Arming Pilots Against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

Order Code RL31674

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Arming Pilots Against Terrorism:

Implementation Issues for the Federal

Flight Deck Officer Program

Updated January 9, 2004

Bartholomew Elias

Specialist in Aviation Security, Safety, and Technology

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Arming Pilots Against Terrorism:

Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck

Officer Program

Summary

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135) contains

provisions to arm pilots of passenger aircraft and gives deputized pilots the authority

to use force, including lethal force, to defend the flight deck against criminal and

terrorist threats. Participation in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program,

established under the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act contained in P.L. 107296, was initially limited to pilots of passenger aircraft. However, a provision in the

FAA reauthorization act (Vision 100; P.L. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490) expanded the

program to include flight engineers as well as flight crews of all-cargo aircraft.

During debate over legislation to arm pilots, proponents argued that the potential

benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft

outweighed the inherent risks associated with arming pilots. However, opponents of

policy allowing pilots to be armed with lethal weapons argued that such a program’s

safety risks and monetary costs significantly outweighed these potential benefits.

Risks cited included potential distraction to the flight crew, dangers that a weapon

discharge could pose to the aircraft or its occupants, and security concerns associated

with carrying firearms in secured areas of the aviation system. Proponents countered

that these risks could be effectively mitigated, but recognized that these are important

issues to be addressed for successful implementation of the policy to arm pilots.

With enactment of this legislation, focus on the issue of arming pilots has turned

to implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.

These

implementation issues fall into four broad categories: 1) pilot selection and

screening; 2) equipment (i.e., firearms and ammunition and the risks they may pose

to aircraft and passengers); 3) training; and 4) operational procedures. This report

describes several implementation issues within each of these areas that may require

continued legislative oversight and possible clarification regarding the intent of the

legislation. The TSA has fully implemented the program over the last year.

However, continued concerns voiced by pilot groups over the implementation of the

program include: the extensive background checks required of applicants; the

requirement to transport issued firearms in lock boxes; and the inconvenient location

of training facilities. These issues, along with the possibility of using private

contractors to provide recurrent training for deputized pilots may be the topics of

continued congressional oversight.

This report will not be updated.

Contents

Legislative Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Pilot Selection and Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What types of screening and selection criteria are needed for

volunteer pilots prior to and while participating in the program . . 3

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

What are the tradeoffs between firearms effectiveness and risk to the

aircraft? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Who should conduct the training? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What will the training consist of ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

How will the effectiveness of the training be evaluated? . . . . . . . . . . 10

Operational Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Storage and Transportation of the Firearm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Airport Security Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Flight Deck Operational Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

What will the costs to the Federal government be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

What will the costs to participants and airlines be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Scope of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Should the Federal flight deck officer program be expanded

to include other pilots? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Arming Pilots Against Terrorism:

Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight

Deck Officer Program

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) contains provisions to

deputize volunteer pilots of air carriers providing passenger air transportation or

intrastate passenger air transportation as Federal law enforcement officers, permitting

them to carry firearms and use force, including lethal force, to defend the flight deck

against acts of criminal violence or air piracy. These provisions are collectively

known as the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act. The program established under

this Act is the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program and qualified pilots deputized

under this program are referred to as Federal flight deck officers. Participation in the

program was initially limited to pilots of passenger aircraft, but has recently been

extended to include other flight crew members, such as flight engineers and flight

crews of all-cargo air carriers (see P.L. 108-176). The Arming Pilots Against

Terrorism Act specified that within three months of enactment, the TSA was to begin

the process of training and deputizing qualified pilots as Federal Flight Deck

Officers. The TSA conducted a prototype training class in April 2003, and began full

implementation of the program in July 2003. Pilot organizations have estimated that

as many as 30,000 eligible pilots may volunteer to participate in the program.1

However, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects that number

may be much lower.2 Pilot groups have voiced concerns that as the program has

evolved over the past year, smaller numbers of pilots than expected have applied for

the program, because, in their opinion, the application procedures imposed by TSA

and the remote location of training facilities is overly burdensome to many pilots

considering participation in the program.3

Legislative Background

During the 107th Congress, Representative Don Young and Representative John

Mica introduced the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (H.R. 4635, 107th

Congress). At that time, the Bush administration voiced initial opposition to the

1

Sara Kehaulani Goo. “Pilots Press for Firearms Instruction,” The Washington Post, 15

November 2002, pg. E1; Alan Levin, “Armed Pilots Are Months Away,” USA Today, 25

November 2002, pg. A1.

2

Sara Kehaulani Goo. “Pilot Gun-Training Deadline Set,” The Washington Post, 25

November 2002, p. E3.

3

Matthew Weinstock. “TSA, pilots wage war of words over gun program.” Government

Exec Daily Briefing, August 26, 2003.

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concept of arming pilots with lethal weapons. As amended by the Aviation

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on June

19, 2002 (and as ordered reported by the full committee on June 26, 2002), the bill

contained a provision that capped participation in the program at 2% of eligible pilots

and limited the program to a two-year test period. On July 10, 2002, Representative

Peter DeFazio offered an amendment on the floor to remove the 2% cap on the

number of pilots who could participate in the program and also deleted the 2-year

sunset provision contained in the bill. The amendment was adopted twice by large

majorities and H.R. 4635 passed by a vote of 310-113. On May 25, 2002, Senator

Robert Smith introduced the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism and Cabin Defense

Act of 2002 (S. 2554, 107th Congress) which contained similar language to the final

version of H.R. 4635 (107th Congress) passed by the House.

