Liberia: Transition to Peace

Order Code RL32243

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Liberia: Transition to Peace

Updated October 28, 2004

nae redacted

Analyst in African Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Liberia: Transition to Peace

Summary

This report, which is updated periodically, covers recent events in Liberia and

related U.S. policy. In 2003, Liberia began a post-conflict transition process to

achieve enduring peace, socio-economic reconstruction and democratic governance.

This process resulted from the signing of a peace accord and the resignation of

then-president Charles Taylor in August 2003, after months of international

mediation. The accord ended a civil war that burgeoned in 2000 which pitted the

forces of Taylor against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war led to an

extreme deterioration in political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights

conditions in Liberia. It also affected neighboring states, from which anti-Taylor

forces operated; against which the Taylor regime sponsored acts of armed aggression;

and in which large numbers of Liberians sought refuge.

Liberia’s security situation, though periodically volatile, has improved steadily

since August 2003. A disarmament and demobilization program, which encountered

repeated initial difficulties, has inducted over 95,000 ex-combatants to date. This

process is jointly supervised by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and

the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), which received over $522

million in aid pledges at a February 2004 donor conference. UNMIL began

operations on October 1, 2003. The NTGL, formed under the August accord and

installed on October 14, 2003, is mandated with re-establishing government authority

and preparing for elections in late 2005. The transition faces many challenges, most

related to the socio-economic effects of war; the dominant role within the NTGL of

former armed factions, which are prone to internal dissension; and limited state

capacities. UNMIL has reached full force strength, and has deployed peacekeepers

to most areas of the country, but insecurity remains a challenge in many rural areas.

Implementation of the peace accord and of the NTGL’s mandate have been beset by

disagreements over the allocation of positions, accusations of corruption, and

leadership rivalries within the NTGL. The legal status of Taylor, who is living in

exile in Nigeria and is under indictment by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war

crimes related to his alleged involvement in war crimes in Sierra Leone, remains

unresolved. U.S. legislation urges Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the court.

Considerable public and congressional debate over possible U.S. intervention

in Liberia occurred in mid-2003. The United States did not intervene militarily, but

it did: deploy limited military forces to Liberia to bolster U.S. security interests;

assist an the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military

force to deploy to Liberia prior to UNMIL; help mediate the August accord; and

provide International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) ($200 million) and

support for UNMIL ($250 million). In addition to H.R. 4818, the Foreign Operations

FY2005 Appropriations bill, current Liberia-related bills pertain to proposals to

change the immigration status of certain Liberian nationals and to cancel certain

Liberian national debts. Liberia-related bills introduced in the 108th Congress include

H.Con.Res. 240; H.Con.Res. 233; H.Con.Res. 255; H.J.Res. 2; H.R. 2673; H.R.

1930; H.R. 3918; H.R. 3289; H.R. 2800; H.R.4511; H.R. 4793; H.R. 4818; H.R.

4885; S. 2812; S. 1426; and S. 656.

Contents

Overview and Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S.-Backed Peace and Transitional Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Donor Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S. Supplemental Appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.N. Mission and Transitional Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Peace Accord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Key Turning Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Liberia’s Conflict: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Actors and Patterns in Liberia’s Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) . . . . . . . 4

MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Pattern of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Rebel Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Decline of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Effects of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Human Rights Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Humanitarian Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

International Dimensions of Liberia’s Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Regional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Persistent Regional Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Guinea and Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

International Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.N. Security Council Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.N. and ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

National Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Current Humanitarian Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Nutrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

General Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Re-establishment of State Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Reforms in the Security and Legal Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

UNMIL Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Security Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Intra-Factional Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Peace Accord Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

NTGL Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

(DDRR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Disarmament Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Child Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Status of Charles Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Taylor Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Indictment: Implications and Asylum Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Status of SCSL Case Against Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Asylum: Debate and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Pressure on Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

U.S. Law and Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Responses to Increasing Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Embassy Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Conflict Resolution Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

U.S. Intervention in Liberia: Debate and Policy Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Perspectives on Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Initial U.S. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Military Assistance and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Joint Task Force Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

U.S. Assistance: Development Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

U.S. Emergency and Post-War Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Current U.S. Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Other Aspects of U.S. Policy toward Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Murder of U.S. Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Current Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

2003 Iraq Supplemental Assistance for Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Other Enacted Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Other Legislation Introduced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Peace Consolidation and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Trial of Charles Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

UNMIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Appendix 1: U.S. Assistance Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Appendix 2: Acronyms and Terms Used in this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

List of Tables

Table 1. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Table 3. U.S. Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance to Liberia,

FY2002-FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Table 4. Recent U.S. Bilateral Development Assistance to Liberia . . . . . . . . . . 50

Table 5. P.L. 108-106 Supplemental U.S. Assistance for Liberia, FY2004 . . . . 50

Liberia: Transition to Peace

Overview and Recent Developments

In August 2003, a political accord was signed that formally ended over three and

one-half years of armed civil conflict in Liberia, a small West African country of

about 3.3 million people. Since that time, the country has made steady progress

toward consolidating peace, initiating post-war resettlement and socio-economic

reconstruction, and establishing functional interim state institutions. Despite such

progress, there are indications that these and other related goals — such as the

conduct of credible and transparent democratic elections, the creation of a durably

transparent and effective governance regime, and a transition from reconstruction to

long-term economic growth — face diverse and substantial obstacles.

U.S.-Backed Peace and Transitional Process

Donor Assistance. Liberia’s progress has been aided, in part, by

international donors, including the United States, which held a pledging conference

for Liberia in New York on February 5-6, 2004. At the conference, donors pledged

over $522 million in relief and reconstruction assistance for Liberia; $200 million of

this amount was pledged by the United States.1 The donor conference, attended by

representatives of 96 countries and 45 public and private organizations, reviewed the

plans of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) for a post-conflict

transition, as well as progress toward implementation of a peace accord signed in

August 2003. It also received an update on the activities and views of the United

Nations (U.N.) Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and considered a program of assistance

organized around a “Results-Focused Transition Framework” centering on

reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in 2004 and 2005. The framework’s main

elements, which underpin the efforts of the multiple functional U.N. agencies and

many of the non-governmental organizations that are active in Liberia, include the

following:

Security maintenance, demobilization and reintegration,

development of democratic governance and the rule of law, police

training and reform, and elections;

! Protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),

advocacy for human and gender-based rights, combating HIV/AIDS;

!

1

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the International Reconstruction

Conference on Liberia,” U.N. Headquarters, New York City, Feb. 6, 2004; Jim

Fisher-Thompson, “U.S. to Pledge $200 Million to Liberia for Reconstruction, Says USAID

Chief,” Washington File, Feb. 4, 2004; and World Bank, “Liberia: International

Reconstruction Conference, 5-6 February 2004,” Summary Pledge Sheet.

CRS-2

Provision of basic services, including water, sanitation, health care,

and education, and related services;

! Economic development policy strategy and restoration of productive

capacity and livelihoods; and

! Reconstruction of infrastructure, e.g., electricity, transport,

telecommunications, and housing.

!

U.S. Supplemental Appropriation. The donor conference followed

President Bush’s November 6, 2003, signing into law of the Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and

Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106. It provided $245 million for assessed costs of

United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in Liberia, and up to $205.5 million

for peace, humanitarian disaster, and famine assistance for Liberia.2

U.N. Mission and Transitional Government. The authorization of

sharply increased U.S. assistance to Liberia followed the deployment on October 1,

2003 of UNMIL, authorized by the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003,

and the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL).

The NTGL, inaugurated on October 14, 2003, was formed in accordance with a peace

agreement signed in Accra, Ghana, which formally ended the Liberian conflict. The

NTGL is led by Gyude (Joo-deh) Bryant, a businessman and Episcopal church

layman of ethnic Grebo descent, who leads the Liberian Action Party. As head of

state, Bryant occupies the office of chairman, a post designated in the August 2003

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (hereafter labeled the CPA), as the top executive

NTGL position in order to emphasize the transitory nature of the NTGL and to

forebear the naming of a president prior to elections. The NTGL vice-chairman is

Wesley Johnson, a university economics lecturer who heads the Liberian United

Peoples’ Party.

Peace Accord. The signing of the CPA on August 18, 2003 followed two and

a half months of negotiations mediated by the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL).3 Its

signatories include the armed parties in Liberia’s conflict and Liberia’s leading

political parties and civil society groups. The armed parties included the forces of

Liberia’s former president, Charles Taylor, and two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups,

2

$200 million in International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) account funds were

appropriated for Liberia in various sections of P.L. 108-106 and in the Joint Explanatory

Statement of the Committee of Conference that accompanied the enrolled bill. The act,

however, also included language (“and by transfer not to exceed 0.5 percent of the funds

appropriated under any other heading in this chapter”) that indicates that up to an additional

$5.5 million was potentially allocated for Liberia and/or Sudan. The IDFA account funds

relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to victims of natural and man-made

disasters, and combines the former International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account and a

previously proposed Famine Fund. IDFA allocations are designed to complement other

bilateral assistance programs, particularly in countries affected by complex emergencies.

3

The ICGL is a body formed in September 2002 by key donor and regional states to

coordinate a comprehensive, regionally-focused conflict resolution process.

CRS-3

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for

Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

The accord provides for disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and

reintegration (DDRR) programs and a peace-building process in Liberia. It mandates

that the NTGL implement a largely failed June 17, 2003 cease-fire agreement;4

monitor and coordinate the DDRR process, with international assistance, as well as

a range of other political and reconstruction programs; and assist in the preparation

and conduct of internationally supervised elections in October 2005.5 Other key

provisions of the accord include

The stipulated establishment of various political processes, legal

authorities, mandates, and bodies, including an Implementation

Monitoring Committee (IMC) and a National Commission for

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

(NCDDRR) to implement the peace accord, and a timetable for this

purpose;

! Military and police restructuring;

! Release of political prisoners and prisoners of war;

! The apportionment of key government leadership positions among

accord signatories;

! “Consideration” of “a recommendation for general amnesty to all

persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during

the Liberian civil conflict”;

! Naming of a new supreme court; and

! The creation of a Contracts and Monopolies Commission (CMC), a

Governance Reform Commission (GRC), an Independent National

Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), a National Electoral

Commission (NEC), a National Transitional Legislative Assembly

(NTLA), and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

!

Key Turning Points. The signing of the peace accord was preceded by two

key events: the departure from Liberia on August 11, 2003 of Charles Taylor, who

resigned from the presidency and went into exile in Nigeria after accepting an offer

of political asylum from its government; and the deployment by ECOWAS of a

military intervention force known as the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

4

Key provisions of the cease-fire agreement were not implemented until after the CPA was

signed. The cease-fire was extensively and repeatedly violated by the three belligerent

groups during negotiations leading to the accord. Two cease-fire monitoring bodies called

for under the cease-fire agreement did not deploy until after the CPA was signed. The Joint

Verification Team, formed in early July 2003, did not deploy to Liberia because of a fluid

military situation and lack of a cease-fire, and due to organizational and technical hurdles.

The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), was not formed until September 2003. Cease-fire

violations included three massive assaults by LURD on the capital, Monrovia, each resulting

in hundreds of civilian casualties, and government-rebel battles in multiple locations in

Liberia’s interior.

5

The June and August agreements are available online from the U.S. Institute of Peace. See

[http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html].

CRS-4

The departure of Taylor, elected Liberia’s president in 1997 after its first civil

war (1989-1997), followed intense international pressure on him to leave Liberia, as

he had publicly pledged to do on June 4, 2003. After Taylor’s departure, the vice

president, Moses Blah, assumed the presidency as head of a caretaker government,

pending the swearing in of the NTGL. Several developments appear to have

motivated Taylor’s decision to leave. These include the possibility that if he did not

accept Nigeria’s asylum offer, he would have faced immediate extradition to Sierra

Leone to answer international war crimes charges (see below); continuing military

gains by LURD and MODEL; and LURD’s refusal to engage in serious conflict

resolution efforts while Taylor remained in office. His departure appears to have

been a key factor motivating LURD and MODEL to agree to the CPA.

The ECOWAS intervention sought to end heavy fighting and alleviate a

worsening humanitarian crisis in the wake of the failed June 17 cease-fire. ECOMIL

was mandated with monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of

relief aid, and preparing the way for UNMIL. Lead elements of ECOMIL,

predominantly comprised of a Nigerian battalion that had been serving with the U.N.

Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), began deploying to Liberia on August 4, 2003.

An additional Nigerian battalion, one of several West African forces trained under

Operation Focus Relief,6 and troops from Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau,

Togo, Ghana, and Benin, continued to arrive throughout August and into September

2003. ECOMIL, which reached a full force strength of over 3,560 members by midSeptember, deployed with the aid of extensive U.S. and U.N. assistance. The United

States provided logistical and transport services, communications equipment, and

other supplies worth $26 million in funds drawn from U.S. peacekeeping operations

accounts. This assistance was delivered primarily by PAE Government Services,

Inc., a military logistics services firm that had previously supported ECOWAS forces

in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in liaison with elements of the U.S. military Joint Task

Force Liberia (see below).

Liberia’s Conflict: Background

Actors and Patterns in Liberia’s Conflict

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

Liberia’s recent conflict, the second in a decade,7 began when LURD launched a

series of cross-border raids into Liberia’s northwestern Lofa County in mid-year

2000, reportedly from nearby bases in southern Guinea. These actions resembled

6

Operation Focus Relief (OFR) was a one-time U.S. military training program that provided

“robust” infantry operational combat training and equipment to troops from Nigeria, Ghana

and Senegal in anticipation of their possible deployment with UNAMSIL. At the time of

the training, in 2001, Sierra Leone was emerging from conflict, but was seen as subject to

a possible military threat from the now defunct rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in

Sierra Leone. OFR cost between an estimated $86.75 million and $87.53 million.

7

Liberia’s first civil war, past developments, and U.S.-Liberian relations are covered in CRS

Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S.

Relations.

CRS-5

several similar, but abortive, attacks launched in 1999, likely by fighters who later

formed LURD, which began to coalesce in mid-1999. It was initially primarily

comprised of Liberians living in Sierra Leone and Guinea as exiles and refugees.8

LURD’s nominal leader, Sekou Damate Conneh, is a former Liberian tax collector

of Mandingo heritage who fled to Guinea in 1990. He later worked as an auto trader

and businessman, and was imprisoned after returning to Liberia in 1997; he later

again fled to Guinea. Conneh reportedly has close relations with the authorities in

Conakry, but these appear to have been mediated, in part, by his wife, Aisha KeitaConneh, who is reportedly a personal advisor to Conté, including on spiritual matters.

Differences between the couple, discussed below, contributed to internal rifts within

LURD.

MODEL. The formation of LURD was motivated by its members’ mutual

opposition to what they viewed as a persistent pattern of ethnic bias, political

exclusion, human rights abuses, and corruption under Taylor. LURD’s ethnically

diverse make-up reflected the commonality of such views across ethnic lines. Such

shared views were not strong enough, however, to permanently overcome parochial

self interests, leadership rivalries, and a history of competition between the two

ethnic groups, the Mandingo and the Krahn, that initially formed the bulk of LURD’s

membership. In early 2003, such issues prompted some of its Krahn members to

depart LURD and form MODEL.9

MODEL appears to have been formed as the result of a merger between LURD

members based in the west of Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia’s neighbor, and Force Lima, a

militia based in the same area. Force Lima was formed in late 2002 to counter

Liberian militias — reportedly backed by the Taylor government — that entered the

Cote d’Ivoire in support of two Ivorian rebel groups that in November 2002 had

taken up arms against the Ivorian government of President Laurent Gbagbo. Many

of Force Lima’s recruits were anti-Taylor Liberian Krahn refugees who had lived for

extended periods in western Cote d’Ivoire, which is the traditional homeland of the

Guere, an Ivorian ethnic group closely related to the Krahn by culture and language.

