Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance
Congressional research reportAug 7, 2009
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Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
August 7, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL31833
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance
Summary
A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq since mid2003. To date, over $49 billion has been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction.
Most recently, in June 2009, Congress provided $439 million in ESF and $20 million in INCLE
funds for Iraq in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-32, H.R. 2346). The $1
billion in ISFF funding appropriated previously in P.L. 110-252 was rescinded and reappropriated
in this bill. The CERP appropriation of $453 million is to be shared with Afghanistan.
A significant number of reconstruction activities, especially those involving construction of road,
sanitation, electric power, oil production, and other infrastructure, are completed or near
completion. Security concerns slowed progress and added considerable expense to these efforts.
Reconstruction priorities and funding mechanisms have changed over time. The Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), the main U.S. assistance account in the first few years, is no longer
available, and most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded. However, many
small-scale, targeted community-level infrastructure efforts are funded under the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The key
emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the
development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
The report will be updated as events warrant. For discussion of the Iraq political situation, see
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted).
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Contents
Most Recent Developments.........................................................................................................1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Congress and U.S. Assistance......................................................................................................1
FY2009 Regular Appropriations............................................................................................4
Defense Authorization for FY2009........................................................................................4
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq Reconstruction ..............................................4
House Action on FY2009 Supplemental ..........................................................................7
Senate Action on FY2009 Supplemental..........................................................................7
Conference Report on FY2009 Supplemental ..................................................................7
FY2010 Regular Appropriations Request ..............................................................................8
U.S. Reconstruction Assistance ...................................................................................................8
U.S. Assistance Implementors ...............................................................................................8
Reconstruction Programs: 2003-2006.................................................................................. 10
Reconstruction Priorities: 2007-2010 .................................................................................. 12
Infrastructure Sustainability and Asset Transfer ................................................................... 13
Capacity Development and Iraqi Capital Budget Execution ................................................. 14
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ............................................................................. 16
CERP.................................................................................................................................. 18
Assistance to Security Forces .............................................................................................. 19
Accountability, Waste, and Fraud ........................................................................................ 20
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Iraq ...................................................................................................3
Table 2. FY2009 Supplemental for Iraq: Request and Conference Report ....................................5
Appendixes
Appendix. Notable Reconstruction Assessments........................................................................ 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 25
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Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance
Most Recent Developments
On July 9, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1434, the FY2010 State,
Foreign Operations Appropriations, providing $375 million in ESF and $52 million in INCLE.
On July 9, 2009, the House approved H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations
Appropriations, providing $400 million in ESF and $52 million in INCLE.
In June 2009, Congress approved the FY2009 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-32, H.R.
2346), providing $439 million in ESF and $20 million in INCLE. The $1 billion in ISFF funding
appropriated in P.L. 110-252 was rescinded and reappropriated in this bill. The CERP
appropriation of $453 million is to be shared with Afghanistan.
On May 7, 2009, the Administration issued its FY2010 State, Foreign Operations budget request,
including $500 million for Iraq economic aid, composed of $415.7 million in ESF, $52 million in
INCLE, $30.3 million in NADR, and $2 million in IMET account funds. The FY2010 DOD
budget request contained $1.5 billion for the CERP, to be shared with Afghanistan. There was no
DOD request for the Iraq Security Forces Fund.
Introduction
Following the 2003 intervention in Iraq, the United States undertook a large-scale assistance
program meant to stabilize the country, rehabilitate economic infrastructure, and introduce
representative government, among other objectives. Even as the U.S. military role in Iraq winds
down, this program, funded through a mix of appropriations accounts, will continue to be
scrutinized closely by the 111th Congress. This report describes recent developments in this
assistance effort. For detailed discussion of the Iraq political and security situation, see CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted).
Congress and U.S. Assistance
Over the years, U.S. assistance to Iraq has been provided through multiple appropriations
accounts (see Table 1 for funding levels). In the first several years of the U.S. effort in Iraq, the
bulk of U.S. assistance was provided through a specially created Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (IRRF), placed under the direct control of the President, supporting aid efforts in a wide
range of sectors, including water and sanitation, electricity, oil production, training and equipping
of Iraqi security forces, education, democracy, and rule of law. The Fund, established in the April
2003 FY2003 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 108-11, H.R. 1559/H.Rept. 108-76) and replenished
in the November 2003 FY2004 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 108-106, H.R. 3289/H.Rept. 108337), eventually totaled nearly $21 billion.
A new DOD account supporting the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, the Iraq
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), was set up under the May 2005 FY2005 emergency supplemental
(P.L. 109-13, H.R. 1268/H.Rept. 109-72). Previously, most security training funds had been
provided out of the IRRF. Policy responsibility for the IRRF, originally delegated to the CPA
(under DOD authority), had, since the end of the occupation in June 2004, belonged to the State
Department as a result of a Presidential directive (NSPD 36, May 11, 2004), which, nonetheless,
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continued to give DOD the main role in directing security aid. Putting funding for security
assistance entirely under DOD, however, was a sharp departure from historic practice. Under
most military assistance programs—Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International
Military Education and Training Program (IMET)—State makes broad policy and DOD
implements the programs. The conference report on the supplemental adopted the President’s
formula for the new account but required that the Iraq Security Forces Fund be made available
“with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.”
Another DOD account, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), has provided
immediate reconstruction and humanitarian assistance at the local level to support the work of
U.S. military commanders. A Business Task Force, attempting to rehabilitate state-owned
enterprises to stimulate the Iraqi economy and increase employment, has been funded out of the
DOD Iraq Freedom Fund account.
By FY2006, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account had replaced the IRRF as the main spigot
of U.S. economic aid, provided in support of a wide variety of economic development and
governance efforts, but not funding the large-scale infrastructure programs or the security forces
training that characterized much of the IRRF. ESF, in particular, was a key component of the socalled “surge” initiative, announced in January 2007. It largely funds the programs implemented
by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), including local governance support; programs
implemented by USAID, such as improvements to community infrastructure, job training,
vocational education, and micro-loans; and supports programs at the national level, including
Ministerial capacity development, agriculture and private sector reform, and strengthening of the
judicial process and democratization efforts.
In addition to ESF, the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement account (INCLE) has
supported “rule of law” efforts, the Democracy Fund supports a range of democratization and
civil society efforts, and the Treasury Department Technical Assistance program offers experts on
financial issues to the government of Iraq. Humanitarian refugee and displaced persons concerns
have been addressed by programs funded under the Migration and Refugee (MRA) and
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) accounts.
Until now, most funding for Iraq reconstruction has been appropriated under emergency
supplemental appropriations legislation, because it is “off-budget” and does not compete with
other aid priorities in the regular aid bill. Efforts to “regularize” the economic assistance program
for Iraq by requesting funds in the traditional annual foreign operations appropriations bill have
met with limited success. The first such effort, in 2005 for the FY2006 foreign operations bill
(P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057), saw only $60.4 million (after rescission) provided of a $414 million
request, because some Members felt that sufficient funds remained unobligated in the IRRF—at
the time, $3-$5 billion—from which the Administration could draw to pay for continuing
reconstruction. In December 2007, Congress rejected almost all of the regular FY2008 ESF and
INCLE request for Iraq (sec. 699K of P.L. 110-161, Division J), specifically approving only
humanitarian aid, including demining and refugees and internally displaced persons programs. In
the FY2009 regular appropriations for foreign operations (sec. 7042 of P.L. 111-8, Division H),
Congress only approved demining assistance. From FY2010 on, the Obama Administration
intends to request all Iraq aid in the annual regular appropriations.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Iraq
(appropriations in $ millions)
Fiscal Year
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
Democracy Fund
INCLE (Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement)
IFTA (Treasury Dept. Tech Asst.)
MRA (Migration & Refugee Asst.)
