Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union

Congressional research reportMar 6, 2012

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Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction

Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former

Soviet Union

(name redacted)

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

March 6, 2012

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RL31957

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

Summary

Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the

former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of

the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The

annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget to over $1 billion per year

across three agencies—DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an

emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat

reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue

nations or terrorist groups, to a global program to address the threat of weapons of mass

destruction.

The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which

provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and

dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations

eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons

storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct

a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials.

The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and

Kiev. These centers have provided research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not

sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided

assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department

of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage and

nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds

programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises.

DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut down

its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants.

Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction

assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs

in the U.S. government, questions about Russia’s willingness to provide the United States with

access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President’s ability to waive certification

requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the

efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends

assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.

This report will be updated as needed.

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Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Background...................................................................................................................................... 3

The Nunn-Lugar Amendment.................................................................................................... 3

A Slow Start............................................................................................................................... 5

An Evolving Program................................................................................................................ 5

Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program .................................................... 7

Program Objectives ................................................................................................................... 7

CTR Funding........................................................................................................................... 10

CTR Projects ........................................................................................................................... 12

Chain of Custody............................................................................................................... 13

Destruction and Dismantlement ........................................................................................ 17

Demilitarization Programs ................................................................................................ 24

Global Nuclear Security .................................................................................................... 26

State Department............................................................................................................................ 26

Global Threat Reduction (Formerly Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise)............................ 27

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance......................................................... 29

Department of Energy.................................................................................................................... 31

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation .................................................. 31

MPC&A Funding .............................................................................................................. 32

MPC&A Projects............................................................................................................... 34

Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (Formerly Russian Transition

Initiative) .............................................................................................................................. 41

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.............................................................................. 42

Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) .......................................................................................... 43

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production ........................................................... 44

Fissile Materials Disposition ................................................................................................... 46

Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 48

Organization and Coordination ............................................................................................... 49

Strategic Plan..................................................................................................................... 49

Program Coordination ....................................................................................................... 50

Access and Transparency ........................................................................................................ 51

Liability Protections and the Umbrella Agreement ................................................................. 52

Certifications and Waivers....................................................................................................... 53

Funding and Focus of the Programs ........................................................................................ 56

Funding ............................................................................................................................. 56

Focus ................................................................................................................................. 57

Globalization and International Cooperation .......................................................................... 58

The G-8 Global Partnership .............................................................................................. 58

Extending CTR Beyond the Former Soviet Union ........................................................... 60

Global Recognition of National Responsibility ................................................................ 62

Tables

Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization ..................................................................... 12

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Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security ....................................................................... 14

Table 3. CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage ..................................................................... 16

Table 4. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)................................... 19

Table 5. Appropriations for M.C.&A and Related Programs......................................................... 41

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 63

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Introduction

In its FY2013 budget request, the Obama Administration is seeking around $880 million for

threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet

Union. This includes $519.1 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, around

$291.4 million for nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, and about $70 million

in funding for State Department programs. This total does not include funds for nonproliferation

programs, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Megaports, and the

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which do not provide assistance within the former

Soviet states.

Congress authorized around $1 billion for U.S. programs that provide nonproliferation and threat

reduction assistance to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union in the FY2012

budget—including $508.2 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program,

around $450 million for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nonproliferation programs in Russia,

and around $75 million for State Department nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet

Union.1 With these programs, the United States seeks to help the recipient nations transport, store,

and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; secure and eliminate the materials used in

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and prevent proliferation of the knowledge needed to

produce these weapons to nations or groups outside the former Soviet Union. Since FY1992, the

United States has appropriated over $13 billion across these three agencies for these programs.2

During his tenure, President George W. Bush often voiced support for these programs. In

November 2001, the White House noted that “The United States is committed to strong, effective

cooperation with Russia and the other states emerging from the former Soviet Union to reduce

weapons of mass destruction and prevent the proliferation of these weapons or the material and

expertise to develop them.”3 At the U.S.-Russian summit in May 2002, the United States and

Russia pledged to “continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce

weapons-usable fissile material.”4 Furthermore, in June 2002, the President joined with the

leaders of the G-8 nations to create the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons

and Materials of Mass Destruction. As is discussed in more detail later in this report, under this

partnership, the United States committed to provide up to $10 billion over 10 years to pursue

nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia and the other former Soviet states.

President Obama has also embraced the goals of these programs, and has pledged to accelerate

them. He pledged to “lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable

sites within four years” and convened a summit of world leaders in Washington in April 2010 to

The DOE budget request for nonproliferation assistance programs totaled more than $800 million and the State

Department budget in these areas totaled around $125 million, but both include funding for programs outside the

former Soviet Union.

The term “spent” in this statement refers to the amount of money appropriated for threat reduction and

nonproliferation programs. The amount of money actually paid to contractors for the work covered by these programs

is less than the appropriated amount because many projects take years to complete, and payments may occur years after

the money is appropriated.

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet. U.S. Government Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction

Assistance to the Russian Federation. November 13, 2001.

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Text of Joint Declaration. May 24, 2002.

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address the international nuclear security agenda.5 He appointed a “White House Coordinator for

Nuclear Security” who, as a deputy national security advisor, coordinates U.S. threat reduction

and nonproliferation programs.6 In addition, President Obama and Russia’s President Medvedev

signed a Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation, in July, 2009, where they confirmed “their

commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

The statement highlighted their continuing commitment to pursue a wide array of threat reduction

and nonproliferation programs, to secure both their own nuclear materials and vulnerable nuclear

materials around the world.7 Moreover, in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, released on

February 1, 2010, the Department of Defense notes that it will expand its capabilities to counter

weapons of mass destruction and support cooperative threat reduction efforts.8

Congress has also supported U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in the former

Soviet states. Although some Members have questioned the value and effectiveness of some

specific projects, Congress has authorized most of the funds requested by the executive branch in

the 20 years since these programs began. Congress has also helped shape the programs,

prohibiting funding for some types of projects and providing added funding for others.

Many analysts have questioned, however, whether the United States has done all that it could to

prevent the leakage of knowledge, weapons, and materials from the former Soviet states. In its

first budget submission in early 2001, the Bush Administration reduced funding for the DOD

threat reduction programs by nearly 10% and cut more than $100 million out of DOE’s defense

nuclear nonproliferation programs, a funding category that includes U.S. nonproliferation

assistance to Russia.9 The Administration increased funding for these programs in FY2003,

FY2004, and FY2006, but its budget for FY2005 and FY2007 for the DOD threat reduction

programs again showed a 10% decrease. Even with increases in DOE budgets, some analysts

argue that, when combined with declines in the DOD budget, the funding falls short of what is

needed to address the continuing dangers of proliferation from the former Soviet states. Further,

funding has begun to shift funding away from programs that secure weapons and materials in the

former Soviet states and into programs that provide border security and assistance to a greater

number of nations around the world. Some analysts support this shift in focus, and the emergence

of a more global nonproliferation and threat reduction effort while others argue that this shift, if

not accompanied by an increase in total funding, could undermine U.S. efforts to accelerate and

complete programs with the former Soviet states. These concerns were evident in the

congressional action on the FY2008 and FY2009 budgets, which increased several of the threat

reduction and nonproliferation programs.

The current political environment may offer new challenges for these programs. Congress did not

pass appropriations bills for FY2011, and, instead, provided funding through a continuing

resolution (P.L. 112-10). With much of the FY2011 funding based on FY2010 budget levels,

For more information on the goals of this summit and progress in securing vulnerable nuclear materials, see CRS

Report R41169, Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth Nikitin.

See the White House website, The Agenda: Homeland Security. http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/

homeland_security/

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of

America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation, Moscow, July 6, 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February 1, 2010, p. 35.

Congress eventually restored the funding for DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs and added $223

million more in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after the September 11,

2001 attacks.

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some programs received more money than was requested in the FY2011 budget and others

received significantly less funding. Moreover, some in Congress sought to fund the remainder of

FY2011 at the levels provided in the FY2008 budget. This would have left U.S. threat reduction

and nonproliferation assistance with funding that fell far short of the amounts requested, and

according to some analysts, would have seriously undermined U.S. efforts to secure vulnerable

nuclear materials and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.10 Congress did not approve these

deep cuts, however, and the funding for FY2011, although lower than the President’s budget

request, will sustain many of the ongoing efforts.

Many studies have offered recommendations for the size, shape, and operation of these programs

that differ from the approaches taken by past Administrations. This report summarizes some

issues raised in these reports and in congressional debates on the future of U.S. nonproliferation

and threat reduction assistance. However, it first reviews the history of these programs, describing

their origins in 1991, their expansion and evolution during the 1990s, and the changes in their

direction during the first two years of the Bush Administration. The report also provides a broad

summary of many of the program areas and projects supported by U.S. funding.

This report focuses on funding for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the states of

the former Soviet Union. Although the United States has expanded its efforts to programs that

seek to assist other nations in securing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials, the

overwhelming majority of U.S. funds still support programs in the former Soviet states.

Nevertheless, because U.S. funding and focus has shifted in recent years, this report provides only

a partial view of U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs.

Background

The Nunn-Lugar Amendment

Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in

November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of

the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.

Consequently, Senators Nunn and Lugar proposed an amendment to the implementing legislation

for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). The Senate passed

the legislation by a vote of 86-8; the House adopted it through the conference report. This

amendment, titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the use of $400

million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet Union, and its

“successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other

weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction;

and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”11

Senators arguing in support of the program, including Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Biden,

emphasized the potential risks inherent in the Soviet collapse. They noted that the disintegration

Michelle Marchesano and Kenneth Luango, Funding Analysis of FY11 International WMD Programs, Partnership

for Global Security, Washington, D.C., January 2011, http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?

PDF=fy11_wmd_security_programs.pdf.

For more information on this legislation, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons

Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. (Available from (name redacted), on request.)

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of the Soviet Union created “the danger that the ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons in the

new political system will not be conducive to their safety or international stability,” particularly if

the weapons remained in several of the former Soviet republics. These Senators also warned of “a

danger of seizure, theft, sale or use of nuclear weapons or components ... particularly if a

widespread disintegration in the custodial system should occur.” And third, they argued that “any

weakening of control over weapons and components could spill outside the territory of the former

Soviet Union, fueling nuclear proliferation worldwide.”12 Senator Nunn further warned that “we

are on the verge of either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the

world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific know-how

on how to make these weapons, as well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological

weapons the world has ever seen.”13

Senators who supported this legislation also emphasized that, by targeting “U.S. defense

resources at the prompt, safe dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Soviet

arsenal,”14 this assistance would “embody a new approach to enhancing our national security, an

approach which fits a dramatically new national security environment.”15 Senator Biden further

stated that, through this legislation, the United States would be “assisting ourselves,” not the

Soviet Union. But others questioned this characterization. They viewed the proposed assistance to

the Soviet Union as foreign aid, which they opposed, and argued that the United States should

instead use its defense resources to fund its own military and national security needs.

Furthermore, some argued that, in providing assistance to the Soviet Union, the United States

would allow the Soviet Union to divert its own resources away from the protection and

dismantlement of its older weapons and towards the development and production of new weapons

that could create new threats to the United States.16 Members have raised these themes on

numerous occasions over the years, debating whether U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction

assistance is a foreign aid program that provides benefits primarily to the recipients or a security

program that provides benefits to both the United States and the former states of the Soviet

Union.

Initially, Congress used the DOD budget to fund U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former

Soviet States. In 1993, DOD began to refer to this effort as the Cooperative Threat Reduction

(CTR) Program. Experts from other agencies, such as the State Department and Department of

Energy, participated in the projects when their expertise was required. In FY1997 these agencies

each took budgetary and management responsibility for the projects that relied on their expertise.

Consequently, although many analysts and observers still use the title “Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program” when referring to the full range of U.S. nonproliferation programs, this is no

longer accurate. This report only uses the term “CTR” when referring to the threat reduction

programs funded by the Department of Defense. It uses the phrase “threat reduction and

nonproliferation assistance” to refer to the full range of programs in DOD, DOE, and State.

See the comments of Senator Richard Lugar in the Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18005.

Ibid. p. S18004.

Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18002.

Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18004.

See the comments of Senator Malcolm Wallop. Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18008.

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A Slow Start

When Congress created the CTR program, many Members and experts outside government

seemed to envision a relatively simple program where officials from the United States would

travel to the four former Soviet states with nuclear weapons on their territories—Russia, Ukraine,

Belarus, and Kazakhstan—to quickly safeguard and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and other

weapons. But the program’s implementation was far slower and more complex than many

expected. First, the need to develop and implement coordinated policies among several U.S.

government agencies (primarily DOD, DOE, and the State Department) and within several

organizations in the Pentagon slowed program implementation. Furthermore, the United States

had to negotiate “umbrella agreements” with each recipient nation—setting out the privileges and

immunities of U.S. personnel and to establishing the legal and customs framework for the

provision of aid—before it could spend any money in the former Soviet states. Lingering mistrust

between the parties, along with the high level of secrecy surrounding Russia’s nuclear and

chemical weapons programs complicated this process in 1992 and 1993.