Force Lima, and later MODEL, were reportedly backed by the Gbagbo government,

which dismissed such allegations, and its supporters.

8

LURD and MODEL have been the subject of numerous press accounts, and U.N. and nongovernmental organization reports. In particular, see James Brabazon, “Liberia: Liberians

United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),” Armed Non-State Actors Project

Briefing Paper No. 1, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Feb. 2003; International Crisis

Group (ICG),”Liberia: The Key To Ending Regional Instability,” Africa Report No. 43, Apr.

24, 2002; and ICG, “Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm,” Africa Report No.

62, Apr. 30, 2003. The latter also discusses MODEL in depth.

9

The LURD-MODEL split closely mirrored the division of the United Liberation Movement

of Liberia (ULIMO), a defunct, predominantly Mandingo and Krahn faction from Liberia’s

first civil war to which many LURD fighters had belonged. In 1993, ULIMO split into

ULIMO-K, a Mandingo-dominated faction, and ULIMO-J, a predominantly Krahn group.

The similar organizational evolution of LURD and ULIMO suggests that ethnicity will

likely continue to function as a key organizing principle, both for exclusionary purposes and

in alliance building, shaping political competition for control of state resources and power.

CRS-6

Despite the emergence of MODEL as a LURD splinter group, there remained

linkages between the two organizations. They reportedly shared some common

sources of financial support, and some members were affiliated with both groups,

which shared a common foe and did not militarily oppose one another. In addition

to such commonalities, both groups have faced internal divisions, and both are seen

as susceptible to further fissures, particularly due to by rank-and-file members’

resentment of their leaders’ actual or perceived access to state resources and the perks

of state office, which some hold as officials of the NTGL.

Pattern of Conflict. After the first LURD attacks in 2000, the armed rebel

campaign, though episodic and seasonal, grew both in its geographic extent and

military intensity. Initially concentrated in Lofa, hostilities gradually spread south

and then to central Liberia, as LURD launched operations further afield, including

attacks near to the capital, Monrovia. By late 2002, many western and central

Liberian towns had been the site of combat or had experienced indirect effects of

war, such as influxes of displaced persons, the activities of armed elements, and the

negative impact on daily life and economic activities of generally rising insecurity.

As the conflict grew, rebel forces gradually seized more territory and held it for

increasingly long periods, notably in 2003, but the military situation was often fluid.

Belligerents’ territorial control was limited and transitory. Fighting often focused on

provisioning, looting, and harassment raids, and often targeted displaced persons’

camps, rural industries, and towns along Liberia’s rudimentary road network.

Marginal changes in variables, such as access to arms materiél, provisions, or

manpower, often shifted the tactical balance between forces, which were often poorly

trained, lacking in discipline, and frequently prone to arbitrary behavior. All of the

armed groups recruited large numbers of children and adolescents, and heavy use of

drugs, alcohol, and other intoxicants was, and likely remains, common among

Liberian combatants.10

Rebel Gains. In early 2003, MODEL moved into eastern Liberia from the

areas in Cote d’Ivoire near the Liberian border. It soon made significant military inroads there, and over the next few months expanded its area of operations,

successfully seizing territory and many towns in Liberia’ eastern counties and along

the coast.11 In April 2003, an ECOWAS assessment team reported that LURD and

MODEL together controlled about 60% of Liberian territory. Rebel gains continued.

LURD launched three intense assaults on the capital, two in June and one in late July.

Monrovians dubbed these “World War” “I,” “II,” and “III” because of the

indiscriminate use of mortars and other projectiles during the fighting, and due to the

high civilian casualty rate that resulted.

Decline of Conflict. Periodic fighting continued following the deployment

of ECOMIL, and persisted after the signing of the CPA and the subsequent

deployment of UNMIL in early October 2004. It gradually decreased in scope and

frequency, however, as peacekeepers expanded their areas of deployment. Fighting

10

Agence France Presse, “Liberian Ex-fighters Given Little Help to Kick Drugs Habit,” Oct.

27, 2004, among others.

11

In late May 2003, a small anti-MODEL militia, the Grebo Defense Force, reportedly

emerged in southeastern Liberia. It has since been inactive, and may no longer exist.

CRS-7

following the CPA appeared to have been motivated by looting opportunities —

particularly in contested zones — and by the belligerents’ attempts to consolidate or

extend control over territory and weaken their foes prior to the further deployment

of peacekeepers.12 Another factor motivating the continued use of arms was the

apparent reticence of the armed groups’ leaders to participate in disarmament before

their political demands, primarily relating to the allocation of government positions,

were met — despite having signed and repeatedly publicly endorsed the peace

accord.

Effects of Conflict

Political Conditions. As the LURD insurgency burgeoned, political

conditions deteriorated, and the Taylor government began to curtail political

activities. In early 2002, it imposed a state of emergency and, separately, a ban on

political activities and gatherings.13 These actions, which remained in effect until

September 2002, reflected Taylor’s persistent intolerance of political opposition.

Under his leadership, foreign observers and many Liberians assert, opposition parties

were harassed and their activities curtailed. U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John W.

Blaney, like many Liberian and foreign observers, charged that opposition parties

were harassed, their activities curtailed, and that presidential candidate eligibility

restrictions, including lengthy domestic residency requirements, were likely to limit

electoral competition in general elections then slated to be held in October 2003.14

Opposition parties charged that the Electoral Commission, which regulated elections

law and administration, was controlled by partisans of Taylor’s ruling National

Patriotic Party (NPP), and that a range of proposed electoral code reforms were likely

create outcomes favorable to the NPP. Such concerns prompted repeated domestic

and international calls for elections to be postponed, but the government insisted until

early May 2003 that credible elections could and would be held in mid-October 2003,

as scheduled. In May 2003, as rebels gains continued, the Taylor government

indicated that it might accept a 12 to 18 month election deferral, if a constitutionally

valid term extension “framework” could be crafted.15

Human Rights Conditions. As restrictions on political activities increased,

a rising number of security operations and attendant human rights abuses were

12

The north-central county of Nimba, Charles Taylor’s base of operations during the first

civil war, and the central county of Bong were focal points for continuing clashes.

13

Associated Press, “Liberia declares state of emergency, says fighting neared capital,” Feb.

8, 2002; Associated Press, “Liberian President Suspends Political Activity,” Apr. 30, 2002;

and BBC News, “Liberia ends state of emergency,” Sept. 14, 2002, among others.

14

U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], “US Will Not Recognise

‘Fraudulent Elections’,” Jan. 6, 2003; Jonathan Paye-Layleh, “Liberia Sets Oct. 14 General

Elections,” Associated Press, Jan. 2, 2003; and Terence Sesay, “Liberia Announces October

Elections, Rules out Foreign ‘Supervision’,” Agence France-Presse, Jan. 2, 2003.

15

Matthew Tostevin, “War-ruined Liberia May Postpone October Elections,” Reuters, May

1, 2003. In February 2003, the Liberian Supreme Court dismissed a case requesting an

election delay filed by IDPs from three war-affected counties. They alleged that the conflict

would undermine election rules and deprive citizens of their right to register and vote in

their home districts. See IRIN, “Liberia: Court Dismisses Elections Case,” Feb. 22, 2003.

CRS-8

reported. Persons viewed by state security forces as dissidents or rebel supporters,

particularly ex-fighters and members of certain ethnic groups, were detained and

harassed, often violently, during raids in urban areas and camps for internally

displaced persons (IDPs). Many detainees were released relatively quickly,

sometimes after beatings and or bribing of arresting agents; a smaller number were

held for longer periods. Theft and extortion by security forces, frequently linked to

lack of combatant pay, reportedly became frequent, as did the impressment of youths

into military service.

In war-affected areas, reports of more numerous and severe abuses against

civilians were common. Human rights and other groups assert that both government

and rebel forces have carried out executions, beatings, torture, and other abuses

against civilians, including rape, and abduction for purposes of forced labor. The

same actors were accused of looting and burning towns and IDP camps, causing

further internal dislocation. Both rebel and state forces periodically issued summary

judgments and sanctions, often violent, against those within their own ranks accused

of looting and other crimes. During the LURD assaults on Monrovia in June and

July 2003, government military forces were reportedly particularly abusive and

violently exploitative. Widespread abuses continued in combat zones after the

signing of the CPA, notably in September 2003, and following the deployment of

UNMIL, though at a gradually decreasing rate.

Humanitarian Conditions. The spread of hostilities caused already poor

humanitarian and economic conditions in much of Liberia to deteriorate sharply,

particularly in late 2002 and 2003. Even where relief aid could be delivered, needs

often outstripped available supplies. IDP camps in Liberia were typically

overcrowded and affected by severe resource constraints. The U.N. Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported in May 2003 that in camps

“minimum standards of assistance are not met, and there are major gaps with regard

to the provision of food, safe water and sanitation, health and education services as

well as protection.” Humanitarian assistance increasingly became the target of raids

by the armed groups. IDP camps were violently assaulted and their residents forced

to flee, abandoning food allocations that combatants then seized.

By April/May 2003 humanitarian relief agencies were unable to provide

emergency assistance in 11 of Liberia’s 15 counties due to combat and related

insecurity. Subsequently, such organizations lost access to nearly all of Liberia; all

but a few withdrew entirely from Liberia for extended periods from June through

August 2003. Three major attacks on Monrovia in June and July caused IDPs to flee

to central Monrovia, causing a dramatic and extensive worsening of humanitarian

conditions. By August, over 300,000 displaced persons were living in or near

Monrovia. Food stocks ran extremely low, and food price inflation rose sharply, as

did cases of malnutrition, notably among children. Access to potable water decreased

due to contamination and overcrowding, and outbreaks of respiratory and stomach

disease, including cholera, occurred. Such conditions were aggravated by the

extensive violence that characterized the fighting in Monrovia. Civilians were

robbed and abused by combatants, hundreds of victims of gunshot and shrapnel were

admitted to hospitals, and several hundred bodies were collected from streets during

and after each major military assault. The belligerents also stole numerous vehicles

from relief groups and looted humanitarian supply warehouses. As of

CRS-9

mid-September 2003, fighting had internally displaced about 500,000 Liberians, and

about 311,000 were refugees to neighboring countries as of October/November.16

Thousands of IDPs and refugees from other countries remained in areas of Liberia

that continued to be largely inaccessible to relief agencies until several months after

the peace accord.

International Dimensions of Liberia’s Conflict

Regional Effects

Persistent Regional Threat. For nearly a decade and a half prior to the

August 2003 peace accord, cycles of conflict in Liberia generated a range of effects

that undermined the national security, political stability, and economic prosperity of

its neighbors, and brought about negative repercussions in the wider sub-region.

Among the most serious of such effects — which continue to threaten Liberia’s

neighbors — include the spread of small arms; the diffusion of violence-based social

norms, often with commercial underpinnings; an increasing amount of mercenary

activity in the region; the deployment of diverse, often state-assisted rebel groups

along regional borders; a rise in human rights abuses; and the creation of aggrieved

refugee and internally displaced populations. A variety of fighters allied with

Taylor’s 1989-1997 civil war faction or, after his election, with the Liberian

government, participated in the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991-2002);17 in fighting

in southern Guinea in 2000-2001; and in Cote d’Ivoire in late 2002 and 2003.

Guinea and Liberia. Taylor’s government and that of Lansana Conté,

Guinea’s president, maintained poor, highly antagonistic relations. Conté bitterly

opposed Taylor, and each government regularly accused the other of sponsoring

aggression against it. During and after the first Liberian civil war, many factional

opponents of Taylor and civilians — many from ethnic groups, notably the

Mandingo, who feared mistreatment by the Taylor government — sought refuge in

Guinea. LURD, which grew out of this exile milieu, allegedly received support from

the government of Guinea, beginning around the time of its inception. LURD

fighters later assisted the Guinean government to defeat a series of attacks on towns

and villages in southern Guinea carried out between September 2000 and early 2001

by a mix of forces made up of RUF fighters from Sierra Leone, Liberian militias, a

small number of Guinean rebels, and mercenaries from the region. In addition to

allowing LURD to maintain rear bases in southern Guinea, the Guinean government

reportedly supported LURD by supplying it with arms, and periodically provided

tactical military assistance, such as cross-border mortar and helicopter air fire

support. Such reports were routinely been denied by Guinea’s government.18

16

U.S. Agency for International Development, “Liberia — Complex Emergency,” Situation

Report #11, [FY] 2003, Sept. 17, 2003; and Situation Report #10, [FY] 2004, Jan. 9, 2004.

17

18

See CRS Report RL31062, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace.

On alleged Guinean support for LURD, see, inter alia, Human Rights Watch, “Weapons

Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the

(continued...)

CRS-10

The influence of Guinea with respect to developments in Liberia was underlined

by a series of visits to Conakry during and after the peace negotiations by officials,

including U.S. and ECOWAS diplomats; the interim Liberian President, Moses Blah;

UNMIL head Jacques Klein; and Chairman Bryant. LURD leaders also appeared to

have received continuing logistical and security support from Guinea in the period

after the signing of the peace accord. In late September 2003, Conneh traveled to

Liberia from Guinea to announce LURD’s intention to end combat. His convoy was

guarded by Guinean government soldiers and included Guinean government vehicles,

and he paid tribute to Guinea’s role in backing LURD’s objectives.19 Similarly, when

Aisha Keita-Conneh traveled to Monrovia in January 2004, she was accompanied by

Guinean military bodyguards.20

Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. In late 2002, a mix of factional fighters,

mercenaries, and refugee recruits from Liberia became involved in clashes, human

rights abuses, and looting in western Cote d’Ivoire. Violence there burgeoned in the

wake of a September 2002 rebellion centered in northern Cote d’Ivoire. The

Liberians joined diverse armed groups that were active in the Ivorian west, some

fighting in support of the Ivorian government, and some against it; others were

involved in banditry. The Taylor government asserted that it was unaffiliated with

any of these groups, but there were repeated reports to the contrary. Fighters and

looted goods reportedly traversed the Liberia-Cote d’Ivoire border frequently, and the

two country’s governments accused one another of sponsoring armed rebel groups

against the other. Such charges were the product of Cote d’Ivoire’s current political

crisis, but had roots in direct and indirect, long-standing, Ivorian involvement in

Liberia’s two conflicts. Numerous press and analytical reports charged that the

Ivorian government provided backing for MODEL. Though violence in western Cote

d’Ivoire has generally subsided, there have been periodic reports of tensions between

local Ivorian citizens and foreign immigrants and refugees in the area.

Peace efforts in both Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire have taken heed of the crossborder dynamics of conflict along the Liberian-Ivorian frontier. Many of the same

actors mediating in Cote d’Ivoire were involved in congruous efforts to end Liberia’s

conflict, and UNMIL and the U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) share

intelligence information. In November 2003, UNMIL head Jacques Klein appealed

for French-speaking peacekeepers, in light of cross-border flows between Liberia,

18

(...continued)

June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia,” Briefing Paper, Nov. 3, 2003; ——, Liberian

Refugees In Guinea: Refoulement, Militarization of Camps, and Other Protection Concerns,

Nov. 2002; ——, Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government and Rebels: A

Call for Greater International Attention to Liberia and the Sub Region, May 2002;

International Crisis Group (ICG), Tackling Liberia;——, Liberia: The Key...; Report of the

Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458

(2003), concerning Liberia in United Nations Security Council document S/2003/498, Apr.

