.4 million; and FY2009, $88.4 million, for a five-year

total of $484.7 million.6 The FY2005 request also presented a plan for RNEP. All

figures for FY2005-FY2009 are subject to congressional approval, rejection, or

modification.

The research program for FY2003-FY2009 was thus estimated to cost $498.3

million — $6.1 million spent for FY2003, $7.5 million appropriated for FY2004, and

$484.7 million, as noted, for FY2005-FY2009. If RNEP were to proceed through

development and production, additional costs would include completing production

engineering, and manufacturing components to convert the selected weapon into an

earth penetrator. These figures include NNSA costs, such as for the penetrator case,

but exclude Air Force costs for the guidance unit (tail assembly, guidance computer,

etc.) NNSA cannot provide an estimate of total program cost because it has not

completed the cost study.

National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council. Division on Engineering and

Physical Sciences, Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other

Weapons, (Washington: National Academies Press, 2005) (prepublication copy), pp. 9-2,

9-3.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Management, Budget, and Administration/CFO,

FY2005 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration,

DOE/ME-0032, Feb. 2004, p. 63. The RNEP budget is available under “Directed Stockpile

Work” at [http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/index.htm].

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By way of background, the Departments of Defense and Energy agreed years

ago to a formal set of phases by which modified nuclear weapons move through

research, development, production, deployment, and retirement, often called the

Phase 6.X process. The key phases for RNEP are: Phase 6.2, feasibility study and

option down select; Phase 6.2A, design definition and cost study; Phase 6.3,

development engineering, in which the nuclear weapons laboratories produce a

completed warhead design; and Phase 6.4, production engineering, in which the

design is adapted for production and a system to manufacture the weapon is created.

In its FY2005 request, NNSA stated the performance targets for RNEP as follows:

FY2005: “Complete 56% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A

activity.” Further, “In FY2005, subsystem tests and a full system

test of the proposed design will be completed.”

FY2006: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A

activity.”

FY2007: “Report results of RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A to Nuclear

Weapons Council [a joint Department of Defense (DOD)-DOE

agency that coordinates nuclear weapon programs] Obtain, if

applicable, RNEP Phase 6.3 appropriate authorization. Complete

initial 25% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if authorized).”

FY2008: “Complete 65% of RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if

appropriately authorized).”

FY2009: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity

(if authorized). Complete 15% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.4

activity (if appropriately authorized).”7

The FY2005 request therefore seemed to cast serious doubt on assertions that

RNEP is only a study. However, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks stated:

We included funds in our out-year budget projections to comply with legislative

requirements for five-year budget projections. The out-year projections are

placeholders in the event the President decides to proceed with development and

Congress approves. No decision will be made until the study is completed. The

law is clear that beginning 6.3 engineering development requires Congressional

approval.8

The legislation that he referred to is P.L. 108-136, FY2004 National Defense

Authorization Act, Section 3117, which states:

The Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase

(phase 6.3) of the nuclear weapons development process, or any subsequent

Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, pp. 69, 70, 76.

Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher,

Mar. 17, 2004.

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phase, of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapon unless specifically

authorized by Congress.

An NNSA manager responsible for the program stated that, if out-year funds

were not included in the FY2005 budget, NNSA would have faced two choices that

it deemed unsatisfactory: (1) By the time the budget for one fiscal year is submitted,

the budget for the next fiscal year is largely fixed; without the placeholder, a decision

to proceed with RNEP could not have been implemented until the second fiscal year.

(2) Alternatively, without the placeholder, a decision to proceed with RNEP could

have been implemented promptly only by taking the needed funds out of other

programs. The budget projection reflects costs that might be expected if RNEP were

to proceed to Phases 6.3 and 6.4. The manager emphasized that no decision had

been made on whether or not to proceed with those phases pending completion of the

Phase 6.2/6.2A study.9

The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million — $15 million a

year for FY2003-FY2005. The numbers, however, have changed for each year. For

FY2003, delay in submission of a DOD study required by the FY2003 National

Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Section 3146) delayed the start of NNSA’s

RNEP study, so $6.1 million was spent of the $15.0 million appropriated. For

FY2004, Congress cut the appropriation to $7.5 million. For FY2005, the request

was $27.6 million, and the appropriation zero, vs. $15.0 million originally planned,

and for FY2006 the appropriation was zero for RNEP but $4.0 million for a related

conventional penetrator study.

Criticisms, Questions, and Responses

Critics reacted to the RNEP budget projection and plan presented with the

FY2005 request. Representative Tauscher, in a letter to NNSA Administrator Linton

Brooks, stated that “This is the first notice that we have received of a significantly

ramped up activity,” and that “the planning and budgeting for further steps in the 6.X

process in the next five years speaks to a clear intent to develop these modified

nuclear weapons at a time when the feasibility study has not been completed and the

Department of Defense has not submitted a request for this weapon.”10 Steven

Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists argued that there are not five-year

budgets for every research program that might lead to development. He reportedly

said, “If they had placeholders for every funding scenario, they’d have to request an

infinite amount of money. ... This is an expression of intent to move ahead with an

expanded program.”11 Another critic, Jay Coghlan, director of Nuclear Watch of

New Mexico, was quoted as saying, “The present administration is definitely seeking

Telephone interview, Feb. 10, 2004.

