Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors

Order Code RL31016

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):

FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors

Updated February 14, 2002

(name redacted)

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

(name redacted)

Specialist in International Security Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):

FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors

Summary

In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in

FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade

preferences and other measures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative

called the “Andean Regional Initiative” (ARI).

Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what

they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia assistance approved in

2000, with an overemphasis on military and counter-drug assistance, and with

inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in Colombia. Supporters

argue that it continues needed assistance to Colombia, while providing more support

for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.

In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506),

the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which

$675 million is for the counter-narcotics “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI)

portion, a reduction of $56 million from the President’s ACI request. The Senate

passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 million for the ARI, of which $547

million is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President’s ACI request.

The conference version of H.R. 2506, as approved by the House on December 19,

and the Senate on December 20, includes $625 million for the ACI, $106 million less

than the President’s ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for AID programs and

a variety of conditions, including an alteration of the cap on military and civilian

contractors serving in Colombia. In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush

Administration allocated $645 million to the ACI account for FY2002, including $20

million transferred from the general International Narcotics Control account.

In action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, the

House passed H.R. 1646 on May 16, 2001, with four reporting requirements on

activities in Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed

groups in Colombia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 1401

on September 4, 2001, with a requirement for a report that outlines a comprehensive

strategy to eradicate all opium cultivation at its source in Colombia. No further

action occurred on either of these bills in the first session of the 107th Congress.

In action on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, the House

passed H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with a cap of 500 on the number of U.S.

military personnel in Colombia, with some exceptions. This provision was not

retained in the conference version of S. 1438 which was passed by both chambers on

December 13, 2001.

In action on the Andean Trade Preference Act, on November 16, 2001, the

House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,

which would extend and expand the ATPA through December 31, 2006. The Senate

Finance Committee reported a more limited version, S. 525, on November 29, 2001,

in the context of other legislation.

Contents

President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative Request for FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Major Legislative Activity in 2001 on Andean Regional Initiative Issues . . . . . 12

Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Conference Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

National Defense Authorization Act, FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix B. Bush Administration’s FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative

(ARI) Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix C. FY2000-FY2001 U.S. Assistance to Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appendix D. Controversy over Spray Eradication Efforts in Southern

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Appendix E. Bush Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI)

FY2002 Request and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional

Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Appendix F. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Allocations and

FY2003 Funding Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts . . . . . . . . . 33

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):

FY2002 Assistance for

Colombia and Neighbors

President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative

Request for FY2002

In April 2001 budget submissions, President Bush requested $882.29 million

in FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance for Colombia and regional

neighbors in an initiative called the “Andean Regional Initiative,” with $731 million

of the counter-narcotics assistance called the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative.”

According to the Administration, there are two distinctive features of this program,

compared to Plan Colombia assistance,1 both of which aim to promote peace and to

stem the flow of cocaine and heroin from the Andean region. The differences are that

the assistance for economic and social programs is roughly equal to the assistance for

counter-narcotics programs, and that more than half of the assistance is directed at

regional countries that are experiencing the spill-over effects of illicit drug and

insurgency activities.2

In the presentation of the International Affairs budget, the Administration noted

that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative would build upon the resources provided in

the FY2000 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Plan Colombia and

ongoing regional funding. It set as counter-narcotics goals to reduce Colombian coca

production by 30% in 2000-2002, to eliminate all illicit coca production in Bolivia

by the end of 2002, to negotiate revised coca and poppy control goals with the new

1

“Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental

appropriations approved by the 106th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction

Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425, P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in

Colombia and neighboring countries. There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which

the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this

and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001. For more detail, see CRS Report

RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).

2

President Bush also requested $31.250 million from the International Affairs account for

international narcotics control funding for Other Western Hemisphere countries, with $12

million for Mexico, $12.5 million for the Latin American Regional program, $4 million for

Guatemala, $1.550 million for Jamaica, and $1.2 million for the Bahamas. He also

committed to fully fund the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act as incorporated into

the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998 (P.L.

105-277) by providing $278 million to upgrade drug interdiction efforts of the U.S. Coast

Guard and Customs Service in Transportation and Administration of Justice accounts. See

the Administration’s February 2001 Blueprint for New Beginnings, and April budget

submission documents.

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Peruvian Government, and to set aggressive and achievable goals by mid-August

2001 with other countries in the region.

In presenting the broader Andean Regional Initiative to Andean regional leaders

at Summit of the Americas III in Quebec City, Canada, in mid-April 2001, President

Bush said: “The United States is responsible to fight its own demand for drugs. And

we will expand our efforts to work with producer and transit countries to fortify their

democratic institutions, promote sustainable development, and fight the supply of

drugs at the source .... The United States appreciates the difficult challenges [Andean

countries] face in fighting drugs – and stands ready to be their partner.”3

Requested ARI funding of $882.29 million for FY2002 is to be distributed as

follows, taking into account only international affairs funding:

Colombia: $399 million

! Socio-economic aid: $146.5 million for programs such as alternative

development, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption

measures, and support for the peace process.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $252.5 million for aviation and infrastructure

support for air assets provided under Plan Colombia, training and

equipping security forces, and interdiction and eradication efforts.

Peru: $206.15 million

! Socio-economic aid: $128.15 million for alternative development,

promotion of democracy, health and education programs.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $78 million for upgrading helicopters and

riverine interdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and

policy development.

Bolivia: $143.48 million

! Socio-economic aid: $88.48 million for programs such as alternative

development, judicial reform, poverty alleviation, health and

environment.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $55 million for ground-based and air

interdiction support, eradication efforts, counter-narcotics training,

and narcotics awareness and prevention programs.

Ecuador: $76.48 million

! Socio-economic aid: $56.48 million for border area development,

poverty reduction, judicial reform, and environmental programs.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $20 million for northern border security, law

enforcement and border checkpoints, and sea and airport control

efforts.

3

See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact

Sheet: U.S. Andean Regional Initiative, April 21, 2001, and Appendix A in this report.

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Brazil: $26.18 million

! Socio-economic aid: $11.18 million for health and environmental

programs.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $15 million for training and equipping border

counter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand

reduction programs.

Panama: $20.5 million

! Socio-economic aid: $8.5 million for judicial reform, watershed

management, and economic growth opportunities.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $12 million for upgrading interdiction and

law enforcement forces, and for modernizing criminal justice

institutions.

Venezuela: $10.5 million

! Socio-economic aid: $0.5 million for legal and judicial reform.

! Counter-narcotics aid: $10 million for law enforcement and

interdiction reforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and

demand reduction.

Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative is U.S. support for the

extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), expiring in

December 2001, that gives duty free or reduced-rate treatment to the products of

Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. This was the centerpiece appeal of Colombian

President Pastrana at his mid-April 2001 meeting with the President Bush, and the

U.S. President replied that he favored extension of the Act and would work with

Congress to broaden the coverage. President Bush repeated that pledge when he met

with Andean leaders at the Summit of the Americas meeting in Canada. Colombia

especially wants textiles and apparel to be covered, while Ecuador wants tuna to be

covered. The countries are looking for parity with Central American and Caribbean

preferences, provided in the U.S.-Caribbean Trade Partnership Act approved in 2000,

in order to prevent a diversion of trade and investment from the Andean region to

Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean.4

In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration

spokesmen noted that democracy is under pressure in all regional countries, that

economic development is in doubt, and that Andean countries pose a direct national

security threat because they produce virtually all of the world’s cocaine and

increasing amounts of heroin. The policy makers suggested three overarching goals

in the Andean Ridge that could be called the three D’s – democracy, development,

and drugs. The first goal is to promote and support democracy and democratic

institutions by support for judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights

improvement, and the peace process in Colombia. The second goal is to foster

sustainable economic development and trade liberalization through alternative

4

For information on ATPA see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:

Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by (name redacted). For information on the U.S.Caribbean Trade Partnership Act and other regional free trade agreements, see CRS Issue

Brief IB95017, Trade and the Americas, by (name redacted).

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economic development, protection of the environment, and renewal of the Andean

Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third goal is to significantly reduce the supply

of illegal drugs to the United States at the source, while simultaneously reducing U.S.

demand, through eradication, interdiction and other efforts.5

The Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative if enacted as requested will

significantly increase funding to some Latin American drug producing countries. It

would place Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia among the top eight U.S. foreign aid

recipients in FY2002, with Colombia in third place, Peru in fifth place, and Bolivia

in eighth place.6

Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what

they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia approved in 2000, with an

overemphasis on military and counter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support

for human rights and the peace process in Colombia. They argue that support for the

military will weaken and undermine the peace process as the only viable solution,

particularly if the military’s ties to the para-military groups and human rights abuse

are not ended. They also argue that forced eradication of crops through aerial

spraying will cause environmental damage and internal displacement in the entire

region, and is likely to fail ultimately as new sources of supply emerge elsewhere.