24, 2003; and Global Witness, The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in

Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, Mar. 2003.

19

See U.N. IRIN, “Liberia: Main rebel group declares end of hostilities in Liberia,” Sept.

24, 2003, inter alia.

20

IRIN, “Liberia: Conneh’s Estranged Wife Emerges...”

CRS-11

Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea of refugees and armed groups. Similarly, former President

Taylor and his Ivorian counterpart, Laurence Gbagbo, met in Togo in early May

2003. They later announced plans, which were never implemented, to deploy along

their shared border a joint military monitoring force.

International Responses

Poor economic conditions and persistent conflict-related humanitarian needs

have long motivated a continuous flow of international relief assistance to Liberia

and its neighbors. Similarly, the region has been the focus of repeated international

conflict resolution efforts centered around mediation attempts and, in the case of

Liberia, the imposition of proscriptive sanctions on its government. Some policy

makers also have expressed concern over reports alleging that the Taylor government

hosted Al Qaeda agents and facilitated their purchase of West African diamonds.21

United Nations

U.N. Security Council Sanctions. Liberia is subject to international

sanctions first imposed, though since modified, by the U.N. Security Council in

March 2001 (S/RES/1343) after it found that the Taylor government had repeatedly

violated earlier U.N. resolutions by providing military support and safe haven for the

rebel Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in part in exchange for Sierra

Leonean diamonds. S/RES/1343 demanded that the Taylor government end such

support, seize RUF assets and expel all RUF members in Liberia, and end its

trafficking in arms for diamonds. It banned the direct or indirect import of rough

diamonds from or through Liberia; flights of Liberian-registered aircraft; the

shipment of arms and related materiél to Liberia; and foreign travel by senior

Liberian officials.

The sanctions were extended for a year in May 2002 (S/RES/1408), after the

Security Council found that Liberia had not fully complied with S/RES/1343, as

Liberia later formally admitted, claiming the right to do so for reasons of self defense

under Article 51 of U.N. Charter. Some Taylor critics advocated widening the

sanctions to include measures to decrease the Taylor government’s access to national

timber, rubber, and maritime revenues, which they alleged it was diverting for private

purposes and uses to fund regional conflict. On May 6, 2003, the Security Council

extended sanctions on Liberia for a year (S/RES/1478) and added a ten-month ban

on the import of Liberian timber, which began July 7, 2003, though it also decided

to assess and mitigate possible negative humanitarian or socio-economic effects of

its sanctions.

On December 22, 2003, the Security Council terminated the sanctions and

replaced them with new ones (S/RES/1521). In doing so, it cited concerns that the

cease-fire and CPA were “not yet being universally implemented throughout

Liberia”; that much of its territory remained outside the authority of the NTGL,

particularly where UNMIL had yet to deploy; that there continued to be linkages

between the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources like diamonds and

21

See CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation.

CRS-12

timber, leading to a the proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms, and the fueling

and exacerbation of conflicts in Liberia and other areas of West Africa; and that the

situation in Liberia, the proliferation of arms and armed non-state actors and

mercenaries in the subregion continued to constitute a threat to international peace

and security in Liberia and the region. S/RES/1521 banned for one year:

The export to Liberia for any recipient of all arms, military materiél,

and technical support relating to such items, with certain exceptions

for UNMIL and other U.N.-approved purposes, such as security

sector reform programs, and humanitarian/protective purposes;

! Foreign travel or transit of “individuals... who constitute a threat” to

Liberia’s peace process or regional security, specifically including

senior members of the former Taylor government and their spouses,

members of the Liberian armed forces with links to Taylor, and

individuals affected by travel restrictions under S/RES/1343;

! The direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from or through

Liberia; and

! The import of Liberian logs and timber products. It also urged the

NTGL to establish full control over timber harvesting areas and

timber-based revenues

!

S/RES/1521 also

Called upon NTGL to establish an “effective Certificate of Origin

regime” for Liberian rough diamonds that would potentially allow

Liberia to join the Kimberley Process and lead to a lifting of the

diamond trade sanctions;

! Urged the NTGL to establish full control and oversight of all public

revenues, specifically including those generated by the Liberian

International Ship and Corporate Registry, and to use such funds for

national development; and

! Mandated the formation of a sanctions monitoring Committee and

an investigatory panel of experts.

!

On June 17, 2004, the Security Council reviewed the sanctions under

S/RES/1521, but declined to lift them (S/RES/1549). Instead, having taken note of

a NTGL request that sanctions on Liberia’s timber and diamonds be lifted, the

Security Council decided to re-establish a panel of experts and mandated that it

assess general compliance with the sanctions and progress toward the goals

underlying their imposition, which the NTGL had also requested. The passage of

S/RES/1549 was preceded by the Security Council’s decision on March 12, 2004

(S/RES/1532), to freeze the assets of the former president, Charles Taylor, as well

as those of his family and close allies, and to trace and freeze funds and other

economic assets owned or controlled by the same parties. President Bush’s

Executive Order 13348, of July 22, 2004, implements this ban in the United States.

The transitional government of Liberia implemented the ban in Liberia in midOctober 2004, though the Supreme Court subsequently halted the action with

reference to two reputed Taylor associates.

CRS-13

U.N. and ECOWAS. The establishment and deployment of UNMIL was

preceded by the Security Council’s authorization, before the CPA was signed, of a

Multinational Force (MNF) in Liberia. Its purpose was to support the

implementation of the much-violated June 17, 2003 cease-fire agreement and to

establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. On August 1,

2003, the Security Council adopted a resolution 1497. It authorized an MNF and

labeled as “critical” President Taylor’s departure from power, to be followed by the

installation of a transitional government in Liberia and the subsequent deployment

of a U.N. stabilization successor force to the country by October 1, 2003. It provided

the MNF with a waiver of U.N. sanctions banning the import of military materiél into

Liberia and authorized the MNF to act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (i.e.,

gave it authority to use military force to ensure international peace and security). It

also provided that all personnel of “a contributing state” would be subject to the

“exclusive jurisdiction” of that state, unless jurisdiction is waived by a state. The

provision was seen as exempting participating troops from potential prosecution in

the International Criminal Court (ICC).22

While S/RES/1497 did not explicitly equate the MNF with the ECOWAS

intervention force that was then preparing to deploy to Liberia, it did authorize

UNAMSIL to provide logistical support for 30 days to ECOWAS for the purpose of

fielding the force that subsequently became known as ECOMIL. The term MNF was

used in the resolution, in part, because in the weeks preceding the authorization of

the MNF, ECOWAS leaders had conditioned their contribution of troops to the MNF

on the expectation they would be joined in this effort by other nations. In the end,

however, no other nations contributed troops to the MNF; it was ultimately

comprised solely of ECOMIL, which deployed days after S/RES/1497 was passed,

as described previously.

U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL, authorized on September 19,

2003, by the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter

(S/RES/1509), commenced operations on October 1, 2003. The formal deployment

of UNMIL, which at the time lacked the bulk of its troop strength, had the legal effect

of dissolving ECOMIL and transferring its authority to UNMIL. Simultaneously, the

troops that had comprised ECOMIL were inducted into UNMIL, and became its

initial core force.

UNMIL was authorized a force of up to 15,000 U.N. military personnel,

including as many as 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115

civilian police officers, and “appropriate” civilian components. Upon the

establishment of UNMIL, the small, previously existing U.N. Office in Liberia

22

The resolution was passed by a vote of 12-0, but three Security Council members (France,

Germany and Mexico) abstained because the measure included a provision exempting

members of the multi-national force from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

(ICC). They asserted that this provision would nullify measures of their sovereign legal

codes, and might prevent their home governments from prosecuting foreign nationals who

commit crimes against their own citizens. Colum Lynch, “Security Council Backs

Nigerian-Led Force in Liberia,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2003, inter alia. On the ICC, see

CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court, and CRS

Report RL31437, International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal Issues.

CRS-14

(UNOL) was dissolved, and certain of its assets folded into UNMIL. The Security

Council gave UNMIL a multi-faceted, 12-month initial mandate. Key duties include

monitoring and implementation of the CPA and June cease-fire accord, and creation

of an action plan for implementing a comprehensive DDRR program, in cooperation

with other international actors. S/RES/1509 also mandated that UNMIL:

Disengage and canton at secure sites the Liberian armed parties’

military forces;

! Support the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), a body

created under the June 17 cease-fire accord;

! Implement a voluntary disarmament program;

! Provide security for key government installations, and other vital

infrastructure, such as transport hubs;

! Protect and enable the free operation of U.N. staff and facilities;

! Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid;

! Assist in the protection and promotion of human rights in Liberia;

and

! Protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, under certain

conditions.

!

The resolution further mandated that UNMIL assist the NTGL to:

Monitor, restructure, and retrain Liberia’s police and military forces;

Re-establish national authority and administrative capacities

nation-wide;

! Develop a “strategy to consolidate governmental institutions,

including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional

institutions”;

! Restore proper administration and regulation of natural resources;

and

! Prepare for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of

2005;

!

!

UNMIL is headed by Jacques Paul Klein, who had been appointed Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia on July 9, 2003. Klein is a

retired U.S. Air Force General and senior U.S. diplomat, and former head of the U.N.

Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Other top UNMIL officials include

its Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande of Kenya, the

former commander of UNAMSIL; Souren Seraydarian of Syria, the Deputy Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for Operations and Rule of Law; Abou

Moussa of Chad, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation and U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia;

and UNMIL Police Commissioner Mark A. Kroeker, the former police chief of

Portland, Oregon.

CRS-15

Current Situation

Numerous medium to long-term challenges face Liberia and its donors. These

include:

!

Achieving a transition from a situation of humanitarian crisis

requiring emergency assistance to one characterized by resettlement

and economic recovery.

!

The re-establishment of state authority throughout Liberia’s national

territory.

!

The rebuilding and reform of government institutions, facilities, and

capacities, notably those of the functional ministries, revenueearning and regulatory independent agencies, the police, and the

justice system.

!

General socio-economic recovery and rehabilitation of national

physical infrastructure.

Other current peace and security-related operational issues that face the NTGL,

UNMIL, and Liberia’s international donors include continued implementation of the

CPA, particularly with regard to maintenance of security; completion of DDRR;

progress in preparing for elections; and resolution of the status of Charles Taylor,

both as an exile in Nigeria and as a war crimes indictee.

National Recovery

Current Humanitarian Situation. Humanitarian conditions remain difficult

in much of Liberia, but are continuing to improve, particularly in Monrovia and other

urban areas. Relief organizations have progressively expanded their areas of

operation nationwide since August 2003, when humanitarian emergency operations

were reinitiated after the deployment of ECOMIL and the signing of the peace

accord. The socio-economic situation also began to slowly stabilize at that time due

to the arrival of renewed food and fuel imports and the reopening of businesses and

key transport corridors. During the past year, U.N. agencies, in concert with

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and NTGL ministries, in a forum called the

Humanitarian Action Committee, have implemented a wide range of projects. These

target needs relating to nutrition, water and sanitation, primary healthcare services

and transportation infrastructure rebuilding, and the continuing assessment of socioeconomic conditions in local areas throughout Liberia. Many initial efforts have

taken the form of “quick-impact projects” meant to provide immediate basic outputs.

Several disease immunization campaigns have also been undertaken.

Despite considerable progress, there remain high levels of basic humanitarian

need in Liberia. In August 2004, according to USAID, quoting U.N. High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, there were 300,000 internally displaced

persons (IDPs) living in camps in Liberia. Additionally, there were 350,000 Liberian

refugees living in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana, as well as 4,000

CRS-16

Sierra Leoneans living in Liberia. As of early June, about 80,000 Liberian refugees

had independently repatriated to Liberia following the end of the conflict. Access to

relief supplies and, in some cases, limited public services are most readily available

IDP camps and informal settlements in urban areas, but these are also characterized

by overcrowding.

Nutrition. Over 418,000 individuals currently depend on monthly food

distributions from the World Food Program (WFP), though the number of

beneficiaries has varied widely, to almost double that number in some months. In

early August 2004, the WFP announced that it would decrease rations due to

shortages of pulses, effectively reducing the daily caloric nutrition levels of rations

by about 27%, though corn-soya supplements were added. Further food aid supply

shortages were forecast by the WFP due to lapses in donor funding. As of late

August, according to a September 2004 WFP report, severe malnutrition —

attributable, in part, to illnesses, such as malaria, diarrhea, and cholera that tend to

rise during the current rainy season — was being reported in some areas. Such

reporting, and associated relief responses, are in part due to the continuing extension

of relief agency activities and increasingly regular assessments of medical and

humanitarian needs throughout the country. Provision of adequate potable water is

a key component of both emergency relief delivery and resettlement programs.

Resettlement. While increasing numbers of IDPs are spontaneously resettling

(i.e., autonomously moving to permanent places of settlement with little, if any,

assistance from relief agencies), the bulk of displaced populations have yet to move

to their permanent areas of residence. U.N. and NGO agencies that will support

resettlement operations are currently planning these activities, and stockpiling and

procuring resources that will be required to carry them out. Such resources include

seed, tool, and basic transitional non-food item packages, as well as follow-up

programs aimed at rehabilitating and providing basic social service facilities for

newly resettled communities. Formal resettlement programs will not begin until

areas targeted for return have been declared safe by an organ called the Security

Assessment Committee for Resettlement (SACR), made up of NTGL, U.N., and

NGOs representatives. Such declarations will require that in each targeted area,

UNMIL peacekeepers be deployed; disarmament programs be completed; social and

local police services be functioning; that the area be freely accessible to humanitarian

agencies; and that spontaneous resettlements in the area be assessed, as a means of

determining the likely success of formal return activities. The UNHCR began to

assist in the repatriation and resettlement of refugees from surrounding countries in

early October 2004.

Education. In late 2003, the NTGL Education Ministry of the began efforts

to reinitiate education activities, which had declined dramatically as the conflict

grew. Most Liberian young adults and school-aged children have had limited access

to schooling and are largely illiterate, in contrast to older generations, which are

generally well-educated by regional standards. The NTGL’s efforts have been

assisted by the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), through its Back to School

Campaign. UNICEF helped coordinate educational facility assessments, delivered

“school in a box” emergency school supply kits, and implemented a rapid master

teacher “train the trainers” program. According to UNMIL, most primary and

secondary schools in urban areas are operational, and UNICEF has delivered over

CRS-17

10,000 school supply kits adequate for the needs of 800,000 pupils; has trained

12,000 primary school teachers; and is supplying schools with access to clean water.

Nationwide, current core activities aimed at rebuilding the education sector include

facilities and manpower assessments; creation of teacher training,

vocational/skills-building, and education promotion programs; efforts to support

girls’ education; school rehabilitation, construction, and provisioning; and

school-based delivery of healthcare and supplementary nutrition. WFP programs

currently reach over 395,000 pupils, and plans call for the expansion of such aid to

about 65,000 additional children by late 200423. Compared to progress in reopening

schools, progress toward reinitiating activities at the university level has been halting.

The University of Liberia (UL) has opened, but only about 20% of enrolled students

are reportedly fully registered, and in August 2004, students and faculty launched a

boycott in protest against the nomination of the NTGL of a new UL president.24

General Economic Recovery. Nation-wide, commerce is growing, in part

because key transport routes are free of factional checkpoints. In core urban areas,

a wide variety of imported goods are reportedly available from major trading

companies, many Lebanese-run, which in turn supply small-scale retailers and street

merchants. Public infrastructure remains devastated. Monrovia, with a population

of about 1 million, lacks piped water and public electricity mains; most electricity is

produced by private generators. These sectors are targeted for donor-aided

rehabilitation. In July 2004, a Spanish firm was awarded a licence to explore for

offshore oil.