Letter from Representative Ellen Tauscher to Linton Brooks, Administrator, National

Nuclear Security Administration, Mar. 8, 2004.

Paul Richter, “Questions Raised about Bomb Plan,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 11, 2004,

p. 12.

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to expand U.S. nuclear capabilities — while at the same time it denounces any kind

of effort by others to do the same.”12

Programmatic Questions. The following paragraphs present questions

from Representative Tauscher’s letter, responses from Administrator Brooks,13 and

additional information based on discussions with staff from NNSA, Los Alamos

National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Representative

Tauscher wrote:

For FY2005 the budget request describes the RNEP activities as including

“subsystems tests and full system test of the proposed design.” Such activities

appear to go beyond research activities and may be interpreted to fall into 6.3

activities. In your view, why are such activities consistent with legislation

passed by Congress last year? What specific activities would be associated with

the initial year of 6.3 work on the RNEP in FY2007?

Administrator Brooks responded:

The “subsystem and full system tests of the proposed design” refer to impact

tests to be performed on surrogate penetrator bodies at Sandia National

Laboratories’ sled track facility. These tests are consistent with the definition

and requirements for a Phase 6.2 feasibility study. We need to understand

whether the penetrator bodies are survivable to ground penetration in the

required geologies before feasibility can be assessed.

The context of this question is that the FY2004 National Defense Authorization

Act, P.L. 108-136, Section 3117, requires specific congressional authorization before

starting Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases of RNEP. NNSA indicated that one type of

physical test (as distinct from a computer simulation) is planned as part of the

6.2/6.2A study: a series of “sled track tests” at Sandia National Laboratories. Some

would be done as full system tests, in which the various components of an RNEP

would be assembled in a penetrator body (a strong, heavy, pointed metal case)

without a guidance system or fissile materials.14 This assembly would be mounted

on a sled that is sent down a track at high speed and slammed into a large concrete

block to test how well the components withstand the deceleration required of an earth

penetrator weapon. This type of test is included in the 6.2/6.2A study because NNSA

deems it essential to assess feasibility. In turn, a successful demonstration of

feasibility is a necessary condition for the weapon to proceed to Phase 6.3. In

preparation for the full system tests, a number of subsystem sled tests will be

conducted, in which candidate RNEP components are slammed into a water target.

These were to have started in the third quarter of FY2005, and to be held at Sandia’s

sled track, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM.

Jeff Tollefson, Santa Fe New Mexican.com, Mar. 11, 2004.

Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher,

Mar. 17, 2004.

Information provided March 11-12, 2004.

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More advanced tests would be conducted in Phase 6.3. In one type, “vibration

flyaround tests,” a mock-up of the weapon would be mounted on an aircraft and

flown to validate that the weapon would not be damaged by the vibration of the

aircraft and to determine the weapon’s aerodynamic stability. In this test, the device

would not be released. Another type of test, which would occur later in the

development process once the guidance system was developed, would involve

dropping a mock-up of the weapon from an aircraft. Both types of test would use

surrogate material (a heavy metal) instead of fissile materials. Other tests would

probably be conducted as well.

Representative Tauscher also asked:

With regard to the Annual Performance Results and Targets, what technical,

military, and other criteria would the NNSA consider and what decisions would

be made before it requests legislative authorization to begin 6.3 work? Who is

involved in the determination to begin 6.3 work and why does the budget indicate

that this might happen in FY 2007? Similarly, what criteria would the NNSA use

to base its decision to go from phase 6.3 to 6.4 in FY 2009?

Administrator Brooks replied:

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) does not make the

decision to proceed to Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases. If NNSA and the Air

Force agree that the Phase 6.2/6.2A study results support proceeding to Phase 6.3

engineering development, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) could consider

whether to proceed further. If the NWC recommends going forward, NNSA

would move beyond the study stage only if the President approves and funds are

authorized and appropriated by the Congress.

He further stated that the criteria NWC would use in this decision include “the

feasibility and military utility of the design definition, and the projected cost and

schedule established in the Phase 6.2/6.2A Study,” and that “If RNEP does proceed

to 6.3, the President and Congress will make a separate decision on whether to

proceed to Phase 6.4, Production Engineering.”

To support a decision to move RNEP to Phase 6.3, NNSA would address cost,

schedule, and feasibility, while the Air Force would address military requirements.

As a hypothetical example, NNSA might say that an RNEP would have a specified

cost, could be ready by a certain date, and would have certain characteristics (weight,

accuracy, depth of penetration, etc.) The Air Force might decide not to proceed if the

penetration ability was too low or if a nonnuclear alternative existed, or it might

recommend proceeding if the proposed RNEP was the only way to accomplish what

it considered a critical military mission. The decision to request congressional

approval would be worked through the Nuclear Weapons Council and ultimately be

made by the President. The decision on whether or not to proceed with Phase 6.3

was projected to occur in FY2007 because the Phase 6.2/6.2A study was expected to

conclude late in FY2006. With elimination of RNEP funds for FY2005 and FY2006,

these decisions would be set back. They would be rendered moot if the

Administration chooses not to proceed with the program, which might be revealed

in the FY2007 request.

