Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Congressional research reportFeb 6, 2004

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Order Code RL32223

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

February 6, 2004

name redacted

Specialist in Terrorism

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Huda Aden, name redacted, and name redacted

Research Associates

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Summary

This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist

organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues

of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those

designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

(For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO

List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS

Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are:

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

‘Asbat al-Ansar

Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)

Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

Hizballah (Party of God)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK)

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

National Liberation Army (ELN — Colombia)

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Al Qaeda

Real IRA (RIRA)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary Nuclei

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)]

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)

United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)

Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Some

spellings have been altered.)

Contents

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Armed Islamic Group (GIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

‘Asbat al-Ansar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

HAMAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Hizballah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Al-Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Kahane Chai (Kach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

(PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Real IRA (RIRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Revolutionary Nuclei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17) . . . . . . . . 96

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Name(s). Fatah — Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades,

Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September.

Goals and Objectives. ANO’s goal is to destroy the state of Israel and

establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom

de guerre, Abu Nidal, means “father of the struggle.” Abu Nidal was a high-ranking

official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO

representative to several Arab states. Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a

Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning

towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the

ANO.

The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations

in the world.1 Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and

hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more

across three continents and 20 countries.2 Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each

reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were

in their interests.3 As a result, the ANO’s selection of targets has been diverse and

inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor.

The ANO has targeted Jews both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted

moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel. ANO is

responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah

outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,4 Abu Iyyad, the PLO’s second-in-command

in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.5

The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome

and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal

reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for

leukemia. However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered

Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO),” Center for Defense

Information, October 9, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ano-pr.cfm].

“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

Alan Philips, “Mystery End for Abu Nidal,” The Daily Telegraph, Aug. 20, 2002.

“Chronology of Abu Nidal’s Major Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 20, 2002.

“Abu Nidal Shot Himself in the Mouth,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 21, 2002.

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questions surrounding his apparent suicide.6 The extent to which the ANO is still

active is under debate.

Favored Tactics. Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and

hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. While the ANO sometimes targeted Western

interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S. interest. On

July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy in Cairo but failed.

Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were

based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi

administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets. The

ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.7 Today, ANO

militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the

years, the group’s activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state

sponsors.8 When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in

20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey,

United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO

consists of a few hundred members.9

Connections with Other Groups. The ANO does not appear to be

connected with any other group.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The ANO received

funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s

and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.10

Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. October

8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Interest to Congress. The mysterious circumstances of Abu

Nidal’s death beg some questions. If it was a murder, published speculation spans

from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the

regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir

“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

“Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, at [http://www.periscope1.com].

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of

Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120. Also accessible at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/].

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

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Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.11 In

addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might

question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization

list. Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are

having on state sponsorship for the group.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated

June 10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United

States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

“Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

CRS-4

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG

Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the

Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority

Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern

islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the

late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial

gain.12

Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the

Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in

1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of

Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there.13 In 1998, Janjalani was

killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not

emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated

commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani,

Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and

the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.14

In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions

of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to

kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom

payments.15 In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French

journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.16 In

May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu

Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans

(see below).

In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the

ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President

Arroyo and offered direct military assistance.17 In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650

Emily Clark,”In the Spotlight: Abu Sayyaf,” Center for Defense Information, updated

March 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sayyaf.cfm], accessed July 15, 2003. See also

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p.1.

Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. See also “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu

Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations,

[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003.

Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS

Report RL31263, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.

Ibid.

“U.S.-Philippines Sign Military Logistics Support Pact,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21,

(continued...)

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troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under

strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300

at the height of operations. The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include

increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG

strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG

from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the

rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support

for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.18 The majority of U.S. forces

withdrew by July 31, 2002.

Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted

bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.

Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of

20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California

and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In

June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had

beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based

on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were

killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.19 The three Americans were apparently

held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush

Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from

the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.20

Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of

Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In

2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an

extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has

been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.21

Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim

radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500

(...continued)

2002.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13.

Bradley Graham, “Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year

by Rebels,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2002.

Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, “Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S.

Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader,” The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and

Mark Lerner, “Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal,” The Washington Times,

April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by

Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003,

p. 11.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.

CRS-6

members.22 According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached

1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.23

That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and

military assistance from the United States to around 450.24 The group maintains its

own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between

island bases.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG

and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group

received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal

Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef

operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf

fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al

Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda,

but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for

profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.25 The 2002 edition of the U.S.

State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al

Qaeda.26

Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the

separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links

with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on

civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that

elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.27

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains

most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its

revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.28

According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic

benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.29 “Libya was a conduit for ransoms

paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.

Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003.

See “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign

Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15,

2003.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 3.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.

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for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the

possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf.”30

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the

Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war

on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign

counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional

oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important.

Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist

group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter,

then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the

ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom

money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should

be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j)

of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as

amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and

MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as

an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated

Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by (name redacted), October 21, 2003.

CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by (name

redacted), Huda Allen, (name edacted),

updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard

Cronin, Larry Niksch, (name re dacted), updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 5.

CRS-8

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Name(s). al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

Goals and Objectives. Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers

from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, and emerged

just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. The organization’s

goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers

and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories. The group is secular in theory,

but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.31

Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent

on destroying the state of Israel.32 Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked

Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa

began targeting civilians in Israel.33 This shift may have been due to the heightened

intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what

al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel’s “targeted killing” of the group’s West Bank

leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.34 Since then, al-Aqsa’s attacks have

become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female

suicide bombers.35 In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide

bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately

100.

Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more

attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad36. While other Palestinian

groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June

2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so. Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared

the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in

the West Bank.37

Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings

(including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings.

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

“Palestinian Militant Groups 101,” CNN, June 18, 2003.

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

“ a l -A q s a M a r t yr s B r i ga d e , ” C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s ,

[http://www.terrorismanswers.org /groups/alaqsa_print.html], accessed July 14, 2003.

Matthew Kalman, “Terrorist says orders come from Arafat; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

leader says group is integral to Palestinian chief’s Fatah,” USA Today, March 14, 2002.

Dan Rothem, “In the Spotlight: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” Center for Defense

Information, June 10, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism.aqsa-pr.cfm], accessed July 14,

2003.

“Foreign Worker Killed in West Bank,” Associate Press, June 30, 2003.

CRS-9

Anti-American Activities. Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests.

However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.38

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the

Palestinian Occupied Territories. The group’s bases are said to be in Nablus and

Ramallah.39

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the number

of members in al-Aqsa is unknown. Some experts estimate that the group consists

of a few hundred young men and women.40

Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa’s connection with Yasir

Arafat’s Fatah — the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — is

murky. Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly

linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.41 They cite as proof Israeli intelligence

acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority

(PA) chief financial officer. In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa

militants are “on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, [al-Aqsa’s] activities are

financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the

knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.”42

Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and

Palestinian Jihad.43

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The source of alAqsa’s funding is unclear. The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the

group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on

PLO head Yasir Arafat’s compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of

funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice

conclusively proves Yassir Arafat’s money supports for the group. However, Arafat

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.102.

“Martyrs of al-Aqsa,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,

[http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 14, 2003 .

“Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs

[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.

Brigade,”

Palestine

Facts,

Yehuda Lancry, “Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of

Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” January 16, 2002,

accessible at [http://domino.un.org].

Yael Shahar, “The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge,” International

Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002.

“Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs

[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.

Brigade,”

Palestine

Facts,

CRS-10

has dismissed the “invoice of terror” as a forgery.44 Yasser Arafat has neither

“officially recognized nor openly backed” al- Aqsa.45

Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Since early 2002, this group has killed

a significant number of civilians in Israel. Its use of suicide attacks has been

particularly frequent and deadly. The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the

Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be

controversial. This group’s violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may

continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated

June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United

States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted),

updated October 22, 2003.

Lee Hockstader, “Israel Says Document Links Arafat, Terror,” The Washington Post,

April 3, 2002

“Profile: al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade,” BBC News.

CRS-11

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Name(s). Armed Islamic Group, GIA

Goals and Objectives. GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in

Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection

of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government

of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law.

Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government

cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front

(FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing

of FIS.) Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union

united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA. Since 1993, the group has

attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of

civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages. On

December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small

town in the space of a few hours.46 Several recent accounts allege, however, that

some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian

government.47 The group’s activity has diminished because of a military crackdown

and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians. Since 1998, GIA has

apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called

Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below).

Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but

it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations,

and airline hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. Although GIA targeted French and other

European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the

group has directly threatened U.S. interests. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed

member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los

Angeles International Airport.48

Areas of Operation. GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria. It

has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through

Algerian expatriate communities. In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA

members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995.