Despite a normalizing economic situation, some observers are concerned that

the upswing in economic activity in Liberia is driven by donor-financed expenditures,

and may not reflect fundamental economic recovery. As of mid-October 2004, $354

million of $520 million in donor pledges made in February 2004 had been received.

About half of these receipts were earmarked for humanitarian activities and about

half for reconstruction projects. Some observers worry that humanitarian crises in

other world regions, such as Sudan, may undermine donors’ actual contribution of

assistance they have previously pledged.

Re-establishment of State Institutions. A phased extension of state

authority continues to be undertaken by the NTGL and the National Transitional

Legislative Assembly (NTLA) with the assistance of UNMIL, particularly its civil

affairs elements. It has been hampered, however, due to a paucity of basic facilities

and resources to rehabilitate them; by insecurity, notably in rural areas; and by

friction among local authorities25. The latter include a mix of those affiliated with

the armed factions, who in some cases were appointed prior to the establishment of

23

UNICEF submitted a funding appeal for $31 million as part of the U.N.’s Liberia

Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for 2004; see U.N. Security Council, Fourth progress

report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2004/725, Sept.

10, 2004.

24

25

The Analyst, “Only 2,500 of 12,000 Students Fully Registered at UL,” Aug. 26, 2004.

See, e.g., IRIN, “Liberia: UN Probes Cross-border Arms Smuggling,” Jul. 21, 2004; —

, “Liberia: Rebels dig in at rubber plantation,” Aug. 10, 2004; and — , “Liberia: A Shattered

Nation on a Long Road to Recovery,” Aug. 17, 2004.

CRS-18

the NTGL and in others in coordination with the NTGL; traditional leaders; and those

still in place from previous regimes. NTLA and local objections to unilateral

nominations of local officials by the NTGL executive have reportedly led to deeper

cooperation between these branches of the transitional government, principally

through a process by which a county-level committee vets and recommends a pool

of candidates from which NTGL nominees are selected by the NTGL chair.

Generally, in areas outside the capital, the dispatch of government officials has

centered on key population centers and areas where UNMIL has deployed troops and

where the demobilization of ex-combatants has been initiated. Key tasks of local

officials include coordination with the NTGL, U.N., and NGO agencies of programs

to reintegrate and resettle ex-combatants and internally displaced persons in their

communities of residence; the initiation of local infrastructure and public facilities

needs-assessments; and, in a few cases, the initiation of reconstruction projects.

Another key goal of the NTGL is to restore state control, in concert with local

officials where appropriate, over the exploitation and regulation of natural resources,

notably forests and diamonds, in part in order to comply with the conditions required

for U.N. sanctions on Liberia to be lifted. The government recently deployed revenue

collectors to Liberia’s main towns. Throughout much of 2004, protection of borders

had been an on-going area of concern with regard to the reassertion of central state

authority, because in many instances, factional fighters remained in control of

frontiers. In early September, however, the UNSG reported that UNMIL had worked

with the NTGL to deploy immigration and customs officials to key border crossings,

and was engaged in negotiations with armed faction elements aimed at ensuring they

relinquish to the NTGL public facilities that have controlled or occupied. UNMIL

is also assisting ad-hoc committees to mediate housing and property disputes,

particularly those pertaining to families resettling or returning to their home areas.

In Monrovia, many NTGL ministry headquarters lack basic equipment,

provisions, and the logistical capacity or resources to obtain them, though donorfunded ministerial rehabilitation projects, including U.S.-funded programs, are

attempting to remedy this situation. Despite such challenges, the NTGL has taken

a number of steps to re-establish basic government processes. It has directed that all

state revenues be submitted to the central bank, though some critics claim that not all

funds have been subjected to this requirement, and replaced the former Taylor-era

head of the Central Bank, who critics had accused of aiding corrupt practices under

the former government.

In late March 2004, the NTGL submitted a $23.5 million interim budget,

derived from maritime and customs receipts among other domestic revenues,

covering the period from February to June 2004, which the legislature passed weeks

later, with minor increases. The budget covered only government current wage bills,

but did not address massive civil servant salary arrears, a central grievance of public

sector workers, a key political constituency. In mid-May 2004, in response to such

concerns and following talks with public sector labor leaders, the NTGL stated that

it would begin bi-monthly payments of such arrears through mid-2005, beginning in

late July 2004, after completion of a general public audit aimed at removing ghost

workers from the state payrolls and preventing future salaries fraud. Despite this

commitment, in late May government workers undertook a labor strike, viewed by

the NTGL as illegal, to demand immediate payment of salary arrears. The

CRS-19

government worker strike began during a separate, multi-week wage arrears strike

by Liberia Telecommunications Corporation workers. In late July, NTGL Chairman

Bryant reiterated the NTGL’s commitment to beginning arrears payments. The NTGL

subsequently proposed a regular $80 million 2004/2005 budget.

Transparency. While the NTGL has made progress toward re-initiating

government functions, some observers worry that it may lack the capacity to ensure

that all state operations are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner.

Some claim that government office holders are acting for their own benefit or are

engaging in nepotism. Critics claim that in a post-conflict country with an average

2003 income of $130 per capita, the issuance of new vehicles to numerous public

office holders, including most of the parliament, is an indication of these office

holders’ self enrichment. They also cite concerns about repeated overseas trips by

NTLA officials, some accompanied by retinues of associates; the sale of Liberian

state overseas properties, such as embassies, and of a $10 million stockpile of iron

ore, and disposition of revenues thereof; the taxation of former monopoly firms; the

disposition of revenues from certain shipping-related state agencies; and lack of

progress toward auditing and regulating natural resource concessions and proceeds26.

UNMIL head Jacques Klein has criticized the NTGL for making making slow

progress in many areas, notably with regard to elections. In late July, reportedly

noting that “each of the warring factions got ministries ... staffed top to bottom with

their people,” he attributed such lack of progress to the assertion that “some people

are thinking, ‘Why next year? I like being in my government job - what’s the rush?’

“27

In late October 2004, a joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF)

fiscal management assessment team in Liberia called for increased transparency,

reform, and accountability in NTGL fiscal management and budgeting. The team

stated that they viewed such an outcome as a pre-condition for the removal of U.N.

sanctions on Liberia, and as a signal to donors considering the provision of increased

aid to Liberia. The team also stated that donors are concerned about the NTGL’s

purchase of 76 Grand Cherokee jeeps for the parliament, though they expressed

optimism that donors would likely eventually grant Liberia foreign debt relief. 28

Despite some criticisms of its performance, the NTGL has received plaudits

from many observers for undertaking incipient reforms of the Central Bank of Liberia

26

U.N. Security Council document S/2004/752, Sept. 24, 2004; H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr.,

“Liberia: Matters Arising,” The Analyst, Aug. 6 2004; The Analyst, “Corruption Widespread

in Liberia - U.N. Panel Observed,” Oct. 1, 2004; communication from a Liberian

parliamentarian; Christopher Melville, “Liberia’s Government Chairman Buries Hatchet

With Parliamentary Speaker,” WMRC Daily Analysis, Aug. 19, 2004.

27

IRIN, “Liberia: Where Are the Weapons? Is Disarmament Really Working?,” July 29,

2004.

28

Radio Veritas, “World Bank and IMF Want Transparency in Fiscal Budget,” UNMIL

Daily Radio Summary, Oct. 27 2004; IRIN, “Liberia: IMF and World Bank demand more

transparency in public finances,” Oct. 26, 2004; and “World Bank and IMF Concerned about

Liberia’s Budget (The Inquirer, The News, The Analyst and The Forum),” UNMIL Daily

Newspaper Summary,” Oct. 26, 2004.

CRS-20

(CBL), including an order that all state revenues be placed in a CBL account. The

NTGL has also announced that several government agencies are to be audited, with

foreign technical assistance. The replacement of the former CBL governor has

generated similar praise. In May 2004, the then-CBL governor, Elias Saleeby,

resigned under pressure from the NTLA and, reportedly, from the IMF. Saleeby, a

former IMF staff who had served as Central Bank governor during the Taylor regime,

had been re-appointed to the post in October 2003. He had, however, become the

focus of increasing criticism from parliamentarians who challenged his authority to

print about $12.3 million worth of Liberian currency, without parliamentary

approval, during Taylor’s final months in power. Saleeby reportedly had claimed

that a 1999 law gave the Bank the authority to do so. He was also the target of

criticism from diverse Liberian and foreign observers because of his close association

with Taylor and the high level of public sector corruption and fiscal chaos that

characterized the Liberian government under Taylor and Saleeby’s tenure. In May

2004, a visiting IMF delegation reportedly threatened to refuse to work with the

Central Bank until Saleeby’s resignation.29

Reforms in the Security and Legal Sectors. A Rule of Law

Implementation Committee, made up of NTGL and UNMIL representatives, has been

formed to coordinate police, judicial, and prison reforms. Liberia’s National Police

Academy re-opened in mid-July, and training of screened and vetted cadets, drawn

from a mix of internal police and external candidates, began in at the end of the

month. The Academy’s capacity remains limited, however, due to rehabilitation

requirements, for which funds were lacking as of early September 2004. Further

police recruitments, aided by UNMIL CIVPOL, are continuing, and all existing law

enforcement personnel are being enrolled in a nation-wide registry.

A limited number of courts at various levels, including the Supreme Court, are

now functioning, though with limited resources, and UNMIL-aided training and

vetting of judges at all levels below the Supreme Court has begun. UNMIL and

experts from various donor countries are working with the NTGL to reform and

rehabilitate the national justice system through implementation of monitoring,

advisory and training programs in diverse rule-of-law institutions, through limited,

quick-impact rehabilitation projects targeting key institutions’ facilities.

Plans for the reform of Liberia’s armed forces, as provided for under the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), are not complete. U.S. Defense and State

Department officials are in the process of assessing and recommending a potential

program for military restructuring. Of the $200 million in IDFA funds under P.L.

108-106, $35 million was dedicated to U.S. assistance to support Liberian military

reform. U.S. defense officials, however, estimate that a total of between $118

million and $200 million will ultimately be required to achieve the goal of rebuilding

a 3,000- 4,000 person military. Other U.S. planning projects a possible need for a

29

PANA, “Liberian Central Bank Governor Resigns,” May 11, 2004; Liberian private DC

101.1 FM radio, “Liberia: Bryant Clarifies Cause for Central Bank Governor’s

Resignation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, August 7, 2004; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Prosecute

Saleeby, Others - LWHR Suggest to Bryant,” May 19, 2004; The Analyst (Monrovia),

“Under IMF’s Pressure: Saleeby Booted Out of CBL,” May 12, 2004.

CRS-21

4,000-6,000 person military. Officials have provisionally identified within the

Administration’s FY2005 and FY2006 requests $118 million in regional

peacekeeping, Foreign Military Financing, and supplemental funds that, if

appropriated and sanctioned for this purpose, might be used to substantially begin

such restructuring. They are also seeking the assistance of other donor nations in

accomplishing this goal.

Security Issues

UNMIL Deployment. UNMIL troops have deployed throughout Liberia,

including at key border sites, and its civilian police (CIVPOL) elements are present

at 25 main locations nationwide, and are expected to undertake further deployments.

As of the end of September 2004, UNMIL, which has an authorized troop ceiling of

15,000 personnel, had a total strength of 14,363 troops; 201 military observers; and

1,089 CIVPOL; and over 423 international civilian personnel. The deployment of

a communications group then under formation was expected to bring UNMIL up to

its fully authorized troop level. UNMIL had experienced 23 fatalities, none as a

result of a hostile act. As of the same date, UNMIL personnel were drawn from 60

countries; the largest combined military/CIVPOL contingents were from Bangladesh,

Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. The United States had contributed six troops; five

military observers; and 72 civilian police. UNMIL had earlier faced challenges in

recruiting personnel from troop contributing countries.30

Security Situation. The nation-wide deployment of UNMIL, together with

the continuing success of disarmament and demobilization programs for

ex-combatants (see below), has contributed to a generally calm and improving

security situation in Liberia, though the country remains subject to periodic unrest

and volatility. In addition to carrying out disarmament activities, UNMIL troops

routinely monitor roads and borders, the latter by land and air, and carry out search

and seizure operations aimed at intercepting and halting trafficking in illicit arms and

ammunition. No significant cease-fire violations between the three armed factions

were recorded to date in 2004. Intra-factional rivalries have on several occasions,

however, turned violent and threatened public security, as have periodic civil unrest

and criminal activities, including sporadic looting and assaults, theft, or extortion of

civilians by ex-combatants. Such threats have primarily affected Monrovia and other

population centers, where many disarmed ex-combatants are present, and localities

awaiting the start of disarmament programs.

Intra-Factional Tensions. Limited discord within MODEL and among

former government force elements, most commonly involving disputes between field

level fighters and their immediate commanders, has periodically been reported. More

serious intra-factional tensions, however, have occurred within LURD. Throughout

late 2003 and 2004, there were persistent reports of rivalries between one group of

LURD members, including several key political leaders said to be allied primarily

with Sekou Conneh, and a second LURD faction. The latter includes several key

military commanders who reportedly back Conneh’s wife, Aisha Keita-Conneh, and

Kabineh Janneh, a former LURD peace accord negotiator and the current NTGL

30

United Nations, “UN Mission’s Contributions by Country,” Sept. 30, 2004

CRS-22

Minister of Justice. While Keita-Conneh, who like her husband is a founding leader

of LURD, holds no formal position within the organization, she has long wielded

extensive influence over large segments of LURD.

LURD has long been subject to internal discord; both during the conflict and

during the peace talks that ended it, disagreements among the group’s leaders were

reported. Tensions grew in January 2004, however, when a group of LURD military

leaders, disenchanted with Sekou Conneh for not backing their candidacies for

positions in the NTGL, alleged that he was engaging in favoritism and accepting

bribes in exchange for positions allocated to LURD in the NTGL. Some called on

Keita-Conneh, who claims to be the “founder and main leader” of LURD, to take

over its chairmanship from Conneh. These tensions also appear to have been

aggravated by an on-going marital dispute between Conneh and Keita-Conneh that

reportedly relates, in part, to Conneh’s nomination of a relative of his former wife to

be NTGL Finance Minister.31

Such tensions persisted throughout 2004. In early April, LURD fighters,

claiming that they were not receiving adequate disarmament assistance and that their

leaders were neglecting their needs, looted and rioted in the central city of Gbargna.

In early June, a group of LURD leaders, claiming status as LURD’s “National

Executive Council,” suspended Conneh “indefinitely” as chairman of LURD, and

days later appointed Chayee Doe as the new LURD chair. Doe, however, died in

mid-June while undergoing brain surgery in the United States. Subsequently, in

June, Janneh was chosen by the Council as Acting and then permanent LURD

Chairman. In early August, the two opposed LURD factions targeted one another in

a series of actions involving vehicle theft, abductions, fistfights and shootings. These

incidents, which threatened to escalate and pose a general threat to public security,

were halted by UNMIL through a combination of police and troop force deployments

and mediation.

Conneh immediately dismissed the legitimacy of his alleged replacement in

June 2004, and continues to claim his position as chairman — though for much of

the period after the CPA’s signing, he resided abroad, and only periodically visited

Liberia32. His absence from Liberia during key events — such as an April 2004

opening of a disarmament camp in Tubmanburg, LURD’s wartime headquarters, and

during peace negotiations — has led some observers to hypothesize that he may

initially have been chosen as a figurehead leader who could later be replaced.