During its first few years in office, the Clinton Administration sought to resolve the bureaucratic

issues that had delayed the program. It offered broader political support to a cooperative

relationship with Russia through a high level commission chaired by Vice President Gore and

Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. This commission identified many efforts that later

received funding through the CTR program. The Clinton Administration also provided significant

policy and financial support to the CTR program, overcoming the reticence that had been

expressed by some officials in the first Bush Administration. Consequently, it succeeded in

sharply increasing the rate of expenditures on CTR projects by the mid-1990s. With the

Administration’s support, and with continuing congressional interest in the program, U.S. threat

reduction and nonproliferation assistance began to expand and evolve. It expanded to several

agencies, with DOE and the State Department each funding nonproliferation efforts in the former

Soviet Union. It also expanded to include a broader range of programs. Where it had first focused

on improving transportation security and helping with the destruction of strategic offensive

nuclear weapons, it grew to include a wide range of efforts to secure and destroy nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons, the materials used in these weapons and the knowledge needed

to design and produce these weapons. It has also expanded financially, from an initial level of

approximately $400 million per year to a total of nearly $1 billion per year across the three

agencies.

An Evolving Program

Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar as an emergency response to

impending chaos in the Soviet Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and

1993, many analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for

diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely

weak and press accounts reported that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black

market in Western Europe. Consequently, many began to view CTR as a part of a long-term threat

reduction and nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to CTR

as “defense by other means”17 as the program helped eliminate Soviet weapons that had

See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC, p. 1.

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threatened the United States and contain weapons and materials that could pose new threats in the

hands of other nations.

By the mid-1990s, many observers also began to view U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states

as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In 1996, experts

testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security

and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear or

chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that provided security at

facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to security at facilities

with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.18 In January 2001, a task

force sponsored by the Department of Energy stated that “the most urgent unmet national security

threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weaponsusable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used

against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”19 Since September 11, 2001, virtually all

analysts who follow U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have made the link

between the possible quest for weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the potential for

thwarting them by helping Russia protect its weapons, materials, and knowledge.20

The Bush Administration also linked U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the

former Soviet States to U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In

early 2003, it stated that it had “expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program” to support the

war on terrorism.21 In its budgets presented between FY2004 and FY2007, it increased funding

for several export and border control programs, for programs designed to stem the leakage of

knowledge out of the former Soviet Union, and for an effort to find and recover “radiological

sources”—a type of military device that could provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in

a “dirty bomb.”22 All of these initiatives focus more on stemming proliferation than on

eliminating nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states. But it did not completely lose the initial

focus. In February 2005, at the Bratislava summit, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to accelerate

some of the efforts to secure Soviet-era nuclear weapons. As is noted below, this agreement has

shifted additional funding into some of the DOD CTR projects.

The Obama Administration has also emphasized that these programs, when implemented around

the world, can help contain proliferation and reduce the threat of WMD terrorism. In testimony

before the House Armed Services Committee, Dr. Michael Nacht, then the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, noted that the CTR program “is in a period of transition

The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult raised the profile of this

type of threat.

The report went on to state that “unless protected from theft of diversion, the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of

mass destruction threatens to become a goldmine for would-be proliferators the world over.” Baker, Howard and Lloyd

Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with

Russia. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. January 10, 2001. p. 1.

Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological, and chemical weapons and

materials should be the central organizing principle on security for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator

Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International

Nonproliferation Conference. November 14, 2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat

Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 1.

Many analysts believe that this type of weapon, which could disperse radioactive materials across a wide area, might

be particularly attractive to terrorists. For details see CRS Report RS21528, Terrorist “Dirty Bombs”: A Brief Primer,

by Jonathan Medalia.

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from a nuclear-centric effort focused on the former Soviet Union to a more expansive effort to

counter WMD threats throughout the world.”23 Funding requests over the past few years have

demonstrated this shift, as the Obama Administration has moved beyond the program’s historical

base in the former Soviet Union and increased support for programs that seek to secure

vulnerable materials around the world. Moreover, the Obama Administration has emphasized

that, instead of providing assistance to nations in their efforts to contain their weapons of mass

destruction, the program now focuses on efforts to engage other nations and foster cooperation

between the United States and these nations in joint efforts to contain dangerous weapons and

materials. While many of the projects may appear similar, the emphasis now is on efforts to form

partnerships with other nations and to help them build their own capacity to stem secure and

eliminate these materials.

Department of Defense Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program

Program Objectives

At its inception, the CTR program sought to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

with assistance in the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear

weapons. During the first few years, the mandate for U.S. assistance expanded to include efforts

to secure materials that might be used in nuclear or chemical weapons, to prevent the diversion of

scientific expertise from the former Soviet Union, to expand military-to-military contacts between

officers in the United States and the former Soviet Union, and to facilitate the demilitarization of

defense industries.24 In 1994, Congress also indicated that threat reduction funds could be used to

assist in environmental restoration at former military sites and to provide housing for former

military officers who had been demobilized as a result of the dismantling of strategic offensive

weapons. The 104th Congress reversed this position, however, banning the use of CTR funds for

environmental restoration or housing for military officers. It also denied additional funding for

the Defense Enterprise Fund, which focused on demilitarizing former Soviet defense industries.

By the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton Administration had agreed on a mandate for the

CTR program that focused on the “core” objectives of securing and dismantling nuclear and

chemical weapons, along with protecting against the proliferation of knowledge and materials

that might be used in the production of these weapons by other nations. The Clinton

Administration outlined this mandate in four key objectives for the CTR program:

•

Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;

•

Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their

destruction;

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearing. Dr. Michael L. Nacht, Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Global Strategic Affairs, Statement for the Record. 111th Cong., 1st sess., July 15, 2009.

For a more detailed description of the changes in the legislative mandate for the CTR program, see CRS Report 971027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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•

Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their

components, and weapons-usable materials; and

•

Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weapons

programs in other nations.25

In the late 1990s, Congress added funds to the CTR budget for biological weapons proliferation

prevention; this effort has expanded substantially in recent years. Congress also expanded the

CTR program to allow the use of CTR funds for emergency assistance to remove weapons of

mass destruction or materials and equipment related to these weapons from any of the former

Soviet republics, and from other nations around the world.

In its first budget, in FY2002, the Bush Administration reduced CTR funding by nearly 10% from

over $440 million to $403 million. It also began a review of all U.S. threat reduction and

nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the former Soviet states, stating that it sought to “ensure

that existing U.S. cooperative nonproliferation programs with Russia are focused on priority

threat reduction and nonproliferation goals, and are conducted as efficiently and as effectively as

possible.”26 Some analysts welcomed the review, noting that it could provide an opportunity to

revise and expand some programs, but others feared the review would lead to reductions in

funding and the elimination of some programs.

When it announced the results of the review, the Bush Administration stated that it found that

“most U.S. programs to assist Russia in threat reduction and nonproliferation work well, are

focused on priority tasks, and are well managed.”27 But the review did signal a shift in the focus

of U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. Instead of highlighting projects aimed at

the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Administration indicated that it would expand some

projects that focused on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, including increasing

funding for the construction of a controversial chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.

For many, this change seemed to be a natural response, in the post-September 11 environment, to

growing concerns about the potential link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Others, however, saw it as a retreat from the long-standing core objectives of the CTR program.

The Bush Administration confirmed this shift in focus with the release of its FY2004 budget

request for CTR. Where it had requested and received $50 million in FY2002 and around $133

million in FY2003 for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia, it

requested, and Congress authorized, $200.3 million in FY2004. This is nearly 45% of the total

CTR budget request. The Bush Administration also increased funding for biological weapons

proliferation prevention from $17 million in FY2002 to around $55 million in FY2003 and $54.2

million for FY2004. In contrast, funding for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia

declined from $133.4 million in FY2002 to $70.1 million in FY2003 and $57.6 million in

FY2004.28

U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 4.

The White House. Fact Sheet. Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the

Russian Federation. December 11, 2001.

Ibid.

The reduced request for FY2004 reflects, in part, the presence of unexpended balances from FY2003. The United

States did not spend these funds because it could not initiate any new contracts during the period after the President did

not certify Russia for participation in the CTR program and before Congress allowed the President to waive the

certification requirement. See Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, II. March 4, 2003. p. 4.

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Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

Furthermore, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, J.D. Crouch, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, stated that the Bush

Administration had revised the four key objectives for CTR. The program would seek to:

•

Dismantle FSU (former Soviet Union) WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and

associated infrastructure;

•

Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials;

•

Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct;

•

Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing

proliferation.29

Although most ongoing CTR projects were consistent with these objectives, the absence of any

specific reference to the destruction of nuclear weapons was notable. In addition, by stating that

the United States seeks to “encourage higher standards of conduct,” the Bush Administration

indicated that it will place a higher priority on Russian openness, cooperation, and compliance

with arms control agreements. This also presented something of a departure from the past, when

the United States raised issues of transparency, openness, and compliance with Russia during

private meetings, but did not tie these issues directly to the goals of the CTR program.

In its FY2010 Annual Report on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, DOD has offered a

list of objectives for the CTR program that demonstrate further how the program has evolved to

pursue broader nonproliferation and anti-terrorism objectives. The Report states that “CTR

activities help deny rogue states and terrorists access to WMD and related materials,

technologies, and expertise.” It specifically notes that the program:

•

dismantles strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure;

•

enhances security and safety of WMD and fissile material during transportation

and storage;

•

consolidates and stores dangerous pathogens at risk for theft, diversion,

accidental release, or use by terrorists;

•

enhances partner states’ capacities to develop early warning systems for bioterror

attacks and potential pandemics;

•

facilitates strategic research partnerships;

•

helps prevent proliferation of WMD and related materials; and

•

facilitates defense and military contacts to encourage military reform.30

U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4. The Administration has formally incorporated these objectives into

its planning for and reporting on the CTR Program. See U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to

Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 1.

U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Activities and Assistance Under Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs,

FY2010 Annual Report, Washington, DC, July 7, 2009.

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CTR Funding

When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it authorized the transfer of $400

million in FY1992 funds from other DOD accounts for threat reduction activities in the former

Soviet Union. Few of these funds were spent in FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer

authority for FY1992 funds and authorized the transfer of an additional $400 million from other

DOD accounts in FY1993. In subsequent years, the Clinton Administration requested, and

Congress authorized new appropriations for the CTR program. Table 1 summarizes the amount

of funding the Presidents requested for the CTR program and the amount authorized by Congress

in each of the fiscal years between 1992 and 2006. Congress has authorized just under $9 billion

for CTR since 1992.

Congress has approved the Administration’s request for CTR funding in most years, but has

added or reduced funding in some. In FY1996, the new Republican majority in the House

questioned many elements of the CTR program and the House Armed Services Committee

reduced funding to $200 million. The Senate had approved the Administration’s request, and the

conference committee agreed on a compromise of $300 million. The House also reduced the

Administration’s request in FY1997, approving $302.9 million for CTR, but the Senate added

$37 million and the House eventually accepted the Senate’s version in the conference

committee.31

In FY2001, the House reduced President Clinton’s request for CTR to $433 million. The Senate

approved the full request and the conference committee settled on $443 million. This reduction

was part of a dispute between the House, on one side, and the Senate and the Clinton

Administration, on the other side, over funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility at

Shchuch’ye in Russia. The House Armed Services Committee had reduced funding for that

program in FY1998 and FY1999; in each of these two years, the Senate and the conference

committee approved the Administration’s requests. In FY2000, the House again eliminated all

funding for the construction of Shchuch’ye and mandated, instead, that CTR fund security

improvements at Russia’s chemical weapons storage facilities. The conference committee

accepted the House position, but still approved the Administration’s request for $475.5 million for

CTR. In FY2001, the Senate again accepted the House position banning funding for Shchuch’ye

and, this time, accepted a small reduction in total funding for CTR.

In FY1996, when the Clinton Administration’s request for CTR funding declined from $400

million to $371 million, total U.S. spending on threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to

Russia actually increased. In that year, the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program

(MPC&A) moved from DOD’s CTR budget to the Department of Energy; the Clinton

Administration requested and Congress authorized $70 million for DOE programs. In addition,

$33 million in funding for the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow moved

from the DOD budget to the State Department budget. In subsequent years, as is noted in more

detail below, funding continued to grow for the DOE and State Department programs.

As is evident in the table below, the Bush Administration’s request for CTR funding declined in

both FY2007 and FY2008. For the most part, these declines reflected reductions in the funding

This trend, with the House approving less than the President requested and the Senate approving the President’s

request, continued for several years. For details, see CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction

Programs: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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requested for the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, as it neared completion,

and, to a lesser extent, declines in funding for weapons elimination programs. The Administration

did not propose to offset these reductions with increases in funding for new existing projects or

the initiation of new projects. Congress did not accept this new funding profile in FY2008. Both

chambers added funding for CTR programs. The House added $50 million, with $42.7 million

going to the plant at Shchuch’ye and $7 million allocated to potential new initiatives in the CTR

program. The Senate, for its part, added $80 million to the CTR budget request, with $50 million

of this added funding going to biological weapons proliferation prevention. Funds were also

added to the accounts for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia and weapons of mass

destruction proliferation prevention. The conference committee (H.Rept. 100-477, Title XIII)

accepted the Senate’s funding level, authorizing $428 million for CTR, with much of this added

funding going to biological weapons proliferation prevention. The legislation also authorizes $10

million for new CTR initiatives that are outside the former Soviet Union. The conference

committee did not retain the provision approved by the House that would fund new initiatives in

CTR within the former Soviet Union. It did however, express support for such initiatives (H.Rept.

