Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply: Background and Issues

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Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:

Background and Issues

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Analyst in Agricultural Policy

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:

Background and Issues

Summary

Iraq’s agricultural sector represents a small but vital component of Iraq’s

economy. Over the past several decades agriculture’s role in the economy has been

heavily influenced by Iraq’s involvement in military conflicts, particularly the 198088 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War, and by varying degrees

of government effort to promote and/or control agricultural production.

Rapid population growth coupled with limited arable land and a general

stagnation in agricultural productivity has steadily increased dependence on imports

to meet domestic food needs since the mid-1960s. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq

was a major trading partner with the U.S. Iraq benefitted from substantial USDA

agricultural export credit during the 1980s to purchase large quantities of U.S.

agricultural commodities. By the mid-1980s Iraq was the major destination for U.S.

rice exports. Iraq was also an important purchaser of U.S. wheat, corn, soymeal, and

cotton. After the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. agricultural export credit to Iraq was ended

and USDA was left with $2 billion in unpaid credit. U.S. agricultural trade with Iraq

remained negligible through 2002.

Present-day Iraqi agriculture and trade have been heavily shaped by the 1990

U.N. sanctions and the Iraqi government’s response to them. From 1991 to 1996,

prior to the startup of the U.N.’s Oil-For-Food program (OFFP), Iraq’s agricultural

imports averaged $958 million or less than half of the pre-war level. Under the

OFFP, the value of Iraq’s agricultural imports rebounded to average $1.5 billion

(during the 1997-2002 period).

In early 2003, just prior to the U.S. — Iraq War, the country’s agricultural sector

remained beset by the legacy of past mis-management, unresolved disputes over land

and water rights, and the lingering effects of a severe drought during 1999-2001.

Clearly, Iraq will be dependent on imports for fully meeting domestic food demand

for several years to come. In the near term, food aid shipments are likely to play a

major role in determining the share of Iraq’s agricultural imports, and may influence

the evolution of future commercial imports.

This report is an extension of CRS Report RS21516, “Iraq’s Agriculture:

Background and Status.” It provides a brief description of Iraq’s agro-climatic

setting and the history of agricultural policy, production, and trade leading up to the

period just prior to the 2003 Gulf War; it reviews issues likely to affect the long-term

outlook for Iraq’s agricultural production and trade; and it provides several tables of

historical data relevant to understanding the evolution of Iraq’s agricultural

production and trade. This report will be updated as events warrant. For detailed

discussion on the status of humanitarian aid efforts, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq:

Recent Developments in Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance. For

discussion on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the

1990s see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International

Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.

Contents

Purpose of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Agro-climatic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Land Use Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Mineral Wealth Favors Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Crop Production Occurs in Two Major Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Rain-Fed Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Irrigated Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Iraq Possesses Extensive Irrigation Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Surface Water Resources and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Salinity Has Been a Persistent Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Ground Water Resources and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Structural Evolution of Iraq’s Agricultural Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Early Structure of the Agricultural Sector: Pre-1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Rise of State Dominance: 1958-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Iraq’s Agriculture during Saddam’s Early Years: 1979-1990 . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Reforms Favor the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Agricultural Inputs Highly Subsidized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Despite Extensive Subsidies, Trade Dependence Grows . . . . . . . . . . . 20

U.S. Provides Substantial Trade Assistance to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Date Production and Trade Remain Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Poultry Surpasses Beef as Primary Meat Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Iraq’s Agriculture in the Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

U.N. Sanctions Impact Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Gulf War Damage Difficult to Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Agricultural Sector Returns to State Control in the Center-South . . . . 25

Food-Ration System Avoids Starvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Field Crop Production Rises Initially Under State Control . . . . . . . . . 26

Iraq’s Date Industry Focuses on Domestic Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Implicit Tax on Agriculture and Inherently Poor Incentives . . . . . . . . 28

Agricultural Input Availability Plummets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Irrigation Support Lessened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Crop Productivity Declines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Livestock Output Declines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Middle East Drought of 1999-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Increasing Malnutrition Sparks International Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

U.N. Resolution 986 Initiates the Oil-For-Food Program . . . . . . . . . . 32

Food Imports Accelerate Under the OFFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Nutritional Status Improves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

OFFP Reorients Focus to Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

De Facto Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Large Humanitarian Relief Operation Directed to Northern Iraq . . . . 36

Free Market Agriculture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

The Oil-for-Food Program in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Outlook and Issues for Iraq’s Agricultural Production and Trade . . . . . . . . 40

Growing Importance of Food Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Problems Remain for Agricultural Productivity in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Trade Dependence Likely to Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

References and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

List of Figures

Figure 1. Agro-climatic Zones in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Figure 2. Iraq's Agricultural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Figure 3. Iraq’s Political Divisions: The 18 Governorates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Figure 4. Iraq’s Crop Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Figure 5. Iraq Imports of Key Agricultural Commodities as a Share of

Total Consumption, Annual Averages for 1985-1989 and 2000-2003 . . . . 24

List of Tables

Table 1. Iraq Population Dynamics, Selected Category by Decade Since 1960 . . 2

Table 2. Historical Precipitation and Temperature Data for Mosul and

Nasiriyah, Monthly and Annual Averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Table 3. Iraq Field Crop Area, by Major Crop, 1981-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Table 4. Iraq Cereal Area, Production, and Yields, by Type, 1981-2003 . . . . . . 46

Table 5. Iraq Livestock Populations and Egg Production, 1970-20021 . . . . . . . . 47

Table 6. Iraq’s Date Production and Export Data, 1970-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Table 7. Iraq Fertilizer Production and Use, by Selected Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Table 8. Iraq Food Calorie Availability per Capita per Day, 1975-2000 . . . . . . . 50

Table 9. Iraq Population and per Capita Calorie Production, Consumption,

and Imports of Cereals, 1970-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Table 10. Iraq Calories from Meat by Type and Share, 1970-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Table 11. Iraq Agricultural Imports, Selected Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Table 12. Iraq Food Imports as Share of Domestic Consumption,

Selected Commodities, 1970-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Table 13. Iraq Wheat and Wheat Flour Imports by Source, 1981-2003 . . . . . . . 55

Table 14. Iraq Coarse Grain Imports by Source, 1981-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Table 15. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Iraq, 1984-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:

Background and Issues

Purpose of This Report

This CRS report provides background on the nature and evolution of Iraq’s

agricultural sector and food supply situation leading up to the 2003 Iraq War. It

directly supports an understanding of Iraq’s current food production and supply

situation by describing the historical development of agricultural policy, production,

and trade, as well as land use and tenure issues and the recent evolution of the

country’s irrigation system. As such, it provides clues to understanding what Iraq’s

agricultural potential and future trade needs might be under a new political and

economic environment in the post-2003 Iraq War era.

The report includes maps that highlight the principal agricultural zones and

political divisions, and it provides several tables of historical data relevant to

understanding the evolution of Iraq’s agricultural production and trade into the 21st

century. The development and implementation of Iraq’s food ration system, as well

as the role of the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food program (OFFP) and its influence on Iraq’s

agricultural sector are outlined. The report ends with a brief discussion of issues

likely to affect the long-term outlook for Iraq’s agricultural production and trade.

Introduction

Iraq’s agricultural sector represents a small, but vital component of the country’s

economy. Prior to the development of the petroleum industry, agriculture was Iraq’s

primary economic activity. As late as 1976, agriculture still contributed about 8%

of Iraq’s GDP, and it employed more than half the total labor force.1 Over the past

several decades agriculture’s role in the economy has been heavily influenced by

Iraq’s involvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the

1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War, and varying degrees of government policy

intervention to promote and/or control agricultural production.

Population dynamics also have been influential in determining the role and

importance of Iraq’s agricultural sector in the general economy, and the extent of

domestic food security. During the period from 1971 to 1990, Iraq’s population

grew at an annual rate of 3.2% compared with only a 1.2% growth rate for Iraq’s

Library of Congress (LOC), Federal Research Division (FRD), Iraq: A Country Study,

edited by Helen Chapin Metz, research completed May 1988, p. 153; Copyright(C)United

States Goverment as represented by the Secretary of the Army.

CRS-2

cereal production (cereals are the principal source of calories in Iraq).2,3 As a result,

food demand outpaced food production and created a growing dependence on

agricultural imports to close the gap between food demand and availability.

Table 1. Iraq Population Dynamics,

Selected Category by Decade Since 1960

Total

Persons

1960

1970

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2003

Urban

Age group

0-14 15-64

65+

—————————Millions—————————

6.8

2.9

3.2

3.5

0.2

9.4

5.3

4.4

4.8

0.2

13.0

8.5

6.0

6.7

0.3

15.3

10.5

6.9

8.0

0.4

18.1

12.6

8.0

9.6

0.5

20.8

14.3

8.9

11.3

0.6

23.3

15.7

9.7

12.9

0.7

24.8

Female

3.4

4.6

6.4

7.5

8.9

10.2

11.4

—————————Percent—————————

Share of Population

1960

1970

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2003

100.0

42.9

56.2

65.5

68.8

69.6

68.6

67.5

46.1

46.6

46.0

45.2

44.2

42.8

41.6

51.4

51.0

51.3

52.0

52.9

54.2

55.5

2.4

2.7

2.8

2.9

3.0

2.9

—————————Percent—————————

Average annual growth rate per period

1960-69

3.1

5.9

3.2

3.0

3.1

1970-79

3.3

4.9

3.2

3.4

4.1

1980-84

3.3

4.2

2.9

3.5

4.1

1985-89

3.3

3.6

2.9

3.7

3.9

1990-94

2.9

2.6

2.1

3.3

3.5

1995-99

2.3

2.0

1.7

2.7

1.5

2000-02

2.1

49.1

49.2

3.1

3.3

3.2

3.3

2.9

2.3

na = not available.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.

By Middle-Eastern standards, Iraq is fairly well-endowed with agricultural

resources that include fertile soils, access to water from two major river systems (the

World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 2003. Note that the World Bank’s

WDI data does not appear to include adjustments for 1991 war-related population loss as

is done by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in their population series for Iraq.

Average annual growth of cereal production between the periods 1969-71 and 1988-90.

CRS-3

Euphrates and the Tigris), and extensive irrigation potential. However, the

agricultural sector has a long track record of government intervention and

mismanagement of the agricultural policy setting. Investment in the sector has been

discouraged by a history of shifting land and water property rights that has ebbed and

flowed with the government’s changing role. Multiple claims to individual land and

water rights have evolved, spawned by tribal affiliation, political patronage and

persecution, and outright military conflict.

Agro-climatic Setting

Over 90% of Iraq’s rainfall occurs during the November-April period (Table 2).

However, precipitation may vary greatly from one year to the next in intensity,

timing, and frequency. Generally precipitation levels increase from lower to higher

elevations (Figure 1). For example, precipitation at Nasiriyah in the southern

lowlands averages only 112 mm (4.4 in.) per year compared with 408 millimeters

(16.1 inches) at Mosul in the northwest foothills.

Table 2. Historical Precipitation and Temperature Data for

Mosul and Nasiriyah, Monthly and Annual Averages

City

Period

units

Precipitation1

Mosul

Nasiriyah4

1923-1990

1941-1990

mm inches

inches

Temperature2

Mosul

Nasiriyah4

1961-1999

1941-1970

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

July

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

2.3

2.5

3.7

2.3

0.9

0.0

0.5

1.4

2.4

0.9

0.6

0.3

0.0

0.1

0.6

0.7

7.2

6.1

12.2

17.2

23.9

28.9

32.8

32.2

27.8

21.1

15.0

8.9

45.0

43.0

54.0

63.0

75.0

84.0

91.0

90.0

82.0

70.0

59.0

48.0

11.5

13.8

18.1

23.4

29.6

32.7

34.1

34.4

31.7

26.0

18.8

12.8

52.7

56.8

64.6

74.1

85.3

90.9

93.4

93.9

89.1

78.8

65.8

55.0

Total

Average

408

34.0

16.1

1.3

112

9.3

4.4

0.4

—

19.4

—

67.0

—

23.9

—

75.0

Source: USDA, World Agricultural Outlook Board; Major World Crop Areas and Climatic Profiles,

Agr. Handbook No. 664.

Note that 1 inch equals about 25.4 millimeter (mm).

C = Centigrade; F = Fahrenheit.

Located in northern Iraq.

Located in central Iraq.

During the dry period from May to October, extremely high temperatures and

a dry north-westerly wind lead to very high evaporation rates from water surfaces,

CRS-4

irrigated land, and plants.4 This exacerbates summer water shortages and soil

salinization in irrigated areas.

Figure 1. Agro-climatic Zones in Iraq

Note: Isohyets show annual rainfall levels in millimetres (mm); 25.4 mm = 1 inch.

Source: K.A. Mahdi, “Agricultural Labor and Technological Change in Iraq” in Dennis

Tulley (ed.), Labor and Rainfed Agriculture in West Asia and North Africa, Dordrecht:

Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Iraq’s soils are generally fertile and easily convertible to agricultural activity.

Two major soil types predominate — heavy alluvial deposits of the Tigris-Euphrates

Plain (brought and deposited by river water) containing a significant amount of

humus and clay; and lighter soils which lack in humus and clay content but contain

Kamil Mahdi, State and Agriculture in Iraq, “Chapter 1 — The Agricultural Resources and

Population of Iraq,” Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press; copyright(c)Kamil

A. Mahdi, 2000, p.12-13.

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wind-deposited nutrients.5 Approximately 9% (about 4 million hectares) of Iraq’s

land is under cultivation, although it is estimated that as much as 21% (about 9.24

million hectares) of the total land could be used for crop production. Estimates of

actual and potential grazing land vary widely. Iraq’s Ministry of Irrigation, in a 1975

report, stated that nearly 73% of Iraq’s land is potentially viable for grazing, although

other studies suggest that potential grazing land is substantially less with significant

seasonal variation.6 The primary limiting factors for land use in agriculture are high

summer-time temperatures, water availability (in the form of either rainfall or river

flow), and the problem of salinity control in the alluvial plains of the Euphrates and

Tigris Rivers.

There is some disagreement among experts as to Iraq’s true agricultural

potential since much of the country’s soil is cultivable (weather and water permitting)

and technical procedures exist for reclaiming prime farmland lost to salinization.

Kamil Mahdi, an expert who has researched and published extensively on Iraq’s

agriculture, characterizes Iraq’s agricultural land base as follows: “It would be true

to say that cultivable land in Iraq is abundant, but that land of good quality is very

limited. Much land could be reclaimed and improved but at too high a cost in

relation to the yields that might be expected from prevailing agricultural practices.”7

Land Use Patterns. Iraq has a total surface area of 43.7 million hectares

(about the size of Wyoming and South Dakota combined) of which 34.0 million

(77.7 percent) is not viable for agricultural use under current conditions.8 Less than

0.4 percent is in forest and woodlands situated along the extreme northern border

with Turkey and Iran. The remaining 22 percent (about 9.5 million hectares) are

involved in agricultural activities, although almost half of this is very marginal and

used only for seasonal grazing of Iraq’s livestock population of predominantly goats

and sheep.