On September 4, 2002, Senator Smith offered an amendment to the Senate

version of H.R. 5005 (107th Congress), a bill introduced to create a Department of

Homeland Security, that included provisions for arming pilots similar to those

contained in H.R. 4635 (107th Congress). On November 12, 2002, Representative

Richard Armey introduced H.R. 5710 (107th Congress) as a new vehicle for

establishing the Department of Homeland Security and for other purposes which

contained provisions for arming pilots. However, in response to lobbying efforts by

the air cargo industry, the language in this legislation limited participation in the

program to pilots of passenger air carrier aircraft. On November 19, 2002, the Senate

amended H.R. 5005 (107th Congress), incorporating provisions virtually identical to

H.R. 5710 (107th Congress). The House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R.

5005 (107th Congress) on November 22, 2002, and it was signed by President Bush

on November 25, 2002 becoming P.L. 107-296.

Debate over the issue of arming pilots focused on the benefits, risks, and costs

associated with implementing the program. Proponents, principally pilots and pilot

unions, argued that the potential benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and

criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighed the inherent risks associated with

arming pilots. Opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armed with lethal weapons,

including the airlines and several prominent aviation safety experts, argued that such

a program’s safety risks and monetary costs outweighed these potential benefits. Key

risks cited by critics of the program include:

Added workload and responsibilities associated with participation

in the program that may distract pilots from primary flying duties

and safety-related functions;

! Risks of a firearm discharge to innocent passengers or aircraft

structure and systems; and

! A proliferation of firearms on aircraft and in secured areas of the

aviation system that is counter to other security objectives.4

!

4

See GAO-02-822R, “Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots”, for a

detailed outline of reasons presented by those favoring and opposing the arming of pilots.

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Many of these concerns raised by critics of the plan to arm pilots have been

recognized by both Congress and proponents of the plan as key issues to be addressed

in program implementation.

In the first session of the 108th Congress, debate focused on whether pilots of

all-cargo aircraft should be included in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.

All-cargo pilots were initially excluded from the program in the final wording of the

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). In the first session of the 108th

Congress, several legislative vehicles were introduced to expand the program to

cargo pilots as well as to other flight crew members, such as flight engineers. On

February 13, 2003, Rep. John Mica introduced H.R. 765, and on March 5, 2003 Sen.

Bunning introduced S. 516. Both bills sought to include cargo pilots in the Federal

Flight Deck Officer Program, while S. 516 sought to also include other flight crew

members such as flight engineers. A separate stand-alone bill (S. 1657) introduced

by Senator Bunning was passed by the Senate on November 10, 2003. Similar

legislation (H.R. 1049 and H.R. 3262,) was also introduced in the House. Also, the

Air Cargo Security Act (S. 165), passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003, contained a

provision that sought to include all-cargo pilots in the Federal Flight Deck Officers

Program. An Amendment offered by Senator Bunning (S.Amdt. 903 to S. 824) was

included in the FAA reauthorization legislation (P.L. 108-176) and was enacted into

law on December 12, 2003. This provision expands the Federal Flight Deck Officer

Program to include other flight crew members such as flight engineers and to flight

crew members flying for all-cargo air carriers.

Implementation Issues

Implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program requires

assessments of the standards and guidelines for: 1) pilot selection and screening; 2)

equipment; 3) training; 4) operational procedures; and 5) costs. To implement the

program, the TSA formed a task force to address these issues and developed a plan

for implementation of the program. While Congress has noted that the TSA’s

decisions regarding the methods for implementing procedural requirements of the

program shall be subject to review only for abuse of discretion, continued legislative

oversight of the program is likely to be an issue for the 108th Congress. Furthermore,

the 108th Congress debated and passed legislation (P.L. 108-176) allowing pilots of

all-cargo air carriers and flight engineers to participate in the program.

Pilot Selection and Screening

What types of screening and selection criteria are needed for

volunteer pilots prior to and while participating in the program.

Issues considered during implementation of the program include the process for

selecting and screening of volunteer pilots seeking to become Federal flight deck

officers. The legislation requires further assessment to determine whether additional

background checks should be required beyond that specified by section 44936(a)(1)

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of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.5 Additional selection and screening criteria

could help to ensure that pilots selected to participate are physically and

psychologically capable of carrying out the duties and responsibilities associated with

participation in the program and maintain the standards set forth by the program

while serving as Federal flight deck officers. Screening measures could be used to

assess whether a pilot poses a security or safety threat by possessing a firearm on the

flight deck or by being trained in the use of lethal force.

Proponents of this new law point out that pilots already undergo rigorous preemployment evaluations and screening throughout their careers with an air carrier.

Captain Stephen Luckey, chairman of the National Fight Security Committee of the

Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), International noted that:

Pilots are undoubtedly the most highly scrutinized employees in the work force,

submitting to a battery of pre-employment evaluations, a flight physical every six

months, random drug and alcohol testing, and a criminal history records check,

among other formal examinations. Additionally, pilots are constantly interacting

with and undergoing de facto monitoring by their airline’s management, their

peers, FAA personnel, and others.6

On the other hand, despite pre-existing measures for screening and evaluating pilots,

recent examples of confirmed and suspected suicides and sabotage of aircraft by

flight crew personnel suggest a potential need for more detailed background checks

of pilots wishing to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.7

However, there is little agreement on whether additional screening including

psychiatric evaluation of pilots would be able to detect pilots who would pose a risk

by participating in the program. Some argue that current screening and peer

monitoring of pilots are insufficient, and detailed psychiatric screening and

psychological testing is needed to adequately assess the mental health of pilots.8

Others argue that many common mental health conditions can be masked during

5

This section describes requirements for criminal history record checks and reviews of

available law enforcement databases and records of other governmental and international

agencies for certain airport and airline employees.

