China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis

Order Code RL30700

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions:

Background and Analysis

Updated November 6, 2001

Shirley Kan (Coordinator)

Specialist in National Security Policy

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

(name redacted)

Analyst in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Ronald O’Rourke

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions:

Background and Analysis

Summary

This CRS Report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that

China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with particular attention

to implications for U.S. security concerns. It is not the assumption of this report that

China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will engage in conflict with

other forces in Asia. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing

concern about China’s assertiveness in Asia and military buildup against Taiwan.

Since 1990, China has acquired or sought to acquire select types and modest

quantities of modern foreign weapons, primarily from Russia. These include: Mi-17

helicopters, Il-76 transports, Su-27 fighters, S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM)

systems, Kilo submarines, Tor-M1 SAM systems, Sovremenny destroyers (with

Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)), A-50 airborne warning and control

systems (AWACS) (Israeli Phalcon system canceled in 2000), and Su-30 long-range

fighters.

The Su-27 and Su-30 represent significant upgrades in fighter aircraft capability

over China’s indigenous aircraft. The combination of the PLA’s imported AA-11

air-to-air missile and highly maneuverable aircraft could prove a vexing air-to-air

challenge to modern fighter aircraft of other forces in Asia. The Russian SAMs

represent marked improvements in China’s ability to target aircraft and missiles that

threaten its airspace. Nonetheless, the PLA’s ability to employ its modern

acquisitions is hampered by factors such as limited inventory, deficient maintenance,

inadequate pilot training, outdated air doctrine, rigid command, disparate

communications, and lack of supporting capabilities in the near term.

China’s navy has been primarily a coastal defense force built around ships based

largely on older or obsolete Soviet technology. China’s two Sovremenny-class ships

are considerably more technologically modern, complex, and capable than most other

PLA surface combatants. The SS-N-22/Sunburn anti-ship cruise missile, designed

to defeat the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air-defense system, is considered by many to be the

most threatening ship-launched ASCM in service today. Still, China’s Sovremennyclass ships, though fairly capable, would be vulnerable to air and submarine attack.

Although much attention has been paid to China’s procurement of Sovremenny-class

ships armed with SS-N-22s, the four quiet Kilos, with their potential for avoiding

detection and their potent torpedoes, might represent a greater threat to naval forces

in Asia. If well-maintained and proficiently-operated, the PLA Navy’s Kilo-class

submarines can launch attacks against ships and submarines operating in the region.

Kilos are, nevertheless, vulnerable to detection and attack.

China has made some significant qualitative upgrades through foreign

acquisitions, but it remains to be seen how these acquisitions will be expanded and

linked to other PLA improvements. The operational significance of China’s

conventional arms acquisitions will also depend on the PLA’s training to eventually

conduct effective joint military operations and the scenario in which the systems

might be used. These developments in PLA modernization will bear watching.

Contents

Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Congressional Concerns and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Scope of Report and Other Factors in PLA Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Major Foreign Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Objectives of the Middle Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Increasing Foreign Arms Acquisitions since 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Major Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Mi-17 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Il-76 Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Su-27 Fighters and Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

S-300/SA-10 Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kilo Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Tor/SA-15 Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Sovremenny Destroyers and Sunburn Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A-50 AWACS and Canceled Phalcon Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Su-30 Fighters and Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Assessment of Air Power Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Platform Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Fighter/Attack Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Air-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Surface-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Force on Force Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Maintenance/Spares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Pilot Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Mission Emphasis and Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Command, Control, and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Supporting Aircraft/Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Assessment of Naval Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Scope of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

China’s Navy in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Sovremenny-class Destroyers and Related Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

China’s Surface Combatant Force in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Sovremenny Class as a Soviet 1970s-era Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Intent of China’s Purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

China’s Ability to Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Comparison with Western Surface Combatants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Capability of SS-N-22 Against Surface Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Vulnerability of Sovremenny-class Design to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Potential Tactical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Kilo Class Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

China’s Submarine Force in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Kilo Class as a Late 1970s-era Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Intent of China’s Purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

China’s Ability to Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Comparison with Western Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Capability of Kilo Against Ships and Subs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Vulnerability of Kilo-class Design to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Potential Tactical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Integrated Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

List of Tables

Table 1. Values of China’s Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table 2. China Among Top 10 Developing Arms Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table 3. China’s Major Conventional Arms Acquisitions Since 1990 . . . . . . . . . 9

Table 4. Comparison of Fighter/Attack Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Table 5. Comparison of Air-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Table 6. Comparison of Surface-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Table 7. Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key Systems . . . . . . 35

This analysis was originally prepared at the request of the Honorable Daniel Akaka,

and is being reprinted by CRS for general congressional distribution with his

permission.

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms

Acquisitions: Background and Analysis

Purpose and Scope1

Congressional Concerns and Actions

This CRS Report examines the foreign conventional arms acquisitions of

China’s military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).2 The

purpose of this report is to provide information to Congress, using best available

unclassified data, on the PLA’s arms procurement, with assessments of implications

for regional security – particularly, U.S. security concerns.

It is not the assumption of this report that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

will engage in conflict with other forces in Asia. This report does not examine the

likelihood or nature of a crisis or conflict that might involve PLA, other Asian, and/or

U.S. forces.

Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing concern about the

PRC’s assertiveness in the Asian-Pacific region as well as military buildup

threatening Taiwan, with possible U.S. military involvement in the Taiwan Strait.

As the Secretary of Defense reported in June 2000, the PLA operates under the

doctrine of “fighting local wars under high-tech conditions,” calling for rapid

response by select pockets of excellence within the PLA to a range of contingencies

along China’s land and sea borders. Particularly, “China expects to encounter a more

technologically advanced foe, such as the United States or Japan, if conflicts

concerning its interests within this strategic envelope arise. Moreover, a cross-Strait

conflict between China and Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the

dominant scenario guiding PLA force planning, military training, and war

preparation.”3 The George W. Bush Administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) report to Congress highlighted the “East Asian littoral” (a maritime region

from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal) as a “particularly

challenging area.”4

1

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Security Policy.

2

The “PLA” refers to all services and branches, including ground, air, and naval forces, and

the missile force (the Second Artillery).

3

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

According to the report, about 14 of perhaps 40 divisions [or approximately one-third] in

the PLA ground forces are considered “rapid reaction units.”

4

Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” September 30, 2001.

CRS-2

Since the 1990s, Members of Congress have increasingly expressed concerns

about the efforts of the PRC to modernize the PLA. While many countries upgrade

their militaries, the PLA’s modernization has prompted a debate about the extent to

which enhanced PLA capabilities challenge U.S. interests and stability in the AsiaPacific region. This debate has covered several areas of concern, including: PRC

assertiveness in the disputed maritime areas of the East and South China Seas, the

greater PLA missile threat to Taiwan as demonstrated by the missile “test-firings” in

1995 and 1996, persistent threats to use force in the Taiwan Strait, suspected

unauthorized acquisitions of U.S. missile technology (associated with satellite

launches) and nuclear weapon secrets, weapons proliferation, and rising arms

purchases (particularly from Russia).

Some Members have cited the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, as a

basis for congressional concern over the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The TRA left

the question of U.S. involvement somewhat ambiguous. Section 2(b)(4) states that

the United States will consider with “grave concern” any non-peaceful means to

determine Taiwan’s future. Nonetheless, in not wanting to pre-determine U.S.

actions, Members of Congress also adopted section 2(b)(6), declaring it to be U.S.

policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or

other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic

system, of the people on Taiwan.”5

Particularly since the PLA’s provocative missile “test-firings” in 1995 and 1996,

and U.S. deployment of two aircraft carriers close to Taiwan in March 1996,

Congress has required reports from the Clinton Administration on the PRC’s military

capabilities and strategy, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The Pentagon has

submitted these reports since 1997.6

As for legislation, the 106th Congress considered some bills generated by

concerns about the PLA’s arms purchases, including H.R. 1838 and S. 693 (the

“Taiwan Security Enhancement Act” introduced by Rep. Delay and Senator Helms),

and H.R. 4022 and S. 2687 (bills introduced by Rep. Rohrabacher and Sen. Robert

Smith banning U.S. forgiveness or rescheduling of debt owned by Russia unless it

stops transfers of Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles to China).

In the 107th Congress, the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (Section

1203 of H.R. 2586) passed by the House on September 25, 2001, would require that

the Pentagon’s annual report on PRC military power (required by section 1202 of the

5

See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy – Key

Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by (name redacted).

6

Department of Defense, “Selected Military Capabilities of the People’s Republic of China

(Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97 National Defense Authorization

Act),” April 1997; “Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of

China (Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense

Authorization Act),” July 1998; “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (Report to

Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill),” February 1999; and “Annual Report

on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Report to Congress Pursuant to

the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act),” June 2000.

CRS-3

FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-65) add a section to discuss

arms transfers to China from the former Soviet Union (which would exclude other

countries, like Israel).

Scope of Report and Other Factors in PLA Modernization

This CRS Report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that

the PLA has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990. Still, it is important

to note that there are other factors important to PLA modernization, besides having

foreign equipment. Separate CRS reports discuss the PLA’s modernization of its

missile force (especially the theater ballistic missile buildup against Taiwan),

including strategic nuclear-armed missiles and warhead modernization, largely

indigenous undertakings.7 Another CRS Report looks at the closer PRC-Russian

“strategic partnership.”8

In parallel with foreign procurement of equipment, the PRC has also sought

foreign technology to help its struggling defense industries. An example is reported

Russian cooperation in the PRC’s development of new submarines, including the

Song-class diesel-electric submarine (SS), Type 093 nuclear-powered attack

submarine (SSN), and Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

(SSBN).9 Another example is Israel’s reported cooperation with China, perhaps

since 1991, in the development of a new F-10 (also called J-10) fighter, based on the

Lavi fighter project that was canceled in 1987 and was comparable to the F-16.10

7

CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by (name redacted); and CRS

Report 97-1022, Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development, by Jonathan Medalia.

8

CRS Report 97-185, Russian-Chinese Cooperation: Prospects and Implications, by (name

redacted) and (name redacted).

9

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997; “Russia Helping

China Develop New-Generation Attack SSN, SSBN,” Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and

Merchant Ships] (Beijing), October 1997, in FBIS; Secretary of Defense, “Report on the

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the

FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

10

Israel’s cooperation with the PRC in producing this next-generation fighter has been

reported in a number of sources, including: Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle] (Hong Kong),

December 16, 1991, translated in JPRS-CAR-92-019, April 1, 1992; Washington Times,

October 13, 1993; Flight International, November 2-8, 1994; Los Angeles Times, December

28, 1994; Defense News, July 21-27, 1997; Flight International, October 15-21, 1997; Flight

International, May 20-26, 1998. As early as 1993, in answering questions from a hearing

of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

publicly confirmed that Israel’s “long history” of military technical cooperation with China

has included work on “China’s next generation fighter.” More recently, the Office of Naval

Intelligence (ONI) issued a report in 1996 that said China has acquired U.S. technology

“through Israel in the form of the Lavi fighter.” In 1996 and 1997, ONI reported that the F10's design was based “heavily” on the canceled Israeli Lavi program and has benefitted

from “substantial direct external assistance, primarily from Israel and Russia, and with

indirect assistance through access to U.S. technologies,” according to Worldwide Challenges

to Naval Strike Warfare.

CRS-4

In-flight refueling aircraft is a third example of new important capabilities

developed by China reportedly with significant foreign assistance. The PLA has

sought in-flight refueling capability at least since the 1980s, reportedly from various

foreign sources (United Kingdom, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia).11 By 1996, a

news story cited a classified Pentagon report as saying that China had produced five

in-flight refueling tankers, converted from B-6 (H-6) bombers, and planned to have

at least 20 tankers to support indigenous F-8 fighters (15 of which had been equipped

with aerial refueling probes), F-10s, and FB-7 fighters under development.12 At the

October 1, 1999 military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of

the PRC’s founding, the PLA’s aerial refueling tankers flew publicly for the first

time, according to China’s official media. China billed the tankers as indigenously

produced and said that “gone are the days” when the PLA’s aircraft could not be

refueled in the air, and what is of “strategic importance is that the flying tankers have

boosted the air force’s long-range [combat capability].”13 Nonetheless, reports do not

say the PLA can perform aerial refueling of the imported advanced Su-27 fighters,

and the Pentagon reported in 2000 that the PLA Air Force’s aerial refueling program

remains behind schedule.14

There are still other considerations that are important to PLA modernization,

and PRC leaders appear to recognize that simply having more modern systems does

not necessarily mean the PLA would be able to utilize them effectively. PRC leaders

have sought to reform, streamline, and restructure the PLA based on high technology

and quality (rather than quantity), requirements for the absorption of modern

weapons acquired from abroad. The PLA has pursued improvements in nonhardware aspects necessary for modernization, such as professionalization, training,

logistics, leadership, maintenance, doctrine, and strategy.15 In the 1996 exercise

11

Andrew Slade, “USA Pushing to Block UK Sale to Chinese,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

September 17, 1988; Far Eastern Economic Review, February 21, 1991; Nayan Chanda,

“China Poses New Threat to Contested Islands,” Asian Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1992;

Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Obtains Aerial-Refueling Technology,” New York Times,

August 23, 1992; Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far Eastern Economic Review,

September 3, 1992;

12

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Arms Buildup Increases Attack Range,” Washington Times, March

12, 1996.