CRS-8

RNEP Budget and Need for Congressional Approval. For many

Members, the five-year cost of RNEP as presented in the FY2005 budget document

came as a surprise not only in the amount, but also in what appeared to be an intent

contrary to legislation barring Phase 6.3 or greater work on RNEP without

congressional authorization. Senator Domenici said:

I was surprised to see that the request — that nearly $500 million is provided for

the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in the out year funding. ... The department

[DOE] should not assume such large sums in its budget without congressional

approval or direction. ... I want it explained to this committee unequivocally what

we are doing and what we are authorizing, and what we are not doing and what

we are not authorizing, because nobody on this committee is voting to do this.

We’re voting to study it if it wins, but not to do it. To study it is a small amount

of money. To do it is a lot of money.15

Senator Reid said to NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks:

I am a little concerned, maybe even put off by the notion that you’ve included a

half a billion dollars in your out year spending plan as what you call a place

holder for bunker busting, pending White House and congressional decisions.

I’m not sure that we can allow this to go forward. This is a large place holder.

Many remain unconvinced that this is an appropriate path.16

Senator Kennedy said to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham:

... you’re rushing ahead with the nuclear weapons, including the mini-nukes and

the nuclear bunker busters. I’ll give you a chance to be able to explain how this

program, which was $45 million two years ago is now up to almost $.5 billion.

... Why are we going ahead and are going to be requesting $.5 billion from

Congress on new nuclear weapons, the bunker buster?17

In a colloquy, Senator Warner expressed his concern on the RNEP budget and

Secretary Abraham offered an explanation:

Senator Warner: Let’s talk about the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. And I

was looking at the out years, and particularly 2006, looking at a fairly substantial

increase. And I bring to your attention the fact ... in 2004, the Department of

Energy — we put in the legislation — may not proceed to the engineering

development phase three or to subsequent phases without a specific authorization

from Congress. And can you correlate that substantial ‘06 bump up with this

statutory provision, which I hope will remain?

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water

Development, FY2005 Budget of the National Nuclear Security Administration, hearing,

Mar. 23, 2004, p. 2. Transcript by Federal News Service, Inc.

Ibid., p. 5.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, FY2005 Department of Energy

Defense-related Activities Budget Request, hearing, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 15. Transcript by

Federal News Service, Inc.

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Secretary Abraham: The statutory provision, Mr. Chairman, would, of course,

govern any decision to move from a stage of research or preliminary inquiry to

the engineering phase. We are required to provide five-year budgets, however,

so that people can look down the road and make a proper sort of assessment of

what potential expenses will be.18

Is There a Military Requirement for RNEP? Another concern is that there

is no military requirement for RNEP.

Senator Reed: ... Is there a specific military requirement for the RNEP today?

Secretary Abraham: It was the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review that a

threat that needed to be addressed in the 21st century in the immediate period

ahead of us would be hard, deeply buried targets. A number of approaches to

dealing with that were then asked to be researched. This is just one of them. It’s

a threat that rose to the level of being included in that review.

Senator Reed: There’s no doubt about the threat. But it’s your opinion that the

position of the administration is there is a specific military requirement for the

RNEP, not for a device to counter deeply buried targets, but for the RNEP? Is

that your position?

Secretary Abraham: No. The position of the administration is that we should

inquire about or that we should make inquiries and investigate a variety of

approaches to dealing with the hard, deeply buried target. Whether or not this

approach is feasible is the first question. And the second is whether or not it’s

preferable to other approaches that would involve conventional weapons. And

we have not completed the first phase of that inquiry, let alone the second.19

NNSA has stated that “requirement” has been used in two senses.20 Before

DOD or NNSA start a concept study, there is a perceived need for a capability. This

type of need used to be called a “requirement,” but DOD now uses the term “desired

capabilities and characteristics.” In the case of RNEP, this perceived need has

reportedly been documented in classified form. An unclassified document dealt more

generally with defeat of hard and deeply buried targets.21 “Requirement” is also used

for a specific weapon as applied to the acquisition process. According to NNSA,

DOD “will not have an acquisition requirement before there is a well defined system

or component for them to acquire. In the nuclear weapon life cycle, that will not

occur until the completion of the Phase 2A/6.2A study.”

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 18.

NNSA provided the information in this paragraph on Apr. 1, 2004.

U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and

Deeply Buried Targets, Submitted by the Secretary of Defense in Conjunction with the

Secretary of Energy in Response to Section 1044 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense

Authorization Act for FY2001, P.L. 106-398, July 2001.

CRS-10

Legislative Activity on RNEP, FY2005

The two defense authorization bills — H.R. 4200, as reported from the House

Armed Services Committee, and S. 2400, as reported from the Senate Armed

Services Committee — both contained the full amount requested for RNEP, $27.6

million. The House Armed Services Committee “strongly reaffirms the importance”

of the RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A study. It further stated,

The committee also takes note that a recent Defense Science Board Task Force

study on Future Strategic Strike Forces specifically recommended that research

be initiated on nuclear weapons that produce much lower collateral damage than

those weapons in the existing nuclear stockpile. The committee also reminds the

NNSA that any efforts beyond a study could only be pursued if the President

approves and funds are authorized and appropriated by Congress.22

Representatives Tauscher, Markey, Skelton, Dicks, Allen, and Spratt offered an

amendment on RNEP and other topics to H.R. 4200. It was defeated, 204-214, on

May 20 (roll no. 203). The text of the amendment is as follows:

Additional amounts for ordnance technology and for strategic capability

modernization.

