File-Sharing Software and Copyright Infringement: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

Congressional research reportJul 18, 2005

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File-Sharing Software and

Copyright Infringement:

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

v. Grokster, Ltd.

Updated July 18, 2005

-name redactedLaw Clerk

American Law Division

-name redactedLegislative Attorney

American Law Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

File-Sharing Software and Copyright Infringement:

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

Summary

In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals decision considered allegations of contributory and vicarious copyright

infringement by companies which distribute peer-to-peer file-sharing software. The

software facilitates direct copyright infringement by its users. It was the first

decision to reject infringement claims against and find in favor of companies

distributing the software. Other digital media file-sharing software decisions found

in favor of the copyright holders, most notably A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.

and In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation. But in Grokster, the court granted summary

judgment for the software companies. The court thus became the first to accept the

“substantial, noninfringing uses” defense to copyright infringement liability, a

defense developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with use of VCRs in

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,

finding that it had misapplied Sony. It articulated a new standard for the imposition

of secondary liability for copyright infringement, namely “inducement.” The Court

held that one who distributes a device “with the object of promoting its use to

infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to

foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”

Although firmly rooted in the common law, the Court imported the “inducement”

theory to copyright law much as it had adopted the safe harbor from infringement

liability in Sony from patent law.

The Court was careful to preserve the safe harbor for dual use technology

established by Sony. Sony bars secondary liability based on presuming or imputing

intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product

capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for

infringement. Inducement of copyright infringement may be demonstrated when an

actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of design

and distribution of the product.

This report examines the background and holding in Grokster and the doctrinal

relationship between Sony and Grokster. It will not be updated.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Substantial, Noninfringing Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. in U.S. District Court . . . . . . . . . 4

Grokster in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The United States Supreme Court Decision in Grokster . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Implications of Grokster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

File-Sharing Software and Copyright

Infringement: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

Background. When the Supreme Court held that distributors of peer-to-peer

(P2P) file sharing could be secondarily liable for copyright infringement, it marked

a milestone in a long line of cases addressing P2P technology. File-sharing software

programs that create P2P network connections between computers enable the

transmission of data and communications over the Internet. A variety of P2P

programs, such as those offered by Grokster, Ltd., StreamCast Networks, Inc., and

Kazaa BV, are typically available for free download from the distributors’ websites.

After installing a P2P program (called a “client application”) onto the computer, the

user runs the application to connect to the computers of other users of that particular

P2P software who are currently “on-line.” The client application allows users to

“share” files located on their computer hard-drives. Once users make files available

for sharing with each other, anyone who uses the same company’s software to

connect to the respective P2P network may locate and download desired files easily

and at no cost. For example, a user of the Grokster software can directly access files

saved on another Grokster user’s computer hard-drive. Or a user can search for a

particular file name, such as an MP3 song title, across all users’ computers connected

to the Grokster network, and then download a copy of that file onto his or her

computer.

The motion picture and music recording industries brought several legal actions

alleging copyright infringement against companies that distribute file-sharing

software. Prior to the lower courts’ decisions in Grokster, nearly all of the cases

found in their favor, including A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.1 and In re:

Aimster Copyright Litigation.2 However, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

(MGM) v. Grokster, Ltd.,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant

software distributors were not liable for copyright infringement. Grokster was the

first P2P file-sharing case involving allegations of music piracy where a court

shielded P2P software companies from liability. In a decisive 9-0 opinion, the U.S.

Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, importing a new theory of “inducement”

as grounds for secondary liability for copyright infringement.4

1

239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1069 (2004).

3

259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (C.D. Ca 2003) aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,125 S.Ct.

686 (2004).

4

125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).