Strength and Composition. GIA’s membership is predominantly Algerian

Islamic militants. It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive

“New Bloodletting in Algeria,” Newsday, January 5, 1998.

See, for example: Habib Souaidia, The Dirty War and Nesroulah Youh, Who Killed in

Bentalha: Chronicle of a Forecasted Massacre.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. Se e also Elaine Ganley, “Ahmed Ressam

Followed Familiar Road Map to Terror,” Associated Press, Dec. 18, 2001.

CRS-12

than many other organizations. The group’s strength has apparently decreased

substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the

current number of members. The State Department estimates that the group’s

strength is now “probably fewer than 100.”49 The International Institute for Strategic

Studies puts its overall strength at “less than 1,500,” divided into cohorts of 50-100.50

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of

connections between GIA and Al Qaeda. In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic

newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative

visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.51 In September

2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided

financial assistance to GIA.52 It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda

are or have been associated with GIA.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns

of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.53 As

noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding

to GIA in the mid-1990s. The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian

expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.54

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The apparent connections between GIA

and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the

war on terrorism. The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe

and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing

are succeeding.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), updated

January 17, 2002.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

Ibid.

“Al Qa’idah reportedly Trying to Unite Algeria’s Armed Islamic Groups,”BBC

Monitoring Middle East, June 8, 2002.

“Former Islamist Chief Says bin Laden Offered to Help Topple Algerian Government,”

BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 12, 2002.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS-13

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by (name redacted), updated May

30, 2003.

CRS-14

‘Asbat al-Ansar

Name(s). ‘Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled ‘Osbat al-Ansar or ‘Usbat al-Ansar,

meaning the “League of Partisans.”

Goals and Objectives. ‘Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state

in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and

elsewhere.

Brief History. Established in the 1990s, ‘Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively

new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh

Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon. Its leader is AbdelKarim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon’s representative

government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law.55

Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.56

‘Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as “un-Islamic,”

including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners. Churches, bars,

nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by ‘Asbat alAnsar militants — as have members of rival militant groups and moderate

government officials. In 1999, ‘Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled

grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges. In an attack against

an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at

the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen

rebels.57

Favored Tactics. ‘Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and

grenades to launch attacks against their targets.

Anti-American Activities. In 2002, ‘Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks

and rhetoric against U.S. targets. The group is a suspect in the November 2002

killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.58 ‘Asbat al-Ansar is

similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.59

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in

the ‘Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. To a large extent, ‘Asbat alAnsar is able to reign freely in Lebanon’s refugee camps — without repercussions

from the Lebanese government — because of an Arab League law that stripped

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

“Portraits of Groups U.S. Links to Terror,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2001.

“Hundreds Attend Funeral of Palestinian Attacker of Russian Embassy in Beirut,”

Associated Press, January 7, 2000.

Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor,

May 20, 2003.

“Presumed Leader of Anti-U.S. Terror Group Arrested in Lebanon,” Agence France

Presse, October 18, 2003.

CRS-15

Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps. Hence, the camps — where

several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and ‘Asbat al- Nour are also said to

be operating — are “off-limits” to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.60

‘Asbat al-Ansar’s attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon.

Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300

militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.61

Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that ‘Asbat al-Ansar is

affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.62 The allegation hinges

on the connection of an Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who

apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda.

Khazal heads Australia’s Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting

Islamic fundamentalists. The CIA claims that “the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly

delegated responsibility”63 to Khazal, and the Australian press claims “Bilal Khazal

has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is

accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001,

terrorist attacks.”64

A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador

to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003. Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell

admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court

in Beirut that the group’s leader, Mohammed Ka’aki “received at least $1,800 from

Khazal.”65 Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin

between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is

subject to dispute.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department

says that ‘Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as

Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.66

Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002.

Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor,

May 20, 2003.

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103.

[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

Jonathan Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar,”

Analysis of Near East Policy from the Scholars and Associates of the Washington Institiute,

Policywatch #79, October 3, 2003.

Sarah Smiles and Linda Morris, “Islamic Youth Leader Charged with Terrorist Links,”

The Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2003.

Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar.”

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

CRS-16

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group threatens the Lebanese

government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly tried to assassinate the U.S.

Ambassador to Lebanon (see above). It may also have ties to Al Qaeda. Within the

context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark, updated November 19, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, (name redacted),

October 22, 2003.

The Middle East Peace Talks, updated

CRS Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred

Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

CRS-17

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)

Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means “teaching the

supreme truth” on the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe”), Aleph

Goals and Objectives. Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and

subsequently create a global utopian society.

Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind

intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu,

Taoist and Christian thought. It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its

adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic. Asahara

claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would

begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group

sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new

order from chaos.67

To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

capabilities.68 On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district

in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds. In its deadliest and most

infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted

sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National

Police Agency’s headquarters. Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were

injured.69 In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including

Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities. Nine members of the

group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial. A

verdict is expected in Asahara’s trial in February 2004.

The group has renamed itself “Aleph,” meaning beginning, and is under the new

leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.70 It has issued a public apology and promised at least

$2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.71 It has also renounced violence

in the political and spiritual processes. Although the group has not been associated

with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that

it is ‘no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.’72 Security forces closely

monitor the group’s activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23,

2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003.

Steven Strasser, “Tokyo Grabs Doomsday Guru,” Newsweek, v.125 No. 22, May 29, 1995.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

“New Aum Title Riles Namesakes,” Mainichi Daily News, January 21, 2000.

Hiroshi Matsubara, “Aum grows again, guru still revered,” The Japan Times, Aug. 8,

2002.

Ibid

CRS-18

raids of Aum facilities. The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities,

disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.73

Favored Tactics. Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and

government targets. In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its

facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the

Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.74 According to one source,

“Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and

1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around

Tokyo.”75 According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to

kill an estimated 4.2 million people.76

Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests

in the past. However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his

constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan’s

economic and social ills.77

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan,

but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan. Analysts

suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka,

Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.78 There are still reportedly a large number

of members of Aleph in Russia.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum

currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.79 Some experts say that at its peak, the

group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty

thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.80 As

recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more

Aum members in Russia than in Japan.81 Aum’s spiritual message has appealed to

For this and other information about the cult’s activities, see David E. Kaplan, “Aum

Shinrikyo,” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,

edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 225-226

“Aum Released Anthrax Virus in Tokyo in 1993,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 25,

1995; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

“Filthy Wars: Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo Sect,” Sunday Herald Sun, April 19, 1999.

Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23,

2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press: New York, p. 123.

Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 122.

“Russia has more Aum Shinrikyo Members than Japan, Orthodox Bishop Says,” British

Broadcasting Corporation, August 3, 2003.

CRS-19

young, well-educated individuals characterized as “alienated by society’s

preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money.”82

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Reportedly owning

nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant

group.83 It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of

approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).84 It has been reported that Aum’s

computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers

work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors. The

sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the

ability to generate robust sources of funds. In addition to high-tech goods, the cult

generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.85

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Aum was the first terrorist group to have

used so-called weapons of mass destruction. The group’s willingness to use

chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering

that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group’s intentions and that it

continues to exist.

With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group’s past

record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether

Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and

resources from Russian facilities.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RS20412, Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Terrorist Threat, by

Steven Bowman, updated December 8, 1999.

CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons

Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by (name redacted), March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB97004, Richard Cronin, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for

Congress, updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31609, Japan’s Economic and Security Challenges, by Richard

Nanto, updated October 16, 2002.

Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 122.

Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.”

“Aum’s True Colors,” Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1999.

Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and

Biological Weapons, p. 226.

CRS-20

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Name(s). Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA

Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on

Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern

France.

Brief History. ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed

by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language

and culture. Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and

some in France. More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its

founding.86 The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials.

In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to

Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly

escaped an attack. Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful

plot. In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and

civilians.87

In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important

breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices,

seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations. France has also recently arrested

a number of suspected members. ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support

among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and

moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties

supportive of ETA.88 In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks

and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to

have been squeezed through international cooperation, and its reported IRA

collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group’s cease fire.89

Favored Tactics. ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and

assassinations.

Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or

U.S. interests.

Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and

France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. The group has also

carried out attacks throughout Spain.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The Council

on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation,

[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/eta.html], accessed on July 25, 2003.

Support for the ETA does exist; however, it has been severely weakened. Ibid.