1. (a) Air Force Conventional Munitions- The amount in section 201(3) for

research, development, test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased

by $25,000,000, of which —

(1) $10,000,000 is to be available in program element 0602602F, Conventional

Munitions, for ordnance technology applicable to defeat of weapons of mass

destruction and hardened, deeply buried targets; and

(2) $15,000,000 is to be available in program element 0603601F, Conventional

Weapons Technology, for ordnance technology applicable to defeat of weapons

of mass destruction and hardened, deeply buried targets.

(b) Defense-wide Strategic Capability Modernization- The amount in section

201(4) for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, is hereby

increased by $11,557,000, to be available for program element 0603910D8Z,

Strategic Capability Modernization.

reduced by $36,557,000, of which —

(1) $27,557,000 is to be derived from the Stockpile Services Robust Nuclear

Earth Penetrator study; and

(2) $9,000,000 is to be derived from the Stockpile Services Advanced Concepts

program.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act

for FY2005, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 108-491 (Washington: GPO, 2004) p. 431.

CRS-11

(The Advanced Concepts Initiative funds R&D, prior to development

engineering, of “laboratory workload activities to potentially enhance the military

capabilities of the stockpile, in coordination with the DOD.”23 See CRS Report

RL32130, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth

Penetrators, Test Readiness, by Jonathan Medalia.)

Senators Kennedy and Feinstein introduced amendment no. 3263 to S. 2400, the

FY2005 defense authorization bill, to bar the use of FY2005 funds for RNEP or the

Advanced Concepts Initiative. The Senate debated the amendment on June 3 and 15,

and rejected it on the latter date, 55-42.

Senator Bennett submitted the following amendment 3403 to S. 2400 on June

7. He withdrew it on June 23.

At the end of subtitle B of title XXXI, add the following:

Sec. 3122. Requirement of specific authorization of Congress for full-scale

underground nuclear test of robust nuclear earth penetrator.

Section 3117 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

(Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1746) is amended by inserting, “or conduct a

full-scale underground nuclear test of such weapon,” after “Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator weapon.”

For reference, Section 3117 of P.L. 108-136 is as follows:

Sec. 3117. Requirement for specific authorization of Congress for

commencement of engineering development phase or subsequent phase of robust

nuclear earth penetrator.

The Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase

(phase 6.3) of the nuclear weapons development process, or any subsequent

phase, of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapon unless specifically

authorized by Congress.

On June 9, 2004, the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee of the

House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2005 energy and water

development appropriations bill by voice vote. The measure provided no funds for

RNEP.24 The full committee approved the bill by voice vote on June 16. The

committee bill provided no funds for RNEP. The committee explained its position

on RNEP and ACI as follows:

The Committee continues to oppose the diversion of resources and intellectual

capital away from the most serious issues that confront the management of the

Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, p. 76.

Statement of Chairman Dave Hobson, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Appropriations, FY2005 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, June 9, 2004.

[http://appropriations.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&

PressRelease_id=383].

CRS-12

nation’s nuclear deterrent. ... the Committee remains unconvinced by the

Department [of Energy]’s superficial assurance that the RNEP activity is only a

study and that advanced concepts is only a skills exercise for weapons designers.

The Committee notes that the management direction for fiscal year 2004 sent to

the directors of the weapons design laboratories left little doubt that the objective

of the program was to advance the most extreme new nuclear weapon goals

irrespective of any reservations expressed by Congress. ... the Committee’s

priorities are maintaining our Nation’s nuclear deterrent in a safe and secure

condition and maintaining our Nation’s integrity in the international effort to halt

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Department’s obsession

with launching a new round of nuclear weapons development runs counter to

those priorities. The Committee directs the NNSA to focus wholly on its

primary mission of maintaining the safety, security, and viability of the existing

stockpile ...”25

On June 25, the House considered the bill, H.R. 4614, and passed it, as

amended, 370-16. No amendments were offered to the Weapons Activities section.

In the Senate, the energy and water bill was held up by disputes over the Yucca

Mountain (NV) civilian nuclear waste repository.26 The Energy and Water

Development Appropriations Subcommittee did not report a bill to the full

committee. For a time, it appeared that it would not be possible to include energy

and water appropriations in the omnibus appropriations bill, and that FY2005

spending for energy and water would be done under a year-long continuing

resolution.27 However, a compromise worked out at the last minute permitted

inclusion of energy and water appropriations in H.R. 4818, Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2005.28

Piecing together numerous press reports, the arrangement that broke the logjam

included several elements. (1) RNEP and ACI were eliminated, and several other

nuclear weapons programs were eliminated, reduced, or modified. (2) Conferees

freed up $800 million from various parts of the omnibus bill, some of which was

used to provide $577 million for Yucca Mountain instead of the $131 million in the

House bill. (3) Conferees provided substantial increases for three projects at Los

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development

Appropriations Bill, 2005, H.Rept. 108-554, 108th Congress., 2nd Session, June 2004

(Washington, GPO, 2004), p. 115.