NADR (Nonprolif, Anti-Terror, De-mining)
IMET (Int’l Mil. Ed & Training Program )
IDA (Int’l Disaster Assistance)
Other USAID Funds
Total 150 Account
DOD - Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)
DOD - Iraq Army
DOD - CERP
DOD - Oil Repair
DOD - Iraq Freedom Fund - Business
Support
Total 050 Account
Total U.S. Reconstruction Assistance
2003
2,475.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
469.9
2,944.9
—
51.2
—
802.0
2004
18,389.0a
—
—
—
—
—
—
1.2
—
—
18,390.2
—
—
140.0
—
2005
2006
10.0b
1,535.4
—
91.4
13.0
—
—
—
7.9
—
1,657.7
3,007.0
—
697.5
—
2007
—
—
—
—
—
—
3.6
—
—
—
3.6
5,391.0
210.0e
718.0
—
—
1,620.8c
250.0
170.0
2.8
65.0
19.4
1.1
50.0
—
2,179.1
5,542.3
—
748.4
—
—
429.0
75.0
85.0
—
179.5
20.4
—
80.0
—
868.9
3,000.0
—
1,280.8
—
—
541.5
—
20.0
—
249.0d
35.5
2.0
45.0d
—
893.0
1,000.0
—
—f
—
Enacted
Total
2003-2009
20,874.0
4,126.7
325.0
366.4
15.8
493.5
78.9
4.3
182.9
469.9
26,937.4
17,940.3
261.2
3,584.7
802.0
—
853.2
3,798.1
—
140.0
18,530.2
—
6,319.0
6,322.6
—
3,704.5
5,362.2
50.0
6,340.7
8,519.8
50.0
4,330.8
5,199.7
—
1,000.0
1,893.0
100.0
22,688.2
49,625.6
2008
2009
Sources: State Department FY2010 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification; SIGIR Report to Congress, July 30, 2009; and CRS calculations.
Notes: The 150 account encompasses International Affairs spending and is mostly appropriated in the State/Foreign Operations bill. The 050 account is Defense
appropriations. This table does not contain agency operational costs, including CPA, State Department, and PRTs, except where these are embedded in the larger
reconstruction accounts. Estimated operational costs to date are an additional $2.0-$3.0 billion.
a.
Original appropriation was $18,439 million. $50 million was rescinded in 2008 by P.L. 110-252.
b.
Transfer from ESF.
c.
State Department rescinded $76 million in 2008.
d.
Appropriation did not provide specified amount for Iraq. Assumes request level will be met.
e.
Transfer from ISFF to reimburse Army for previous Iraqi training expenses.
f.
Total CERP appropriation in FY2009 was $1.453 billion, shared with Afghanistan. Total allocation for Iraq not yet available.
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FY2009 Regular Appropriations
On February 4, 2008, the Bush Administration submitted its FY2009 regular appropriations
request, providing $397 million for Iraq reconstruction under foreign operations and, as had been
the case until the FY2010 budget submission, making no Iraq aid request under the regular DOD
appropriations. Of the requested amount, $300 million was for ESF, $75 million for INCLE (rule
of law), and $20 million for NADR (mostly demining).
On July 16, 2008, the House State/Foreign Operations Subcommittee approved its FY2009 bill. It
provided no funding for Iraq. On July 17, the full Senate Appropriations Committee reported S.
3288 (S.Rept. 110-425), its version of the FY2009 State/Foreign Operations bill, recommending
$75 million in ESF and $25 million in INCLE funds for Iraq, $275 below the combined request
for these accounts. A recommended NADR account amount for Iraq was not specified.
On March 11, 2009, the President signed the FY2009 Omnibus appropriations into law (P.L. 1118, H.R. 1105), providing regular FY2009 foreign operations funding (Division H). With the
exception of demining assistance, it provides no funds for Iraq reconstruction (Div. H, sec. 7042).
As noted above, most economic and security assistance for Iraq has been provided under
emergency supplemental legislation. The legislation requires that all FY2009 assistance,
including supplementals, be provided “only to the extent that the Government of Iraq matches
such assistance on a dollar-for-dollar basis.” It also requires that the Secretary of State submit a
report detailing plans for the transition of assistance programs to the Government of Iraq.
Defense Authorization for FY2009
On October 14, 2008, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 was
signed into law (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417). It contains several provisions of importance to the
reconstruction of Iraq. The most significant provision (sec. 1508) bans the use of ISFF funds for
infrastructure projects. A large proportion of IRRF security funding and ISFF funds has gone to
the construction of training facilities, border forts, police stations, and the like. The congressional
view in approving this measure is that the Iraqis should now provide such infrastructure from
their own resources. In another effort to limit the use of U.S. funds for infrastructure, the Act (sec.
1214) restricts the use of the CERP by setting a maximum limit on project cost at $2 million;
anything over $1 million must be certified by the Secretary of Defense as an urgent humanitarian
or reconstruction requirement. The legislation also authorizes (sec. 1501) only half of the
Administration’s FY2009 ISFF request, providing only the $1 billion already approved in the
FY2008/2009 supplemental approved in June 2008.
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq Reconstruction
The FY2009 supplemental assistance request for Iraq reflects the Obama Administration’s
intention to move toward a diminished U.S. presence in the country. The total non-humanitarian
foreign operations aid request amounted to $482 million, which, with already appropriated
amounts from the June 2008 FY2009 “bridge” supplemental (P.L. 110-252) and the regular
FY2009 appropriations approved in March 2009 (P.L. 111-8), would bring total non-humanitarian
foreign operations assistance to $605 million, basically the same amount as appropriated in
FY2008. The equivalent amount in FY2007 was $2 billion, which would have been available
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through FY2008. Without a similar cushion of funds from the preceding year, the FY2009 request
may be seen as a notable decrease in economic assistance.
The request for DOD assistance represents a more pronounced decline. The Administration asked
that the $1 billion appropriated in the FY2009 “bridge” appropriation to the Iraq Security Forces
Fund (ISFF), which supports training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, be rescinded and reappropriated in this new FY2009 supplemental bill. In essence, the request was made in order to
extend availability of these funds. The “bridge” appropriation would have expired at end of
September 2009; with this new appropriation, it would be available until end of September 2010.
If the request was approved—as largely turned out to be the case—the trend in ISFF totals would
appear as follows: $5.5 billion in FY2007, $3 billion in FY2008, and $1 billion in FY2009. The
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) request, totaling $453 million, was, as for
other years, to be shared by both Afghanistan and Iraq.
The $482 million foreign operations request broke down as follows—$449 million in Economic
Support Fund (ESF), $20 million in International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), $2
million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $11 million in Narcotics,
Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds. Within these accounts, the
largest amounts were requested for certain programs in ESF that well-characterize the Iraq
assistance program at this stage. Of programs supporting improved governance, the Quick
Response Fund ($45 million), a civilian equivalent of the CERP, is a key tool of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that allow U.S. civilians, with security provided by the U.S.
military, to maintain a presence in the provinces, deal directly with local leaders, and bolster local
government. The Local Governance Program ($55 million), managed by USAID, helps build
management and knowledge skills of provincial government personnel. The Community Action
Program (CAP) ($35 million) funds projects identified by local representative associations.
Ministerial Capacity Development ($60 million) seeks to enhance the capabilities of Iraqi central
government personnel, especially focusing on helping them execute their budgets. Significant
funding ($112 million) was requested to support national elections scheduled for later this year.
Key programs supporting economic growth in Iraq are Economic Reform ($50 million) activities
to build a better regulatory system and in Agriculture ($43 million), which after oil production is
Iraq’s best hope for an improved economy.
In addition to the security and economic aid-related requests for Iraq, the supplemental request
contained a humanitarian aid component. The Migration and Refugee Assistance account (MRA)
included $108 million to address the needs of the roughly 4.8 million Iraqi refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs).
Table 2. FY2009 Supplemental for Iraq: Request and Conference Report
Request
P.L. 111-32
150 Foreign Operations Accounts
Economic Support
Fund (ESF)
$449 million, of which:
$439 million, of which:
Civil Society & Elections
$112 million
Civil Society & Elections
$118 million
Community Action
Program (CAP)
$35 million
Community Action
Program (CAP)
$50 million
Ruzicka War Victims
Fund
$3.5 million
Ruzicka War Victims
Fund
$10 million
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Request
International
Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism,
Demining and Related
Programs (NADR)
P.L. 111-32
War Widows
$5 million
War Widows
$5 million
Quick Response Fund
$45 million
Iraq Cultural Antiquities
$2 million
Ministerial Capacity
Development
$60 million
Targeted Stability
Programs
$15 million
Local Governance
$55 million
Unallocated
$239 million
Economic Reform
$50 million
Provincial Economic
Growth
$27.5 million
Agriculture
$43 million
Program Support
$13 million
$20 million, of which:
$20 million, unallocated
Police Transition Planning
$5 million
Judiciary
$9 million
Rule of Law Advisors
$3 million
Program Support
$3 million
$11 million of which:
Level for Iraq not Specified
Train ISF for Diplomatic
Protection
$6 million
Terrorist Interdiction
$0.5 million
Border Control
$2 million
WMD
$1 million
Nuclear Waste Disposal
$1.5 million
International Military
Education and
Training (IMET)
$2 million
$2 million
Migration and Refugee
Assistance (MRA)
$108 million
Level for Iraq not Specified
050 DOD Accounts
Iraq Security Forces
Fund (ISFF)
$1 billion
Coinciding with
cancellation of
$1 billion from
FY2009
“bridge” (P.L.