13

“Chinese-Made Aerial Refuellers Debut in Military Parade,” Xinhua [New China News

Agency] (Beijing), October 1, 1999, in FBIS. A PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong

reported that the refueling tankers were modified H-6 bombers (based on the Soviet Tu-16

bomber) and asserted that “the presence of these tanker planes indicates that China has

already mastered the technique” (“Article Reviews China’s New Weapons,” Ta Kung Pao

(Hong Kong), October 2, 1999).

14

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

15

On multifaceted aspects of PLA modernization, see, for example: “Special Issue: China’s

Military in Transition,” China Quarterly, June 1996; James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs

(editors), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington: American Enterprise Institute and

National Defense University Press, 1997); James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the

Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications, Rand, 1997; James C. Mulvenon

and Richard H. Yang (editors), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa

CRS-5

involving the three separate services, the PLA showed its intent to eventually have

the ability to carry out joint operations.16 The Secretary of Defense has reported that

a possible PLA attack on Taiwan would likely include naval blockades, missile

strikes, special operations, air attacks, and airborne and amphibious invasions.17

Russian training has accompanied the PLA’s hardware acquisitions. In October

1999, Russian and PLA naval forces took the first steps in holding what they called

“military exercises” together in the East China Sea near Shanghai.18 PRC leaders

have also tried to curb corruption in the PLA, with President Jiang Zemin’s ban on

businesses in the PLA (announced in July 1998). In addition, strategic thinkers of

the PLA have examined changes in warfighting, including information warfare, the

revolution in military affairs (RMA), and asymmetric warfare.19

Major Foreign Arms Acquisitions20

Objectives of the Middle Kingdom

Leaders in Beijing have pursued a historical quest for a modern China that is

prosperous and strong, presuming the country as rightfully the most powerful among

Asian countries and one among great powers of the world. Many analysts in and

outside government believe that, since economic reforms began in 1979, China’s

leaders have placed their top priority on economic growth as the requirement for

social stability, political control, national unification, and world standing.

Nonetheless, Beijing has pursued military modernization as a secondary, but

important, component of building comprehensive national strength. China pursues

military modernization in order to ensure that it is the preeminent power in Asia so

that any significant action undertaken by any other country in Asia must first consider

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (editors),

China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1999);

Susan M. Puska (editor), People’s Liberation Army After Next (Army War College, 2000).

16

Office of Naval Intelligence, Chinese Exercise, Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996, 1996.

17

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress

Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999.

18

“Russian Navy to Conduct First Joint Exercise with PRC,” Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong

Kong), in FBIS; “Russia, China to Hold Military Exercises Early Oct,” Voice of Russia

(Moscow), October 1, 1999, in FBIS; “Russian Warships Complete Visit to Shanghai,” RIA

(Moscow), October 6, 1999, in FBIS; “Sino-Russian Naval Exercise Reviewed,” Yazhou

Zhoukan [Asiaweek] (Hong Kong), October 11-17, 1999, in FBIS.

19

For a study that examined PLA modernization with an emphasis on strategic aspects, such

as the targeting of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)

systems with missiles and information warfare, see: Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic

Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). For some published PLA writings on future warfare, see:

Michael Pillsbury (editor), Chinese Views of Future Warfare and China Debates the Future

Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National

Strategic Studies, 1997 and 2000).

20

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Security Policy.

CRS-6

China’s interests.21 Over the last two decades, discussion of China’s interests and

challenges to regional stability has shifted from its role in the Cold War to domestic

repression and instability (e.g., Tiananmen crackdown) to claims over the South

China Sea to tensions over Taiwan (and the potential involvement of U.S. and

Japanese forces).

Especially since the mid-1990s, China has viewed its top security problem as

preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation and securing unification as “one China.”

This focus has catalyzed PLA modernization, including procurement of advanced

foreign military equipment. In the longer-term, experts believe that China also aims

to preclude Japan’s rise as the strongest Asian power, ensure PRC influence over the

Korean peninsula, support PRC claims in the East and South China Seas, subdue

India’s quest for power, and counter American might in the region.

Increasing Foreign Arms Acquisitions since 1990

In the early 1990s, a number of changes in the world contributed to the PRC’s

renewed arms procurement from the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia – the

PLA’s source of arms in the 1950s, before the Sino-Soviet split. Israel has been cited

as another source of weapons technology, in secondary importance.22 After the

Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, the United States imposed sanctions that have

included a suspension of arms sales to the PRC.23 Previously, the PRC had looked

to the United States for some weapons technology, including a military aircraft

modernization program called “Peace Pearl.”24 The rationale for U.S.-PRC

cooperation during the Reagan Administration stemmed from the Cold War, the end

of which in 1991 removed the strategic basis for U.S. arms sales to China. The

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dire economic situation of Russia also

brought Moscow and Beijing together in renewing their arms trade. Initially for

domestic security reasons, PRC leaders began to pay greater attention to the PLA, as

indicated by double-digit increases in the public defense budget, beginning with a

real increase in 1990 that was the first since the early 1980s.25 Moreover, by the early

1990s, the PRC’s economic reforms, expanded foreign trade, and earnings from

tourism had spurred significant jumps in its foreign exchange holdings. As an

indicator, with about $43 billion in foreign reserves in early 1992, the PRC held the

21

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

22

Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb

and Secret Weapons,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report

No. 11 (Oxford University Press, 1995).

23

U.S. sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown were enacted in section 902 of

the Foreign Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246).

24

As announced by the State Department on December 22, 1992, the Bush Administration

decided to close out the four suspended Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, which involved

an avionics upgrade for the F-8 fighter, equipment for munitions production, four antisubmarine torpedoes, and two artillery-locating radars.

25

Central Intelligence Agency, The Chinese Economy in 1989 and 1990: Trying to Revive

Growth While Maintaining Social Stability, July 1990.

CRS-7

6th largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, part of which was available for

arms.26

U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 also altered perceptions of world

power relations and dramatically demonstrated to PRC leaders the obsolescence of

PLA equipment. PRC leaders quickly learned lessons from that war, driving them

to upgrade the PLA for modern warfare.27 Lastly, after pursuing quiet, unofficial ties

since 1979, reportedly including several billion dollars in defense sales, the PRC and

Israel established diplomatic relations in 1992.28 In short, Beijing had greater

motivation, resources, and opportunity to acquire modern arms from abroad.

Thus, in the 1990s, as a result of the turn to major foreign military equipment

to modernize the PLA, the PRC ranked among the top ten leading arms buyers

among developing nations. As an indicator of its arms purchases from abroad, in the

period 1993-2000, China ranked 3rd in arms transfer agreements with a total value of

$12.6 billion, behind Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). In the

same 8-year period, China received a total value of $6.2 billion in arms deliveries.

Russia has been the primary source of China’s arms. Estimated values of China’s

acquisitions, in current U.S. dollars, are shown in Table 1 below.29

26

Central Intelligence Agency, The Chinese Economy in 1991 and 1992: Pressure to Revisit

Reform Mounts, July 1992.

27

Sheryl WuDunn, “War Astonishes Chinese and Stuns Their Military,” New York Times,

March 20, 1991; “Leaders Reach Consensus on Hi-Tech Development,” Ta Kung Pao

(PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong), April 27, 1991; “CPC Leadership on Technological

Development,” Wen Wei Po (PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong), May 21, 1991.

28

Clyde Haberman, “Israeli Aide’s Trip Linked to China Ties,” New York Times, January

9, 1992; DCI Woolsey’s answers to questions from a hearing of the Senate Governmental

Affairs Committee, “Proliferation Threats of the 1990s,” February 24, 1993; Amnon

Barzilai, “Bringing Down the Chinese Wall,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 1999.

29

CRS Report RL31083, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000,

August 16, 2001, by (name redacted).

CRS-8

Table 1. Values of China’s Arms Acquisitions

Period

Agreements

Deliveries

1993-1996

$ 7.1 billion

$ 2.9 billion

1997-2000

$ 5.5 billion

$ 3.3 billion

1993-2000

$12.6 billion

$ 6.2 billion

In comparison, some other governments in the developing world acquired more

arms than the PRC, which ranked 8th among top recipients of arms deliveries.

According to the same CRS Report, in the 8-year period, Saudi Arabia (ranking 1st)

received $65.9 billion in arms deliveries; and Taiwan (ranking 2nd), $21.0 billion.

Table 2 shows China’s ranking among the top 10 recipients of arms, excluding

developed powers (United States, Russia, European nations, Canada, Japan,

Australia, and New Zealand).

Table 2. China Among Top 10 Developing Arms Recipients

Rank

Recipient

Value of Deliveries,

1993-2000

1

Saudi Arabia

$65.9 billion

2

Taiwan

$21.0 billion

3

Egypt

$10.7 billion

4

South Korea

$9.7 billion

5

U.A.E.

$7.9 billion

6

Kuwait

$7.6 billion

7

Israel

$7.6 billion

8

China

$6.2 billion

9

Iran

$4.2 billion

10

Malaysia

$4.1 billion

Major Arms Acquisitions

Since embarking on foreign procurement for steady military modernization in

1990, the PLA has acquired or committed to acquire (with preliminary agreements

or contracts) select types and modest quantities of weapon systems, as described

below using public sources of information. Table 3 summarizes these major

acquisitions. Following this discussion on what the PLA has been acquiring, the next

two sections will assess the implications of these acquisitions for upgrading PLA air

and naval capabilities and the challenges they may pose for other forces in Asia.

CRS-9

Table 3. China’s Major Conventional Arms Acquisitions Since

1990

Qty.

Year

of Sale

Year of

Delivery

Mi-17

helicopters

60

1990-97

1991-99

from Russia

Il-76 transport

aircraft

10

1990-92

1991-93

from Russia

Su-27 fighters

26

22

<200

1991

1995

1996

1992

1996

1998-?

S-300/SA-10

SAM

regiments

4

1991-99

1993-00

Kilo-class

submarines

4

1994

1995-98

Tor-M1/SA-15

SAM

regiments

2

1995-99

1997-00

Sovremennyclass

destroyers

2

1996

1999-00

A-50 AEW

aircraft

4

1996;

2000

Su-30 fighters

38

1999

Item

Value

($ mil)

1,000

710

2,500

from Russia; armed

with AA-10 and AA11 AAMs; up to 200

(called J-11) to be coproduced under

license with Russian

help over perhaps 15

years

from Russia; similar

to U.S. Patriot air

defense system

700

from Russia; 2 Type

877, 2 Type 636

from Russia

1,000

800

2000-01

Comment

2,000

from Russia; equipped

with 3M-80 Moskit

(SS-N-22 Sunburn)

ASCMs, Uragan (SAN-7 Gadfly) SAMs,

and Ka-27 and Ka-28

ASW helicopters.

from Russia; for

PLAAF; 1st Israeli

Phalcon radar deal

canceled in 2000

from Russia;

armaments could

include Python-4

AAMs (Israeli), KR-1

anti-radiation AAMs,

air-launched Moskit,

R-77 (AA-12) AAMs.

CRS-10

Mi-17 Helicopters. In the first purchase of military equipment from Moscow

after the Sino-Soviet split ended with rapprochement in the late 1980s, the PLA

purchased 24 Mi-17 transport helicopters for army troops in 1990 and received them

by 1991.30 One source reported that the PLA ordered 30 Mi-17s in 1995 which were

delivered by 1997, when the PLA ordered five more, for a total of about 60 Mi-17

helicopters by 1999.31 The Mi-17s were assigned to the army aviation corps.32

Il-76 Transports. Beijing also procured from Moscow three Il-76TD

transport aircraft in 1990, and PRC official media confirmed the arrival of the planes

in 1991.33 In 1992, the PLA ordered seven Russian Il-76s in a deal worth $200

million that was paid 40 percent in hard currency and 60 percent in barter goods.34

Thus, the PLA Air Force is believed to have acquired 10 Il-76 transports by 1993.35

The Pentagon confirmed that the PLA Air Force has about a dozen Il-76 heavy lift

aircraft.36 The Il-76 transports were assigned to the PLA Air Force’s 13th Air

Division near Wuhan, Hubei province, to support the airborne troops (15th Airborne

Army).37

Su-27 Fighters and Armaments. Beijing’s first controversial order in the

renewed arms procurement relationship with Moscow involved the Su-27, the first

fourth-generation fighter for the PLA Air Force. China bought 48 Russian Su-27s.38

The PRC and the Soviet Union began high-level negotiations over fighters in

1990,39 later reported to be for two dozen Su-27 fighters.40 The Soviets demonstrated

several fighters, including the Su-27, in Beijing in March 1991.41 Beijing signed the

30

Far Eastern Economic Review, October 11, 1990; Gill and Kim.

31

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1999-2000.

32

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st

Century, Rand, 1995.

33

Xinhua [New China News Agency], September 26, 1991, translated in FBIS; Far Eastern

Economic Review, October 7, 1993.

34

Tai Ming Cheung, “Arms Reduction,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1993.

35

IISS, 1999-2000; Gill and Kim.

36

Secretary of Defense, “The Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant

to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999; and “Report on the Military Power of the

People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense

Authorization Act, June 2000.

37

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st

Century, Rand, 1995.

38

Office of Naval Intelligence, “Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare,” 1996.

39

“China Seeking Soviet Fighters,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 21, 1990; Tai Ming

Cheung, “A Sale is in the Air,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 6, 1990.