For details on Yucca Mountain, see CRS Issue Brief IB92059, Civilian Nuclear Waste

Disposal, by (name redacted). Regarding the legislativ

e process on the energy and water bill, see

Amol Sharma, “Energy and Water Appropriations: The Battle for Yucca Mountain, CQ

Weekly, Nov. 27, 2004, p. 2787.

Joseph Schatz, “Thorny Issues, Multibillion-Dollar Gap Divide Chambers’ Fiscal

Spending Bills,” CQ Today, Oct. 22, 2004.

For text of this measure, see U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, Nov. 19, 2004, Book

II (entire volume). For text of Weapons Activities, see ibid., pp. H10273-H10274, H10556H10557, and H10566-H10569.

CRS-13

Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories.29 According to one report, “In return for

letting Hobson cut the bunker-buster and other new nuclear weapons initiatives,

Domenici got money he wanted for work at Sandia and Los Alamos, Domenici

acknowledged in an interview.”30 Another report stated: “Sen. Pete Domenici (RNM), one of the chief backers of RNEP and ACI funding in Congress, told reporters

this week that he agreed to the spending cuts for both programs in order to get the

omnibus bill finished.”31

Developments in the FY2006 Budget Cycle

The FY2006 RNEP request

For FY2006, NNSA cast a program more modest in its cost, scope, and schedule

than it was for FY2005. Rather than show a five-year projection, NNSA, recognizing

that a separate decision would be needed to go beyond the study phase, projected a

cost for the study only, ending in FY2007, and reduced the scope of the study from

the B83 and B61 to the B83 only. As a result, the cost was much lower, $4.0 million

for FY2006 and $14.0 million for FY2007.32 As Ambassador Brooks explained,

The reason the level is so much less is we have cut back on what it is that we

propose to do. Originally, we proposed to examine two different warheads.

Fundamentally, what we’re doing is taking a warhead, putting a very hard case

on it, controlling its attitude very precisely, so that it can penetrate a few meters

into rock and still stay intact and go off, that way the energy goes into the

ground. We’ve concluded that we can demonstrate whether or not the concept

is feasible by looking at only one warhead. We selected the B83, which is one

of the two bombs we were looking at, because that was where we were when the

program was stopped.33

Further, NNSA stated:

The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) category includes funding for the

Phase 6.2/2A Air Force-led study. The decision to complete this study was

reaffirmed with DOD in January 2005. Activities include participating in

integrated NNSA-DOD integrated product teams for development of RNEP

requirements and programmatic documents; system design and integration;

Amol Sharma, “Energy and Water Appropriations: The Battle for Yucca Mountain,” CQ

Weekly, Nov. 27, 2004, p. 2787.

John Fleck, “Nuclear Weapons Budget Grows Despite Cuts to Bomb Modernization

Plans,” Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 23, 2004.

Keith Costa, “Lawmakers Scuttle FY-05 Funding for Nuclear ‘Bunker Busters,’” Inside

the Pentagon, Nov. 25, 2004.

Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, p. 68.

Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security

Administration, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on

Strategic Forces, Strategic Forces/Nuclear Weapons Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, hearing, Apr.

4, 2005.

CRS-14

planning, cost and risks analyses; and phenomenology studies. The study is

scheduled for completion in FY 2007. In FY 2006, activities include conduct of

a B83 impact test, analyzing test data, and supporting integration meetings with

the DOD.34

The Senate Armed Services Committee stated that the funding is “to prepare and

execute the sled track impact test at Sandia National Laboratories on the feasibility

of case hardening and target penetration.”35

DOD also requested FY2006 funds for RNEP, included in the Air Force budget.

According to an Air Force legislative liaison officer:

The Air Force will spend $4.5M in FY 2006 and $3.5M in FY 2007 to complete

the joint study that began in FY 2003. As part of the joint study in these years,

the Air Force will perform analysis and specify requirements for integrating the

conceptual weapon on the B-2 platform (e.g., software and hardware

modifications), identify environments the weapon would have to withstand (e.g.,

temperature, acceleration, and shock and vibration), and define capabilities

needed for the navigation, guidance and control (NG&C) — (e.g., accuracy and

impact parameters). We will also develop estimates of the associated costs.36

An Air Force document provides further details on the FY2006 DOD RNEP

request. The document states that Nuclear Weapons Support

Supports pre-acquisition studies/analyses to determine feasibility and develop

definition, and cost of navigation, guidance, and control (NG&C) concepts as

well as evaluate B-2 aircraft integration issues associated with the joint

Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) Robust

Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) concept as approved/directed by the Nuclear

Weapons Council (NWC).