110-252).
$1 billion
Coinciding with
rescission of $1
billion from
FY2009
“bridge” (P.L.
110-252).
Commander’s
Emergency Response
Program (CERP)
$453 million
For both Iraq
and
Afghanistan.
$453 million
For both Iraq
and
Afghanistan.
Source: Department of State, OMB, and Conference Report H.Rept. 111-151 on H.R. 2346.
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House Action on FY2009 Supplemental
The House-approved bill (H.R. 2346) matched the Administration request for most items
associated with Iraq reconstruction aid. Bill language appropriated the request for the ISFF, and
House Appropriations Committee explanatory language provided the request for the CERP, ESF,
INCLE, NADR, and IMET accounts. Sufficient funds were provided to the overall MRA account
to meet the Iraq request here.
The most notable change from the Administration request came in operating expense accounts.
The State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs account, which funds staff salaries,
expenses, and security, was increased in the case of Iraq by 224%, from a request of $150 million
to a House allocation of $486 million. The Appropriations Committee took this action in order to
fund the Iraq Mission through the first quarter of 2010 as it transitions “both to an annualized
funding cycle and to a more regular diplomatic and development program.” Funds are largely to
lease facilities supporting the Mission and to provide for civilian security needs that, presumably,
are expected to increase as U.S. troops draw down.
Senate Action on FY2009 Supplemental
The FY2009 supplemental approved by the Senate mostly followed the Administration request
for Iraq reconstruction—matching the request for CERP, INCLE, NADR, and IMET accounts,
and reducing by only $10 million the ESF level to $439 million. Sufficient funds were also
provided to the overall MRA account to meet the Iraq request. On the ISFF, however, the Senate
bill departed from the request. Instead of rescinding $1 billion from the FY2009 “bridge”
supplemental and re-appropriating it in this bill, the Senate version left the “bridge” appropriation
intact and still appropriated $1 billion in the new supplemental. Further, recognizing that
responsibility to train Iraqi security forces will transition from DOD to the Department of State in
August 2010, the committee added language transferring unobligated balances, as of July 31,
2010, to State to use for this purpose. Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill matched the
Administration’s $150 million request for the State Diplomatic and Consular Programs account.
Conference Report on FY2009 Supplemental
The conference report on H.R. 2346 closely follows the Administration request for Iraq
reconstruction aid. ESF is provided at $439 million, $10 million less than the request. INCLE, at
$20 million, and IMET, at $2 million, match the request. The ISFF appropriation from P.L. 110252 was essentially extended for another year, by the rescission and reappropriation of its $1
billion. The $453 million in requested CERP funds (shared with Afghanistan) is provided.
Amounts from other accounts requested by the Administration are not specified in the bill, but
will likely be allocated at or near the request level.
Bill language specifies that not less than $15 million of ESF be used for targeted development
programs determined by the Ambassador. Explanatory language made special reference to the
treatment of women in Iraq and encouraged the use of funds to incorporate women in the course
of stabilizing the country and building government institutions.
The conference report adopted the $486 million House level for State Operating Expenses,
addressing the FY2010 request early in order to assist the Embassy transition to a more regular
diplomatic and aid program.
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FY2010 Regular Appropriations Request
On May 7, 2009, the Administration issued its FY2010 State, Foreign Operations budget request,
including $500 million for Iraq economic aid. The request is composed of $415.7 million in ESF,
$52 million in INCLE, $30.3 million in NADR, and $2 million in IMET account funds.
The FY2010 DOD budget request contains $1.5 billion for the CERP, to be shared with
Afghanistan. There is no DOD request for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the first time since 2003
that there has been no large funding request for the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces.
In H.R. 2647, the House authorized $1.3 billion for the CERP; in S. 1390, the Senate authorized
$1.4 billion. The House-approved FY2010 DOD appropriations bill, H.R. 3326 (July 30, 2009),
provides $1.3 billion, to be shared with Afghanistan.
On July 9, 2009, the House approved H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations
Appropriations. The House bill provides $400 million in ESF and $52 million in INCLE, but
makes no specific allocation under NADR and IMET accounts. In report language (H.Rept. 111187), the Appropriations Committee recommended that $50 million of the ESF go to USAID’s
Civilian Assistance Program and $126 million go to democracy and civil society activities. It also
notes its support for all efforts to incorporate women in Iraq’s stabilization and government
institutions. The bill would require that assistance follow the U.S. government guidelines that
have been established in response to earlier legislation requiring that funds be matched by Iraq.
On July 9, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1434, its version of the
FY2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations, providing $375 million in ESF and $52
million in INCLE. It does not specify an amount for NADR and IMET. The committee report
(S.Rept. 111-44) recommended $5 million for the Marla Ruzicka War Victims Fund and not more
than $50 million for USAID’s Ministerial Capacity Development program, $35 million below the
Administration request for this program, because of its belief that the Iraqi government should
funds such programs itself.
U.S. Reconstruction Assistance
Among the key policy objectives laid out by the Bush Administration was the economic and
political reconstruction of Iraq. Since 2003, discussion and debate have been ongoing regarding
the strategy to reach these ends utilizing reconstruction aid funds and the effectiveness of aid
implementation. Although the aid program is already greatly diminished from its first years, a
changed U.S. role in Iraq, as proposed by the Obama Administration, is reflected in the FY2010
aid request largely due to the absence of a request for the ISFF, but ESF would also decline by
23% from FY2009 if the request is met. As U.S. forces draw down, there are likely to be
substantial changes in the way in which U.S. assistance is provided. Elements of the history,
current state, and possible future of the aid program are discussed below.
U.S. Assistance Implementors
On June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the agency established to
temporarily rule Iraq and implement reconstruction programs, was dissolved as Iraq regained its
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sovereignty. At that time, broad responsibility for assistance programs moved from the Secretary
of Defense to the Secretary of State.1 In Iraq, the United States provides assistance and, to the
extent possible, policy guidance to the Iraqi government through its U.S. embassy under U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Hill.
Within the embassy, an Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) was established by executive
order (13431) in May 2007, supplanting some of the functions of the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO) that had, itself, supplanted CPA efforts in setting requirements and
priorities for the aid program. It managed most of the IRRF and continues to manage much
funding related to infrastructure. It is expected to expire in May 2010. The embassy’s Office of
Provincial Affairs is in charge of the PRTs (see PRT section below). Within the embassy, there are
also separate coordinators for the many activities addressing anti-corruption and rule of law that
are carried out by multiple U.S. government entities.
With the policy guidance of the ambassador, U.S. military officers are in charge of overseeing the
training and support of all Iraqi security forces. Although the State Department had assumed
control of technical assistance provided to the different Iraq ministries, in October 2005 it ceded
responsibility to DOD for the two ministries most closely involved in security matters—Interior
and Defense. Among reasons given for this switch were that DOD had greater resources at its
disposal and that State had difficulty filling advisor positions in these ministries, the latter point
disputed by some. In most other countries, State has responsibility for training police forces.2 The
State Department is expected to resume a police training role in Iraqi in FY2010 as U.S. troops
withdraw.
DOD has also played a major role administering and implementing development programs more
normally associated with civilian agencies. In charge of the embassy’s Project and Contracting
Office (PCO), the Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (ACE-GRD), was chiefly
responsible for the more than $10 billion in FY2004-funded IRRF programs dedicated to
infrastructure construction, as well as follow-on sustainability efforts. Although in the
Department of the Army, it reported to the Department of State as well as to the Department of
the Defense. More recently, ACE-GRD has implemented the infrastructure projects under the
roughly $700 million ESF-funded Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC)
program and the DOD-funded CERP.
A third major U.S. actor in the implementation of the aid program is the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Responsible for more than $6 billion of assistance to date,
USAID manages a wide range of economic, social, and political development programs. Its
programs have included a multi-faceted, large-scale construction project and most activities
related to public health, agricultural development, basic and higher education, civil society, local
governance, democratization, and policy reform.