Keith B. Richburg, “Long Basque Rebellion Losing Strength: International Effort

Squeezes Underground Separatist Group,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2003, p. A1.

CRS-21

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of

Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA’s strength at several hundred members, plus

supporters.90

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently

has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed

the IRA’s lead in terms of tactics and operations.91 Terrorism experts believe that

ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in

early 2003.92

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. ETA members have

reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as

sanctuary in Cuba. The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and

extortion.93 The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort

money from businesses in the Basque regions.94

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The measures taken by the United States

and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for

the group. While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque selfdetermination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources

for the violent activities of the ETA. Some terrorism experts point to Spanish

government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case

study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree. Others are

concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further

Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence.

Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as

measures instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective

transnational counterterrorism.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11:

Political Will and Diverse Responses, (name redacted), coordinator, October 17,

2002.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 105.

David Trimble, “In Northern Ireland, A Question of Trust,” The Washington Post,

November 30, 2002.

Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing,”

San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-22

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army

Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA).

Goals and Objectives. To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a

violent uprising against the Philippine government.

Brief History. The New People’s Army (NPA) is the military wing of the

Communist Party of the Philippines. It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and

is recognized as Southeast Asia’s longest-running Marxist insurgency.95 This Marxist

group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in

global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new

ideological players such as Al Qaeda. In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest

attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army

camp, killing 17 people.96 In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group. Prior

to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace

talks. Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA

assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA

rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under

extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.97

Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests.

It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations,

and arson. It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine

society.

Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S.

military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases

there (Clark and Subic) in 1992. Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the

presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military

stay out of domestic affairs. In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign

Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans

and U.S. interests. In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the

Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine

soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.98

“One Philippine soldier killed, eight injured in clash with communist rebels,” Associated

Press, April 17, 2003.

Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly

attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003.

“Philippine Exploratory Peace Talks Halted,” Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 20, 2003. See

also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,”

Associated Press, March 30, 2003.

Lee Peart, “Philippines — NPA Vows to Target US Troops in Philippines,” WMRC Daily

Analysis, March 28, 2003.

CRS-23

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines,

particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. It also reportedly has cells in

Manila.99

Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500

members.100 According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed

strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to

Corazon Aquino’s restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military

operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the

Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology. By

1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000. Since then, however, there has

been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members. The reasons for the

resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the

restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the

exiled Jose Sison.101 Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands.

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money

through several mechanisms. It reportedly collects “revolutionary taxes” from rural

communities by taxing food and other items.102 The group also raises money by

engaging in criminal activities such as extortion. Philippine officials estimate that

the group gathers about $1.8 million each year.

Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is a threat to a major U.S.

ally, the Philippines. It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it

may be growing in numbers.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard

Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.

100

Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels

following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003.

101

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin,

Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updatedNovember 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez,

“Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press,

March 30, 2003.

102

Honesto C. General, “Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,

August 18, 2002.

CRS-24

al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

Name(s). al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama’a al-Islamiyya,

(Islamic Group, IG).

Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian

government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari’a law and devoid

of “un-Islamic” influences.

Brief History. Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group,

was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt. Several key events

and phenomena served as catalysts for the group’s formation and the beginning of its

violent attacks. The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under

President Anwar Sadat’s leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace

accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords). At about the same time, Sadat

introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights

of women. Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant

Islamic groups — a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach

towards them. These policies prompted the IG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel

al- Rahman,103 to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed

in 1981.104 Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible

for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in

connection with the crime.105

The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian

President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.106 In general, the

organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of

an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic

Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters.

The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.107

In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58

foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.108 Since the Luxor

103

Sheikh Rahman is also a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which

he has been serving life in prison since 1995.

104

William Farrell, “Egypt Reports Plot to Kill Aides at Sadat’s Funeral,” The New York

Times, Oct. 31, 1981

105

Lamia Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder,” Agence

France Presse, Sept. 29, 2003.

106

“Ethiopia Announces Arrests in Mubarak Assassination Bid,” Agnence France Presse,

Aug. 2, 1995.

107

108

Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder.”

“Egypt Arrest 45 Militants after Identifying One of the Luxor Attackers,” Agence France

Presse, Nov. 21, 1997.

CRS-25

attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.109 The goal

of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led

by Rifa’i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the

other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.110

The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since

1998.111

Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs,

suicide bombs, and gunfire.

Anti-American Activities. The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or

interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S.

foreign policy interests in the region. However, the group has previously threatened

violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans

to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”112

In 1998, the group’s current operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin

Laden’s proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.113

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt,

primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj. The organization

reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in

Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.114

Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers,

but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants. Experts suspect that the

group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to

a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the

1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.115 The group has

tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by

widespread unemployment in the country.

Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact

with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad. The two groups share members

and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the

attempted assassination of Mubarak.116 IG may also have a connection with Osama

109

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.106.

110

“Most Jamma Leaders Favor End to All Attacks,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 11, 1997.

111

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.106

112

“Urgent,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 21, 1996.

113

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

114

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

115

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

116

“In the Spotlight: al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya - Islamic Group,” Center for Defense

(continued...)

CRS-26

bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the

IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below).

Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides

a key link between IG and Al Qaeda.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the

Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant

groups.117 The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic nongovernmental organizations.118

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group’s potential threat to the

Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious

concern in the war on terrorism. Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the

United States.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), updated

January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93087, Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark, updated

October 10, 2003.

116

(...continued)

Information, December 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa-pr.cfm], accessed

July 28, 2003.

117

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.

118

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-27

HAMAS

Name(s). Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement;

HAMAS; Hamas.

Goals and Objectives. Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization

that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel from Israel/Palestine, and

to establish an Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law. These goals appear

to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the

group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Brief History. Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization

in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine.

The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs “clinics,

kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,”119 and

a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.

Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians.

Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous

participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or

Palestinian uprisings against Israel). The group has opposed the Middle East peace

process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the

Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and

ineffective government.120

Recently, Ariel Sharon’s government has become much more aggressive in

targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah

Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed September 2002),

Abdel Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed

Yassin (September 2002).121 Yassin and Rantisi are still alive.

Favored Tactics. Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been

suicide bombings.122 Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile,

sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and

families. The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and

assassinations.123

Anti-American Activities. According to the State Department, the group has

not targeted U.S. interests. Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas

119

Khaled Abou Toameh, “Cradle to Grave,” The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 4, 1997.

120

PR Kumaraswamy, “Hamas Emerges as Winner in Cairo Talks,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, March 1, 2003.

121

Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Unsuccessful Israeli strike on top Hamas leaders highlights

difficulty of targeted killings,” Associate Press Sept. 7, 2003.

122

Samuel Katz, “Policing Israel’s Front Line,” The Washington Times, Sept. 22, 2002.

123

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-28

bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional

targets.124 Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of

four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996.

Areas of Operation. Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but

is strongest in the latter. The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the

Gulf States.125

Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic

radicals. The number of official members is unknown. According to some estimates,

the group has “tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers” for its

uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to

corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.126

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Hamas’ closest ally

is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not

maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.127 Since 1994, the two

groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint

attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that

Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail

the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group

deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.128 There

have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and

logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.129 In June 2003, PIJ

and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on

Israelis and Israeli interests.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly

receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently

derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private

124

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

125

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

126

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. See

also Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” Center

for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 14,

2003.

127

“Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,

[http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003.

128

Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine, Feb.

28, 2000.

129

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003. See also

“Hizballahland,” Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July

1, 2003, pg 56.

CRS-29

sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled

areas.130

The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting

Hamas.131 Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim

that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom

fighters.132 During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide

bombers, including Hamas members. Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia

of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.133 Secretary

of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, “There are

some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed.”134

Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza

Strip, and abroad.135

Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West,

reportedly including The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy Land

Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with

branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la

Palestine (France).136

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group apparently has significant

financial resources and extensive international ties. The combination of strong social

services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous.

Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable

foundations that help support the activities of Hamas. The role of Saudi Arabian

citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny

and criticism in the United States.

130

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

131

T. Christian Miller, “Near Iraq, Syria Reportedly Still Quietly Backs Militants,”Los

Angeles Times, August 12, 2003.

132

See for example, “Again, Bush Warns Iran, Syria on Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, July

22, 2003.

133

Steve Weizman, “Israel Accuses Saudis of Helping Palestinian Terror Attacks,” Associate

Press, May 6, 2002.

134

Barry Schweid, “Powell Says He Has No Evidence that Israel Massacred Palestinians in

Refugee Camp,” Associate Press, Apr. 24, 2002.