Supporters argue that the Andean Regional Initiative continues needed assistance to

Colombia when Plan Colombia assistance is just beginning to take effect, while

providing more support for endangered regional neighbors and more assistance for

social and economic programs.7

5

See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact

Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing

on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available at the following website

[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].

6

See CRS Report RL31011, Appropriations for FY2002: Foreign Operations, Export

Financing, and Related Programs, p. 9, by (name redacted). For more information on past

international narcotics control efforts by the United States, see CRS Issue Brief IB88093,

Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by Raphael Perl.

7

For critical comments, see statements on the Center for International Policy’s Colombia

Project website [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/] under CIP Analyses, under U.S.

Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses) and under U.S. Government

Information (especially Legislators). For supportive comments, see statements on the same

website under U.S. Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses), and U.S.

Government Information (especially statements from Officials and Legislators).

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Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries

The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven

important countries in the broadly defined Andean region8, or what the

Administration has called the Andean Ridge: Colombia (the major producer of

cocaine and the central challenge); Peru and Bolivia (where past successes in

reducing cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in Colombia);

Ecuador (the most exposed neighbor because of its proximity to Colombian areas

controlled by drug producers and guerrillas); and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama

(where the threat is primarily confined to common border areas with Colombia).

This area has some of the most heavily populated countries in Latin America,

including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and

eighth (Ecuador) most populous. It includes three major drug producing countries

(Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the world’s cocaine, and more than

two thirds of the heroin consumed in the U.S. East Coast are produced. It also

includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador) which supply

significant quantities of oil to the United States and are members of the Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While the designated countries have

diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading partner by far for

all of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela,

Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) the Andes mountain range that runs through South

America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but the

countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact.

While Colombia and Venezuela have largely European-Indian mixed race (mestizo)

populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have significant indigenous populations.

Colombia

With a population of 42.8 million, Colombia is the third most populous country

in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico, with a largely mixed race (mestizo)

population, and a spacious territory separated by three parallel mountain ranges. It

is known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence,

including guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug

trafficking activity. Negotiated settlements were achieved with some of the guerrilla

groups in the 1980s, but fell apart by 1990 when former guerrillas participating in

political activities were assassinated. Recent administrations have had to deal with

a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist para-military forces, and drug

traffickers associated with both forces.

President Andres Pastrana was elected and inaugurated in 1998 for a four year

term largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with

the guerrillas, strengthening the Colombian military and counter-narcotics forces, and

8

Panama and Brazil are not normally considered to be part of the Andean region; Bolivia

is an Andean country but it does not share a border with Colombia. For usage of the term

“Andean Ridge” see citations under Plan Colombia on the website of the State Department’s

International Information Programs [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].

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seeking international support for these efforts and other reforms to address the

country’s unusually serious economic difficulties.9

In 1999, President Pastrana, with U.S. assistance, developed a $7.5 billion plan

called Plan Colombia, with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion to

come from international donors, although funding from Colombia and the

international community has been lagging. In response to Colombian requests, the

Clinton Administration developed and the U.S. Congress approved a $1.3 billion

package of assistance in 2000, also called Plan Colombia assistance. Some $860.2

million or 67% of this assistance was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9

million for helicopter, training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army

counternarcotics battalions. This plan was targeted mainly at Colombia and expenses

for big ticket items were weighted toward support for military and counter-narcotics

activities, although there was funding for alternative development, governance, and

human rights programs, and conditions to encourage an improvement in the

military’s human rights performance.10

President Pastrana is approaching the end of his term, which expires in August

2002, and the selection process to determine his successor is under way. While peace

talks had been reinvigorated by President Pastrana’s direct talks with Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda in February

2001, prospects are still very uncertain. Although many elements of Plan Colombia

counter-drug assistance were just beginning to be put in place, the State Department

reported in March 2001 that Colombian production of cocaine had increased 11% in

the year 2000. Despite the FARC’s murder in late September 2001 of the popular

former Minister of Culture, President Pastrana decided in early October 2001 to

extend the demilitarized zone through January 20, 2002, after the FARC agreed to

stop random highway kidnappings and to discuss a ceasefire. Shortly thereafter,

however, the Army accused the FARC of kidnapping six people on a highway in

Narino province, and killing four others in an attack on a small town there.

While international support for Plan Colombia had been lagging, with European

countries previously pledging only about $200 million for social development (not

military) projects, the shift in focus of the U.S. Andean Regional Initiative gained

wider diplomatic support. In part because of the change in emphasis, the

international community pledged an additional $580 million at the third meeting of

the International Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia on April 30,

2001, although some double counting may be involved. The European Union

pledged $297 million, the United States pledged $146 million, the Andean

Development Corporation pledged $100 million, and other countries pledged $37

million.

9

For information on the multi-faceted conditions in Colombia, see CRS Report RL30330,

Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, by (name redacted).

10

For information on U.S. “Plan Colombia” assistance in FY2000-FY2001, including all

Congressional action and congressionally imposed conditions, see CRS Report RL30541,

Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001), by (name r

edacted). This report also contains charts detailing U.S. assistance to Colombia since 1989.

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Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Colombia would have

received $399 million, with $146.5 million in socio-economic aid for programs like

alternative development, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption measures, and

support for the peace process; and $252.5 million in counter-narcotics aid for

aviation and infrastructure support for air assets provided under Plan Colombia,

training and equipping security forces, and interdiction and eradication efforts.

Under final allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $380.50 million, with $137

million in economic and social programs, and $243.50 million in counter-narcotics

aid.

Peru

With a population of 25.7 million (45% Indian, 37% mestizo, 15% European),

Peru is the fifth most populous country in Latin America. It has been in flux since

the constitutionally questionable third term re-election in June 2000 of President

Alberto Fujimori. Although President Fujimori had considerable support during his

presidency (1990-2000) for restoring the economy, defeating the guerrilla insurgency,

and reducing drug trafficking activity, he was criticized for corruption, human rights

violations, and authoritarian tendencies. The political uncertainty in Peru was

compounded when President Fujimori suddenly resigned and fled into exile in

December 2000, following allegations of corruption associated particularly with

security chief Vladimiro Montesinos.

Peru was governed by Acting President Valentin Paniagua during a transition

period until president-elect Alejandro Toledo was inaugurated as President on July

28, 2001, following the well regarded two-round presidential elections in April and

June 2001. Toledo, a longtime anti-Fujimori opposition leader, was elected on June

3, 2001, with 53% of the valid vote, against former left-leaning Peruvian President

Alan Garcia with 47% of the vote.11 President Toledo has promised to end

corruption and to stabilize the economy, and most observers worry that the

expectations of the populace, especially poor, indigenous groups, are almost

impossible to achieve.

Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the

circumstances and procedures leading to an accident on April 20, 2001, when a

Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary

woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane indicated that the

small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities. As a result of this

accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia were

suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released the

report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that

“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in

the accident.

Peru is viewed as a success story in counter-narcotics efforts because six years

of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication

11

For more details, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, by (name r

edacted).

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efforts, and promising alternative development programs have reduced coca

production by 70%. However, Peruvian spokesmen have worried about spillover

effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia into Peru, and a possible increase in

coca production. They have denounced Colombian plantings of coca and poppies in

Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC guerrillas in

Colombia. Because of these threats, Peru has moved a fleet of MI-17 helicopters

from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished, to the

border with Colombia.

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Peru

received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police, and

benefitted from regional interdiction funding .

Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Peru would have

received $206.15 million in assistance, with $128.15 in socio-economic aid for

alternative development, promotion of democracy, health and education programs;

and $78 million in counter-narcotics aid for upgrading helicopters and riverine

interdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and policy development.

Under final allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million, with $119.87

million in economic and social programs, and $75 million in counter-narcotics aid.

Bolivia

With a population of 7.9 million (roughly 60% indigenous and 40% mestizo and

European), Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country in Latin America. It has

been governed by President Hugo Banzer, elected and inaugurated in 1997, who was

serving the second time as President, this time as a democratically elected President,

following his earlier period of military rule in the 1970s. In late June 2001, President

Banzer was diagnosed with lung and liver cancer and flew to the United States for

treatment. Banzer resigned on August 6, and Vice President Jorge Quiroga became

President on August 7, 2001, vowing to continue the economic reforms and to rid the

country of coca production in line with his predecessor’s promises.