A July 2009 State Department Inspector General inspection of the U.S. embassy noted that many
aid functions are dispersed among numerous actors and are misaligned with traditional aid roles,
largely as a result of the ad hoc and urgent nature of their origin during the occupation and
insurgency. Among other things, it noted that multiple agencies and offices are involved in some
1
According to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) of May 11, 2004. It made the Secretary of State
responsible for “continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq.”
2
“Aid to Iraq Ministries to Shift to Pentagon,” Washington Post, September 26, 2005.
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capacity development activities, but have only recently adopted a coordination mechanism to
address redundancies and gaps in aid. In view of the impending military drawdown and the
anticipated decline in numbers of specialist temporary employees, the IG recommended that steps
be taken to incorporate appropriate assistance programs into USAID’s portfolio.3
Reconstruction Programs: 2003-2006
Most funding during the first several years of the U.S. assistance program came from the Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The nearly $21 billion provided through that account
supported the entire range of economic and security programs. Although FY2004 IRRF funding
levels were initially established in 10 categories of assistance, reconstruction priorities changed
over time and allocations mirrored shifting events on the ground. For example, after the State
Department took charge in June 2004, the new U.S. Embassy country team reallocated FY2004
IRRF resources, emphasizing security needs, increased oil production, greater employment, and
democracy as the highest priorities, at the expense of many large-scale economic infrastructure
projects—in particular water and sanitation and electricity—that were viewed as too slowly
implemented and dependent on an improved security situation to have an immediate impact.4 In
the end, nearly a quarter of the IRRF ($5 billion) has gone to the training and equipping of Iraqi
security forces, nearly half (roughly $10 billion) to economic infrastructure—the construction of
water, oil, electric, and other facilities—and another quarter to a range of more traditional
assistance in health, education, policy reform, and other areas.
These reconstruction programs have shown mixed results.5 There have been many positive
outputs. Among achievements of the U.S. reconstruction program, more than 1,200 security
facilities—police stations, border forts, fire stations, courts, etc.—were completed. Nearly a halfmillion police and military security forces were trained and equipped. Health facilities were
rehabilitated and equipped, health care providers trained, and medical services such as
immunizations provided. The deepwater port at Umm Qasr was restored, as were 96 of 98
railway stations, two international airports, and three regional ones. Local governance was
strengthened through establishment of councils and community associations. More than 6,000
grassroots projects were conducted through USAID grants provided to more than 1,450
community action groups. Voter education, training of election monitors, and related activities
contributed to three successful elections in 2005. Technical experts provided advice to
government agencies regarding adoption of budgetary and management reforms. About 6,716
schools were rehabilitated and 60,000 teachers trained. Irrigation systems were rehabilitated, 68
veterinary clinics reconstructed, and 83,500 date palm offshoots planted. Agricultural extension
agents were trained and agribusiness supported. Credit was provided to micro and small business.
U.S.-funded projects added 2,500 megawatts (MW) to Iraq’s generating capacity. Water and
sanitation sector assistance provided clean water to 6.7 million people and sanitation to 5.1
million. Oil production, largely stagnant in the first years, by 2008 had risen to near pre-war
levels.
3
State Department Inspector General, Report of Inspection, Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, ISP-I-09-30A, July 2009, p. 29.
4
Water and sanitation projects were cut by half (from $4.3 billion to $2.1 billion), and electric power programs lost a
quarter of their original funding (from $5.6 to $4.2 billion).
5
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009 and previous reports; Department of State, 2207 Report to Congress,
January 2009 and previous reports.
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Yet, along with the accomplishments have come less than satisfactory outcomes. In the critical
sectors of electric power and oil production, outputs were less than originally envisioned.6 Many
health-related construction projects experienced considerable delays, and contracts won by U.S.
firms had to be revoked and re-awarded to Iraqis, including 12 of 20 refurbished hospitals. Only
91 of a planned 142 new clinics will be completed with U.S. funding. Further, the Basrah
Children’s Hospital had significant cost overruns. Although the airports and seaport showed
considerable activity, only a tiny percentage of Iraqi trains ran because of security concerns,
although numbers have been improving since 2008. Despite democratization efforts, halting
progress has been made on achieving national reconciliation.
Moreover, the impact of U.S. projects on Iraq is hard to estimate, and the extent to which they
and other-donor contributions meet the total needs of Iraq has not been fully assessed. While the
U.S. water and sanitation contribution has been significant, the International Committee of the
Red Cross estimated in 2008 that more than 40% of Iraqis do not have access to clean water.
Despite U.S. efforts in the health sector, Oxfam reported in 2007 that 90% of Iraq’s 180 hospitals
lacked basic medical and surgical supplies.7 U.S. transport assistance is said to have repaired only
8 bridges of 1,156 in poor condition or destroyed. Although mismanagement and corruption play
a large role in diminishing returns from reconstruction efforts, it has been the lack of stability and
the effects of the insurgency that have most affected the course of reconstruction. 8 A more
6
Oil production accounts for more than 90% of Iraqi government revenue. Recognizing the importance of oil revenue
to Iraq reconstruction, more than $2.5 billion of total U.S. reconstruction funding was devoted to restoring and
expanding oil production infrastructure. Oil exporting resumed in mid-June 2003, but oil production was slowed by
sabotage and corruption, and the CPA target of 2.8-3.0 million barrels/day (MBD) by end of 2004 was not met. In
September 2004, rates of production reached a peak of 2.67 MBD compared with an estimated pre-war rate of 2.5
MBD, but rates fell after that and hovered at around 2.0 MDB until 2007 when production grew again to reach the 2.5
MBD mark. As of July 2009, the rate was 2.5 MBD. Before the war, electric power was 4,500 MW and until the end of
2007 capacity fell well below this level despite an early goal of reaching 6,000 MW. By late 2007, it had increased to
around 4,550 MW, a post-war record. Nevertheless, in Baghdad, Iraqis receive fewer hours of electricity than before
the war (averaging about 14 hours in early August 2009); elsewhere they receive more than previously (about 14
hours). Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, August 5, 2009.
7
State Department, Iraq Weekly Status Report, November 5, 2008, p. 14; Oxfam, Rising to the Humanitarian
Challenge in Iraq, July 30, 2007, p. 3 and 11.
8
The cumulative effect on the reconstruction effort of years of continued instability has been manifold. Implementation
of reconstruction projects was hindered. Security threats prevented PRT personnel from communicating directly with
local governments, construction workers from appearing at their jobs, and project managers from monitoring project
work. Completed reconstruction projects and pre-existing infrastructure were destroyed. For instance, in June 2007,
eight of the twelve 400-kV transmission lines were out of service, greatly reducing the electricity supply to Baghdad.
Major pipelines were sabotaged, shutting down oil exports. Along with criminal activity and poor equipment, insurgent
attacks are estimated to be responsible for the loss of $16 billion in oil revenue during a two year period from 20052006. Reconstruction costs rose substantially due to the need to provide for security and insurance for personnel.
Estimates of the portion of project costs devoted to security have varied widely—a 2006 SIGIR survey of major U.S.
contractors found security costs to range from a low of 7.6% to a high of 16.7%. Unanticipated security costs as well as
the related need to shift $1.8 billion from water and power projects to the training and equipping of Iraqi forces meant
that infrastructure programs could accomplish less than originally anticipated. Fearing for their safety, many aid
implementors were withdrawn from the country, with U.N. and some bilateral aid donors forced to run programs from
Jordan or Kuwait utilizing Iraqi personnel to the extent possible. With implementors not able to meet with local people
and design and monitor projects as they would in other countries, the quality of aid has likely been negatively affected.
The pool of foreign expertise available to offer technical assistance has been restricted to those few willing to endure
the country’s hardships. U.S. agency personnel stay only a short time (usually one year) and therefore institutional
knowledge is not maintained. Among the 2.4 million Iraqis who have fled the country are professionals necessary to
successful reconstruction. In 2006, more than 300 teachers and Ministry of Education staff were killed. Since 2003, an
estimated 8,000 doctors fled the country, thereby hindering the ability to open new health facilities. Notable signs of
the decrease in violence in 2008 were reports of the return of many foreign aid staff and the reappearance of 800 Iraqi
(continued...)