40

Tanjug [Yugoslav News Agency], November 9, 1990, in FBIS; Far Eastern Economic

Review, February 14, 1991.

41

People’s Daily (overseas edition), March 15, 1991; Xinhua, March 22, 1991; in FBIS.

CRS-11

contract later in 1991.42 By 1992, Russia delivered 26 Su-27s, including two for

free.43 Reporting to the United Nations (U.N.), both Russia and China confirmed that

it received 26 Russian combat aircraft in 1992, and Russia added that six of them

were training aircraft.44 The two countries also reported a transfer of 144 missiles.

These were believed to be AA-10 air-to-air missiles (AAMs) to arm the Su-27s.45

The value of this first Su-27 package eventually reached about $1 billion, with

payment involving 60 percent in hard currency and 40 percent in barter goods.46

After showing interest in 1993 in buying a second order of Su-27s, the PRC

ordered 22 of the fighters in 1995 in a deal worth about $710 million, with perhaps

50-100 percent in hard currency.47 In reporting to the U.N., both China and Russia

confirmed that the transfer of 22 aircraft took place in 1996.48

China’s Su-27s, a version called Su-27SKK, reportedly have been based in

southeastern China, with the first group at Wuhu, Anhui province (under the Nanjing

Military Region), and the second at Suixi, in Guangdong province (under the

Guangzhou Military Region).49 AAMs equipped on the SU-27s include the AA10/Alamo as well as the AA-11/Archer infrared AAM.50 The total number of these

AAMs cannot be established through open sources.

42

Flight International, April 3-9, 1991; Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1991.

43

Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20, 1992, December 17, 1992.

44

United Nations General Assembly, “United Nations Register of Conventional Arms,

Report of the Secretary-General,” October 11, 1993.

45

Gill and Kim.

46

Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1991; Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far

Eastern Economic Review, September 3, 1992; “‘Made in China’ Deal is Forged for Su27s,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Aleksandr Koretskiy, “China Will Be

Manufacturing Russian Airplanes on Its Own,” Kommersant Daily (Moscow), translated by

FBIS.

47

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993;

“‘Made in China’ Deal is Forged for Su-27s,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995;

“Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 10,

1997.

48

U.N. Register of Conventional Arms for 1996; Paul Lewis, “China Receives Su-27 Batch

and Discusses Third Order,” Flight International, October 23-29, 1996.

49

“China Prepares for Local Production of Sukhois,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997;

Federation of American Scientists ([http://www.fas.org]). The Secretary of Defense said

in the June 2000 report that a PLA operation against Taiwan would include air and ground

force units under the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions.

50

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997;

Douglas Barrie, “Russia and Israel Prepare for Dogfight Over Chinese Missile,” Flight

International, September 24-30, 1997; Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin,

“Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s,” SIPRI Research Report No. 15 (Oxford

University Press, 1999); IISS, Military Balance 1999-2000; Jane’s; Secretary of Defense,

“The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99

Appropriations Bill, February 1999.

CRS-12

China’s Su-27s are not believed to have an in-flight refueling capability.51

Moreover, a 1996 press account cited a classified Pentagon report as saying that

China’s converted B-6 tankers support the indigenous F-8 fighter, and perhaps also

the FB-7 and/or F-10 fighters under development, but the report did not mention

aerial-refueling of Su-27s.52

As agreed in principle in 1995, Russia consented in 1996 to allow China to coproduce perhaps as many as 200 Su-27s under license, initially consisting of

assembly from Russian kits, eventually leading to full production in China over a

period of perhaps 15 years.53 This deal was worth around $2.5 billion, including

$450 million for the license to produce and up to $2 billion for co-production.54 The

PRC has designated the PRC version, produced at the Shenyang Aircraft Factory, as

the J-11 (or F-11).55 With the help of over 100 Russian engineers, China assembled

the first two kits in 1998 and flight-tested the planes in December 1998, but the

aircraft had to be rebuilt afterwards.56 By 2000, with initial production problems and

the schedule falling behind, Russia planned to deliver at least 20 already-assembled

Su-27s as part of the deal.57

S-300/SA-10 Air Defense Systems. China has sought to upgrade its air

defense capability with the purchase of the Russian S-300/SA-10 Grumble area

defense system (similar to the U.S. Patriot system). According to a 2000 Pentagon

report to Congress, China has procured limited numbers of “state-of-the-art” Russian

surface-to-air (SAM) systems, namely, the SA-10b, SA-10c, and SA-15.

(Procurement of the SA-15 is discussed below.) The SA-10b (S-300PMU) missile

has a range of 90 km (56 mi); the SA-10c (S-300PMU1), 150 km (93 mi).58

According to the report, these Russian air defense systems provide only a

51

According to Piotr Butowski, “Dominance by Design: the Reign of Russia’s ‘Flankers’,”

Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1999, the Su-27, unlike the Su-30, has no standard

provision for in-flight refueling.

52

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Arms Buildup Increases Attack Range,” Washington Times, March

12, 1996.

53

Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Barbara Opall, “China Mulls Production of CarrierBased Su-27,” Defense News, November 18-24, 1996; “China Prepares for Local Production

of Sukhois,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997.

54

“Russian-Chinese Trade May Triple Due to Energy, Military Links,” Interfax (Moscow),

April 16, 1997; “Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

December 10, 1997; Pyotr Yudin, “Russia’s Sukhoi Plans Aircraft Technical Center in

India,” Defense News, February 23-March 1, 1998.

55

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

56

“Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 10,

1998; “Test Flights of 1st Domestically Made Su-27 Fighters,” Voice of Russia (Moscow),

December 31, 1998, in FBIS; “China-assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, February 24, 1999; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

57

Robert Sae-Liu, “Russia to Make Up China’s ‘Flanker’ Fighter Shortfall,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, June 14, 2000.

58

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1996-97.

CRS-13

“rudimentary” and “limited” defense against aircraft and cruise missiles, as China

tries to further fill the gaps in its air defense structure by building its own systems

using purchased technology. Moreover, the assessment said that “China’s groundbased air defense forces reportedly can provide no better than point defense; there is

no comprehensive, integrated national air defense network.”59

By 1998, China reportedly acquired two S-300 regiments (each with perhaps

four to six batteries to surround a defensive area) and began negotiations to acquire

two more S-300 regiments for other areas.60 The PRC first purchased four to six S300PMU batteries in 1991 and acquired them in 1993, with an initial batch of

perhaps 60-100 missiles and 120 more missiles in 1994.61 The PLA Air Force first

deployed the long-range S-300 batteries around Beijing to protect this major political

and economic site.62 By 1999, China also reportedly deployed several S-300 batteries

to a second area in Fujian province across the strait from Taiwan (at Longtian, near

Fuzhou). In addition, the PLA began to prepare for the deployment of additional S300 batteries at two more areas across the strait from Taiwan (near the coastal cities

of Xiamen in Fujian province and Shantou in Guangdong province). The S-300

batteries near Xiamen were expected to be operational in early 2000.63 While the

operational status of the 3rd and 4th S-300 regiments is uncertain, it appears that the

PLA Air Force has been acquiring four S-300 regiments (with plans to defend the

four areas of Beijing, Longtian, Xiamen, and Shantou).

Public reports do not provide the total number of S-300 launchers or missiles

the PLA has deployed. An estimate of the number of S-300 missiles deployed by the

PLA Air Force would depend on the number of batteries in each regiment and the

number of launchers in each battery. Each S-300 system consists of a towed launcher

with four launch tubes (towed by a heavy wheeled tractor) or a mobile launcher (a

transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)) with four launch tubes to fire reloadable

missiles.64 One S-300 regiment has several batteries, and the regimental command

post can control up to six batteries. A typical S-300 battery consists of up to four

59

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000;

China’s acquisition of the SA-10c is also reported in: Office of Naval Intelligence,

Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 1997.

60

“China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 2, 1998.

61

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993;

Steven J. Zaloga, “‘Grumble:’ Guardian of the Skies – Part 2,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,

April 1997; “Russian Area Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group

Corporation, February 2000.

62

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997; John

Pike, “S-300PMU,” Nuclear Fores Guide, Federation of American Scientists

([http://www.fas.org]); Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air

Force Enters the 21st Century, Rand, 1995.

63

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Bases Near Taiwan Sport Defense Missiles,” Washington Times,

March 28, 2000.

64

“Russian Area Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Corporation,

February 2000.

CRS-14

launchers, a command and control vehicle, a radar vehicle, additional missiles for

reloads, and maintenance equipment.65 The PLA’s initial procurement of four to six

S-300 batteries may have comprised one regiment. If assuming four TELs (each with

four launch tubes) in each battery and four to six batteries in each regiment, one

regiment in the PLA Air Force would have 16-24 TELs that could fire 64-96 missiles

(with further reloads) to protect one area.

Kilo Submarines. In addition to equipping the PLA Air Force, the PRC also

placed priority on acquiring modern weapon systems for the PLA Navy. By 1993,

Beijing had begun negotiations with Moscow on the purchase of perhaps four Kiloclass diesel-electric submarines (SS).66 China finalized an agreement with Russia by

November 1994 to acquire four Kilo-class submarines for about $700 million.67 In

October 1994, a PLA submarine’s vulnerability to tracking by anti-submarine warfare

(ASW) aircraft of the U.S. Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle group in the Yellow Sea

may have strengthened the PLA Navy’s resolve to quickly acquire advanced Russian

submarines rather than waiting for new indigenous submarines.68

According to their reports to the U.N., China acquired a Russian warship, likely

the first Kilo, in 1994, and another warship in 1995.69 It was in February 1995 that

Russia shipped the first Kilo to China aboard a cargo ship, and Russia delivered the

second Kilo in October 1995.70 The PLA’s first two Kilos are the older Type

877EKM model. In 1997, China received its third Kilo, the first of two of the more

advanced Type 636 model that had been supplied only to the Russian navy.71

According to a Russian marketing brochure, the Type 636, or Project 636, submarine

is one of the quietest submarines in the world. It can operate up to 400 miles

submerged and remain at sea for up to 45 days.72 With the Kilos, the PLA Navy

acquired updated sonar design and quieting technology, and wake-homing and wireguided acoustic homing torpedoes.73 Russia transferred to the PLA its second Project

65

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1996-97; Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

66

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993.

67

Robert Karniol, “China to Buy Russian ‘Kilo’ Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

November 19, 1994; “Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, December 10, 1997.

68

Jim Mann and Art Pine, “Faceoff Between U.S. Ship, Chinese Sub is Revealed,” Los

Angeles Times, December 14, 1994; Barbara Starr, “‘Han Incident’ Proof of China’s Naval

Ambition,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 7, 1995. According to press reports, although

U.S. ASW aircraft tracked the PLA submarine and the PRC scrambled fighters to within

sight of the U.S. aircraft, neither side fired shots in this encounter. However, the PLA later

warned a U.S. military attache in Beijing that China may use force in a future confrontation.

69

U.N., “Register of Conventional Arms.”

70

Barbara Starr, “USA Keeps an Eye on Slow ‘Kilo’ to China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

February 25, 1995; Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 1997.

71

“China Should Receive Its Third ‘Kilo’ by November,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 30,

1997.

72

Rosvoorouzhenie, “Project 636 Diesel-Electric Submarine,” marketing brochure, 1996.

73

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997.

CRS-15

636 Kilo in late 1998.74 While China did not report its arms transfers to the U.N.

after 1997, Russian reports confirmed that it transferred a warship to China in 1997

and another in 1998.75 China may seek two or three more Kilos, as well as upgraded

weapons to arm the Kilos, including the Russian 3M54 Club anti-ship cruise

missile.76

The Secretary of Defense has confirmed the PLA Navy’s acquisition of the

Kilos, saying that the Kilos, along with more ASW training, are expected to improve

the capability of the PLA’s submarines to conduct ASW operations. He wrote,

“China’s submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable of controlling

sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to

submarines in the East and South China Seas.”77

Tor/SA-15 Air Defense Systems. In addition to the S-300 area defense

system, the PLA has also acquired the shorter-range Russian Tor (SA-15) air defense

system, whose missile has a range of 12 km (7 mi) against aircraft and 5 km (3 mi)

against cruise missiles.78 China initially acquired one Tor-M1 regiment by 1998 and

began negotiations on an additional regiment.79 Each regiment is believed to include

16 Tor-M1 systems, and the PLA has acquired perhaps 35 Tor-M1s. A PLA Tor-M1

regiment appears to match the Russian organization of having four batteries, each

with four launch vehicles (each firing eight missiles).80 China first ordered 13-15

systems in 1995, which were delivered in 1997, and purchased 20 more systems in

1999, with deliveries in 2000.81 The cost of the Tor-M1 systems has been unclear,

since Moscow delivered the second order in partial payment for debts to Beijing.82

China may secure a license to produce 160 launchers.83

74

Moscow TV Shows PRC, Iranian Crews Receiving Submarines,” NTV (Moscow),

December 30, 1998, in FBIS; “China Gets Second Sub from Russia,” Pacific Stars and

Stripes, December 31, 1998.

75

U.N., “Register of Conventional Arms.”

76

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and

Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Yihong Zhang, “China

Negotiates to Buy Advanced Russian Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August

9, 2000.

77

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

78

Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

79

“Russian Point Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Corporation,

February 1997; “China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

September 2, 1998.

80

“SA-15 ‘Gauntlet’,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

81

Military Balance 1999-2000; Nikolai Novichkov, “Tor-M1s Help to Pay Debt to Beijing,”

Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 15, 2000; Yihong Zhang, “China In Talks with Russia to

Produce Tor-M1 SAM,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 19, 2000.