With a large indigenous population, Bolivia experienced a significant social

revolution under one party in the 1950s with sweeping land reform, universal

suffrage, rural education, and nationalization of the country’s important tin mines.

The period of military control ran from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and was

followed by a series of ineffective and largely corrupt governments with linkages to

drug traffickers. Beginning in the mid-1990s, reformist governments in Bolivia

carried out major privatization programs and put the country on a sound economic

footing. President Banzer continued the economic reforms and set the goal of

eliminating illegal coca cultivation and narco-trafficking during his five year term.

While Bolivia is actively involved with the Andean Community, it is an associate

member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina,

Paraguay and Uruguay. In support of Bolivia’s counter-narcotics efforts, the United

States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance

and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development assistance projects, and most

of the debt for food assistance.

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Bolivia, like Peru, is viewed by many as a counter-narcotics success story, with

joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and

effective alternative development programs reducing coca cultivation to the lowest

level in five years, with a net reduction of approximately 70%. Bolivia does not have

a common border with Colombia, but the principal concern in Bolivia is that the

successes of the last few years could be turned back and coca cultivation and drug

trafficking could return to Bolivia to meet world-wide demand if counter-narcotics

efforts are successful in Colombia. Some critics have also charged that, while

eradication has been successful in dramatically reducing coca cultivation, it has hurt

the overall economy.

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Bolivia

received $25 million for regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in

alternative development assistance.

Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Bolivia would have

received $143.48 million. This would have included $88.48 million in socioeconomic aid for programs such as alternative development, judicial reform, poverty

alleviation, health and environment; and $55 million in counter-narcotics aid for

ground-based and air interdiction support, eradication efforts, counter-narcotics

training, and narcotics awareness and prevention programs. Under final allocations

for FY2002, Bolivia received $122.96 million, with $74.46 million in economic and

social assistance, and $48.50 million in counter-narcotics aid.

Ecuador

With a population of 12.6 million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country

in Latin America. While more than half of the population is mixed race mestizo,

about a quarter of the population is indigenous. Ecuador is the most exposed

neighbor in the region because it is situated adjacent to southern Colombian areas

that are guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. Ecuador is led by

President Gustavo Noboa, the former Vice President who took office in January

2000, after an uprising by elements of the military and indigenous groups. He is the

fifth president in five years, with several of the previous presidents leaving as a result

of corruption charges. The country has experienced hyperinflation for several years

in the past, and is still struggling with economic austerity following dollarization of

the currency in early 2000.

According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory

for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians

are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug

cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small

cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a

constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with

Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings

CRS-10

in Ecuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in

Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations.12

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding

Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support

drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million was for alternative development assistance.

Another $61.3 million has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating

Location in Manta, Ecuador for counter-narcotics aerial surveillance. There have

been numerous press reports that Ecuadoran officials have been requesting

significantly increased U.S. assistance for some time.

Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Ecuador would have

received a total of $76.48 million in assistance, with $56.48 million in socioeconomic aid for border area development, poverty reduction, judicial reform, and

environmental programs; and $20 million in counter-narcotics aid for northern border

security, law enforcement and border checkpoints, and sea and airport control efforts.

Under final allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $46.86 million, with $31.85

million in economic and social programs, and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid.

Brazil

With a population of 170 million (of European, African, and mixed stock),

Brazil is the largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of the

population concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and

along the Atlantic coast. The country is led by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso

who is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is credited with leading

the country into a period of growth after ending years of inflation with his Real Plan

and after weathering the international financial crisis with IMF assistance in late

1998 and 1999. New presidential elections are approaching in 2002, with doubts

about whether the governing coalition can hold together and carry out needed

reforms. Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory

in the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs

and intervention in this territory.

In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a

$1.4 billion radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its

acronym in Portuguese, and it has offered to share data from this system with

neighbors and the United States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with

25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air force and navy support, to deal with spillover

effects from Colombia. Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug

traffickers encouraging indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, and the

threat of FARC incursions along the border. In one example in late 1998, the FARC

captured a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into

Brazilian territory, before recapturing the city. In another example, a plane from

Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered when it was forced to make

an emergency landing in Brazil.

12

For more information, see CRS Report RS20494, Ecuador: International Narcotics

Control Issues, by Raphael Perl.

CRS-11

Brazil is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a growing transit area for

cocaine moving from the Andean Ridge to Colombia. Although Brazil was not

designated as a recipient of Plan Colombia assistance, under the FY2002 Andean

Regional Initiative request, it would have received $26.18 million. This would have

included $11.18 million in socio-economic aid for health and environmental

programs; and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid for training and equipping border

counter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand reduction programs.

Under final allocations for FY2002, Brazil would receive $18.63 million.

Venezuela

With a population of 23.5 million (of largely mestizo stock), Venezuela is the

sixth most populous country in Latin America. The country is presently led by

President Hugo Chavez, a former disgruntled military leader and a populist, who was

initially elected in late 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the constitution, rid the country

of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the people. During 1999, at

Chavez’s request, Venezuelan voters approved the creation of a National Constituent

Assembly, elected members of the new assembly, and approved the newly written

constitution which lengthened and expanded presidential powers. On July 30, 2000,

in a so-called mega-election, President Chavez easily won election to a new six year

term of office.13 Because of his previous attacks on the legislature and other

institutions, many observers fear that he has authoritarian tendencies somewhat like

those of disgraced former President Fujimori in Peru. Chavez has established close

ties with Fidel Castro and other leftist leaders, and he often employs anti-U.S.

rhetoric. He has denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy,

and he has denied the United States overflight rights over Venezuela territory.

Reports persist that he has established friendly relations with Colombian guerrillas.

At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, President Chavez

reserved the position of Venezuela in the Declaration of leaders committing to move

forward to achieve a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005, and

he also expressed alternative views on U.S. policy and Plan Colombia.

Venezuela is not an illicit drug producing country but it is a transit route for

cocaine and heroin from neighboring Colombia to the United States and Europe.

Despite various policy disagreements with the United States, the Chavez government

has cooperated with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts. While Venezuela

was not designated specifically as a recipient of Plan Colombia assistance, under the

FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have received $10.5 million.

This amount would have included $0.5 million in socio-economic aid for legal and

judicial reform; and $10 million in counter-narcotics aid for law enforcement and

interdiction reforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and demand reduction.

Under final allocations for FY2002, Venezuela would receive $5.5 million.

13

For more details, see CRS Report RS20978, Venezuela under Chavez: Political

Conditions and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and Scott Wilson, “Chavez’s

Unfinished Revolution; Venezuelan’s Accomplishments Fall Short of His Rhetoric,”

Washington Post, May 21, 2001, p. A1.

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Panama

With a population of 2.8 million (of largely mestizo and West Indian stock),

Panama is the twentieth most populous country in Latin America. Its history has

been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the transit of commerce through

the Panama Canal in the center of the country where the major cities are located. It

is led by Mireya Moscoso, elected and inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing

with economic difficulties in Panama, and Panamanian responsibilities for the

Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal on the last day of 1999. Despite

considerable effort in the period leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, Panama was

unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal military presence in Panama

for counter-narcotics surveillance purposes.14 This forced the United States to

develop the Forward Operating Locations in El Salvador, Aruba/Curacao and

Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities. Panama has been the scene of

cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and by Colombian paramilitary

groups, and there is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being founded in

Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception that the

Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected.

Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment

point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America. In recent

years Panama has cooperated with the United States in bilateral counter-narcotics

efforts, seizing significant amounts of illicit drugs and passing anti-money laundering

legislation. While Panama was not designated as a recipient of Plan Colombia

assistance, under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have

received $20.5 million. This would have included $8.5 million in socio-economic

aid for judicial reform, watershed management, and economic growth opportunities;

and $12 million in counter-narcotics aid for upgrading interdiction and law

enforcement forces, and for modernizing criminal justice institutions. Under final

allocations for FY2002, Panama is to receive $13.50 million.

Major Legislative Activity in 2001 on

Andean Regional Initiative Issues

Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002

House Action. On July 10, 2001, the House Appropriations Committee

approved H.R. 2506, with a reduction of $55 million in the ACI portion of the ARI,

after defeating several amendments to reduce the funding even more. On July 24,

2001, the House approved H.R. 2506, reducing counter-drug assistance by an

additional $1 million, and approving amendments relating to caps on personnel in

Colombia and a required report on the April 20 accidental shootdown of a missionary

plane in Peru. As passed by the House, the bill provides $826 million for the ARI,

14

For more detail, see CRS Report RL30981, Panama-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted)

and (name redacted).