31

IRIN, “Liberia: Bryant to Intervene in Rebel Rift,” Jan. 21, 2004; BBC News, “Family

Feud Rocks Liberia rebels, Jan. 20, 2004; Jonathan Paye-Layleh, “Liberian rebel leader’s

wife claims leadership of insurgency,” Associated Press, Jan. 20, 2004; and IRIN, “Liberia:

Conneh’s Estranged Wife Emerges as Power Broker in LURD,” Jan. 14, 2004; IRIN,

“Liberia: Leadership Battle in LURD Leads to Fighting on Streets of Monrovia,” Aug. 4,

2004; Mike Jabateh and Ora Garway, “Dweh Threatens War - Gen. Opande Wheeled Sekou

Away - Duala Residents Run Helter-Skelter -What Is Afoot,” The Analyst (Monrovia), Aug.

5, 2004, among others.

32

Conneh’s poor relations with Keita-Conneh may have undermined his relations with the

authorities in Guinea. In mid-2004, he reportedly moved his primary place of residence from

Conakry to Dakar, Senegal.

CRS-23

According to such views, he was selected because he had access to funding and links

to the Guinean government, but held little direct sway over LURD’s military

elements. During the post-accord period, in this view, Conneh has continually had

to struggle to assert his authority within the group, and has attempted to form

alliances with politicians who possess political connections and aspirations

independent of those of the core military LURD leadership. Such factors may

underlie the spate of intra-LURD violence in early August; it appears, in large part,

to have been spurred by Conneh’s return to Monrovia and the prospect that he might

attempt to re-assert control over LURD’s Monrovia-based leadership. Since that

time, Conneh’s position appears to have strengthened, as some military leaders

formerly allied with Keita-Conneh have begun to distance themselves from her.

The on-going tensions within LURD are worrying to many observers because

of LURD’s key position within the NTGL, and its history of using the force of arms

to achieve political ends. Were LURD to permanently split into mutually opposed

factions, some believe, the threat of significant renewed armed conflict could

re-emerge, and could again destabilize Liberia and endanger the viability of the peace

accord. However, in accordance with the CPA, LURD has announced that will

officially dissolve as an armed force on October 31. Observers anticipate that the

group will transform itself into a political party.

Peace Accord Implementation

Substantial progress toward two key challenges to implementation of the CPA

— resolution of persistent disagreements about appointments to posts in the National

Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and completion of the disarmament and

demobilization process — has been made, though neither goal has been completely

met. Other key peace accord-related tasks facing the NTGL include the need to

improve its functional capacity; ensuring progress toward security sector reform; and

establishing the legal and operational conditions and capacities necessary for the

conduct of free and fair elections in October 2005.

NTGL Posts. Job-related political demands by the armed actors, notably

LURD, repeatedly threatened to prevent the initiation of demobilization and to

undermine the accord and the formation of the NTGL. In mid-September 2003,

LURD asserted that the Bryant Administration was planning to deny LURD assistant

minister posts, in contravention of the peace accord, and threatened not to join the

NTGL. In mid-October, LURD again requested that job allocations be clarified prior

to the inauguration of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA)33. In

mid-December 2003, the three armed factions issued a formal declaration, which they

dubbed The Monrovia Clarification on the 18 August 2003 Comprehensive Peace

Agreement, demanding control over virtually all top government posts, including six

ministries and 16 independent government agencies allocated to the unarmed

political parties and civil society under the CPA. Their demand, if upheld, would

33

IRIN, “Liberia: Lurd Threatens to Quit Government over Jobs Row,” Sept. 12, 2003;

IRIN, “New Parliament to Meet Before Tuesday,” Oct. 10, 2003; IRIN, “County Nominees

Rejected As New Parliamentarians Meet,” Oct. 13, 2003; and IRIN, “Liberia: Warring

Parties Formalise Demands for More Jobs in Government,” Dec. 19, 2003.

CRS-24

reportedly have caused civilian groups to lose as many as 33 positions, and spurred

the civilians, including the Deputy Chairman of the NTGL, Wesley Johnson, to

threaten to resign from the NTGL in protest. While most such disagreements have

been resolved, in early September 2004, the UNSG reported that “there are still

ongoing disputes over government posts which have made it difficult for the

Transitional Government to function as a cohesive administration.”34 Similar

disputes, mostly pitting the former armed factions against unarmed political parties

and civil society groups, had earlier arisen over the manner in which National

Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) seats had been selected. Disagreements

over disputed NTLA seats have since been resolved, apart those affecting one seat,

for which a special election was slated to be held.

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

(DDRR). Liberia’s peace accord requires the cantonment and “disarmament,

demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration” (DDRR) of the armed parties to the

conflict. An UNMIL-supervised disarmament process began in December 2003, but

faced immediate and substantial problems related to the operational and logistical

challenges of rapidly initiating a nationwide DDRR program. A key point of the

initial failure related to misinformation about the protocol for paying disarming

combatants when the program began in mid-December. Plans called for a two-stage

payment of $300 to disarming combatants, the first $150 installment to be paid after

initial induction into the DDRR process. When disarming combatants learned that

they would not receive on-the spot payments upon surrendering their weapons, they

rioted and looted in and near the capital. Although the unrest was successfully

suppressed, and UNMIL announced that it would pay each disarming fighter $75 in

exchange for their weapon upon entrance into the cantonment site, the DDRR

process was halted, pending further planning. Other factors that contributed to this

outcome included a series of public criticisms of DDRR plans; LURD’s initial

opposition to the establishment of a DDRR camp in its territory; and the publicly

announced need for more extensive preparations of DDRR camps, further

deployments of UNMIL troops, and public education about the disarmament process.

After repeated postponements, the DDRR process began anew in mid April

2004, and has since recorded significant success, despite a few localized violent

incidents associated with some ex-combatants’ dissatisfaction over the DDRR

process and the mishandling of military materiel. Over 95,000 combatants, more

than double the initial UNMIL projection of 38,000, have been demobilized to date.

The total includes over 12, 600 women and 10,000 children, about 22% of them girls,

and at least 530 foreign combatants. Over 21,000 weapons, predominantly light

weapons, have been turned in, as well as substantial amounts of ammunition and

unexploded ordnance. Disarmament has occurred in most areas of the country,

including some remote border zones.35

34

35

Paragraph 14, U.N. Security Council, S/2004/725.

U.N. Security Council, S/2004/725; IRIN, “Liberia: UN opens last disarmament site in

Harper,” Sept. 30, 2004; UN News Service, “Liberia: UN-run disarmament tops

expectations but aid needed to help ex-fighters,” Oct. 20, 2004.

CRS-25

Disarmament Challenges. Not all ex-combatants inducted into the DDRR

program have surrendered a weapon. This has led to two criticisms of the DDRR

process. First, some critics allege that non-combatants are taking advantage of the

process to gain demobilization payments, a claim denied by UNMIL, which asserts

that it vets all DDRR inductees. Second, some observers fear that the former armed

factions may be sequestering significant caches of weapons, which might facilitate

a return to armed conflict if Liberia’s weak political institutions fail to mediate

competing interests. They point to UNMIL’s seizure of multiple weapons, on several

occasions, as possible evidence for such claims. Similar concerns have been

expressed with regard to the lower-than-anticipated number of heavy weapons being

surrendered. There have been periodic though unconfirmed reports that former

Taylor loyalists may be attempting to recruit and train fighters in southern Guinea,

possibly in order to incite a rebellion against that country’s government, which

opposed that of Taylor.

There have also been reports that some weapons from Liberia have been

smuggled out of Liberia into neighboring countries. Some worry, in particular, that

weapons and/or ex-combatants may cross into neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, where the

political situation remains unsettled, and where DDRR plans call for the payment of

demobilization stipends nearly three times as large as those being offered in Liberia.

A related matter of contention arises because, although not all disarmed excombatants surrendered weapons during the much of the DDRR process to date, in

August 2004, UNMIL officials reportedly began to reject prospective inductees into

disarmament camps who lacked a weapon. While the hand-over of arms is not

presently official policy, UNMIL is reportedly considering requiring male combatants

to turn in a weapon, while exempting disarming female and child combatants from

such an obligation. The alleged rejection of prospective inductees has caused

consternation among those affected. In mid- September 2004, the National

Commission on DDRR (NCDDRR) received a complaint from a former government

commander claiming that 2,000 of his men had been rejected for DDRR.

The completion date for disarmament has also been a matter of contention. In

late August 2004, the deputy UNMIL force commander announced that the

disarmament program would be extended to December. This would mean that

disarmament would continue after refugee repatriation programs, which began in

October, had commenced. The head of UNMIL, Jacques Klein, subsequently

announced that the previously-planned disarmament end-date of October 30 would

be followed. On September 7, however, the NCDDRR rejected the October 30 date,

calling it “unrealistic and unilateral.” It asserted that several disarmament sites had

yet to be opened and that further time for disarmament in remote, seasonally

inaccessible areas was required. A NCDDRR spokesman also stated that none of the

three former armed factions or the NTGL had been officially notified of the date

announced by Klein, a claim later denied by the deputy head of UNMIL. Chairman

Bryant, however, subsequently accepted the October 30 date, and in late September,

UNMIL opened its last disarmament site.36

36

IRIN, “Liberia: DDR Commission Rejects October Deadline for Completing

Disarmament,” Sept. 7, 2004; — , “Liberia: Disarmament Finally Begins in Lofa county,”

(continued...)

CRS-26

A related challenge facing the disarmament process is a reportedly inadequate

level of funding for ex-combatant reintegration programs, due in part to donor

concerns. Some donors reportedly will not release pledges for reintegration support

until the disarmament process has formally ended. While several large reintegration

programs are operating, United Nations and NTGL officials maintain that given

current levels of funding, not all ex-combatants will receive reintegration assistance,

which these officials see as threatening to the sustainability of the DDRR program

as a whole.

Child Soldiers. U.N. agencies have estimated that there are over 15,000 child

soldiers in Liberia, many forcibly recruited by the belligerent forces for use as

soldiers, domestic workers, involuntary sexual companions, and porters.

Disarmament plans include special provisions for addressing the special needs of

child ex-combatants, and a Child Protection Working Group (CPWG) chaired by

UNICEF has been created. In late August 2004, however, UNICEF Carol Bellamy

made press statements indicating that only about half of the UNICEF’s appeal for

reintegration projects for child ex-combatants had been funded by donors.37

Elections

In January 2004, an independent National Elections Commission (NEC) was

appointed by the NTGL, as required under Liberia’s CPA; its members include two

former Supreme Court justices and two former Taylor-era members of the NEC. Its

mandate is to ensure the conduct of elections “in a manner that is acceptable to all”

no later than October 200538. As called for under the CPA, the United Nations, in

cooperation with other members of the ICGL (see above), is designing a prospective

U.N. elections assistance program, and possible legal and operational reforms of the

electoral system, as well as a potential elections time line. Such an aid program

would have two key goals: the conduct of “credible” and expertly administered

elections, and the creation of a sustainable national electoral administration capacity

in future elections.

A report of an assessment undertaken in April 2004 by the elections technical

assistance group IFES stated that any eventual electoral framework should address

the following tasks or issues:

Establishment of electoral system (constituency, number of

representatives, electoral formula);

! Creation of electoral boundaries;

! Determination of type of elections to be held (national, general);

! Eligibility to vote and process for becoming a voter (including

provisions for refugees and IDPs);

!

36

(...continued)

Sept. 8, 2004.

37

IRIN, “Liberia: Too little money for rehabilitation of former combatants, UNICEF says,”

Aug. 26, 2004.

38

Article XVIII, Electoral Reform, CPA.

CRS-27

Eligibility and process for political candidacy;

Political party registration and the electoral campaign processes;

Elections administration (procedures of operations, appointments);

Voting, vote-counting, and the announcement of results procedures;

Sanctions for specific electoral offences;

Consultative mechanisms;

Elections observation and guarantees for the rights of political party

representatives; and

39

! Election dispute resolution.

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

An assessment mission by the U.N. Department of Political Affairs Electoral

Assistance Division in April 2004 found that the NEC had “very little material and

staff capacity to carry out civic and voter education, voter registration, constituency

delimitation and polling.” It asserted that these activities could not be carried out in

timely manner without “extensive international assistance.” The United Nations

projects that administration of the elections will require a one year deployment to the

UNMIL electoral unit of 32 international experts, 11 national experts, 49 national

General Service staff; a five-month deployment of an additional 92 national General

Service staff to support the Unit’s data center; a six to nine month deployment of 220

U.N. Volunteers; and the hiring for six months of 4,080 temporary registration staff.

The UNSG has proposed that the cost of these workers, as well as funding for

registration materials and partial funding for voter education materials, be included

in UNMIL’s 2005-2006 budget submission. Under this proposal, however, all direct

NEC Commission funding would have to come from other sources. In addition to

electoral conduct work, the UNMIL CIVPOL unit is preparing for the elections by

supporting the training of about 1,800 Liberian Police Service personnel. UNMIL

projects that a five-week nationwide voter registration exercise will begin in April

2005 and to proceed for around five weeks.40

In July 2004, the NEC chair announced that an estimated $12.4 million would

be required to conduct the election, and that about one third of this cost would likely

be represented by the in-kind support being provided by UNMIL. By comparison,

a rough estimate by IFES in April 2004 totaled “$16 million for an elections and

operational budget for the period of July 2004 - January 2006,” but IFES warned that

“this figure would not include local elections, a costly constituency delimitation

exercise, out-of country refugee registration/voting, and the necessary logistical

support.”41

The NEC has also begun to prepare for the 2005 election. In July 2004, it

hosted a consultative meeting with Liberian political parties. This process reportedly

generated a consensus that Liberians generally favor a direct, constituency-based

elections, the traditional electoral method in Liberia, rather than proportional party

39

IFES, “Report of an Electoral Assessment and Planning Mission to Liberia, April 4-25,

2004.”

40

U.N. Security Council, S/2004/725; and — , Third progress report of the

Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2004/430, May 26, 2004.

41

IFES, “Report...”

CRS-28

elections, which were employed in the 1997 post-war special election. Following

this consultative process, in late August, the NEC submitted to the NTLA for

ratification a draft electoral law, the Electoral Reform Bill, which is currently under

parliamentary consideration.42 It proposes the following measures, which include

proposed suspensions of articles of the current constitution and a variety of related

legal reforms:

Suspension of Article 83(b), which requires elections on the basis of

an absolute majority for all public offices. Instead, the president and

vice president would be chosen by a first round absolute majority

(over 50%) vote, to be followed by a simple majority run-off vote

between the two highest vote earners if no candidate received an

absolute majority in the first round vote. County-based simple

majority votes would be used to elect House representatives and

senators.

! Due to the “unlikely” probability of a national census before the

2005 elections, suspension of Article 80(d) of the constitution,

which requires a census to demarcate constituencies totaling no

more than 100. Instead, the number of House seats would be fixed

at sixty four, representing multi-member constituencies for each

county. Each winning candidate would be elected by “an

approximately equal number” of voters, though means for

accomplishing this end are not entirely provided for in the bill.

! Due to the increase of counties from nine to fifteen since the

adoption of the current constitution, suspension of Article 78,

requiring political parties to be defined as associations of at least 500

members in each of at least six counties. Instead the same

requirements would apply, but with applicability to at least 12

counties. Currently registered parties would not be subject to this

amendment, and inter-party electoral coalitions would be permitted.