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Grokster Compared to Napster and Aimster. In the Napster and Aimster cases,

the courts of appeals found that the plaintiff record companies would likely prevail

on their contributory and vicarious infringement claims and granted preliminary

injunctions against the defendant companies.5 The distinction in the lower courts’

analyses in Grokster was based, in large part, on the technological differences in the

design of the file-sharing networks in question and, to some extent, judicial

uncertainty over the reach of the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., discussed below.6

P2P Network Architecture. Unlike Napster and Aimster, Grokster and

Morpheus software users connect to file-sharing networks with no central database

server. Instead, Grokster provides for dynamic “root supernodes,” which are a group

of randomly chosen computers which are connected to the P2P network at a

particular time. The Grokster software “self-selects” its supernode status for the day;

a user’s computer can function as a supernode one day and not on the following day.7

As a supernode, a connected P2P user’s computer acts as an index server, collecting

information about shared files located on other users’ computers. “Normal” Grokster

clients connect to their “neighborhood” supernode to perform searches for files.8

This creates a “two-tiered” organizational distribution structure for the P2P network,

with groups of regular Grokster users clustered around a single supernode.9 All

search traffic and information passes through these personal computers acting as

supernodes, none of which are owned or controlled by Grokster.

StreamCast’s Morpheus network operates in an even more decentralized

fashion. While Grokster licenses proprietary FastTrack networking technology from

Sharman Networks, StreamCast bases its Morpheus program on a non-proprietary,

“open-source”10 technology called Gnutella.11 The Gnutella P2P network can be

accessed using not only Morpheus software, but also other Gnutella-based software

distributed by companies such as “BearShare” and “LimeWire.” Unlike Grokster’s

supernode architecture, search requests on the Gnutella network quickly pass from

user to user until a matching file is found or until the search request expires. The

5

The Aimster service was renamed “Madster” in January 2002, after a ruling by the National

Arbitration Forum panel that the Internet domain name “aimster.com” violated the

trademark for America Online (AOL)’s instant messaging service. To avoid confusion, this

report will continue to refer to the file-sharing service as “Aimster.” See

[http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/02/01/aimster-now-madster.htm].

6

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

7

Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1040.

8

[http://www.grokster.com/us/help/faq/supernodes.html]. Only connected computers that

are particularly powerful or have fast Internet connections are chosen as “supernodes.”

9

Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1040.

10

Open-source refers to any software program whose “source code” (the software

programming language) is made freely available to the public for use or modification by

other software developers. See [http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php].

11

Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1041.

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query can reach over 8,000 other computers on the Gnutella network before

expiring.12

While Aimster and Napster actively assisted their end-users in locating specific

files and facilitating the download transactions, Grokster did not. Aimster provided

an illustrated tutorial on its website which “methodically demonstrated how to

transfer and copy copyrighted works over the Aimster system.”13 The Court of

Appeals in Aimster referred to this tutorial as “an invitation to infringement,” overtly

encouraging Aimster users to infringe copyrights.14 Aimster also offered its users a

$4.95 monthly subscription service called “Club Aimster,” which presented a list of

the “top forty” most frequently downloaded songs by Aimster users. This list

included a “play” button next to each song that allowed users to click on it to

download the music file from wherever it was located in the Aimster network to the

requesting member’s computer.15

Napster similarly provided substantial assistance to its users through its server,

maintained as a collective directory of shared MP3 files available on each connected

user’s computer. Any Napster user could run a search on this centralized index for a

desired song title in order to transfer a copy of the file from the “host user” (the

individual sharing the file) to the requesting user’s hard-drive.16

Therefore, when the Napster network was terminated, its demise prevented any

further P2P file-sharing among its users. But, because Grokster and StreamCast

operate decentralized networks, “if either [company] closed their doors and

deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products could continue

sharing files with little or no interruption.”17 According to the district court in

Grokster, this is a “seminal distinction” between Grokster/StreamCast and Napster

which formed the basis for its judgment that the defendants did not materially

contribute to infringing activity.18

Substantial, Noninfringing Use. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City

Studios, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court found that despite the fact that video cassette

recorders (VCRs) could be used by consumers to infringe copyrights, the manufacturer

was not liable for contributory copyright infringement because the VCR was also

capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”19 The Court identified private,

noncommercial “time-shifting” of broadcast television as a noninfringing fair use of

12

See [http://computer.howstuffworks.com/file-sharing.htm/printable].