The extreme northeastern frontier of Iraq bordering Turkey and Iran is

mountainous with cold winters and cool summers. Elevations in the Zagros range

of Iraq-Iran and the Taurus range of Iraq-Turkey exceed 3,000 meters. The Zagros

mountains are attributed to be the location of the original domestication of sheep.

Livestock grazing occurs throughout the country’s agricultural zones, but is more

widespread in the north where hillside grazing prevails. Small ruminants — sheep

and goats — are the most prevalent livestock species. However, beef (from cattle)

has been the traditional source of dietary protein for most Iraqis. Commercial poultry

production has increased in importance since the 1960s and generally occurs in close

proximity to urban centers (Table 5).

Ibid., pp.17-18.

Ibid., p.17.

United Nations (UN), Food and Agriculural Organization (FAO), FAOSTAT. (A hectare

equals about 2.47 acres.)

CRS-6

The hill country of northern Iraq — sometimes called Kurdistan — has

sufficient precipitation to support rain-fed agriculture (Figures 1 and 2). From the

foothills of north-central Iraq, a broad, dry rolling plain (used primarily for desert

grazing and marginal agriculture) sweeps downward to the fertile valley of the Tigris

and Euphrates rivers where irrigated agriculture predominates. South-western and

western Iraq is mostly desert, extending into Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Some

vegetable production under drip-irrigated plastic tunnels has been practiced in the

western desert region, otherwise little other agricultural activity occurs in this zone.9

Area cultivated annually to field crops such as cereals, pulses, and vegetables

varies with weather and market conditions, generally averaging between 3.5 to 4

million hectares.10 Cereal production (mostly winter wheat and barley) is the

principal agricultural activity in Iraq accounting for 70 to 85 percent of crop area in

any given year (Tables 4 and 5).

Fruit orchards are well suited to Iraq’s temperate hillsides and to more arid

regions where irrigation water is available. Over 300,000 hectares are permanently

in tree crops — mostly dates, but also some olives, grapes, oranges, apples, and

other fruit orchards (Tables 7 and 9).11 Date palms are the most important tree crop

farmed in Iraq and have traditionally been Iraq’s main export after petroleum.12

Mineral Wealth Favors Agriculture. In addition to its petroleum reserves,

Iraq is endowed with abundant supplies of natural gas and phosphates. Natural gas

is the major feed stock in the production of nitrogenous fertilizers. Nitrates and

phosphates are essential ingredients for plant growth. Phosphate rock reserves are

located mainly in the Akashat area northwest of Baghdad and were estimated in 1987

at 5.5 billion tons — enough to meet local needs for centuries.13

Following the oil boom of the 1970s, Iraq invested heavily in fertilizer

production. During the 1970s and 1980s Iraq was a consistent exporter of

nitrogenous and phosphate fertilizers, with annual fertilizer production running well

ahead of domestic use (Table 7). During this same period, the government also

invested in Iraq’s domestic production capacity for agro-chemicals and farm

machinery. However, both the agro-chemical and farm machinery industries were

dependent on critical imports of raw materials, technology, and spare parts, and were

particularly vulnerable to international trade restrictions.

Ahmad, Mahmood. “Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq: Short- and

Medium-term Options,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter

In the early 1990s, cultivated area temporarily expanded to nearly 5.5 million hectares,

due primarily to government incentives (see section “Iraq’s Agriculture in the post-gulf War

Era: 1001-2002" of this report), before returning to under 4 million.

U.N. FAO, FAOSTAT.

Europa Publications, “Iraq: Agriculture and Food,” from The Middle East and North

Africa 2003, 49th edition, pp 475.

LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, “Chapter 3 — The Economy: Industrialization,” May

1988, p. 153

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Figure 2. Iraq's Agricultural Areas

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Figure 3. Iraq’s Political Divisions: The 18 Governorates

Source: United Nations Development Program, Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000 Report,

June 2000, p.4.

CRS-9

Crop Production Occurs in Two Major Zones

Wheat and barley have been Iraq’s most important crops (Tables 3-5). In 2002,

wheat and barley accounted for 73% of all planted area. With respect to crop

production, Iraq’s agricultural sector can be divided into two distinct regions: the

predominantly rain-fed North and the predominantly irrigated Center-South (Figures

1 and 2). Agricultural production is generally characterized by smallholding,

although the rain-fed farms of the North tend to be larger (averaging 10 to 30

hectares) than the irrigated farms of the Center-South (averaging 1 to 2.5 hectares).14

Rain-Fed Agriculture. About one-third of Iraq’s cereal production —

predominantly winter wheat and barley — is produced under rainfed conditions in

the northern foothills. Rain-fed agriculture is practiced in the governorates of

Ninevah, Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya (Figure 3). The variegated topography of

the region includes various micro-climatic zones, but basically the region can be

divided into three rainfall regimes: high (700-1100 mm), medium (400-700 mm), and

low (under 400 mm).15 Vegetable production and fruit orchards predominate in the

high-rainfall zone in the north, wheat occupies most of the medium-rainfall zone, and

barley is the main crop in the low-rainfall zone. Winter wheat and barley are planted

in the fall (October-November) and harvested in the late spring (April-June) in

accordance with the rainfall pattern (Figure 4).

Yields on the rain-fed crops are generally poor and vary significantly with

rainfall amounts. Traditionally, a biennial fallow system was used in rain-fed areas

to regenerate depleted soils and provide protection against pests and diseases. Under

this system, a winter crop of wheat or barley was grown once every two years and

alternate halves of a field were left idle in successive years. Apart from crop rotation,

very little inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides) are used in rain-fed conditions,

and generally poor crop management practices prevail.16 Since the early 1990s

farmers have been rotating previously mono-cropped cereals with leguminous forage

crops such as alfalfa. This was done to partially offset the sharp decline in imported

feed grains and to break a slump in productivity due to declining soil fertility.

Irrigated Agriculture. Iraq’s irrigated production zone runs along and

between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers extending from the country’s central region

southeastward to the marshlands of the Tigris-Euphrates Delta. Very little rain falls

in the center-south zone of Iraq and agricultural in this region is dependent on

irrigation.

About two-thirds of Iraq’s cereal production occurs within the irrigated zone.

Irrigated agriculture includes both winter wheat and barley production and summer

rice and corn crops. The other main irrigated summer crops include cotton and

vegetables. Traditionally, the biennial fallow system was also practiced in the

irrigated zone. The fallow period would permit the water table to drop sufficiently

Ahmad (2002), p. 170.

Ibid., pp. 170-171. Note that 1 inch equals about 25.4 millimeters (mm).

Mahdi (2000), p. 27.

CRS-10

to allow the salt accumulation in the topsoil to be leached downwards and prevent

salinization. However, the biennial fallow system has declined in use for a variety

of reasons including government policies in the 1990s encouraging more intensive

land cultivation, and a land tenure system that encourages short-term exploitation

over long-term investment in the soil.

In recent decades, a single crop is planted per year for the most part, often in a

cycle of mono-culture that has encouraged plant disease and pests. Some double

cropping of wheat/rice or barley/rice and multiple cropping of vegetables is

occasionally practiced where and when irrigation water is available. Irrigated

summer crops are planted in April-May and harvested in September-October,

although this may vary by crop.

Figure 4. Iraq’s Crop Calendar

Historically Iraq has been one of the world’s leading producers and exporters

of dates, and dates have long been a staple of the Iraqi diet. Iraq is reputed to have

some 411 varieties of dates.17 In 1970, Iraq had an estimated 21 million palms, and

supplied almost half of the world’s date consumption.18 Most date trees grow within

the irrigated zone and benefit from summer-time irrigation. Iraq’s extensive date

IPR Strategic Business Information Database, September 18, 2000.

CRS-11

palm plantations are located in the center of the country, especially around Karbala,

and southward in the area surrounding Basra.

Iraq Possesses Extensive Irrigation Potential

Surface Water Resources and Irrigation. Iraq has more water than most

Middle Eastern nations due to the Tigris and Euphrates river systems. Both rivers are

fed by snowpack and rainfall in eastern Turkey, while Tigris tributaries are also fed

by water sources in northwest Iran. Iraq’s irrigation development depends to a large

extent on the volume of water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers released by

upstream countries Syria and Turkey. Both the Tigris and Euphrates originate in

Turkey. The more southerly Euphrates travels through Syria before entering Iraq

from the West with an average annual flow estimated at 30 km3.19 The more

northerly Tigris briefly runs along Syria’s most north-eastern border before entering

Iraq from the North. The Tigris has a smaller flow capacity, estimated at slightly

over 21 km3, however, numerous rivers and streams running out of Iraq’s northern

foothills feed into the Tigris. As a result, the Tigris is less dependent on foreign

sourcing. About 50% of the Tigris water comes from outside the country compared

with 90% for the Euphrates.

Both the Tigris and the Euphrates experience significant water flow variation

over the course of a year. The Euphrates’ flow shows the greatest variation

fluctuating annually between 10 and 40 km3. Water discharges are highest for both

rivers in April and May, coinciding with the winter crop harvest when irrigation

requirements are very low and potential flood losses very high. The Tigris generally

floods earlier and more violently than the Euphrates, and tends to carry more silt

from the denuded hillsides of northern Iraq. Flood water levels decline rapidly and

water supplies remain at a low level from July through November. Given the high

rate of evaporation and transpiration, summer crops are heavily restricted, while

winter cultivation is also restricted by extremely low river discharge levels at the

beginning of the winter crop season in October and early November.20

The sourcing of water flow and international agreements governing the control

of that flow are critical because water demand is expected to continue to grow for all

three countries within the Tigris-Euphrates watershed (Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). In

1980, Iraq and Turkey created a Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters to

oversee the control and management of the Euphrates and Tigris. Although Syria

joined this committee later, a more important agreement between Syria and Iraq was

established in 1990. Under the 1990 Syria-Iraq agreement, the two countries agreed

to share the Euphrates’ waters at a rate of 58% (Iraq) and 42% (Syria) based on the

flow received by Syria at its border with Turkey.21 Turkey has unilaterally promised

U.N. AQUASTAT, “Country Profile: Iraq,” — FAO’s Information System on Water and

Agriculture, Food and Water Development Division, 1997 version.

Note: 1 km3 = 1 billion m3.

Mahdi (2000), p. 19.

U.N., FAO, AQUASTAT (1997), p.

CRS-12

to secure a minimum flow of 15.8 km3 per year at its border with Syria. This implies

a de facto minimum flow of 9.2 km3 per year for Iraq.

The realization of Iraq’s irrigation potential will depend on the development of

planned upstream irrigation and water management projects. The South-east

Anatolian (GAP) project in Turkey and various irrigation projects in Syria will likely

reduce Iraq’s overall irrigation potential.

Within Iraq, early attempts at constructing barrages that channeled river water

into natural depressions to control flood waters proved ineffective in supporting

irrigated agriculture. The combination of high evaporation from the reservoirs and

the absorption of salt residues in the depressions often made the water too brackish

for agricultural use. However, a system of on-river water storage facilities — such

as barrages or dam reservoirs at Samarra, Dukan, Darband, Khan, Mosul, and Al

Hadithah on the Tigris, Habbaniyah on the Euphrates, and the Bakhma on the upper

Zab — were successfully developed to help regulate the flow of both the Euphrates

and Tigris and to expand the irrigation potential.

According to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),

in 1990 Iraq’s irrigation potential was estimated at over 5.5 million hectares — 63%

in the Tigris basin, 35% in the Euphrates basin, and 2% in the Shatt al-Arab basin.22

However, only 3.5 million hectares were estimated to be fully or partially equipped

for control irrigation that same year. Of this total, a much smaller area was actually

irrigated, since substantial area has been abandoned due to poor irrigation system

maintenance leading to water-logging and salinity. In 1993, only 1.936 million

hectares were estimated to be actually irrigated.23

Problems related to poor irrigation system management and low usage rates

include the growing salinity problem for which no effective national-scale

desalinization program has ever been developed; problems related to the evolution

of land and water rights; difficulties experienced with silt and weed clearance from

canal beds and silting up of flood-irrigated land; and labor shortages resulting from

rural-urban migration and the expansion in cultivation of high-value labor-intensive

crops. A further problem relates to the growing importance of pump-irrigated

systems that have replaced previous flow-irrigated (i.e., gravity driven) systems.

Pump irrigation can be more effective and reliable at delivering water to fields, but

it is vulnerable to the availability of timely and inexpensive fuel and machine parts.

Salinity Has Been a Persistent Problem. Another important issue for

Iraq’s irrigation potential is water quality, particularly as measured by the water’s

salinity or salt content. High water salinity can produce salinization of the soil if not

managed properly. Salinization is the process by which water-soluble salts

accumulate in the soil. Excess salts hinder the growth of crops by limiting their

ability to take up water. Increasing salinization eventually renders the land sterile.

The water table of southern Iraq is saline and so near the surface that it only takes a

bit of injudicious over-irrigation to bring it up to root level and destroy the crop.

Ibid.

CRS-13

Throughout history the irrigated agriculture of Iraq’s center-south region has

been menaced by salinization. Iraq’s historical records include accounts of

salinization caused by canal irrigation between 2400 and 1700 B.C. and the problem

has recurred at intervals through the present. In 1973, it was estimated that at least

2.5 million hectares of Iraq’s irrigated cropland had become uncultivable due to

excessive salinity, and that every year another 6,000 to 12,000 hectares were lost to

salinization.24 As a result, salinization represents both an immediate and long-term

threat to Iraq’s land resources and agricultural productive capacity.

Reducing the severity and extent of soil salinity is primarily a problem of water

management — the usual “treatment” for salinization is to flush the soil with lots of

water. As a result, good water flow and effective drainage are critical to salinity

control. Irrigation diminishes water flow and increases the level of salinity,

particularly during the dry season. In addition, proper drainage is not easily achieved

because Iraq’s terrain is very flat in the irrigated zone of the Center-South. Baghdad,

for example, although 550 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, is only 34 meters above

sea level. This slight gradient makes the plains susceptible to flooding and, although

it facilitates irrigation, it also hampers drainage.

Technically, salinity is not an insurmountable problem, but would require heavy

investment in an effective drainage system, as well as rebuilding and maintenance of

existing canals. In addition to increased water flow and an effective drainage system,

the degree of salinity can be improved by plant selection, tillage practices, and soil

management.25

Ground Water Resources and Irrigation. According to FAO, good

quality subterranean water exists in the foothills of northeastern mountains and along

the right bank of the Euphrates. However, both aquifers become increasingly saline

towards lower altitudes. FAO estimated that 220,000 hectares were irrigated in 1990

from approximately 18,000 wells.

Mahdi (2000), p.16.

Okin (undated). [http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/~desert/]

CRS-14

Structural Evolution of Iraq’s Agricultural Sector

Introduction. Over the past 150 years Iraq’s agricultural sector has undergone

numerous structural transformations, each marked by the degree and nature of state

interference. Throughout this period, Iraq’s system of land tenure, inefficient

government implementation of land reform, and interventionist agricultural policies

have had a profound impact upon agricultural relations and upon production,

employment, and investment decisions. The net effect has been a perpetuation of low

productivity of farmers, slow growth of the agricultural sector, and an ever-increasing

dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs.