82

83

Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 2, 1998, March 15, 2000.

Yihong Zhang, “China In Talks with Russia to Produce Tor-M1 SAM,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, July 19, 2000.

CRS-16

Sovremenny Destroyers and Sunburn Missiles. PRC and Russian

leaders began talks on destroyers in 1994, but in late 1996, after U.S. deployment of

two carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan in March 1996 during provocative

PLA military and missile exercises, Russia and China agreed on the sale of two

Sovremenny-class destroyers. Each destroyer would be armed with 8 powerful (660lb high-explosive or 200-kt nuclear warhead), over-the-horizon (range of 86 nautical

miles, or 100 statute miles), supersonic (Mach 2.5), low-flying 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N22/Sunburn) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Each destroyer cost around $400

million, and the total package, with weapons systems, was valued at about $1 billion,

marking the first Russian arms sale to China in all hard currency. In December 1996,

then PRC Premier Li Peng visited Moscow and signed a military cooperation

agreement that apparently included the destroyers.84

On December 25, 1999, the first of the two Sovremenny destroyers for the PLA

Navy carried out sea trials in the Baltic Sea and was transferred to the PLA Navy

(PLAN) at the St. Petersburg shipyard.85 PLA and Russian naval crews then sailed

the destroyer, named the Hangzhou, to China in February 2000.86 As confirmed by

the Pentagon, it joined the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet, after sailing through the

Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.87 The second

destroyer began sea trails in June 2000 that included firings of Sunburn ASCMs.88

On November 25, 2000, the PLAN accepted the second Sovremenny in St.

Petersburg and sailed it to China where it joined the other Sovremenny at Dinghai

84

“Russia: Officials Sign Trade, Military, Finance Agreements,” Interfax (Moscow),

December 27, 1996, in FBIS; “China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, January 15, 1997; Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Says Russians Sell Destroyers to

China,” Washington Times, January 10, 1997; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1997-98'; Russian

Destroyers for China to Carry Moskit Missiles,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), November 26,

1997, in FBIS; “Russian Kamovs Set to Boost Chinese ASW,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

March 4, 1998.

85

“Russian-Made PRC Destroyer Starts Baltic Sea Trials,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow),

August 5, 1999, in FBIS; Trevor Hollingsbee, “Delivery of First Russian Destroyer Boosts

Firepower of Navy,” South China Morning Post, December 22, 1999; Bill Gertz, “China

Will Get Russian Ship This Week,” Washington Times, December 23, 1999.

86

Robert Karniol, “China’s First Sovremenny Sets Sail for Home,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

January 19, 2000.

87

Craig S. Smith, “New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York Times,

February 9, 2000; Pentagon, news briefing, February 10, 2000; “China’s Destroyer Purchase

from Russia Discussed,” Zhongguo Tongxun She [China News Agency] (Hong Kong),

February 12, 2000, in FBIS.

88

Bill Gertz, “Russia Readies Warship for China,” Washington Times, July 12, 2000;

Nikolai Novichkov, “Second Chinese Destroyer Tested,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 26,

2000.

CRS-17

naval base (near Shanghai) in January 2001.89 In addition, China may acquire two

or more Sovremenny-class destroyers.90

The Pentagon confirmed that the PLAN planned to receive two Sovremennys

by 2000, armed with the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic ASCM.91 China initially

ordered about 50 Sunburn missiles, and the first shipment of 24 missiles arrived in

China in the spring of 2000.92 In addition, the PLA also acquired Uragan (SA-N-7

Gadfly) surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and eight Ka-27 and Ka-28 ASW

helicopters.93 In 2000, the Secretary of Defense’s report to Congress confirmed that

the PLA was acquiring the SA-N-7 SAM system equipped on the Sovremennys and

wrote that the SA-N-7 “is a modern, medium-range naval SAM system; however, it

will have only a limited capability against cruise missiles.”94

A-50 AWACS and Canceled Phalcon Deal. To more effectively utilize

its advanced fighters, the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy have long required airborne

early warning (AEW) aircraft, with each service originally seeking perhaps ten AEW

systems from European, Russian, or Israeli sources, to supplement unsuccessful PRC

developmental efforts.95 The PLA would acquire potential new capabilities, ranging

from AEW aircraft (largely radars in the sky) to airborne early warning and control

systems (AWACS) aircraft (an airborne command post that detects enemy targets and

provides battle management by coordinating attacks among air, naval, and ground

forces). The roles of these aircraft could be defensive (detecting aircraft and cruise

missiles) or offensive (control of fighters). Moreover, the implications of the PLA’s

AEW acquisitions would also depend on how well they are used in conjunction with

other acquisitions, such as fighters and naval vessels.

89

Interfax (Moscow), November 25, 2000; Kommersant (Moscow), November 28, 2000;

Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 17, 2001.

90

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and

Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Nikolai Novichkov, “Four

Sovremennys in Total for Beijing,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 15, 2000; “Russia-China

Destroyer Deal Detailed,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 15, 2000.

91

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

92

“Russia to Export More ‘Sunburn’ Anti-Ship Missiles to PRC,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow),

September 25, 1998, in FBIS; Simon Saradzhyan, “Russians Tout Anti-ship Sunburn Missile

for Chinese,” Defense News, October 12-18, 1998; Bill Gertz, “Russia Sends Cruise

Missiles to China for New Warships,” Washington Times, May 19, 2000.

93

“Russia Delivers Eight Anti-Sub Helicopters to China,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), December

10, 1999, in FBIS; “China Receives Russian Equipment,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January

5, 2000.

94

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

95

G. Jacobs, “China’s Changing Doctrine,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1990; “West

Briefs China on AEW,” Flight International, August 25-31, 1993; Robert Karniol, “China

Chose ‘Careless’ Platforms,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Jason Glashow and

Vivek Raghuvanshi, “China Seeks AEW To Guard Su-27s,” Defense News, March 18-24,

1996.

CRS-18

By 1992, China had begun talks with Russia about purchasing perhaps three

modified Il-76 AEW aircraft.96 Later, talks involved acquisition of an Israeli radar

system. Three-way negotiations that began in 1994 considered four AEW aircraft for

$1 billion. However, China, Russia, and Israel reached initial agreement in 1996 on

a $250 million deal to supply one AEW aircraft to the PLA Air Force by installing

an Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Phalcon phased-array radar with 360 degree

coverage on a modified Russian Il-76 plane.97 The Phalcon system could be similar

in capability to U.S. E-3 AWACS on Boeing 707s. One source said that the Phalcon

could track up to 60 targets at the same time and guide a dozen fighters in allweather, day and night operations,98 while another report credited the Phalcon as

being able to track 100 targets simultaneously.99 Meanwhile, China also looked to

Britain’s GEC-Marconi Avionics to equip up to four Il-76s with an AEW system, and

Russia wanted to supply its own AEW system.100

At about the same time that the PLA Air Force looked at procuring the A-50

AEW aircraft in 1996, China reportedly signed a contract with a British firm, Racal

Thorn Defense of Racal Electronics, to buy six to eight Searchwater maritime

reconnaissance radars to equip Y-8 aircraft of the PLA Navy, in a deal valued at

about $62 million.101 However, it appears that both sides did not conclude the sale,

and there are no reports that the PLA Navy has deployed the new system. Indeed, the

Pentagon’s report to Congress on China’s military power, submitted in June 2000,

did not mention such acquisitions by the PLA Navy.102

The Phalcon deal became an increasingly controversial issue between the United

States and Israel. After military tensions in the Taiwan Strait that included PLA

“test-firings” of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles (in 1995 and 1996) and U.S.

deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups (in March 1996), U.S. officials,

including Defense Secretary William Perry, expressed concerns to Israeli officials

about the pending AEW sale.103 In May 1997, Israel and Russia reached agreement

on modifying one Il-76, as a Beriev A-50I Mainstay, for $250 million, with the

96

Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 3,

1992.

97

Ari Egozi, “Israel Presses Russia in Bid to Clear Way for China AEW Deal,” Flight

International, July 17-23, 1996.

98

O’Sullivan, Arieh, “Israel Mum on China Defense Ties,” Jerusalem Post, November 17,

1999.

99

Chaisson, Kernan, “Airborne Surveillance Takes Command,” Journal of Electronic

Defense, January 1999.

100

“China Poised to Seal AWACS Deal with British Firm,” AFP, October 8, 1996, in FBIS.

101

Barbara Opall and Michael J. Witt, “China Pits U.K. vs. Israel in AEW Quest,” Defense

News, August 5-11, 1996.

102

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

103

“U.S. ‘Concern’ Sparks ‘More Circumspect’ Approach to PRC,” Jerusalem Post, October

31, 1996, in FBIS; Steve Rodan, “Israel Pushes China Aircraft Deal Despite U.S., Russian

Objections,” Defense News, January 6-12, 1997.

CRS-19

option of three more AEW systems for a total cost of $1 billion.104 Russia secured

about 20 percent of the deal.105

After some delay, in October 1999, Russia transferred an Il-76 transport plane

to Israel for the installation of the Phalcon AEW radar by IAI. Pentagon

spokesperson Ken Bacon confirmed the arrival of the IL-76 in Israel and stated that

Defense Secretary William Cohen “has repeatedly raised his concerns with Israel

about the transfer of technology to China.”106

The Clinton Administration voiced stronger objections to the sale and urged

Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon, saying it is a system comparable to the U.S.

AWACS and could collect intelligence and guide aircraft from 250 miles away.107

President Clinton confirmed that the United States raised the issue with Israel. While

acknowledging that “the facts are in dispute,” Clinton said that “whenever any of our

friends sell sophisticated equipment that might be American in origin that is

inconsistent with the terms under which the transfer was made, then we raise that.”108

Nonetheless, U.S. objections were based not only on the question of whether

Israel would transfer U.S. technology to China, but also based on concerns about

Israeli upgrades to PLA capabilities that would affect the security situation in Asia.

Dov Zakheim, a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, wrote that “what matters

is that Israel should not be in the business of complicating America’s already delicate

position vis-a-vis China and Taiwan, one that led to a major crisis in the Taiwan

Strait only three years ago. Nor should Israel help to unbalance the equally delicate

relationship between China and America’s major regional allies, notably Japan and

the Republic of Korea.”109 By late 1999, some Members of Congress also objected

to the sale, including Senator Helms, who wrote to the Israeli Ambassador in

Washington that U.S. security “will be put at risk by the Phalcon and other Israeli

sales to Beijing.”110

104

“Russia Agrees Il-76 Sale to IAI for AEW,” Flight International, March 19-25, 1997;

Douglas Barrie and Ari Egozi, “Il-76 Deal Raises Israeli Hopes in Bid for China AEW

Contract,” Flight International, May 21-27, 1997; Steve Rodan, “Israel, Russia to Team on

Early Warning Platform for China,” Defense News, May 19-25, 1997; “Russia, Israel to

Make Spy Planes,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1997.

105

Steve Rodan, “Il-76 AEW Upgrade Bolsters Israeli, Russian Industry Ties,” Defense

News, July 21-27, 1997.

106

“Israel to Convert Russian Spy Plane for China,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), November 2,

1999, in FBIS; Barbara Slavin, “Israel-China AWACS Deal Worries U.S.,” USA Today,

November 4, 1999.

107

Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Seeks to Curb Israeli Arms Sales to China,” New York Times,

November 11, 1999.

108

White House, “Remarks by the President on Education and the Budget,” November 11,

1999.

109

Dov S. Zakheim, “Get Real on China,” Jerusalem Post, November 22, 1999.

110

Senator Jesse Helms, letter to Zalman Shoval, Embassy of Israel, November 17, 1999.

CRS-20

According to the Pentagon, the United States expressed opposition to the sale

as early as 1996,111 but in 2000, U.S. opposition to Israel’s transfer of the Phalcon

AEW/AWACS system to China mounted openly. Speaking in Jerusalem at a news

conference with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak on April 3rd, Defense Secretary

Cohen called on Israel to cancel the “counter-productive” sale. Cohen said, “I have

indicated before that the United States does not support the sale of this type of

technology to China because of the potential of changing the balance in that region,

with the tensions running high as they are between China and Taiwan.”112

There was also bipartisan opposition in Congress. On April 6, 2000,

Representative Sonny Callahan, chairman of the House Appropriations

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs,

sought to withhold $250 million, equivalent to the value of the Phalcon sale, from the

almost $3 billion in economic and military aid, if Israel transfers the plane to China.

Representative David Obey, the ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee

supported the effort.113

The Pentagon’s 1999 report to Congress on Taiwan security had expected that

the PLA would procure “several” Phalcon AEW systems and noted that the PRC

“conceivably could have fully operational AEW platforms by 2005.”114 The 2000

report, however, noted that the PLA Air Force’s AEW program remained behind

schedule. The report noted the expectation that the PLA Air Force would achieve the

incorporation of both aerial refueling and AEW/airborne command and control

capabilities later in the decade. Such capabilities would provide a significant “force

multiplier,” but only for a relatively small number of aircraft at one time.115

By May 2000, Israel had nearly completed work on the AEW aircraft.116

However, on July 11, 2000, during peace talks at Camp David, MD, Prime Minister

Barak told President Clinton that Israel canceled the Phalcon sale in a letter delivered

to PRC President Jiang Zemin the day before.117

Many observers have expected Russia to complete the sale of AWACS aircraft

to China, with existing A-50s from the Russian Air Force and/or, later, an advanced

A-50E version, that would bring Russia more earnings than the original deal

involving Israel. The A-50E is designed to guide up to 30 aircraft and track 300

111

Pentagon, news briefing, April 11, 2000.