135

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

136

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-30

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name r

edacted), updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated

June 10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United

States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted),

updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by

Alfred Prados, updated November 14, 2003.

CRS-31

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)

Name(s). Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy

Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar.

Goals and Objectives. HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant

organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create

an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories.

Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially

founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. After

the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks

against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In

1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and

other Western targets. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which

resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India

since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.137

After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-eMuhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below).

In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on

Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and undersupported.138 In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group

over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by

President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.139

Favored Tactics. HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and

civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also

highjacked airliners.

Anti-American Activities. Despite signing Osama bin Laden’s 1998

declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S.

interests primarily. HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu. However, in

2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the alAlmi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in

Karachi that killed 11 people.140

Areas of Operation. HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied

Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu

137

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

138

Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense

Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm],

July 15, 2003.

139

“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India,

March 12, 2003.

140

Kahn, Zarar. “Pakistan sentences men to death for bomb that killed French engineers.”

Associated Press. June 30. 2003.

CRS-32

and Kashmir. In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.141

Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in

operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma.

Strength and Composition. HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from

Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the

Soviet Union. The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters. The

group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed

(JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.142

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM

signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers

and civilians. The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al

Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.143 HUM has also cooperated with other

Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. HUM receives financial

support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi

Arabia and the Gulf states.144 The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani

and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.145 Its fund-raising in Pakistan

has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following

9/11. The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and

encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM.

Originally Designated. as an FTO October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. An important concern for the United

States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al

Qaeda. The convergence of a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and

Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus is worrisome.

Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the

United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern. Finally, attacks by

the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states

apparently often on the brink of war.

141

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

142

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. See also Patterns of Global Terrorism

2002, p. 109.

143

CRS Report RL31119,, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 18.

144

145

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 108.

Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense

Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm],

July 15, 2003.

CRS-33

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),,

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by (name r

edacted), updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), , updated

November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and

Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated September

30, 2002.

CRS-34

Hizballah

Name(s). Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice

Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth.

Goals and Objectives. According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated

to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment

of an Islamic state in Lebanon.146

Brief History. Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and

ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response

to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The group was the principal supporter of antiWestern and anti-American terrorism in the 1980’s and is directed by its Majlis alShura, or Consultative Council. Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon’s

political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.147 Other

terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention

of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the bombing

of Israel’s Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the ArgentineJewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).148 During its 15-year military

insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon,

Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.149

Favored Tactics. Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and

highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of

surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.150

Anti-American Activities. Hizballah’s most active period of anti-American

targeting occurred during the 1980’s and resulted in a very large number of U.S.

casualties. Under the alias Islamic Jihad,151 Hizballah has been implicated in or is

known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April

1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18

Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September

1984).152 Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed

18 people in Torrejon, Spain. An additional 82 persons, including 15 Americans,

146

“Hezbollah’s Manifesto,” available at [http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm]. See

also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

147

Hezbollah holds ten seats and its allies hold two.

148

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

149

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2002.

150

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com].

151

CIA report on Islamic Jihad. Central Intelligence Agency. Issue Date: Oct 4, 1984. Date

Declassified: Mar 01, 1987. 6 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference

System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, 2003.

152

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2002.

CRS-35

were wounded. Of their strictly terrorist acts between 1994 and 2002, however, none

has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets. However, some experts believe

there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity. For example, Singapore’s

Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a Hizballah plot to attack U.S.

shipping interests in the 1990’s.153 Moreover, Hizballah has pledged retaliation for

the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security official, for which the group

blames both the United States and Israel.154 Finally, some experts have warned of

Hizballah’s potential for “wreaking havoc” in post-war Iraq, although there is no

direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.155

Primary Areas of Operation. Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs

of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe,

Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.156

Strength and Composition. The group is believed to have two to five

thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.157

Connections with Other Groups. Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim

that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime

activity throughout the Gulf region. Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government’s

indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in

1998 state that “Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling),

for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the

West, particularly the United States.”158

State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding. Iran supports Hizballah

with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic,

political, and logistic support.159 In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher

testified that Iran provides “up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah

[sic].”160

153

“Singapore Says Hizballah Tried to From Terror Cell,” Reuters, Jun. 8, 2002. See also

“Hezbollah had plans to attack US, Israeli ships in Singapore,” Agence France Presse, Jun

9, 2002.

154

“Hizbullah Vows to Retaliate,” The Daily Star, Aug. 4, 2003. Available at

[http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm]

155

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December

2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67.

156

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

157

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.

[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

158

“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

159

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.108.

160

Martin Sieff, “U.S. to Keep Pressure on Iran,” Washington Times May 26, 1996. See also

(name redacted), “ Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, CRS Report

RL31119, updated February 13, 2002.

CRS-36

The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest

in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette

smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.161

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The U.S. approach to Hizballah is

complex. Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented

in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128. Apparently

mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in

the Arab world. Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has

global assets. The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of

Hizballah. Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the

1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;162

however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent

years. Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States,

potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that

failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate,

ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.163

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name r

edacted), updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark,,updated October 21, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United

States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted),

updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Report RL31078, “The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and its Implications,” by Alfred

Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

161

Gary Wright and Eric Frazer, “Trial Starts for Two Accused of Hizballah Tie,” The

Charlotte Observer, May 20, 2002.

162

“Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

163

Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?”

CRS-37

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Name(s). Islamic Party of Turkestan.

Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to

overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan. The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule

in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of

Islam.164

Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic

opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing

opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam. However the roots of the IMU go back

as far as December 1991, when the mayor of the eastern city of Namangan refused

to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men

seized the Communist Party headquarters. The men were led by Tohir

Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma

Namangani). Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the

Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who

apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin

while he served in Afghanistan.165

Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given

refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups.

Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.166 In

1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and reportedly helped the

Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle. From bases in

Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government.

Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in

Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the

group’s leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led

war against the Taliban in 2001.167

Favored Tactics. The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla

warfare.

Anti-American Activities. In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four

American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a

164

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

165

“In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information.

[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003.

166

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com].

167

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

CRS-38

cliff.168 The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war

in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Areas of Operation. The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia,

especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders

converge.169 The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan,

Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.170

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of

Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000

militants.171 Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group,

the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.172

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. IMU leaders are

believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in

the late 1990s.173 IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in

Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The IMU received

support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the

Middle East and South Asia. Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed

to have been a major supporter of the IMU.174 The group is reportedly heavily

involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70

percent of opium trafficking in the region.175

Originally Designated as an FTO. September 25, 2000.

Re-designated. September 25, 2002.

168

Audrey Cooper, “American Hostages Push Guard Off Cliff to Escape Militants,” Chicago

Tribune, Aug. 25, 2000.

169

Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense

Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed

Oct. 27, 2003.

170

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

171

Ibid

172

“The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.

[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

173

Raffi Khatchadourian, “Militants on the Steppes,” The Nation, May 20, 2002.

174

Ibid

175

Prepared Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence

Directorate, InterPol General Secretariat Before for the House Committee on the Judiciary

Subcommittee on Crime, “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of the Organized Crime,

Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism,” December 13, 2000.

CRS-39

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group could play a role in impeding

the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a postTaliban state. Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities

against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its

very close ties to Al Qaeda.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted),

May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems

with Terrorism, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), updated

October 7, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications

for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted), updated November 6, 2003.

CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S.

Interests, by (name redacted), updated April 3, 2003.

CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, by (na

me redacted) and (name

redacted), updated January 9, 2003.

CRS Report RS21041, Taliban and the Drug Trade, by Raphael Perl, updated

October 5, 2001.

CRS-40

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Name(s). Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.176

Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu

and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with

Pakistan.

Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded

by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000. Indian authorities arrested Azhar in

February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ulMujahideen (HUM).177 Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in

exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM

militants.178 Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with

the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule.

The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as

well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.179 The JEM is suspected of

executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October

1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.180 The group initially claimed credit for the attack,

but later denied involvement. The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in

conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian

Parliament on December 13, 2001.181 Armed with explosive materials and firearms,

five assailants stormed the Parliament and “fired indiscriminately,” killing nine

security guards and one civilian bystander.182 In January 2002, the government of

Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry,

below).

The JEM is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and “principal terrorist

organization in Jammu and Kashmir.”183 As of September 2003, crackdowns on the

JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi

Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan,

176

“Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India,

March 12, 2003.

177

Azhar was previously the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was renamed

Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) and then again renamed HUM in October 1997 when the HUA was

designated a FTO. See B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South

Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper 332.html], accessed July

31, 2003.