! Funding of the NEC by the public treasury, provided that a formal

finance and audit process overseen by special committees be

established to oversee NEC spending and ensure the accountability

of NEC activities.

! The enactment, for diverse reasons, of a number of technical

amendments to the New Elections Law of 1986, including several

provisions aimed at preventing electoral malfeasance and setting

campaign spending limits.

!

Due to widespread population displacements, the bill would also:

!

42

Suspend Article 52(c), which requires that presidential and vice

presidential candidates reside Liberia 10 years prior to an election,

but wold add a provision requiring that the two incumbents not come

from the same county;

Christopher Melville, “Election Commission Seeks Revision of Liberian Electoral Law,”

WMRC Daily Analysis, Sept. 2, 2004, among others.

CRS-29

Suspend Article 30(b), which requires one year of residence and

status as taxpayers of all legislative candidates within the

constituencies that they propose to represent; and

! Amend the New Elections Law of 1986 to allow the NEC to

administratively and operationally facilitate the registration and

voting of displaced persons and refugees, and to provide assistance

to illiterate and disabled persons.

!

Status of Charles Taylor

Taylor Indictment. A key factor that appears to have motivated Taylor’s

departure from power was the unsealing of an indictment against him by the Special

Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) a hybrid U.N.-Sierra Leonean body established to try

those most responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses during Sierra Leone’s

civil war43. The indictment, issued on March 7, 2003, was publicly unsealed on June

4, 2003, as Taylor addressed opening remarks to the Ghana peace talks.

Simultaneously, an arrest warrant for Taylor was issued, and the SCSL requested that

the Ghanaian government detain and transfer him to Sierra Leone for prosecution.

Ghana claimed non-receipt of SCSL’s request, and Taylor abruptly returned to

Liberia, reportedly on a Ghanaian state aircraft. The indictment was seen as

weakening Taylor’s stature and bargaining power; the following day, LURD mounted

a fierce assault on Monrovia, in an apparent bid to gain pre-negotiation military

superiority. The attack, and the initial failure of MODEL to send a delegation to

Ghana, temporarily postponed the talks. LURD threatened to withdraw from the

talks if Taylor, who LURD labeled a war criminal, did not resign. Taylor then

threatened to pull out of talks unless the indictment was lifted. The talks continued,

however, leading to the June 17 cease-fire accord.

Indictment: Implications and Asylum Offer. Taylor’s indictment was

controversial. It was seen by many analysts as a potential impediment to a rapid

political settlement leading to Taylor’s departure from power and from Liberia. In

late June 2003, Abdulsalami Abubakar, the former Nigerian head of state and the

ECOWAS peace negotiations mediator, called the indictment counter-productive to

mediation efforts. Nigeria subsequently offered asylum to Taylor, reportedly with

strong U.S. encouragement. He initially rejected the offer because Nigeria would not

guarantee his safety from extradition to face trial, but later accepted it, after meeting

with Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo on July 6, and departed Liberia on

August 11. The exact terms of his asylum were not publicly stated, but the offer

reportedly was made in exchange for Taylor’s agreeing to resign, withdraw from

Liberian politics, and not talk to the press. News reports alleged, however, that he

continued to directly communicate from Nigeria with political allies in Liberia, in an

attempt to exert continuing control over economic, political, and military events in

Liberia44. In mid-September 2003, the Nigerian government rebuked Taylor for his

43

The Special Court is supported, in part, by the United States, which has pledged $20

million over the first three years of its operation.

44

Edward Harris, “Ousted Liberian Leader Controlled a Financial Empire — and Isn’t

(continued...)

CRS-30

actions, warning that it would “not tolerate any breach of this condition and others

which forbid him from engaging in active communication with anyone engaged in

political, illegal or governmental activities in Liberia.”45 Reports of such activities by

Taylor have since declined, and his influence appears to be slowly waning, although

periodically such allegations continue to appear in the media. Some observers of

Liberian affairs believe his influence — as projected through a variety of allies, such

as top former Taylor administration officials who hold high offices in the NTGL —

remains significant.

Nigeria. Taylor’s asylum has caused considerable controversy within Nigeria.

Many Nigerians find the presence in their country of a war crimes indictee repugnant.

Others see Taylor as a long-time enemy of Nigeria, in part because his forces

reportedly murdered and abused Nigerians during and after the first Liberian civil

war. Several Nigerian legislators have called for Nigeria to surrender Taylor to the

International Police Organization (Interpol), which in December 2003 issued a Red

Notice for Taylor in response to a request from the Special Court, but not all

legislators support such a move46. On December 10, 2003, a coalition of Nigerian,

Liberian, and Nigerian NGOs, in collaboration with Open Society, a political reform

and advocacy organization, called on the Nigerian government to revoke Taylor’s

asylum and surrender him to the Special Court47. More recently, in July 2004, a

working quorum of Liberia’s transitional parliament rejected a petition from a

coalition of 80 human rights and pro-democracy groups calling for the parliament to

urge Chairman Bryant to demand that Nigeria extradite Taylor to face trial before the

SCSL.

Taylor’s asylum is also the object of a court case by two Nigerian plaintiffs

seeking transfer of Taylor to the SCSL. The plaintiffs, former businessmen whose

limbs were amputated by Sierra Leonean RUF rebels in 1999, are pursuing a

consolidated court case that seeks to have the Nigerian government reconsider, and

ultimately rescind, its provision of asylum to Taylor. They contend that Taylor’s

44

(...continued)

Giving it Up, Diplomats Say,” Associated Press, Sept. 7, 2003; Tim Weiner “Liberian

Ex-Leader Stole $3 Million as He Left, U.N. Aide Says,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 2003 and

Terence Sesay, “UN’s Liberia Envoy Says Taylor Stole 3 Million Dollars Meant for

Soldiers,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 5, 2003; and Emily Wax, “In Exile, Taylor Exerts

Control,” Washington Post, Sept. 17, 2003.

45

Associated Press, “Nigeria Warns Guest-in-exile Taylor to Stay out of Liberia’s Affairs,”

Sept. 16, 2003, inter alia.

46

See Chinwe Maduagwu and Cosmas Ekpunobi, “Reps’ Panel Wants Taylor Sent to

Interpol,” Daily Champion (Lagos), Dec. 11, 2003 and Stephen Oladidupo and Adeyemi

Adebanjo, “Reps Member Wants FG to Handover Charles Taylor,” P.M. News (Lagos),Dec.

11, 2003. Emeka Mamah, “Why Nigeria Won’t Hand Over Taylor for Trial, By Speaker,”

Vanguard (Lagos), Dec. 16, 2003. An Interpol Red Notice is a criminal “wanted” document

used to seek a subject’s arrest and extradition from a third country based upon the issue of

a legal arrest warrant. Some countries regard such notices as the legal basis for a provisional

arrest, while others view them merely as informational communications.

47

Open Society Justice Initiative, et al., “NGOs Demand Nigeria Revoke Charles Taylor’s

Asylum,” Dec. 10, 2003.

CRS-31

asylum is illegitimate because it was granted by the Nigerian executive branch, rather

than the National Refugee Commission, which they contend has sole legal authority

to decide asylum claims. They claim that the executive’s actions breached their

rights under the Nigerian constitution and international law, and assert that the

Nigerian government’s provision of asylum is obstructing Taylor’s trial before the

SCSL. The government contends that the Nigerian Federal High Court, which is

hearing the case, lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by the two plaintiffs

because they lack standing in the case, since they are not parties to the SCSL. It also

contends that the plaintiffs’ case was filed after relevant statutes of limitation had

expired.48

In September 2004, the human rights advocacy group Amnesty International

applied to the Federal High Court for leave to submit an amicus curiae (friend of the

court) brief in the case. The brief focuses on two issues: whether war crimes

indictees of the SCSL are entitled under international law to have or retain refugee

status, which the brief concludes is not permitted; and whether under international

law Nigeria must surrender such an indictee if it does not investigate and, if

evidentiarily warranted, prosecute such a case. The brief concludes Nigeria must

investigate the case against Taylor or surrender him to the SCSL for prosecution.49

Status of SCSL Case Against Taylor. Taylor is pursuing efforts to have

the SCSL indictment lifted. In August 2003, his representatives filed a complaint

before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenging the jurisdiction of the

Special Court to prosecute him. However, according to an ICJ press release, “no

action will be taken in the proceedings ... unless and until Sierra Leone consents to

the Court’s jurisdiction in the case” — an unlikely prospect, given the Sierra Leone

government’s support for the case against Taylor. The ICJ finding followed a similar

motion first filed before the Special Court itself in July 2003. In late October and

November 2003, the Special Court heard arguments by lawyers for Taylor asserting

that his indictment is invalid because he was head of state, and therefore was immune

from prosecution, when it was issued. His then-legal counsel also maintained that

the Special Court has no power to enforce an arrest warrant outside the borders of

Sierra Leone.

Taylor’s efforts to quash the indictment have failed. In late May 2004, the

SCSL Appeals Chamber rejected Taylor’s claim of immunity from prosecution. The

prosecution team is now awaiting Taylor’s appearance before the SCSL. In addition,

in March 2004, SCSL prosecution agents, acting under a Liberian court warrant,

carried out a search of Taylor’s former residences in Liberia, as well as those of his

key associates. Taylor could also potentially face additional legal charges before the

sub-regional ECOWAS court. The court’s president stated in mid-September 2004

48

Lilian Okenwa , “How Taylor Can Appear in Court,” This Day (Nigeria), September 16,

2004; Iseoluwa Ige, “Legal Moves to Extradite Taylor by Nigerians Invalid,” Vanguard

(Nigeria), September 16, 2004; Nigeria Coalition on the International Criminal Court, et al.,

“Nigerian High Court Agrees to Review Charles Taylor Asylum,” June 3, 2004.

49

Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Federal High

Court Reviewing Refugee Status Granted to Charles Taylor,” AI Index, AFR 44/030/2004,

Sept. 23, 2004.

CRS-32

that the court has the authority to hear cases filed by a national of any member state,

including cases pertaining to Taylor’s role in the Liberian conflict or those in other

ECOWAS states.50

Asylum: Debate and Implications. The possibility that asylum might

provide Taylor with de facto indemnity from prosecution prompted considerable

debate over the implication that the conditions pertaining to his departure from

Liberia gave primacy to goals related to political negotiations, rather than those

related to justice and the rule of law. Some policy makers and observers, viewing the

need for peace as paramount, saw Taylor’s extradition to Sierra Leone as a less

pressing objective than a resolution of the war in Liberia and the formation of a

transitional government there. Many advocates of this view — reportedly including

the Bush Administration — do not necessarily support indefinite asylum for Taylor,

but rather may see it as a temporary expedient, and implicitly leave the future

disposition of his case subject to legal decisions by the Special Court and decisions

by the Nigerian government.51 Other observers, including some Members of

Congress, maintain that Taylor must face the serious charges against him, and that

his asylum substantially undermines the deterrent effect on other human rights

abusers, including the armed parties in Liberia, of the prospect of being subjected to

criminal sanctions.52

Pressure on Nigeria. Some advocate bringing pressure on Nigeria, which

asserts that it “will not be harassed” over its asylum offer, to extradite Taylor, and

several provisions of U.S. law support that goal, in part by conditioning some U.S.

aid to Nigeria on its transfer of Taylor to the SCSL.53 Some observers worry,

however, that such legislation unfairly targets Nigeria, and could damage

U.S.-Nigerian relations or be perceived as unjustifiably punishing Nigeria, and

thereby potentially undercut its extensive efforts to bring peace to Liberia. They

argue that the transfer of Taylor to Nigeria was undertaken with full U.S. cognizance

and reportedly was urged by Secretary of State Colin Powell. In addition, they stress

that Nigerian ECOWAS officials were central in the mediation of the CPA and note

that Nigeria spearheaded the ECOMIL intervention and is a leading UNMIL troop

contributing country.

U.S. Law and Taylor. Several U.S. legislative provisions pertain to Taylor’s

asylum. P.L. 108-106 includes $2 million for “for rewards for an indictee of the

50

PANA Daily Newswire, “ECOWAS Court May Try Charles Taylor,” September 16, 2004.

51

See “Daily Press Briefing,”Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, State Department, Dec. 4,

2003, among other official remarks on Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria.

52

House International Relations Committee, “Hyde, Lantos Urge Powell to Release Funds

for Sierra Leone Court Facing Security Threats,” June 13, 2003. See also Human Rights

Watch, “Letter to President Obasanjo on Bringing Charles Taylor to Justice,” Nov. 17,

2003; Amnesty International, “Nigeria: No impunity for Charles Taylor,” AFR 44/024/2003,

Aug. 12, 2003; and U.N. IRIN, “Liberia-Nigeria: Questions raised over Taylor’s exile in

Nigeria,” Aug. 21, 2003.

53

Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Amnesty International Seeks to Intervene in Case

Reviewing Asylum Granted to Former Liberian President Charles Taylor,” AI Index, AFR

44/029/2004, Sept. 22, 2004.

CRS-33

Special Court for Sierra Leone.” Though it does not mention Taylor by name, this

provision is widely assumed to be targeted at and applicable to him. After the

enactment of P.L. 108-106, the Nigerian government, which called the reward

provision “an incitement to terrorism,” increased security for Taylor, and asserted

that the provision might prompt violations of its sovereignty54.

State Department officials oppose such infringements of sovereignty or

associated illegal actions and assert that the apprehension of indictees for which there

are U.S. rewards should be undertaken by appropriate government authorities. They

also contend that such rewards are not fugitive bounties; rather, according to the State

Department, when offered, they are given in exchange for credible information

leading to a fugitive’s apprehension and transfer to the appropriate court of

jurisdiction, on a case-by-case basis. In Taylor’s case, they maintain, no reward is

necessary because Taylor is under the control of the Nigerian government. The offer

of a reward for his apprehension would be potentially offered only if he becomes a

fugitive. S. 2809, the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005, would provide funding for

emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service, providing that funds previously

appropriated “for rewards for an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone” be

transferred to the SCSL55. Other U.S. legislation has concerned the Nigerian

government. P.L. 108-199 which contains FY2004 foreign operations appropriations,

incorporated some provisions similar to those in H.R. 2800 (Kolbe). These include

measures that could deny some forms of U.S. assistance to Nigeria, including funds

for debt restructuring, if it fails to surrender and transfer Taylor to the Special Court.

U.S. Policy

For much of 2002 until June 2003, Bush Administration policy toward Liberia

centered on three activities: urging the Taylor Administration and its armed

opponents to uphold human rights norms, cease armed hostilities, and engage in

direct negotiations; providing emergency humanitarian assistance; and providing

relatively small amounts of development assistance (DA). DA, administered by the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), supported international and

local NGO projects. These sought to increase access to basic health care; bolster

food security by improving food crop production, processing and marketing

capacities and small-scale community-level income generation and infrastructure

54

Such concerns followed reports that Northbridge Services Group, a U.K.-based military

services firm, had in mid-2003 attempted to procure a $4 million deal to forcibly apprehend

Taylor, and turn him over to the Special Court. In mid-December 2003, the group floated

a similar plan, this time in exchange for the $2 million reward, a proposition that was

sharply attacked by Nigeria. See Thomas Catan, James Harding And Michael Peel, “FBI

investigates offer by private military company to arrest Liberian president,” Financial

Times, Aug. 7, 2003; and Anton La Guardia, “Mercenaries told they can seize Taylor,” The

Daily Telegraph, July 25, 2003; and BBC News, “Firm seeks Charles Taylor bounty, Dec.