6

Statement of Captain Stephen Luckey, Chairman, National Fight Security Committee, Air

Line Pilots Association, International Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, U.S. Senate, on Aviation Security, July 25, 2002.

7

Examples of confirmed deliberate acts by flight crew personnel to crash commercial

aircraft include an intentional crash of a Japan Airlines DC-8 in 1982, an attempted hostile

takeover of a Federal Express DC-10 in 1994 by an off-duty flight engineer who intended

to crash the airplane into FedEx headquarters, and the 1999 theft and intentional crash of

an Air Botswana ATR-42 into two other Air Botswana aircraft. Additionally, there have

been other high profile crashes of passenger air carrier aircraft, such as the 1997 crash of a

Silk Air Boeing 737 in Indonesia and the 1999 crash of an EgyptAir Boeing 767 off the

coast of Rhode Island, where intentional pilot action was suspected but never conclusively

determined. It should, however, be noted that none of these crashes involved flight crews

of U.S. flag carriers providing passenger air service.

8

See, e.g., James N. Butcher. “Assessing Pilots with ‘The Wrong Stuff’: A Call for

Research on Emotional Health Factors in Commercial Aviators,” International Journal of

Selection & Assessment, 10(1-2), March 2002, 168-184.

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these evaluations. They assert that the costs of implementing such elaborate

screening measures would far outweigh the marginal improvement in assessing the

mental health of pilots beyond that obtained through the scrutiny pilots already

undergo. Proponents for arming pilots also argue that by having access to the flight

deck, a pilot intent on causing harm already possesses the means to do so, and

introducing a firearm on the flight deck does little to add to that already existing

capability. They argue that, historically, incidents of deliberate acts by pilots to

harm the airplane and its occupants are extremely unusual and current background

checks, screening, and evaluations of pilots are more than adequate for assessing

their fitness to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.

The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act specifies that pilots who are former

military or law enforcement personnel should be given preference to participate in

the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. This could be one way to mitigate the risks

identified above, at least among the initial cadre of deputized Federal flight deck

officers by giving preference for participation in the program to persons that were

already deemed fit to carry a firearm. It is also of note that the law does not limit

participation to U.S. citizens. Therefore, another implementation issue is whether

additional background checks will be required for non-U.S. citizen pilots

volunteering to participate in this program. While provisions for waiting periods and

background checks have been established for foreign pilots seeking certain types of

advanced flight training in the United States since September 11, 2001, it is uncertain

whether additional background checks and waiting periods would be needed for

foreign pilots seeking to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program,

particularly if the pilot has an extensive employment record flying for U.S. air

carriers.

Currently, TSA procedures require that pilots applying for the program undergo

additional psychological screening, background checks, and a medical examination

beyond those already required of airline pilots. The Airline Pilots Security Alliance

(APSA), a grass-roots organization supporting efforts to arm pilots, has called the

TSA screening requirements unacceptable and redundant with many existing FAA

and airline screening requirements.9 However, the TSA asserts that the proposed

screening measures are similar to those used in selection of federal law enforcement

officers, including federal air marshals, to determine an individual’s fitness to carry

a firearm and act in a law enforcement capacity and are necessary to ensure that

participating pilots meet these same standards.10 According to TSA, about 6 percent

of the applicants for the program are screened out prior to initial training – 2 percent

fail to meet the qualifications specified by law, 3 percent are eliminated through

psychological screening, and 1 percent have problems identified by the background

check.11

9

See [http://www.secure-skies.org]

10

Keith L. Alexander, “Some Pilots Oppose Gun Rules.” The Washington Post, 13 February

2003, p. A13.

11

Matthew Weinstock. TSA, pilots wage war.

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Equipment

What are the tradeoffs between firearms effectiveness and risk to

the aircraft?

The legislation identifies the selection of firearms and ammunition as an issue

to be addressed in developing procedural requirements for the program. The

legislation also specifies that an analysis shall be conducted to assess the risk of

catastrophic failure of an aircraft as a result of the discharge (including an accidental

discharge) of a firearm into the avionics, electrical systems, or other sensitive areas

of the aircraft. The legislation further specifies that information developed in this

analysis shall be treated as classified information and not disclosed. If significant

risks are determined to exist, the Under Secretary shall take actions to minimize these

risks.

The selection of firearms and ammunition for use in the program is an important

consideration because the unique environment of the flight deck and the fact that

pilots are not primarily law enforcement officers make this program quite different

than other law enforcement applications of firearms. Opponents of arming pilots

have argued that a stray bullet could cause serious damage to aircraft systems and

structures and jeopardize flight safety. Speaking before the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science and Transportation, Captain Edward M. Davidson, Director of

Flight Safety and Quality Assurance for Northwest Airlines, cautioned that bullets

could pierce flight deck windows creating a potentially catastrophic cockpit

decompression, could strike one of the flight deck’s many multi-functional

instruments putting at risk numerous safety critical systems, or could strike critical

electronic navigation equipment located beneath the flight deck.12 A depressurization

of the airplane at altitude would necessitate that the flight crew use supplemental

oxygen and complete checklist procedures in response to the depressurization.

Similarly, loss of critical aircraft systems may require a flight crew’s immediate

attention. Accomplishing required safety-related tasks may prove difficult during a

struggle with intruders in the cockpit.

However, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Mr. Ron

Hinderberger, Director of Aviation Safety for the Boeing Company stated that “[t]he

risk of loss of the aircraft due to a stray round from a handgun is very slight. Boeing

commercial service history contains cases of gunfire onboard in-service airplanes, all

of which landed safely.” Hinderberger further noted that “[c]ommercial airplane

structure is designed with sufficient strength, redundancy, and damage tolerance that

single or even multiple handgun bullet holes would not result in loss of the aircraft.