178

Zahid Hussein, “Freed Militant Arrives in Paksitan,” Associated Press, Jan. 6, 2000.

179

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

180

“Jaish: Taliban’s Twin, Harakat’s New Avatar,” Indian Express, Oct. 2, 2001.

181

Neelesh Misra, “India Police Finger Attack Sponsors,” Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2001.

182

“Masood Azhar masterminded Parliament attack,” Hindustan Times, May 15, 2002.

183

B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group,

October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html], accessed July 31, 2003.

CRS-41

second in command (September 17, 2003).184 After President Musharraf outlawed

the group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam. At the same

time, JEM’s leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he

was released in December 2002.185

Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen

(suicide terrorist) in nature.186 In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack

with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being

killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.187 In this fashion, JEM militants

allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security

personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people. All five terrorists in this attack were

killed. The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns,

and assault rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive

devices, and rocket grenades.188

Anti-American Activities. The JEM was implicated in the February 2002

kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked

as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment

in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with

alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.189 (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistancontrolled Kashmir. Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and

India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions. The JEM primarily launches attacks in

Indian-controlled J&K. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the

only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K.

Strength and Composition. The JEM consists of several hundred armed

supporters.190 Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis. By some accounts,

up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.191 The JEM is said to have supporters

and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab

184

Mujtaba Ali Ahmad, “2 Top Rebel Commanders Killed in Kashmir,” Associated Press,

Sept. 17, 2003.

185

Husain Haggani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January

7, 2003.

186

“Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),

[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_moh

ammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.

187

See CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),,

August 28, 2003.

188

“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

world/para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.

189

Paul Haven, “A Year After Pearl’s Abduction, Questions Remain,” Associated Press,

Jan. 22, 2003.

190

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

191

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-42

veterans of the Afghan war. Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly “maintained

training camps in Afghanistan.”192

Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the

former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and

the Al Qaeda network.193 The connection with the Taliban was apparently

established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and

Afghanistan. JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in

both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda. Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties

with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen

(HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba

Pakistan (SSP).194

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Experts believe that

JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as

HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).195 Indian officials claim that the JEM

has also received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt

to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan’s position in the dispute

over Kashmir. Those claims remain in dispute.196

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is potentially a serious threat

to stability in South Asia. Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make

it a significant concern for the United States. Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting

of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American

citizens and interests in the future. Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between

India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasahs: Background, by Febe

Armanios, updated October 29, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

192

“Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/

para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003.

193

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

194

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; “Jaish-eMohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),

[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_

outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003.

195

196

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, “New Delhi Lays Blame,” The Washington

Post, December 29, 2001.

CRS-43

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), updated

November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by (name r

edacted), updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and

Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated September

30, 2002.

CRS-44

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Goals and Objectives. Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims

to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern

Philippine islands, and southern Thailand.

Brief History. The group’s roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic

group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. After the Dutch left, the

movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too

secular. The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto

era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal

gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.197 The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu

Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the

main island of Java. Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.198

In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians

and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to

train in Al Qaeda camps.199 Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and

Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for

attacks in Southeast Asia. Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in

2000.200 JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian

churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies

in Singapore.

The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night

club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young

Australian tourists. Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is

believed to be the group’s spiritual leader, though he denies it. An Indonesian court

convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious

charges. His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate

court. Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI’s chief of

operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali

bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali “Asia’s bin Laden.”201

Other specific evidence of JI’s shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in

the aftermath of the Bali tragedy. During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also

known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin

Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion’s Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred

in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden’s

recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for

197

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle

Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10,

2003.

198

CRS Report RL31772, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Mark Manyin, by Richard Cronin,

Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003, p. 5.

199

Ibid.

200

Ibid.

201

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-45

non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has

testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.202 Building

on Mukhlas’ testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership

of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war

against the Soviets.203

Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against

Western targets in Southeast Asia.204 On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected

of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.205

Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya’s attacks have involved bombings

of varying degrees of sophistication.

Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb

the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and

military personnel in Singapore. In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative

revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia

with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.206 On August 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya

was linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and

injured 148.207

Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although

Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation. The group has also

operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines. It may also

have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia.

Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some

believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces

their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,208 or former

trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the

202

Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial

Times, Aug. 27, 2003.

203

“Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis

Group, Asia Report No. 63, Aug. 26, 2003. Additional information about the Bali bombing

and other recent attacks is available in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,

by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted),, updated November

18, 2003, pp.6-8.

204

Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, pp.7-8.

205

“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

206

Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, September 23, 2002;

cited in Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.

207

208

“Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial

Times, Aug. 27, 2003.

CRS-46

terrorist camps in southern Philippines.209 Some intelligence reports say that up to

700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.210 The State Department’s

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several

hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group’s strength

around 5,000.211 It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries

since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. JI is alleged to have

extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute. Some

contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that

Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI

proposals.212 Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders

have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.213 Two of the 9/11 hijackers and

imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met

with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.214

Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore’s Internal Security Department released

a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close

operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.215

Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against

U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al

Qaeda.216 JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia

(KMM).217

209

Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on

Philippine Island,” The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003.

210

John McBeth, “Indonesia-Easy Does It,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17,

2003.

211

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

212

“Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Asia

Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003.

213

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah,” The Council on Foreign

Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/

groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003.

214

Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.

215

“Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia,”

Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also “Jemaah Islamiah Report

Released,” Radio Australia, available at [http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/

s760988.htm].

216

“Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001” Agence France

Presse, Sept. 14, 2002.

217

“Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts,” Financial Times Information Global News

Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, “Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003.

CRS-47

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the U.S.

State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and

logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda. The group also raises funds from

sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although there have been important

arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a

serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. Members of the

group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the

citizens and assets of U.S. allies. Jemaah Islamiya’s apparently extensive ties to Al

Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States. Indonesia’s reluctance to

crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if

another anti-Western attack occurs. Additionally, the growing evidence of ties

between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist

group in the Philippines),218 may soon force the United States and the Philippines to

decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by (name

redacted), Huda Allen, (name redacted), updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard

Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (na me redacted), updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31265, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by Larry Niksch,

updated September 25, 2002.

218

For additional information about the MILF see the Abu Sayyaf entry, above.

CRS-48

Al-Jihad

Name(s). Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of

Conquest.

Goals and Objectives. Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of

the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to

attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt.

Brief History. Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the

Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by

Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu’ran and opposed

to the secular rule and Western influence. Known for high profile assassinations and

bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar

Sadat (October 1981), the death of the People’s Assembly Speaker Rifaat elMahgoub (October 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi

(August 1993), Prime Minister Atef Sedky (November 1993), and President Hosni

Mubarak (1995).219

In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down

on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.220 One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud

al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered.

The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around

1987 moved al-Jihad’s base of operations to Afghanistan.221 Al-Zawahiri has moved

further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden’s Al

Qaeda quest to target American interests directly. In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and alZawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda’s so-called International Front for Jihad against

Jews and Crusaders. Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda.

There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.222

Favorite Tactics. Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and

suicide attacks.223

Anti-American Activity. Since the mid-1990s, al-Jihad has been shifting its

focus from Egyptian to American targets. Commandos for al-Jihad were linked to

219

“Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. See

also “Arrests in Connection with Assassination of Speaker of Parliament,” The IndependentLondon, Oct. 29, 1990.

220

“Egypt’s Brutal Response to Militants: Tactics Used to Counter Opponents at Home

Contrast with Appeals for U.S. Restraint,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2001, p.A25.

221

“Al-Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il]

accessed October 27, 2003.

222

Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aljihad.cfm].

Accessed October 15, 2003.

223

“Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com]. See

also Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad,” Center for Defense Information,

[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism], accessed October 15, 2003.

CRS-49

a foiled attack on the U.S. Embassy in Albania in August 1998.224 As part of Al

Qaeda, al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in the bombings of the

American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7,

1998.225 They are also implicated in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in port at

Aden, Yemen,226 and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and

Pentagon.227

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Historically, al-Jihad operated in the Cairo

area; but most of its network is now outside Egypt, in places such as Yemen,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.228 After the external

component of al-Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the group’s areas of operation may

have expanded.

Strength and Composition. Unknown. It is likely that al-Jihad has several

hundred hard-core militants and possible several thousand supporters. After merging

with Al Qaeda, distinguishing between members of the groups became more difficult.