CRS-13

of which $675 million is for the ACI, a reduction of $56 million from the President’s

request.

Subcommittee Action. On June 27, 2001, the House Appropriations

Committee’s Foreign Operations Subcommittee marked up and passed a $15.2

billion FY2002 foreign operations funding bill, which contained funding for the Bush

Administration’s Andean Regional Initiation (ARI). The subcommittee action

funded the entire bill at the level requested by the President, but considerably reduced

funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative portion of the ARI.

The subcommittee action would provide $55 million less than the President’s

$731 million request for the State Department’s International Narcotics Control

“Andean Counterdrug Initiative” portion, funding that account at $676 million. The

subcommittee did not specify which among the initiative’s programs were to be

affected by the funding reduction. This would reduce funding for the total ARI from

$882 million to $827 million.

Two amendments regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn during the

subcommittee mark-up. The Pelosi amendment would have limited funding for

Colombia’s military to no more than $52 million, and transferred the other

approximately $100 million of funding requested for the Colombian military to a

Child Survival account for infectious diseases. The Rothman amendment would have

placed a temporary moratorium on U.S. supported fumigation efforts in Colombia

until the State Department presented Congressional appropriations committees with

conclusive evidence that the United States and Colombian governments had

commenced implementation of viable alternative development plans in 75% of all

communities that have signed alternative development pacts.

Committee Action. On July 10, the House Appropriations Committee passed

H.R. 2506, retaining the subcommittee-approved $827 million funding level for the

ARI, with the $676 million funding level for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The

Committee provided no explanation in the report (H.Rept. 107-142) for its action, but

recommended there that the $55 million reduction “should be evenly distributed

among all programs, projects, and activities referred to in the Administration’s

request for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.” The bill itself recommends a limit

of $14.24 million for administrative expenses. As reported by the committee, the bill

also would exempt any programs supported through the ACI funds from the cap of

300 on civilian contractors established by the Plan Colombia legislation (Section

3204(b)(1)(B), P.L. 106-246). (It does not, however, exempt the cap of 500 on the

number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia established by the same legislation.)

The bill would also exempt ACI funds from the prohibition under Section 482 (b) of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, on the use of funds for the

procurement of weapons and ammunition, with exceptions for counternarcotics

activities. The exceptions, requiring an advance notification to Congress, apply to

the defensive arming of aircraft used for counternaroctics activities, and the provision

of firearms and related ammunition for defensive purposes to Department of State

employees or contract personnel engaged in such activities. The Section 482(b)

exemption was also contained in the Plan Colombia legislation.

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The full committee rejected two Colombia-related amendments: (1) the Pelosi

amendment, which had been withdrawn in subcommittee, to transfer approximately

$100 million from the Colombian military to the Child Survival account, failed 22

to 39; and (2) the Obey amendment, to withdraw all Andean counter-drug funding

and shift it to domestic drug treatment and prevention programs, failed 18 to 43.

In H.Rept. 107-142, however, the Committee adopted language requiring the

Secretary of State to report to the appropriations committees by January 1, 2002, and

quarterly thereafter, on the human health and environmental effects of the materials

used in aerial eradication of coca and opium poppy in Colombia, and of the spraying

of those illegal narcotic crops in Colombia. “Such reports shall include a description

of the areas sprayed, materials and methods used, compliance with the spray

guidelines, and the human and environmental impacts of such spraying.”

The Committee also requested two semi-annual reports from the Secretary of

State, both beginning March 1, 2002. One would provide information on all aircraft,

vehicles, boats, and lethal equipment transferred to military and police forces under

the ACI. This report is also to include the number of U.S. military personnel

deployed or assigned to duty in the Andean region or other countries using fund

provided under the ACI during the previous 180 days, and the length, purpose, costs,

and risks of their deployment or assignment. Another would provide information on

“the specific efforts being made by AID, the State Department and the Colombian

government to expedite the delivery of non-cash assistance to communities in

Colombia that have signed pacts to voluntarily eradicate their coca crops.” This

report is to include the percentages of available alternative development funds

disbursed to Colombian communities that have signed such pacts.

The Appropriations Committee report also contains extensive language on

Colombia and other Andean countries. On Colombia, the Committee stated that it

believes that a negotiated settlement “offers the only viable resolution to the complex

conflict” in Colombia, and that efforts to reduce the cultivation of illegal crops “will

continue to face enormous challenges” until a peace accord is reached. The

Committee strongly urged the Secretary of State “to work with all parties in the talks

to encourage rapid progress toward a firm and lasting peace.” Noting that “stronger

trade between Colombia and the United States is crucial to managing the

vulnerabilities of the Colombian economy,” the Committee urged the President “to

seek renewal and expansion of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).” It

expressed concern that alternative development projects were not being implemented

in a timely fashion in Southern Colombia.

For the Andean region in general, the Committee report called on the

Department of State to ensure that all U.S. laws regarding human rights, including

Section 556 of the bill, “are strictly applied in Colombia and each of the Andean

nations.” Regarding Bolivia, the Committee took “special note” of the country’s

progress in counternaroctics efforts, and stated that its “enormous success” was due

“in large part, to the support of the U.S. Government.” It urged the Administration

to continue to strongly support Bolivia “when deciding on its allocation of aid.”

Floor Action. On July 24, the House adopted H.R. 2506, by a vote of 381-46.

It reduced the ACI account by $1 million from the level approved by the

CRS-15

Appropriations Committee, to $675 million, despite efforts to reduce it by much

larger amounts, and altered committee provisions regarding the cap on civilian

contractors. (See the first bullet under approved amendments, below.)

In floor action on July 24, three amendments pertaining to the ARI were

approved, two were defeated, and two were withdrawn. Nine others, which had been

printed in the record and therefore were eligible for debate under the initial rule were

barred from debate under an order of procedure adopted in the course of floor

consideration.

The three amendments approved were:

!

An amendment offered by Rep. Conyers to allow the President to

waive the 300 person cap on civilian contractors set by the Plan

Colombia legislation, provided that the President certifies that the

aggregate ceiling of 800 personnel (for military personnel and

civilian contractors combined) set by that legislation would not be

exceeded, and if Congress is informed of the extent to which the 300

civilian contractor limitation is exceeded. Agreed to by voice vote.

!

Amendment 44 offered by Rep. Hoekstra to withhold $65 million of

ACI funds until the Secretary of State submits to Congress a full

report on the April 20, 2001, aircraft shootdown by the Peruvian Air

Force in which U.S. missionary Veronica “Roni” Bowers and her

daughter were killed. Agreed to by voice vote.

!

A substitute Kolbe amendment (to amendment 12 offered by Rep.

Crowley) to transfer $1.0 million from the ACI to the International

Disaster Assistance account. (The Rep. Crowley amendment would

have transferred $10 million.)

The two amendments defeated were:

!

Amendment 26, offered by Rep. Lee, to transfer $60 million to the

Child Survival and Health Programs fund, where it was to be

available for HIV/AIDS programs. Of the $60 million, $38 million

would be taken from the ACI. Failed 188-240.

!

Amendment 27, offered by Rep. McGovern, to reduce ACI funding

by $100 million, and transfer half of that funding to the infectious

diseases account to combat tuberculosis and the other half to the

child survival and maternal health account. (In a floor speech, Rep.

McGovern stated that the intent of the amendment was that the full

$100 million should be cut from funding for the Colombian

military.) Failed 179-249.

CRS-16

The two amendments withdrawn were:

!

Amendment 47 offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee to transfer $100 million

from the ACI to the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund.

Withdrawn by unanimous consent.

!

Amendment 11 offered by Mr. Conyers to prohibit the use of funds

provided as part of Plan Colombia and the ACI for aerial fumigation

to eradicate illicit crops in Colombia. Withdrawn by unanimous

consent.

On July 19, during the first day of consideration of H.R. 2506, two amendments

regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn after points of order were raised.

!

Rep. Souder offered and withdrew Amendment 35 to earmark $27

million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

funds for the purchase of two Buffalo transport/supply aircraft for

the Colombian National Police, $12 million for the purchase of six

Huey II patrol helicopters for the Colombian Navy, and $5 million

for assistance in purchasing operating fuel for drug interdiction

along Colombia’s north coast and its on rivers. In effect, this would

supplement funding for Andean regional counterdrug efforts that

would be made available through the ACI.

!