110-477, §1306) and request a study by the National Academy of Sciences that would assess

possible initiatives and identify options for strengthening the program.

Congress also added funds to the Bush Administration’s $414.1 million request for CTR for

FY2009. The House authorized $445.1 million and the Senate authorized $434.1 million for these

programs. The conference committee accepted that Senate funding level, adding $10 million

$10.0 million for new initiatives, including activities in states outside of the former Soviet Union,

$1.0 million for additional expenses associated with the Russian chemical weapons destruction

activities, and an increase of $9.0 million for weapons of mass destruction proliferation

prevention in the former Soviet Union.32

The Obama Administration, in its request for FY2010, sought $404.1 million for DOD’s CTR

program. This reduction again reflects the near-completion of many ongoing arms elimination

projects, along with a decline in funding for biosecurity programs. As is noted below, however,

the budget request does include increases for some CTR project areas, such as the Weapons of

Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program. Congress authorized $424.1 million for

FY2010. The Administration has requested $522.5 million for CTR in FY2011. As is noted

below, this added funding is allocated primarily to biosecurity programs and to a new initiative

known as the Global Security Lockdown. Congress approved this request in the FY2011 Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) and in the final continuing appropriations act for FY2011. In

FY2012, the Obama Administration requested $508.2 million for DOD’s CTR program. Congress

approved this request in the FY2012 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81). The Obama

Administration has requested $519.1 million for this program in FY2013.

P.L. 110-417, Title XIII.

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Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization

($ millions)

Fiscal Year

Request

Authorization

1992

$400

1993

$400

1994

$400

1995

$400

1996

$371

$300

1997

$328

$364.9

1998

$382.2

1999

$440.4

2000

$475.5

2001

$458.4

$443.4

2002

$403

2003

$416.7

2004

$450.8

2005

$409.2

2006

$415.5

2007

$372.3

2008

$348.0

$428.05

2009

$414.1

$434.1

2010

$404.1

$424.1

2011

$522.5

522.5

2012

$508.2

2013

$519.1

Total FY1992-FY2010

$9239.009

$8790.85

CTR Projects

In its early years, the Department of Defense divided the CTR program into three distinct project

areas—chain of custody, destruction and dismantlement, and demilitarization.33 These distinctions

faded over the years, as the program evolved and new projects entered the mix, although they

provide a useful tool in reviewing the history of the program. In addition, in FY2012, the Obama

Administration restructured the program and offered new categories for the different project

This division, and the description in the next few paragraphs come from U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative

Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 5-6. The fourth category, “Other,” includes administrative expenses

and a special project on Arctic nuclear waste.

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areas. Specifically, it combined several project areas that sought to improve security for nuclear

weapons and materials into a single category known as “Global Nuclear Security.”

Chain of Custody

Chain of custody activities were those designed to enhance safety, security, and control over

nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Many of these were completed during the early years of

CTR. These programs were created, in part, in response to early concerns about the safety and

security of weapons and materials in transit. The United States and the recipient nations also

found it easier to agree on the implementation of projects that focused on transit and storage of

nuclear weapons and materials than to focus on destruction activities. The brief descriptions that

follow summarize some of the key chain of custody activities.34

Transportation Security

When the Soviet Union collapsed, thousands of nuclear weapons were spread among four states

(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and, within each state, the weapons were dispersed

among hundreds of deployment and storage areas. Soviet President Gorbachev and Russia’s

President Yeltsin had both committed to removing non-strategic nuclear weapons (those with

ranges less than 3,600 miles) from non-Russian republics and storing them in a smaller number of

facilities in Russia. In 1992, after signing the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, Ukraine,

Belarus, and Kazakhstan also pledged to return all the warheads based on their territories to

Russia.35 Table 2 summarizes the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for

many of these transportation security projects through FY2011.

The United States has helped Russia improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons in

transit. According to DOD, the CTR program “assists in the secure transport of 1,000-1,500

warheads per year.” It has provided armored blankets to protect warheads in transit from potential

attacks, storage containers to hold the warheads during transit, and assistance to enhance the

safety and security of rail cars used to transport warheads from deployment to storage or

dismantlement facilities. Ongoing transportation security projects also provide Russia with

emergency response vehicles, training, and support equipment that it might need to respond to a

nuclear weapons transportation accident. Funding for FY2005 supported the procurement and

maintenance of specialized warhead transportation railcars.36 The United States supported the

movement of 45 train shipments in 2004. This number dropped to 24 shipments in 2005. The

United States has required increased transparency for these shipments, and the process stopped

between November 2004 and May 2005 while the United States and Russia resolved this issue.

DOD is also helping Russia procure up to 100 new heated rail cars to replace aging existing rail

cars as they are removed from service. DOD procured 19 of these rail cars through FY2009 and

has begun production of another 23 cars. It has also verified the elimination of 38 older rail cars.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm.

For a description of the nuclear weapons based in non-Russian republics in 1991, see CRS Report RL32202, Nuclear

Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, by (name redacted).

Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005 Cooperative Threat

Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.

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Congress authorized an additional $30 million for this project in FY2007; the Bush

Administration requested, and both the House and Senate authorized, $37.7 million for FY2008.

DOD initially indicated that it planned to support 70-72 shipments per year through 2011,37 but it

has reduced that number to no more than 4 shipments per month, or 48 per year, for FY2006,

FY2007, and FY2008. It supported 45 rail shipments in FY2008.

Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security

($ millions)

Project

Fiscal years

Total appropriation

Armored Blankets

FY1992-FY1993

$3.1

Emergency Response

FY1992-FY1996

$29.2

Railcar security enhancements

FY1992-FY1994

$21.5

Weapons Transportation Security

FY1995-FY2011

$355.4

Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project

on Managing the Atom. March 2003; Updated Funding Analysis of FY09 International WMD Security Programs,

by Michelle Marchesano. Partnership for Global Security. July 2009.

DOD requested and Congress authorized $40.8 million for transportation security for FY2009.

The Obama Administration requested, and Congress authorized, an additional 46.4 million for

transportation security in FY2010. The Administration has requested $45 million for FY2011.

According to DOD, this funding will support the transport of around 48 trainloads of deactivated

nuclear warheads to storage or dismantlement sites. Congress authorized $45 million for this

program in FY2011. The Obama Administration did not request any additional funding for this

distinct program in FY2012, and instead, included it in the new Global Nuclear Security program

area.

Weapons Storage Security

Several CTR projects have helped Russia improve security at storage facilities for strategic and

tactical nuclear warheads. Russia has three types of storage sites—operational sites, storage sites,

and rail transfer points. The United States does not provide assistance at operational sites. The

Department of Energy has addressed security needs at rail transfer points that store warheads

from the Russian Navy, and plans to do the same at one or more sites for the Strategic Rocket

forces. Under the CTR program, DOD has enhanced security at both large “national stockpile

storage sites” and smaller storage sites at Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Force bases.38

DOD provided perimeter fencing, as a “quick fix” for vulnerable sites, and more comprehensive

upgrades, including alarm systems and inventory control and management equipment to keep

track of warheads in storage.

According to the GAO, this effort was slowed by Russia’s reluctance to provide the United States

with information about the precise number of sites in need of security upgrades and its refusal to

U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 43.

The total number of sites remains classified. For details on DOD’s plans, see U.S. General Accounting Office.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security

at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. p. 34.

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allow the United States access to sites to design appropriate upgrades. For example, DOD

purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter fencing for weapons storage sites; the Russian Ministry of

Defense (MOD) said it would install the fences itself, but it has reportedly made little progress in

doing so.39 Furthermore, the United States purchased and tested equipment for comprehensive

upgrades, but could not install it because Russia’s MOD had not allowed the United States access

to the interior of any storage facilities. The United States and Russia completed agreements in

February 2003 that have provided the United States with a degree of access to these sites.40 U.S.

personnel can now conduct site assessments and other activities that support the installation of

physical security upgrades at a number of weapons storage locations. This change is reflected in

significant increases in funding for site security enhancements in the FY2005 and FY2006 budget

requests for CTR. The United States has plans to provide security enhancements at up to 42

permanent storage sites and temporary handling sites in Russia.41 In 2005, during the Bratislava

summit, Presidents Bush and Putin pledged to accelerate work on weapons storage security, and,

as a result, both DOD and DOE report that they had completed their work of installing security

upgrades by the end of 2008. In a complementary effort, the United States has constructed a

Security Assessment and Training Center so that DOD and MOD personnel can test and select

security systems for weapons storage sites. The United States is also helping Russia develop

training programs for personnel with access to nuclear weapons.

Between FY1995 and FY2010, DOD appropriated around $831.8 million for weapons storage

security.42 The Bush Administration requested $74.1 million in FY2006, and reprogrammed $10

million intended for strategic offensive arms elimination to this program area in FY2006, leading

to a total appropriation of $84.1 million. It also requested an additional $44.5 million in the

FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations package for effort. Then, it requested an

additional $87.1 million for FY2007. Congress approved the added funding in the Emergency

Supplemental Bill and authorized 74.1 million for FY2007. The Administration requested only

$23 million for warhead storage security for FY2008; Congress increased this amount to $47.64

million in the conference report on the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill.

The increases in funding for warhead security through FY2007 reflect the commitment made by

Presidents Bush and Putin in February 2005 to accelerate the warhead security upgrades. After

Russia identified all the sites in need of upgrades, the United States agreed to provide assistance

at 15 sites, 8 with funding from the CTR program and 7 with funding from the DOE

nonproliferation budget. Because they have completed these upgrades, they have begun to shift

funding towards sustainment activities, rather than further upgrades. The FY2009 request for

weapons storage security declined to $24.1 million, as a result of this shift to sustain and support

the systems that have been installed in previous years. Congress approved this request for

FY2009.

The Obama Administration requested, and Congress authorized, $15.1 million for weapons

storage security in FY2010. The appropriation for FY2010, however, increased to $22.1 million.

The budget for FY2011 includes a request for $9.6 million for this effort. Much of this funding

Ibid. p. 36.

U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Policy. March 4, 2003.

U.S. Department of Defense. FY2006 CTR Annual Report to Congress. December 31, 2004. p. 41.

Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on

Managing the Atom. March 2003.

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will be used to continue sustainment efforts at secure storage sites. Congress authorized this

amount in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act and the continuing resolution for FY2011.

In FY2012, the Administration requested funding for weapons storage security activities in the

new Global Nuclear Security program area. It did not specify how much of the funding in this

program area would go to weapons storage security.

Fissile Materials Storage

According to unclassified estimates, Russia inherited more than 30,000 nuclear warheads from

the Soviet Union, along with enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce

thousands more warheads. As it consolidates and reduces its arsenal, Russia has begun to

dismantle thousands of these warheads. Several CTR projects seek to improve the long-term

security of the fissile materials removed from these weapons. Table 3 summarizes the amount of

money that the United States appropriated for projects related to storage of fissile materials in

Russia.

The United States provided Russia with more than 26,000 containers to hold the fissile materials;

it also helped Russia design and build a highly secure storage facility at Mayak that will provide

long-term safe and secure storage for these materials. This facility will hold the equivalent of

fissile material from 25,000 nuclear warheads. The first wing of this building was completed and

certified for use in December 2003; it is now ready to receive nuclear materials for storage.43 The

United States and Russia no longer plan to construct an expected second wing.44 The United

States and Russia are still working, with little progress, to complete a “transparency agreement”

that will allow the United States to confirm that materials stored in the facility actually came from

dismantled warheads. The State Department has pursued this agreement. Even without the

completion of this agreement, however, the Mayak facility began to accept nuclear materials for

storage in July 2006

Table 3. CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage

($ millions)

Project

Fiscal years

Total appropriation

Fissile Material Containers

FY1992-FY2000

$82.2

Storage Facility Design

FY1993

$15

Storage Facility Construction

FY1994-FY2001

$387

Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project

on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Testimony of Lisa Bronson,

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein

after referred to as Bronson Testimony.)

The absence of funding for the second wing of Mayak was responsible for a significant portion of the decline in the

Bush Administration request for CTR funding, from $443 million in FY2001 to $403 million, in FY2002.

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Destruction and Dismantlement

Destruction and dismantlement projects help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other

weapons and their delivery vehicles. These projects have helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan remove warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for the nuclear

weapons covered by the START treaty. The Clinton Administration, and some analysts outside

government, credited U.S. assistance in this area with providing Ukraine, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan with an incentive to relinquish the nuclear weapons on their territories in the early

1990s.45 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads deployed

on nearly 1,400 ICBMs, 940 SLBMs and 162 heavy bombers. According to the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency, the CTR program has helped deactivate more than 7,500 warheads, 768

ICBMs, 651 SLBMs, and 155 heavy bombers.46 More than half of the funds appropriated for

CTR support projects in this category. Some of the key areas of destruction and dismantlement

projects are described below.