A single bullet hole in the fuselage skin would have little effect on cabin

pressurization.”13

12

Statement of Captain Edward M. Davidson, Director, Flight Safety and Quality

Assurance, Northwest Airlines before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation, July 25, 2002.

13

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Press Release #253, May 2, 2002.

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It has been reported that the weapon initially chosen for the program was a

Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol that is commonly used by law

enforcement agencies.14 More recently, it was announced that German weapons

manufacturer Heckler & Koch who makes a similar .40-caliber handgun was awarded

the TSA contract to supply up to 9,600 guns for the program.15 This award was

questioned, particularly by other bidders and supporters of “buy American”

principles. This prompted TSA to reevaluate the contract bids, but Heckler & Koch

again came out on top in the reevaluation process. The company is building a

manufacturing facility in Columbus, Georgia that will eventually supply guns for the

Federal Flight Deck Officer program and create about 200 U.S. manufacturing jobs.16

As the program evolves, further research and development of firearms and

ammunition more specifically tailored to the needs of Federal Flight Deck officers

and the unique environment of the flight deck may be needed. Factors to be

examined include enhancement of firearm effectiveness in the flight deck

environment and mitigation of the risks of accidental discharges, inadvertent

shootings of innocent passengers, and possible depressurization of the cabin or

disabling of aircraft systems from a firearm discharge. The law provides for

temporary suspension of the program if the firearm of a Federal flight deck officer

accidentally discharges due to a shortcoming in standards, training, or procedures

until the shortcoming is corrected.

Training

Who should conduct the training?

The law specifies that training of Federal flight deck officers was to begin

within three months after enactment. Following enactment, the TSA convened a task

force to define the training program and address other implementation issues. The

law provides that the training program may be administered either by the Under

Secretary or by a firearms training facility approved by the Under Secretary. This

leaves to the Under Secretary’s discretion whether the training will be provided by

TSA facilities and staff, by facilities and staff of other Federal law enforcement

agencies or organizations, or by contractor facilities. One advantage of using TSA

facilities is that doing so could maximize standardization of training for pilots and

compliance with the standards and guidelines established by the Under Secretary.

It could also improve coordination of training and procedures between Federal flight

deck officers and Federal air marshals who will need to coordinate and communicate

effectively when dealing with in-flight situations that may arise. However, TSA

training facilities may become overburdened if large numbers of pilots wish to

participate in the program. TSA facilities and staff may lack the ability to administer

14

Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar. “In Test, Some U.S. Airline Pilots May Carry Guns as Early

as April. The Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2003.

15

16

Richard H. P. Sia. “TSA revisits gun contract.” Congress Daily, July 30, 2003.

“TSA Reaffirms Decision On German Firearm Supplier.”, Congress Daily, October 22,

2003.

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training in a timely manner that meets scheduling constraints of the pilots, especially

given that the pilots will need to complete this training during their time off.

One alternative that has been considered is to use Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) training facilities. In December 2001, the FBI released its

proposal for training airline pilots termed the “Cockpit Protection Program.” The

advantage of this plan is that it is already well defined and includes assessments of

the facility and staff requirements needed to administer the training. The

disadvantage of this program is that it removes the training from the direct control

of the TSA, who would instead assume an oversight role to ensure that training

standards established by the Under Secretary are maintained. Also, this arrangement

may not offer the opportunity for specific training regarding the coordination of

duties and responsibilities between Federal flight deck officers and Federal air

marshals. Another federal entity named as possible provider of training for Federal

flight deck officers is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) which

has facilities in Glynco, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; and Artesia, New

Mexico. These facilities may provide capabilities to train larger groups of pilots at

locations that may be more convenient to some, but like the FBI facilities, these

facilities may have limited oversight by TSA and may not offer the opportunity for

training on coordination with Federal air marshals.

Using contractor facilities and/or contractor staff to administer training to

Federal flight deck officers are also options, but ones that pose several challenges.

Extensive oversight of contractor provided training may be necessary to ensure that

established curriculum and qualifications standards are maintained. If multiple

contracts are used to train Federal flight deck officers, standardization of training

across vendors may be difficult to maintain. One advantage of using contract training

for the program might be the reduction of capital investment for facilities and

personnel.

A prototype training program was held in April, 2003 used FLETC facilities in

Glynco, Georgia to train an initial group of 48 pilots. Full implementation of the

program began in July 2003 at the Glynco facilities as well as facilities in Artesia,

New Mexico. In September 2003, the program was moved in its entirety to the

Artesia, New Mexico facilities because that site has aircraft mockups for training that

were not available at Glynco and other law enforcement training at Glynco, Georgia

was limiting facilities available for the program there. Some pilot groups have

complained that the TSA’s reliance on a single site, and the remote location of the

Artesia, New Mexico facility (269 miles from the nearest major airport in

Albuquerque) creates a considerable inconvenience for attending the training.17

Admiral Loy noted that while the initial training is being conducted at federal

facilities, as the program evolves “...there very well may be a private sector

opportunity...” to provide the training.18 More recently, the TSA has indicated that

17

Brock N. Meeks. “Pilot gun training resumes amid flap.” MSNBC News July 15, 2003.

18

Hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science and

(continued...)

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they view initial training of the pilots as a federal function, so that trainees can be

appropriately evaluated before being deputized, but remain open to the possibility

that private firms can provide for recurrent training and re-qualification of federal

flight deck officers. However, TSA has indicated that it will make no decision on

whether re-qualification training should take place at federal facilities or TSAapproved private facilities or some combination thereof until they have more

experience with the program.19

What will the training consist of ?