112

Pentagon, news briefing with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, April 3, 2000.

113

Eric Pianin, “Israel-China Radar Deal Opposed,” Washington Post, April 7, 2000.

114

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress

Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999.

115

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

116

117

Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, May 19, 2000.

Pauline Jelinek, “Israel Cancels Arms Sales to China in Midst of U.S. Summit,”

Associated Press, July 12, 2000; Jane Perlez, “Israel Drops Plan to Sell Air Radar to China

Military,” New York Times, July 13, 2000.

CRS-21

targets as far as 250 miles away.118 As announced in October 2000 by visiting

Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov in Beijing, Russia and China reportedly agreed

on the sale of four A-50E AWACS aircraft. The contract was said to be signed

during Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit to Beijing in early November 2000.

The four A-50Es will cost about $800 million.119

Su-30 Fighters and Armaments. By 1996, China and Russia had begun

negotiations over the Su-30 long-range fighter.120 By August 1999, China and Russia

signed a preliminary agreement (letter of intent) on the transfer of Su-30MKK

fighters for the PLA Air Force, an initial deal that included 38 fighters valued at

about $2 billion.121

Delivery of the Su-30s to the PLA Air Force began sooner than originally

expected, with the first 10 fighters landing at Wuhu air base (near Nanjing) in

December 2000.122 By the summer of 2001, Russia had already delivered 29 of the

Su-30s, with some based at Cangzhou air base in Hubei province. Delivery was

expected to be completed by the end of year.123

There also are indications that China has sought an additional 38 Su-30s, and

another contract worth about $2 billion was reportedly signed for this second batch

in July 2001.124 China reportedly has sought an aerial refueling capability with the

118

Ivan Safronov, “Israel Will Help Us,” Kommersant (Moscow), July 14, 2000, in FBIS;

Simon Saradzhyan, “China to Explore Buy of Russian Early Warning Aircraft,” Defense

News, July 31, 2000.

119

ITAR-TASS (Moscow), October 31, 2000, December 13, 2000; Nezavisimaya Gazeta

(Moscow), November 1, 2000; Washington Post, November 19, 2000.

120

“China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 15,

1997; Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia and China Tighten Links on Military Projects,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, August 19, 1998; John Pomfret, “China, Russia Forging Partnership,”

Washington Post, November 21, 1998; Christiaan Virant, “China, Russia Hammer Out Arms

Deals,” Reuters, October 22, 1998; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

121

Barbara Opall-Rome, “China Sets Sights on 50 Su-30s,” Defense News, July 5, 1999;

“Russia, China Conclude Deal to Produce Fighter Jets,” Interfax (Moscow), August 6, 1999,

in FBIS; Robert Sae-Liu, “Su-30MK Purchase on Chinese Agenda,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

August 11, 1999; Philip Finnegan and Simon Saradzhyan, “New Capabilities Heighten

Asian Tensions,” Defense News, August 23, 1999; “Klebanov: Russia to Sell Su-30s to

China,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), August 24, 1999, in FBIS; Piotr Butowski, “Dominance by

Design: the Reign of Russia’s ‘Flankers’,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1999;

“Overview of Russia-PRC Military-Technical Cooperation,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), January

16, 2000, in FBIS.

122

Itar-Tass, December 18, 2000; Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, December 20, 2000;

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 21, 2000.

123

Robert Sae-Liu, “PLAAF Develops New Airbases,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September

26, 2001.

124

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and

Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey

(Moscow), July 18, 2001, via FBIS; Washington Post, July 20, 2001; Zhongguo Tongxun

CRS-22

Su-30MKK, but its converted H-6 tankers cannot be used for the Russian fighters.125

China has negotiated to buy 4 Russian Il-78 refueling tankers for the Su-30

fighters.126

One question involved the armaments China has acquired for the Su-30 fighter.

The PRC and Israel have negotiated, since at least 1997, on the transfer of Python-4

beyond-visual-range AAMs.127 China and Russia have co-developed the KR-1 antiradiation missile, a variant of the Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) that has been added to a

version of the Su-30.128 The talks in 1998 included whether the Su-30 would be

armed with the newly-developed 3M-80EA anti-ship missile, the air-launched

version of the Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) equipped on the Sovremenny destroyers,

although the missile had not yet undergone flight tests.129 There have been increasing

indications that the Su-30 fighter sold to the PLA Air Force may be equipped with

the R-77 (AA-12), a medium-range AAM (similar to the U.S. AIM-120 Advanced

Medium-Range Air-to-Air- Missile, or AMRAAM) or a version of which Russia may

sell to or co-produce with China.130 In January 2001, China reportedly received some

weapons for the Su-30s, including the Kh-59ME (AS-18 “Kazoo”) TV commandguided air-to-surface missile, the Kh-29T (AS-14 “Kedge”) TV- guided air-to-surface

missile, the KAB-500Kr TV-guided bomb, and the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile.131

She [China News Agency], August 2, 2001.

125

Robert Sae-Liu, “Refueling Go-Ahead by China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 25,

1999.

126

Robert Sae-Liu, “PLAAF Develops New Airbases,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September

26, 2001.

127

Douglas Barrie, “Russia and Israel Prepare for Dogfight Over Chinese Missile,” Flight

International, September 24-30, 1997; Paul Lewis, “Israel/Russia Compete to Arm F-10

Fighter,” Flight International, October 15-21, 1997; “U.S. To Question Israel on China

Tech Transfers,” Defense News, December 8-14, 1997.

128

Douglas Barrie, “China and Russia Combine on KR-1,” Flight International, December

10-16, 1997; Barbara Opall-Rome, “China Sets Sights on 50 Su-30s,” Defense News, July

5, 1999; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

129

Simon Saradzhyan, “Russians Tout Antiship Sunburn Missile for Chinese,” Defense

News, October 12-18, 1998.

130

Paul Lewis, “Russia Reviews Chinese Sales,” Flight International, September 17-23,

1997; Paul Lewis, “Israel/Russia Compete to Arm F-10 Fighter,” Flight International,

October 15-21, 1997; Tim Butcher, “Russia and China ‘are Developing Super-Fast

Missile’,” London Daily Telegraph, January 3, 2000; Steven Mufson and Thomas E. Ricks,

“Pentagon Won’t Back Taiwan Deal,” Washington Post, April 17, 2000; Jane’s All the

World’s Aircraft 2000-2001; Duncan Lennox, “China, India Close in On Russian ‘Adder’

Sale,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 6, 2000. In April 2000, the Pentagon decided to

support a sale of AMRAAMs to Taiwan, with the missiles to be kept in the United States

where Taiwan personnel would be trained to use them. The missiles would be transferred

to Taiwan, if the PLA acquired the similar Russian missile. On September 28, 2000, the

Pentagon announced that it approved the sale of 200 AIM-120C AMRAAMs to Taiwan.

131

Yihong Chang, “China Gets Second Batch of Su-30MKKs,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

August 29, 2001.

CRS-23

The above discussion of PRC efforts to acquire foreign advanced conventional

weapons raises questions regarding the effect of those systems on PLA capabilities

and implications for regional security. The following two sections will assess the

PLA’s air power and naval capabilities in light of the acquisitions.

Assessment of Air Power Acquisitions132

Platform Comparisons

The following section compares the capabilities of the fighter aircraft, AAMs,

and SAMs that China has imported to those produced indigenously by China as well

as to those found in some other Asian militaries and U.S. forces based in the region.

This comparison does not provide a complete picture of PLA air power capabilities.

It is, however, a necessary first step for further assessment. A platform-to-platform

comparison of these systems indicates that China’s imported systems appear to be

notably more capable than indigenous systems and are roughly on-par with Western

aircraft, AAMs, and SAMs.

Fighter/Attack Aircraft. Indigenous PLA fighter and attack aircraft have

been described by various analysts as obsolete and antiquated. There is consensus

in U.S. defense circles that the PLA Air Force is beset with many weaknesses. The

foremost weakness “...is that the PLAAF is currently saddled with over 2,000 aircraft

of 1950s-era Soviet design comparable to outdated U.S. fighters like the F-100, F-8,

and B-47.”133

The Su-27 and Su-30 represent significant upgrades in fighter aircraft capability

over indigenous PLA aircraft. Making simple performance comparisons, it is clear

that the Russian fighters fly farther and faster than indigenous PRC fighters. The Su27 and Su-30 are more maneuverable, and carry more and better armament than

domestic PRC aircraft. According to some analysts, the Su-27and Su-30 that China

has sought from Russia are roughly comparable to the U.S. F-15C air superiority

fighter.134 Indeed, the information in Table 4 below suggests that the Su-27 is in

many ways comparable to the best fighters in other Asian and U.S. inventories. The

Su-27's flight profile and armament are similar to those of the F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A18C/D, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) (of Taiwan), and Mirage 2000. The Su-27

may be more maneuverable than the best Western fighters. The Russian fighter has

been described by observers as having “unbelievable agility” and being able to

perform maneuvers that “no Western fighter can emulate.”135

132

Prepared by (name redacted)

, Analyst in National Defense.

133

Tirpak, John, “Can the Fighter Force Hold Its Edge?” Air Force Magazine, January 2000:

27. and Fisher, Richard D., “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the

U.S.,” Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.

134

Fisher, Richard D., “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.,”

Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.

135

Lake, Jon, “Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker,” World Air Power Journal, Aerospace Publishing

Ltd. London. 1994: 6.

CRS-24

There are, however, additional fighter/attack aircraft characteristics that are

important measures of performance. These factors – including radar cross section

and electronic countermeasures, for instance – are difficult to quantify or compare

in the unclassified milieu. A comparison of these factors would provide a clearer

picture of how the Su-27 measures up to the Western fighter aircraft.

Radar Cross Section. An aircraft’s radar cross section has a significant

effect on its survivability. Aircraft that incorporate stealth materials and design

techniques to reduce their radar cross sections are more difficult to detect, track, and

engage than aircraft that have larger radar cross sections. The general design of

indigenous PRC aircraft and their lack of composite materials strongly suggest they

have large radar cross sections. By comparison, the Russian fighters use modern

designs that, while not stealthy on the scale of aircraft designed specifically to be

stealthy, reduce their radar cross sections appreciably relative to indigenous PRC

fighters. A U.S. Air Force assessment asserts that the Su-27's radar cross section is

“on par” with the F-15C’s, but it does not provide data to substantiate this

assessment.136 Lacking the supporting data on radar cross section, it is impossible to

make definitive statements regarding how stealthy the Su-27 is relative to Western

fighter aircraft. However, some observations can be made that suggest that the U.S.

fighter aircraft based in Asia may have lower radar cross sections than the Su-27.

136

Tirpak, John, “Can the Fighter Force Hold its Edge?” Air Force Magazine, January 2000.

783

1,187

N/A

4 AAM

2 500 lb

bombs

Max Speed

(nm/hour)

Max Range

w/tanks (nm)

+G limit (M.09)

Missiles &

Bombs

36 Air-air

rockets

2 300 lb

bombs

7

1,203

648

1966

J-7

PL-7

AAMs

unguided

AA rocket

bombs

4.8

1,188

701

1969

J-8

5 500 lb

bombs

4-7 AS

rocket

7.5

982

643

1965

Q-5

10 AAM in

AA role

unguided

bombs

9

1,985

1,350

1982

SU-27

10 AAM in

AA role

unguided

bombs

9

2,800

(w/refuel)

1,350

1988

Su-30

Russian Aircraft

6 AIM54,

AGM84/88

-

1735

1,210

1989

F-14

8 AIM-120

3 AGM

hard point

9

2,200

1,610

1979

F-15C

6 AAM

or 7

AGM-65

9

1,740

>1,290

1981

F-16D

6 AIM120, 4

AGM-65

7.5

1,333

>1,160

1986

F/A18C/D

6 hard

point

9

1,200

1,160

1994

IDF

Other Asian and U.S. Aircraft in Asia

9 hard

point

9

1,800

1,420

1991

Mirage

2000

Sources for all tables in this assessment: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense, Jane’s Strategic Weapon

Systems, Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing (Teal Group Inc), World Missile’s Briefing (Teal Group Inc), Aerospace Source

Book 2000 (Aviation Week & Space Technology),The World’s Missile Systems (General Dynamics, Inc.), and conversations with U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air

Force Offices of Legislative Affairs. Unclassified information on the capabilities of Russian and PRC weapon systems is often inconsistent and contradictory. When

information was found to be contradictory, the most conservative estimate was recorded in these tables.