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination

The United States has provided Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in

eliminating the launchers and infrastructure associated with strategic nuclear weapons deployed

on their territories. This effort is complete in Belarus and Kazakhstan; it continues in Russia, and,

to a lesser extent, Ukraine. In each of these nations, the United States has provided the recipient

nations with technology and expertise needed to deactivate and dismantle missiles, launchers,

submarines, and bombers. According to the CTR Scorecard, the United States has, thus far,

eliminated nearly 1,400 ballistic missiles and has deactivated over 7,500 warheads on former

Soviet strategic nuclear forces.47 It has also helped construct storage facilities for missiles

removed from deployment and fuel removed from deactivated missiles.

The United States and Ukraine have been working on a method to eliminate rocket motors from

SS-24 ICBMs. DOD did not request any more funding for this project area in FY2006 and

planned to complete ongoing work with prior year funds, because the two nations could not agree

on a method to eliminate these rocket motors. However, a low level of funding has resumed in

recent years, as the United States now supports the safe storage of 160 rocket motors from SS-24

missiles and buys the casings from Ukraine after Ukraine has removed the propellant. Ukraine is

financing, on its own, the construction and operation of a water washout facility for this purpose.

The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized $6.4 million for the U.S. portion of

this effort in FY2009. The Obama Administration requested, and Congress authorized, an

additional $6.8 million for FY2010. The Obama Administration requested, and Congress

authorized, an additional $6.8 million for this project in FY2011; this funding will continue to

support the storage of SS-24 rocket motors, while Russia constructs the elimination facility for

them.

In Russia, the United States is helping to eliminate and dismantle SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs,

disassemble and eliminate components of the SS-N-20 SLBM, eliminate SS-25 ICBMs and their

road-mobile launchers, and destroying rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs and their launchers. For

U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 1.

For the full CTR scorecard, see Defense Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/scorecard.cfm.

http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html

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FY2006, DOD requested $78.9 million for this project area, an increase of around $20 million

over the budget in FY2005. The increase reflected the fact that Russia had added more missiles

and launchers to the destruction schedule to meet the terms of the Moscow Treaty. However, after

Congress appropriated the requested amount, the Administration reprogrammed funding out of

this project area, leaving only $49.7 million. As was noted above, it transferred $10 million to

weapons storage security. It also transferred $1.1 million to strategic offensive arms elimination

programs in Ukraine and will lose around $5 million in recisions imposed by Congress. The Bush

Administration requested $77 million for this project area in FY2007; Congress approved $78.9

million. It requested $77.9 million for FY2008. The House approved this amount; the Senate,

however, increased funding for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia to $102.9 million.

According to the Senate Armed Service Committee Report on this legislation (S.Rept. 110-77),

this increase of $25 million should be used to “accelerate the completion of activities at sites ...

where the materials and weapons are stored” and to facilitate the consolidation, dismantlement,

and disposition of these weapons and materials. The conference committee (H.Rept. 110-477)

allocated $92.885 million to this project area. DOD requested $79.9 million for Strategic

Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia, FY2009; Congress authorized these amounts.

The Obama Administration requested an additional $66.4 million in FY2010. Congress

authorized this amount in the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act. The Administration requested,

and Congress authorized, $66.7 million for this project area in FY2011. This funding supports

efforts to assist Russia in eliminating SS-19 and SS-25 ICBMs and their launchers, and in

completing the dismantlement of a Russian Typhoon submarine. It requested an additional $63.2

million for this project area in FY2012; this amount includes funding for both the strategic

offensive arms elimination activities in Russia and those in Ukraine. Congress authorized this

amount. According to the Administration, this funding will continue to support the elimination of

SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silo launchers, SS-25 ICBMs and their launchers, SS-N-18 SLBMs, and

the reactor core and launcher section of one Delta-IV submarine. The Administration has

requested $68.3 million for this project area in FY2013.

One project funded in this category, the construction of a plant to dispose of liquid fuel removed

from Soviet ICBMs, raised concerns among some in Congress during the Bush Administration.

The United States constructed the facility at a cost of nearly $100 million. However, during

construction, Russia used much of the fuel in rockets in its space-launch program. Consequently,

in 2002, Russia informed the United States that it did not have any fuel for the facility.48

Representative Duncan Hunter stated that the episode represented an example of the potential for

waste in the CTR program.49 Others, however, note that, although unfortunate, this case is the

exception in a program that has spent more than $4 billion on threat reduction projects.

Table 4 summarizes the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for several key

strategic offensive arms elimination projects.50

U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of David K. Steensma, Deputy Assistant Inspector for

Auditing, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General. March 4, 2003.

Hunter, Duncan. “Wasteful ‘Threat Reduction’ in Russia.” Washington Post. March 4, 2003. p. 23.

For a more detailed breakdown of projects in this program area, see U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services.

Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4. See

also U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat

Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. pp. 16-21.

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Table 4. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

($ millions)

Nation

Fiscal years

Total appropriation

Russia

FY1993-FY2012

$1745.9a

Ukraine

FY1993-FY2011

$590.8

Kazahkstan

FY1994-FY1996

$64.6

Belarus

FY1994-FY1996

$3.3

Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project

on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

Beginning in FY2012, the budget request combined funding for Russia and Ukraine; this combined funding is

added to the total for Russia.

WMD Infrastructure Elimination

Through the CTR program, the United States has helped Ukraine eliminate equipment and

facilities that supported the deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. These facilities

include liquid missile propellant storage facilities, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and

infrastructure at bomber bases. The United States also helped Kazakhstan secure fissile materials

and eliminate facilities at a nuclear weapons storage area and a former chemical weapons

production facility.51 Between FY1994 and FY2003, DOD appropriated $38.2 million for this

program in Ukraine and $44.5 million in Kazakhstan. It has not requested any additional funds in

subsequent years.

Chemical Weapons Destruction

The Soviet Union had the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world. Russia declared

this stockpile to contain 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The United States has

questioned the accuracy and completeness of this declaration, a factor that contributed to Russia’s

loss of certification for CTR programs in FY2002. Russia’s chemical weapons are stored at seven

sites in Russia; five sites contain nerve agents in bombs and artillery shells, and three of these

sites and two additional sites house bulk stocks of blister agents.52 Russia has committed, under

the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to destroy these stocks by 2007 (it has requested an

extension until 2012), but it contends that it lacks the financial resources to meet this deadline. A

European consortium, led by Germany, has constructed a destruction facility at Gorny to destroy

the blister agent.53 The United States is assisting Russia with the design and construction of a

facility at Shchuch’ye to destroy all of Russia’s nerve agent. The chemical weapons storage

facility at Shchuch’ye contains nearly half of Russia’s stockpile of artillery shells filled with

U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat

Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 9.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 58-59.

For a description of this facility and program see Glasser, Susan B. “Cloud Over Russia’s Poison Gas Disposal.”

Washington Post. August 24, 2002. p. 1

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nerve agent.54 The new facility is intended to destroy these stocks and those stored at the other

four storage sites, an amount estimated to be around 5,450 metric tons.

Construction on this facility began in March 2003. The United States also helped install

equipment at the destruction facility and to train the operating personnel. The United States and

Russia had hoped that construction would be completed and the facility would begin operations

by the end of 2008. It would then take around 3.5 years to destroy the stocks of nerve agent,

allowing Russia to meet the 2012 deadline. Operations at the facility began in March 2009, and

was officially dedicated in late May 2009.55 As of September 2011, Russia had eliminated over

2,365 metric tons of nerve agent at Shchuch’ye.

This project has been at the center of much debate during the past ten years. In FY1999, the

House tried to reduce the amount of CTR funding requested for Shchuch’ye by $53.4 million,

arguing that Russia’s chemical weapons posed more of an environmental problem for Russia than

a threat to U.S. security.56 The Defense Authorization Bills for FY2000 and FY2001 prohibited

any additional funding for Shchuch’ye. Congress resumed funding Shchuch’ye in FY2002, when

the Bush Administration requested $50 million for the project. However, in FY2003, when the

Bush Administration requested $133.6 million for Shchuch’ye, the House balked again and

approved $50 million. The House Armed Services Committee argued that the program could not

absorb such a large increase in one year and, because Russia did not yet appear committed to the

elimination of its chemical weapons, that the United States should not accelerate its efforts. The

conference report (H.Rept. 107-772) also limited funding for Shchuch’ye to $50 million, but it

stated that the Administration could use the remaining $83.6 for other projects related to the

storage and elimination of nuclear weapons, or for chemical weapons destruction if Russia

provides a “full and accurate” disclosure of its chemical weapons stockpile.

The Bush Administration requested $200 million for this project in FY2004. The Senate approved

this amount, but the House, in its version of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588),

reduced the funding to $171.5 million. It also mandated that the United States could only release

funds in excess of $71 million if Russia and other nations contributed to the project. Specifically,

the U.S. contribution could not exceed the other nations’ contribution by more than a factor of

two. These provisions reflect concerns expressed by some in the House about a lack of financial

commitment from Russia and other European nations to the Shchuch’ye project. The conference

committee rejected the House position, approving the full $200 million for Shchuch’ye and

eliminating the linkage of U.S. funding to funding from other nations. Nevertheless, by December

2003, six other countries had contributed $69 million to the project.57

The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, $158.4 million for Shchuch’ye in

FY2005. The reduction in funding for this project represented most of the reduction in the overall

CTR budget between FY2004 and FY2005. This reduction in funding did not derive from any

significant policy debates about the project; instead, it occurred because the FY2004 budget

The Department of Defense estimates this to be 5,460 metric tons of agent in nearly 2 million rocket and artillery

warheads. See U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union

Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 4

Jim Heintz, “U.S, Russian Officials Open Plant to Destroy Chemical Weapons,” Boston Globe, May 30, 2009. See,

also, “New Russian Chemical Weapons Site Begins Operations,” Global Security Newswire, March 6, 2009.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1999.

Report 105-532, Washington, DC. May 12, 1998. p. 352.

Bronson Testimony, March 10, 2004.

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included funding for a one-time investment in capital-intensive construction equipment. The

United States did not need to repeat this investment in FY2005.58 The Administration requested,

and received, an additional $108.5 million in its budget for FY2006. It requested only $42.7

million for this project in FY2007; Congress approved this request. The Bush Administration

indicated that the reduction reflected the maturity of the project and the lack of any further capital

investment.

The Bush Administration did not request any additional funding for the Shchuch’ye plant in the

FY2008 budget. This lack of funding raised eyebrows among analysts outside government, as

work at the facility was not yet complete and the facility was not yet operating. The House Armed

Services Committee also questioned this approach and added nearly $43 million to the budget in

the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill for Shchcuch’ye. In its report on the bill (H.Rept. 110477), the committee noted that it did not believe that DOD could complete the project without

additional funding, as the existing budget did not account for the rising costs of construction

materials in Russia. The conference committee approved $6 million for this project area, allowing

some work to continue during FY2008. Congress also required that the Secretary of Defense

submit a report on the strategy and cost estimates for completing the Shchcuch’ye project. The

Administration again did not request any funding for Shchcuch’ye in FY2009; Congress added $1

million.

Congress also authorized $3 million for Shchcuch’ye in FY2010, and the Obama Administration

requested, and Congress authorized, an additional $3 million for FY2011. Some analysts outside

government believe the United States will have to provide more funding for this facility in the

future. The Obama Administration requested, and Congress approved, $9.8 million for this effort

in FY2012. The Administration requested an additional $14.6 million for this project area in

FY2013. Some of this funding will allow the United States to provide technical support to Russia

in its operation the Kizner CWDF destruction facility.

In the past, Congress has subjected funding for Shchuch’ye to a number of certifications. For

example, it stated that the President must certify that Russia is committed to providing at least

$25 million per year to help construct and operate the facility; that Russia was committed to

destroying all its remaining nerve agent; that other nations were committed to contributing to the

construction of this facility; and that Russia is forthcoming with data about its chemical weapons

stockpile. The President requested that Congress allow him to waive the certification requirement,

so that construction could continue, even if Russia has not met all the conditions. Congress

provided the President with waiver authority, but only for one year, in the FY2003 Defense

Authorization Bill (P.L. 107-248).59 It extended this waiver authority by one more year in the

FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588); the Administration submitted this waiver in

early December 2003.60 For FY2005, the Senate approved unlimited waiver authority for the

President, but the House again limited this authority to one year. The House prevailed in

conference, with an adjustment to allowing the waiver authority through the end of the calendar

Ibid.

The waiver authority for the certification requirements from Shchuch’ye is different from the waiver authority the

President sought for the broader certification requirements included in the CTR legislation. These are discussed in more

detail below.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Presidential Determination No. 2004-10. Presidential Determination on

Waiver of Conditions on Obligation and Expenditure of Funds for Planning, Design, and Construction of a Chemical

Weapons Destruction Facility in Russia. The White House. December 9, 2003.

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year, rather than the fiscal year (see P.L. 108-375). Congress extended this waiver authority

through 2011.