13

Aimster, 252 F.Supp.2d at 643.

14

Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.

15

Ibid. at 652.

16

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.

17

Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1041.

18

Ibid.

19

Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.

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the technology.20 It emphasized that the primary use of the VCR was fair, and, in

addition, it had the potential to be used for time-shifting sports, educational, religious

and other programming that was authorized for copying or was copied without

objection from the copyright holder.21

As a result of Sony, “substantial, noninfringing uses” became a judicially

recognized defense to claims of contributory infringement. The defense arises from the

Court’s statement that “[t]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles

of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely

used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes... [I]t need merely be capable of

substantial noninfringing uses.”22

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. in U.S. District Court. Plaintiffs,

twenty-eight organizations in the motion picture and music recording industries, sued

several P2P companies for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. The

plaintiffs and defendant companies Grokster and StreamCast Networks filed crossmotions for summary judgment because “the only question before the [c]ourt (as to

liability) is a legal one: whether [d]efendants’ materially undisputed conduct gives rise

to copyright liability.”23

The court granted a summary judgment determining that defendant companies,

Grokster and StreamCast, were not secondarily liable for copyright infringement

committed by users of their P2P software (called Grokster and Morpheus,

respectively).24 Finding no evidence that the defendants had any material involvement

in their users’ infringing conduct, the court held that Grokster and StreamCast were not

liable for contributory infringement.25 Summary judgment was also warranted on the

vicarious infringement claim, the court reasoned, because there was no evidence

showing that the P2P companies had the right or ability to supervise the conduct of

end-users of their products.26

Grokster in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the outset, the court

noted that the question of direct infringement, although undisputed, was not before it.

Rather, the issue was one of secondary, i.e., contributory and/or vicarious copyright

infringement liability, and it fully concurred in the district court’s “well reasoned

analysis” that defendants were not liable under either theory.

20

Time-shifting refers to the practice of recording a broadcast television program to view it

at a later time, and then erasing it afterwards. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.

21

Ibid., at 444.

22

Ibid., at 442.

23

259 F.Supp.2d at 1031.

24

This summary judgment only applies to software offered by defendants Grokster and

StreamCast Networks. Another defendant, Sharman Networks, distributor of Kazaa Media

Desktop software, was not a party to these summary judgment motions. See ibid., at 1033.

25

Ibid., at 1043.

26

Ibid., at 1046.

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Contributory Infringement. The three elements required to prove contributory

copyright infringement are (1) direct infringement by a primary infringer, (2)

knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to it. The Court of

Appeals generally tracked the reasoning of the lower court and concluded that the

architecture of the P2P systems precluded the defendants from having requisite

knowledge of and making a material contribution to copyright infringement.

The court invoked the “staple article of commerce” doctrine from patent law, cited

by the Supreme Court in Sony, for the proposition that “it would be sufficient to defeat

a claim of contributory copyright infringement if the defendant showed that the product

was <capable of substantial’ or <commercially significant noninfringing uses.’”27 With

respect to the “knowledge”element, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in its Napster

decision, this means

[I]f a defendant could show that its product was capable of substantial or

commercially significant noninfringing uses, then constructive knowledge of the

infringement could not be imputed. Rather, if substantial noninfringing use was

shown, the copyright owner would be required to show that the defendant had

reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files.28

Because the court found it “undiputed” that P2P software is capable of substantial

noninfringing uses, it would not impute constructive knowledge of infringement by

others to the defendants. They must have “reasonable knowledge of specific

infringement” to satisfy the knowledge requirement. And, the copyright owners needed

to establish that the software distributors had specific knowledge of the infringement

at a time in which they contributed to it and failed to act upon their knowledge. This

knowledge standard was not met by the plaintiffs’ after-the-fact notices of

infringement. By the time they arrived, the software distributors could not prevent it.