11, 2003, and — , “Nigeria warns off bounty hunters,” Dec. 12, 2003.

55

State Department, “Daily Press Briefing for Nov. 10,” Nov. 10, 2003; and — , “Daily

Press Briefing for Nov. 25,” Nov. 25, 2003.

CRS-34

building capacities; and support adult literacy and providing civic education and

public information. USAID also focused on improving prospects for successful

electoral change, primarily through capacity building efforts targeted at civil society

groups and local independent media.

Responses to Increasing Conflict. Beginning in late May and early June

2003, Administration activities relating to Liberia shifted toward ensuring the

protection of Americans and U.S. government personnel and assets in Liberia, and

facilitating the Liberian cease-fire and peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana

(June-August 2003). Several U.S. military teams were dispatched to the region to

bolster security for the U.S. embassy, which was hit by mortar fire and stray bullets

during heavy fighting in Monrovia, and to evacuate Americans. The French military

also evacuated Americans from Liberia.

Embassy Attacks. On June 25, 2003 Greystone, a U.S. embassy storage

compound occupied by thousands of civilians fleeing fighting and mortar fire, was

hit by two explosions during a second major assault by LURD on Monrovia. Three

persons were killed, including two local embassy workers, and 16 were injured. The

State Department issued a sharp condemnation of the attack, after earlier labeling the

LURD assault a “serious violation of the cease-fire” and stated that the attack might

remove “any international credibility or recognition” retained by LURD56. On June

26, Liberian crowds piled eleven bodies, including children, in front of the U.S.

embassy, in a demonstration calling for immediate U.S. intervention to halt the

fighting. On July 20, a team of 21 U.S. Marines, part of a 41 member Fleet

Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) trained to guard U.S. diplomatic installations,

was deployed to Monrovia. Upon its arrival, the FAST faced a hail of mortar fire

falling in the vicinity of the embassy. Its deployment was backed by U.S. air

transport teams based in Senegal and Sierra Leone; the latter carried out several

evacuations from Monrovia. In late July 2003, all of these U.S. military elements

became part of a larger U.S. military effort, dubbed Joint Task Force Liberia.

Conflict Resolution Efforts. The United States, a key member of the ICGL,

actively participated in the peace negotiations in Ghana. These efforts sought to

improve the security environment in Monrovia; enable then-suspended or otherwise

interrupted emergency relief operations to resume; and to further resolve the conflict

and a transition of state power. After a cease-fire agreement was signed on June 17,

the United States repeatedly and strongly urged the Liberian belligerents to adhere

to it, and to prevent civilian casualties. In late July, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State Pamela Bridgewater traveled to Guinea, where she reportedly met with LURD

Chairman Sekou Conneh and Guinean government officials to emphasize the need

for an end to the conflict and for Guinean support of LURD. Her visit was quickly

followed by a visit to Guinea by Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for

Africa, who reiterated Bridgewater’s message to Guinean officials.

56

Associated Press, “Fighting Engulfs Liberia’s Capital, Explosives Wound Refugees in

U.S. Compound,” June 25, 2003; MSNBC News Services, “3 Killed in Blasts at U.S.

Compound,” June 25, 2003.

CRS-35

In July and August 2003, the United States assisted the deployment of ECOMIL

to Liberia (see “Overview and Recent Developments,” above) — a course of action

that was preceded by extensive public debate about the potential and relative merit

of a direct U.S. military intervention. Once ECOMIL had deployed, U.S. policy

makers pushed for the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Liberia. The

United States also acted to protect the interests of some Liberians living in the United

States by granting to those who qualified for Temporary Protected Status (TPS).57

U.S. Intervention in Liberia: Debate and Policy Responses

Many Liberians and a number of foreign policy advocates had for several years

called for direct international intervention in Liberia — preferably, in their view, a

U.S. led intervention — to stop the civil war and assist in resolving the political

issues underlying it. As fighting in and around Monrovia grew, such calls, including

several from world leaders, increased, contributing to a growing debate in the press

and among U.S. policy makers about a potential U.S. intervention in Liberia.

Perspectives on Intervention. Proponents of a potential U.S. intervention

in Liberia argued that the United States had long been involved in Liberia —

beginning by founding it — and benefitted from substantial and enduring Liberian

support for the United States during the Cold War. Opponents argued that bilateral

ties had weakened considerably since the 1980s, and that Liberia was peripheral to

U.S. interests; that its conflict was essentially an internal political contest for state

power; that potential dangers to U.S. troops, if deployed to Liberia, were not

warranted; and that the United States was already over-extended militarily across the

globe. Some warned that U.S. troops in Liberia would face dangers akin to those

faced by the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992, in which 29 Americans died.

Proponents asserted that Liberia’s political and military situation was qualitatively

different from that of Somalia, and that its citizens welcomed Americans. They also

argued that Liberia had become a lynchpin for persistent political and economic

instability; had engendered increasingly porous border zones beset by cross-border

crime, arms flows, and smuggling; and was the source of severe regional

humanitarian crises. Liberia had become a failed state, they asserted, that

undermined regional U.S. democracy and governance policy goals and constituted

a direct threat to the United States by providing operational space for international

criminal actors and international terrorists. They cited reports that the Taylor

government had directly aided international terrorist financing by allegedly

facilitating the purchase by Al Qaeda operatives of Sierra Leonean diamonds.58

Initial U.S. Responses. U.S. officials responded to mounting calls for U.S.

military intervention by stating that they were assessing the situation in Liberia. They

offered no firm commitments or pledges to deploy U.S. troops, however, and

suggested that African militaries could mount an effective intervention force.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that African troops had “been

57

TPS is a temporary “safe harbor”immigration status granted to qualified nationals of some

countries affected by ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other difficulties. See CRS

Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues.

58

See CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation.

CRS-36

well-trained” and equipped for peacekeeping by the United States59. On June 30,

2003 James Cunningham, the U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the U.N., said that prior

to the establishment of an intervention force, the United States would require that

Taylor give up power; that a political agreement among the Liberian parties be

finalized; and that there be international support for a continued peace process.60

Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team. In early July 2003, a

U.S. Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team (HAST) was dispatched from

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to Monrovia. The 32-member team included

experts with medical, contracting, civil engineering, logistics, water purification and

other technical expertise, and a security component. Initial plans called for the

HAST to undertake an assessment over a week, but the mission was extended61.

Some observers supportive of a U.S. intervention, but skeptical that one would take

place, viewed the HAST as a stop-gap measure undertaken to demonstrate U.S.

engagement with Liberia and counter growing international pressure for a U.S.-led

intervention on the eve of President Bush’s July 7-12 state visit to Africa.62

Military Assistance and Monitoring. A second U.S. military team was

dispatched to ECOWAS member states to assess the force readiness and military

logistical and equipment needs of these countries prior to their anticipated

deployment of a joint intervention force to Liberia, and to assess a possible U.S. role

in supporting such a force63. The United States also deployed a private contractor as

a member of the Joint Verification Team, a monitoring body that was to be created

under the June 2003 cease-fire accord. The contractor performed liaison functions

59

Jonathan Paye Layleh, “Liberia’s Chief Rebel Group Urges Americans to Lead

International Peace Force,” Associated, June 30, 2003 and “U.S. Resist Pressure to Intervene

in Liberia,” Reuters, June 30, 2003.

60

Scott Lindlaw, “White House Considering U.S. Role in Liberia, amid Calls for Military

Action,” Associated Press, June 30, 2003.

61

Voice of America, “Pentagon Sources: US Assessment Team’s Stay in Liberia

Open-Ended,” July 15, 2003. On August 17, 2003, the Los Angeles Times reported that the

HAST team had completed a report during President Bush’s Africa trip that reportedly

recommended that a 2,300-strong U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit be deployed to Liberia

to stabilize the country and protect civilians. The recommendations were reportedly

reviewed by top Administration policy makers, and the HAST was ordered to revise the

report because its conclusions were said to be at odds with policy makers’ preferences. A

revised report, submitted a week later, reportedly described a need for “security” to “be

established so that humanitarian organizations can undertake an appropriate emergency

response,” but contained no specific recommendations for a U.S. military intervention.

Defense Department officials reportedly maintained that the HAST report had addressed

matters outside the scope of its assessment mandate. See Maggie Farley, Ann Simmons and

Paul Richter, “Team in Liberia Sought Fast Aid,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003.

62

Howard Witt, “U.S.: No Decision Yet on Liberia; Advisers Arrive in Monrovia; Bush En

Route to Africa,” Chicago Tribune, July 8, 2003.

63

Vicky O’Hara, “Analysis: Pros and Cons of Sending US Troops to Help Enforce a

Cease-fire in Liberia’s Long-running Civil War,” National Public Radio, July 11, 2003; and

Dow Jones/Associated Press, “US Military Experts, W African Officials Discuss Liberia,”

July 11, 2003.

CRS-37

on behalf of the United States and the ICGL. The same delegate later assisted

ECOWAS to undertake a pre-deployment assessment mission, and subsequently

acted as a liaison between ECOMIL and the Joint Task Force Liberia, and helped

ECOMIL form the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), as provided for under the

CPA.

Joint Task Force Liberia. In late July 2003, just prior to the arrival a U.S.

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the Liberian coast, U.S. military elements in

the region responding to events in Liberia were integrated into an ad-hoc operational

unit dubbed Joint Task Force Liberia. The ARG, which arrived in early August, was

deployed in anticipation of possible contingencies requiring a military role, most

notably the provision of U.S. assistance to the ECOMIL. It complemented the air

support and embassy security teams already in the region. Personnel from the ARG,

part of Joint Task Force Liberia, provided coordination support for PAE’s delivery

of goods and logistics services to ECOMIL (see “Overview and Recent

Developments,” above), and undertook various other security, flight, and

infrastructure/logistical assessment duties in Liberia.64

U.S. Assistance: Development Assistance

Three types of U.S. assistance is provided to Liberia: long-term development aid

(DA); emergency humanitarian assistance; and post-conflict-focused International

Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) aid. Budget figures for these accounts are

presented in Appendix 1. The USAID DA program during the latter years of the

Taylor presidency exclusively aided NGOs, notably those engaged in primary health

care, agriculture, and peace-building activities. It was inactive, however, for much

of FY2003 due to insecurity associated with the war. The bulk of USAID’s FY2004

programs in Liberia are being funded under IDFA. FY2004 DA assistance is limited

to $2.4 million in Child Survival and Health (CSH) programs that support capacitybuilding for community-based basic health services delivery organizations, and

$100,000 in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related/Small Arms

and Light Weapons Destruction (NADR-SALW) funds. In addition, a three-year,

$1.5 million Displaced Children and Orphans Fund program targeting vulnerable

children has been initiated, and some Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund monies are

being used to aid disabled children. USAID’s West Africa Regional Program

supports a small HIV/AIDS information project.

Programs under the Bush Administration’s FY2005 request for Liberia would

complement and extend core IDFA program goals. Under the USAID request, an

integrated set of CSH programs ($1.997 million) would improve access, quality and

demand for health services through various capacity-building initiatives. Under

USAID’s Community Revitalization and Reintegration program ($.545 million in

DA and $25 million in ESF), USAID would resettle and reintegrate refugees, IDPs

and ex-combatants in their permanent post-war communities of residence, as well as

promote good governance, reconstruction, and economic development. In addition,

$5 million in State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

64

Reuters, “Handful of US Marines ordered into Liberia,” August 6, 2003; and Voice of

America, “US Troops to Arrive in Liberia Wednesday,” August 6, 2003.

CRS-38

(INCLE) funds would be used to continue to extend IDFA programs aimed at

creating a “credible and competent” national Liberian police force and competent

judicial institutions, and promoting various anti-corruption measures.

U.S. Emergency and Post-War Assistance

The delivery of U.S. emergency humanitarian assistance to Liberia, provided by

USAID’s Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace

(FFP), flowed to Liberia as the conflict grew, beginning with aid provided after a

Complex Emergency for the Mano River countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra

Leone) was declared in FY2002. In FY2003, a Liberia-specific Complex Emergency

was declared. As of August 27, 2004, total U.S. humanitarian assistance to Liberia

in FY2004 totaled $72.96 million.65 Such aid has supported:

!

Shelter and camp management activities for internally displaced

persons (IDPs) and returning refugees, and IDP abuse protection

initiatives, including those targeting sexual/gender-based violence;

!

Targeted emergency food assistance, which includes staple food

commodities, provided through direct distribution and food for work

programs, and targeted therapeutic and supplementary feeding

programs delivered to vulnerable individuals and through emergency

school feeding, maternal/child health programs;

!

Measles immunization and other health programs, including in IDP

camps;

!

Access to water and sanitation;

!

Support for the coordination, logistics, and information activities of

the U.N. and other humanitarians organizations; and

!

Reintegration of Liberian returnees and IDPs.

USAID also helped create the Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) for

Liberia, an information clearing house for humanitarian aid agencies in Liberia

managed by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

OFDA disaster assessment teams carried out multiple evaluation missions in the

months after the peace accord. Their findings helped shape preparations for both

continuing USAID emergency aid programs and post-conflict recovery assistance.

These preparations also draw from assessment missions undertaken by USAID’s

Africa Bureau and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and information from the

U.S. diplomatic mission in Monrovia.

65

USAID, “Liberia,” Complex Emergency Situation Report #14, FY2004, August 27, 2004.

Such aid totaled $6.25 million in FY2002 and $35.5 million in FY2003.

CRS-39

Current U.S. Assistance Programs

In addition to supporting the operation of UNMIL, current U.S. Liberia-related

assistance funds a variety of programs meant to consolidate Liberia’s transition to

peace. USAID and the departments of State, the Treasury, and Defense, both

individually and in ad-hoc inter-agency working groups, are implementing this

integrated package of post-war assistance, which is being predominantly funded by

approximately $200 million in IDFA funds appropriated under P.L. 108-106.

Key Issues. Key considerations guiding the pace of delivery and the

organization of this aid include:

!

The potentially limited capacity of the NTGL, Liberian

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other local

organizations to efficiently use or absorb large quantities of external

resources;

!

The need to ensure that programs of assistance and capacity-building

produce sustainable and durable results; and

!

The need to incorporate audit functions and a monitoring role for the

USAID Inspector General for all USAID-provided assistance to

Liberia, and for Treasury Department efforts and general U.S.

assistance programs to stress the need for public accountability in

Liberia, given the relatively large size of the IDFA aid package, and

given Liberia’s long history of public sector corruption.

The IDFA aid has been programed for delivery in two “phases,” the first worth

a total of $144 million, and the second $86 million, as reflected in tables 1 and 2:

CRS-40

Table 1. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase I

($ millions)

Program Areas

Amount

Relief and Resettlement

for Returnees and

Remainees I

19.5

Relief and Resettlement

for Returnees and

Remainees II

24.5

Reintegration,

Resettlement and

Community

Revitalization

Reintegration,

Resettlement and

Community

Revitalization and

Basic Social Services

Civil Police and Related

Judicial Structures

5

Program Summaries

Implementing

Agencies

•International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Hospital services, water/sanitation programs, family

tracing/reunification, and provision of non-food items for IDPs and refugees ($4.5 million).

•U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Refugee and related IDP protection and assistance,

repatriation and reintegration ($11 million).

•International Organization for Migration (IOM): Various resettlement assistance functions, in coordination

with UNHCR and ICRC ($1 million).

•Other International Organizations: Water/sanitation programs in IDP camps; resettlement transit assistance;

and community-based reintegration/recovery support in targeted; UNICEF and UNDP, in cooperation with

UNHCR ($3 million).