Biological Threat Reduction

The Soviet Union reportedly developed the world’s largest biological weapons program,

employing an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites. This weapons complex developed a

broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants, animals, and humans.61 Russia

reportedly continued to pursue research and development of biological agents in the 1990s, even

as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its facilities began to deteriorate. The

United State began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to improve safety and security at its

biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons scientists during the late 1990s,

even though Russia has not provided a complete inventory of the sites or people involved in

biological weapons work.62

The CTR program has supported four separate BTR programs, working at dozens of sites that

include many weapons facilities. Through the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination

program, the United States helped Russia eliminate the infrastructure and equipment at those

Biological Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) that have the capability to produce

biological weapons. Through the Biosecurity and Biosafety program, the United States is helping

to enhance safety and security at these centers to ensure the safe and secure storage and handling

of biological pathogens. This program has been combined with the BW Threat Agent Detection

and Response program, which seeks to develop modern surveillance, warning, and response

networks and to help secure Russia’s central storage facilities for BW pathogens. Finally, through

Cooperative Biodefense Research, the United States and Russia are using cooperative research

projects to increase transparency and discourage the “leakage” of Russian biological weapons

knowledge to other nations. Each of these programs is implemented through the International

Science and Technology Centers, because DOD has been unable to conclude implementing

agreements with the relevant ministries in Russia.63

The Biological Threat Reduction program also supports activities in other former Soviet states,

including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DOD is also negotiating an

agreement to begin work in Armenia. For example, CTR funding helped destroy the huge

biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.

The potential proliferation of biological weapons poses one of the key challenges for U.S.

nonproliferation assistance to Russia.64 According to the General Accounting Office, progress in

gaining Russia’s cooperation and implementing these projects has been very slow. The United

States has found it particularly difficult to gain access to four key military facilities. The problem

For more details on the BWPP programs, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological

Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 48-49.

Ibid. p. 54.

“The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related

experts, and the future disposition of the FSU biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat

reduction agenda.” Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 2.

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is further aggravated by the fact that Russia is reducing the size of its complex, leaving many

scientists potentially unemployed or underemployed. In addition, biological pathogens are small

and easily transported, further increasing the proliferation risk.65

Between FY1997 and FY2011, DOD appropriated around $1.1 billion for these projects, with

significant increases in the amount of both the request and the appropriation in recent years. The

Bush Administration requested $54.2 million for these programs in FY2004. Congress approved

this amount but attached some restrictions to the funding. In its version of the FY2004 Defense

Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588), the House had sought to prohibit funding cooperative research at

any site in the Soviet Union until the Secretary of Defense could certify that the site did not house

any prohibited biological weapons research, until the facility had conducted an assessment of its

vulnerability to the loss or theft of pathogens and until it had begun to implement measures to

reduce its vulnerability to the loss or theft of biological agents. The conference committee

modified this measure, stating that CTR could not fund cooperative research at a facility until the

Secretary of Defense determines that no prohibited research occurs at the facility and until the

facility plans to implement appropriate security measures. It also permitted the use of up to 25%

of the funds authorized for the project to be expended on making these determinations.

The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, a similar amount—$55 million—

for biological weapons proliferation prevention in FY2005. However, within this total, the

Administration shifted funding away from Cooperative Biodefense Research projects, reducing

this area from $36.6 million in FY2004 to $13.1 million in FY2005, towards bio-security and biosafety efforts. This shift reflected, in part, the congressional concerns with possible U.S. support

for ongoing Russian biological weapons programs. It also derived from the Administration’s

plans to expand U.S. bio-safety and bio-security assistance into facilities in Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan and Georgia.66 The Bush Administration requested, and Congress approved, an

additional $60.8 million for BW proliferation prevention in FY2006. It requested an additional

$68.4 million for FY2007, and the 109th Congress approved this request in the FY2007 Defense

Authorization Bill. This legislation also mandated that the National Academy of Sciences pursue

a study that would analyze the challenges and identify opportunities for further cooperation

between Russian and the United States on biological weapons proliferation prevention.

The Bush Administration requested $144.5 million for Biological Weapons Threat Reduction

programs in FY2008, with the funding split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat Agent

Detection and Response ($125.75 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($18.75 million).

This request represents a significant expansion in U.S. biological weapons nonproliferation

assistance for the Soviet Union and reflects growing concerns about the threat of biological

weapons proliferation. But some believe this increase may not be sufficient. Senator Richard

Lugar sought to add $100 million for the CTR program in FY2008, with the express purpose of

expanding and accelerating biological weapons nonproliferation programs.67 The Senate reduced

this amount but still added $50 million to the program for FY2008. According to the Senate

Armed Services Committee Report on the bill (S.Rept. 110-77), this funding would support

U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 44-46.

Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005 Cooperative Threat

Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.

Lugar Wants $100 Million Nunn-Lugar Budget Increase. Press Release. Office of Senator Richard Lugar. February

5, 2007.

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programs throughout the former Soviet Union and accelerate high-priority efforts. The committee

also requested that the National Academy of Sciences prepare a report on how the United States

might cooperate with other nations in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons. The

conference committee (H.Rept. 110-477) authorized $158.5 million for this program area and

retained the request for a study by the National Academy of Sciences. The Bush Administration

further increased the request for BWTR program in FY2009 to $184.5 million. As in FY2008,

these funds were being split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat Agent Detection and

Response ($160 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($24.4 million). Congress

authorized this request for FY2009.

The Obama Administration requested $152 million for Biological Threat Reduction in FY2010.

Within this request, the Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Threat Agent Detection and Response

program would receive $133.3 million, a reduction from its FY2009 appropriation of $174.3

million, and Cooperative Biological Research projects would receive $26.5 million, an increase

over its appropriated level of $18.8 million in FY2009. Congress authorized the requested

amount. At the same time, House Armed Services, in its report on the FY2010 Defense

Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 111-166) called on DOD continue its efforts to strengthen the

biological threat reduction programs and to pursue more interagency coordination. In addition, in

recognition of the fact that biological weapons proliferation prevention has consumed a growing

proportion of the CTR budget, the HASC encouraged DOD “to maintain a strong focus on …

other threat reduction challenges, including preventing the proliferation of chemical and nuclear

weapons and weapons-related materials, technologies, and expertise.”

For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested $209 million for Biological Threat reduction,

with $184.7 million allocated to Biosafety, Biosecuirty and Threat Agent Detection and Response,

and $24 million allocated to Cooperative Biological Research. Congress approved this request in

the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act and the continuing resolution for FY2011 appropriations.

The Obama Administration requested, and Congress approved, $259.5 million for this effort in

FY2012. It has requested an additional $276.4 million in FY2013. It now refers to this project

area as Cooperative Biological Engagement and, according to the budget documents, plans to use

this funding to extend bio-engagement efforts and cooperative research projects outside the

former Soviet states to nations in Africa.

Demilitarization Programs

Demilitarization programs included projects that encouraged Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan that were designed to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes. The International

Science and Technology Center, which provides grants to Russian weapons scientists and

supports cooperative research with biological weapons scientists, began with funding in this

category. Funds for demilitarization also support Defense and Military contacts between officers

in the United States and those in the former Soviet republics. According to DOD, these contacts

between the defense establishments help “promote counter-proliferation, demilitarization, and

democratic reforms.”68 This program includes representatives from Georgia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DOD has appropriated just over $100

million for Defense and Military contacts over the life of the CTR program; the Bush

Administration requested, and Congress approved, an additional $11 million for FY2004, $8

U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat

Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 6.

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million for FY2005, and $8 million for FY2006. Congress also approved the Administration’s

request of $8 million for FY2007. The authorizations for FY2008 and FY2009 remained the

same, at $8 million. The request and authorizations have declined to $5 million in FY2010 and

FY2011.

The Bush Administration added a new demilitarization program in FY2003. Through the WMD

Proliferation Prevention Program, the United States has cooperated with the military

establishments, internal security forces, border guards, and custom forces in Kazakhstan, Ukraine,

Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to improve their border controls. In FY2006, Moldova joined the

effort, with funding provided to begin developing its border control and monitoring systems.

DOD is also helping Ukraine establish a comprehensive WMD monitoring and interdiction

capability along its border with Moldova. CTR completed the radiation portal monitoring

program in Uzbekistan in 2008. The program is also assisting Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan develop

a comprehensive capability for WMD surveillance and interdiction along their Caspian Sea

borders. These programs are intended to help these nations deter, detect, and interrupt the

unauthorized movement of weapons or related materials across their borders.69

Congress appropriated $40 million for this program in FY2003; the Bush Administration

requested $39.4 million in FY2004 but received only $29 million. It requested, and Congress

authorized, an additional $40 million for FY2005 and $40.6 million in FY2006. It requested and

received an additional $37.5 million for this program in FY2007. The budget request for FY2008

included $37.9 million for this program. The House approved this request, but the Senate added

$14 million, for a total of $51 million. The conference committee approved nearly $48 million. It

also allocated the $10 million that Congress approved for new initiatives to projects in this

program area outside the former Soviet Union. For FY2009, the Bush Administration requested

$50.3 million for WMD proliferation prevention programs in the former Soviet Union; Congress

added $9 million, for a total of $59 million for this effort in FY2009. The Obama Administration

requested, and Congress authorized, 29.1 million for this program area in FY2010. The FY2011

budget request included $26.1 million for this program area, and Congress authorized this amount

in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act. The Administration requested, and Congress approved,

28.1 million for this effort in FY2012. The Administration has requested an additional $32.4

million for this project area in FY2013.

The FY2010 budget for DOD’s CTR program also includes $17 million for new CTR initiatives.

Congress added $10 million to the FY2009 budget in this funding area to provide DOD with the

flexibility to respond to emerging proliferation concerns in the former Soviet states and in other

nations around the world. Moreover, Congress mandated that the National Academy of Sciences

review the CTR problem and suggest changes that might strengthen the program.70 DOD

indicates, that, using the funds appropriated in FY2009 and FY2010, DOD expanded CTR

contacts with nations outside the former Soviet Union and conducted initial biological threat

reduction assessments with new countries. The Obama Administration did not request any

additional funds for this program area in FY2011.

The FY2011 CTR budget added a new program area—Global Nuclear Lockdown—and requested

$74.5 million for this effort. According to DOD, this funding would support efforts to secure

Ibid., p. 10.

National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,

Washington, DC, April 2009.

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“weapons-usable” materials in Russia and to fund “centers of excellence” outside the former

Soviet Union. The budget request indicated that these centers would receive $30 million in

FY2011. These centers would help DOD expand CTR support to nations outside the former

Soviet Union. Congress authorized funding for this program area in the FY2011 Defense

Authorization Act. However, because this program did not receive any funding in FY2010, it was

not included in the funding provided through the continuing resolution. This project area was

incorporated into the Global Nuclear Security project area in FY2012.

Global Nuclear Security

In the FY2012 budget request for CTR, the Obama Administration combined a number of

previous program areas into a new category of Global Nuclear Security. This new area includes

all the funding that had previously been allocated to nuclear weapons storage security, and some

of the funding from nuclear weapons transportation security and proliferation prevention. The

Administration requested $121.1 million for this program in FY2012; this compares with the

FY2010 appropriation of $118.6 million and FY2011 appropriation of $164.3 million. Congress

approved this amount. The Administration has requested $99.8 million for this program area in

FY2013.

State Department

The State Department has played an integral role in U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction

programs since their inception. It has taken the lead in negotiating the broad agreements needed

before recipient nations can receive U.S. assistance and in providing for broad policy

coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States and recipient nations. The

State Department also manages the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which it can

use to help nations address problems with proliferation-prone weapons located on their territories.

Congress appropriated approximately $15 million for this fund each year between 1993 and 2003.

The Bush Administration requested, and Congress approved, $35 million for NDF in FY2004,

$31.7 million in FY2005, and $37.5 million in FY2006. It requested $38 million in FY2007 and

$30 million for FY2008, with Congress appropriating $37 million and $33.7 million for those

years, respectively. The Bush Administration requested an additional $40 million for the NDF in

FY2009; Congress approved this amount, and added $77 million more in the Supplemental

Appropriations Acts (P.L. 111-32). The Obama Administration requested $57 million for this fund

in FY2011, $30 million for FY2012, and $30 million in FY2013.

The Bush Administration indicated that it planned to use this program to expand U.S. efforts to

help countries establish better accounting and control mechanisms for nuclear, chemical, and

biological materials.71 According to John Wolf, the former Assistant Secretary of State for

Nonproliferation, the State Department also planed to use these funds to “focus on unanticipated

opportunities to eliminate missile systems, chemical agents, and to secure orphaned radiological

sources.”72 For example, funding from this program contributed to the U.S. effort to eliminate

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for

Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.

U.S. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittees on Europe and International Terrorism,

Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on U.S. Cooperative

Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs. May 8, 2003.

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Libya’s WMD infrastructure and to help redirect weapons scientists in Libya and Iraq. Most of

the funding in this program is used on projects outside the former Soviet Union.

The State Department also manages and funds the International Science and Technology Center

(ISTC) in Moscow and its companion Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kiev, Ukraine.

In the FY2005 budget request, it combined these centers and the biological weapons redirect

program into a new category, called Nonproliferation of WMD expertise. The State Department

also manages the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. The

following discussion provides more detail about these two program areas.73

Global Threat Reduction (Formerly Nonproliferation of WMD

Expertise)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many experts feared that scientists from Russia’s

nuclear weapons complex might sell their knowledge to other nations seeking nuclear weapons.