In the court’s view, the software distributors did not, indeed, could not materially

contribute to infringing activity as a consequence of the P2P program structure. The

distributors do not provide a “site and facility” for the infringement, the infringing

material does not reside on the defendants’ computers, nor do they have the ability to

suspend user accounts.

Vicarious Infringement. In order to establish vicarious infringement, a

copyright owner must demonstrate (1) direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a

direct financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise the

infringers.29 Concurring with the district court, the Court of Appeals found it to be

undisputed that there was both direct infringement and the defendants benefitted

financially from the software via advertising revenue. But “the right and ability to

supervise infringers” was missing. The court reiterated the lower court’s finding that

the communication between the defendants and their users does not provide a point of

access for filtering or searching for infringing files since infringing material and index

information do not pass through the defendants’ computers.

27

Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.

28

Ibid. (Citations omitted.)

29

Ibid., at 1164.

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The Court of Appeals considered and rejected the argument that “a right to

supervise” could be interpreted to mean that the distributors had a responsibility to alter

the software to prevent users from sharing copyrighted files. Only where one has

already been determined to be liable for vicarious infringement does a duty to exercise

“police” powers arise. It also rejected what it characterized as a “blind eye” theory of

liability for vicarious infringement. Copyright owners argued that “turning a blind eye

to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit” should give rise to liability.30

But the court found that there is no separate “blind eye” theory or element of vicarious

liability that exists independently of the traditional elements of liability.

In closing, the Court of Appeals echoed the district court in declining to interpret

copyright liability law to achieve public policy goals that might protect copyright

owners’ economic interests but alter general copyright law in profound ways with

unknown ultimate consequences. That function is a prerogative best left to the

Congress.31

The United States Supreme Court Decision in Grokster. In a decisive

9-0 opinion written by Justice Souter, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. At the outset, the Court noted that the subject of the case is the “tension

between the competing values of supporting creativity through copyright protection and

promoting technological innovation by limiting infringement liability[.]”32 To resolve

the conflicting interests, it articulated a new standard for the imposition of secondary

liability for copyright infringement.

Although the general principle of “inducement” as a basis for secondary liability

has its roots in the common law, it had not heretofore been statutorily or judicially

applied in a copyright context. Hence, the Court mirrored its previous adoption of

patent law’s “staple article of commerce” doctrine in Sony as a model for a copyright

infringement safe-harbor rule by adopting an “inducement” rule, also codified in patent

law,33 as a basis for imposing secondary liability for infringement.:

For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a

model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one

for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the

object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or

other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts

of infringement by third parties. We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep

from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of

technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony did not

find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that

its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of

actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.

Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering

customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves. The

30

Ibid., at 1166.

31

Ibid., at 1167.

32

Metro-Gold-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2780.

33

35 U.S.C. § 271.

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inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and

conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage

innovation having a lawful promise.34

The Court’s analysis of the doctrinal relationship between the two is discussed

below.

The Court reviewed the evidence adduced in the trial court record supporting

Grokster’s successful motion for summary judgment. Although Grokster challenged

petitioner MGM’s assertion that nearly 90% of the files available for download were

copyrighted works, the Court nonetheless concluded that the evidence gave reason to

think that the vast majority of users’ downloads were acts of infringement and that the

probable scope of copyright infringement is “staggering.”35 Indeed, the P2P services

conceded infringement in most downloads and actual knowledge of such from time to

time from their users’ e-mail questions. But there the Court parted dramatically from

the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that actual knowledge was legally insufficient to

support a finding of liability since it did not arrive in a time or manner that allowed the

P2P service to stop the infringing activity.

The Ninth Circuit had misapplied Sony, which it read as limiting secondary

liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied, the Court explained.

Sony bars secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause

infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial

lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. But the Ninth

Circuit read Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial

lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable for third parties’

infringing use. The rule of Sony, however, is not that broad. Inducement of copyright

infringement may be demonstrated when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is

shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of the product.