The Act specifies that the training of a Federal flight deck officer shall include:

Training to ensure that the Federal flight deck officer attains a level

of proficiency with a firearm comparable to the level of proficiency

required of Federal air marshals;

! Training to ensure that the officer maintains exclusive control over

the officer’s firearm at all times, including training in defensive

maneuvers; and

! Training to assist the officer in determining when it is appropriate to

use the officer’s firearm and when it is appropriate to use less than

lethal force.

!

The Act specifies that the Under Secretary shall base the requirements for training

Federal flight deck officers on the training standards applicable to Federal air

marshals, taking into account the differing roles and responsibilities of Federal flight

deck officers and Federal air marshals. While many of the details of the Federal air

marshal training program are classified and cannot be disclosed, it has been reported

that the program consists of 10 ½ weeks of progressive training starting with basic

marksmanship, followed by reactive firearms training scenarios, followed by

advanced firearms techniques specific to the aircraft cabin environment, followed by

scenario-based exercises using wide-body and narrow-body aircraft mockups.20

Pilot groups including ALPA and the Allied Pilots Association (APA) have

suggested that initial training for Federal flight deck officers could be completed in

a 48-hour training program. Such a training program was derived from details

released in December 2001 regarding the FBI Cockpit Protection Program that

proposed a five-day, 48-hour training course in firearms handling, legal aspects, tort

18

(...continued)

Transportation Committee on Aviation Security and Impacts Associated with the Regulatory

and Statutory Requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),

Wednesday, February 5, 2003.

19

Statement of Stephen J. McHale, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security

Administration. Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee

on Aviation. U.S. House of Representatives. Status of the Federal Flight Deck Officer

Program. May 8, 2003.

20

J. Croft. “TSA Provides Rare Peek at Air Marshals,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, 156(23), 10 June 2002, p. 54; Leslie Miller. “Pilots Anticipate Guns in Cockpit

by Spring,” Associated Press, Washington Dateline, 27 November 2002.

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law, and policies regarding use of lethal force. The current TSA program similarly

consists of a 48-hour curriculum of classroom instruction, firearms training, and

tactical drills.

The legislation also specifies that Federal flight deck officers will have to requalify at an interval required by the Under Secretary. The FBI Cockpit Protection

Program specified an annual re-qualification interval. The selection of a requalification interval will need to strike a balance between adequately ensuring that

qualification standards are maintained while ensuring that the process does not

overburden TSA resources or place an undue schedule burden on Federal flight deck

officers who will need to re-qualify during time away from their flying jobs.

How will the effectiveness of the training be evaluated?

The law does not specify any criteria or guidelines for assessing the

effectiveness of the program or the training provided under the program. Given that

the primary objective of the program is deterrence of terrorism and criminal acts

against the flight deck, effectiveness of the program in this regard will be difficult if

not impossible to assess. Successful deterrence may be indicated by statistics

regarding security incidents aboard aircraft. However, it will be difficult to attribute

any reduction in security incidents directly to this program. This is especially true

in consideration of the fact that the Federal flight deck program is but one component

of a larger effort to heighten aviation security in response to terrorist threats that also

includes enhanced passenger and baggage screening and the deployment of Federal

air marshals. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of certain elements of the program can

be assessed. For example, the effectiveness of training can be assessed through

evaluation of performance during re-qualification. Also, effectiveness of the program

with regards to risk management can be assessed though analysis of data on incidents

of firearms mishandling, accidental discharges, lost and stolen weapons, and so on.

Operational Procedures

Storage and Transportation of the Firearm.

Should the weapon be stored at secure airport facilities or carried

by the Federal flight deck officer traveling to and from duty?

The legislation identifies storage and transportation of firearms as an issue to be

addressed in establishing the procedural requirements for the program. The

legislation specifies that particular attention should be given to storage and

transportation of firearms on international flights and when the pilot leaves the

airport to remain overnight away from the pilot’s base airport. Pilot groups have

argued for allowing Federal flight deck officers to retain the firearm, particularly at

the pilot’s home base, and further advocate that Federal flight deck officers be given

the opportunity to train with the firearm to maintain proficiency in its use.21

21

See, e.g., Allied Pilots Association, Committee for the Armed Defense of the Cockpit.

Report submitted to the National Officers and Board of Directors, Winter Board of Directors

(continued...)

CRS-11

Opponents of such a plan argue that pilots carrying weapons both in airports and to

and from work could be the target of terrorists and criminals seeking to steal their

firearms and increases the potential for mishandling of the firearm and accidental

discharges.

In February 2003, a TSA task force studying the implementation issues for the

Federal Flight Deck Officer Program recommended the use of lock boxes for

transporting the firearms. Pilot groups have voiced concerns that the use of lock

boxes undermines the intent of the legislation which they believe specifies that “...the

officer maintains exclusive control over his or her firearm at all times...”22 The TSA

has indicated that its decision is based on the very specific nature of the mission

outlined in the legislation which permits pilots to use their weapons only in defense

of the flight deck. The TSA considers the lock box as a means to minimize the risk

that the firearms will be used in other situations. However, the Airline Pilots’

Security Alliance (APSA) is concerned that the use of lock boxes to transport

firearms may make pilots particularly vulnerable targets for thieves seeking to steal

their weapons and provides pilots with no means for personal security to protect

against this threat.23 Currently, TSA requires the firearm to be carried in a secured

lock box and only opened inside a secure cockpit.

Should the firearm be concealed?