Many of these scientists had worked in the Soviet Union’s “closed” nuclear cities, where they had

enjoyed relatively high salaries and prestige, but their jobs evaporated during Russia’s economic

and political crises in the early 1990s. Even those scientists who retained their jobs saw their

incomes decline sharply as Russia was unable to pay their salaries for months at a time.

In late 1992, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia established the

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Several other former Soviet

states joined the center during the 1990s, and other nations, including Norway and South Korea,

added their financial support. In late 1993, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Ukraine

established the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). Several former Soviet states

have also joined this center, and Japan has joined to provide financial support.

By early 2010, 39 countries were participating in the centers. According to the International

Science and Technology Center in Moscow, since its inception, this facility has funded 2,702

funded proposals and awarded grants totaling $836.5 million. The funds have supported the work

of more than 70,000 scientists. However, reports indicate that support for the center was waning,

and funding has declined in recent years. 74 Moreover, the future of the center is uncertain

because, in August 2010, Russia’s President Medvedev announced that Russia was withdrawing

from participation in the center. This may not affect the center’s ability to grant funds to Russian

scientists, but it could alter the operations of the programs.

The centers fund scientists who have worked on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but

they have, historically, focused on nuclear scientists, with many projects going to those who work

at institutes in the closed nuclear cities. The State Department estimates that about half of the

participants are senior scientists, which means the programs may have reached a significant

portion of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 senior scientists and engineers in the Soviet nuclear

complex. However, most of these scientists spend fewer than 50 days per year on projects funded

by the science centers. In the remainder of the time, most continue to work at their primary jobs.

For a more details see Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew

Bunn et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

“Budget Cuts Threaten Support Program for Former Soviet Weapons Experts,” Global Security Newswire, June 19,

2009.

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In addition, some of the grants go to research institutes in Russia, rather than directly to scientists,

and some of these funds may be used for administrative or management purposes. Nevertheless,

the income earned from even short-term research projects may undermine incentives these

individuals might otherwise encounter to sell their knowledge to potential proliferant nations.

The Science Centers also sponsor a Partners Program, through which private industry,

universities, and other government agencies can provide funding for and establish contacts with

former Soviet scientists. The program started small, with about 30 partners and $5 million in

projects in 1997; it had grown to 166 partners supporting over 100 projects worth $31 million in

2002. This represented one quarter of the grant funding provided by the science centers in 2002.75

In FY2009, the Partner Program had grown to include more than 430 partners, and it provided

$9.5 million to support 34 projects.

Between 1994 and 2009, the ISTC in Moscow had received more than $803 million in funding

from its participating nations, with the United States providing about $220 million of this total.

The United States has also provides support through the ISTC to the Biological Weapons

Redirection Program.76 This program provides research grants to Russian biotechnology institutes

to redirect scientists to commercial, agricultural, and public health projects. The State Department

collaborates with several other U.S. agencies in this program.77 In recent years, it has begun to

shift grant funding away from Russia’s nuclear scientists to biological and chemical weapons

scientists, thus re-naming the program the Bio-Chem Redirection program, and to scientists from

other former Soviet states. Further, it expects this decline in funding to force the ISTC to focus

more on “graduating scientists” from U.S. assistance to projects with more commercial viability.78

The State Department operates a third program within this category, known as the Bio Industry

Initiative (BII). This initiative, which began in 2002, seeks to help Russia reconfigure its largescale former BW-related facilities so that they can perform peaceful research issues such as

infectious diseases. The Global Threat Reduction program has also expanded beyond the borders

of the former Soviet Union, with programs designed to engage scientists in Iraq and Libya.

For FY2004, the Bush Administration requested $59 million for the science centers and BW

redirection programs, and received about 50.2 million. It did not identify the precise funding for

either of the two. In its FY2005 budget, it requested $50.5 million, with about $30.5 million

going to the science centers, $17 million going to the Bio-Chem Redirect program, and $3 million

going to the BII.79 Congress approved the Bush Administration’s budget request for this program

area in FY2006, appropriating $52.6 million. However, a declining proportion of the budget is

likely to be spent on programs in the former Soviet Union, as this program is expanding to help

redirect scientists in Libya and Iraq.

The Bush Administration requested 22.7 million for the Science Centers in its FY2007 budget. It

also requested $17 million for the Bio-Chem Redirect program and $13 million for the BioIndustry Initiative. This total of $52.7 million will be spent primarily in the former Soviet states.

The Administration has requested $2.5 million for the scientist redirection program in Iraq and $1

Ibid.

For more details, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the

Former Soviet States, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

U.S. Department of State. FY2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. p. 370.

U.S. Department of State. FY2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. p. 135.

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million for the program in Libya.80 It requested a total of $53.5 million for these two program

areas in FY2008 and $64 million in FY2009. The Obama Administration requested

approximately $68 million for these programs in FY2010. The FY2011 and FY2012 budgets each

included $69 million for the Global Threat Reduction Program. The Administration has requested

$64 million for FY2013.

Analysts have raised numerous questions about the science center programs. One of the first

critiques came from the General Accounting Office, in a study published in 1995. GAO found

that some scientists who received grants from the ISTC “may also continue to be employed by

institutes engaged in weapons work.”81 GAO interpreted this finding to mean that the centers had

not succeeded in redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. Other critics of the CTR

program claimed that GAO’s findings indicated that, by supporting Russian weapons scientists,

U.S. funds were supporting Russian weapons programs. The State Department disputed both of

these conclusions, noting that the grants from the ISTC were intended to supplement, not replace,

the scientists’ income from work in other institutes. And, in the years since this report, the State

Department has enhanced its auditing procedures to ensure that ISTC grants support the assigned

projects and do not support work on Russian weapons.

Analysts have also noted that the ISTC and STCU do not have enough money to support full pay

for a significant number of scientists. Consequently, some have questioned whether the centers

achieve their objective of keeping these scientists away from nations or groups seeking weapons

of mass destruction. Others, however, note that, even if the financial support is less than

complete, the cooperation with Russian institutes, and the promise of a fairly steady stream of

funding, helps build relationships and draw these institutes into the “western orbit.”82 To address

this problem, some have suggested that, instead of providing short-term grants, the centers should

focus on projects that will lead to the long-term redirection of scientists out of weapons work.

The State Department seems to agree with this approach, with its growing reliance on the Partners

Program and its acknowledged need to transition Russia’s nuclear scientists to more

commercially viable projects.

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

Many view the potential for smuggling or illegal exports of materials and technology from the

former Soviet Union as a key proliferation concern. The collapse of political control along the

Soviet borders, along with incentives created by the weakness in the economies of the newly

independent states, contributes to this growing concern. The State Department’s Export Control

and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program helps the former Soviet states and other

nations improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and stop the illicit trafficking of all

materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual use goods and technologies. The

U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign

Operations. pp. 135, 140-144.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet

Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington, DC. p. 27.

Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn et al. Project on

Managing the Atom. March 2003.

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EXBS program currently has projects underway in more than 30 nations and is expanding its

reach around the globe.83

When designing a nation-specific plan for border control assistance, the United States seeks to

address four key areas. First, if needed, it helps the recipient nation establish the legal and

regulatory basis for effective export controls. It then helps the nation develop appropriate export

licensing procedures and practices. Third, the United States helps the recipient establish and

enhance effective enforcement capabilities. When needed, it provides the recipient with detection

and interdiction equipment and training. Finally, the United States helps establish procedures that

promote effective interaction between government and industry so that business entities in the

recipient nation will abide by the laws and regulations of the new export control regime.

The State Department also provides support to border control efforts in DOD’s CTR program and

the DOE’s nonproliferation program. It seeks to coordinate these and other U.S. efforts to identify

and stop the smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or materials. Analysts inside

and outside the government have questioned, however, whether the coordination has been

effective. Consequently, the National Security Council is leading an effort to develop a

government-wide strategic plan for interdiction assistance, which includes but is not limited to

export assistance, that might help stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.

Between FY1998 and FY2002, the State Department allocated $146 million to the EXBS

program for nations in and around the former Soviet Union. Approximately $100 million of this

amount was allocated to Georgia for its border security program. Funding for border security in

the rest of the former Soviet states was around $5-$7 million per year, until the State Department

added $24.7 million from the FY2002 supplemental appropriations. In FY2003, the State

Department requested around $17 million for the EXBS program, with an additional $15 million

allocated to the Georgia Border Security Program. Funding declined in FY2004; the Bush

Administration requested $13.9 million for EXBS and an additional $15 million for the Georgia

Border Security program. In FY2005, the Bush Administration requested a total of $38 million

for EXBS, although only around $19 million was allocated to projects in nations in and around

the former Soviet Union. An additional $11.5 million was allocated to “global” efforts, with the

remaining $7 million allocated to projects in other nations around the world. This trend continued

in FY2006 and FY2007. The budget request for the EXBS program equals $44.4 million.

Congress approved $43.4 million. However, only around $8.5 million of this amount will go to

projects in nations around the former Soviet Union. A far greater amount, around $19 million, is

allocated to nations in other regions such as South Asia and the Near East. The remainder is

allocated to global programs, such as the provision of advisors and equipment and the

development of global regional export controls. For FY2007, the Bush Administration requested

$45.050 million for the EXBS program; less than $6 million would go to states that were once a

part of the Soviet Union. For FY2008, the total request was $41.3 million, but only around 4.5

million was allocated to states of the former Soviet Union. For FY2009, the request was for $42.1

million, with less than $4 million going to states of the former Soviet Union. The Obama

Administration requested $55 million for EXBS in FY2010, but, again, less than $4 million of

that funding will go to nations in the former Soviet Union. The State Department requested $61

million for this program in FY2011 and FY2012, but, again, only a fraction is allocated to nations

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for

Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.

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that were a part of the former Soviet Union. The FY2013 budget request includes $55 million for

EXBS.

Department of Energy

The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation

assistance to the former Soviet states from the start, when CTR included a small amount of

funding for materials control and protection. Officials from DOE participated, along with their

counterparts at DOD, in early efforts to outline projects and reach agreement with Russian

officials on assistance to secure nuclear materials. But these government-to-government

negotiations proceeded slowly, in part because Russia’s nuclear energy ministry—known as

Minatom at the time—was less open to cooperation than the Ministry of Defense. Consequently,

projects at facilities that housed nuclear materials did not begin until 1994. In a parallel effort that

sought to reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories, which are a part of

DOE, also began less formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify and solve

safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, these government-to-government and

lab-to-lab projects evolved into an effort to apply Material Protection, Control and Accounting

(MPC&A) techniques to Russian facilities.

The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in FY1993. This amount grew to $73

million in FY1995. In FY1996, DOE assumed budgetary and management responsibility for the

program. DOE also initiated a second program, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, which

sought to provide employment opportunities for scientists and engineers from Russia’s nuclear

weapons complex. In the latter half of the 1990s, DOE expanded these efforts and added several

other programs to its nonproliferation assistance. These programs are now managed by DOE’s

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The discussion below summarizes the

objectives and achievements of many of these efforts.84

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program seeks to “secure nuclear

weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials by upgrading security at nuclear sites, by

consolidating these materials to sites where installation of enhanced security systems have

already been completed, and by improving nuclear smuggling detection capabilities at

international borders.”85 The MPC&A program86 addresses the first of these objectives. The

Materials Consolidation and Conversion Program addresses the second, and the Second Line of

Defense (SLD) and Megaports programs address the third. Each of these is discussed below.

As was the case with the summaries of DOD and State Department programs, these descriptions do not cover all

DOE programs. A complete description of the programs funded under DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Budget can be found in DOE’s budget documents. See U.S. Department of Energy. FY2006 Congressional Budget

Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2005. pp. 481-497.

U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.

p. 623.

This program area included, for a short time, an effort to identify and secure radiological sources that could be used

to make radiological dispersion devices. In the FY2005 budget request, this initiative is combined with two others in a

single initiative known as “International Nuclear and Radiological Cleanout.” See 2005 DOE Budget Rollout. Remarks

by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham. February 2, 2004, Washington, DC.

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MPC&A Funding

The budget for MPC&A grew rapidly during the 1990s, reaching $169 million in FY2001, the

last year of the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration, in its budget request for

FY2002, reduced funding for the MPC&A program to $138.8 million, in part because it believed

that the program had enough unexpended funds from prior years to carry on with less funding. Its

first budget also shifted money from Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs to U.S. nuclear

weapons programs. Congress objected to this reduction, and both the Senate and House

Appropriations Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills for FY2002, restored

funding to the FY2001 level. Furthermore, Congress added $150 million in a supplemental

appropriations bill passed at the end of 2001, after the September 11 attacks had raised new

concerns about the potential threat that terrorists might seek to acquire nuclear materials from

insecure facilities in Russia. The Bush Administration allocated much of this new funding to the

Second Line of Defense and Radiological Dispersion Devices. But the Bush Administration did

increase its budget request for MPC&A in FY2003, to $223 million, so that it could accelerate the

installation of comprehensive upgrades and material consolidation and conversion efforts.87 The

Bush Administration requested $227 million for these efforts for FY2004; Congress approved

$260 million, adding $5 million for “high priority” activities and $28 million for an initiative

under the Second Line of Defense Program (described below).