•Agriculture for work/seeds and tools programs and community-based food for work repair of social

infrastructure ($8 million).

•Community-based school and various specially-targeted feeding programs ($4 million).

•Health and water/sanitation infrastructure rehabilitation and upgrades. and staff training/assistance ($10

million).

•Aid coordination and logistical support ($1.5 million).

•Abuse prevention among IDPs and returnees populations ($1 million).

•Targeted quick impact reintegration support.

State/PRM (a)

USAID/OFDA (b)

USAID/OTI (c)

45

•Rehabilitation by community-based labor brigades of public services infrastructure; vocational training,

technical assistance, and micro-credit programming; and psycho-social counseling for female and child excombatants and armed faction associates ($40 million).

•Condensed remedial primary school education (Advanced Learning Program, or ALP) targeting excombatants and war-affected youth. ($5 million).

USAID/AFR (d)

10

•Liberian police force training programs and support, in coordination with UNMIL, including basic police

skills and human rights components; and judicial system assistance and reform, including training focusing

on ethics and anti-corruption, and on legal and procedural knowledge, and provision of law books and basic

supplies required for basic court functions.

State/INL (e)

CRS-41

Program Areas

Amount

Governance and

Independent Media

7

Military Reform (SSR)

1

Forest Sector

Rehabilitation

1

Support to the Central

Bank

1

Program Summaries

Implementing

Agencies

•Provision of targeted technical assistance and “Ministries in a Box” packages to core NTGL components,

such as the Chairman’s office, and key ministries and offices, and support of citizen participation in

governance ($5 million).

•Media capacity-building assistance, including the creation of community radio stations, to increase the

substantially illiterate public’s access to basic information, in local languages, about the peace process and

government; help build an enduring free and balanced press; increase human rights awareness and abuse

prevention; promote conflict mediation and reconciliation capacity-building, particularly in relation to

resettlement processes ($2 million).

•Program of State Department/DoD assessment of DDRR, military facilities and camps, and consultations

with Liberian citizens and officials, and U.N. agencies, prior to formulating proposals for possible U.S.

military restructuring and reform assistance.

•Assessment of Liberia’s forestry sector, seen as a key environmental and public revenue source for Liberia,

focusing on Liberia’s institutional capacity to formulate and enforce laws, regulations, policies;

transparently allocate and regulate forestry concessions; and track and manage forestry revenues ($.5

million).

•Immediate rebuilding of the capacities of the Liberian Forest Development Authority (FDA) with respect to

issues under assessment, with a focus on the training, operational, and facilities needs of its administrative

and law enforcement staff ($.5 million).

•Provision of resident advisors in Liberia, slated, in coordination with international financial institutions and

“predicated upon a thorough audit of the [Liberian] Central Bank,” to assist Liberia’s government to reestablish core revenue/taxation, debt, and budgeting functions and institutions. Focal areas of assistance

may include helping the Central Bank to formulate and implement credible fiduciary controls and monetary

policies and reduce its operating expenses. Programing may also provide other economic policy

formulation support to the NTGL.

USAID/OTI

State/RSA (f); and

Defense Department

(DoD)

State/OES (g)

Treasury Department

114

TOTAL

Sources: Information from USAID and the State Department.

Notes

a. PRM: Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration, State

Department

b. OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

c. OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID

d. AFR: Africa Bureau, USAID

e. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, State Department

f. Regional Security Affairs-Africa Bureau State Department

g. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs (OES), State

Department

CRS-42

Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase II

($ millions)

Program Areas

Amount

Military Reform (SSR)

34

Debt Arrearages

15

Police

Elections

3

10

Treasury Advisors for

Fiscal and Financial

Management

2.5

Reintegration

10

Forestry

3

Rule of Law/ Judicial

Reform

6

HIV/AIDS

1.5

Agriculture

1

TOTAL

86

Sources:

Notes

Program Summaries

Implementing

Agencies

•Establishment of a new military, likely of 5,000-6000 personnel, to meet core national security needs

under a democratic system. Programming is anticipated to take two-three to years; require additional

funding from unspecified sources, possibly including support from other donor governments.

•Reduction of Liberia’s debt arrearages to multilateral development banks (MDBs) to enable MDB fiscal

support, in part aimed at leveraging additional resources, possibly including arrearage payment aid from

other donors.

•Continued support for police retraining.

•Elections preparation assistance focusing on electoral commission capacity building; political party and

polling place worker training; civil society election observation; and election materials, equipment and

other polling day requirements.

•Deployment of resident advisers on budgeting, banking, tax, and debt issues. A separate, additional $2.5

million aid package may be provided in support of second year of costs for resident advisers and a resident

macro-economic advisor. Treasury may deploy an attaché to Monrovia to assist in advisory coordination,

regular bilateral functions, and provision of support to Liberian customs.

•Support for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, IDPs, and war-affected populations into

communities, and for general social and economic growth in Liberia; focus on employment creation,

income generation, and work skills-building.

•Continued forest sector rehabilitation and natural resources management capacity-building programming

State; DoD;

Contractors

•Re-development of judicial institutions, including criminal courts and democratic institutions, and the

capacities of civil society and protect human rights institutions, in support of a sustainable transition to a

market-oriented, democratic political system.

•HIV/AIDS testing and epidemiological surveillance of ex-combatants and other high risk groups, and

provision of voluntary counseling and preventive services in resettled communities; program intended to

prevent potentially high increase in post-war HIV infections rates as a complement to treatment assistance

from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

•Rehabilitation of smallholder rubber sector for purposes of future income generation, particularly for

women, focusing on tree re-planting and development of tree nurseries.

Information from USAID and the State Department.

a. USFS: U.S. Forest Service /International Programs.

Treasury

State/INL

USAID

Treasury

USAID

State/OES; USAID;

USFS (a)

USAID; State/INL; and

Justice Department

USAID

USAID

CRS-43

Other Aspects of U.S. Policy toward Liberia. In December 2003,

President Bush issued Presidential Determination No. 2004-11, which, on the basis

of a finding that U.S. assistance to Liberia is in the U.S. national interest, waived

“Brooke Amendment”requirements that would otherwise have barred or restricted

such aid66. The State Department has also stated that the United States has concluded

a bilateral “Article 98 agreement” with Liberia, in part to protect the safety of U.S.

personnel operating in Liberia, thus allowing the United States to provide certain

kinds of military assistance to Liberia67. The United States is also involved in efforts

to assess Liberia’s progress toward meeting the provisions under which U.N.

sanctions against it may be lifted.

Murder of U.S. Official. No recent progress has been reported in the

investigation of the May 2004 murder in Monrovia of John Auffrey, a Defense

Department civilian employee who was a member of a U.S. mission that assessed

needs and prospects for Liberian military restructuring. Auffrey, a former U.S. Peace

Corps volunteer in Sierra Leone, was fatally stabbed during a robbery in his hotel

room. Soon after the crime, four suspects were provisionally identified, and at least

three rewards were offered for information leading to their apprehension. In June

2004, three Liberian police officers were reportedly charged with aiding the suspects,

and several suspects linked to the killing were later charged with murder. The main

suspect, however, who was reportedly sighted in August 2004 in a country adjacent

to Liberia, remains at large.68

Congressional Role

From June 2003 through September of that year, Liberia garnered frequent

Congressional attention, most notably over the issue of a potential U.S. intervention

in Liberia. Reactions by some Members of Congress to potential U.S. intervention

66

The “Brooke Amendment” is the popular name for provisions of the Foreign Assistance

Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and individual fiscal year appropriations acts, that prohibit

assistance to countries that are in default to the United States for certain kinds or portion of

loans owed to the United States.

67

State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” October 8, 2003. “Article 98" agreements are

bilateral agreements with national governments that provide U.S. nationals in third countries

with immunity from actions of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In addition to the

CRS reports cited previously, see State Department, Article 98 Agreements and the

International Criminal Court, [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/art98/]; and Coalition for the

International Criminal Court, US and the ICC, available online from the ICC website at

[http://www.iccnow.org/documents/usandtheicc.html].

68

Sheriff Z. Adams, “Wanted Man ‘Spotted’ Govt Quotes Intelligent Sources,” The News,

Aug. 18; IRIN, “Liberia: Police Identify Four Suspects Linked to US Civilian Killing,” May

28, 2004; The Analyst, “More Money on Boye T. Moore,” June 7, 2004; PANA, “Liberian

policemen linked to murder of US military official,” June 1, 2004; Agency France-Press,

“50 arrests after murder of US national in Liberia,” June 2, 2004; Anthony A. Mesas,

“Service Saturday for man killed in Liberia,” The Pueblo Chieftain, June 11, 2004; and

Mike Boater, “Memorial to Mr. John Auffrey,” International Training Management, Defense

Institute of Security Assistance Management, N.D.

CRS-44

in Liberia varied widely. Some, notably several Members of the Congressional Black

Caucus, urged that immediate and substantial U.S. resources and actions be taken to

resolve the conflict in Liberia and provide its people with what these Members saw

as badly-needed humanitarian assistance69. Other Members voiced considerable

caution or outright opposition in relation to direct U.S. military intervention in

Liberia. Representative Ron Paul, for instance, introduced H.Con.Res. 255, entitled

“Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States military should not

become involved in the Liberian civil war, either alone or as part of a United Nations

peacekeeping force.”70 Congressional debate incorporated many of the perspectives

previously outlined (see “Debate on U.S. Intervention in Liberia”). Many Members

urged the Administration to confer closely with Congress and keep Members clearly

informed about U.S. policy decisions on Liberia. Some called for a vote in Congress

on any decision to deploy U.S. troops on the ground.

On October 2, 2003, the House Committee on International Relations

Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing entitled U.S. Policy Toward Liberia. Liberia

also featured prominently in hearings held during summer, 2003, by the House

Armed Services Committee; the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations; and the House Committee on International

Relations.

Legislation

Current Appropriations. H.R. 4818 (Kolbe). Foreign Operations, Export

Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005, introduced July 13,

2004, was reported by the House Committee on Appropriations as an original

measure, H.Rept. 108-599, on July 13, 2004. It was passed by the House on July 15,

2004 and subsequently amended and passed by the Senate, along with a request for

a conference, on September 23, 2004, in lieu of S. 2812. During Senate

consideration of H.R. 4818, Senator Leahy offered S.Amdt. 3684, providing not less

than $25 million in ESF assistance for Liberia, which was agreed to by unanimous

consent. In addition, the Senate version of H.R. 4818 would provide Liberia with a

portion of $5 million to address sexual and gender-based violence; and not less than

$30 million in Foreign Military Financing aid. The House version contained no

similar Liberia-related provisions.

69

House, “Africa,” Congressional Record, July 8, 2003, H6324 to H6330, passim; — ,

“Africa,” Extensions of Remarks - July 8, 2003, E1425, — , “U.S. Can No Longer Afford

to Ignore Africa,” July 9, 2003, H6434-H6435; and , inter alia, [http://www.allafrica.com],

“Congressional Black Caucus on the ‘The State of Africa,’” July 10, 2003; Voice of

America, “African-American Lawmakers Look Carefully at US Involvement in Liberia,”

July 10, 2003; and Mark Kuki, “Liberia Revisited,” National Journal, July 12, 2003.

70

Similarly, during House debate on the Iraq Supplemental, H.R. 3289, Rep. Goode

introduced H.Amdt. 413, which would have eliminated funding for reimbursement to the

United Nations for peacekeeping in Liberia and U.S. foreign assistance to Liberia, primarily

because, according to Rep. Goode, the purpose of the “supplemental is Iraq, not Liberia.”

Rep. Best also said that he feared such funds would “not be utilized in a way that will be

to the best interest of the United States” and would “not bring the peace and the hope for a

good Liberia.” See House, Congressional Record, Oct. 16, 2003, H9590-9591.

CRS-45

2003 Iraq Supplemental Assistance for Liberia. The key source of U.S.

assistance for Liberia is P.L. 108-106, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, (H.R.

3289 [C. W. Bill Young]). P.L. 108-106 was passed by Congress and signed into

law by President Bush following the deployment of UNMIL and the inauguration of

the NTGL. It appropriates International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA)

funds for Liberia totaling approximately $200 million to support peace and

humanitarian intervention operations unrelated to natural disasters, and $245 million

for the assessed costs of U.N. peacekeeping in Liberia. During Senate debate on S.

1689 (Stevens), the Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill (FY2004), which was

incorporated into P.L. 108-106, several Liberia-related amendments were offered.

These included S.Amdt. 1884 (Byrd); S.Amdt. 1885 (Brownback); and S.Amdt. 1807

(Chafee).

Other Enacted Legislation. Other Liberia-related bills that passed into law

during the 108th Congress include:

H.J.Res. 2 (C. W. Bill Young). Joint Resolution making consolidated

appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003, and for other purposes.

Introduced January 7, 2003; enacted as P.L. 108-007. Prohibits the appropriation of

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Liberia; and requires special notification for

any funds appropriated by the Act for Liberia.

H.R. 2673 (Bonilla). The Omnibus Appropriations Act, FY2004. Introduced

July 9, 2003; enacted as P.L. 108-199. It prohibits the use of FMF funds for Liberia.

Requires regular notification to the Committees on Appropriations about use of the

funds for Liberia appropriated under the Act. Recognizes the contribution of the

Nigerian government to promoting stability and reconciliation in Liberia. Includes

measures that could deny some forms of U.S. assistance to Nigeria, including funds

for debt restructuring. Such measures are applicable to Nigeria because it is a

country in which an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), i.e.,

Charles Taylor, is “credibly alleged to be living.” Under the Act, such a country can

receive certain kinds of U.S. assistance only if the Secretary of State determines and

reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such a government is cooperating

with the SCSL, including by surrendering and transferring to the SCSL persons it has

indicted. The president can waive such stipulations in the interest of U.S. national

security, if certain conditions are met.

Other Legislation Introduced. Other Liberia-specific bills and resolutions

introduced in the 108th Congress include the following:

H.Con.Res. 233 (Fossella). Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the

dire humanitarian situation in Liberia and efforts to introduce peace and justice to

that country; introduced June 26, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on

International Relations.

H.Con.Res. 240 (Payne). Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the

urgency of providing support for the “Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of

Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and Liberians United

for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy of Liberia” and

CRS-46

for other purposes; introduced July 8, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on

International Relations.

H.Con.Res. 255 (Paul). Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United

States military should not become involved in the Liberian civil war, either alone or

as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force; introduced July 24, 2003 and referred

to the House Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 1930 (Patrick J. Kennedy). Liberian Refugee Immigration Protection

Act of 2003; introduced May 1, 2003; referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration,

Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 656 (Reed). Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2003; introduced

March 19, 2003, read twice, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 3918 (Jackson-Lee). Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Reform Act

of 2004; introduced March 9, 2004; referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration,

Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 4885 (Jackson-Lee). Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Act;

introduced July 21, 2004; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 4511 (Waters). The Justice and Understanding By IMF Loan Elimination

and Equity Act of 2004; introduced June 3, 2004; referred to the Subcommittee on

Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, Committee on

Financial Services.

H.R. 4793 (Waters). Justice and Understanding By International Loan

Elimination and Equity Act of 2004; introduced July 9, 2004; referred to the

Committee on Financial Services.

Appropriations bills introduced in the 108th Congress that contain

Liberia-specific provisions include:

S. 1426 (McConnell). Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related

Programs Appropriations Act, 2004. FY2004 foreign operations appropriations were

authorized by H.R. 2673 (P.L. 108-199, see above), which contains some provisions

similar to those in

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