Rep. Delahunt offered and withdrew Amendment 17 to require

quarterly reports from the Secretary of State on the implementation

of the Colombian national security legislation passed by the

Colombian Congress on June 20, 2001. According to Rep.

Delahunt, that legislation “contains ambiguous provisions that could

threaten civilian oversight of the military in Colombia and place at

risk the progress that has ben made toward reforming the military...”

Senate Action. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version

of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill on July 26, and reported out H.R. 2506,

with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Rept. 107-58) on September 4,

2001, reducing ACI funding by $164 million, and imposing conditions on the safety

of aerial fumigation programs in Colombia, and requiring reports on human rights

conditions in the country. The Senate passed H.R. 2506 on October 24, 2001, after

defeating on a point of order an amendment to fund the ACI and the ARI at the level

requested by the President, and approving two amendments that transferred $20

million from the ACI to other programs. As passed by the Senate, the bill provides

$698 for the ARI, of which $547 is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the

President’s request, and includes conditions on the safety of aerial fumigation and the

implementation of alternative development programs..

Committee Action. In the July 26 mark-up, the Senate Appropriations

Committee cut $164 million from the President’s requested ACI funding, and

earmarked not less than $200 million of the total of $567 million that would remain

in that account for direct apportionment to the U.S. Agency for International

CRS-17

Development (AID) for economic and social programs. The ACI cut would bring

total ARI funding down to $718 million.

The committee bill would condition the release of funds to purchase chemicals

used for the aerial coca fumigation program. To release those funds, the Secretary

of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human

Services and with the Surgeon General, would have to determine and report to

Congress on the human health and safety effects of the chemicals and the manner of

their application. Specifically, the Secretary would have to report that 1) “the

chemicals used in the aerial fumigation of coca, [and]...the manner in which they are

being applied, do not pose an undue risk to human health or safety;” and 2) that the

fumigation “is being carried out according to the health, safety, and usage procedures

recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, and the manufacturers of the chemicals.” The Secretary

would also have to report that “effective mechanisms are in place to evaluate the

claims of local citizens that their health was harmed or their licit agricultural crops

were damaged by such aerial coca fumigation, and provide fair compensation for

meritorious claims.”

In contrast to House action, the Senate Appropriations Committee incorporated

by reference in its bill the Plan Colombia legislation’s cap of 500 on the number of

U.S. military personnel and 300 on the number of U.S. civilian contractors in

Colombia (Section 3204(b) of P.L. 106-246). The Committee also included a Plan

Colombia human rights restriction, requiring the immediate return to the United

States of any helicopter purchased with ACI funds that “is used to aid or abet the

operations of any illegal self-defense groups or illegal security cooperative.” Like the

House, however, it would waive the restrictions of Section 482(b) of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961. The Committee would limit by law funding for Department

of State administrative expenses to $14.24 million, whereas the House bill merely

recommends that limit.

In the report accompanying the bill (S.Rept. 107-58), the Committee stated that

it “recognizes some progress on human rights” in Colombia, but also expressed

concern about “the surge in paramilitary violence, persistent reports of cooperation

between the military and the paramilitaries, and the impunity of military officers who

order or commit atrocities.” It stated that the U.S. government should make it a

priority to promote “far more aggressive action...by the Colombian Government and

the military, to thwart it.” Deploring the “ongoing abuses by the FARC,” the

Committee called on other nations, “particularly Mexico and the Scandinavian

countries, to exert greater influence on the FARC to repudiate these tactics and

participate seriously in negotiations toward a settlement of the conflict.”

The Committee also called for the Secretary to State to submit to the

appropriations committees reports containing information on several areas of human

rights and other concerns. The Committee would expect the first report within 60

days of enactment and every 120 days after that.

This report would include information on two human rights topics for which

reporting was also required by the Plan Colombia legislation. These are:

CRS-18

!

the extent to which the Colombian armed forces have suspended

members credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of

human rights, and are providing civilian prosecutors and judicial

authorities requested information on the nature and cause of

suspension; and

!

the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are cooperating

with civilian authorities, including providing access to witnesses and

relevant military information, in prosecuting and punishing in

civilian courts those members credibly alleged to have committed

gross violations of human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary

groups.

Two other human rights topics are also to be included:

!

the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are severing links,

including intelligence sharing, at the command, battalion, and

brigade levels, with paramilitary groups, and executing outstanding

arrest warrants for members of such groups; and

!

the extent to which attacks against human rights defenders, trade

unionists, and government prosecutors, investigators and civilian

judicial officials are being investigated, and alleged perpetrators

brought to justice.

The report would also be expected to provide information on the actions taken by the

United States, Colombia, and other governments to promote and support peace

negotiations, and on financial support for Plan Colombia provided by the Colombian

government and the international community.

A second report including information on other areas of human rights concerns

would be expected only if national security legislation passed by the Colombian

Congress on June 20, 2001, were to become law. In that case, the Secretary of State

would be expected to submit a report within 90 days of enactment of the security law

and 120 days thereafter on incidents of and any rising trend in arbitrary and

prolonged incommunicado detention by members of the Colombian armed forces and

police; an assessment of the effectiveness of investigations conducted by military

personnel under the new security law compared to investigations by civilian

authorities; and an analysis of the security law’s implications for Colombia’s

commitments under international treaties.

The Committee also expressed concern in its report about the spill-over effects

of the Colombian narcotics trade into Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Floor Action. After considering H.R. 2506 for two days, the Senate approved

the measure on October 24, 2001, largely retaining the basic features of the bill

relating to the ARI as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Five

amendments relating to the ARI were approved, with the last two reducing ACI

funding by $20 million; and one amendment, seeking to restore funding cuts, was

defeated on a point of order.

CRS-19

The five amendments that were approved were:

!

Senate Amendment 1929 by Senator Leahy that not less than $101

million of ACI funds be made available for Bolivia, and not less

than $35 million of ACI funds be made available for Ecuador.

!

Senate Amendment 1942 by Senator Helms that up to two million

of ACI funds be made available to support democracy-building

activities in Venezuela.

!

Senate Amendment 1951 by Senators Feingold and Wellstone that

added another condition relating to aerial fumigation upon which the

Secretary of State is to report, namely that alternative development

programs be in place in areas where fumigation is being

implemented.

!

Senate Amendment 1960 by Senators Hutchison and Inouye that

reduced ACI funding by $10 million, and made those funds available

for the prevention, treatment, and control of tuberculosis.

!

Senate Amendment 1961 by Senator Bingaman that reduced ACI

funding by $10 million, and made those funds available for relief

and reconstruction assistance for victims of earthquakes and drought

in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America.

The amendment that was defeated on a point of order was Senate Amendment

1950 by Senators Graham, Hagel, and Dodd to increase funding for the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative to $731 million, the amount of the President’s request, which

would have effectively overridden the Committee-reported cut of $164 million in that

portion of the ARI. Proponents of the amendment argued that full support was

necessary to assist troubled Colombia and to deal with the flow of drugs to the

United States. Opponents argued that extensive assistance was being provided to the

region, that needs elsewhere in the world were great, and that evidence of progress

was lacking despite the major contribution of resources in recent years. A point of

order was raised by Senator Leahy that the amendment was in violation of the

Congressional Budget Act for failing to identify offsets for the proposed $164 million

increase in funding, and a motion by Senator Graham to waive the requirements of

the Budget Act was defeated 27-72, thereby defeating the amendment.

Conference Action. The conference version of H.R. 2506 (H.Rept. 107-345)

was passed by the House on December 19, and by the Senate on December 20, 2002.

It was signed into law (P.L. 107-115) on January 10, 2002. It includes $625 million

for the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI) portion of the Andean Regional

Initiative. (This is $50 million less than the House’s $675 million, but $78 million

more than the Senate’s $547 million in ACI funding.) Of the conference version

amount, $215 million is earmarked for U.S. Agency for International Development

(AID) economic and social programs, and no more than $14.2 million may be used

for administrative expenses of the Department of State, and no more than $4.5

million for AID’s administrative expenses.

CRS-20

Authority is also provided to transfer up to $35 million to the ACI from other

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds in this and in prior

foreign operations appropriations acts, subject to regular notification procedures.

The managers’ statement of the conference report (H.Rept. 107-345) notes that, “In

the event of such a transfer, the managers intend for the funds to support interdiction,

alternative development, or other economic assistance to the Andean countries. The

managers emphasize that there are other funds for Andean nations in this Act that

may be made available for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI).”

The conference version of H.R. 2506 contains several conditions on the use of

funds. These include the following.