The Bush Administration requested $238 million for MPC&A in FY2005. The reduction from

FY2004 to FY2005 reflected, in part, the completion of physical security upgrades at Russian

Navy warhead storage sites.88 In the conference report on the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill

(H.Rept. 108-767; P.L. 108-375), Congress authorized the full amount requested by the President.

The House had reduced that amount by around $10 million, citing delays in the program caused

by Russia’s refusal to allow the United States access to some facilities, but the Senate prevailed in

conference. The Appropriations Committee added $84 million to the MPC&A program, for a total

of $322 million. The conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005

(H.Rept. 108-792; P.L. 108-447), notes that this added funding should be used to accelerate

efforts to secure nuclear weapons sites and nuclear materials production sites in Russia.89

The Bush Administration requested $343.4 million for these programs in FY2006. Nearly $100

million of this total was allocated to the Second Line of Defense and Megaports Initiative, leaving

approximately $245 million to secure nuclear materials in Russia. In the FY2006 Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163, H.Rept. 109-360), Congress added approximately $20 million to

this total, in part to accelerate warhead security work at the Strategic Rocket Force facilities. The

Energy and Water Appropriations Committee added $83.6 million to this portion of the DOE

budget, so that DOE could pursue “new opportunities in warhead security work with Russia.

In the FY2007 budget, the Bush Administration requested $413.2 million for MPC&A. Although

this exceeds the Administration’s request for FY2006, it falls below the appropriated amount of

$422.7 million. In addition, it includes $124 million for Second Line of Defense and Megaports,

leaving $298.7 million to secure nuclear materials in Russia. Within this total, as is noted below,

the Administration shifted money among the different project areas, as some ongoing projects

U.S. House. Committee on Appropriations. Statement of Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy. March 6, 2002.

Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005 Nonproliferation Budget

Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004.

Congressional Record. November 19, 2004. H10558.

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accelerate and others move toward their conclusion. Specifically, the budget indicated that work

at the Rosatom complex, which houses most of Russia’s nuclear weapons materials, would be

reduced, while sustainment activities would increase. Congress did not accept some of these

changes, appropriating a total of $472.7 million for this program area and shifting money among

the budget areas, as is noted in more detail below.

The FY2008 budget request sought a total of $371.7 million for the MPC&A program areas, with

$119.3 million going to the Second Line of Defense and Megaports initiatives. This leaves $251.8

million for the efforts to secure nuclear warheads and materials in Russia. The DOE budget

request also reflects continuing declines in the MPC&A budget in the outyears, as many of the

MPC&A upgrades to storage facilities are completed and the program switches to sustainment

activities. DOE also noted that Russia has added some Rosatom sites to its list of sites in need of

upgrades; if these are approved, they would also be added to budget and work effort after

FY2008.

Congress increased, in some cases significantly, funding for the MPC&A programs in the

FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 110-477) and the FY2008 Omnibus Appropriations

Bill (H.R. 2764). For example, the House version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill

(H.R. 1585) included $401 million for MPC&A, which essentially incorporates $30 million from

the FY2008 Supplemental request into the Authorization Bill. The Senate, for its part, added only

$10 million, authorizing $381.8 million. The conference committee added $30 million, with most

of this going to the Second Line of Defense program. On the other hand, the House Energy and

Water Development Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee more than doubled

the request for funding for MPC&A, providing $831.8 million (H.Rept. 110-185). The committee

noted that this program is on the “front line” in the global war on terror because it seeks to protect

the United States against a terrorist using a nuclear device on U.S. soil. As is noted below, the

committee added funding in several areas to accelerate work at Russia’s nuclear materials

facilities and warhead storage facilities, and to expand the Second Line of Defense and

Megaports programs. The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, in contrast, added only

$20 million to this program area (S.Rept. 110-127). The Omnibus Appropriations Bill for FY2008

includes $624 million MPC&A, with $136 million going to Second Line of Defense and $130.8

million for Megaports (these are described in more detail below).

The President’s budget for FY2009 requested $429 million for MPC&A programs; Congress

added $22 million to this project area. As discussed in more detail below, the budget request for

most of the project areas fell sharply below the amount appropriated in FY2008. These declines,

in most cases, reflected the fact that, with the added funding appropriated in FY2008, many of the

ongoing projects are nearing completion. The Obama Administration requested $552.3 million for

this project area in FY2010, a significant increase over the amount appropriated in FY2009. The

request included a significant increase of $92 million, for a total of $194 million, for the

Megaports program, but also allocated added funding to several of the efforts to secure nuclear

warheads and materials in Russia. Congress authorized $592 million for these programs in

FY2010, but appropriated only $572 million. President Obama requested $590 million for these

programs in FY2011, with $265 million going to the Second Line of Defense and Megaports.

Congress approved this request in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act, but, with funding held

to FY2010 levels in the continuing resolution, these programs have received 572.1 million in

appropriations for FY2011.

The Obama Administration requested $571.6 million for this program area in FY2012; Congress

appropriated $569.9 million. Within this total, $132.7 million was allocated to the Megaports

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initiative, leaving $437.2 million to secure warheads and materials in Russia. The Obama

Administration has requested $311 million for this program area in FY2013. As is discussed

below, most of the reductions reflect completion of materials protection projects. There are also

significant reductions in Second Line of Defense and Megaports, as projects in these areas near

completion.

Between FY1993 and FY2012, Congress appropriated nearly $5 billion for the MPC&A program.

With the exception of approximately $1 billion for the Second Line of Defense and Megaports

programs, these funds were allocated to efforts to improve security at nuclear warhead and

nuclear material storage facilities in Russia. NNSA has identified 105 nuclear sites, with 243

buildings, that may need assistance in improving their security systems. According to NNSA,

these sites contain approximately 600 metric tons of nuclear materials, enough for around 41,000

nuclear warheads. Within this total, 63 sites belong to the Ministry of Defense, (52 warhead

storage site and 11 Navy fuel storage sites), 11 are a part of the Minatom (now known as

Rosatom)90 weapons complex, and 31 are civilian sites. More than 80% of these materials are

located at the Rosatom/Minatom sites.91

MPC&A Projects

DOE provides MPC&A assistance at Russian facilities in two phases. First, it installs rapid

upgrades that are designed to delay unauthorized access to the storage facilities. These may

include the installation of hardened doors and windows, locks and keys to control access,

perimeter fences, and moveable barriers at entry points. The second phase provides

comprehensive upgrades that are tailored to meet the security needs at each individual facility.

These may include monitoring and detection systems, the relocation of guard forces, the

consolidation of materials, central alarm systems, and electronic access control systems. DOE has

helped improve security at sites that house considerably more than half of the former Soviet

Union’s 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials.92 In 2006, DOE altered the way in

which it measures progress in these programs, focusing on the percentage of facilities that had

received upgrades, rather than the percentage of materials that were captured by the upgrades. By

the end of 2006, DOE had completed rapid upgrades at about 81% of the 215 facilities housing

this material and comprehensive upgrades at about 63% of these facilities.93 DOE reported that,

by September of 2007, it had completed upgrades at nearly 90%, or 193, of the buildings.

Moreover, in recent years, some of the funding in this program area has gone to support security

upgrades at nuclear facilities outside the former Soviet Union.

Russia reorganized its government entities, beginning in March 2004. MINATOM, the Ministry of Atomic Energy,

was redesignated as the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, or Rosatom. Rosatom is still the primary agency

responsible for nuclear weapons. See Matthew Bouldin. Updated Analysis. Russian Government Restructuring and the

Future of WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation. RANSAC. May 2004.

U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.

p. 625.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement of Ambassador Linton Brooks. Administrator, NNSA. June

15, 2004. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian Cooperation

Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GA)-03-482. Washington, March 2003. p. 4.

See also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Paul M. Longsworth. Deputy Administrator for

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein after referred to as Longsworth Testimony.)

Bunn, Matthew. Securing the Bomb2007. Project on Managing the Atom. Commissioned by the Nuclear Threat

Initiative. September 2007. p. 65.

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When the upgrades are complete, DOE plans to continue “sustainability efforts” to ensure that the

upgrades remain effective in the long term. This program, titled National Programs and

Sustainability, seeks to create regulations, reporting requirements, training and maintenance

facilities, and other infrastructure components to ensure that Russia can continue to operate its

new security systems.94

Navy Complex

DOE has provided assistance to Russia’s navy by improving security at 39 naval nuclear warhead

storage sites and 11 nuclear fuel storage sites. These sites house approximately 60 metric tons of

weapons-useable nuclear materials and 4,000 nuclear warheads. According to DOE, it had

completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at all naval nuclear fuel storage sites by the end of

2004, and had completed the comprehensive upgrades at the last two warhead sites in FY2006.

The FY2006 budget request included $6.5 million for this program area, a reduction that reflected

the completion of much of the work. However, in response to the U.S. and Russian commitment

at the Bratislava summit to accelerate work on warhead storage security, Congress approved $16

million for the navy complex sites in FY2006. The Bush Administration requested an additional

$17.3 million in FY2007; the House and Senate Armed Services Committees approved this

request. The FY2008 budget requested, and Congress appropriated, $13.4 million for this project

area. The FY2009 budget request included $16.4 million. These funds, and the funds appropriated

in FY2007 and FY2008, will be used to provide “sustainability support” at the sites, which

includes training and site level maintenance on the equipment at the sites, as the upgrades were

completed at by the end of 2008. The FY2010 budget request for this program area included

$33.9 million, with the focus on additional support for training and sustainability. Congress

appropriated 33.8 million for FY2010.

NNSA requested, and Congress appropriated, $34.3 million for the Navy Complex programs in

FY2011. The Administration requested, and Congress approved, an additional $33.7 million for

these programs in FY2012. It has also requested $39.9 million in FY2013. These funds will

support sustainability and training programs at the sites and will provide for the replacement of

outdated security equipment at eight sites.

Strategic Rocket Forces

DOE has completed security upgrades at warhead storage sites for Russia’s strategic rocket

forces. The United States approved upgrades at 25 sites on 11 SRF bases; work on these sites was

completed in late October 2007, nearly two years ahead of schedule.95 It is upgraded security at

nine sites under the command of the 12th Main Directorate, the branch of Russia’s Ministry of

Defense responsible for warhead security and maintenance. It completed the work on upgrades at

these sites in FY2009. DOE requested $47.5 million to continue these activities in FY2006. The

Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 109-163) increased this total by $10 million, and the Energy and

Water Appropriations Bill increased it by $86 million. Consequently, the FY2006 appropriation

for this project area was $120.2 million. The Bush Administration requested, and Congress

approved, $129.3 million for this project area in FY2007. The FY2008 budget request included

For more details see U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget

Justifications. February 2003. p. 655.

Chivers, C.J. Securing Russian Nuclear Missiles? U.S. Is Set to Say “Done.” New York Times, October 31, 2007.

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$91.5 million for this project area. The decline in the request reflected the fact that the accelerated

pace of the last few years had brought some of the sites close to completion. Congress, however,

appropriated $121.9 million for this project area. The FY2009 budget requested only $53.6

million, but Congress appropriated only $34.4 million. The decline again reflects the completion

of most of the work on upgrades and a shift to sustainment activities at all these sites. The

FY2010 budget, however, requested, and Congress appropriated, $48.6 million for this program

area, with a planned expansion of the sustainment activities. The FY2011 budget request

increased this amount to $51.4 million. Congress authorized this request, but the appropriation,

funded through the continuing resolution, equals the FY2010 level of $48.6 million. The

Administration again increased its request in FY2012, and Congress approved, $59.1 million for

this program. These funds supported sustainability and training programs at 23 SRF sites and 3

sites of the 12th Main Directorate.

The Administration has requested $8.3 million for these projects in FY2013. According to the

Administration, the decrease from FY2012 reflects the completion of the sustainability support

efforts in FY2012. The remaining funding will support for 3 training and maintenance centers and

will allow for the replacement of outdated security equipment at up to 11 sites.

Weapons Material Protection (Formerly Rosatom Weapons Complex)

Work at Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, managed by Rosatom, consists of seven sites and

four “Enterprises of the Nuclear Weapons Complex” in Russia’s nine closed nuclear cities. The

buildings in this complex house around 500 metric tons of “highly attractive” weapons-useable

materials.96 DOE has completed rapid upgrades on buildings that house about 60% of these

materials and comprehensive upgrades on buildings that house another 25% of these materials.

By the end of 2006, DOE had completed work on 92 buildings in the Rosatom complex. The pace

of work at these facilities has accelerated, with increased funding and increased cooperation from

Russia, during the past few years. DOE hopes to install security upgrades at all these facilities by

2008. DOE has stated that an access agreement signed in 2001 has “allowed significant access

and acceleration of physical protection systems ... at these large facilities.”97 In addition,

Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham reported that, in numerous meetings with Russia’s

Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, he worked “to accelerate and expand our

programs” and to “clear away the bureaucratic obstacles.”98

The FY2006 budget requested $86 million for this program area, a steep increase from the $18.7

million appropriated in FY2004 and a slight reduction from the $88 million appropriated in

FY2005. Congress approved this request. The FY2007 budget requested only $56.5 million for

this program area. DOE noted that the reduction reflected the completion of many of the projects

that were accelerated over the past few years. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees

both approved this request. The House Energy and Water Development Appropriations

Committee, however, increased this request by $65 million, for a total of $121.5 million for

FY2007; the final appropriation was $85 million. The FY2008 budget requested $60.1 million for

Ibid. p. 639.