Connections with Other Groups. In June 2001 al-Jihad allegedly merged

with Al Qaeda after a decade of increasing cooperation.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Uncertain. Egypt has

claimed that al-Jihad is supported by Iran and Sudan, accusations that those states’

governments have denied.229 In 2002 U.S. intelligence claimed that Iran was

harboring Saif al-Adl, Osama bin Laden’s security chief and an Egyptian national

with links to al-Jihad.230 However, Iran claims to have prosecuted or deported all Al

Qaeda related persons within its borders as of October 2003.231 In view of al-Jihad’s

apparent merger with Al Qaeda, the groups are likely cooperating on sources of

224

Philip Shenon, “U.S. Embassy Halts Business in Albania,” The New York Times, Aug.

15, 1998.

225

David Cloud and Brian Duffy, “Egyptian Group Draws Scrutiny in Bomb Probe,” The

Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1998. See also “Embassy Bombings; Egyptian Group now Top

Suspect,” Knight Ridder, Aug. 15, 1998.

226

Lenny Savino and Jonathan Landay, “Al-Jihad Suspects in ‘Cole’ Bombing, “KnightRidder, Oct. 20, 2000. See also “Authorities Reportedly Arrest Jihad Suspects Linked to

Cole Blast,” BBC, Oct. 28, 2000.

227

Marcus Gee, “The Hydra’s Ten Biggest Heads,” The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29, 2001. See

also Michael Elliott, “The Hate Club,” Time Magazine Vol. 158, Issue 21, Nov. 12, 2001.

228

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 111.

229

Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad.” Center for Defense Information.

[http://www.cdi.org/terrorism]. Accessed October 15, 2003.

230

(name redacted)pkin, “Two Leaders of Terrorist

Organization al-Qaeda Operating in Iran,”

Associated Press, August 28, 2002.

231

“Iran List has 225 Names,” Associated Pres, October 27, 2003.

CRS-50

revenue. Other sources of revenue may include non-governmental Islamic agencies

and criminal acts.232

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in violent

attacks against the United States and its interests. It is closely associated with Al

Qaeda and, with that organization, has apparently evolved from a territorially-based

threat to a truly global network.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted),

May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), updated

January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by (name r

edacted), updated October 24, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

232

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-51

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Goals and Objectives. Kach and Kahane Chai are radical Jewish groups that

aim to restore the Biblical state of Israel by annexing the West Bank and Gaza as well

as parts of Jordan, and expelling all Arabs from this territory. These groups also seek

the strict implementation of Jewish law.233

Brief History. Kach was founded in 1971 by Meir Kahane, an IsraeliAmerican Rabbi who was assassinated in New York in 1990 by El Sayyid Nosair, an

Islamic radical also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.234 Kahane’s

son, Binyamin, then founded Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), although Kach appears

to have continued to operate as an independent organization. Binyamin and his wife

were killed in a 2000 drive-by shooting by a Palestinian group in a West Bank

settlement.235

Beginning with the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State

Department has listed the two groups as one entry, suggesting that the two have

essentially merged. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler and U.S.

immigrant to Israel, attacked a mosque in Hebron with a machine gun, killing 29

worshippers and wounding about 150. Goldstein was reportedly associated with

Kach and other Jewish militant groups. Both Kach and Kahane Chai publicly

supported the attack, leading Israel to declare them both terrorist organizations.236

The groups have conducted numerous attacks against Palestinians in the West

Bank and Jerusalem with rocks, grenades, and firearms, including a failed attempt to

assassinate several Palestinian mayors.237 Since the beginning of the second Intifada

in September, 2000, at least seven Palestinians have been shot in the West Bank by

Jewish settlers believed by Israeli police to be associated with Kahane Chai.238 In

2002, they were suspected of involvement in several attacks against Palestinians, but

neither group claimed responsibility.

Favored Tactics. Kach and Kahane Chai have attacked Palestinian targets

with guns, grenades, bombs, and other weapons.

Anti-American Activities. Neither Kach or Kahane Chai is known to have

attacked U.S. interests. However, in December 2001 several members of the Jewish

233

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 21.

234

David Kocieniewski and Kevin McCoy, “Old Evidence Hints at Trade Center Blast,” The

Seattle Times, May 29, 1993. See also Jeanne King, “Accused Killer of Kahane also Focus

in Trade Center Bombing,” Reuters, March 5, 1993.

235

Dina Kraft, “Slain Settler Leader Followed Father’s Path,” Assoc. Press, Dec. 31, 2000.

236

Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, p. 21.

237

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Kach, Kahane Chai,” The Council on Foreign

Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/kkc.html], accessed on August 6, 2003.

238

Vivienne Walt, “Israeli Turnabout Alleged,” USA Today, May 17, 2002.

CRS-52

Defense League, a group associated with Kahane, were arrested by the FBI in

California and charged with plotting to bomb the offices of Representative Darrell

Issa, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles.239

Areas of Operation. Both groups operate primarily in Israel and the West

Bank, but recent arrests have led to concern that they could be planning attacks in the

United States.

Strength and Composition. The groups’ strength is unknown, according

to the State Department.240 Estimates by other organizations place the groups’

strength at around several dozen.241

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Neither Kach nor

Kahane Chai is known to have ties to other designated foreign terrorist organizations.

Both are believed to be linked to various militant Jewish groups in Israel and the

West Bank.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Kach and Kahane

Chai receive support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States. Within

Israel, the groups receive funding and other support from various sympathizers,

particularly members of settler communities in the West Bank.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has allegedly plotted a

violent attack against a Member of Congress, as well as a mosque and a Muslim

advocacy group in Los Angeles. Its alleged activities lead to concern about the

potential for future violence against civilians and property within the United States

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United

States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted),

updated October 22, 2003.

239

“U.S. Representative Darrell Issa Holds News Conference on Bomb Threat,” Federal

Documents Clearinghouse, Dec. 12, 2001. See also Aldrin Brown, “2 Leaders of Jewish

Group Accused of Anti-Arab Bomb Plot,” The Orange County Register, Dec. 13, 2001.

240

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, U.S. State Department,

April 2003, pp. 112.

241

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://www.periscope1.com].

CRS-53

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Name(s). Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and

Democracy Congress of Kurdistan, KADEK, KONGRA-GEL.

Goals and Objectives. The PKK is a secular, leftist insurgent group that

originally aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically

Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq,

and Syria. More recently, the group has claimed to be seeking greater political and

cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey rather than a separate homeland.242

Brief History. The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group

seeking to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey. The group

launched a guerilla war against the Turkish government beginning in 1984 that

claimed as many as 35,000 lives. After a brutal crackdown by the Turkish military

in the early 1990s, the group shifted from a rural insurgency strategy to urban

terrorism. In 1999, Turkish authorities, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence,

captured the PKK’s charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan, striking a major blow

against the group.243 Ocalan’s arrest sparked riots among Kurdish populations in

parts of Europe.

Under threat of a death sentence, Ocalan advised his followers to refrain from

violence and to pursue Kurdish rights peacefully. The PKK has essentially ceased

its attacks as a result, and in 2000, the group formally announced its intention to use

only political means to achieve the goal of rights for Turkish Kurds. The armed wing

of the PKK (called the People’s Defense Forces) did not, however, disarm. The PKK

first renamed itself the KADEK and then the KONGRA-GEL. In November 2003,

the KADEK announced plans to dissolve itself and, according to reports, establish

a “new group that would likely be pan-Kurdish and would pursue Kurdish rights

through negotiations.”244 On November 14, 2003, the U.S. State Department stated,

“The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change

or press release can alter that fact.”

Favored Tactics. Many PKK attacks targeted Turkish military and security

forces. In addition, however, the PKK used suicide bombings, car bombings,

kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe.245

There were also attacks on symbolic representatives of the Turkish state in the

Southeast, such as teachers.

Anti-American Activities. The PKK has not directly attacked or targeted

U.S. citizens or interests.

242

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 27.

243

“U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture,” Agence France Presse Feb. 16, 1999.

244

Louis Meixler, “Kurdish Rebel Group Dissolves Itself,” Associated Press, Nov. 11, 2003.

See also, “Turkish Kurd Rebel Group Disbands,” Dow Jones, Nov. 11, 2003.