!

Fumigation and Alternative Development. No funds can be used for

aerial coca fumigation programs until the Secretary of State reports

to the Appropriations Committees on four matters: the first, after

consultation with the heads of the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), the Department of Agriculture, and if appropriate, the Center

for Disease Control and Prevention, is that such programs are being

carried out according to EPA regulatory controls that pertain to

programs in the United States; the second, after consultation with the

Colombian government, is that such programs are in accordance

with Colombian laws; the third is that the chemicals used in the

fumigation programs and the manner in which they are applied do

not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to human beings or to

the environment; and the last is that procedures are in place to

provide fair compensation for valid claims by local citizens that their

health was harmed or their licit agricultural crops were damaged by

such spraying. (As of the date of this report, these funds are on hold

awaiting the Secretary’s report. The status of this hold will be

tracked in RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors.)

The funds are not to be available after six months from the date of

enactment unless alternative development programs have been put

in place in consultation with communities and local authorities.

!

Peruvian Interdiction. No funds can be used for a Peruvian air

interdiction program until 30 days after the Secretary of State and

the CIA Director certify to Congress that enhanced safeguards and

procedures are in place for any air interdiction program that permits

the shootdown of aircraft.

!

Limitations on Personnel in Colombia. Limits on U.S. personnel in

Colombia established for previous Plan Colombia funding are

modified, with a cap of 400 set on both the number of U.S. military

personnel and U.S. civilian contractors supported by funding from

the ACI account.

!

Helicopters. Any helicopter procured with this funding is to be

immediately returned to the United States if it is used to aid or abet

CRS-21

the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security

cooperative.

!

Human Rights. Section 567 (a) of the bill provides that the

Secretary of State must determine and certify to Congress that the

Colombian armed forces are meeting three human rights criteria

before any of the funds by this act or prior foreign operations

appropriations acts can be made available to Colombia’s armed

forces. These criteria are: (1) that the Colombian Commander

General is suspending soldiers and officers credibly alleged to have

committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or

abetted paramilitary groups ; (2) that the Colombian armed forces

are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in

prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts any members credibly

alleged to be involved in such offenses; and (3) that the Colombian

armed forces are taking steps to sever links with paramilitary groups

and to execute outstanding orders for the capture of their members.

(As of the date of this report, these funds are on hold awaiting the

Secretary’s certification. The status of this hold will be tracked in

RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental

and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors.) After such

a determination and certification, no more than 60% of such funds

can be made available to the Colombian armed forces through May

31, 2002. After June 1, 2002, the balance of such funds may be

obligated if the Secretary determines and certifies that the

Colombian armed forces are continuing to meet those criteria. Every

120 days after the bill’s enactment, the Secretary must report to the

appropriations committees regarding the Colombian armed forces’

observance of these criteria.

!

Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed Groups.

No alien shall be issued a visa if the Secretary of State has

determined that he or she (1) has willfully provided any support to

either of Colombia’s two major leftist guerrilla groups (the FARC

and the ELN) or to the rightist illegal self-defense group (the AUC),

or (2) has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise

participated in the commission of gross violations of human rights

in Colombia, unless the issuance of such a visa is necessary to

support the Colombian peace process or for urgent humanitarian

reasons.

Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003

House Action. The House International Relations Committee reported out

H.R. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirements on Colombia and a

prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. The bill

was passed by the House on May 16, 2001, without additions or modifications in

that area. The required reports relate to the elimination of Colombian opium, the

effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador, alternative development and resettlement

programs, and the Colombianization of counter-narcotics activities.

CRS-22

Committee Action. H.R. 1646 was introduced by Representative Hyde on

April 27, 2001, with two reporting requirements concerning the elimination of

Colombian opium poppy crops and the effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador (see

below for details). The measure was referred to the House Committee on

International Relations. When the Committee marked up the bill on May 2, it

adopted by voice vote two amendments offered by Representative Delahunt: the first

imposed reporting requirements on Department of State activities and on the

“Colombianization” of counternarcotics activities; the second prohibited the issuance

of visas to supporters of Colombian illegal armed groups (see below for details). The

bill was reported out amended (H.Rept. 107-57) by the Committee on May 4.

Floor Action. After floor consideration on May 10 and 16, with no additional

amendments on Colombia or the Andean region, H.R. 1646 was approved by the

House on May 16, and sent to the Senate on May 17, with the following provisions

relating to the Andean Regional Initiative:

!

Reporting Requirement Concerning Elimination of Colombian

Opium. Sec. 204 requires the Secretary of State, through the

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit,

not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines a

comprehensive strategy to address the crisis of heroin in the United

States due to opium originating from Colombia, including

destruction of opium at its source.

!

Reporting Requirement Concerning Effect of Plan Colombia on

Ecuador. Sec. 211 requires the Secretary of State, through the

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit,

not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines a

comprehensive strategy to address the spillover effect of Plan

Colombia on Ecuador.

!

Reporting Requirement on Department of State Activities. Sec.

213 (a) requires the Secretary of State to submit within 180 days of

enactment, and every 180 days thereafter, a report on State

Department funded and authorized activities to promote alternative

development, recovery and resettlement of internally displaced

persons, judicial reform, the peace process, and human rights. This

report would include summaries of activities undertaken during the

previous 180 days, estimated timetables for the next period, an

explanation of any delays in meeting planned timetables, and an

assessment of steps to be taken to correct such delays.

!

Reporting Requirement on the “Colombianization” of U.S.

Funded Counternarcotics Activities. Sec. 213 (b) states that U.S.

policy “encourages” the transfer of counternarcotics activities in

Colombia now carried out by U.S. businesses under agreements with

the State Department to Colombian nationals, “in particular

personnel of the Colombian antinarcotics police, when properly

qualified personnel are available.” It also requires the Secretary of

State to report within 90 days of enactment and subsequently not

CRS-23

later than March 1 on the counternarcotics activities carried out by

U.S. businesses under State Department agreements. The report

must include the names of such businesses, the total State

Department payments to each business, a statement justifying the

agreement, an assessment of risks to personnel safety and potential

involvement in hostilities incurred by employees of each such

business, and a plan to provide for the transfer of these activities to

Colombians.

!

Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed

Groups. Sec. 236 prohibits the issuance of visas to any alien who

the Secretary of State determines has wilfully provided direct or

indirect support to either of the two leftist guerrilla groups (the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, i.e., the FARC, and the

National Liberation Army, i.e., the ELN) or to the rightist United

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (the AUC); or “has wilfully

conspired to allow, facilitate, or promote the illegal activities of any

of those groups. A waiver is provided for cases where a visa “is

necessary to support the peace process in Colombia, for urgent

humanitarian reasons, for significant public benefit, or to further the

national security interests of the United States.”

Senate Action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the

Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401)

on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill on September 4, 2001, with a

requirement for a report outlining a strategy to eradicate opium in Colombia.

Committee Action. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S.

1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606, similar to a provision

in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit to

appropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that

outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia.

National Defense Authorization Act, FY2002

House Action. The House Armed Services Committee marked up H.R. 2586

on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill (H.Rept. 107-194) on September 4,

2001, with a provision containing a cap on U.S. military personnel in Colombia, and

this was retained when the House approved the bill on September 25, 2001.

Committee Action. As reported by the House Armed Services Committee,

the FY2002 defense authorization bill, H.R. 2586, would cap the number of U.S.

military personnel on duty in Colombia that could be supported from Department of

Defense funding at 500. This provision, Section 1208, would exclude any military

personnel in Colombia (1) serving tours of duty of 30 days or less for the purpose

of rescuing or retrieving U.S. military or government personnel, (2) serving with the

U.S. Embassy in Colombia as an attache or as part of the security assistance office

or Marine Corps security group, (3) participating in natural disaster relief efforts, or

(4) traveling through Colombia but not involved in operations there.

CRS-24

Floor and Conference Action. After floor consideration on September 20,

24-25, the House approved H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with the Committeereported cap on military personnel in Colombia. The Senate bill, S. 1438, had no

corresponding provision. This House provision was not retained in the conference

version of S. 1438 (S.Rept. 107-333), which passed by both chambers on December

13, 2001.

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)

(For details on this legislation, see the CRS Trade Briefing Book section on the

Andean Trade Preference Act, [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra127.html].)

House Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee

ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,

that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006. On November 16, 2001,

the House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,

which would offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December

31, 2006.

Committee Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means

Committee approved and ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion

and Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006,

and provide duty-free treatment to selected apparel, tuna, and other products

previously excluded. The bill would also expand the conditions countries would have

to meet to remain eligible for program benefits.