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peaceful environment since 2007 has set the stage for noteworthy improvements in the electric,
oil, and other sectors.
Reconstruction Priorities: 2007-2010
Reconstruction priorities in the period from 2007 mainly reflect the “surge” strategy enunciated
by the Bush Administration in January 2007 as well as the fact that IRRF funds are exhausted and
large-scale infrastructure programs, which chiefly characterized IRRF economic efforts, are no
longer funded as plentifully by the United States.9 The major elements of assistance in this period
have been as follows:
•
Military-Security Assistance. More than 62% of total FY2007-FY2008 regular
and supplemental reconstruction appropriations were applied to the training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces. This effort was funded entirely from the ISFF.
Economic-social-democratization assistance has been funded mostly with Economic Support
Fund (ESF) assistance, categorized under three “tracks”:
•
Security Track. Under the security track are assistance programs supporting
work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and USAID to improve
local governance and establish stability in strategic locations (see PRT section
below for details).
•
Economic Track. This track encompasses assistance to help Iraqis operate,
maintain, and sustain U.S.-funded infrastructure projects (see sustainability
section below for discussion), and to develop agriculture and small business.
•
Political Track. Under the political track are a range of efforts to support
governance, democratization, and rule of law programs at all levels of
government in Iraq, including helping Iraqi ministries improve their ability to
operate and helping local governments administer their provinces and
municipalities.
Finally, there has been increasing attention paid to humanitarian needs.
•
Humanitarian Aid. The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) accounts address the problems of a
refugee and internally displaced persons population amounting to more than 4.6
million.
Security, sustainability, PRTs, governance, and humanitarian needs constituted the key features of
Bush Administration reconstruction aid program from 2007 through 2008. The Obama
Administration can be said to be continuing many of these programs, but some key distinctions
(...continued)
doctors.
9
A number of significant infrastructure efforts remain—a new Amara surgical hospital is being funded with ESF funds,
the CERP supports larger, targeted neighborhood-oriented infrastructure projects, sustainment of completed
infrastructure projects continues, and, until an October 2008 legislative prohibition was imposed, the ISFF supported
construction of security-related facilities.
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can be seen based on statements from officials as well as the FY2009 supplemental and FY2010
appropriations requests.
For one, the overall level of assistance is falling significantly. In FY2009, the change is largely in
ISFF levels, which decreased by two-thirds in FY2009 from the previous year. As suggested by
this decrease and the absence of any request for the ISFF in FY2010, support for the Iraq security
forces will alter in coming months. The training of the Iraqi military will be conducted by an Iraq
Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM), and training of the Iraqi police will be handed to the
Department of State.
The pending drawdown on U.S. troops means that both the CERP, distributed by U.S. forces, and
PRT activities, dependent on U.S. troop protection, may be expected to decline, while other
mechanisms to provide aid to the grassroots might be found. It has been reported that four new
Army brigades—Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs)—have been created focusing on advising
Iraqi troops and providing transport and other stability support to civilian reconstruction
personnel. 10
Economic aid in the two main spigots, ESF and INCLE, would fall by about 17% if the FY2010
Administration request is met. Assistance would emphasize improved local and national
governance capabilities as well as specific economic policy reforms at the national level.
Infrastructure Sustainability and Asset Transfer
As large-scale construction projects—power plants, water and sanitation systems, oil facilities,
etc.—have been completed, there has been concern regarding the ability of Iraqis to maintain and
fund their operations once they are handed-over to Iraqi authorities. This concern has grown
following SIGIR “sustainment reviews” that suggested projects transferred to Iraqi control are not
being adequately maintained. For instance, a July 2007 assessment found that two Baghdad
region power station units that had been rehabilitated with U.S. funds were not operational,
largely because of insufficiently maintained equipment. 11 More recently, Humvees provided to the
Iraqi military, reportedly, are being cannibalized for spare parts rather than properly repaired. 12
To insure long-term sustainability, a U.S. effort led by the Army Corps of Engineers has focused
on capacity development—providing training to the appropriate personnel in the labor force who
will operate and maintain facilities and insuring sufficient funds are available for repairs and
equipment replacement following project completion. At the Ministry level, the United States is
assisting development of policies and laws conducive to efficient use and maintenance of
infrastructure. Nearly $300 million in ESF has been used to support sustainment of U.S. projects.
In addition, the United States has provided significant assistance to support the physical
protection of important infrastructure, in particular electricity and oil facilities. Efforts to secure
infrastructure include the use of biometrics, construction of security perimeters, lighting and
10
“Troops Ordered to Advise Iraqis,” Washington Times, July 15, 2009.
11
SIGIR, Report to Congress, April 30, 2007, p. 147; SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2007, p. 7; SIGIR, Project
Assessment 07-103, Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, July 18, 2007.
12
“Lower Oil Prices Put Iraq’s Security Forces in Bind at Crucial Time,” Washington Post, May 20, 2009
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communications improvements, establishment of exclusion zones for pipelines, and
enhancements to the forward operating bases used by the Iraqi army to protect infrastructure.13
The long-term responsibility for sustainability, however, lies with the Iraqi government. Although
a “principal objective” of the U.S. infrastructure construction program has always been the “swift
transition of the reconstruction effort to Iraqi management and control,” the SIGIR found in July
2007 that the Iraqi government had not accepted any U.S. project transfers since July 2006. As of
May 31, 2007, 2,363 projects valued at $5.3 billion awaited transfer. According to the SIGIR, the
U.S. government in some cases has continued to fund maintenance of projects pending
acceptance by Iraq.14 A SIGIR report in April 2008 found that only limited progress had been
made in establishing an asset transfer process, and that planning included only IRRF projects and
excluded more than $2 billion in ESF, ISFF, and CERP projects. 15 In July 2008, the SIGIR noted
the continued lack of a definitive asset transfer agreement—many facilities were being transferred
unilaterally without formal Iraqi government acceptance. 16 As of October 2008, according to the
Embassy, of the $13.5 billion in completed projects, 72% had been transferred locally and 13%
transferred nationally. However, the SIGIR notes that this data is unreliable.17
P.L. 110-252 withheld $10 million in infrastructure maintenance funding until the Department of
State certified that Iraq had entered into and begun to implement an asset transfer agreement,
including an agreement to maintain U.S.-funded infrastructure. As of April 26, 2009, when the
SIGIR issued yet another report on the issue, little progress had been made on reaching agreement
with the Iraqi government on an asset transfer process.18
Capacity Development and Iraqi Capital Budget Execution
Much effort and assistance has gone into improving the capabilities of government ministries,
including equipping and training personnel at all levels of service, and situating U.S. advisers in
every ministry. In particular, government ministry officials and staff have been deficient in
knowledge of modern administrative systems and management practices, a problem addressed
under the Ministerial Capacity Development Program and the National Capacity Development
Program (“Tatweer”). The latter program, according to USAID, has trained more than 70,000
staff in a recent two-year period.19
A focus of these efforts is on improving budget execution and service delivery, considered by
many to be essential elements of an effective Iraqi government. In particular, both the national
Government of Iraq and provincial governments have had difficulty implementing capital budgets
that support construction of schools, roads, and oil and electricity production facilities and the
like. Among the reasons offered for this situation were a rapid turnover in personnel, security
13
State Department, 2207 Report to Congress, January 2008, p. III6-9.
Iraq Reconstruction Pre-Proposal Conference Briefing Slide Show, DOD, January 21, 2004; SIGIR, Transferring
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq, Audit 07-004, July 25, 2007.
15
SIGIR, Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq, 08-017, April 2008.
16
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2008, p. 4.
17
SIGIR, Asset Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability, 09-016, April 26,
2009, p. iii.
18
Ibid, p. ii.
19
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 91; GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Improved Management Controls and Iraqi
Commitment Needed for Key State and USAID Capacity-Building Programs, 09-526, June 2009.
14
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concerns preventing construction, a lack of personnel skilled in contracting and managing
projects, and a fear by government employees of being accused of corrupt practices.20
According to U.S. officials, only about 23% of the 2006 capital budget of about $6.2 billion was
spent in that year, and only 3% of a $3.5 billion capital budget available to the Oil Ministry was
spent in 2006. Congressional concern on the issue led to its making the allocation and expenditure
of the 2007 capital budget one of the 18 benchmarks assessed under section 1314 of the FY2007
Supplemental.