The first major transformation in Iraq’s agricultural sector came in the late

nineteenth century involving the break up of tribal landholdings and the creation of

large privately-held estates. This was followed, in 1958, by the rise to dominance of

the central state. During this period, which extended into the late 1970s, the

agricultural sector underwent a radical land redistribution involving the breakup of

the large land-holdings and the creation of state-enforced cooperatives and even some

collectivization. In 1979, Saddam Hussein assumed power and immediately set out

to recreate the state under his control. Under Hussein, agriculture’s role in the

economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq’s involvement in military conflicts,

particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War,

and by varying degrees of government effort to promote and/or control agricultural

production. The early periods are discussed in the following two sections, followed

by two sections that present in some detail the development of Iraq’s agricultural

sector under Saddam Hussein.

Early Structure of the Agricultural Sector: Pre-1958. Although urban

settlements and irrigated agriculture have existed within Iraq for thousands of years,

the traditional agriculture practiced throughout most of modern Iraq, until late in the

nineteenth century, consisted of pastoral agriculture within a nomadic tribal setting.

The initial modernization of Iraq’s agricultural sector involved the transformation

from traditional practices of livestock grazing and crop production to mechanization

and consolidation of land holdings into vast estates during the hundred years or so

preceding 1958.

While part of the Ottoman Empire, a system of tribal tenure — through which

the state retained ownership of the land although tribes used it — predominated in

Iraq. 26 During this period, accumulating pressure from urban-based capital, emerging

international trade linkages, and the growing power of a central government placed

substantial pressure on the traditional tribal-based agrarian system. Around 1870,

large agricultural land holdings began to come under private individual title,

frequently by former tribal shaikhs (chiefs), at a rapid pace. This transformation

facilitated agricultural expansion and the settlement of what had formerly been

grazing land. But it also played a significant role in the tenure conditions, the

Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire from the mid-1500s until 1920 when it became a

British Mandate. At that time, Britain established a monarchy in Iraq. Independence was

achieved by Iraq in 1932, but Britain retained a role in defense and foreign affairs. A

military coup in 1958 ended the monarchy and established Iraq as a republic.

CRS-15

organization of farm activities, the pattern of land use, and the associated agricultural

production relations that emerged.

Under this informal system of tribal tenure, land titles were insecure. By the

1930s, large landowners had accumulated considerable political clout and began to

lobby for greater security over their landholdings. In response, the government

passed a law in 1932 empowering it to settle title to land and to speed up registration

of titles. Under the law, a number of tribal leaders and village headmen were granted

title to the land that had been worked by their communities. Even though agriculture

was commercialized and farm surpluses could be directed to satisfying a growing

urban demand, important elements of tribal organization remained. For example,

traditional share tenancy (involving the rotation of plots to be cultivated and the

strips to be assigned to tenants) was often based on customary rights of tribesmen,

who tended to have a share of the land rather than rights to a specific plot. As a

result, factor markets for land and labor were severely restricted — wage labor and

cash rents were almost nonexistent. The number of sharecroppers and tenants

increased over time under this system. This relationship was formalized in favor of

landowners by a 1933 law which provided that a sharecropper could not leave the

land if he were indebted to the landowner. Because landowners were usually the sole

source of credit and almost no sharecropper was free of debt, the law effectively

bound many tenants to the land.

Large landowners who were reliant on cheap labor and traditional social

organization had no incentive to carry out investments in new technology or

production practices that might have had unfavorable consequences for factor pricing

and social organization. As a result, the intensity of cultivation and land productivity

was very low, and the entire growth in output was due to rapid expansion in

cultivated area. Emphasis was placed on resource development that reinforced the

existing agrarian system and served the interests of the landlords. The limits to area

expansion that were reached were due to salinization and seasonal water constraints

in the irrigation zone, and to expansion into marginal lands in the rain-fed zone.

In the south-central irrigated zone, investment in water-storage and floodcontrol projects, along with adoption of irrigation pumps, served to expand cultivated

area rather than to increase productivity. The tribal-based share tenancy system

contributed to the poor upkeep of the irrigation system — irrigation and drainage

networks were not maintained and salinity spread over large areas.

In the northern rain-fed zone, the arrival of tractors quickly pushed area

expansion onto marginal grazing land. Such cultivation was ecologically

unsustainable. Problems associated with geographic isolation were also compounded

by the land-tenure system, and reinforced the low productivity, low investment nature

of production.

Over time, many landowners sought the amenities of urban life, and absentee

landlords whose incentive was to maximize short-term profits contributed to the

failure to adopt better, but higher-cost land management and production practices.

This agrarian system reinforced the practice of cereal monoculture to the detriment

of varied and mixed farming that encompassed higher-valued activities such as

vegetable and fruit production and livestock raising.

CRS-16

On the eve of the 1958 revolution, more than two-thirds of Iraq’s cultivated land

was concentrated in 2% of the holdings, while at the other extreme 86% of the

holdings covered less than 10% of the cultivated land.27

Rise of State Dominance: 1958-1979. A period of heavy state dominance

in the agricultural sector began in 1958 when the ruling regime was overthrown by

sections of the Iraqi army.28 The poor conditions of tenant farmers and the

inequalities of the countryside juxtaposed against the wealth and political influence

of the landlords placed agrarian reform high on the agenda of the new government.

Land reform was initiated in October 1958 and resulted in the break-up of large

estates whose owners were compelled to forfeit their ‘excess’ land to the government,

which would then redistribute the land to new peasant owners.29 This land was to be

redistributed to individuals in parcels of between 7 and 15 hectares. Recipients

would repay the government over a 20-year period. Under the law, the government

was to pay for expropriated land, but by 1968 the government had absolved itself of

all responsibility to recompense landowners.30

The government also began promoting the growth of cooperatives and collective

farms in 1967. Farmers receiving expropriated lands were required to join a

cooperative. The government provided heavily subsidized farm equipment to

farmers through farmers’ cooperatives. During this period, most government

subsidies were directed to these state-sanctioned enterprises. However, this approach

of heavy state control proved inefficient and unproductive. First, the government was

slow to redistribute the expropriated land. By 1968, 1.7 million hectares of farmland

had been expropriated, but less than a third of it had been redistributed. As a result,

the government continued to hold a large proportion of arable land, which, because

it was not distributed, often lay fallow.31 Second, the previous system of input supply

covering credit, seeds, pumps, and marketing services that had been performed by the

landlords was not being fully undertaken by the state due to a lack of personnel,

funds, and expertise. Agricultural production stagnated and rural-to-urban migration

increased.

In 1970 the government continued its program of agrarian reform with

legislation that further reduced the maximum size of permissible land holdings with

expropriation of the excess. In 1975, a further reform law was enacted to target the

large estates of Kurdish tribal owners in the North. An increasing share of

agricultural land came under the direct control of the government.

During the 1970s Iraq experienced rapid urbanization accelerated by the oil

boom. The urban share of Iraq’s population grew from about 43 percent in 1960 to

LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, “Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform,” 1990.

Kamil A. Mahdi, State and Agriculture in Iraq, Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series,

Europa Publications (2003), p. 474.

LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, “Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform,” 1990.

Ibid.

CRS-17

66 percent by 1980 (Table 1).32 Accompanying this development there was growing

concentration of population in the central region, particularly inBaghdad city.33 The

indigenous agricultural labor force declined by one-half million workers from 1973

to 1977, causing agriculture’s share of the total labor force to slide from 50 percent

to 30 percent. The resultant labor shortage in the countryside necessitated

importation of foreign laborers and technicians, mainly Egyptians.34

The original purpose of the land reform had been to break up the large estates

and to establish many small owner-operated farms, but fragmentation of the farms

made extensive mechanization and economies of scale difficult to achieve, despite

the extensive cooperative system. Therefore, in the 1970s, the government turned to

collectivization as a solution. By 1981 Iraq had established 28 collective state farms

that employed 1,346 people and cultivated about 180,000 hectares.35

An upward trend in import dependence began during the 1970s as agricultural

output failed to keep up with Iraq’s rapidly growing population, and imports became

increasingly important to meet domestic food demand. Rising petroleum revenues,

food subsidy programs to improve consumer diets, and changes in trade policy paved

the way for increased imports of cereals, livestock products, sugar, and oilseed

products. By 1980 Iraq was importing about half of its food supply. Despite massive

expenditures on imports, food shortages, particularly of fresh commodities including

fruits, vegetables and eggs, plagued consumers.36

During the 1970's, the United States was effectively a residual supplier of Iraq’s

grain imports as other foreign competitors were able to take advantage of either

geographic proximity or lower prices to garner most of Iraq’s trade. However, Iraqi

programs to diversify the sources of supply caused Iraq to continue purchasing U.S.

rice and wheat even when supplies from other sources were abundant and lower in

price.37

World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.

Mahdi (2000), p.31.

Springborg, Robert. “Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in

Contemporary Iraq,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 33-52.

LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, 2000.

Ibid., p. 32.

Kurtzig, Michael E. and John B. Parker. “World Agriculture and Trade: Iraq,”

Agricultural Outlook, November 1980, pp. 18.

CRS-18

Iraq’s Agriculture during Saddam’s Early Years: 1979-1990

Reforms Favor the Private Sector. In July 1979 Saddam Hussein assumed

power from President Hassan Al Bakr. Almost immediately he set out to shift the

economy (including the agricultural sector) away from State control and towards

allowing a greater role for private-sector investment from both Iraqi and other Arab

sources.38 State intervention took the form of large subsidies to the sector. Surging

oil revenues were used to acquire Western, as opposed to Soviet Bloc, technology

and to lavish extensive government subsidies on the agricultural sector. In addition,

marketing regulations were relaxed and the Government raised prices for virtually

all commodities in the early 1980s in order to stimulate production and to expand the

role of the private sector.39 The result of the government largesse was the emergence

of a system of cronyism and political patronage under the guise of privatization and

capitalism. Agricultural reforms were given further impetus by the 1983 decline in

oil prices which caused government policy to focus narrowly on agriculture.40

The large state-controlled enterprises that had dominated the agricultural sector

the previous two decades were broken up and sold to the private sector or to publicprivate companies.41 In 1982, the Iraqi government still controlled approximately 50

percent of all agricultural lands. However, in 1983, Law No. 35 was implemented.

Under the provisions of this act, Iraqis or Arab nationals, acting individually or in

companies, could apply to rent land from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian

Reform for a period of five to 20 years. No upper limit on the size of land parcels

was specified in the act. Rents charged were well below prevailing market rates.42

By January 1989, according to government sources, the ownership structure of land

had changed considerably: 53 percent was privately owned; 46 percent was rented

from the state by farmers and private investors; and the remaining 1 percent was state

held.43 In addition, a majority of very large poultry, dairy, and fishing enterprises had

been sold to the private sector.

During this period, the government adopted a number of policies to remove the

existing barriers to large industrial investments that had been in place since the

nationalizations of 1964. In 1988, the government fully liberalized all imports for

the private sector, provided that they were paid for with foreign exchange held

Ibid. Springborg suggests that at least a partial motivation for this behavior by Saddam

was that, by weakening the Baath Party structure, he was able to enhance his own power

base within the Party.

Ibid., p. 40-41.

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, “Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social Foundations

of Iraqi Etatisme,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Ithaca Press,

Ahmad (2002), p. 184.

Springborg (1986), p. 37.

Chaudhry (2002), p. 245.

CRS-19

outside the country. Previously, imports had been completely controlled by the state,

either directly or through strict licensing procedures.44

Agricultural Inputs Highly Subsidized. Extensive government subsidies

were provided to the agricultural sector throughout the 1980s. First and foremost

was cheap fuel to run the agricultural machinery, and cheap electricity to run the

irrigation pumps. After cheap energy, water was the main subsidy among agricultural

inputs. Below-market fees were charged for water use. Poor demand management

practices contributed to very low efficiency in water use. For example, water charges

were area-based rather than crop- or production-based. The government’s

management focus was generally on upgrading irrigation technology, rather than on

lowering unit-costs via conservation and reduced waste through maintenance.45 The

government invested heavily in the irrigation infrastructure — irrigation pumps were

widely installed and the government assumed primary responsibility for maintenance

activities such as cleaning out the irrigation ditches and drains. This maintenance

was critical to allowing salts to be washed from the soil to prevent salinization.46

The government also distributed high-yielding seeds, and provided substantial

and ever-increasing subsidies on fertilizers and agricultural chemicals. Vaccinations

for poultry and livestock were available at subsidized prices. Credit was available

to agricultural producers at below-market interest rates through Iraq’s Agricultural

Credit Bank (ACB).47 Agricultural extension services were also available through

more than 3,000 field-extension agents.48 Government controlled storage and

marketing facilities were widespread throughout the main agricultural areas.

However, most of the agricultural subsidies were directed to irrigated agriculture and

to commercial livestock activities such as chicken farms and a fledgling feedlot

industry.

During this period, Iraq relied on foreign technology and imports for livestock

vaccines. In addition, most raw materials were imported for crop pesticide

production. To facilitate access to foreign technologies, the government import

agency used an over-valued exchange rate (three times higher than the black market

rate) to acquire pesticides and agricultural equipment such as combines, tractors, and

irrigation pumps on the international market. Producers could then buy these

agricultural inputs from the government import agency at the official exchange rate.49

However, it is not clear how widespread access to these officially purchased inputs

was. Observed production behavior suggests that they were mostly available to Party

favorites or a privileged few.

Ibid., p. 247.

Ahmad (2002), p. 191.

USDA. January 1998. “Soil Quality Resource Concerns: Salinization,” Natural

Resources Conservation Service, USDA. [http://soils.usda.gov/sqi/files/Salinzation.pdf]

Springborg (1986), p. 38-39.

Ahmad (2002), p. 184.

Ibid., p. 40.

CRS-20

Despite Extensive Subsidies, Trade Dependence Grows. Planted area

and production expanded through the 1980s for cereals, vegetables, and fruit. During

1985-89, average cereal harvested area and production were up 28 and 14 percent,

respectively from the average for 1970-79 (Table 4). However, cereal yields

stagnated despite heavily subsidized inputs, due in large part to poor production

practices and limited varietal development. In addition, the Iran-Iraq War gradually

diverted labor and other resources away from agriculture, and the government’s

agricultural input subsidies were slowly reined in. During the 1980s, up to two

million unskilled laborers, mostly originating from Egypt, Sudan, and South Asian

countries, replaced the domestic labor force of Iraqi citizens away on military front

duty.50

Population growth continued to outpace agricultural production, increasing the

importance of trade. Despite Government efforts at stimulating agricultural

production during the 1980s, average cereal and poultry imports as a share of

domestic consumption nearly doubled from a decade earlier, jumping to 69% and

48% shares, respectively, over the decade (Table 12). By 1989 Iraq was importing

over $2.5 billion in agricultural commodities annually including 78 percent of its

cereals and nearly 100 percent of its vegetable oils and sugar (Tables 16 and 17).51

The growth in food imports helped total calorie availability rise steadily through

the 1980s from 2,820 calories per capita per day in 1980 to average about 3,500 in

1988 and 1989 according to FAO. Cereals, mostly wheat and rice comprised 60

percent of calories consumed by the average Iraqi during the 1980s (Table 8).