1953

IOC

J-6

PRC Aircraft

Table 4. Comparison of Fighter/Attack Aircraft

CRS-25

CRS-26

First, it can be observed that while Russia does possess the ability to incorporate

stealth materials and designs in its military aircraft, it has not yet advanced to the

level of the United States in this technology. Furthermore, the United States

continues to refine its stealth technologies by developing a third generation of

stealthy aircraft: the F-22 Raptor. As the U.S. defense establishment improves its

knowledge of stealth while working on programs like the F-22 and Joint Strike

Fighter, it identifies radar deflecting or absorbing techniques that can be employed

on existing aircraft.137

Another observation that suggests that the Su-27 radar cross section may be

inferior to that of U.S. aircraft is that the Su-27s operated by China are export

aircraft. It is usually (but not always) the case that an export variant of a given

aircraft does not incorporate the latest and most potent components. Thus, it would

be a very common practice for Russia to eliminate radar reducing elements of the Su27 exported to China, if feasible. Furthermore, materials and technologies that

improve an aircraft’s stealthiness are often costly and difficult to maintain. In light

of China’s maintenance shortcomings that will be outlined below, the PLAAF may

have difficulty maintaining any stealth capabilities that its Su-27s may possess.

Electronic Countermeasures. The effectiveness of an aircraft’s electronic

countermeasures (ECM) is a strong determinant of its survivability. In an era of

sophisticated radar and infrared (IR) guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and

radar guided anti-aircraft artillery, modern fighter aircraft rely on a variety of

countermeasures to survive in hostile airspace. These systems include radar warning

receivers, self-protection jamming pods, towed radar and IR decoys, chaff dispensers,

and flare dispensers.

Information on the range, power, frequency, and other characteristics of

electronic warfare (EW) systems and ECM are as jealously guarded as is information

on stealth capabilities. Unclassified information on Russian aircraft EW and ECM

typically include nothing more informative than a NATO-generated code name, the

suspected manufacturer, the approximate physical dimensions of the device, and the

aircraft on which it has been observed. Another factor complicating the comparison

of Russian aircraft EW/ECM and Western aircraft EW/ECM is that these devices are

very portable. They are often based in under-wing pods and can be installed or

removed from an aircraft with relative ease.

It appears that Russia’s EW and ECM capabilities are roughly comparable to the

United States’. During the 1999 war in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), for

instance, NATO military planners expressed strong concern over Serbia’s EW/ECM

capabilities – largely based on imported Russian equipment – even though “the

alliance didn’t face the most sophisticated Russian electronic warfare equipment

137

In the B-2 program, gold paint was found to significantly reduce the radar reflection from

cockpit canopies and was subsequently applied to F-16 and helicopter canopies in the US

inventory. Browne, Malcolm, “Will the Stealth Bomber Work?” New York Times, July 17,

1988; Cook, Nick, “The Disappearing Helicopter,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 28, 1999.

CRS-27

available.”138 China’s ability to optimally operate and maintain the EW/ECM

systems that are found on their Su-27s is another factor that is important, but difficult

to assess reliably.

Air-to-Air Missiles. PRC-manufactured AAMs are analogous in capability

to the indigenous fighters on which they are employed. They are, or are based on,

first generation weapon systems that trace their lineage to 1960s era designs. The PL2, -5, -7, -8, and -9 are short-range AAMs (3-5 km; 2-3 mi) and depend on IR

guidance. The oldest systems (PL-2, -4, -7) can only engage targets from the rear,

which limits their flexibility and constrains the aircraft’s pilot.

China’s imported AA-10 and AA-11 represent as great an improvement over

indigenous AAMs as do the Russian fighters over indigenous PRC fighters. These

missiles are effective to much longer ranges than the PRC AAMs, which adds to their

operational effectiveness and increases launch-aircraft survivability. The Russian

AAMs – especially the AA-11 – are highly maneuverable missiles, a feature that

increases their lethality.

Although the PLA Air Force has not yet acquired the Russian AA-12 or Israeli

Python 4 AAMs, it has reportedly sought them. If successfully acquired, these

systems will also represent a significant improvement in the PLA’s AAM capability.

The AA-12 has been called the “AMRAAMski,” indicating its similarities to the

premier U.S. medium-range (75 km; 47 mi) air-to-air missile. The Python 4's range

of 15 km (9 mi) is more in keeping with the range of PRC missiles. However, this

missile is extremely maneuverable, and it incorporates advanced seeker technology

that increases the missile’s lethality and increases launch-aircraft survivability.

Table 5 provides information that can be used to compare domestic PRC AAMs

to imported Russian AAMs as well as other Asian and U.S. AAMs. Russian AAMs

have been described generally as being of “high technical quality.”139 One analyst

has described the AA-10, for instance, as “generally comparable to the American

AIM-7M Sparrow missile...”140

Similar to the case of assessing fighter aircraft, air-to-air missiles possess

additional characteristics that bear strongly on their effectiveness. These

characteristics – including seeker discrimination capability and susceptibility to

electronic countermeasures, for instance – are very difficult to assess due to

classification and complexity. Even experts in the U.S. missile industry write that

“Evaluation of missile intercept performance involves so many nonlinear functions

that only sophisticated analytical modeling can reliably predict results.”141

138

Asker, James, “NATO Insecurities,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 26,

1999:27.

139

Zaloga, Steven, “Russian Air-to-Air Missiles,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Inc.,

February 2000.

140

141

FAS, [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/aa-10.htm].

Gurvine, Jeff, and Edwin Stauss. Fundamentals of Tactical Missiles. Raytheon Missile

Systems Company. Tucson, AZ. 1997: 8-39.

1981

3

11

IR

Tail

aspect

attacks

only

no off

boresight

IOC

Range km

Warhead

kg

Guidance

Misc

PL-2B

> off

boresight

than

PL2/3

IR

9

3

1982

PL-5

10 ft

lethal

radius.

tailaspect

attacks

only

IR

13

3

1987

PL-7

Based on

Python 3

IR

11

5

1990

PL-8

PRC Missiles

High

Altitude

(69k

ft)

IR

10

5

1991

PL-9

8G

intercept

INS, IR,

SAR

44

80-110

1985

AA-10

12 G

intercept

Helmet

mounted

cueing

INS, IR

7.4

20-30

1987

AA-11

Russian Missiles

All Wx

All aspect

SAR

39

45

1988

AIM-7

Helmet

mounted

sight

IR

10

8

1982

AIM9M

Home

on jam

SAR,

Inertial

and

active

radar

60

150

1985

AIM54C

All Wx,

All

aspect,

fire and

forget

Command

inertial,

active

radar

22

50

1991

AIM120

Other Asian and U.S. Missiles

Table 5. Comparison of Air-to-Air Missiles

CRS-28

Thrust AIM120 like

Command

inertial

active

or

imaging

IR

12

80

1996

Mica

All

aspect,

AIM-9

like

IR

~10

5

1993

Sky

Sword

CRS-29

Nonetheless, some observations can be made regarding two additional

characteristics that shed light on the utility of the AA-10 and AA-11 acquired by the

PLA Air Force vis-a-vis Western AAMs. These characteristics are “fire-and-forget”

capability and the missile’s “off-boresight” launch envelope. These two

characteristics are central to air superiority operations, because they often determine

which aircraft achieves the first shot during aerial combat.

“Fire-and-Forget” Capability. Shorter-range AAMs can effectively use IR

guidance. Once an IR missile is launched, the host aircraft’s role in missile guidance

is complete, and the aircraft can prepare another missile for launch, initiate evasive

action, or target another hostile aircraft. In essence, the aircraft can fire and forget

the missile. However, as range increases, the effectiveness of IR-guided missiles

diminishes.

Radar guided missiles operate more effectively at longer ranges than do IR

missiles. Active radar missiles use a radar transmitter to autonomously track targets

at short- and medium-ranges. Semi-active radar missiles require the host aircraft’s

radar to illuminate the target until missile impact. Generally speaking, AAMs that

employ active radar guidance, such as the AIM-54C, AIM-120, and Mica, fly more

independently after launch than do AAMs that employ semi-active radar guidance,

such as the AA-10 and AIM-7R. Thus, the AA-10 is not a fire-and-forget missile and

thus not as attractive from an aircraft survivability perspective as, say, an AIM-120.

However, the AA-10 “has a lock-on range of 30 km [20 mi] against typical fighter

aircraft targets...,”142 which may make up partially for this disadvantage.

“Off-Boresight” Capability. Traditionally, AAMs are launched by pointing

the host aircraft directly at the hostile aircraft and using a sight to line up the target.

The requirement to fire from this position gives advantage to the most maneuverable

aircraft or the pilot with the greatest tactical flying skill. The ability to fire a missile

from “off boresight” also proves advantageous, either by contributing by extension

to an aircraft’s maneuverability or by countering an adversary’s maneuverability.

The AA-11's most distinguishing characteristic is its high maneuverability and

its off-boresight capability. The AA-11 is the first effective “helmet-sighted” air-toair missile. With this system, a pilot can aim his weapon by turning his head and

does not have to line up the aircraft with the target. The first generation of AA-11s

can be fired 45 degrees off the aircraft’s forward line-of-direction, or off-boresight.

The second generation of this AAM has increased range and can be fired 60 degrees

off-boresight. The AIM-9M Sidewinder, by comparison, can acquire targets only

27.5 degrees off the forward line of sight and has a shorter range.143 Some analysts

assert that the AIM-120's long range and fire-and-forget capability confer much of

the same tactical flexibility as the AA-11.”144

142

Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group Ltd., 1997, London.

143

The next generation of the AIM-9, to be deployed in 2003, is expected to achieve 90

degree off-boresight launches.

144

Fisher, Richard D, “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.,”

Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.

CRS-30

The combination of the PLA’s AA-11 AAM and highly maneuverable aircraft

imported from Russian could prove a vexing air-to-air challenge to current day

fighter aircraft of other Asian and U.S. forces. The Russian MiG-29 has been flown

against U.S. aircraft in Red Flag exercises at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. At

longer distances, the U.S. aircraft were found to have the advantage versus the

Russian plane due to superior avionics. As the distance between aircraft closed,

however, the MiG’s high maneuverability and the AA-11's off-boresight capabilities

defrayed the U.S. aircraft’s advantage. Observers noted that, at a distance of

approximately five miles, the Russian aircraft enjoyed a significant advantage.145 The

Su-27 is also a highly maneuverable aircraft, and the combination of it and the AA11 will likely prove as dangerous a combination as the MiG-29 and AA-11.

Surface-to-Air Missiles. China manufactures five different SAM systems.

Two of them – the HN-5 and QW-1– are short-range, man-portable systems. Based

on the 1960s era Russian SA-7, the HN-5's utility is limited by a primitive IR seeker

that often cannot differentiate between an aircraft’s engine signature, the sun, or heat

radiating off the ground. While the QW-1 IR seeker is much improved over the HN5's, this missile’s engagement envelope is even more limited than its predecessor’s.

China’s HQ-2 SAM is effective to a much greater altitude and range than the

manportable SAMs, but it is based on Russia’s first generation, 1950s era SA-2

SAM, and is the oldest technology in China’s inventory. The HQ-2 employs a liquid

fueled second stage rocket motor, which requires time-consuming preparation and

cumbersome handling equipment. This SAM has been described by at least one

analyst as “antiquated.”146 By reverse engineering foreign SAMs, China was able to

incorporate some improvements in the PL-9 and HQ-7 SAMs not found in earlier

PRC systems. These improvements include better seekers that allow off-axis launch

and reportedly electronic countermeasures such as “home on jam.” However, these

systems and the less advanced HQ-61 are still short-range SAMs designed to defend

against low-to-medium altitude aircraft.

The Russian SAMs acquired by China – the SA-15 and especially the SA-10 –

represent marked improvements in China’s ability to target aircraft that threaten its

airspace. The SA-15's range and intercept altitude are similar to China’s most

modern indigenous SAMs. However, the SA-15 features a number of characteristics

that make it a more effective system. For instance, the SA-15 can use its surveillance

and tracking radars and can fire missiles while moving. It can fire two missiles

simultaneously at two different targets. Perhaps more significantly, this system can

engage cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It has also been

reported that the SA-15 may have some capability against short-range ballistic

missiles.147 None of these features is found on indigenous PRC SAMs.

145

“German MiG-29s in Red Flag Exercise,” Aviation Daily, August 1, 2000.

146

Zaloga, Steven. World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Inc., Fairfax, VA, November 1999.

147

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998; World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group,

February 2000; “China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

September 2, 1998.

a

35

27

120

130

No

Based on

SA-2?

Max Range

(km)

Max Altitude

(km)

Surveill. Radar

Range (km)

Warhead (kg)

TBM Capable

Misc

Copy of

SA-7

No

1.1

-

2

3.6

1966

HN-5

HN-5

up-grade

No

1.5

-

0.4

0.5

1994

QW-1

CSA-N2 marinized

version

No

42kg?

-

8

10

1991

HQ-61

Crotale

copy?

No

14

20

5.5

12

1991

HQ-7

The Patriot PAC-3 has a range of 15 km against tactical ballistic missiles.

1967

IOC

HQ-2

Indigenous PRC Missiles

Python 3

copy?

No

10

>15

5

5.5

1991

PL-9

Yes

143

300

30

90

1992

SA-10

S-300

PMU

12 G

intercepts.

Fire on the

move

Some

15

>25

6

12

1988

SA-15

Imported Russian

Missiles

13 G

intercept

Yes

84

170

25

>105

ATBM

optimized

Yes

142

N/A

All Wx,

Day/

Night

No

75

560

18

40

15a

>15

1960

2001

Hawk

Improved

guidance,

ECM

Yes

75

560

18

40

1973

I-Hawk

Other Asian and U.S. SAMs

Patriot

PAC 2 PAC3

1991

Table 6. Comparison of Surface-to-Air Missiles

CRS-31

Based

on

Patriot

No

90

150

24

80

1995

Sky

Bow 2

CRS-32

The SA-10 SAM system is considered similar to the U.S. Patriot system. It is

most distinguished by its very long range and very high intercept altitude. With a

range of up to 150 km (93 mi), a handful of SA-10s potentially could cover large

volumes of PRC airspace; protecting cities, airfields, and potential attack corridors.