U.S. programs to facilitate budget execution included institution of 18 Provincial Procurement
Assistance Teams, several Procurement Assistance Centers (two in Baghdad and one in Erbil),
and a range of training programs in public administration. According to U.S. officials, since 2007,
the government of Iraq has taken significant steps as well, including formation of a senior-level
task force, establishment of new procedures such as revised procurement regulations, and
additional training. In 2008, a number of ministries and governors have been permitted to enter
into contracts at much higher levels than previously and a central contracts committee has been
replaced with a more decentralized system.
These steps appear to have led to improvements in budget execution, although definitional
disagreements and lack of available data make it difficult to precise. According to DOD, the Iraqi
government spent about $9 billion on capital projects in 2008 compared with $3.4 billion in 2007.
If commitments are added to spending, the figure is $16 billion in 2008 compared with $6 billion
in 2007.21
The FY2008 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 110-252) and subsequent FY2009 appropriations
(P.L. 111-8) require that Iraq match U.S. economic aid appropriations on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Although prior to this legislation, the Iraqi government budget, on paper, had provided funding
for capital investments equivalent to the U.S. reconstruction effort in some sectors, its
expenditures did not match those of the United States. According to the GAO, the United States
spent about $23.2 billion on four critical sectors—security, oil, electricity, and water—from
FY2003 through June 2008, 70% of its total allocation of $33.4 billion in these sectors. Iraq,
however, spent 14%, $3.9 billion, of its total $28 billion allocation for these same sectors from
2005 through June 2008.22 Dwindling U.S. contributions and the rising Iraqi budget execution
expenditures noted above would suggest that this imbalance has been corrected, and the
Department of State has certified that sufficient Iraqi government contributions are being made.
The 2009 Iraqi budget contains $12.5 billion for reconstruction projects, a significant decrease
from the previous year’s level of about $21 billion due to the fall in world oil prices and Iraqi
revenue, but still significantly greater than the U.S. reconstruction budget for Iraq.23
20
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2007, p. 5.
DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2009, p.12.
22
GAO, Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus, GAO-08-1031, August 2008, p.17.
23
SIGIR, Information on Government of Iraq Contributions to Reconstruction Costs, 09-018, April 29, 2009; “Budget
2009: Iraq Cuts Reconstruction Spending 40%,” World Markets Research Centre, January 26, 2009.
21
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
In an effort to expand outreach to the provinces and strengthen local government, the U.S.
Embassy, in mid-2005, began establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). There are
two types of PRTs in Iraq—PRTs and ePRTs (embedded PRTs).24 In each case, the military
provides protection to U.S. civilian officials and development specialists, allowing them access to
parts of Iraq that otherwise would not be possible. The PRTs were a key element in the surge
strategy and remain a major purveyor of U.S. reconstruction aid.
PRTs are made up of Embassy, PCO, USAID, military, and other U.S. agency staff, between 35
and 100 members in each, with the State Department as leader. There are currently 16 PRTs—15
U.S.-led and one Italian-led. A South Korean and a British-led PRT transitioned to U.S. control in
the 2008 and 2009 respectively.25
The current seven ePRTs are structured differently than their predecessors. They are embedded in
Brigade Combat Teams with the Brigade Commander acting as leader. Most have 8 to 12
personnel. They were created as part of the January 2007 surge strategy, which also saw an
increase in U.S. forces. In essence, the strategy envisioned that, as U.S. and Iraqi military forces
worked to clear and hold an area, ePRT staff would work with local Iraqis to further stabilize the
area by drawing on all available spigots of U.S. and Iraqi government funding to create jobs and
meet other basic needs. They have played a major role in reconciling tribal, municipal, district,
and provincial government entities.26
While the ePRTs are more focused on establishing stability, the PRTs emphasize improvement of
local governance. They work together with local community and Iraqi government
representatives—forming Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDCs)—to
identify projects that can be implemented and carried out with U.S. financing. It is anticipated
that, as a result of this collaboration, local governments may be strengthened while U.S. projects
achieve more lasting support. The PRTs also work closely with provincial governments to
strengthen their capacities and enable them to better interact with the central government as well
as to more effectively utilize the Iraqi government funds that have been allocated to each
province. 27
At the disposal of both PRTs and ePRTs (henceforth collectively referred to here as PRTs) is a
tool-box of projects that can be implemented at the grass-roots level. PRDC-identified projects
tend to be focused on infrastructure—road and bridges, water and sanitation, schools, and health
clinics—and usually are finished in one year. Although the Embassy must approve them, PRDC
projects generally are implemented by the Army Corps of Engineers. In August 2007, a new
Quick Response Fund (QRF) that mimics the flexibility of the CERP in funding local community
24
Until mid-2009 when they were phased out or converted to PRTs, there were also a number of Provincial Support
Teams (PSTs), much smaller teams that resided on a military forward operating base outside their target provinces and
provided advice to provincial officials as needed.
25
SIGIR, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18,
2007; Department of State, 2207 Report to Congress, October 2006, p. 5. “Military to Protect U.S. Aid Teams in Iraq,”
Washington Post, April 14, 2006.
26
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2007, pp. 53-60; SIGIR, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program
Expansion in Iraq, Audit 07-014, July 25, 2007.
27
Robert Perito, Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing.
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projects was made available to the PRTs. They support local government, NGOs, and small
businesses.
In addition to economic projects directly handled by the PRTs, USAID runs several programs,
often in conjunction with the PRTs, that address local-level concerns. The Community Action
Program (CAP) funds projects identified by local representative associations, stimulating
democratic participation, while meeting local needs and creating short-term employment. The
Community Stabilization Program (CSP) addresses economic needs in specific strategic cities,
providing youth programs, micro and small enterprise support, and vocational training. The Local
Governance Program (LGP) helps build management and knowledge skills of provincial
government personnel. Complementing the work of the PRTs and USAID, although provided
independently, Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is also available to
pacify the local population where PRTs reside. A large proportion of CERP projects support local,
small-scale infrastructure construction, especially in the water and sanitation and electrical power
sectors.
One problem with these multiple assistance programs is that they are implemented by different
agencies, with different funding sources, and different authorities, raising concerns regarding
coordination of program coherence. Among other criticisms of the PRTs are that they lack clear
lines of authority, agreed missions, and measurable objectives. 28
Even before the announced drawdown of U.S. forces, the concern had been raised that security
obstacles facing PRTs might increase as U.S. troops protecting PRT civilian staff hand
responsibility for security over to Iraqi forces. In September 2007 testimony to Congress, a SIGIR
official suggested that U.S. civilians would be unable to move about freely and, consequently,
PRTs might be unable to function in those areas where the U.S. military steps down.29 In addition
to security, the PRTs rely on the military for food and housing, and civil affairs officers make up
about 10% of PRT staff.
The FY2008/2009 supplemental withheld all PRT operating expenses and program funds until the
State Department reported on a strategy for winding down and closing out the PRTs. That
strategy, was issued on September 7, 2008. This and an associated document issued by the
Embassy Office of Provincial Affairs on October 1, 2008, in the SIGIR’s view, suggested that no
specific timeline existed for PRT close-out. However, it appeared “uncertain whether military
resources will be available to support the PRTs until all conditions for close out are met.”30 In
March 2009, the National Security Council issued “preliminary verbal guidance” that PRTs total
16 by August 2010 and six by end of 2011.31 The State Department envisions that the mission
currently carried out by PRTs will evolve into a traditional USAID program at some point.32
28
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan, April 2008.
29
Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2007; Testimony of Ginger Cruz,
Deputy SIGIR, to House Armed Services Committee, Subcomm. on Oversight, September 5, 2007.
30
SIGIR, Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Performance Measurement Process Has Improved, 09-013, January 28,
2009, p. 10.
31
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 20, 2009, p. 119.
32
SIGIR, Report to Congress, October 20, 2008, p. 9.