Wheat has been Iraq’s most important agricultural import in terms of both

quantity and value for most of the past two decades. During the 1981-89 period, Iraq

imported an average of 2.6 million metric tons of wheat annually (Table 13). The

average annual value of total cereal (principally wheat) imports during this same

period averaged over $750 million (Table 11). Australia was Iraq’s primary wheat

supplier with a 38% market share compared with 29% from the United States and

22% from Canada.

U.S. Provides Substantial Trade Assistance to Iraq. In the 1980's,

U.S.-Iraqi trade expanded rapidly on the strength of large USDA export credit. From

1983 through mid-1990, Iraq received nearly $5 billion in U.S. GSM-102 and GSM103 export credit guarantees to purchase significant quantities of U.S. agricultural

commodities. In addition to the export credit, Iraq also participated in other U.S.

agricultural export programs. Under the Export Enhancement Program U.S.

exporters received an estimated $157.2 million in bonuses to facilitate Iraqi

purchases of about $509.8 million in agricultural commodities (wheat, wheat flour,

barley, barley malt, dairy cattle, poultry, and table eggs) during fiscal years 1986

through 1990. During those same years, the Targeted Export Assistance and

Cooperator Foreign Market Development Programs together provided $1.9 million

Michiel Leezenberg,”Refugee Camp or Free Trade Zone? The Economy of Iraqi

Kurdistan since 1991,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter

U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-21

in market development assistance to U.S. commodity groups targeting the Iraqi

market.52

Virtually all of Iraq’s purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities were made

under U.S. government programs. By 1989, Iraq was the 12th largest foreign market

for U.S. agricultural exports buying about 2% of all U.S. agricultural exports. Iraq

had become the major destination for U.S. rice exports and also an important

purchaser of U.S. wheat, feed grains, oilseed products, cotton, sugar, dairy products,

poultry, and tobacco (Table 20).

Date Production and Trade Remain Important. During the 1970s, Iraq’s

production of dates averaged slightly more than 415,000 metric tons annually of

which 68% was exported at an average annual export value of nearly $35 million.

But Iraq’s date industry reportedly experienced severe damage during the Iran-Iraq

War.53 Many palm plantations in the region surrounding Basra were destroyed by

Iranian shelling and Iranian soldiers reportedly used thousands of palm trunks to

build shelters during their occupation of parts of southern Iraq. In the early 1980s,

Iraq’s data production slumped to about 387,000 metric tons and the export share fell

precipitously to only about 28%. However, a sharp rise in international date prices

more than offset the decline in exports and kept export value near $35 million

annually. In the latter half of the 1980s the international market price rose

substantially and the value of annual date exports averaged over $55 million.54

During the 1980s, the government-managed Iraqi Date Administration initiated

a major program to support date production by subsidizing the development of plants

to industrially process dates into sugar, dry sugar alcohol, vinegar, and concentrated

protein. The Iraqi Date Processing and Marketing Company was established to

oversee date production and marketing. As a result, of their activity, domestic use

gained a generally increasing share of Iraq’s annual date production (Table 6).

Poultry Surpasses Beef as Primary Meat Source. In the 1970s the Iraqi

government had started to emphasize livestock and fish production in an effort to add

protein to the national diet. In the mid-1980s, British, West German, and Hungarian

companies were given contracts to establish poultry farms. At the same time, the

government expanded aquaculture and deep-sea fishing.55 According to FAO data,

calorie availability from meats — the principal source of dietary protein — peaked

in 1984 at an estimated 139 calories per day per capita (Table 10). For the 1985-89

period, meat availability averaged nearly 132 calories/capita/day. Beef had been the

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), November 1990, p. 2. Note: under GSM-102

USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees repayment for credit sales of

three years or less; under GSM-103, CCC guarantees repayment for credit sales of more

than three years but less than 10 years.

IPR Strategic Business Information Database, “Iraq: 9 Million Palm Trees Lost in Wars,”

FAOSTATS, FAO, United Nations.

Library of Congress, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, “The Economy — Cropping and

Livestock,” p.162.

CRS-22

traditional source of meat calories in Iraq. However, poultry meat had been making

strong gains through the 1970s and 1980s. By 1989 poultry surpassed beef as the

principal source of calories from meat in the Iraqi diet — 55.5 calories/capita/day for

poultry compared with 51.3 for beef.56

Livestock production in Iraq has traditionally been dominated by small

ruminants (sheep and goats). Large ruminant production (mostly cattle, but also

draft animals — camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, and donkeys) comprise a much

smaller share of the livestock sector (Table 5). Iraq’s sheep and goat population

peaked in 1970 at an estimated 15.4 million head, while the cattle population peaked

in 1974 at over 3 million head. All ruminants have been in decline ever since as

rapid human population growth and urbanization have increased pressure for highervalued food crops on suitable grazing land, while limited investment and increasing

feed-import costs slowly squeezed the profitability out of the sector.

FAOSTATS, FAO, United Nations.

CRS-23

Iraq’s Agriculture in the Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-2002

In the mid-1980s, agriculture accounted for only about 14 percent of Iraq’s

national GDP. However, after the imposition of U.N. sanctions in 1990 and the loss

of oil revenues, the country’s economy turned inward and agriculture’s share of GDP

is estimated to have risen to 35 percent by 1992.57 This section discusses the

government’s policy shift behind the inward reorientation of the agricultural sector

and the near catastrophic results of failed government programs and prolonged

drought.

U.N. Sanctions Impact Agricultural Trade. In August 1990 the U.N.

Security Council adopted resolution 661, imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq

following that country’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait.58 Under U.N. sanctions,

foreign companies were prohibited from investing directly in Iraq. The importation

of agricultural products was not banned; however, the Iraqi government’s

unwillingness to participate in the U.N.’s 1991 Oil-for-Food plan cut off government

oil export revenues needed to purchase foodstuffs and agricultural inputs on the

international market.59

The sanctions and the Iraqi government’s response to them, had devastating

consequences for Iraq’s agricultural sector and the country’s food supply. The

impact on Iraq’s agricultural trade was immediate as exemplified by the initial

forecast and subsequent revisions to USDA’s estimate of Iraq’s grain imports for the

1990/91 marketing year. In July 1990, a month prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

USDA forecast Iraq’s 1990/91 grain imports at 4.6 million tons, down only slightly

from the 5 million tons imported in 1989/90. Just a month later, in August 1990,

USDA revised its forecast for 1990/91 imports downward to 2.85 million tons.

USDA’s final estimate of 1990/91 Iraqi grain imports was 492,000 tons — only 11%

of the original forecast.60

From 1990 to 1994, Iraq’s agricultural imports averaged slightly above $1

billion or less than half of the pre-war level (Table 11). USDA’s export credit offers

that had been so generously extended to purchase U.S. agricultural products during

the 1980s were stopped, and USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation was forced to

Ahmad, Mahmood. “Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq” Short- and

Medium-term Options,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Ithaca

For a discussion of Security Council resolutions and requirements on Iraq, see CRS Issue

Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.

For a discussion of Security Council resolutions related to the Oil-For-Food Program in

Iraq, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and

Illicit Trade; and United Nations, Office of the Iraq Program — Oil for Food; “About the

Program: In Brief.” [http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/inbrief.html]

Parker, John, Michael Kurtzig, and Tom Bickerton. “Iraq Faces Embargo,” Agricultural

Outlook, ERS, USDA, September 1990, pp. 16.; and USDA “PSD online database.”

CRS-24

cover over $2 billion in unpaid Iraqi credit guarantees.61 U.S. agricultural trade with

Iraq fell to nearly zero and has remained negligible even after the increase in

agricultural imports associated with the OFFP (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Iraq Imports of Key Agricultural Commodities as a

Share of Total Consumption, Annual Averages for

1985-1989 and 2000-2003

U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq’s Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export

Programs, NSIAD-91-76, November 1990, p. 2.

CRS-25

Gulf War Damage Difficult to Assess. Anecdotal evidence suggests that

the short, but costly 1991 Gulf War resulted in significant damage to much of the

country’s infrastructure including telecommunications, transportation, and irrigation,

all vital to Iraq’s agricultural production and marketing system. However, it is

difficult to evaluate the extent or severity of the damage.

In addition to the infrastructure damage, Iraq suffered a substantial loss of

agricultural labor in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. According to U.S. Census

Bureau data, in 1991 Iraq experienced a 3.7% decline in total population (i.e., 1990

total population plus births and in-migration minus deaths and out-migration

produced a net decline of an estimated 663,000 persons). Much of this decline was

attributable to an exodus of refugees fleeing potential political or ethnic persecution.

However, the exodus also likely included a substantial number of foreign guest

workers from the agricultural sector.62 Both infrastructure damage and loss of guest

agricultural labor likely diminished Iraq’s agricultural productivity during the years

following the war.

Agricultural Sector Returns to State Control in the Center-South.

Under the terms of Iraq’s military defeat, the country was effectively partitioned into

two distinct entities — three northern governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniyah)

and the remaining fifteen governorates of central and southern Iraq (Figure 3). As

a result of the partition, the central government’s control over agricultural policy was

limited to the 15 southern governorates. Unless specifically indicated, the following

discussion refers to the central government’s agricultural policies within its southcentral zone of control.63

During the first year following the implementation of U.N. economic sanctions

against Iraq in August 1990, the central government took several steps to increase

both production and control of domestic food within its zone of control. First, it

monopolized the marketing of all grain and oilseed crops in Iraq. Intervention in

other crops (mostly vegetables) was limited to price controls. In addition, the

government announced the introduction of a system of rationing of basic foodstuffs.

Food-Ration System Avoids Starvation. In light of Iraq’s substantial

dependence on trade for meeting domestic food needs by 1989, the sharp slow-down

in agricultural imports under international sanctions placed the country’s consumers

in a precarious position. In an attempt to meet food security needs, the government

introduced a food-ration system for basic food items. The system involved procuring

strategic food crops from domestic producers at fixed prices, then selling them to

consumers at much lower prices. The initial monthly allotment of the food-ration

basket of goods included wheat flour (7 kilograms), rice (1.5 kg), vegetable oil (0.75

kg), sugar (0.5 kg), tea (0.1 kg), and some other non-food items. The basket of goods

changed over time, and was substantially increased after larger food imports began

in 1997 under the Oil-for-Food program.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base (IDB), Iraq, Oct. 10, 2002.

A later section, “Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-2002,” describes the

agricultural sector in the 3 governorates of Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq during the postGulf War period.

CRS-26

The food-ration system had three important features: it was based primarily on

Iraq’s domestic grain production; it was made available on a monthly basis to all

individuals; and it was sold at only a fraction (3 to 5%) of its market value.64

Consumer survey data from the 1992-96 period suggests the food ration was

equitably available to all individuals irrespective of ethnic identity.65 As a result, the

basic food entitlement of all sections of the Iraqi population was protected by the

ration system from falling below the point where mass starvation could have

occurred.66

The value of a food basket was calculated on the basis of an adult ration valued

at the average monthly market price of each commodity. As a result, its price varied

with market conditions which, in turn, were highly dependent on domestic food

production. In August 1991, shortly after the startup of the food ration program, an

adult food basket cost 217 Iraqi Dinar (ID) at market prices, while the nominal

purchase fee charged individual consumers was 11.1 ID (or about 5% of the market

value). In May 1996, several months prior to the arrival of food imports under the

OFFP, the market price for an adult food basket had climbed to over 19,000 Iraqi

Dinar (ID), due in large part to significant domestic inflation, while the assessed fee

was 600 ID (or about 3.2% of the market value).

Under the food-ration system, black market prices for food products rose

substantially. Although government control was intended to keep food prices in

check, the basic food ration was insufficient to fully meet individual daily calorie

needs — the initial ration basket only covered an estimated one-third of daily foodenergy needs.67 As a result, consumers turned to other sources for the remainder of

their calories. With domestic demand in excess of domestic food supplies, internal

commodity prices rose quickly. Prices of a wide range of foods outside the rationing

system, including meat, eggs, and dairy produce, exceeded the budget of the average

Iraqi worker.

Field Crop Production Rises Initially Under State Control. In an

attempt to expand planted area and boost agricultural production, the government

launched a national agricultural campaign on 12 April 1991, involving new

incentives for farmers, priority allocation of fuel and machinery, and the creation of

a special committee to supervise the 1991 harvest and to maintain the state’s

monopoly of food sales.

As part of the new program the official purchase prices of major field crops

were raised. In addition, the government also imposed several rules to reinforce its

newly established monopoly over grain production and to ensure adequate supplies

for the food-ration system. First, the government made it compulsory for cereal

Gazdar, Haris, and Athar Hussain, “Crises and Response: A Study of the Impact of

Economic Sanctions in Iraq” Short- and Medium-term Options,” from Iraq’s Economic

Ibid., p. 56-57.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ahmad (2002), p. 194

CRS-27

farmers to deliver their output to state collection centers within two weeks of

harvesting. Furthermore, each farmer was obligated to supply a minimum quota

based on an assessed crop area and an assigned yield. A farmer who failed to meet

the quota had to purchase the shortfall from the market and supply it to the

procurement agency. As a further penalty, the government took emergency steps to

confiscate land from farmers who failed to fulfill production quotas. Finally, the

government introduced the death penalty for hoarding of cereals.

Iraqi farmers responded to the mix of government and market incentives by

expanding cropped area to include marginal pastureland and fragile hillsides.

Cropped area expanded each year from 1991 through 1993. By 1993, Iraq’s cereal

harvested area hit a record 4.6 million hectares, 94 percent above the average cereal

harvested area of 2.4 million hectares during 1985-89 (Table 4). However, the record

area was not sustainable due to serious degradation of soil fertility on marginal rainfed lands and increasing salinization in irrigated areas. By 1997 cereal harvested area

had declined to 2.8 million hectares.

Iraq’s Date Industry Focuses on Domestic Market. Iraq’s date industry

was reportedly heavily dependent on foreign workers and expertise, and suffered

from their departure following the imposition of U.N. sanctions and the subsequent

1991 Gulf War.68 In addition, palm tree populations were significantly damaged by

war-related activity.69

However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the eventual economic downturn and

widespread loss of jobs that occurred in the decade following the 1991 Gulf War,

coupled with escalating food costs, particularly in urban centers, led to some urbanto-rural migration and a rebound in the rural labor force available for agricultural

production. Iraq’s date industry appears to have benefitted from these agricultural

labor force dynamics. Although palm tree numbers declined sharply in 1991, FAO

data indicate that rising productivity more than made up for lower tree populations

(Table 6). From 1990 to 2002, date yields per hectare averaged about 20% above the

1985-89 level, while date production averaged almost 622,000 tons per year — 57%

above the 1985-89 average. The dramatic rise in production for the date industry,

while most other agricultural sectors were in decline, suggests that market incentives

for date production remained strong relative to other agricultural activities. The

sharp drop off in Iraq’s sugar imports, particularly on a per capita basis, likely

enhanced the value of dates as a sugar substitute in domestic markets and made them

an attractive cash crop for producers (refer to sugar availability and importation data

in Tables 13 and 16).