The SA-10's very long range surveillance radar is also a significant improvement

over indigenous PRC systems. With its ability to detect aircraft up to 300 km (186

mi) away, the SA-10s could provide China with earlier warning of attacking aircraft

and more effective, integrated air defenses. Additionally, the SA-10 has the ability

to attack cruise missiles and perhaps limited defense against some ballistic missiles.

Table 6 contains information that can be used to compare China’s most

advanced imported surface-to-air missiles to those used by other Asian and U.S.

forces. This information suggests that the SA-10 and SA-15 are in many ways on par

with U.S. and similar SAMs in the region. However, the most useful level of

comparison for these systems is not between the PLA’s SAMs and those other

SAMs, but between the PLA’s SAMs and Western aircraft.

The effectiveness of the PLA’s SAMs against U.S. and other aircraft in the

region depends on a variety of technological and operational factors. On the

technological side, the aircraft’s speed, maneuverability, radar cross section, and

electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities are important factors to consider.

Operationally, the aircraft’s flight profile, and the employment of electronic warfare

(EW) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft, also contribute to or

detract from survivability vis-a-vis enemy SAMs. Also, the rules of engagement

(ROE), which political and military leaders impose on operational forces, have a

strong influence on which tactics, techniques, and procedures can be employed.

To definitively assess the effectiveness of China’s SA-10 and SA-15 force

against aircraft flown in Asia requires campaign-level analysis using high fidelity

analytical models and simulation to accurately measure the factors described above.

However, instructional observations can be made regarding specific SAM measures

of effectiveness and recent operational experience. In addition to the features

discussed in the previous part of this assessment (on missile and surveillance radar

range), SAM system characteristics that will challenge regional aircraft include

mobility, certain command and control factors, and resistance to ECM.

Mobility. Both the SA-10 and SA-15 are mobile systems. Because it is

currently difficult for other Asian and U.S. forces to detect and track most mobile

systems, this feature both increases the SAM’s survivability and also contributes to

its effectiveness. Mobility gives the adversary greater potential for surprise, as the

SAMs can be deployed to unexpected areas. The SA-15's launch vehicle’s maximum

speed is 40 mph, and the entire system can be readied for launch in as little as 18

minutes.148 The SA-15 is based on a tracked vehicle, which gives it the ability to

move well in rough terrain. The long-range SA-10 SAM is also a mobile system.

China’s S-300 PMU variant was designed specifically to improve system mobility

148

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London; Zaloga,

Steven, “Russian Point Defense SAMs,” World Missile Briefing, Teal Group Inc., February

2000.

CRS-33

and reportedly can be ready for firing within five minutes of arrival at an un-surveyed

site.149 Like the SA-15, the larger SA-10 is mounted in a vehicle that gives it off-road

capability. While current estimates report that the PLA has plans to deploy its SA10s around four areas (Beijing and areas across the strait from Taiwan), this system’s

inherent mobility suggests that it could be speedily moved to protect other PRC

assets if desired.

Command and Control. The SA-10 and SA-15 are modern systems and thus

incorporate command, control, and communications capabilities that increase their

effectiveness against other Asian and U.S. aircraft in Asia. These modern command

and control features may enable the PLA to network otherwise disparate air defense

units and meld them into an integrated system.

The SA-15's digital fire control computer processing system can automatically

perform threat evaluation on up to 48 targets. Automatic track initiation can be

performed on the 10 most dangerous targets, and two targets can be simultaneously

engaged in all weather, day or night “irrespective of enemy ECM operations.”150

Although it is an autonomous system, it can be interfaced into an air defense network

as it carries a special coded datalink for such purposes.

The S-300 system provides the PLA with even greater capability for air defense

integration. The radar can track up to 180 targets simultaneously. A battery can

engage up to 6 targets with 12 missiles in severe ECM environments.151 Multiple S300 regiments can be coordinated by a universal command, control, and

communications system to integrate several air defense systems together and share

target allocations. It is believed that SA-10 systems can now be netted with SA-5

and SA-12 systems and interoperate with fighter air defense zones controlling around

70 to 80 SAM launchers covering a front line of around 600 km (375 mi).152

Force on Force Considerations

The above discussion compared indigenous PRC and imported systems on a

platform-to-platform level. However, aircraft, SAMs, and other platforms do not

operate singly, but in conjunction with other components of an air force. This part

of the assessment will build on the previous one, by describing some of the factors

that may contribute to, or detract from, China’s ability to translate their recent

imports into effective combat power at the force-on-force level. The factors

discussed in this part include inventory, maintenance, pilot training, air doctrine,

command, control, and communications, and support from other aircraft (i.e.,

refueling, surveillance, and electronic warfare).

149

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London.

150

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London.

151

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London, 137.

152

Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. 1997, Jane’s Information Group, London.

CRS-34

Inventory. The aphorism that “quantity has a quality all its own” holds true

for China’s imported systems. While their quality is important, the operational

utility of these systems is diminished if they cannot be employed in large numbers.

Generally speaking, attackers tend to require greater numbers than defenders.

In planning ground operations for instance, a 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders is

traditionally considered the minimum required for success. Recent military

operations illustrate the value of mass in air operations. In the 1991 war in the

Persian Gulf (Operation Desert Storm), the U.N. coalition generated 132,029 air

sorties in five months. During Operation Allied Force (the 1999 conflict in Kosovo),

37,225 combat sorties were flown in 78 days. In contrast, it will be difficult for the

PLA Air Force to generate even hundreds of sorties (let alone thousands of sorties)

with its modern aircraft (only around 48 Su-27s) against targets at a distance from the

nearest PLA airbase. In its 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, for instance, it took

the PLAAF 45 days to move 700 aircraft to the theater of operations. Once there, the

PLAAF achieved an average operational tempo of only one flight for each aircraft

every four days. China did not fly a single sortie over Vietnamese airspace.153

Having about 48 Su-27s will not make a great difference in China’s inability to

generate numerous offensive sorties.

Table 7 compares the key platforms in the inventories of the PRC, Taiwan,

Japan, and U.S. air forces stationed in the region. This table illustrates that Taiwan,

for instance, has seven times more modern fighter aircraft than does the PRC.

(Taiwan and Japan also have AEW and EW forces which the PLA does not. The

implications of the PLA’s deficiency in this regard will be discussed below.)

Disregarding arguments about the Su-27's technological capabilities and assuming

a rough parity between the Su-27 and modern Western fighter aircraft, the numerical

inequity between the PRC’s modern fighters (48) and Taiwan’s modern airforce (340

fighters) brings into question the PLAAF’s ability to mount effective offensive action

in this scenario. However, a force of about 48 Su-27s is enough to make a tangible

impact on the PRC’s ability to conduct defensive operations, especially when

integrated with modern air defenses.

China’s procurement of four SA-10 regiments appears sufficient to make an

immediate operational impact. An estimated 16-24 batteries capable of launching

over 250 long-range missiles could significantly augment China’s existing air

defenses or enable the defense of additional assets. Also, because it is a defensive

system, the SA-10 enjoys advantages over attacking aircraft, such as the ability to

prepare staging and re-supply areas, and pre-survey launch sites. These advantages

suggest greater operational effectiveness, which in turn, puts the pressure on the

attacker to increase their numbers vis-a-vis the defenders.

153

Fulghum, David, “Israel Builds China’s First AWACS Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, November 29, 1999.

CRS-35

Table 7. Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key

Systems

U.S. Air Forces in Asia

PRC

Taiwan

Japan

CVBG*

Korea**

Japan

Modern

Fighters/

Attack

Aircraft

48 Su-27

150 F-16

130 IDF

60 Mirage

2000

160 F15J/DJ

14 F-14

36 F/A18C/D

72 F-16

36 F-16

54 F15C/D

AAMs

AA-10

AA-11

AIM-9J/P

Matra Mica

Sky Sword

I/II

AIM-7

AIM-9

AIM-7

AIM-9

AIM-54

AIM-120

AIM-9

AIM-120

AIM-7

AIM-9

AIM-120

AEW/

AWACS

0

4 E-2T

10 E2-C

4 E-3

4 E-2C

0

2 E-3

EW

0

2 C-130HE

2 CC-47

EP-3

1 EC-1

10 YS11E

4 EA-6B

0

0

0

0

2 KS-3B

0

15 KC135

Patriot 24/6

I-Hawk

240/78

Sky Bow

465/115

Patriot

128/32

I-Hawk

200/66

0

0

0

Aerial

Refueling

Long Range

SAMs

missiles/

launchers

(estimates)

SA-10

256-384/

64-96

* Yokosuka, Japan, is home port for 1 U.S. aircraft carrier, 6 surface combatants.

**U.S. Aircraft in Korea can self-deploy without refueling to Japan.

Source: The Military Balance1999-2000, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Maintenance/Spares. Self-sufficiency has been a goal of PRC aerospace for

50 years. Yet, there is doubt even today whether China can adequately maintain the

advanced aerospace systems that it has imported. Even PRC officials have claimed

that the PLA Air Force “is not currently capable of flying or maintaining

sophisticated foreign aircraft.”154 Clearly, the ability to maintain imported aircraft,

surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles is central to their overall effectiveness. Poorly

maintained equipment often does not work, does not work up to requirements, or

worse yet, can severely damage itself, other equipment, or personnel. Inability to

maintain modern aircraft will result in high attrition rates and exacerbate the

inventory issues articulated above.

It has been reported that PRC aerospace industry is “struggling to cope with the

advanced technology and industrial management methods needed to produce a state-

154

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st

Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA: 1995): 141.

CRS-36

of-the-art fighter within the assembly process.”155 At least during the initial coproduction of Su-27s, sub-standard work resulted in the first two aircraft

manufactured by China to be abruptly reassembled after their first flights.

One analyst claims that China’s difficulties in maintaining advanced technology

result in part from poor manufacturing processes. Lacking the tight tolerances

required to manufacture identical parts, PRC aircraft are literally one of a kind. “The

implication is that there is no interchangeability of parts between two unique

airframes of the same type of aircraft. This can be a tremendous maintenance

headache involving grounding of aircraft in case of even minor unserviceabilities

until inoperative parts are repaired or replacements manufactured to tailor-made

specifications.”156

China appears to have a particular deficiency in maintaining aircraft engines.

Unable to maintain them in-country, the PLA has been forced to send the AL-31F

engines which power both the Su-27 and the locally developed F-10 fighter to Russia

for repair. China is trying to purchase from Russia a turn-key repair and maintenance

facility.157 Despite the structural obstacles in China’s aircraft industry, however,

Russian assistance may prove to be an important difference in the eventual full

production of capable Su-27s in China.

Pilot Training. Learning how to safely and effectively operate a supersonic

fighter aircraft in a modern warfare environment takes a good deal of time, resources,

and effort. The standard minimum training for fighter pilots in NATO, for instance,

is 180 hours a year.158 U.S. pilots typically log more than 200 hours of in-cockpit

training. Additionally, U.S. fighter pilots spend up to 70 hours a year in high quality

simulators where they develop advanced skills and hone complex tactics. Western

fighter pilots fly in dynamic “many versus many” engagements. They train against

“aggressor squadrons,” dedicated adversary pilots that fly enemy aircraft with enemy

weapons and employ enemy tactics. Western pilots fly in combined arms exercises

(i.e., with ground- and sea-based forces) and with multinational allies.

Many analysts criticize China’s pilot training. They note that pilots spend too

few hours in the cockpit and that the training they do undergo does not adequately

prepare them for real combat. The PLA Air Force’s Su-27 pilots have flown just 60100 hours per year.159 This figure is well below the NATO standard and just barely

155

“China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February

24, 1999.

156

Sachdev. A.K., “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force,” Strategic Analysis, Institute

for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, September 1999.

157

“China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February

24, 1999.

158

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st

Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1995): xix.

159

Allen, Kenneth W., “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in Crisis in the Taiwan

Strait, edited by James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, American Enterprise Institute and

National Defense University Press, 1997.

CRS-37

enough training to ensure that the pilots can operate the aircraft safely.160 Moreover,

after losing several Su-27s to training accidents, each Su-27 aircraft is flown only

about 10 hours monthly.161 A major RAND study concludes that “advanced

operational techniques and tactics are simply impossible to learn in so little time.”162

The quality of the training that PLA pilots do receive has been questioned.

Some have noted the heavy scripting of PLA pilot training and called it unrealistic.163

The standard training syllabus consists of stereotyped engagements against single,

non maneuvering targets. Consistent with this observation are others who claim that

“almost 80-85 percent of the flying consists of plain and simple navigation sorties

with marginal tactical value.”164 Finally, it appears that for all intents and purposes,

once out of the cockpit, the PLA pilot’s training ends. “There is virtually no

simulator training, except on very rudimentary systems.”165 This lack of training

affects more than the fighter pilots; it affects the quality of the whole PLA Air Force.

Some have suggested that “the PLA Air Force has no capability to perform some

missions, such as close air support, that are commonly assigned to the air arms of

other nations.”166

While there is consensus that PLA pilot training is below Western standards, it

is unclear how far behind they really are and how long it will take them to catch up.