Concealment of the issued firearm is not specifically addressed in the legislation

but was a significant issue considered in establishing the procedural requirements of

the program. Carrying a concealed firearm would prevent the flying public from

determining which pilots were Federal flight deck officers. Doing so could prevent

Federal flight deck officers from becoming targets of attempts to seize or steal

firearms. Concealing the firearms could also benefit pilots who are not participants

in the program since individuals intending criminal acts against a flight deck will not

have foreknowledge of whether the pilots on the flight deck are armed or not. On the

other hand, carrying a concealed weapon in the airport terminal, outside controlled

access areas of airports, and during travel to and from work could complicate security

screening and law enforcement efforts to establish a pilot’s status as a Federal flight

deck officer authorized to carry a concealed firearm. Pilot groups have also raised

the issue of whether Federal flight deck officers will be permitted to carry backup

firearms.24 It is common practice among law enforcement officers to carry concealed

backup firearms. Currently, the flight deck officers are only issued one weapon

which must be transported in a secured lock box that is concealed in pilots cases, but

not readily accessible to the pilot when outside the secured cockpit.

21

(...continued)

Meeting, February 14, 2002. Fort Worth, TX: Author.

22

Air Line Pilots Association. “News Release: ALPA Criticizes Serious Deficiency in TSA

Firearms Carriage Recommendation.”, Release #03.010, February 20,2003. Available at

[http://www.alpa.org/alpa/DesktopModules/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=2096].

23

Sara Kehaulani Goo. “TSA Nearly Ready to Begin Gun Training for Pilots.” The

Washington Post, 20 February 2003, p. A8.

24

Ibid.

CRS-12

Airport Security Screening.

What identification will verify that a pilot is a deputized Federal

flight deck officer authorized to possess a firearm?

The legislation identifies methods for ensuring that security personnel will be

able to identify whether a pilot is authorized to carry a firearm under the program as

an issue that was addressed in establishing the procedural requirements for the

program. Adequate methods for preventing forgery of identification and accounting

for misplaced or stolen identification are needed to ensure that terrorists and

criminals cannot breach security checkpoints by impersonating Federal flight deck

officers. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71; 115

Stat. 597) mandated the establishment of a uniform system of identification for all

State and local law enforcement personnel for use in obtaining permission to carry

weapons in aircraft cabins and in obtaining access to a secured area of an airport, if

otherwise authorized to carry such weapons. The TSA also currently has several

research efforts examining technologies for establishing a standardized

Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) and for exploring the use of

biometric technologies for identification. Future deployments of systems using these

technologies may provide enhanced capability to assure positive identification of

Federal flight deck officers. Federal flight deck officers are identified by credentials

issued by TSA, but specific procedures for verifying these credentials is considered

security sensitive information.

Where should screening and identification checking of Federal

flight deck officers take place?

If it is determined that concealing the identity of Federal flight deck officers

would be a desirable aspect of the program, then security screening of Federal flight

deck officers and other flight crew at security checkpoints in open public spaces may

diminish the effectiveness of the program. As previously noted, public identification

of Federal flight deck officers may have negative consequences for both Federal

flight deck officers who may be targeted in attempts to seize firearms and for pilots

not participating in the program whose flights may be targeted if it is determined that

a Federal flight deck officer is not on board. Screening of pilots in open view may

also compromise specific security procedures to validate the identity of Federal flight

deck officers. However, alternative arrangements for screening of flight crew may

be impractical, particularly at smaller airports where employee and passenger

screening are collocated.

Flight Deck Operational Procedures.

Where should the firearm be placed during flight operations?

The legislation identifies the placement of a Federal flight deck officer’s firearm

on board the aircraft to ensure security and ease of retrieval as an issue to be

addressed in developing the procedural requirements of the program. A holstered

weapon may present a safety hazard as it may interfere with the pilots full range of

motion and prevent performance of normal flight deck duties. A holstered weapon

may also be difficult to access from a seated position. However, alternative options

CRS-13

involving aircraft modifications for securing firearms on the flight deck would

require industry retrofitting of flight decks for all affected transport category

airplanes and FAA certification of these designs. Simple designs may be easily

approved and implemented. However, more elaborate designs for housing firearms

on the flight deck may require more detailed test and evaluation as part of the

certification process. Due to significant differences in flight deck layouts among

transport category aircraft, standardization across aircraft types in a manner that

optimizes positioning of the firearm may be difficult to achieve. These designs may

also have difficulty accommodating differences in physical dimensions and

handedness among Federal flight deck officers.

What coordination of flight crew and law enforcement personnel is

needed?

The legislation identifies interaction between a Federal flight deck officer and

a Federal air marshal on board the aircraft and methods for ensuring that pilots are

able to identify law enforcement officers authorized to carry a firearm aboard the

aircraft as issues to be addressed in establishing the procedural requirements of the

program. Such coordination will need to address concerns over concealing the

identity of Federal air marshals while allowing sufficient coordination between them

and Federal flight deck officers. Airlines have procedures in place for identifying

armed law enforcement officers and making these individuals known to flight crews.

These procedures may need to be enhanced and further standardized by TSA to

ensure that flight crews can easily recognize armed law enforcement officers on

board and coordinate with them if needed.

The legislation also identifies the division of responsibility between pilots in the

event of an act of criminal violence or air piracy for instances where either one or

both of the flight crew are Federal flight deck officers as an additional issue to be

addressed in implementing the program. This raises a question of what, if any,

training and educational materials regarding the Federal flight deck officer program

will be made available to non-participating flight crew and cabin crew members.

Currently, only very limited information about the program is available to them.