However, the international embargo had essentially cut off Iraq’s official

exports of dates. Despite an important outflow of dates through Iran and Turkey,

average annual exports declined to only 54,000 tons or $10.2 million during the

1990s compared with about 200,000 tons during the previous two decades. In the

IPR Strategic Business Information Database, “Iraq: 9 Million Palm Trees Lost in Wars,”

Agence France Presse, “War, embargo take their toll on Iraq’s palm trees,” Baghdad, Iraq,

CRS-28

absence of Iraqi data exports, several other date exporting countries expanded their

production and captured Iraq’s lost market share. Tunisia is reportedly the world’s

leading date exporter followed by Pakistan and Iran.70 Iraq’s market share may prove

difficult to recapture.71

Implicit Tax on Agriculture and Inherently Poor Incentives. To help

finance the growing gap between rising market prices and the low fee charged for the

food ration that developed through the mid-1990s, the government kept the rate of

growth of procurement prices substantially below the growth of market prices. This

implicit tax on agricultural producers was estimated to range between 20 to 35% of

the value of production for various commodities in 1996.72 The implicit tax provided

a strong incentive for farmers to under-report cropped area. To minimize this

problem the government linked its supply of subsidized agricultural inputs to

reported cropped area.

As a result, Iraq’s agricultural sector faced a highly distorted system of

incentives that included subsidized agricultural inputs, mandatory production quotas,

and an implicit tax on the sale of that production. The net subsidy-tax balance

appears to have become increasingly negative over time. The balance was finally

tipped against agricultural productivity in the mid-1990s due to increasing shortages

of agricultural inputs.

Agricultural Input Availability Plummets. Iraq’s fertilizer industry

declined severely during the 1990s due to rising natural gas and energy prices, and

a general lack of spare parts for production and maintenance of machinery. Total

fertilizer production dropped from a high of 870,900 metric tons in 1989 to 125,000

tons in 1991 — an 86% decline in two years. Production averaged 325,000 tons

through the rest of the decade (Table 7). Fertilizer use also dropped sharply early in

this period declining from an estimated use rate of 89.5 kg/ha in 1989 to 33.8 kg/ha

in1991.

As a result of the U.N. embargo, Iraqi fertilizer exports stopped in 1991 after

having peaked at 530,100 tons in 1989. During 1985-89, net fertilizer exports

averaged almost 250,000 tons annually. In the first half of 1990, prior to the

international embargo, Iraq undertook 232,000 tons of net exports. After 1990, Iraq

became a net importer of all fertilizers (including nitrogen).

The embargo dictated an inward focus for the fertilizer industry. By 1994

domestic production had recovered somewhat at over 300,000 tons. Fertilizer usage

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi date trade, pride of the nation, reeling under U.N.

The problem for dates is even more acute than simply reclaiming lost market share.

Demand for dates in international markets is likely quite inelastic — i.e., not very price

responsive. Therefore, any significant increase in supplies of dates on international markets

is likely to lead to substantially greater declines in the international market price.

Gazdar and Hussain (2002), p. 62.

CRS-29

rates began to rise dramatically hitting a record 97 kg/ha in 1997. By 2000, the

reported fertilizer usage rate had climbed to 123 kg/ha.73

Comprehensive data are not available concerning Iraq’s production or imports

of agricultural chemicals such as fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides. However,

the available FAO data on pesticide imports reveal that Iraq’s imports of agricultural

pesticides declined from an average annual import value of $11.8 million during

1985-89 to an estimated $5 million since 1990 — a 58% drop. Agricultural

chemicals are often highly critical to the productivity of many vegetable and fruit

crops.

Irrigation Support Lessened. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Iraq’s

irrigation infrastructure suffered significant damage during the 1991 Gulf War.

However, as with other war damage concerns, little documentation is available to

support claims or provide evidence. At any rate, given the importance of the

country’s irrigation infrastructure to the agricultural sector and national food security,

it is likely that the government engaged in rebuilding the damaged canals deemed

most essential to agricultural production.

In the absence of oil revenues, subsidies for irrigation water and canal

maintenance were becoming a serious drain on the government budget. In 1995, the

government raised water charges on irrigated land and shifted the burden of canal

maintenance to growers who were obligated to maintain their on-farm drainage

networks. If the farmer failed to do so, the government would undertake the work

at the farmers expense.74 However, this system does not appear to have been

effective.

The encroaching drought of 1999-2001 (see section “Middle East drought of

1999-2001") meant reduced waterflows through the canal system, and made cleaning

and maintenance to improve the flow of existing water all the more critical. If left

alone, the rivers, streams, and canals that feed Iraq’s irrigation network quickly clog

with various sediments, herbs, straw, and papyrus. The government Irrigation

Ministry complained of unfulfilled international contracts (negotiated prior to the

Gulf War) to import irrigation equipment, pumps, and spare parts for the country’s

dilapidated fleet of old canal dredgers.75 By the late 1990s, news reports indicated

that widespread salinity had spread across much of the irrigated fields of central and

southern Iraq, and that Iraq’s agricultural productive capacity was being eroded.76

Once severe salinization has occurred in soil, the rehabilitation process may take

These data should be viewed with caution. Although they are from FAOSTAT, they

reflect the data officially reported by the Iraqi government to the FAO. Rising usage rates

may be more a reflection of declining area to which fertilizer is applied, rather than

increasing widespread availability.

Ahmad (2002), p. 191.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Iraq: Irrigation

BBC.

The Economist, “Digging for defeat: Iraq,” May 2, 1998, Vol. 348, No. 8066, p.44.

CRS-30

several years according to FAO officials.77 The extent of salinization damage is

uncertain; however, FAO has initiated rehabilitation efforts under the Oil-for-Food

program.

Crop Productivity Declines. By the mid-1990s, agricultural productivity

was becoming severely hampered by the over-exploitation of resources and the

decline of essential inputs. Continuous cropping rather than the routine cereal/fallow

rotation resulted in rapidly depleting soil fertility. In addition, government input

subsidies were gradually reduced under severe macroeconomic pressures including

budgetary shortfalls, rampant inflation, and a rapidly depreciating currency. By 1998,

government distribution of high-yielding seeds and subsidized credit had ended and

the state-run veterinary clinic had closed.

Strict price controls in an environment of both rapid inflation and a rapidly

depreciating currency resulted in declining terms of trade for agriculture. Although

the official purchase prices for most commodities were continually being raised, they

did not rise as fast as the currency (the Iraqi dinar) depreciated in international

exchange markets. This meant that the value of imported inputs such as pesticides

and farm machinery was rising faster than the value of the crop being produced. As

a result, any reliance upon imported inputs purchased at black market (unofficial)

prices meant that producer returns were being squeezed. In the end, producers were

discouraged from using the expensive imported inputs and productivity declined.

The problem was compounded by the inability to import most chemicals used for

production of fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, and spare parts for all manner of

machinery — crop dusters, tractors, irrigation pumps, etc. — that might have some

military purpose.

Livestock Output Declines. Iraq’s livestock sector experienced a sharp

decline during the first year following the 1991 Gulf War, due primarily to a nearly

complete cut off of feed grains. In 1989, over 1.2 million tons of feed grains were

imported by Iraq. Feed grain imports ceased during the first three years of sanctions,

and only restarted in a significant manner in 2000 (Table 14). In addition, domestic

supplies available for feed use declined as barley and corn production which had

previously been used as animal feed was re-designated for human consumption.

Under most circumstances, ruminants can rely partially or totally on grazing when

feed grain supplies are unavailable. However, much of the area expansion that cereal

planting experienced in Iraq during the 1991-93 period involved cultivating marginal

rangeland. The smaller amount of rangeland could not support the same number of

animals as before.

As a result of the loss of rangeland and the cut-off of feed grain imports, all of

Iraq’s livestock sectors underwent severe liquidation in 1991 (Table 4). Cattle

inventories declined 34% in 1991. Small ruminant populations fell by over 38%.

Draft animal populations — buffaloes, horses, mules and donkeys — declined by

nearly 24%. Iraq’s poultry industry, which had experienced very rapid growth the

previous three decades, nearly disappeared in the 1991 liquidation. Unlike

ruminants, commercial poultry operations depend almost totally on feed grains and

Ibid.

CRS-31

protein meals. As a result, the import cutoff of feedstuffs had the most severe impact

among the livestock species on Iraq’s poultry sector. Iraq’s poultry inventories

declined from an estimated 105 million birds in 1989 to only 3.6 million in 1991.

The 1991 liquidation of the poultry inventory represented a major setback for poultry

consumption, dropping the daily calorie per capita of poultry meat from over 55 in

the 1989 to less than 4 in 1991.

Livestock populations were further hurt by the lack of veterinary medicines to

combat routine parasites and diseases. An epidemic of screw worms broke out in

1997 that decimated cattle populations, and Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) started

to spread among livestock populations a year later.78

Middle East Drought of 1999-2001. Iraq’s failing agricultural productivity

and growing trade dependence was further aggravated by a severe drought that

persisted throughout much of the Middle East from 1999 through 2001. U.N.

personnel described the drought as the “most severe drought that has ever struck

Iraq.”79 Cereal production in Iraq’s rain-dependent northern zone was particularly

hard it, but even the irrigated production of the center-south region suffered from

diminished water availability (down to 43% of normal levels). Shortage of fodder

resulted in forced slaughter of sheep, and compounded the impact of the FMD

outbreak that had started in 1998. An estimated one million head of livestock died

due to a lack of medicines.80

As a result of the drought, Iraq’s annual cereal production per capita plummeted

from its already low 1999-level of 77 kilograms to 39 by 2000 (Table 9).81 U.N.

nutritional programs administered through the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and

the World Food Program (WFP) played a key role in sustaining vulnerable segments

of the Iraqi population, particularly infants and pregnant or lactating women during

the late 1990s.

Increasing Malnutrition Sparks International Concern

Prior to the start of food imports under the Oil-For-Food Program in 1997, a

basic food ration in south-central Iraq comprised an estimated 1,200 calories per

day.82 This amount was far short of the recommended level of 2,000 to 3,000

Ibid., p. 44.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000 Report,

June 2000, p. 8.

Ibid.

USDA, PSD database, April 2003. Note that during 1960-69 annual cereal production per

capita averaged 249 kilograms (kg). This fell to 177 kg/capita/year in the 1970s, and 130

in the 1980s, but had regained ground to 155 during the 1990-94 period.

U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Fact Sheet;

[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html]

CRS-32

calories per day for an individual.83 Families were expected to fend for themselves

in the marketplace for calorie supplements to the basic ration. However, the decline

in domestic agricultural productivity observed through the 1990s resulted in falling

food availability and rising prices, and was accompanied by reports of a rise in

malnutrition, particularly in south-central Iraq.

The extent of this problem was later confirmed when UNICEF and the

Government of Iraq, in August 1999, released the results of a survey on child

mortality — the first since 1991. The survey showed that in the Baghdad-controlled

Center-South, under-five child mortality had risen sharply from 56 deaths per 1,000

live births in the 1984-89 period, to 91.5 for 1989-94 and to 130.6 during 1994-99.84

In the Kurdish-controlled northern region, the under-five mortality showed a very

different pattern. It was much higher in 1984-89 and the rise to 90 per 1,000 in 198994 was less dramatic. More importantly, and in sharp contrast to the rest of the

country, the rate had fallen to 72 per 1,000 during 1994-99, 45% lower than the

Center-South’s mortality rate.

The Iraqi government used the results of the UNICEF report to claim that the

increased malnutrition in the Center-South was due to the international sanctions

without taking any responsibility for its own role. In contrast, the U.S. State

Department claimed that the decline in mortality rates made in northern Iraq during

the 1990s compared with the pre-Gulf War levels demonstrated how proper

implementation of the OFFP could meet humanitarian needs.85 U.S. officials also

pointed out the reluctance of the Iraqi government to implement measures to target

special assistance to vulnerable groups — a tactic advocated by U.N. agencies for

several years. However, UNICEF dismissed the idea that the difference between preGulf War and post-Gulf War child mortality rates was attributable to the differing

implementation of the OFFP. UNICEF claimed that since food imports under the

OFFP did not begin until March 1997, they would have had little influence on the

statistical mortality indicators for the 1994-99 period reported in its survey.86

U.N. Resolution 986 Initiates the Oil-For-Food Program. In response

to the mounting humanitarian crisis in Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted (and

the Iraqi government agreed to) Resolution 986 on April 14, 1995, to establish the

OFFP.87 Under the OFFP, Iraq could sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian

Individual calorie needs vary with age, sex, activity level, and a number of other factors.

World Health Organization (WHO), Energy and protein requirements, Technical report

Series 724, report of a joint FAO/WHO/UNU expert consultation, Geneva, 1985, pp. 76-78.

Graham-Brown, Sarah. “Humanitarian Needs and International Assistance in Iraq after

the Gulf War,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and

For a discussion of the targeted nutrition program in northern Iraq see the discussion

below under “Nutritional Status Improves,” or see WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-forFood, Background brief — Nutrition; [http://www.un.org/depts/oip/sector-nutrition.html]

Ibid., p. 283-4.

The Iraqi government had refused to agree to an earlier offer by the U.N. Security

(continued...)

CRS-33

goods and various mandated U.N. activities concerning Iraq. OFFP implementation

did not begin until December 1996 and the first OFFP-funded food shipments did

not arrive until March 1997. The increased food imports under OFFP, allowed the

government to gradually expand the calorie content of the food ration to an average

of 1,993 kilocalories and 43 grams of protein per person per day by mid-1999.88 By

mid-2002, the nutritional value of the monthly food basket had risen to about 2,200

calories per person per day.

Once food imports started under the OFFP, compulsory procurement of cereal

production was ended by the central government and market prices were subject to

strong competition from imports.89 As a result, domestic food prices softened. In

addition, Iraq’s currency strengthened substantially after oil exports resumed, but

remained highly variable.90 Between May 1996 and October 2002, the market-based

value of an adult food basket tracked downward from over 19,000 Iraqi Dinar (ID)

to under 7,000 ID.91 The nominal fee charged for an adult food basket also varied

over time, but was reported by the WFP to be 250 ID in June 2003.92

Food Imports Accelerate Under the OFFP. Initially humanitarian

imports under the OFFP focused on acquiring food and health-related goods. From

the arrival of the first food shipments in March 1997 through December 2002,

roughly $10.8 billion of food was imported under the OFFP.93 In the first year of the

OFFP, the value of agricultural imports jumped to $1.370 billion in 1997 from $922

million a year earlier — an increase of nearly 49% — as oil revenues generated under

the OFFP facilitated an increase in Iraq’s international purchases (Table 11). The

import volume of wheat — Iraq’s principal food import — showed an even greater

increase (over 62%) surging to nearly 2.5 million metric tons (mt) in the 1997-98

(...continued)

Council to establish a similar OFFP (Resolution 706; Aug. 15, 1991). For more information

on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the 1990s see CRS Report

RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.