Floor Action. On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009, the

Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which would offer expanded

trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006.

Senate Action. The Senate Committee on Finance reported out a version of

H.R. 3009 on November 29, 2001, but no floor action has been taken thus far.

Committee Action. On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on

Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3009

(containing the substance of S. 525). This version would extend the ATPA through

February 28, 2006, and provide expanded benefits, but more limited benefits than the

House-passed version.

CRS-25

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional

Initiative Countries

(Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela)

CRS-26

Appendix B. Bush Administration’s FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) Request

by Purpose and Functional Accounts

($ millions)

ARI Proposed Funding

By Purpose

Country

Total

ARI

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics and

Security

ARI Proposed Funding

By Account

International

Narcotics

Control

(Andean

Counterdrug

Initiative)

Development

Aid

Child

Survival and

Diseases

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

Colombia

399.00

146.50

252.50

399.00

0

0

0

0

Bolivia

143.48

88.48

55.0

101.00

25.08

6.40

10.00

1.00

Brazil

26.18

11.18

15.0

15.00

3.38

7.80

0

0

Ecuador

76.48

56.48

20.00

39.00

6.48

0

30.00

1.00

Panama

20.50

8.50

12.00

11.00

4.50

0

4.00

1.00

Peru

206.15

128.15

78.00

156.00

28.65

10.50

10.00

1.00

Venezuela

10.50

0.50

10.00

10.00

0

0

0.50

0

Totals

882.29

439.79

442.5

731.0

68.09

24.7

54.5

4.00

Source: ARI Reference Sheet, 150 Account, provided by the Department of State, May 14, 2001.

CRS-27

Appendix C. FY2000-FY2001 U.S. Assistance to Colombia

(Obligations and authorizations, $ millions)

Category of Foreign Aid or Other Assistance to Colombian Programs

State Department/INC accounta

State Department INC Air Wing

Agency for International Development (AID)a

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Foreign Military Financing/Grant

Department of Defense/Section 1004

Department of Defense/Overlapping Sections 1004/124

Department of Defense/Section 1033 account or projects funded under

Section 1033-type authority

Department of Defense/Section 506 Drawdown authorized

Other Section 506 Drawdown (i.e., Departments of Transportation, Justice,

State, and the Treasury) authorized

TOTALS

Related Spending: Department of Defense/ Section 124

Plan Colombia

(P.L. 106-246)

FY2000

FY2000

Regular Approps.

50.0

31.3

4.0

0.9

–

68.7

1.6

7.2

768.5

–

–

–

4.5

6.0

17.4

None

163.7

960.1

11.1

FY2001

Reg. Approps.

48.0

28.0

4.0

1.0

–

49.8

1.8

8.1

Plan Colombia

(P.L. 106-246)

FY2001

–

–

–

–

–

101.2

0.0

13.0

None thus far

796.4

13.0

140.7

254.9

14.4

114.2

0.0

Note: For detail on Plan Colombia and pre-Plan Colombia funding, see CRS Report RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).

Sources: General Accounting Office (GAO -01-26), Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2001; U.S. Agency for International

Development Budget Justification for FY2001, Annex IV; and information provided by Department of State and Department of Defense officials. This chart includes direct U.S. foreign

assistance (i.e., the categories usually counted as U.S. foreign aid, which are in italics), as well as the costs of goods and services provided to Colombia from other U.S. government

programs supporting counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The United States also provides a small amount of DOD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to Colombia. Other funds are

spent in Colombia on counternarcotics and other activities that are considered part of U.S. programs: for instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) spends its own funds

on joint operations in Colombia. Figures on FY2000 and FY2001 State Department INC funding provided January 10-11, 2001. Figures on DOD Sections 1004, 124, 1004/124, and

1033 funding provided June 29, 2001. DOD Sections 124, 1004, and 1033 funding is taken from regional accounts and the tentative allocations for Colombia can be shifted to respond

to developing needs in other areas. (Section 124 covers U.S. operated radar systems in Colombia and elsewhere, and other costs of U.S. detection and monitoring of drug flights.)

a

FY2000 non-DOD Plan Colombia supplemental funds were all assigned to the State Department INC account; the State Department is transferring them to the other agencies carrying

out programs in Colombia with those funds. The AID FY2000 and FY2001 figures are all ESF. These AID figures do not include funds provided to AID from the INC account.

CRS-28

Appendix D. Controversy over Spray Eradication

Efforts in Southern Colombia

The following discussion of the controversy over spray eradication (i.e., fumigation)

of illegal coca crops in southern Colombia was prepared in response to the controversy

over this effort in southern Colombia. This short synopsis of available information on the

effects of fumigation of coca crops in Colombia is only meant to provide a summary of

various claims; it is not a judgment on their validity.

In its U.S.-supported coca eradication program, the government of Colombia

sprays coca crops from aircraft with a mixture of the herbicide glyphosate,

manufactured by the U.S. company Monsanto and marketed as “Roundup,” and two

additives or “adjuvants.”15 According to the State Department (in its report of

January 23, 2001, submitted to Congress consistent with the provisions of the

Statement of Managers accompanying Title III, Chapter 2 of the Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act. P.L. 106-246, which provided funding for Plan

Colombia), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found that “the use of

glyphosate, as labeled for use in the U.S., is acceptable provided that the regulatory

controls required by the EPA – the labeled instructions – are followed.” The State

Department also claims that the ingredients in the two additives (COSMO FLUX411F, a surfactant, and COSMO-iN-D, an anti-foaming additive16), both produced

in Colombia, are on an EPA list of acceptable chemicals “for use on food crops when

the label instructions are followed.” This report states an EPA review of “adequate

scientific studies” shows that when properly used glyphosate “will not cause adverse

effects in humans,” and “does not cause risks of concern for birth defects, mutagenic

effects, neurotoxic effects, reproductive problems, or cancer.” It does, however, state

that “splashes” of glyphosate “can cause transient irritation to skin and

eyes,”although at the same level of irritation as baby shampoo according to one cited

study. For its conclusion that there are “no grounds to suggest concern for human

health” from the spray mixture used in Colombia, the State Department cited a

recent study published in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology.17

15

The active ingredient in Roundup is isopropylamine salt of N-(phosphonomethyl) glycine,

commonly known as glyphosate, Chemical Abstract Registration Number 38641-94-0, EPA

Registration Number 000524-004445. “Adjuvant” is a term for an ingredient that facilitates

or modifies the action of the principal ingredient.

16

COSMO FLUX-411F, according to the State Department report, “increases the herbicide

penetration through the waxy layer of the coca leaf by allowing ore of the spray to stick to

the plant. When more of the spray solution sticks to the plant, the herbicide becomes more

effective which means it can be applied in smaller doses.” COSMO-IN-D “is used to

minimize the foam created by the mixture-circulating pump inside the aircraft spray hopper”

in order to avoid the creation of a vacuum within the spray pressure pump which could shut

off the spray system during flight.

17

Gary M. Williams, Robert Kroes, and Ian C. Munro. Safety Evaluation and Risk

Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for Humans.

Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2000. Available through

[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/12301.htm] from a hyperlink at the bottom of the text

of the State Department’s January 23, 2001 report. This publication is the official journal

(continued...)

CRS-29

Since spraying began in December 2000 in Colombia’s Putumayo province

(where it is now indefinitely suspended), however, there have been many allegations

that the spray mixture has caused extensive harm to humans, other crops, and

livestock. The ill health effects on thousands of children and adults most commonly

reported in the areas of Putumayo fumigation include fever, eye and gastrointestinal

irritation, and skin and bronchial irritation and infections. There have also been

allegations of increased incidence of brain damage in children in these areas since

fumigation was started. In addition, critics claim, many crops other than coca have

been sprayed, depriving peasants of food crops and other sources of income, and

livestock reportedly have suffered ill effects, including hair loss in cattle from

moderate exposure, abortion among pregnant cows (possibly due, one source notes,

from stampedes caused by the noise of overhead helicopters) and the death of fowl

from spraying or drinking contaminated water. (The effects on livestock and fowl

are taken from the “Counter-Fact Sheet” of February 9, 2001, prepared by Acción

Andina, which is a non-governmental organization, and posted online at

[http://usfumigation.org/Literature/FactSheets/ContraDoS/AA-IPS-RAPAL%20F

act%20Sheet%20-English.htm].) Supporters of aerial fumigation, however, state

that negative health and environmental effects can be attributed to drug producers

themselves, whom, they claim, also use Roundup to suppress weeds around coca

bushes, and who pollute Colombian rivers with chemicals used in processing and

refining coca into cocaine in their drug labs.