While, flight crews and cabin crews already receive initial and recurrent training in

FAA mandated crew resource management (CRM) training programs that facilitates

coordination of duties and responsibilities, airlines are unlikely to address the subject

of division of responsibility when a pilot must perform duties as a Federal flight deck

officer, citing that this is a Federal function and possibly fearing liability issues if

such matters are addressed in training.25 Furthermore, there is no requirement in the

legislation for training or education of non-participating flight crew personnel

regarding the program and most details of the program have not been released

because of their security sensitive nature. Thus, it has been largely left up to

individual Federal flight deck officers to brief non-participating flight crew on the

25

While the Act contains language limiting the liability of air carriers and Federal flight

deck officers for damages arising from a Federal flight deck officer’s use or failure to use

a firearm, there is ambiguity whether this protection would extend to other flight crew

actions, particularly actions related to flight operations, during periods when one pilot is

performing Federal flight deck officer functions.

CRS-14

coordination of flight duties if the flight deck were attacked. The coordination

among multiple flight crew members who are deputized Federal flight deck officers

is likely much less troublesome as they have undergone the same standard training

and thus have a better understanding of the division of responsibilities during an

attack.

How should disturbances in the passenger cabin be handled?

The legislation specifies procedures for ensuring that the firearm of a Federal

flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if there is a disturbance in the passenger

cabin as an issue to be addressed in establishing the procedural requirements of the

program. Current guidelines and procedures prohibit Federal flight deck officers

from intervening in cabin disturbances. Rather, Federal flight deck officers are

instructed to use their weapons and training only in the defense of the flight deck

which is consistent with the intent of the law establishing this program.

Disturbances in the passenger cabin are left to be handled by flight attendants,

federal air marshals, or any other law enforcement personnel on the aircraft. Federal

flight deck officers are instructed to use their judgment and any available information

they can ascertain from flight attendants and so on to determine the best course of

action for diverting the aircraft to a location where ground based law enforcement

can intervene if needed. While the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L.

107-71) specifies that the FAA may develop and implement methods, such as video

monitors or other surveillance technologies, to alert pilots in the flight deck to

activity in the cabin, such devices are not yet available, but are being developed.

What procedures should be established for opening the cockpit

door and leaving the cockpit?

Additionally, the legislation specifies procedures for ensuring that the firearm

of a Federal flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if the pilot leaves the

cockpit for personal reasons as an issue to be addressed in establishing the procedural

requirements of the program. Procedures relating to opening the cockpit door for

other reasons are not specifically addressed in the legislation but were examined in

the implementation of the program. Reasons for opening the cockpit door and

leaving the cockpit during flight include flight crew meal and beverage service, flight

crew changes on long-duration flights, use of the lavatory, and abnormal or

emergency situations that require actions outside of the cockpit. Such events may

result in a physical separation between the Federal flight deck officer and his or her

firearm if the firearm is to be secured on the flight deck at all times. Occasions when

the cockpit door is opened and when the flight crew is moving about may in fact be

the most risky times with regard to a potential attack. Procedures may be needed to

address these various scenarios and mitigate the risks associated with opening the

cockpit door.

CRS-15

Costs

What will the costs to the Federal government be?

The law specifies that the Under Secretary shall be obligated to provide all

training, supervision, and equipment needed for the program at no expense to the

pilot or the air carrier employing the pilot. Thus, direct training costs will be the

obligation of the Federal Government. This will include initial training and

qualification as well as recurrent training and re-qualification of pilots in the

program. The Federal Government is also obligated to provide equipment needed for

the program. These equipment expenses will primarily consist of issued firearms and

ammunition as well as any equipment needed to maintain the firearms. This may

also include facilities to house firearms at airports. The Federal Government will

also incur the costs of additional background checks or screening that may be

necessary to determine the fitness of a pilot to participate in the program.

Total costs to the Federal Government for the program will be highly dependent

on the number of pilots that volunteer and qualify to participate in the program as

well as the rate at which pilots are trained and deputized. Congressional Budget

Office (CBO) cost estimates for the program were based upon earlier proposed

legislation (107th Congress, H.R. 4635) that limited participation to 2 percent of

pilots employed by air carriers. In this estimate, the CBO assumed that it would cost

about $8,000 per pilot annually to cover the costs of equipment, training, and travel.26

This figure does not include costs required to manage the program. In preparing to

implement the prototype program, TSA has indicated that it will cost about $10,400

per pilot for training and equipment. The TSA budgeted a total $500,000 to conduct

the prototype program.27 In the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for FY2003

(P.L. 108-7), the TSA was given $8 million to startup the Federal Flight Deck Officer

program and begin full scale implementation of the program which began in July,

2003. The Homeland Security Appropriations for FY 2004 (P.L. 108-90, 117 Stat.

1137) gave the TSA $25 million for continuing the program. At this funding level,

more than 2,000 pilots could be deputized as Federal Flight Deck Officers by the end

of FY 2004 assuming TSA is able to conduct the background screening and training

for this number of pilots over the course of the fiscal year. Currently, TSA is

conducting weekly initial training classes of 48 pilots each.28

What will the costs to participants and airlines be?

The law specifies that pilots participating in the program shall not be eligible for

compensation from the Federal Government for services provided as a flight deck

officer. The law further states that the Federal Government and the air carriers shall

not be obligated to compensate the pilots for any training, qualification, or requalification to carry firearms under this program. Consequently, pilots are not

26

Congressional Budget Office. “Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, H.R. 4635,

Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act.”, p. 2.

27

Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar. Op. cit.; Sara Kehaulani Goo, “TSA Nearly Ready to Begin...”

28

Matthew Weinstock. TSA, pilots wage war of words.