U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Fact Sheet.

Kamil Mahdi (2002b), p. 338.

The official exchange rate has been fixed at U.S. $1 = 0.311 ID since 1983. However, this

official rate bears no relationship with the currency’s true value. The black market rate has

shown considerable variation over the past decade, often in relation to the U.N. sanctions

status and international petroleum prices. During 1996 the dinar rose from its lowest value

of ID3,000 per U.S. dollar to ID1,000, reportedly in anticipation of the adoption and

implementation of the OFFP. [Ahmad (2002), p.174.] In March 2003, the black market rate

was estimated to be U.S. $1 = 2,700 ID. [The Economist, Economist Intelligence Unit,

Country Report: Iraq, April 2003 Updater.]

According to Gazdar and Hussain (2002; p.49), the food basket’s market value was 19,048

ID in May 1996. The food basket’s value temporarily hit a low of 5,866 ID in June 2002

as cited in U.N., Office of the Iraq Program, “The Humanitarian Program in Iraq Pursuant

to Security Council Resolution 986 (1995),” 12 November 2002, p. 13.

WFP, Emergency Report No. 26, Iraq section, paragraph (c), June 27, 2003.

U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Humanitarian Imports, “Status of ESB

account on 31 Dec. 2002.”[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/basicfigures2.html].

CRS-34

July-June international marketing year (Table 13). The food imports were

supplemented by over $2 billion spent on improving or rehabilitating the food

distribution system, and over $2.1 billion spent on medicines and other health-related

materials.

Nutritional Status Improves. By 2000, malnutrition rates showed signs of

abating throughout the country. The prevalence of underweight children had fallen

from 23.4% in 1996 to 19.6% in 2000; chronic malnutrition (stunting) from 32% in

1996 to 30%; and acute malnutrition (low weight-for-height) from 11% to 7.8%.94

By 2002, further nutritional improvements were reported by UNICEF survey data.95

In the 15 central and southern governorates malnutrition rates for children under the

age of five were half those of 1996. The number of underweight children had fallen

to 10%; chronic malnutrition to 24%; and acute malnutrition to 5.4%. Similarly, in

the 3 northern governorates malnutrition rates for 2002 were reported down sharply

from 1996 rates: acute malnutrition was 20% lower, chronic malnutrition was 56%

lower, and acute malnutrition was 44% lower.96

Advocacy efforts by UNICEF and the WFP reportedly helped convince the

Ministry of Trade and Industry (the government agency in control of imports) to

fortify wheat flour with iron, and locally produced salt with potassium iodate, to

counter micronutrient deficiencies.97 UNICEF and the WFP attribute the nutritional

gains in the Kurdish-controlled northern governorates to combining a targeted

nutrition program with food rations under the OFFP. The targeted nutrition program,

which started in 1998, provided supplementary rations to an average of 75,000

people in the three northern governorates, including malnourished children and their

families, pregnant women and nursing mothers, hospital in-patients, residents in

social institutions, and children in nurseries. It also supplied high-energy biscuits to

350,000 primary school children in rural areas to supplement their micronutrient

needs.

OFFP Reorients Focus to Rehabilitation. After higher food import levels

had been achieved, the OFFP gradually expanded to include infrastructure

rehabilitation and development, improvements to agricultural productivity, and

projects addressing household food security. Between March 1997 and December

2002, just under half of the $24.9 billion outlay under the OFFP was for goods and

services directed at meeting rehabilitation needs other than food and medicines.

Nearly $2.2 billion was directed to a variety of activities intended to improve

agricultural productivity.

According to the WFP, improvements to infrastructure in the food and

agriculture sectors included the installation of cleaning, handling and fumigation

WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief — Nutrition.

Preliminary, unpublished findings of a 2002 U.N. survey of children under the age of

five. WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief — Food Basket;

[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/food-facts.html].

Ibid.

WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief — Nutrition.

CRS-35

equipment in grain silos to reduce storage and handling losses; the installation of

generators and the maintenance and repair of flour mills; improvements to the port

of Um Qasr to facilitate unloading of cargo; and some railway rehabilitation and

expansion. Household food security projects generally targeted female-headed

households and included distributing small ruminant livestock and beekeeping for

honey production.

According to the WFP, support for agricultural productivity under the OFFP

provided direct assistance to about 374,000 farmers during its initial phases,

including the provision of agricultural machinery, seeds, agro-chemicals, veterinary

supplies, and poultry feed. OFFP funds also supported the establishment of

reforestation nurseries in the 3 northern governorates. In addition, program funds

supported irrigation rehabilitation and development including canal cleaning, new

canal construction, and lining earth irrigation and drainage canals. OFFP funds were

used to purchase irrigation pumps, equipment for drilling wells, equipment for

operation and maintenance of irrigation projects as well as necessary spare parts.

WFP reported that these activities resulted in significant land recovery and improved

irrigation water flows.

By 2002, the decline in agricultural productivity had been reversed — probably

due mostly to improved rainfall patterns — although cereal yields remained well

below historical yields (Table 4). Iraq’s primary agricultural production zones were

still recovering from the prolonged drought of 1999-2001, and the region remained

vulnerable to recurrence of below normal rainfall. Soil moisture reserves had been

badly depleted and water flow levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their

tributaries were still inadequate for full use of Iraq’s irrigation potential. A return to

normal weather patterns in 2003 and beyond remained critical for domestic cereal

production in Iraq.

CRS-36

Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-200298

De Facto Independence. Several events occurred in 1991 that resulted in

de facto independence from the rest of the country for the three northern governorates

of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniyah (Figure 3), referred to as Kurdish-controlled

northern Iraq. Shortly after President George H. W. Bush announced a cease-fire on

February 28, 1991, ending the Gulf War ground offensive, regional uprisings against

Baghdad’s control emerged in northern and southern Iraq. These uprisings were

brutally suppressed by the central government and a major refugee crisis emerged

along the Turkish and Iranian borders. On April 5, 1991, the United Nations Security

Council adopted Resolution 688 which demanded that Iraq immediately end

repression of its civilian population.99 President Bush ordered the U.S. European

Command to assist Kurds and other refugees in the mountains of northern Iraq. On

April 10, 1991, U.S. officials warned Iraq not to interfere with relief operations.100

No Iraqi planes were to fly north of the 36th parallel, thereby establishing the

northern “no-fly” zone.

The Kurdish-controlled region’s de facto independence was further expanded

in October 1991, when peace talks between the Kurdish parties and Baghdad

collapsed, and all central government security personnel and civil servants were

withdrawn. On October 23, 1991, Baghdad imposed an economic blockade on the

Kurdish-controlled area. The shipment of food rations by the central government to

northern Iraq was cut in half and further reduced in 1992 when medicines were

included in the U.N. embargo. In July 1992, delivery of subsidized petroleum

products stopped altogether. These cut-offs made illegal trade between the Baghdadcontrolled Center-South and the Kurdish-controlled North more profitable and

substantial smuggling of goods between the two regions is reported to have

developed.

Large Humanitarian Relief Operation Directed to Northern Iraq. In

the spring of 1991, the population in the Kurdish-controlled area was estimated in

excess of 3 million, and included many displaced persons and refugees lacking both

food and shelter. The looming humanitarian crisis was worsened by the poor state

of the region’s infrastructure which had reportedly been badly damaged over the

years by Iraqi government policies, and during the Gulf War by allied bombing.

In April 1991, the U.N. signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Iraqi

government for carrying out a relief operation in Iraq as a whole. The U.N. directed

a disproportionate amount of its humanitarian effort towards the Kurdish region, in

large part to provide relief from the blockade on foodstuffs and petrol. Ultimately,

Most of the information in this section relevant to the agricultural sector of northern Iraq

(unless otherwise indicated) is from Leezenberg’s chapter “Refugee Camp or Free Trade

Zone? The Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament,

Kamil Mahdi, Editor.

Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press,

UN Security Council, Resolutions: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html]

100

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), European Command, Operation Norther Watch,

Chronology of Significant Events. [http://www.defendamerica.mil/iraq/iraq_nofly.html]

CRS-37

humanitarian aid organizations resorted to buying petrol products and foodstuffs for

the North from the Baghdad-controlled central government. The international relief

effort directed towards northern Iraq that evolved over the following years would

eventually assume such a scale that it suppressed agricultural incentives in the region.

As part of the central government’s economic blockade on northern Iraq, assets

of the regional branches of all Iraqi banks were frozen, thereby paralyzing the entire

banking system in the North. What little formal banking services that existed were

largely taken over by foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the local

black market became the main locus for monetary transactions. Foreign aid agencies

and expatriate Kurds sent substantial flows of money through this informal NGO

banking system. The limited banking system inhibited agricultural investment flows.

The two main Kurdish factions — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and

the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — initially attempted to coordinate their

efforts at governing the region, but this devolved into internecine fights by May 1994.

In 1996, the two factions had established separate governments in the areas under

their control. The regional governments had very restricted budgets and lacked

trained personnel. The resulting state of affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan was a market

economy essentially left alone by a very weak governing structure, but heavily

influenced by substantial international humanitarian aid flows.

Free Market Agriculture? The agricultural policy environment in Kurdishcontrolled northern Iraq was very different from policy in the regions under the

control of the central government. Agricultural production was primarily in response

to market signals, and farmers were not obliged to sell their crops to government

authorities. There was no government intervention in cereal and oilseed production

and no provision of subsidized agricultural inputs by the government.

Prior to the startup of food imports under the OFFP, shortages of foodstuffs and

agricultural inputs existed in northern Iraq as in the rest of the country. However,

observed market prices for most goods were lower in the North suggesting that the

large influx of food aid was meeting a substantial portion of local demand, and that

some trade was probably occurring with outside regions through Turkey and Iran.

Trade in agricultural products within the northern zone was generally free and

substantial trade is reported to have occurred with the Baghdad-controlled southcentral region. Both sides gained from this trade as cheap oil was exported by the

central government in order to import northern wheat at half of international prices.101

In addition, the authorities in the North used the trade as a revenue source by

imposing certain local taxes on wheat exported out of the region.

The bulk of the reconstruction efforts by foreign NGOs working in the North

was directed towards rural villages and the agricultural sector. However, significant

problems existed in the agricultural production zones of northern Iraq. Due to high

petrol costs and the absence of adequate transportation infrastructure, it was often

unprofitable to bring locally-grown goods to the local markets. In addition, lack of

both infrastructure and security prevented agricultural laborers from returning to

101

Ahmad (2002), p. 187.

CRS-38

isolated rural areas to resume farming. Only 43% of arable land was reportedly under

cultivation in northern Iraq in 1992, whereas the total cultivated area of Iraq as a

whole had expanded sharply in that year.102

Land conflicts also emerged as a major impediment to increased agricultural

production. As refugees and formerly deported peasants returned to an

“independent” northern Iraq, many farmers found that their villages and land had

been seized by neighboring tribes or local landowners that had remained loyal to the

central government. In most cases the landowners, many with tribal backing,

emerged victorious. In addition, the prevalence of large-scale mechanized

commercial farming in the North strengthened the position of the landowning elite.

The regional government was too weak to implement a new land-redistribution law.

Instead, rival Kurdish parties sought alliances with the influential landowners,

thereby giving the landowners opportunities to assert greater control over their land

holdings.

Despite de facto independence from the central government, the Kurdishcontrolled region’s food production and supply remained strongly influenced by

conditions in the Center-South, particularly U.N. sanctions and the cut-off of oil

revenues and critical imports.

Agricultural productivity in northern Iraq suffered from lack of pesticides and

fertilizers under the economic blockade by the central government. The lack of

petrol forced many villagers to search more widely for firewood, thereby accelerating

an already acute deforestation problem with all of its negative implications for

erosion, soil fertility and local watersheds. A localized drought struck northern Iraq

in 1996 and 1997 badly affecting the harvests.

The Oil-for-Food Program in the North. With the implementation of the

OFFP, the central government once again regained a considerable degree of its

former economic influence over northern Iraq. Although the physical distribution of

food rations within Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq was handled entirely by U.N.

workers, the principal storage points were in Baghdad-controlled territory. From the

OFFP inception until February 21, 2003, about $4 billion of civilian goods were

delivered into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq compared with goods worth $24.4

billion delivered to the rest of Iraq.103 In addition, about $600 million in locally

produced goods and contracts were acquired in the North during that period.104

According to a report from the U.N. Secretary General to the U.N. Security

Council, dated November 12, 2002, no food shortages were reported in any of the 3

Kurdish governorates. This is consistent with press reports and observed market

price behavior, all of which suggest that food had become relatively abundant in

Kurdish-controlled regions, to the detriment of local agricultural production. Thus,

while the OFFP is view by international aid workers as having considerably relieved

102

Leezenberg (2002), p., 303.

103

CRS Report RL30472, p. 3.

104

Ibid., p. 5.

CRS-39

suffering in the Kurdish-controlled North, it was little short of a disaster for the

agricultural sector.105 Producers from northern Iraq were often left to smuggle their

harvest into Iran in an attempt at obtaining higher prices.

In the aftermath of the spring 1991 uprising, an increasing number of reports

emerged of predatory acts against infrastructure materials and other state-related

resources, and against the civilian population.106 These predatory acts appeared to

intensify following the security breakdown that occurred in 1994 when the two

principal Kurdish factions engaged in armed combat. Favorite items for predation

included electricity cables, agricultural and irrigation machinery, and cars. Some

groups closely following events in Kurdish Iraq expressed fears that the “predatory”

economy would become institutionalized by small groups of individuals, backed by

force of arms, while the bulk of the population remained poor, weak, and dependent

on external support.

105

Leezenberg (2002), p. 314.

106

Ibid., p. 311.

CRS-40

Outlook and Issues for Iraq’s Agricultural Production

and Trade

Growing Importance of Food Imports. Food imports under the OFFP

made Iraq’s trade dependence nearly complete for many basic foodstuffs. According

to the WFP, by early 2003 nearly 60 percent of Iraq’s population was totally

dependent on food rations sustained in large part by OFFP imports. For cereals, the

major staple, nearly 80% of all consumption during the 2000-02 period came from

imported grain (Table 9).

Furthermore, the country’s long-run food deficit still confronts the perennial

problem of a population growth rate that has continued to exceed growth in

agricultural productivity. Iraq’s population growth rate has showed some signs of

slowing107 — it grew at an annual rate of about 2.3% from 1995 to 2000, down

dramatically from the pre-1990 rate of 3.3% (Table 1), but domestic cereal

production actually declined during the 1990s.

Despite its recent poor performance, Iraq’s agricultural production potential has

likely been clouded by several factors that occurred in the period leading up to the

Iraq War of 2003. Together these factors have tended to understate Iraq’s

agricultural potential.

107

First, Iraq was only beginning to emerge from a three-year drought

that devastated agricultural production in much of the Middle East

during 1999-2001.

Second, a growing dependence since early 1997 on the U.N. OFFP

for basic foodstuffs exaggerated Iraq’s dependence on food imports

and understated its ability to feed itself.