245

Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://scope1.com]

CRS-54

Areas of Operation. The PKK has operated primarily in Turkey. The armed

wing of the group apparently took refuge in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. In the past, the

group maintained bases in Syria and Lebanon.246

Strength and Composition. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish

Kurds and has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, according to the State

Department and other sources.247

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In the early 1980’s,

when the PKK fled to Lebanon’s Syria-controlled Beka’a Valley, the group

reportedly got its first real training alongside various Palestinian groups and with the

help of Syrian intelligence.248 Later, the PKK reportedly provided a safe haven for

the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F), another Turkish group,

in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in

1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups249 However,

cooperation has apparently since broken down. (See RPLP/F entry below.)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. During its history,

PKK reportedly received support and safe haven from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece.250

The group also raises funds in Europe among Kurdish expatriates, some of whom

accuse the Turkish government of human rights violations in its campaign against the

PKK.251

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish

minority has been a significant issue in its efforts to join the European Union. The

European Union only named the PKK a foreign terrorist organization in May 2002

and has not similarly identified KADEK. With its leader Ocalan in jail, it is unclear

whether the PKK, in its evolving form, will continue to be a violent group. The

246

“Ankara Accuses Syria of Backing Rebel Kurd Group,” Reuters, Jan. 7, 1996. See also

“Turkey Syria, Lebanon to Stop Activity of Terrorist Group,” BBC, Dec. 27, 2001.

247

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 112. See also “The

Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103.

[http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41.

248

Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Oxford, England:

Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. See also Nadire Matar, “Syria and Iran with Iraq

on Kurdish Issue,” Inter-Press Service, Aug. 22, 1994. Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall

of the PKK,” Orbis, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, Jan. 1, 2001.

249

“Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror

Organizations - DHKP/C.” [http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html].

Accessed October 16, 2003.

250

Ibid., p. 31. See also Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.”

[http://www.periscope1.com].

251

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

CRS-55

Kurdish population in northern Iraq may play a role: for example, actions by Iraqi

Kurds against PKK guerrillas remaining in Iraq could affect the future of

PKK/KADEK/KONDRA-GEL.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31794, Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related

Issues, by (name redacted), updated May 2, 2003.

CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by (name redacted),

updated September 8, 2003.

CRS-56

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Name(s). Army of the Righteous/Pure, Jamaat al-Dawat.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group

in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Although

primarily focused on freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic

state there, the group has also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all

of India as well.

Brief History. Formed in 1990, LT is the military wing of the Pakistani

radical Islamic organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for

Islamic Call and Guidance), which itself formed in 1989. Since 1993, LT has

become one of the largest and best organized groups fighting in Kashmir against

India.252 The group has conducted a number of attacks against Indian troops and

civilians in Kashmir.

The Indian government accused the group of involvement in the December 2001

bombing of the Indian parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI)

with supporting the group.253 President Musharraf banned the LT and several other

groups (see Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above) in January 2002, and the LT renamed

itself Jamaat al-Dawat.254 The LT’s leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was arrested

in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.255

In May and June 2003, the FBI arrested 11 men in Virginia on charges of

training with and supporting Lashkar e Tayyiba. The 11 are to face trial in the U.S.

District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.256 In July, a federal judge ordered four of the

eleven suspects released from custody until their trial begins.257

Favored Tactics. In its attacks, LT has used various types of firearms,

machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar e Tayyiba is not known to have

conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. The group

remains focused on Kashmir.

252

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

253

Chris Kraul and Mubashir Zaidi, India, Pakistan will try again to reach peace,” San Jose

Mercury News, May 3, 2003.

254

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

255

Husain Haqqani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January

7, 2003.

256

257

“Alleged U.S. Militants Arrested,” Associate Press, June 28, 2003.

Eric Lichtblau, “4 Terror Suspects Ordered Released Pending Trials,” The New York

Times, July 3, 2003.

CRS-57

There is, however, possible cooperation between LT and Al Qaeda (see below).

Areas of Operation. LT is based near Lahore in Pakistan and, according to

the State Department, operates mobile training camps in Pakistan-controlled

Kashmir.258 The group also had training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of the

Taliban in late 2001. LT is believed to have conducted operations not only in Indiancontrolled Kashmir, but also in other regions of India.

Strength and Composition. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is comprised mainly of

Pakistani Islamic radicals, although some Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars are

also members. The State Department estimates a total of several hundred

members.259

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In March 2002,

senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LT safe house in

Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to

move through Pakistan.260 There are also reports that members of LT have

participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the

group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.261

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the State

Department, LT collects donations from Pakistani expatriates in the Persian Gulf and

the United Kingdom.262 The group also reportedly receives support from Arab

sympathizers in the Persian Gulf states.263 Prior to a crackdown by the Pakistani

government against anti-Indian groups operating in Kashmir, the group invested in

various business enterprises in Pakistan.

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The LT’s activities directed against

India pose a threat to the stability of South Asia. The group may also be helping

members of Al Qaeda in their anti-American activities. Its apparent links to other

radical Islamic organizations lead to concern about the degree to which the LT is part

of an evolving globalized network of terrorist organizations. Within the United

States, this group’s alleged training and fund-raising activities in Alexandria,

Virginia, if proven true, are also cause for concern (see above).

258

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

259

Ibid.

260

Ibid.

261

Dan Rothem, “CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar e Taiba,” Center for Defense Information,

updated August 12, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 28, 2003.

262

263

Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The

Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/harakat.html] ,

accessed on July 25, 2003.

CRS-58

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by (name r

edacted), updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), updated

November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and

Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated September

30, 2002.

CRS-59

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Name(s). Army of Jhangvi.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is a radical Sunni group that

has primarily targeted Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan. The group apparently aims to

establish Pakistan as a Sunni Islamic state based on Islamic law. The group has close

links to Al Qaeda and has adopted that organization’s anti-Western, anti-U.S.

ideology.

Brief History. LJ arose in 1996 out of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan between

radical Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim factions. LJ’s members belong to the

radical Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam, and have carried out numerous attacks against

the minority Shi’a population, which they consider apostate. LJ reportedly killed 25

Shi’a and wounded 50 others in Lahore in 1998 and attempted to assassinate thenPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.264 The group has also been connected to

attacks against Christian groups in Pakistan.265 In mid-2001, Pakistani President

Musharraf outlawed the group, which took refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.266

Since the fall of the Taliban, the group has presumably returned to Pakistan, but

several leaders have been captured or killed by the Pakistani government.267

Favored Tactics. The group has conducted a variety of armed attacks and

bombings, including several suicide bombings.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar I Jhangvi has carried out several attacks

against Americans in Pakistan, most notably the kidnapping and subsequent murder

of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 in conjunction with Al Qaeda. (See also Jaish-eMohammed entry, above.) The group also reportedly killed four American oil

workers in 1997268 and attacked the Protestant International Church in Islamabad with

grenades in 2002, killing two Americans.269

Areas of Operation. The group operates mainly in Punjab and Karachi in

Pakistan, and some members reportedly travel in Afghanistan. Its strength is most

manifest in urban areas.

264

Stephen Collinson, “US designates Pakistani-based Sunni extremists as terror group.”

Agence France Presse. January 30, 2002.

265

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

266

Ibid.

267

Anthony Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi,” Center for Defense Information,

updated March 3, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 25, 2003.

268

Ibid.

269

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

CRS-60

Strength and Composition. The members of Lashkar I Jhangvi are militant

Sunni Muslims of the Deobandi sect. The State Department estimates their strength

at fewer than 100.270

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. LJ’s leaders

participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and are believed

to have connected with bin Laden during that time. LJ members reportedly trained

at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Al Qaeda is also believed to have

provided key support to the group in several of its attacks against Western targets

since 2002. Pakistani authorities believe that LJ has formed a partnership with two

other Islamic militant groups in Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and Jaishe-Mohammed (JeM, see entry above), to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), also called alQanoon.271

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Beyond support from

Al Qaeda, it is not known how the group funds its activities.

Originally Designated as an FTO. January 30, 2003.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in serious antiAmerican violence in Pakistan, including apparently participating in the kidnapping

and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl. (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry,

above.) Its activities may threaten the stability of Pakistan and the South Asian

region. Its connections with Al Qaeda make it a serious concern.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),

August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), updated

November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and

Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted),

updated September

30, 2002.

270

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

271

Keats, “CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi.”

CRS-61

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Name(s). Tamil Tigers.

Goals and Objectives. The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka

that initially aimed to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil

regions of the island. Recently the group has softened its insistence on an

independent Tamil state, declaring that it will accept a solution that respects the

principle of self-determination, possibly an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking

peoples within a federal structure (see below).

Brief History. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by the

charismatic Vellupillai Prabhakaran and arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a

number of Tamil groups opposing discrimination against Tamils by the dominant

Sinhalese ethnic group. In 1983, in retaliation for the deaths of thirteen Sinhalese

soldiers, several thousand Tamils were killed in riots that marked the beginning of

full scale separatist war. In the ensuing 20-year war, an estimated 64,000 people

were killed and between 800,000 and 1.6 million persons were displaced.