FY 2006 funding is a combination of $1.0M in RDT&E-AF [research,

development, test, and evaluation, Air Force] and $3.5M in O&M-AF [operation

and maintenance, Air Force] funding. The RDT&E-AF funding will complete

logistics and aircraft integration planning as well as develop nuclear certification

criteria. The O&M funding will support the development of a conceptual NG&C

design and risk assessment, identification of B-2 software/hardware issues, and

other related B-2 logistics and integration efforts. (FY 2005 Base $0)37

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO, FY 2006

Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration,

DOE/ME/0046, Feb. 2005, pp. 82-83.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2006, S.Rept. 109-69, to accompany S. 1042, 109th Congress, 1st Session,

2005, pp. 202, 482.

E-mail from Lt. Col. Joseph Cappello, USAF, to Jonathan Medalia, Feb. 16, 2005. The

funds are contained in the FY2006 Air Force Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Program under Advanced Component Development and Prototypes as a part of Program

Element 0604222F, “Nuclear Weapons Support.”

U.S. Department of the Air Force. Fiscal Year (FY) 2006/FY2007 Budget Estimates:

(continued...)

CRS-15

The $1.0 million is included in $15.4 million for program element 0604222F,

“Nuclear Weapons Support,” within RDT&E, Air Force.38 The $3.5 million is

included in $287.2 million for program element 3400F, line 020, “Primary Combat

Weapons,” within O&M, Air Force.39

A question that arose in 2004 was if DOD supported RNEP. In 2005, DOD

answered affirmatively. NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks testified in April 2005,

After last year’s action by the Congress [on RNEP], we asked the Department of

Defense to review the continuing need. The Secretary of Defense personally

reviewed that, and at his direct personal request we have included the money in

the budget for this year. He did this not because he’s particularly interested in

developing a new weapon, but because there are adversaries who are building

deeply buried facilities, and it is unwise for there to be anything that’s beyond

the reach of U.S. power.40

According to a press report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memo

in January 2005 to then-Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham that stated “‘I think

we should request funds in FY06 and FY07 to complete the [RNEP] study. ... You

can count on my support for your efforts to revitalize the nuclear weapons

infrastructure and to complete the RNEP study.’”41

There was also a suggestion that DOD’s request was crucial to DOE’s decision

to include RNEP in the FY2006 budget. According to a press report, “‘The reason

the money was put in the budget was the result of a direct request from [the Defense

Department] to finish the study,’ said Anson Franklin, a spokesman for the Energy

Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration. ‘The Secretary of Defense

was consulted, and based on that information we put it back in the budget.’”42

(...continued)

Operation and Maintenance, Air Force, Volume I, Feb. 2005, p. 87. Available at

[https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2006/afoandm/AF_FY06_PB_OM_Vol%201.pdf].

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

RDT&E Programs (R-1), Fiscal Year 2006, Feb. 2005, p. F-5, [http://www.dod.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_r1.pdf].

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Operations Programs (O-1), Fiscal Year 2006, Feb. 2005, p. 10, [http://www.dod.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_o1.pdf].

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water

Development, FY2006 Appropriations for the National Nuclear Security Administration,

hearing, Apr. 14, 2005.

Walter Pincus, “Rumsfeld Seeks to Revive Burrowing Nuclear Bomb,” Washington Post,

Feb. 1, 2005, p. 2.

Bill Gertz, “Defense Seeks Raise, Rock-Penetrating Nuke,” Washington Times, online

edition, February 8, 2005.

CRS-16

Legislative Activity

The House Appropriations Committee recommended eliminating NNSA funds

for RNEP from the Energy and Water Development Bill, H.R. 2419, as it did in the

FY2005 bill. The report stated,

The Committee continues to oppose the diversion of resources and intellectual

capital away from the more serious issues that confront the management of the

nation’s nuclear deterrent, primarily the transformation of the Cold War nuclear

weapons complex and existing stockpile into a sustainable enterprise. The

Committee has been disappointed at the bureaucracy’s adherence to an initiative

that threatens Congressional and public support for sustainable stockpile

initiatives that will actually provide long-term security and deterrent value for the

Nation.43

The House passed the bill, 416-13, on May 24, with no amendments on RNEP, and

only a few brief mentions of it in prepared remarks. (Note that the bill did not

address the Air Force RNEP request, which fell under the jurisdiction of the DOD

Appropriations Subcommittee.)

The House Armed Services Committee recommended providing the DOD

RNEP funds as requested, but transferring the $4.0 million in NNSA funds to a

separate program in DOD. In explaining the transfer, the committee’s report stated,

“Based on the applicability of the sled test results to various options for HDBT [hard

and deeply buried target] defeat, the committee believes that this [NNSA RNEP]

study is more appropriately conducted under a program element within the

Department of Defense.”44 Accordingly, “The committee authorizes $4.0 million in

PE [program element] 64327F for a penetrator test that would evaluate the feasibility

of various options for different types of penetrators that could hold HDBTs at risk.

The committee intends that this study be completed by the end of fiscal year 2006.”45

However, 23 of the 28 committee Democrats stated that the report language “could

be construed to allow the sled test to inform whether a nuclear payload could be used

in high-speed penetration of hard geologies,” and urged that the test “should be

conducted in a manner that only informs conventional payloads.”46 The House

passed the bill, H.R. 1815, 390-39, on May 25 with no amendment or debate on

RNEP. Representative Heather Wilson, in discussing the energy and water bill,

stated, “It is my understanding that this study will now move to the Department of

Defense and outside of the jurisdiction of the Energy and Water Appropriations

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development

Appropriations Bill, 2006, report to accompany H.R. 2419, 109th Congress, 1st Session,

H.Rept. 109-86, (Washington: GPO, 2005), p. 131.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2006, report to accompany H.R. 1815, 109th Congress, 1st session, H.Rept.