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CERP
Drawn from Department of Defense funds rather than IRRF or ESF appropriations, the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) contributes to the reconstruction effort by
providing U.S. military commanders on the ground with “walking around money” intended to
win hearts and minds throughout Iraq. Up to now, a total of about $4.1 billion—$548 million in
CPA-provided Iraqi funds and about $3.6 billion in U.S. DOD appropriations—has been made
available for this purpose. In April 2008, the Iraqi government allocated $300 million to establish
an Iraqi CERP to be managed by the U.S. military. That program has ended, however, due to the
decline in Iraqi oil revenue. 33
In addition to the dolls, tee shirts, sheep, and other items reportedly provided to win popular
support, the CERP supports a wide variety of reconstruction activities at the local level, from
provision of micro-grants to businesses to digging wells to painting schools, provided in the form
of small grants.34 CERP also funds many infrastructure efforts, such as repair or provision of
electric generators and construction of water and sewer systems, roads, and schools. Commanders
identify local needs and dispense aid with few bureaucratic encumbrances. Major subordinate
commanders have authority to approve grants up to $500,000. The grants have been credited with
helping the military better exercise their security missions, while at the same time meeting
immediate neighborhood development needs, often much more quickly than equivalent efforts of
the civilian reconstruction program. In addition to reconstruction, CERP funds are used for
compensation payments to the families of killed or injured Iraqis.35 The CERP has also been used
to pay the salaries of the so-called Sons of Iraq (formerly known as the Concerned Local
Citizens); this effort accounted for more than one third of total FY2008 CERP obligations.
Responsibility for the Sons of Iraq was fully transferred to the Iraqi Government in April 2009.36
As the IRRF program declined, the CERP program grew as a major spigot of U.S. aid in Iraq.
From its beginnings as a small-scale village program—the average grant in FY2004 was
$67,000—it became a major source of U.S. infrastructure construction aid with an average grant
in FY2006 of $140,000. The SIGIR, however, indicates that in FY2008 the number of large-scale
projects declined. The 2009 Defense Authorization (P.L. 110-417, sec. 1214) sets the maximum
cost of CERP projects at $2 million unless waived by the Secretary of Defense, and requires
certification of any project over $1 million as an urgent need.
The SIGIR and others have raised some concerns regarding the CERP, most derived from the
essentially different security and reconstruction objectives of military and civilian efforts,
respectively. Among the SIGIR’s concerns is that there is no mechanism to measure the outputs
and outcomes of CERP projects. Secondly, the high turnover of military personnel in Iraq means
that there is little continuity in management and oversight of the projects. Third, little weight has
been given to the handing-over of projects to Iraqis and insuring their sustainability.
The House Appropriations Committee report on the FY2010 Defense appropriations (H.R. 3326)
notes its concern that the CERP is growing into an alternative development program “with few
33
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 39.
“Money as a Weapon,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008.
35
SIGIR, Report to Congress, January 30, 2007, Appendix G.
36
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 57.
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limits and little management.”37 Other observers have noted that civil affairs officers and others
allocating CERP grants are not development specialists and have been provided little or no
training on the selection and management of reconstruction activities. The program’s early
rationale—that the military were the only ones able to conduct small-scale reconstruction in
places where civilian U.S. officials and NGO aid personnel were unable to go—appears less
strong with civilian ePRT personnel embedded in combat battalions. Further, an October 2007
SIGIR report on the PRTs points to cases where the use of CERP funds to meet local needs
conflicted with PRT efforts to make local government assume responsibility for provision of local
services and work with the provincial and national government, instead of the U.S. military, to
address problems. 38
The impact on the CERP of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities into bases is not yet
clear. To the extent that military contact with the local populace is diminished, the utility of the
CERP may decline as well.
Assistance to Security Forces
There have been two elements in the effort to provide the security that might allow political and
economic reconstruction to take hold—U.S. (and earlier coalition) forces and the training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces to replace them. The number of U.S. troops is currently about
130,000.39 About $23 billion in U.S. appropriations has been aimed at building Iraqi security
forces. As of April 2009, there were roughly 645,000 Iraqi security forces—police, army and
other defense forces.40
During the first four years of the U.S. presence in Iraq, poorly trained and equipped security
forces, no-shows and desertions, dismissals of police for criminal behavior, and infiltration of
police and other units by sectarian militia groups threatened U.S. plans to increase security using
Iraqi personnel. 41 In June 2008, the DOD stated that 67% of all formed Iraqi Army combat units
are able to plan and execute operations with “minimal or no assistance.” It reports “continued
progress” since then, but with the end of the multinational force mandate in Iraq, estimates of
Iraqi security force proficiency are considered sensitive and are not made public. In recent
months, the emphasis of U.S. security assistance funding has shifted from provision of
infrastructure—prohibited by Congress—to training and equipment. U.S. assistance in the
security sector includes improving the institutional capacities of the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Interior, both of which, according to DOD, improve “slowly and unevenly.”42 The
37
H.Rept. 111-230, p. 349.
SIGIR, Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large-Scale Projects, 08-006, January
2008; SIGIR, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18,
2007, pp. 23-24; GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for CERP, GAO-08746R, June 23, 2008.
39
The last coalition forces departed in Summer 2009. Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/
iraqindex, July 16, 2009, p. 24.
40
DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2009, p. 37.
41
GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T, March
13, 2007; “U.S. Officers Detail Problems with Iraqi Soldiers,” Washington Post, November 1, 2006; “In Baghdad, a
Force Under the Militias’ Sway,” Washington Post, October 31, 2006; “Flaws Cited in Effort to Train Iraqi Forces,”
Washington Post, November 21, 2006.
42
DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2009, p. 39.
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SIGIR reports that the pace of police training has not kept up with the growth in numbers of
police forces.43 U.S. military officials point to a lack of logistical capabilities—procurement and
maintenance of equipment, for example—on the part of the Iraqi military as a continuing major
challenge. 44 See CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches,
Results, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), for further discussion.
Accountability, Waste, and Fraud
A lack of transparency in early contracting and numerous reports in the media suggesting that
reconstruction funds were being squandered led to the establishment in November 2003 of an
Inspector General for the CPA, now called the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR). To date, the SIGIR has issued 149 audits and 154 project assessments, and it has
conducted 96 limited onsite inspections as well as hundreds of investigations of possible criminal
activity. 45 Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. has been the SIGIR from the beginning.
In congressional testimony, Mr. Bowen estimated that as much as 15%-20% of the IRRF—$3-$5
billion—was wasted. 46 Summing up the assistance program in a recently published review report,
the SIGIR asked and answered the question:
Was the program grossly burdened by waste and fraud? Regarding waste, yes; regarding
fraud, no. The overuse of cost-plus contracts, high contractor overhead expenses, excessive
contractor award fees, and unacceptable program and project delays all contributed to a
significant waste of taxpayer dollars. Although SIGIR and other law enforcement agencies
have uncovered egregious examples of fraud, the size of the total criminal wrongdoing
known to date amounts to a relatively small percentage of the overall reconstruction
investment, and the number of individuals involved was relatively low. 47
Some of the worst examples of misconduct found to date appear to center on the CPA’s use of
Iraqi funds during the year-long occupation. For instance, a January 2005 SIGIR audit found that
the CPA “provided less than adequate controls” for $8.8 billion of DFI resources it moved
through Iraqi ministries. An April 2005 audit concluded that CPA managers of DFI funds
distributed in the South-Central region of Iraq could not account for more than $96.6 million in
cash and receipts. An October 2005 audit found that South-Central personnel could not account
for more than $20.5 million in Rapid Regional Response Program funds and made $2.6 million in
excessive payments. In late 2005, several U.S. citizens were criminally charged with respect to
the handling of these funds—and have since pled guilty. In February 2007, five more were
indicted, of whom four were convicted and one pled guilty. 48
43
SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 56 and 35.
DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2009, p. 54.
45
See SIGIR website, http://www.sigir.mil/, for audit reports to date. SIGIR, Report to Congress, July 30, 2009,
Section 4.
46
Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2009.
47
SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, January 2009, p. viiii, available at http://www.sigir.mil.
48
SIGIR, Report to Congress, January 30, 2009, p. 230; Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in
South-Central Iraq, Report No. 05-015, October 25, 2005; Audit of Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries
through the National Budget Process, Report No. 05-004, January 30, 2005; Control of Cash Provided to SouthCentral Iraq, Audit Report No. 05-006, April 30, 2005; “5 Indicted in Probe of Iraq Deals,” Washington Post, February
8, 2007.