Third, the low agricultural productivity of the previous two decades

was exacerbated by the central government’s focusing of resources

and productive capacity on its military sector. Agricultural

productivity suffered from limited investment and resources,

shortages of inputs, deteriorating irrigation infrastructure, and

increasing soil salinity.

Fourth, for most of the previous 30 years, production and investment

decisions in Iraq’s agricultural sector were subject to a maze of often

contradictory policy signals (including explicit input subsidies and

implicit output taxes) that likely resulted in significantly less than

optimal cropping patterns and levels of investment.

Fifth, serious land ownership and water rights issues contributed to

the degradation of Iraq’s agricultural resource base. Widespread

control of land and water based on cronyism and tribal connections

are reported to have encouraged over-exploitation of land and water

World Bank, WDI 2003.

CRS-41

resources for short-run profits, rather than encouraging investments

in the long-run productivity of the soil and its supporting irrigation

network.108

Problems Remain for Agricultural Productivity in Iraq. In the post2003-Iraq-War environment, national issues such as political stability and internal

security will likely have to be addressed, before sector-specific problems can be

tackled in a systematic manner. The agricultural sector confronts enormous

challenges to investment and growth. Settlement of unresolved land and water rights

issues, renovation of Iraq’s irrigation infrastructure, development of a coordinated

national program of de-salinization, as well as the rebuilding of infrastructure for

handling, storing, and distributing agricultural inputs and outputs will all likely be

needed to fully restore producer and investor confidence in market processes.

The status of Iraq’s national agricultural research and extension program is

uncertain, but has likely become dysfunctional due to lack of government support and

the cut-off from international technology under the U.N. sanctions. Re-establishment

of a national capacity for providing agricultural research, extension, and veterinary

services will be important for improving long-term agricultural productivity for both

crops and livestock. In the past, such extension and veterinary networks served as

the principal conduit for information on improved crop and animal husbandry

practices, as well as for distributing crop and livestock inputs such as improved seeds

and veterinary medicines.

Full integration into the international agricultural research network of the

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and possibly

collaborative research with USDA and/or other institutions could foster gains in

productivity through access to improved seed and production technology. Modern

agricultural research has much to offer Iraq’s agricultural sector — for example,

improved plant genetics; selective breeding to local conditions; and identification of

improved production practices. In addition, if acceptable to the Iraqi populace,

modern agricultural biotechnology might bring additional benefits including reduced

use of agricultural inputs, often higher yields, and the addition of specific nutrients.

Trade Dependence Likely to Continue. Such developments would likely

result in a significant improvement in Iraq’s agricultural productivity. However,

Iraq’s large population relative to its arable land base ensures that agricultural

imports will remain a vital component of the country’s ability to meet all of its food

needs for the foreseeable future. Iraq’s historical trade and food consumption

patterns suggest that food grains such as wheat and rice, as well as vegetable oil,

sugar, meat, dairy products, and feedstuffs including corn, barley, and protein meals,

are all likely to be important imports into Iraq (Table 11).

In the near term, while political and economic structures are being rebuilt, Iraq’s

trade pattern will likely depend on foreign assistance and food aid programs. Imports

108

Kamil Mahdi, “Iraq’s Agrarian System: Issues of Policy and Performance,” Chapter 9

from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies

CRS-42

during this recovery phase are likely to continue to focus on cereals, sugar, and

vegetable oils as they did during the decade of the 1990s under international

sanctions. However, due to existing circumstances, U.S. agricultural exports will

likely play a more important role in this first phase than they did during the 1990s.

For example, since the 1991 Gulf War, Australia has dominated Iraq’s wheat

trade accounting for 67% of all wheat imported by Iraq (Table 13). When OFFPfunded food imports first began in 1997, the United States captured the largest share

of the increase in wheat imports during the first year (754,000 metric tons).109

However, this proved temporary as U.S. wheat shipments to Iraq declined to 262,000

mt in 1998, before falling to zero during 1999-2002. Australia, Canada, and

Argentina captured the market share lost by the United States. Spokespersons from

the U.S. wheat industry have announced their intentions to regain this market share.

Also, international aid agencies and U.S. and Australian officials have noted

their intentions to rebuild Iraq’s poultry industry. Poultry production in Iraq had

nearly shut down during the 1990s for lack of feed imports. During the 1980s when

Iraq’s poultry sector was booming, the United States was the principal supplier of

coarse grains (principally corn) to Iraq (Table 14). Iraqi coarse grain imports will

likely resume step-for-step with growth in its poultry sector.

In the longer term, after Iraq’s economy has regained its viability and vibrancy,

market forces and international competition will likely be the driving forces behind

Iraq’s agricultural trade patterns.

109

During calendar 1997.

CRS-43

References and Data Sources

Ahmad, Mahmood. “Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq: Short- and

Medium-term Options,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.

pp. 169-199.

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, “Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social

Foundations of Iraqi Etatisme,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi,

CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and

Illicit Trade, by (name redacted), May 19, 2003.

CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and

Reconstruction Assistance, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), May 9, 2003.

Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, online country factsheet,

[http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq].

Europa Publications. “Iraq: Agriculture and Food,” from The Middle East and North

Africa 2003, 49th edition, London, pp 474-477.

Graham-Brown, Sarah. “Humanitarian Needs and International Assistance in Iraq

after the Gulf War,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.

pp. 267-288.

Leezenberg, Michiel. “Refugee Camp or Free Trade Zone? The Economy of Iraqi

Kurdistan since 1991,” from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.

pp. 289-319.

Mahdi, Kamil, Editor. Iraq’s Economic Predicament. Exeter Arab and Islamic

Mahdi, Kamil. “Iraq’s Agrarian System: Issues of Policy and Performance,” Chapter

9 from Iraq’s Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and

Mahdi, Kamil. State and Agriculture in Iraq. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies

Mahdi, Kamil. “Rehabilitation Prospects for the Iraqi Economy,” CASI internet

version of November 1999. Originally published in The International Spectator,

Vol. 33, July-September 1998, pp.41-46. [http://www.casi.org.uk/info/mahdi98.html]

Springborg, Robert. “Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in

Contemporary Iraq,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 3352.

CRS-44

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for

Iraq, 2000. [http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/malnutrition/index.htm]

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000

Report, June 2000.

United Nations (U.N.), Food And Agriculture Organization (FAO), AQUASTAT

— FAO’s Information System on Water and Agriculture, “Country Profile: Iraq,”

Food and Water Development Division, 1997 version.

[http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/main/index.stm]

U.N., Office of the Iraq Program, “The Humanitarian Program in Iraq Pursuant to

Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), 12 November 2002.

U.N., Office of the Iraq Program — Oil for Food. [http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/]

U.N., World Food Program (WFP), online Iraq factsheets ,

[http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/index.asp?country=368]

U.N., WFP, Emergency Report No. 26, Iraq section, paragraph (c), June 27, 2003.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “Iraq,” The World Factbook 2002, online:

[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/].

USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Production Estimates and Crop

Assessment Division (PECAD). “Iraq Crop Production.” January 16, 2003.

[http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad/highlights/2003/01/iraq_update/index.htm]

U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq’s Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export

Programs, NSIAD-91-76, November 1990, [http://161.203.16.4/d22t8/142766.pdf]

World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003; online access.

CRS-45

Table 3. Iraq Field Crop Area, by Major Crop, 1981-2002

Total

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Period averages

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-993

2000-02

2,656

2,773

2,878

1,526

3,667

3,470

2,593

3,075

2,322

4,002

3,912

4,630

5,370

4,351

3,966

4,134

3,546

3,592

3,494

2,889

3,468

3,464

2,562

2,364

2,507

3,025

4,453

3,746

3,274

Cereals

2,257

2,356

2,479

1,083

2,977

2,777

1,938

2,462

1,625

3,256

3,343

3,920

4,588

3,570

3,168

3,336

2,766

2,809

2,716

2,137

2,712

2,707

2,268

2,008

2,093

2,356

3,735

2,959

2,519

Crop area

OilVegecrops

Pulses

Other

Fruit2

tables1

1,000 hectares

249

272

259

285

335

240

312

262

300

246

273

240

310

261

313

261

108

208

254

260

277

107

288

302

104

277

321

281

329

273

335

100

280

315

288

307

288

307

284

309

284

309

284

309

166

200

262

306

269

282

284

250

283

319

309

1. Includes melons. 2. Excludes melons. 3. Imports under the Oil-for-Food program began in March 1997.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

Cereals

Share of crop area

VegeOiltables1

crops

Fruit2

Percent

Pulses

CRS-46

Table 4. Iraq Cereal Area, Production, and Yields, by Type, 1981-2003

Total1

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2,265

2,357

2,483

1,112

2,982

2,784

1,943

2,467

1,629

3,280

3,307

3,944

4,579

3,567

3,189

3,339

2,790

2,799

2,719

2,569

2,579

3,269

3,274

Area harvested

wheat

barley

rice

corn

1,000 hectares

1,193

984

1,160

1,110

1,191

1,217

493

550

1,540

1,357

1,240

1,456

859

972

1,041

1,314

587

913

1,200

1,920

1,800

1,300

110

1,700

2,010

130

2,000

2,315

110

145

1,800

1,535

163

1,550

1,390

175

1,500

1,650

120

1,400

1,200

121

1,400

1,200

130

1,300

1,220

130

1,200

100

1,220

1,200

100

1,800

1,300

110

1,800

1,300

115

Total1

1,989

2,019

1,790

1,068

2,888

2,240

1,668

2,546

1,425

3,384

2,677

2,899

3,186

2,714

2,449

2,914

2,192

2,844

1,744

904

1,344

2,969

3,319

Production

wheat

barley

rice

corn

1,000 metric tons

902

925

108

965

902

109

841

836

471

482

1,406

1,331

1,036

1,046

722

743

131

929

1,437

491

663

155

105

1,200

1,850

153

170

1,500

800

126

240

1,000

1,510

120

260

1,200

1,560

137

280

1,350

970

255

130

1,250

890

210

1,300

180

125

1,100

800

163

120

1,300

1,200

200

135

800

700

120

115

450

350

650

550

1,800

1,000

100

2,000

1,150

100

Total1

0.88

0.86

0.72

0.96

0.97

0.80

0.86

1.03

0.87

1.03

0.81

0.74

0.70

0.76

0.77

0.87

0.79

1.02

0.64

0.35

0.52

0.91

1.01

Yield

wheat

barley

rice

corn

metric tons per hectare

0.76

0.94

1.96

2.17

0.83

0.81

1.82

2.33

0.71

0.69

1.51

1.87

0.96

0.88

1.87

1.63

0.91

0.98

1.87

1.95

0.84

0.72

1.88

1.96

0.84

0.76

1.87

1.97

0.89

1.09

1.84

1.50

0.84

0.73

2.12

2.33

1.00

0.96

1.94

2.43

0.83

0.62

1.47

2.18

0.59

0.75

1.26

2.00

0.60

0.67

1.25

1.93

0.75

0.63

1.56

2.17

0.81

0.64

1.20

1.38

0.87

0.79

1.50

2.08

0.79

0.67

1.35

2.00

0.93

1.00

1.54

2.25

0.62

0.57

0.92

1.92

0.38

0.29

0.40

0.92

0.53

0.46

0.85

1.00

0.77

0.91

1.20

1.11

0.88

0.87

1.20

Period averages

1,000 hectares

1,000 metric tons

metric tons per hectare

1960-69

2,303

1,400

800

2,000

1,009

845

132

0.87

0.72

1.05

1.42

1970-79

2,094

1,400

604

1,884

1,143

580

116

0.89

0.80

0.96

1.78

1980-84

2,097

1,082

932

1,721

831

744

0.84

0.79

0.81

1.84

1985-89

2,361

1,053

1,202

2,153

917

1,044

115

0.91

0.86

1.92

1990-94

3,735

1,700

1,816

107

103

2,972

1,250

1,338

158

216

0.81

0.75

0.73

1.49

1995-992

2,967

1,430

1,332

135

2,429

1,150

978

175

117

0.82

0.80

0.73

1.30

2000-03

2,923

1,505

1,250

106

2,134

1,225

763

0.70

0.76

0.60

0.76

1. Total includes small quantities of miscellaneous other grains. 2. Imports under the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program began in March 1997.

Source: USDA, PSD data base, April 2004.

0.92

1.89

2.10

1.94

2.14

1.93

1.08

CRS-47

Table 5. Iraq Livestock Populations and Egg Production,

1970-20021

Large Ruminants

Other

Total Cattle Equine

Small Ruminants

Total Sheep Goats

3,104 1,830

3,095 1,860

3,068 1,880

3,065 1,900

3,130 2,048

2,823 1,850

2,646 1,804

2,622 1,804

2,496 1,698

2,468 1,698

2,437 1,702

2,453 1,670

2,462 1,675

2,473 1,685

2,441 1,698

2,345 1,635

2,264 1,578

2,270 1,580

2,302 1,600

2,306 1,578

2,259 1,520

1,534 1,000

1,794 1,260

2,019 1,480

1,890 1,354

1,720 1,190

1,530 1,050

1,808 1,300

1,837 1,320

1,829 1,325

1,861 1,350

720

718

715

708

647

556

543

538

531

495

533

503

500

503

505

511

526

530

410

419

423

442

454

425

439

446

432

438

288

270

250

240

184

161

146

160

170

175

174

175

170

155

141

140

141

145

150

110

105

108

1,000 head

15,400 13,099 2,301

14,305 11,955 2,350

13,210 10,810 2,400

12,170 9,670 2,500

11,110 8,526 2,584

11,255 8,470 2,785

11,390 8,401 2,989

11,820 9,500 2,320

11,782 9,723 2,059

11,835 9,775 2,060

13,080 11,000 2,080

13,700 11,750 1,950

12,545 10,865 1,680

12,291 10,491 1,800

11,333 9,723 1,610

10,050 8,500 1,550

10,457 8,981 1,475

10,500 9,000 1,500

10,550 9,000 1,550

10,457 8,981 1,476

11,150 9,600 1,550

6,870 5,800 1,070

8,775 7,525 1,250

11,050 9,500 1,550

9,825 8,400 1,425

8,850 7,400 1,450

6,405 5,300 1,105

8,050 6,584 1,466

8,200 6,700 1,500

8,300 6,750 1,550

8,380 6,780 1,600

Period Averages

1960-69 2,786 1,567

1970-79 2,852 1,837

1980-84 2,453 1,686

1985-89 2,297 1,594

1990-94 1,869 1,301

1995-99 1,751 1,249

2000-02 1,861 1,350

762

640

519

509

445

439

438

246

204

173

144

112

13,337 11,171 2,166

12,428 9,993 2,435

12,590 10,766 1,824

10,403 8,892 1,510

9,534 8,165 1,369

7,961 6,547 1,414

8,380 6,780 1,600

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Poultry

Chicke

Eggs

mt4

11,861 14,500

12,400 15,000

13,000 15,600

13,900 15,750

14,700 15,800

15,404 15,900

15,500 22,500

15,395 35,450

20,500 53,380

22,000 50,175

27,000 47,850

30,000 47,060

70,000 47,810

50,000 41,164

55,000 41,472

65,000 61,440

70,000 81,800

75,000 74,100

76,000 63,700

105,000 91,850

80,000 81,550

3,600 18,100

11,000 19,750

10,500 25,150

15,500 26,250

16,800 20,800

17,300 21,850

15,500 12,500

13,000 1,131

22,000 9,450

23,000 14,000

5,954

15,466

46,400

78,200

24,120

16,920

23,000

12,000

25,406

45,071

74,578

34,160

13,146

14,000

Livestock populations are inventory averages for the period. Includes donkeys, horses and mules.