109-89, (Washington: GOP, 2005), p. 463.

Ibid., p. 211.

Ibid., p. 513.

CRS-17

subcommittee.”47 It is unclear whether the move of RNEP funds from NNSA to

DOD was done with that purpose in mind.

The House Appropriations Committee’s FY2006 DOD Appropriations Bill,

H.R. 2863, contained $4.0 million for a “conventional penetrator study” as a new

program under “Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System.”48 Further, it

retained $4.5 million within the categories “Nuclear Weapons Support” and “Primary

Combat Weapons” that was requested for integrating RNEP with the B-2.49

Committee staff explained that the committee intended that the study be of

nonnuclear means of hard and deeply buried target defeat, and not of RNEP. As a

corollary, the staff continued, since the RNEP study was not funded but the $4.5

million was linked to the B-2, the committee intended that the latter sum be used to

study integrating conventional earth penetrators with the B-2.50 The House passed

H.R. 2863, 398-19, on June 20, with no change to the foregoing provisions.51

The Senate Armed Services Committee reported the defense authorization bill,

S. 1042, on May 17. It recommended eliminating the $4.5 million in DOD funding

on grounds that “evaluation of RNEP feasibility by the Department of Energy is not

scheduled to be completed prior to 2007.”52 Further, “The committee does not

believe that these activities are necessary to evaluate the feasibility of RNEP.”53 The

committee recommended providing the $4.0 million that NNSA requested for

RNEP.54 The Senate began considering the bill on July 20. On July 22, the Senate

debated an amendment (SA 1415) by Senator Kennedy to transfer NNSA RNEP

funds to the Washington, DC, Army National Guard. The amendment was withdrawn

on November 4, and the bill passed, 98-0, on November 15.

The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the energy and water bill, H.R.

2419, on June 16. The committee recommended $4.0 million for NNSA for the

RNEP study, and urged that sled tests be conducted at Sandia National Laboratories

in Albuquerque, NM, as planned.55 On June 30, the Senate rejected, 43-53, an

“Speech of Hon. Heather Wilson,” in U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, May 25,

2005, p. E1091.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations Bill, 2006, H.Rept. 109-119 to accompany H.R. 2863, 109th Congress, 1st

Session, 2005, pp. 266, 275.

Ibid., pp. 65, 275.

Information provided by House Appropriations Committee staff, June 21 and 23, 2005.

For a colloquy and statement on H.R. 2863 regarding RNEP, see U.S. Congress,

Congressional Record, June 20, 2005, pp. H4736, H4738-H4739.

Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2006, pp. 202, 292.

Ibid., p. 483.

Ibid., p. 482.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Energy and Water Appropriations

Bill, 2006, S.Rept. 109-84, to accompany H.R. 2419, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005, pp.

(continued...)

CRS-18

amendment by Senator Feinstein to eliminate the $4.0 million from the bill.56 The

Senate passed the bill, as amended, 92-3, on July 1.

The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the FY2006 DOD

appropriations bill, H.R. 2863, on September 29. It eliminated the $3.5 million for

RNEP in the Air Force operation and maintenance account under line 20, “Robust

Nuclear Earth Penetrator Support,” and eliminated the $1.0 million for RNEP in the

Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation account under line 66, “Nuclear

Weapons Support.” Also under line 66, it eliminated another $1.4 million requested

for counterproliferation support to counter future threats such as deeply buried

targets.

While the conference on the energy and water bill was underway, Senator

Domenici issued a press release stating that NNSA had dropped its request for

continued research on RNEP, and that conferees had therefore dropped RNEP

funding. According to the Senator,

The focus will now be with the Defense Department and its research to earth

penetrating technology using conventional weaponry. The NNSA indicated that

this research should evolve around more conventional weapons rather than

tactical nuclear devices. With this department change in policy, we have agreed

not to provide DOE with funding for RNEP.57

The conference report (H.Rept. 109-275) provided no funds for RNEP. The Energy

and Water Development Appropriations Act was signed into law (P.L. 109-103)

November 19, 2005.

The authorization conference report provided no funds for RNEP, but instead

added $4.0 million to DOD in program element 64327F, Hard and Deeply Buried

Target Defeat System, “to conduct a sled test and a study on the physics of

penetrating geologic media, to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2006.”58 The

measure was signed into law (P.L. 109-163) January 6, 2006.

The DOD appropriations conference report deleted $3.5 million for RNEP

Support under Primary Combat Weapons within the Operation and Maintenance, Air

Force, account. Under the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force,

account, it provided $4.0 million for a conventional penetrator study under Hard and

(...continued)

155-156.

For debate on the amendment, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, June 30, 2005,

pp. S7781-S7794. Amendment text is on p. S7781; vote on the amendment is on p. S7794.