The Tamil Tigers have gained control of portions of the Northern and Eastern

provinces of Sri Lanka and have a substantial arsenal including artillery, mortars, and

anti-aircraft weapons. They also have a naval component with speedboats,

demolition teams, and fishing boats.272 The LTTE’s most infamous element is the

Black Tigers, the 500 plus member highly-trained unit that carries out the group’s

suicide attacks. The LTTE has engaged in a large number of political terrorist attacks

and killings, most notably including the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. It is the only terrorist

group ever to have assassinated two heads of state. And in December 1999, three

days before re-election, current President Chandrika Kumaratunga lost vision in one

eye to a LTTE suicide attack that killed 26.

Citing fundamental changes in international attitudes towards violence for

political ends after the September 11 attacks, experts say support and funding for the

LTTE from the Tamil diaspora fell off dramatically. This was apparently a factor

bringing this group to the negotiating table.273 Since December 2001, the LTTE has

largely respected a cease fire negotiated with the Sri Lankan government. In

September 2002, the LTTE and the Columbo government held their first peace talks

in seven years. In December 2002 both sides made what could be the most important

breakthrough by issuing a statement saying, “The parties have agreed to explore a

solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the areas of

historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure

272

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted),

November 5, 2003, p. 4.

273

Kim Barker, “In War Torn Sri Lanka, Truce Holds Day by Day,” Chicago Tribune, April

4, 2002. See also Catherine Philip, “Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers Ready to End 19-Year War

and Share Power,” The Times, December 6, 2002. See also Amal Jayasinge and Edward

Luce, “Tamil Tigers Emerge from the Shadows,” Financial Times, April 5, 2002.

CRS-62

within a united Sri Lanka.”274 Such a statement marks significant concessions from

the LTTE who have always sought independence rather than autonomy, and from the

government in Colombo, which would be accepting the idea of federalism for the

first time.

On the 4th and 5th of November 2003, Sri Lankan President Chandrika

Kumaratunga removed three top cabinet officials, suspended parliament, and

deployed troops around the Sri Lankan Capital of Colombo. The political crisis

apparently was a result of a power struggle between President Kumaratunga, who

represents the more hardline faction within the government, and the more

conciliatory elements led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. After reviving

the Norwegian brokered peace talks in late 2001 Wickremesinghe has made

significant gains, including a permanent cease-fire established and more-or-less

respected since February 2002 and several rounds of successful talks. However,

fearing Kumaratunga could veto any agreement, Wickremesinghe proposed a

constitutional amendment (the 19th) that would eliminate the President’s power to

dissolve the parliament. Kumaratunga and her supporters are opposed to any

settlement that would establish a federal system and infringe on Sri Lankan

sovereignty. They believe the Norwegian mediators are biased in favor of the

rebels.275 This crisis is as yet unresolved.

Favored Tactics. The LTTE’s tactics have ranged from full military

operations to terrorist attacks against civilian centers and political assassinations.

Inspired by the apparent success of suicide bombings by Hizballah in the latter’s

campaign against foreign occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, the LTTE launched

its first suicide attack in 1987.276 The group subsequently conducted the bloodiest

suicide campaign on record, involving more than 150 attacks.277 The LTTE is also

noted for the first and most active use of female suicide bombers, who have carried

out 30-40% of the suicide attacks of the LTTE.278

Anti-American Activities.

interests.

The LTTE has not targeted or attacked U.S.

Areas of Operation. The LTTE operates mainly in the Northern and Eastern

provinces of Sri Lanka, but has also operated throughout the island and in India.279

274

Amy Waldman, “Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government,” The New York Times,

December 6, 2002.

275

Frances Harrison, “Sri Lanka Peace Moves Attacked,” BBC News, April 8, 2003.

276

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), August

28, 2003.

277

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, “We Know Terrorism,” The Washington Post,

Nov. 7, 2001.

278

279

Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing,” The New York Times, January 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name r

edacted), updated May 30, 2003, p. 4.

CRS-63

Most notably, there was the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi on May 22, 1991 while he

was attending an election rally in Sriperambudur, India.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that LTTE has

between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants plus substantial numbers of supporters

within Sri Lanka and overseas.280 The Black Tigers, which are the elite unit believed

responsible for most of the suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, reportedly

have some 500 members.281

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The Tamil Tigers are

not believed to have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. LTTE suicide

bombing tactics have been copied by various groups, however. For instance, Soosai,

the head of the Sea Tigers, who carry out the LTTE’s naval attacks, claimed in a

November 2002 interview that Al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 had

been inspired by LTTE naval operations.282

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. LTTE has raised

funds among the Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia, and from

smuggling and businesses in Sri Lanka.283 The most common estimates state that

before 2001, the Tigers collected up to $1 million a month from expatriates in

Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia, making it among the most well-funded

terrorist groups in the world.284 This flow of funds was apparently significantly

reduced after the September 11th, 2001 attacks.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although it is still early to be certain,

this extremely violent, territorially-based group may be an example of a group that

has been moved by the war on terrorism (among other things) toward negotiation and

peaceful resolution. The apparently dramatic fall-off in funding after September 11th

was an important development. The evolution of the LTTE and its relationship to the

Sri Lankan government bears close scrutiny in future months. For example, the

extremely authoritarian nature of Prabhakaran’s rule over the LTTE realm may pose

difficulties for trying to reach a settlement on northern Sri Lanka that would be at all

democratic.

280

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

281

“Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” The Council on

Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/tamiltigers.html] , accessed on

August 11, 2003.

282

Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing.” See also Amal Jayasinghe, “Tamil Tigers

Mark Suicide Anniversary,” Agence France Presse, July 5, 2003.

283

284

Kronstadt, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 4.

Raymond Bonner, “Sri Lanka’s Ruthless Tigers Easily Armed by Unchecked Market,”

Chicago Tribune Mar. 8, 1998. See also Peter Goodspeed, “Tamil Tigers’ Leader Poised for

Dramatic Comeback,” National Post, May 17, 2000.

CRS-64

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” by (name redacted),

August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), updated

November 7, 2003.

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name

redacted), November 5, 2003.

CRS-65

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

Name(s). People’s Mujahedeen of Iran; PMOI; The National Liberation Army

of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), National Council of Resistance (NCR);

the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Muslim Iranian Student’s

Society.285

Goals and Objectives. The MEK is an Iranian dissident group whose

ideology originally blended Marxism with a moderate interpretation of Islam. In the

1970s, the group opposed the regime of the Shah for its corruption and perceived

susceptibility to U.S. and Western influence. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979,

MEK has opposed the religious Iranian regime, favoring a secular government in

Iran. The group apparently supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of

Iran’s minorities, although some believe the group takes these positions only to

improve its image in Western countries.286

Brief History. The MEK was founded in the 1960s by leftist college students

in Iran opposed to the Shah, who they believed was corrupt and too open to Western

influences. During the 1970s, the group conducted several attacks against U.S.

military personnel and civilians working with the Shah, as well as attacks against the

Iranian government. The MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah,

but quickly fell out of favor with Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of its original

leadership was executed by the Khomeini regime.

In 1981, the MEK bombed several important government buildings, killing as

many as 70 high-ranking Iranian officials. Under pressure from the government in

Tehran, the group fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which it took refuge in

Iraq. While in Iraq, Saddam Hussein armed the group and sent it into battle against

Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The group also provided various security services for

the Saddam Hussein regime, including helping with the suppression of Kurdish and

Shi’a revolts after the first Gulf War in 1991. It continued to attack the Iranian

regime, conducting a 1992 bombing campaigning of Iranian embassies in 13 different

countries. In early 2000, the group used mortars to attack the leadership complex in

Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Since the

end of the Iran-Iraq War, the group has represented an important security threat to the

Iranian regime.287

U.S. and international policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and

controversial. Some see the group as a legitimate, pro-democracy resistance to the

illiberal Iranian government, while others condemn the group’s earlier anti-Western

attacks and regard the group as an anti-Western cult with a pro-democracy facade.

French authorities arrested more than 160 members, including the group’s leader

285

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

286

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,

(name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 28.

287

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by (name redacted),

updated October 24, 2003.

CRS-66

Maryam Rajavi, in Paris in 2003, reversing the longstanding French policy of giving

asylum to the group.288 Several high-profile figures have opposed the arrests.289

During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces bombed MEK bases in Iraq but later signed a

cease-fire with the group. Finally in May 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the

group.290

Favored Tactics. The MEK’s tactics range from bombings to organized

guerilla warfare.

Anti-American Activities. The MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S.

interests since the 197

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