Includes buffalo and camels. 4mt = metric tons.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-48

Table 6. Iraq’s Date Production and Export Data, 1970-2002

Exports

Area

Harvested Yield Production

mt/ha

Quantity

Share of

Value Production

1,000

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

105

122

108

103

120

124

116

136

165

168

176

156

144

145

150

3.7

3.6

3.0

3.4

4.1

4.4

4.9

3.9

4.5

4.1

5.2

4.5

4.0

4.4

3.0

4.0

4.3

300

450

310

385

360

496

372

578

389

519

597

370

374

345

251

390

434

324

356

488

545

566

448

613

676

881

797

625

630

438

600

650

350

279

314

336

242

254

286

203

170

207

228

122

120

110

111

157

120

248

190

100

116.8

62.1

101.4

87.2

67.3

51.3

76.8

35.1

43.7

39.9

38.2

33.0

32.1

25.8

9.7

28.2

25.6

48.5

33.7

50.8

34.9

3.5

4.9

1.6

4.4

4.5

6.3

14.4

15.9

6.8

5.0

4.6

Period averages

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-99

2000-02

112

137

155

150

3.6

4.5

4.0

4.2

348

416

388

399

621

623

633

270

264

117

149

80.4

68.2

27.7

37.4

9.0

10.8

4.7

‘na=not available; ha=hectares; mt=metric tons.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-49

Table 7. Iraq Fertilizer Production and Use, by Selected Period

Total

Nitrogenous

Phosphate

Potash

Production, 1,000 metric tons

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

397.4

771.0

870.9

449.0

125.0

210.0

308.0

325.0

328.0

81.4

364.0

539.4

242.0

95.0

130.0

218.0

235.0

238.0

316.0

407.0

331.5

207.0

30.0

80.0

90.0

Production, 1,000 metric tons

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-95

1996-99

2000

83.2

164.3

557.9

284.7

325.8

328.0

83.2

126.7

226.6

186.8

235.8

238.0

92.4

331.3

97.8

90.0

Consumption, 1,000 metric tons

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-95

1996-99

2000

6.1

41.4

90.3

209.5

269.6

370.7

371.3

4.3

31.1

64.9

140.6

174.0

247.3

250.6

1.6

9.2

23.0

65.6

92.5

120.1

117.2

0.2

1.2

2.3

3.3

4.6

3.3

3.5

Net Exports, 1,000 metric tons

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-95

1996-99

2000

-6.2

27.7

45.3

247.5

13.5

-44.9

-43.3

-4.4

38.5

9.4

67.3

11.6

-11.5

-12.6

-9.6

26.3

185.2

5.2

-30.1

-27.2

-0.2

-1.1

-4.4

-5.0

-3.4

-3.3

-3.5

na = not available.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-50

Table 8. Iraq Food Calorie Availability per Capita per Day,

1975-2000

Total

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2,333

2,360

2,435

2,607

2,735

2,820

2,970

3,086

3,156

3,299

3,401

3,493

3,513

3,500

3,496

3,295

2,387

2,289

2,316

2,274

2,234

2,191

2,099

2,073

2,173

2,197

Cereals

1,368

1,380

1,401

1,511

1,628

1,713

1,757

1,840

1,900

1,958

2,024

2,082

2,124

2,129

2,113

2,088

1,684

1,484

1,377

1,276

1,218

1,188

1,185

1,244

1,426

1,499

VegVeg.

Roots &

Sugar1 etables Fruits Oils Pulses Tubers2 Meat Other

Calories per capita per day

354

350

358

351

343

328

335

330

326

331

337

380

372

345

351

258

167

175

182

189

140

120

162

130

109

105

100

107

120

108

101

100

106

115

130

141

125

101

114

117

115

129

132

127

118

120

116

126

144

136

137

124

125

122

108

139

142

168

210

240

246

304

320

339

370

400

422

436

438

450

392

137

215

327

421

510

515

390

345

320

308

110

119

133

139

135

133

126

107

163

172

170

167

191

189

185

176

193

179

168

158

169

160

155

Calories per capita per day, period average

1960-69

2,109

1,229

228

1970-79

2,378

1,398

341

1980-84

3,066

1,834

330

1985-89

3,481

2,094

357

105

1990-94

2,512

1,582

194

1995-99

2,154

1,252

132

2000

2,197

1,499

105

115

123

134

120

130

158

316

429

298

416

308

119

132

175

170

186

167

102

Calorie shares by food group, period average

1960-69

100

1970-79

100

1980-84

100

1985-89

100

1990-94

100

1995-99

100

2000

100

Includes other sweeteners. Dry equivalent.

Source: United Nations (U.N.), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), FAOSTATS.

CRS-51

Table 9. Iraq Population and per Capita Calorie Production,

Consumption, and Imports of Cereals, 1970-2002

Population

million

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

9.356

9.665

9.985

10.317

10.662

11.020

11.391

11.777

12.175

12.585

13.007

13.440

13.882

14.338

14.815

15.317

15.840

16.382

16.938

17.505

18.078

18.643

19.197

19.739

20.267

20.779

21.313

21.847

22.328

22.797

23.264

23.750

24.247

Cereals

Production

Imports Consumption

kilograms per capita

219.3

153.8

381.7

150.4

181.8

121.9

181.3

117.0

141.5

118.6

133.5

148.0

145.4

124.8

72.1

188.5

141.4

101.8

150.3

81.4

187.2

143.6

151.0

161.4

133.9

117.9

136.7

100.3

127.4

76.5

38.9

56.6

66.8

27.1

56.0

2.9

77.1

100.8

70.4

108.4

156.5

140.1

246.6

158.8

178.1

180.5

291.0

290.6

154.9

242.8

289.8

265.2

287.9

27.2

154.5

55.6

41.2

39.0

36.1

88.4

152.7

125.7

172.1

197.5

181.1

171.2

245.2

209.7

295.2

256.4

259.1

224.5

269.4

264.0

280.3

336.7

332.6

334.2

315.3

406.6

364.0

317.9

389.6

397.0

411.5

378.8

225.4

299.3

189.6

201.7

189.2

154.4

213.4

253.1

250.9

240.1

244.8

220.4

231.7

Period averages

1960-69

8.010

249.0

20.6

257.2

1970-79

10.893

176.7

98.6

264.1

1980-84

13.896

124.8

219.8

350.5

1985-89

16.396

132.7

248.1

379.0

1990-94

19.185

155.4

63.5

221.0

1995-99

21.813

111.8

115.0

222.4

2000-02

23.754

54.1

183.2

232.3

Source: Population data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database,

2003. Production, consumption, and import data are from USDA’s PSD database, April 10,

2003.

CRS-52

Table 10. Iraq Calories from Meat by Type and Share, 1970-2000

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Calories from meat

Meat calorie shares

Mutton

Total Bovine & Goat Poultry Other

Mutton

Total Bovine & Goat Poultry Other

— Calories per capita per day —

—— percent——

110

119

133

139

135

133

126

107

100

Period averages

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

119

1985-89

132

1990-94

1995-99

2000

100

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-53

Table 11. Iraq Agricultural Imports, Selected Periods

($ millions)

Total

Ag.

Bovine Poultry Veg.

Imports Cereals Sugar1 Meat Meat Oils

Value

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Coffee

Fruit & Tea

ToDairy Veg. Cocoa bacco Other2

$1,000,000

777

592

808

1,019

1,470

2,030

2,107

2,174

1,932

2,708

2,093

1,663

1,7196

2,720

2,524

1,852

824

1,182

991

764

1,065

922

1,370

1,388

1,317

1,818

1,596

Period averages

1960-69

1970-79

606

1980-84

2,190

1985-89

2,144

1990-94

1,113

1995-99

1,249

2000-01

1,707

221 250.6

234

124

278

137

432

115

605

158

816

367

693

214

672

234

786

994

143

629

116

568

145

563

170

899

223

1,003

284

619

204

302

437

196

349

109

205

246

227

111

634

150

682

100

668

100

1,177

115

980

119

5.3

206

146

150

252

105

114

327

241

127

169

268

200

129

110

221

792

732

382

491

1,078

121

208

175

119

211

188

136

111

117

110

129

116

167

135

104

130

164

149

145

106

115

267

143

209

138

184

183

187

130

158

213

188

180

277

268

199

177

286

162

174

119

161

171

153

142

130

125

122

138

116

185

106

153

133

115

152

172

252

238

194

429

284

205

226

429

304

197

103

178

147

186

310

287

264

290

211

175

128

$1,000,000

111 203

136 219

188

185

149

126

257

290

162

272

151

Percent

1960-69

100

1970-79

100

1980-84

100

1985-89

100

1990-94

100

1995-99

100

2000-01

100

na = not available. 1Raw equivalents. 2Includes eggs, pulses, beverages, and various other.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-54

Table 12. Iraq Food Imports as Share of Domestic Consumption,

Selected Commodities, 1970-2000

Cereals

Sugar2

Vegetable

Oils

Beef

Poultry

1.5

0.7

0.2

3.1

7.6

8.2

4.1

5.4

21.6

26.8

28.5

45.6

112.8

58.9

65.4

108.4

44.6

38.5

90.2

67.5

38.5

34.8

41.4

26.0

9.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.8

3.2

3.6

0.7

2.6

41.2

16.6

40.0

35.7

75.7

85.6

120.5

78.4

46.6

49.3

32.7

24.7

28.2

9.8

1.9

3.2

2.6

22.3

54.8

4.9

7.5

5.2

6.0

7.0

4.1

4.0

196.4

148.2

153.0

146.9

120.7

193.4

55.8

130.1

120.9

118.4

56.0

126.9

107.5

82.8

102.5

84.8

100.8

101.6

97.9

89.7

85.5

42.3

85.7

71.7

54.5

78.7

43.6

74.0

57.6

71.9

73.2

1.1

7.9

62.2

69.9

29.9

0.1

0.0

22.0

76.1

19.5

17.5

6.0

4.0

87.2

138.4

95.1

95.0

68.0

65.2

73.2

Percent 1

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

4.5

52.5

3.8

7.3

35.4

30.5

30.6

37.7

49.8

65.6

70.5

57.0

60.8

69.6

88.1

58.6

55.6

64.9

72.4

77.8

47.3

34.7

48.6

35.9

26.5

30.0

23.7

69.5

71.9

57.0

94.1

1960-69

1970-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-99

2000

8.9

31.8

69.2

65.8

38.6

50.4

94.1

77.9

92.5

64.0

135.3

112.8

82.5

81.5

112.2

99.4

117.5

150.2

92.9

127.7

82.4

111.4

114.1

102.9

110.7

111.5

118.5

106.3

59.9

176.1

93.7

70.7

79.8

97.9

102.1

123.6

179.1

177.9

Period averages

113.7

97.6

112.9

111.5

101.3

116.5

177.9

Import share in excess of 100 percent implies re-exports. 2 Raw equivalent.

Source: Calculated using data from U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.

CRS-55

Table 13. Iraq Wheat and Wheat Flour Imports by Source,

1981-2003

Total Australia

United

States

Canada

Turkey

Argentina

Other

1,000 metric tons

Volume

CY1981

CY1982

CY1983

CY1984

CY1985

CY1986

CY1987

CY1988

CY1989

CY1990

CY1991

CY1992

CY1993

CY1994

CY1995

CY1996

CY1997

CY1998

CY1999

CY2000

1,844

2,006

3,308

2,686

1,648

2,562

2,860

3,265

3,189

180

1,512

106

477

691

467

1,540

2,498

1,752

2,729

3,253

751

444

832

1,243

765

1,034

970

1,427

1,388

989

105

215

226

832

1,275

1,179

2,265

2,589

762

1,167

852

397

798

919

790

948

770

262

230

310

632

367

364

691

823

784

843

262

310

483

256

150

340

319

236

314

414

253

277

105

209

167

319

276

440

676

224

122

100

264

MY2000/011

MY2001/021

MY2002/031,2,3

MY2003/041,3

3,300

2,700

1,700

2,200

2,417

2,245

752

740

192

155

333

347

110

395

108

867

1,158

Period average:

1981-89

1990-2000

1997-2000

2000/01-2003/04

2,596

1,382

2,557

2,457

984

892

1,827

1,539

745

258

560

144

153

105

200

198

234

632

Percent

1980-89

100

1990-2000

100

1997-2000

100

2000/01-2003/04

100

Note: wheat flour is in wheat equivalents.

1. The Total is estimated from USDA PSD data for the July-June international marketing year; April

2004. Individual country allocations are from new storites & the International Grains Council.

2. U.S. wheat exports to Iraq in 2002/03 are donations from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust

($39.4 million).

3. Breakout by exporter is incomplete. The “Other” category includes all unknown sources.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT for calendar years (CY) 1980-2000; USDA PSD data is for marketing

years (MY) 2000/01-2003/04.

CRS-56

Table 14. Iraq Coarse Grain Imports by Source, 1981-2003

United

States Canada

Total

Turkey Russia Ukraine Other

1,000 metric tons

Volume

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

219

588

791

497

823

648

1,248

381

573

492

688

588

862

206

135

351

Period average:

1981-89

1990-1999

1997-2001

2000/01-2003/04

544

415

1980-89

1990-1999

1997-2001

2000/01-2003/04

100

111

338

161

104

Percent

1. The Total is estimated from USDA PSD data for the July-June international marketing year; April

2004. Individual country allocations are from new storites & the International Grains Council.

2. Breakout by exporter is incomplete. The “Other” category includes all unknown sources.

Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT for calendar years (CY) 1980-2000; USDA PSD data is for marketing

years (MY) 2000/01-2003/04.

CRS-57

Table 15. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Iraq, 1984-2001

Total

Agriculture

Total grains

& feeds

Wheat

Flour

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2,236

1,285

1,539

2,168

2,364

2,362

1,133

372

595

1,120

532

711

910

895

1,011

335

372

595

117

130

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

535

326

360

532

808

749

329

466

272

245

294

488

497

236

171

112

170

Rice

Barley

Corn

Quantity, 1,000 metric tons

448

339

407

240

373

323

509

542

513

153

617

392

187

565

222

104

413

Value, $1,000,000

182

149

102

119

199

133

Feed &

fodder

Pulses

Cotton

Veg.

Oil

Sugar

Soybean

Meal

156

122

180

204

103

142

163

272

320

CRS-58

Total

Total grains

Feed &

Agriculture

& feeds

Wheat

Flour

Rice

Barley

Corn

fodder

Pulses

Cotton

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

na = not available. Source: USDA, ERS, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS), various calendar year summaries.

Veg.

Oil

Sugar

Soybean

Meal

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