U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.

p. 639.

“The FY2004 Nonproliferation Budget: Supporting the Ten Principles for Nuclear and Radiological Materials

Security.” Remarks by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington,

DC. February 10, 2003.

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this project area. Congress again increased the funding, appropriating $79.1 million. The FY2009

budget request showed a steep decline, with the Bush Administration requesting only $32.3

million. This reduction, again, reflects the completion of many projects that were accelerated over

the last few years. Congress, however, appropriated $56.1 million, and, in FY2010, the Obama

Administration requested $71.5 million. Congress appropriated this amount. DOE indicated that,

in FY2009, the majority of the continuing work would occur at the sites at Mayak, Arzamas-16,

and Chelyabinsk-70. The added funding in FY2010 would go to fund upgrades at facilities that

had recently been added to the program and to replace and retrofit equipment that had reached the

end of its service life at facilities that have already received upgrades.

The NNSA budget request for FY2011 included $105.3 million for the Rosatom complex. This

request would fund upgrades at sites that were added to the program after the Bratislava

agreement in 2004. The budget documents indicate that DOE planned to make significant efforts,

in FY2011, toward “implementing a comprehensive MPC&A sustainability effort at these sites.

This funding would also support projects outside Russia, in other former Soviet states. Congress

authorized this request in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act. The Obama Administration

requested, and Congress approved, $80.7 million for the Rosatom complex in FY2012. This

funding will support, among other projects, the start of comprehensive MPC&A upgrades at 10

new buildings that store and process weapons-usable nuclear materials.

The Obama Administration has requested $47 million for this project area in FY2013. The

reduction from FY2012 reflects the fact that many of the ongoing projects that provide security

upgrades will be completed during the year.

Civilian Nuclear Sites

DOE has assisted with the installation of security upgrades at 31 civilian nuclear sites throughout

the former Soviet Union. These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors.

According to DOE, these sites contain around 40 metric tons of weapons-useable materials. DOE

has already completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at most of these facilities; it had

planned to complete the comprehensive upgrades at facilities housing the final 5% of nuclear

materials during FY2006, but this schedule slipped, and they are now due to be completed in

FY2008. It also plans to expand its efforts to secure weapons-useable nuclear materials at civilian

facilities outside the former Soviet Union. DOE has requested, and Congress approved, $47

million for this effort in FY2006, a substantial increase over the $14.6 million appropriated in

FY2005. The Bush Administration requested only $21.2 million for this program area in FY2007.

DOE noted that the decrease reflects the completion of initial upgrades at a facility outside the

former Soviet Union. Congress, however, appropriated $52.7 million for this program area. The

Bush Administration has requested $22.2 million for this effort in FY2008, but Congress again

increased the funding, appropriating $54.2 million. The Bush Administration requested $34.5

million for FY2009, and Congress approved this request. DOE indicated that this funding would

help foster “site capabilities” to operate and maintain the equipment and will provide

sustainability support at the 19 sites with completed upgrades.

The Obama Administration requested $43.5 million for this program area in FY2010; Congress

increased this amount to $63.5 million. The Administration requested, and Congress approved,

$59 million for this effort in FY2011 and $59.1 million in FY2012. The Administration has

requested an additional $60.1 million in FY2013. As with the other projects in this program area,

much of the funding will go to sustainability efforts. Congress authorized the Administration’s

request.

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Material Consolidation and Conversion

In addition to securing sites that house nuclear materials, the MPC&A program is providing

Russia and the other former Soviet states with assistance in consolidating these materials in fewer

facilities and converting them to forms that might be less attractive to nations seeking materials

for nuclear weapons. By the end of FY2003, DOE had planned to remove nuclear materials from

about 40% of the 55 buildings that will eventually be cleared of this material. It also plans to

convert about 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium by 2012.

DOE requested $28 million for this effort in its budget for FY2006. Congress added $10 million

to this request in the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163). The Administration

requested an additional $16.8 million for this program area in FY2007. DOE reports that the

decrease is due to a slow-down in the availability of highly enriched uranium, which is blended

down to low enriched uranium with funds in this area. The Senate Armed Services Committee

approved this request, but the House increased it to $21.8 million. The final amount approved for

FY2007 was $27.7 million, reflecting increases in the appropriations process. The FY2008

budget request included $19.7 million for this project area; Congress appropriated this amount.

The budget request for FY2009 included $20.9 million for this program area. For FY2010, the

Obama Administration reduced the request to $13.6 million. Congress approved this request. In

FY2011, DOE sought, and Congress authorized, $13.9 million for this effort. Congress also

approved the Administration’s request of 14.3 million for FY2012. The Administration has

requested an additional $17 million for FY2013. It plans to continue to use this funding to

continue converting special nuclear materials a form that is less attractive for proliferation to

nations or groups seeking nuclear weapons.

National Programs and Sustainability

The MPC&A budget also supports an effort to build an infrastructure within Russia that can

operate effectively and be sustained in the recipient nations after the initial and comprehensive

upgrades are complete. These efforts include developing regulations, inspection capabilities, site

safeguards, security programs, and other accounting capabilities. The program will operate

regional technical support facilities that can repair and maintain equipment and develop training

programs for participants. In the FY2005 budget request, DOE reduced funding for this initiative

from $41 million appropriated in FY2005 to $30 million, continuing a trend of preceding years.

DOE noted in 2004 that funding in this area had declined because DOE altered it priorities to

support increased funding for MPC&A activities in countries outside the former Soviet Union.99

The Bush Administration sought to reverse this decline in FY2007, with a request of $48.1

million, but Congress appropriated only $29.7 million. The Administration requested $45.6

million in FY2008, and Congress appropriated nearly $70 million. The Bush Administration

requested $59.3 million for FY2009, and Congress appropriated $54.9 million. The Obama

Administration has requested $68.5 million for sustainability programs in FY2010, and Congress

approved this amount. The Obama Administration requested, and Congress authorized, $61

million for this effort in FY2011. The Administration requested, and Congress approved, $60.9

million for FY2012. The Administration has requested an additional $46.2 million for FY2013.

Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005 Nonproliferation Budget

Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004

Congressional Research Service

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

Radiological Dispersion Devices

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many analysts have expressed growing concerns about

the possibility that terrorists might acquire nuclear materials that could be used in a “dirty bomb.”

Although such a device would not explode with a nuclear yield, it could, nonetheless, spread

radiological debris across a wide area. Many nations around the world have nuclear materials at

research facilities, hospitals, or power plants that could be used in a dirty bomb. But most

analysts agree that the states of the former Soviet Union pose a greater threat in this regard,

particularly since the Soviet Union left devices with radioactive materials scattered across its

territory. According to Spencer Abraham, the Secretary of Energy, “more attention is being paid

to the risks associated with the misuse of radiological materials” because they are much “more

abundant and much less secure” than weapons-grade materials.100 Consequently, DOE developed

a program to identify these sites, set priorities, and begin security upgrades. This program

received its initial funding in FY2002, with $20 million allocated from the $150 million Congress

added to the MPC&A program in the Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after

the September 11 attacks.

DOE identified 35 nuclear waste sites in Russia and the other former Soviet states that posed a

threat for the theft or sale of nuclear materials. These states also have radiological sources at

agricultural research institutes, research reactors, medical facilities, intelligence sites, and defense

facilities.101 DOE is also working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to

identify and secure facilities that may house these materials in other nations. In FY2005, DOE

received around $24.8 million for this effort. In the FY2006 budget, DOE moved this program to

the Global Threat Reduction Initiative portion of its program and requested an additional $24

million. It requested $18.3 million for International radiological threat reduction in FY2007 and

$6 million in FY2008; this program no longer focuses exclusively on sites in the former Soviet

Union.

Second Line of Defense

Through its Second Line of Defense Program, DOE contributes to U.S. efforts to help the former

Soviet states detect and intercept attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the country. DOE

has begun to install radiation detection equipment systems at strategic “transit and border sites.”

By the end of FY2006, the program had installed equipment at more than 150 sites and planned to

add 51 more sites in FY2007. According to DOE, the core program has equipped 161 sites in

Russia with radiation detection equipment and hopes to equip a total of 370 sites in Russia with

this equipment by 2011. DOE also plans to provide training and communications equipment to

border control agents to help them implement the plan. The core program has also provided

equipment to 69 sites outside of Russia. This program began in FY1998 and received less than $3

million per year for several years. However, the budget increased to $46 million, and the effort

expanded significantly with funding provided under the FY2002 supplemental appropriations

(P.L. 107-206). DOE requested, and Congress approved, $24 million for the core program of

Second Line of Defense in FY2006.

100

Remarks by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International

Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002

101

U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.

p. 649.

Congressional Research Service

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

Congress also added $28 million in FY2004 for a project known as the Megaports initiative. This

project is developing and deploying radiation detectors for use at the largest foreign seaports that

handle about 70% of the container traffic headed for the United States.102 Megaports is designed

“to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials in the world’s busiest seaports.”

According to former Secretary of Energy Abraham, DOE hopes to install detection equipment at

seaports around the globe. At the end of 2008, according to DOE, the Megaports program had

completed work at 23 ports and planned to complete work at 5 more ports in 2009. The

Administration requested $15 million for this program in FY2005 and $73.9 million for this

program in FY2006. This funding is included in International Nuclear Materials and Protection

portion of the budget, even though it is not intended for use in the former Soviet Union. As a

result, it is not included in this report’s DOE totals for nonproliferation projects in the former

Soviet Union. It is worth noting, however, that the increase in Megaports for FY2006 exceeded

the increase in the entire International Nuclear Materials and Protection portion of the budget,

signaling a shift in funding out of the former Soviet Union and into projects in other nations.

The Bush Administration requested a total of $124 million for Second Line of Defense and

Megaports in FY2007. This was an increase of $27 million over the combined budget for the two

programs in FY2006. But it also contained a significant shift, with $84 million allocated to

Second Line of Defense and only $40 million allocated to Megaports. The increase in SLD

reflects the acceleration of efforts to install radiation detection equipment at sites in the Caucuses

region, while the decrease in Megaports is attributed to the completion of the installation of

radiation detection equipment at five ports in 2006. The House and Senate Armed Services

Committee approved the authorization request for SLD; the House Energy and Water

Appropriations Committee added $40 million, for a total of $123.9 million. For Megaports, the

Senate Armed Services approved the Administration’s request, the House added $15 million to

the authorization request, and the Energy and Water Appropriations Committee added $60

million, for a total of $105.1 million. The appropriators noted that this added funding should be

used to expand work at high-risk foreign ports. It reflects a growing concern in Congress with

port security issues.

The FY2007 budget requested $119.3 million for the Second Line of Defense Program, with

$72.5 million allocated to the Core program and $46.8 million allocated to Megaports. However,

Congress appropriated $191.9 million in FY2007, with $116.1 million going to Megaports. In

FY2008, Congress appropriated $266.9 million, with $136 million going to the core program and

$130.8 million going to Megaports. These increases indicated that Congress has placed a high

priority on detecting possible efforts to smuggle nuclear materials. In its request for FY2009, the

Bush Administration sought $212 million for SLD, with $78.5 million going to the core program

and $134 million going to Megaports. Congress appropriated $71.9 million for the core program

and $102 million for Megaports.

The Obama Administration requested $78.4 million for the core program and $194 million for

Megaports for FY2010; Congress appropriated this amount. The Administration requested $140.4

million for the core program in FY2011, and $124.9 million for Megaports. Congress authorized

this amount in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill, but, with funding provided through the

continuing resolution, the funding remained at $78.4 million for the core program and $194

million for Megaports. The Administration requested a total of $263.8 million for SLD in

102

Hoehn, William. Update on Legislation Affecting U.S-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction.

RANSAC. November 17, 2003.

Congressional Research Service

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance

FY2012, with $129.4 allocated to the core program and $134.4 allocated to Megaports. Congress

appropriated $262 million in FY2012, with a slight reduction taken from the Megaports portion.

In FY2013, the Obama Administration has requested only $92.6 million for the SLD program,

with $73 million allocated to the core program and only $19.6 million allocated to Megaports.

These reductions reflect the fact that DOE completed the installation of radiation detection

equipment and Megaports equipment in FY2012, and will transition to sustainability programs in

FY2013. According to DOE, it has, over the course of the program, installed radiation detection

equipment at 450 sites in the former Soviet Union and Megaports equipment at 45 ports around

the world.

Table 5, below, displays the funding history for many of these International Nuclear Materials

and Cooperation programs. It aggregates the funding for the years between FY2002 and FY2006,

then demonstrates how the budgets have evolved through the appropriations for FY2007-FY2013.

The table demonstrates that funding for SLD, much of which is not spent in the former Soviet

Union, increased sharply during the past decade. In addition, much of the funding in recent years

has gone to

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