At trial on the merits in Sony, evidence showed that the principal use of the VCR

was for “time shifting,” which the Court found to be a fair use. There was no evidence

that Sony had “expressed an object of bringing about taping in violation of copyright

or had taken active steps to increase its profits from unlawful taping.”36 Once sold, the

distributor had no control over the device. In other words, the fact that the VCR

promoted copying, much like a photocopy machine, did not suffice to impute to the

distributor an intent that the device be used for copyright infringement. The majority

of television content is, in fact, copyrighted content. But, because the primary use of

the device was for permissible copying meant that the fact that Sony knew that it could

or would be used for unauthorized copying as well was not sufficient to establish

secondary liability for infringement solely from the sale of the product. The Sony

doctrine “absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as

well as unlawful uses and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere

34

Ibid., at 2780. (Citations omitted; emphasis added.)

35

Ibid., at 2772.

36

Ibid., at 2777.

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understanding that some of one’s products will be misused. It leaves breathing room

for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”37

Conversely, in Grokster, the evidence of culpable intent to induce infringement

by the P2P file-sharing services was great. The record indicated that Grokster used

advertising — a classic means of inducement — to stimulate others to commit

copyright infringement. The Court reviewed at length the efforts of StreamCast and

Grokster to market to Napster users when that service was “under attack” for

facilitating massive infringement. It cited internal communications at StreamCast

discussing ways to market to Napster users that demonstrated “unequivocal indications

of unlawful purpose.”38 Whether the internal communications were communicated

outside of the company was immaterial because they functioned, under an inducement

theory, “to prove by a defendant’s own statements that his unlawful purpose

disqualifies him from claiming protection.” The Court reviewed three features of

inculpatory evidence:

! Each company showed itself to be designed to satisfy a known source of

demand for copyright infringement, the market for former Napster users. This

evidenced a principal intent to bring about infringement;

! Neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to

diminish the infringing activity using their software; and

! Both companies used a business model premised on increased advertising

revenues commensurate with increased use of their software. Hence their

profits depended upon high volume use of their software to infringe.

The Court was careful to note that neither factor alone would necessarily prove

“inducement.” For example, in a footnote, it noted that there is no absolute duty of a

manufacturer to provide filtering tools:

Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to

find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take

affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of

substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony

safe harbor.39

It made a comparable observation with respect to the business model evidence.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit and remanding for action consistent with its

opinion, the Court reiterated the continuing sound precedent of Sony:

In sum, this case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on that case to

rule in favor of StreamCast and Grokster was error. Sony dealt with a claim of

liability based solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful

37

Ibid., at 2778.

38

Ibid., at 2781.

39

Ibid., at fn. 12.

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uses, with knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful course. The case

struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that

the product’s capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the

imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of

others.

MGM’s evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis of liability

for distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the

distributors’ words and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose

to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement. If liability for

inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on the basis of presuming

or imputing fault, but from inferring a patently illegal objective from statements

and actions showing what that objective was.40

Concurring Opinions. Both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer wrote a

separate concurring opinion, each joined by two other Justices. Their opinions might

be characterized as a colloquy over the methodology contemplated by Sony to

determine whether a product is capable of substantial or commercially significant

noninfringing uses. Both subscribed to the inducement theory of secondary liability

adopted by the Court, but they differed in their views of how Sony should be applied

to determine whether the product — the software in this case — was capable of

substantial noninfringing use. Since it appears highly unlikely that Grokster and

StreamCast will avoid secondary liability under the newly articulated inducement

theory, the theories advanced in concurring opinions respecting Sony’s applicability to

them may ultimately be dicta.