“Domenici: RNEP Funds Dropped from Appropriations Bill,” press release, Senator Pete

Domenici, Oct. 25, 2005. For further details on NNSA’s position, see Jeffrey Lewis,

“NNSA Denies Axeing RNEP,” ArmsControlWonk.com, November 15, 2005, available at

[http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/855/nnsa-denies-dropping-rnep].

U.S. Congress. Committee of Conference. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2006, H.Rept. 109-360, to accompany H.R. 1815. 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005,

p. 592, 902.

CRS-19

Deeply Buried Target Defeat System and deleted $1.0 million for RNEP under

Nuclear Weapons Support.59 The measure was signed into law (P.L. 109-148)

December 30, 2005.

Clarification of Key Points in FY2006 Hearings

Hearings in 2005 added information on topics that may arise in any future

debate, such as the yield of RNEP, the collateral damage the weapon would likely

cause, and the military requirement for RNEP. The following colloquy occurred at

a hearing in February:

Representative Terry Everett: ... Could you please tell me directly if there’s

a military need for this, for robust earth — nuclear earth penetrator?

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: ... It is a question that’s difficult

to answer, because sometimes they say “military requirement”. And that’s a

formal process. There was no military requirement for military aircraft, for

example. There was no military requirement for unmanned aerial vehicles until

they came along. And so, what I believe, there is a need for the study — which

is what we’re talking about here, and not a weapon. We’re talking about taking

existing weapons and doing a study to see if they can be reduced in their power,

their lethality to a level that’s lower than the current weapons are so that they

might have the ability to penetrate the earth in a way that could help protect the

United States of America. I think that it is clearly in our country’s interest to do

the study. Has it — [speaking to General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs

of Staff] You want to comment on whether there’s a, quote, “military

requirement” specifically?

General Myers: You bet. Our combatant commander that is charged by

this nation to worry about countering the kind of targets, deeply buried targets

certainly thinks there’s a need for this study. And General Cartwright has said

such. I think that. I think the Joint Chiefs think that. And so, the study is that.

It’s not a commitment to go forward with a system, it’s just to see if it’s

feasible.60

This colloquy occurred at a hearing in March:

Representative Ellen Tauscher: I just want to know is there any way an

RNEP of any size that we would drop will not produce a huge amount of

radioactive debris?

NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks: No, there is not.

Representative Tauscher: Secretary Rumsfeld last week confused the

debate over the RNEP when he told our committee that the RNEP study, “is

taking existing weapons and doing a study to see if they can be reduced in their

power, lethality, to a level that is lower than current weapons.” My

understanding was that the RNEP study was not going to change the physics

U.S. Congress. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for the Department of

Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, and for Other Purposes, H.Rept.

109-359, to accompany H.R. 2863, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005, p. 219, 222, 404, 416.

Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and General Richard Myers,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,

FY2006 Defense Budget Request, Feb. 16, 2005. Transcript by Federal News Service, pp.

30-31.

CRS-20

package of the warhead but simply look at ways to repackage the device so it can

penetrate hard geologies. Am I right or are you also looking at lowering the yield

of, say, the B83 to perhaps under five kilotons?

Administrator Brooks: We are not looking at changing the yield of the

physics package. ...

Ambassador Brooks: I really must apologize for my lack of precision if we

in the administration have suggested that it was possible to have a bomb that

penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don’t believe that — I don’t believe

the laws of physics will ever let that be true. ...

This is a nuclear weapon. This is a nuclear weapon that is going to be

hugely destructive and destructive over a large area. No sane person would use

a weapon like that lightly, and I regret any impression that anybody, including

me, has given that would suggest that this is going to be any easier a decision —

I mean if this weapon were in the arsenal today, it would still be a hugely

difficult decision for any president to even contemplate it. So I — the

administration believes and I personally believe that this study should continue,

but it — I want to — I do want to make it clear that any thought of sort of nuclear

weapons that aren’t really destructive is just nuts.61

To summarize, the foregoing passages, by clarifying several points that were at

issue in earlier debates on RNEP, may help focus any future debate.

There is no formal military requirement for RNEP.

There is considerable interest by DOD and the armed services in

learning, through the proposed RNEP study, whether RNEP is

feasible.

The possible conversion of a B83 bomb to an RNEP would not

involve changing the yield of the weapon.

RNEP — and probably any other nuclear earth penetrator — would

not penetrate the ground deeply enough to contain fallout. Use of

RNEP would therefore cause a “huge” amount of fallout and

destruction.

Because RNEP, if it is deployed, would be a nuclear weapon, a

presidential decision to use it would be very difficult.

Developments in the FY2007 Budget Cycle

NNSA requested no funds for RNEP for FY2007. The program appears

nowhere in its FY2007 request document.62 NNSA stated in January 2006 that it

Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, House Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 2,

2005, pp. 15-16.

U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Chief Financial Officer. FY2007 Congressional

Budget Request, Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/CF-002,

(continued...)

CRS-21

disbanded the RNEP teams in March 2005, and stated in February 2006 that it has

closed out the project.63

(...continued)

February 2006, 683 p.

Information provided by NNSA, January 27 and February 17, 2006.

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