44
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While some investigations of reconstruction programs utilizing U.S.-appropriated funds have
raised the possibility of criminal activity and the number of such investigations has risen
significantly in 2009, many more have produced evidence of poor project implementation and
questionable management and oversight of projects, a large proportion of these the responsibility
of the Army Corps of Engineers which runs the Embassy’s Project and Contracting Office. SIGIR
auditors and project assessment teams with engineering, audit, and investigative experience have
traveled to major U.S.-funded project sites to see if work was performed properly. Although most
conclude that projects were either carried out as intended or point out correctable quality control
and structural deficiencies, the SIGIR has found some projects to be especially problematic,
including the following:
•
The Basrah Children’s Hospital, expected to cost $50 million, will run to at least
$98 million and nearly a year behind schedule. Bechtel, the project contractor,
was removed and the project will be completed using local contractors. USAID,
the agency responsible, failed to report the cost and delays, in part because it had
only one contracting officer and one technical officer to oversee 20 projects
worth $1.4 billion.49
•
In September 2006, the SIGIR reported that the Baghdad Police College, a $75
million construction project implemented by Parsons, was riddled with
deficiencies, including improperly fabricated wastewater plumbing which poses a
health and structural hazard. Press reports in November 2007 indicated that the
problems had still not been fixed by the contractor, despite promises made to
Congress.50 The Mosul police headquarters, constructed by an Iraqi contractor at
a cost of approximately $1 million, was similarly troubled. 51
•
A $218 million first responders network was ineffective—communication was
not possible between the three established zones of the system and Iraqi citizens
could not call in to request emergency assistance, among other problems.52
•
After the expenditure of $186 million, only 6 of 150 planned primary health care
centers to be constructed by Parsons were completed and only 14 more were
expected to be finished. A contract was awarded to Iraqi firms to complete 121
partially constructed centers.53
•
A project to run 16 oil pipelines under the Tigris River failed amidst warnings
from a geologist that the subsoil was not conducive to drilling, demonstrating a
lack of appropriate oversight by the Army Corps of Engineers. Nearly $76
million in DFI funds were wasted. 54
49
SIGIR, Audit 06-026, July 2006; “U.S. Neglect Found in Long-Delayed Iraq Hospital Project,” Washington Post,
July 29, 2006.
50
SIGIR, Project Assessment-06-078.1 and 06-079.1, September 27, 2006; “Heralded Iraq Police Academy a
‘Disaster’,” Washington Post, September 28, 2006; “Baghdad’s Police Academy Remains in Poor Condition, Despite a
Repair Pledge,” New York Times, November 6, 2007.
51
“U.S. Agency Cites Flaws in Another Iraqi Construction Project,” New York Times, October 12, 2006.
52
SIGIR, Audit 06-020, July 2006.
53
SIGIR, Audit 06-011, April 2006; SIGIR, Report to Congress, October 30, 2006, p. 78; “In a Dispute, Army Cancels
Rebuilding Contract in Iraq,” New York Times, May 13, 2006.
54
SIGIR, Project Assessment SA-2005-001, in Report to Congress, January 30, 2006, pp. 73-75; “Rebuilding of Iraqi
Oil Pipeline as Disaster Waiting to Happen,” New York Times, April 25, 2006.
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•
An examination of Task Force Shield, a program to train and manage an oil and
electricity infrastructure protection force, found it had been unsuccessful after the
expenditure of $147 million. In part, this outcome was due to the absence of a
clear management structure for the various U.S. agencies involved. Further,
auditors, reportedly, could not determine how many Iraqis were trained or how
many weapons were purchased. 55
•
An audit of “design-build” contracts that characterized many of the infrastructure
projects found very high administrative costs in some cases. About 55% of KBR
work on the RIO project and 43% of a Parsons oil project were consumed by
overhead costs. Security is likely one factor in the high level of overhead found
here, and enforced idleness while awaiting government direction to begin work is
another. However, the audit also found inadequate accounting and billing systems
to capture administrative costs in four of five contracts examined. 56
•
Roughly 370,000 weapons purchased with $133 million in IRRF funds for the
use of Iraqi security forces were not accompanied by spare parts or technical
repair manuals, and were not registered to insure accountability. (Some of these
weapons reportedly made their way to the black market.)57
•
A DynCorp project to provide services to international police trainers spent
nearly $44 million on a residential camp that was not used (including an
Olympic-size swimming pool that was unauthorized) and about $36 million for
weapons that cannot be accounted for. The audit found the State Department
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and State Office
of Acquisition Management provided poor contract administration. 58
•
A 2007 SIGIR financial review of the State Department’s DynCorp contract for
training Iraqi police could not be completed, because documents were in disarray,
invoices had not been validated, and INL did not know what it received for the
$1.2 billion in expenditures.59
•
A more than $38 million project to provide a new accounting system for the Iraq
Ministry of Finance had been of limited use and was suspended pending
clarification of Iraqi government support for the effort.60
•
A 2007 DOD IG audit of $5.2 billion in the Iraq Security Forces Fund found a
lack of proper accountability for $1 billion in equipment purchase contracts.61
55
SIGIR, Audit 06-009, April 2006; “In Shadows, Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos,” New York Times, May
24, 2006.
56
SIGIR, Audit 06-028, October 2006; “Idle Contractors Add Millions to Iraq Rebuilding,” New York Times, October
25, 2006.
57
SIGIR, Audit 06-033, October 2006. “Black-Market Weapon Prices Surge in Iraq Chaos,” New York Times,
December 10, 2006.
58
SIGIR, Audit 06-029, January 2007. An April 2008 review of INL progress in meeting SIGIR recommendations
arising from the earlier audit found that a concerted effort was being made to implement them. SIGIR, Audit 08-014,
April 2008.
59
SIGIR, Audit 07-016, October 19, 2007. See above footnote re April 2008 review of INL.
60
SIGIR, Audit 08-001, October 23, 2007.
61
Department of Defense Inspector General, Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia—Phase
III, November 30, 2007, Report No. D-2008-026.
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•
A 2008 assessment of the $270 million Nassriya water treatment plant was
producing water at one fifth its intended capacity, because the Iraqi government
had failed over a four-year period to meet its promises to provide permanent
power, repair leaks in the distribution system, and provide qualified staff to
operate the facility.62
•
A 2008 audit of the USAID Community Stabilization Program found potential
fraud ranging from $6.7 to $8.4 million in a district of Baghdad, including
possible diversion of funds to militia activities by means of overpriced trash
collection contracts as well as phantom workers for cleanup campaigns. The
project was suspended in that district.63
•
Two July 2008 audits demonstrated the level of waste incurred by contract
terminations, usually due to poor planning and cost estimates. In one case, $6.9
million was wasted when water-supply project task orders were terminated at the
60% design stage due to lack of funds. In the other, $142 million was spent on
task orders for fire station and police training facilities that were terminated.64
•
A 2008 audit of the $98 million Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System found a
system costing three times the original estimate, but serving only one third the
homes originally planned. In addition, the original U.S. plan to provide a system
requiring little power and maintenance was rejected by the Iraqi Public Works
Ministry because it was for “third-world countries.” The new system requires
thousands of gallons of fuel per day, provision of which there is no commitment
from the Ministry, raising the possibility that the U.S. effort has been wasted.65
62
SIGIR, Sustainment Assessment, 07-116, April 28, 2008.
USAID Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program, E-267-08-001-P, March 18,
2008.
64
SIGIR, Audit 08-018, July 2008; SIGIR, Audit 08-019, July 2008.
65
SIGIR, Project Assessment 08-144 to 08-148, October 27, 2008.
63
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Appendix. Notable Reconstruction Assessments
Dozens of reports and articles published during the past six years have sought to analyze,
criticize, and recommend action regarding the progress of reconstruction aid. Among the more
notable:
Anthony Cordesman, Cleaning Up the Mess, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July
7, 2004.
David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New York Times Magazine, November 2, 2003.
George Packer, “War After War: Letter from Baghdad,” The New Yorker, November 24, 2003.
Kenneth M. Pollack, “After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2004.
John Hamre et al., Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 17, 2003.
James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Frederick
Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, Co-Directors, Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s
Reconstruction, September 2004 and November 12, 2007, Update.
Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq, Henry Holt, 2005.
James Fallows, “Why Iraq Has No Army,” The Atlantic Monthly, December 2005.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, Knopf, 2006.
George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
International Crisis Group, Reconstructing Iraq, September 2, 2004, available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?.
T. Christian Miller, Blood Money, Little, Brown, and Company, 2006.
SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management, March 2007.
Glenn Zorpette, “Re-engineering Iraq,” IEEE Spectrum, February 2006, available at
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/feb06/2831.
SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, January 2009, available at
http://www.sigir.mil.
Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, RAND Arroyo
Center, 2008.
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Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
Congressional Research Service
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