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, with which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice

Kennedy concurred, focused on and took issue with the evidence of substantial

noninfringing use utilized by the lower courts to support and uphold the grant of

summary judgment. Justice Ginsburg noted that, in Sony, the Court came to a

conclusion about the VCR’s respective use “enlightened by a full trial record.”41 To

do so, it considered whether a significant number of potential uses of the VCR were

noninfringing. Finding that the recorders were used primarily for time-shifting or for

permissive copying, “there was no need in Sony to ‘give precise content to the question

of how much [actual or potential] use is commercially significant.’ Further

development was left for later days and cases.”42

In Grokster, however, the lower courts found it “undisputed” that there were

substantial noninfringing uses for the software. Justice Ginsburg’s review of the

record, however, indicated that there had been no finding of any fair use and only

anecdotal evidence of noninfringing uses, all of which was almost exclusively based

on evidence introduced by the defendants. She noted that in Sony, the plaintiff’s

owned less than 10 percent of the copyrighted television programing, and that

testimony indicated that owners of at least another 10 percent of programing expressly

consented to its home recording. But in Grokster, evidence suggested that between 75

40

Ibid., at 2782.

41

Ibid., at 2783.

42

Ibid., at 2784. (Footnote omitted.)

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and 90% of the files traded were owned or controlled by the plaintiffs. That left

approximately 10% of files exchanged as presumptively noninfringing. There was no

evidence about the software’s use for copying authorized by copyright holders.

Anecdotal evidence about public domain material or promotional music that was

available for file sharing by permission was not, in her view, sufficient to support a

motion for summary judgment. And in addressing the issue of use, she focused

narrowly, distinguishing between the software at issue and P2P technology in general:

Even if the absolute number of noninfringing files copied using the Grokster and

StreamCast software is large, it does not follow that the products are therefore put

to substantial noninfringing uses and are thus immune from liability. The number

of noninfringing copies may be reflective of, and dwarfed by, the huge total volume

of files shared. Further, the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not

sharply distinguish between uses of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software

products (which this case is about) and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally

(which this case is not about).43

She concluded that if, on remand, summary judgment was not granted in favor of

MGM based on a finding of “inducement,” then a fuller record of the software’s use

would be necessary to determine whether the Sony product distribution’s safe harbor

would or could be met.

Justice Breyer, in an opinion concurred in by Justices Steven and O’Connor,

agreed with the majority that the distributor of a dual-use technology may be liable for

infringing activities of third parties where they actively seek to advance or induce the

infringement. He took issue, however, with Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion that the

lower court record was insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment finding

that the defendants’ software had substantial noninfringing uses. He preferred not to

“revisit” Sony and rejected what he characterized as Justice Ginsburg’s “stricter”

interpretation of the case.44

He read the evidence in Sony as establishing that “of all the taping actually done

by Sony’s customers, only around 9% was of the sort the Court referred to as

authorized.”45 Hence, by analogy, he contends, that the showing in Grokster that as

little as 10 percent of files shared were noninfringing was adequate to support a motion

for summary judgment on the issue of demonstrating that the company’s product is

capable of substantial noninfringing use:

Importantly, Sony also used the word “capable,” asking whether the product is

“capable of” substantial noninfringing uses. Its language and analysis suggest that

a figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove insufficient, but that such

a figure serves as an adequate foundation where there is a reasonable prospect of

expanded legitimate uses over time. ... And its language also indicates the

43

Ibid., at 2786. (Emphasis added.)

44

Ibid., at 2787.

45

Ibid., at 2788.