CRS-16

compensated by the Federal Government while attending training. While the air

carriers employing pilots participating in this program are not obligated to

compensate pilots, such compensation may be a topic for negotiations between air

carriers and pilot unions. Consequently, policies may vary from one air carrier to

another. Similarly, indirect costs of training, such as travel to and from the training

site and lodging and per diem while in training, could either be paid by the individual

pilots participating in the program or by the air carriers employing these pilots.

While pilots may use their access to free airline transportation on a space available

basis for travel to and from the training site, it is likely that most other indirect costs

arising from participation in the program will be the responsibility of the pilots

themselves. Given the airlines’ early opposition to this program, it is unlikely that

compensation for pilots and payment of their indirect costs associated with

participation in this program would be a concession that airlines are likely to make

in negotiations with pilots unions. This is especially true in light of the economic

difficulties facing many airlines that prompted them to request tax relief from the

Federal Government and ask for concessions from pilot unions and other labor

groups rather than vice versa. Consequently, in the current economic environment,

pilots will most likely have to complete training, qualification, and re-qualification

during their own time and are likely to pay the indirect costs for training and

participating in the program out of pocket. One issue that may arise is whether these

out of pocket expenses incurred by pilots participating in the program will be tax

deductible.

While the law specifies that equipment cost is a Federal obligation, it is

uncertain who would pay for cockpit modifications if it is determined that such

modifications are needed to store or secure firearms used in the program onboard the

aircraft. Even if the direct costs for making such modifications are covered by the

Federal Government, air carriers may be burdened by indirect costs associated with

removing aircraft from service to make any needed modifications. The current

program does not require any cockpit modifications.

Scope of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act initially limited participation in the

Federal Flight Deck Officer Program to volunteer pilots of air carriers providing

passenger air transportation or intrastate passenger air transportation. The legislation

defines a pilot as a pilot-in-command (i.e., a captain), or a second-in-command (i.e.,

first officer) when a second pilot is required, and does not include flight engineers or

other members of the flight crew not meeting this definition. From the time the

legislation was introduced, pilot organizations have argued that the program should

be expanded to include other pilots and flight crew members, principally pilots of

cargo air carriers and flight engineers.

Should the Federal flight deck officer program be expanded to

include other pilots?

Proponents for arming pilots voiced concerns that the legislative language of the

Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act did not include all air carrier pilots.

Specifically, the language limits inclusion to pilots providing passenger air

transportation or intrastate passenger air transportation. Consequently, pilots of

CRS-17

cargo flights initially could not participate in the program. Nor could flight engineers

or other flight crew members who are not formally considered pilots. However, a

provision in the FAA reauthorization legislation (P.L. 108-176) expanded the

program to include all flight crew members of both passenger and all-cargo air carrier

aircraft.

Proponents for including cargo pilots among the cadre of Federal flight deck

officers note that layers of security protection similar to those in place to protect

passenger air carrier aircraft are not required for air cargo operations. They argue that

this leaves cargo flight crews vulnerable to potential terrorist threats against cargo

aircraft, including large and heavy aircraft that could be used in an attack similar to

that launched on September 11, 2001. They suggest that this vulnerability can be

mitigated by allowing cargo air carrier pilots to participate in the program. In a

statement issued November 15, 2002, Captain David Webb chairman of Air Line

Pilot Association’s FedEx unit, expressed the following view:

A cargo aircraft is devoid of cabin attendants and air marshals. However, at

airlines such as FedEx, employees and vendors are routinely boarded. Political

maneuvering by the cargo industry has shielded them from the level of security

screening mandated for the passenger terminal. The entire burden for the security

of the aircraft rests on the two or three pilots in the cockpit. There is little we can

do to defend the aircraft against a terrorist attack. Stripping us of the ability to

carry firearms in the post-9/11 environment is an appallingly irresponsible act.

And the worst part is that it is our own managements that did this to us, with no

discussion, no warning, no justification whatsoever.29

Opponents argued that the general public does not have authorized access to

cargo aircraft and therefore, enhanced ground-based security measures to better

protect cargo aircraft and improve screening of employees authorized to access these

aircraft would make deputizing cargo pilots as Federal flight deck officers

unnecessary. Some also argued that costly training for Federal flight deck officers

is not needed for cargo pilots, because the operational environment of cargo aircraft

does not introduce the same risks associated with arming pilots of passenger

aircraft.30 Consequently, a separate program, with separate standards, training, and

guidelines was considered by some to be more suitable for implementation in the air

cargo industry.

Besides cargo air carrier pilots, other pilots, such as on-demand air charter pilots

and pilots flying for fractional-ownership programs, may also seek participation in

the program, although this has not happened to date. Proponents for including these

pilots in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program may argue that currently there are

29

ALPA news release #02.101, “ALPA President Blasts Industry for Watering Down Cargo

Security”, November 14, 2002.

Viewed November 18, 2003 at:

[http://www.alpa.org/alpa/DesktopModules/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=870].

30

Risk factors in passenger air carrier service that are not applicable to cargo air carrier

operations include the presence of large numbers of passenger on board the aircraft, carrying

firearms in controlled access areas where large numbers of people are present, and

coordination of law enforcement duties and responsibilities with Federal air marshals and

other law enforcement officers on board the aircraft.

CRS-18

few, if any, security protections to guard against threats of air piracy and criminal

violence in these types of aviation operations. Arming these pilots, they argue, may

serve as the most viable means for providing security in these highly varied

operations where control of access to the aircraft and flight deck is more difficult.

Opponents of such a proposal argue that the inclusion of these pilots in the Federal

flight deck officer program would significantly increase the costs of the program and

would lead to further proliferation of firearms in the aviation environment that may

compromise other security initiatives. Thus far, there have been no legislative

initiatives to include these types of pilots in the FFDO program.

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