Some U.S. officials assert that many of the complaints come from those with an

interest in continuing coca production, especially as aerial spraying of coca crops has

taken place for many years in other areas of Colombia without the outcry that the

spraying in Putumayo has produced. However, according to a Washington Post

article of January 7, 2001, about the spraying in Putumayo: “Until recently, spraying

focused almost entirely on remote industrial-sized coca and poppy plantations....Now

the planes are targeting more populous farming areas ... where coca ... is often grown

side by side with corn, yucca, pineapple and livestock. Often it shares a plot next to

the farmer’s tin-roofed shack.” (“Aerial Attack Killing More than Coca,” by Scott

Wilson.) Regarding crop damage, the Post reporter stated that his “inspection of

fields in the area suggested that food crops have been hit at least as hard as coca.”

Critics have attributed food crop damage to the side-by-side plantings of legal and

illegal crops in Putumayo, but also charge that spray planes fly higher than normal

for crop dusting operations elsewhere in order to avoid ground fire, and under

unacceptable wind conditions, thus leading to the dispersion of spray beyond

intended targets.18

17

(...continued)

of the International Society of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology.

18

One website’s ([http://www.farmsource.com]) discussion of the use of Roundup

(accessed through the Monsanto website, [http://www.monsanto.com]) notes that Roundup

should “only be applied from aircraft when the potential for drift to adjacent sensitive areas

(e.g. residential areas, bodies of water, known habitat for threatened or endangered species,

non-target crops) is minimal (e.g. when the wind is blowing away from sensitive areas).” It

gives detailed instructions for aerial applications, including the maintenance of an

appropriate buffer zone from “any desirable vegetation or crops,” i.e., normally some 100

(continued...)

CRS-30

Some analysts, however, have noted that complaints of ill effects to humans and

animals may not be entirely inconsistent with State Department assertions of safety

under controlled circumstances as the health and environmental effects could vary

depending on the exact formulation of the spray mix, the manner of its application,

and the conditions under which it was used. Some critics have argued that Roundup

is not being applied in a manner consistent with U.S. usages and with the

manufacturer’s recommendations, and that not all issues related to ingredients used

in the mixture applied in Colombia have been explored.

!

The World Wildlife Fund, in an October 30, 2000 statement,

“Comments on Glyphosate,” states that existing studies “may not be

adequate to assess the impacts resulting from Plan Colombia’s actual

use of glyphosate (aerial applications, product formulation,

frequency and rate of application, etc.), especially given the soils,

topography, climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, etc.) plant and

animal species found in Colombia.” (Available online from the

WWF at: [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/103001.htm]).

!

In a February 9, 2001 statement calling for the end of aerial

eradication, representatives of three non-governmental organizations

claimed that “there is evidence that herbicide concentrations much

higher than ones recommended are being applied in Colombia” and

that “there are no toxicological studies ... regarding the effects of

mixing the Cosmoflux-4111F surfactant with pesticides.”19 The

statement also noted that Roundup Ultra (which opponents say is the

actual variety of Roundup being used in Colombia, although the

State Department report cited above does not refer to either trade

name) “contains other ingredients besides glyphosate and the two

adjuvants.” The World Wildlife Fund, in the October 2000

statement cited above, found that studies on the effects of Roundup

“focus on the pesticide active ingredient alone, not the combination

of inert ingredients actually applied, thereby giving an incomplete

assessment of the toxic threat,” and asserted that “the inert

ingredients mixed with the Roundup to increase its effectiveness can

be as, or more, toxic to humans, wildlife and foodwebs than the

pesticide itself.” The Monsanto website states that the “new

ingredients” in Roundup Ultra are on an EPA approved list (#4B),

but the specific “new” ingredients are not named.

!

An analysis by agronomist Elsa Nivia, identified as associated with

the non-governmental Red de Acción en Plaguicidas y Alternativas América Latina, RAP-AL. PAN-Colombia (Pesticide Action

18

(...continued)

feet, but 500 feet if the wind is blowing up to five miles an hour, and more at greater

windspeeds.

19

Forced Aerial Eradication of Illicit Crops: A Reply to the State Department, signed by

Ricardo Vargas M. of Acción Andina Colombia, Martin Jelsma of Transnational Institute,

TNI, and Elsa Nivia of RAPALMIRA. Posted at [http://www.usfumigation.org].

CRS-31

Network), claims that the aerial fumigation of illegal crops in

Colombia with Roundup is “very different from the recommended

agricultural use in the United States,” citing the concentration as 26

times greater than that recommended, with negative effects

intensified by the use of Cosmoflux 411F. Even though the authors

of the report cited by the State Department had found glyphosate and

Roundup to be at most mildly toxic, Ms. Nivia’s conclusion from

their discussion of the effects of accidental and occupational

exposures to higher concentrations, and of the doses that proved

lethal in people attempting suicide, is that higher than recommended

concentrations or applications could help to explain the severe ill

effects reported in the fumigated areas. (See Las fumigaciones

aéreas sobre cultivos ilícitos si son peligrosas - Algunas

aproximaciones, by Elsa Nivia. Paper given at a conference on The

Wars in Colombia: Drugs, Guns and Oil, held at the University of

California at Davis, May 17-19, 2001, accessible through

[http://www.usfumigation.org].)

The State Department is funding a study, with design assistance supplied by the

Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the EPA, of the health effects of aerial

eradication in Putumayo Department. Results are anticipated by late 2001.

CRS-32

Appendix E. Bush Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Request and

FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts

($ millions)

Country

Total ARI

FY2002

Request

Total

ARI

FY2002

Allocations

Colombia

399.00

Bolivia

ARI FY2002 Allocations

By Purpose

ARI FY2002 Allocations

By Account

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics and

Security

International

Narcotics Control

(Andean

Counterdrug

Initiative)

380.50

137.00

243.50

380.50

0

0

0

0

143.48

122.96

74.46

48.50

81.00

12.05

19.41

10.00

0.5*

Brazil

26.18

18.63

6.00

3.93

8.70

0

0

Ecuador

76.48

46.86

25.00

6.86

0

15.00

0

Panama

20.50

13.50

5.00

4.50

0

4.00

0

Peru

206.15

194.87

142.50

14.17

23.20

15.00

0

Venezuela

10.50

5.5

NA**

NA**

5.00

0

0

0.50

0

Totals

882.29

782.82

NA**

NA**

645.00

41.51

51.31

44.5

0.50

NA**

31.85

NA**

119.87

NA**

15.00

NA**

75.00

Development

Aid

Child

Survival and

Diseases

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary and Highlights. February 2002. The ARI does not include

International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. These will range in FY2002 from an estimated $170,000 for Panama to an estimated $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared

by (name redacted), Specialist in International Security Affairs, CRS, February 12, 2002.

* The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF). The small amount for Bolivia is included here, even though it was not specifically for

counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, which includes FMF for Andean Regional Initiative countries.

**NA = Not Available. A breakdown by purpose is not available for Brazil, Panama and Venezuela as the INL figures for those countries was not broken down by purpose.

CRS-33

Appendix F. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Allocations and FY2003 Funding Request

by Purpose and Functional Accounts

($ millions)

Country

Total ARI

FY2002

Allocations

Total ARI

FY2003

Request

ARI FY2003 Request by

Purpose

ARI FY2003 Request by Account

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics

and Security

International

Narcotics

Control (ACI)

Development

Aid*

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

Colombia

380.50

537.0

164.0

373.0

439.0

0

0

98.0

Bolivia

122.96

132.6

82.6

50.0

91.0

30.6

10.0

1.0

Brazil

18.63

29.5

17.5

12.0

12.0

17.5

0

0

Ecuador

46.86

65.1

43.1

22.0

37.0

7.1

20.0

1.0

Panama

13.50

20.5

10.5

10.0

9.0

7.0

3.5

1.0

Peru

194.87

186.6

119.6

67.0

135.0

40.6

10.0

1.0

5.5

8.5

0.5

8.0

8.0

0

0.5

0

782.82

979.8

437.8

542.0

731.0

102.8

44.0

102.0

Venezuela

Totals

Source: Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy. International Affairs Function 150 Summary and Highlights, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request. The ARI totals

do not include International Military Education and Training funds, which range in the FY2003 request from $200,000 for Panama to $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared by (nam

e redacted), Specialist in International Security Affairs, February 12, 2002.

* Includes funds previously cited under Child Survival and Diseases.

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