CRS-11

appropriateness of looking to potential future uses of the product to determine its

“capability.”46

The opinion goes on to suggest the existence of a significant future market for

noninfringing uses of Grokster-type P2P software. He acknowledged other nowunforseen noninfringing uses that may develop for P2P software, just as the homevideo rental industry developed for the VCR. To the end of protecting the legal climate

for developing technologies, Justice Breyer argues against any perceived modification

of Sony that could have the effect of chilling new technology development:

As I have said, Sony itself sought to “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s

legitimate demand for effective — not merely symbolic — protection of the

statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially

unrelated areas of commerce.” Thus, to determine whether modification, or a strict

interpretation, of Sony is needed, I would ask whether MGM has shown that Sony

incorrectly balanced copyright and new-technology interests. In particular: (1) Has

Sony (as I interpret it) worked to protect new technology? (2) If so, would

modification or strict interpretation significantly weaken that protection? (3) If so,

would new or necessary copyright-related benefits outweigh any such weakening?47

Justice Breyer concludes that Sony, as he interprets the case, has provided

entrepreneurs with needed assurance that they will be shielded from copyright liability

as they bring valuable new technologies to market. He fears that a modified rule, one

which requires a defendant to produce concrete evidence of use to avoid liability, or

relies on a case-by-case balancing approach, would undercut Sony’s protection; it

would increase the legal uncertainty that surrounds the creation of new technology

capable of being put to infringing use and assert a chilling effect on technology

development in general.

The majority opinion, however, does not specifically modify Sony. It leaves

further consideration of Sony for a day when that may be required.48 Instead, it imports

into copyright law a new theory of secondary liability independent of Sony’s

“substantial noninfringing use,” that is, the “inducement” of copyright infringement as

shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement by

third parties. Such a cause of action is tailored to the claims of the plaintiffs in MGM

v. Grokster. Thus, despite conflicting interpretations of Sony expressed in the opinions

of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Grokster can only signal views regarding any future

revisions of the Sony doctrine.

Implications of Grokster. During the 108th Congress, some members of

Congress reacted to the Court of Appeals Grokster decision by introduction of S.

2560, the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, 108th Cong., 2d sess.

(2004). This bill would have codified criteria to establish secondary liability for

copyright infringement. In view of the Court’s express adoption of an inducement

46

Ibid., at 2789.

47

Ibid., at 2791. (Citations omitted.)

48

Ibid., at 2779.

CRS-12

standard as a basis for secondary liability for copyright infringement, the need and

legislative momentum for such legislation are doubtful.

The majority opinion clearly affirms the technology-protective standard

established by Sony. Distributors of dual-use technology capable of both infringing and

noninfringing uses continue to have a high level of protection from secondary

copyright infringement liability. This is particularly so for durable goods such as

digital music recording devices that work in conjunction with authorized music

sources, even if they may be used with an unauthorized source as well.49

Never overtly discussed, but implicit in Grokster, is an emergent legal treatment

of divergent functional attributes of durable consumer goods versus software.

Nowhere in the three opinions do any Justices express the view that software is to be

treated differently from other fungible goods for liability purposes. Arguably, however,

the inducement theory has, of necessity, been adopted to address business models using

a more flexible software platform designed to promote “willful blindness” to the

infringing activities of its users. So, for example, compression technologies as such

may not be thwarted, but services designed to promote unauthorized digital transfer of

motion pictures over the Internet will most certainly be affected by Grokster.

Supporters of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Sony may bemoan the loss of

what many believe was a bright line test to determine whether a distributor is guilty of

secondary liability for copyright infringement. Inducement is intent specific. Hence,

a manufacturer’s advertising, business model, and product design may be examined

when challenged — as the Court did to those of Grokster and StreamCast. But, as both

Justice Breyer and Ginsburg noted explicitly, P2P file-sharing technology was not on

trial in Grokster, rather it was the use of the technology by two P2P services. The

Court attempted to balance a need for effective protection of copyright with the need

to promote technological innovation. To many, its decision in Grokster will promote

this balance by continuing to offer considerable protection for dual-use technology

while limiting the ability of a technology-user to ignore the consequences of business

modeling predicated on the infringing use of technology.

49

Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion states quite specifically that “Sony’s rule shelters

VCRs, typewriters, tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disc

burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer

software. But Sony’s rule does not shelter descramblers, even if one could theoretically use

a descrambler in a noninfringing way.” Ibid., at 2791 -2792. (Emphasis in original.)

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