For example, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence

Agency, testified in January 2000 that China has made improvements in its pilot

training program that have resulted in much greater proficiency.167

Mission Emphasis and Doctrine. In many ways, China faces the same

crisis that Western military planners have grappled with after the Soviet Union

disintegrated. After decades of preparing to withstand a land invasion by the Soviets,

China must now develop a new doctrinal underpinning that focuses its military on

relevant roles and missions, currently centered on what it sees as its top security

problem, namely, Taiwan. While there have been discussions of a new doctrine

160

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades.”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

161

Brodie, Jonathan, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships and

Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999.

162

Mann, Paul. “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

163

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

164

Sachdev. A.K., “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force,” Strategic Analysis, Institute

for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, September 1999.

165

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st

Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1995): xix.

166

Mann, Paul. “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

167

Wall, Robert, “CIA: China-Taiwan Clash Possible Soon,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, February 7, 2000.

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(called “local war under high-technology conditions”) in military circles in China, the

PLA has yet to fully develop and implement reforms.

Many analysts comment that while China has purchased new technology, it has

not developed new doctrine or concepts of operation that are required to realize the

potential of these new weapon systems. For instance, the same RAND study claims

that “China is as far behind the West doctrinally as technologically. When a PLA Su27 pilot is being trained only in one-on-one tail chase intercepts against nonmaneuvering targets, he is being trained to waste his airplane. New equipment

implies new concepts, and the PLA will need to foment a doctrinal revolution to

complement the technological one if the billions to be spent on modern weapons are

to pay off.”168

Command, Control, and Communications. Western air power concepts

of operation emphasize centralized planning but de-centralized decision making and

execution. Initiative is fostered at low levels of command. Squadron commanders

and individual pilots are allowed great freedom to improvise during operations. The

success of air power in operations such as Operation Allied Force and Operation

Desert Storm suggests that this philosophy has merit. In contrast, the PLAAF

emphasizes centralized execution. The PLAAF has been described as “...rigid, with

little flexibility for command initiative.”169 PLAAF deployment of its surface-to-air

missile systems, for instance, has remained conservative and consistent over time,

despite improvements in SAM capability. Almost 100 percent of PLA SAMs ring

population and military centers with no attempt to aggressively cover large swaths

of PRC territory. Even though recently acquired systems make new employment

concepts capable, the RAND study notes “China has shown no inclination to extend

its SAM coverage beyond its traditional boundaries.”

The PLA’s ability to command and control its air forces and air defenses

effectively is influenced strongly by the quality of its communications technology.

Communications systems are used to give orders, issue warnings, share information

on an adversary or situation, request guidance, and generally to coordinate offensive

and defensive operations.

The quality and utility of military communications systems varies considerably.

At the low end of the spectrum, radios are used to broadcast voice communications

between aircraft and surface based command and control assets. Digitized

communications – often called data links – pass information at a faster rate, of greater

quality and fidelity, and under more secure and jam resistant conditions than do voice

communications. This increased capability, however, comes at the cost of increased

complexity. Generally speaking, any UHF radio can communicate with another UHF

radio. However, digitized communications have unique protocols and standards that

must be synchronized throughout a force.

168

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

169

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

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Similar to EW systems, China’s communications equipment is difficult to

catalogue with a high degree of confidence via open sources. Technical capabilities

of communications systems are jealously guarded to hamper adversary

communications warfare efforts. Furthermore, communications hardware tends to

be physically inconspicious and relatively easy to swap-out. However, some

information is available in the unclassified realm and general comments on the

PLAAF’s communications capabilities can be made.

Many analysts comment that China currently lacks the skills and information

technology required for a modern integrated air operations system. China’s

communications equipment appears limited in capability, and the PLA has been slow

to digitize. Recent activity suggests that Beijing recognizes the need to improve

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), but its

attempts to redress this deficiency are hampered by funding problems. A 1997

assessment asserted that “the current wire and radio communications equipment of

the PLA is at least two generations behind that of Western countries.”170

China’s indigenous and imported fighter aircraft currently operate with a wide

variety of communications equipment, which does not bode well for interoperability.

The standard communications equipment on the Su-27s, for example, is a “R-800

UHF radio, R-864 HF intercom and cockpit voice recorder, SO-69 ATC transponder,

and various IFF fits.”171 While the J-8 (F-8) fighter uses VHF/UHF radio and HF

radios – which implies some compatibility with the Su-27, – the Q-5 and J-7 aircraft

do not use UHF radios. The Q-5 and J-7 use VHF radios and Italian short wave and

ultra short wave transceivers, respectively.

China indigenously manufactures a Tactical Air Defense Command and Control

System (TADS) to command and guide its surface-to-air intercept systems. It has

been estimated that this system is able to control up to eight automatic simultaneous

interceptions, control up to 10 gun or SAM systems, and accept data from up to four

radars.”172 Yet, TADS’ exact means of communications is unclear, as is whether it

can control SA-10 batteries. The SA-10 batteries are coordinated by two different

C3I systems (the Universal-1E C3I system developed by the Proton NPO in Moscow,

and the D4M Polyana C3I system produced by Agat NPO in Belarus or the Baikal-1

system developed by Proton NPO.173). However, due to the disparate C3I systems,

it is most likely that China’s air defense assets operate in a more independent than

coordinated fashion. Furthermore – and more significantly from a fratricide

perspective – it is unlikely that China’s fighter aircraft and surface-based air defenses

communicate seamlessly.

Significantly improving China’s communications capabilities – especially

digitized communications – will not happen overnight. Yet, recent news accounts

suggest that China has taken steps that could bear fruit in several years. In January

170

Karniol, Robert, “Power to the People,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 12, 2000.

171

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001, Jane’s Information Group, London:447.

172

Jane’s C4I Systems 1996-1997, Jane’s Information Group. London: 89.

173

Steven Zaloga. “Russian Area Defense SAMs,” World Missile Briefing, Teal Group Inc.

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2000, China was reported to have launched a military communications satellite that

is to serve as the foundation of its first integrated C4I system; called Qu Dian.

According to this report, China claims that Qu Dian is analogous to the U.S. JTIDS

(Joint Tactical Information Distribution System), a secure, high-capacity data

communications network. The potential impact of this nascent system apparently is

being debated. Some components of the U.S. intelligence community reportedly

argue that, when fully deployed, the Qu Dian system will enable coordination and

data-sharing at the joint forces level. Others in the intelligence community are said

to counter that inflexibility of the PLA command structure will limit the

effectiveness of the new military system.174

Supporting Aircraft/Missions. The fighter aircraft and other systems that

China has been acquiring will not operate in isolation but as part of a larger air force.

The effectiveness of the Su-27s, for instance, will depend on a large part on how well

these fighter aircraft are supported by, and integrated with, any future PLA aerial

refueling, airborne early warning, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Aerial Refueling. It has been reported that China has approximately10 aerial

refueling aircraft.175 China converted some B-6 (often referred to as H-6) bombers

by 1996.176 Since then, the PLA has conducted two known exercises with aerial

tankers. Considering the small number of these aircraft and the apparent lack of

training and limited integration with other parts of its air force, the PLA’s aerial

refueling capabilities in the near-term appear to be rudimentary.

Thus, in the immediate term, it does not appear that China has the

ability to use their best fighter aircraft up to their full range potential. However, the

longer-term implications of PLA acquisition of aerial refueling aircraft is significant,

because these aircraft can greatly increase the reach and capabilities of fighter and

attack aircraft.

Support from aerial tankers increase air operations effectiveness by expanding

the range and payload options of attack aircraft and by keeping air superiority fighters

flying combat air patrol (CAP) in the air longer. Aerial refueling also maximizes

cargo aircraft capabilities important for replenishing friendly ground forces operating

in distant theaters.

By refueling in the air rather than carrying extra fuel externally, combat aircraft

can take off with a maximum weapon load. When air operations are measured in

terms of aircraft squadrons (12-18 aircraft), this effect is an important force

174

Gertz, Bill, “China’s Military Links Forces to Boost Power,” The Washington Times,

March 16, 2000:A1.

175

Sae-Liu, Robert, “Chinese Expand Aerial Refueling Capability to Navy,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, June 21, 2000:14.

176

Gertz, Bill, “Chinese Arms Buildup Increases Attack Range,” Washington Times, March

12, 1996: 1.

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multiplier. Combat aircraft with greater fuel capacity and refueling options have

flexibility in choosing target routes. Also, ubiquitous fuel enables fighter aircraft to

fly at higher speeds (consuming fuel at high rates) for maneuver and escape.

Air-to-air fighters on combat air patrol or escort missions benefit from aerial

refueling by remaining on patrol and engaging in combat for extended periods,

instead of returning to base for fuel. During Operation Desert Storm, for example,

F-15s on Scud patrol were able to loiter for hours over suspected launch sites due to

the approximately three refuelings each mission enjoyed.177

Airborne Early Warning. Despite several attempts to acquire this capability,

China has not yet acquired airborne early warning aircraft. Airborne early warning,

and airborne early warning and control (AWACS or AEWC2) aircraft significantly

improve the effectiveness of modern defensive and offensive air operations. AEW

and AWACS aircraft provide an expanded and clearer view of the battlespace, and

the ability to more coherently organize and employ large numbers of aircraft over

great distances and against a large number of targets.

Because radar is usually effective only to the extent of its direct line of sight, the

Earth’s curvature limits the ability of surface-based radars to detect low flying

aircraft at about 30 miles. Modern aircraft can travel this distance in less than a

minute, eluding detection until they are literally on top of their target. By elevating

early warning radars, say to 30,000 feet, low flying enemy aircraft can be detected at

approximately 250 miles, providing better ability to prepare defenses and eliminate

devastating surprise attacks.

AEW systems are often combined with command, control, and communications

(C3) equipment – such as identification friend or foe (IFF), electronic and

communications intelligence (ELINT and COMINT), advanced navigation, and jamresistant tactical data links. The resulting AWACS aircraft can be used not just to

provide warning to defenses, but also to effectively control large numbers of aircraft

on both defensive and offensive missions, over a large area against a large number

of threats or targets. In sum, AWACS aircraft may be considered “force multipliers.”

They enable the coherent use of large numbers of aircraft over great distances against

numerous threats or targets, that would otherwise operate in small groups with

relatively limited operational “vision.”

The military value of AEW/AWACS aircraft has been made explicit in

numerous conflicts. The success of Israel, for instance, against Syrian aircraft in the

1982 Lebanon War owed much to U.S.-built E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft in Israeli

service. E-2s routinely detected incoming Syrian aircraft at long range and vectored

Israel fighters to surprise them.178 The E-2 also enabled Israeli air attacks. In 1985,

Israeli F-15s, escorted by an E-2, flew 1,500 miles to bomb PLO headquarters in

Tunisia. By contrast, the British lack of AEW aircraft is considered a major

contributor to the loss of two destroyers during the 1982 Falklands war. Lacking

177

Coniglio, Sergio, “Modern Air Refueling Systems,” Military Technology, June 1991, p.93

178

Nordeen, Lon, Fighters Over Israel (Orion Books, New York, NY, 1990):163.

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long range surveillance, the British were forced to position the HMS Sheffield and

HMS Coventry in defensive postures that increased their vulnerability.179

Electronic Warfare. China has no electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. EW

aircraft, especially those systems that collect electronic intelligence and those that

jam or spoof an enemy’s electronic emissions, are central to modern aerial warfare.

EW warfare systems protect attacking aircraft by identifying threats such as SAMs,

helping to plan safer attack routes, and degrading the effectiveness of these threats

if they cannot be avoided. EW aircraft can also help air superiority aircraft by

providing early warning of approaching enemy aircraft. EW systems also reduce

fratricide by augmenting identify friend or foe (IFF) systems.

The importance of electronic warfare is strongly suggested by recent operational

experience. Air power has played a central role in the last three major conflicts in

which the United States has been involved. EW aircraft have been busily and

effectively protecting both offensive and defensive combat operations.

During Operation Desert Storm, only 38 allied aircraft were lost in 132,029

sorties. EW aircraft, such as the EA-6B Prowler and EF-111 Raven, flew 8,478

sorties during the war.180 Afterwards, a senior military official reported “We have no

reports that any SAM locked-up an attacking aircraft while being escorted by an EA6B...”181 Furthermore, a major NATO Conference after Desert Storm assessed how

suppression of enemy air defenses contributed to the Gulf War: “the Joint SEAD

campaign and SEAD support of the Gulf War will long be remembered as an

outstanding success.”182

During the 1995 conflict in Bosnia (Operation Deliberate Force), the NATO

allies flew 17,290 sorties and suffered only two aircraft casualties.183 The loss of the

second aircraft, Captain Scott O’Grady’s F-16, to a 30-year-old SA-6 SAM

highlighted the need for capable EW jamming aircraft.184 EW escorts became the

179

Luttwak, Edward, and Stuart L. Koehl. The Dictionary of Modern War (Harper Collins,

New York, NY, 1991): 10.

180

Gulf War Air Power Survey. Vol V. Statistical Compendium and Chronology. U.S.

Department of the Air Force. Washington, DC 1993: 150.

181

Nordwall, Bruce D., “Electronic Warfare Played Greater Role In Desert Storm Than Any

Conflict,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 22, 1991.

182

AAFCETLP Gulf War Conference Report, 1730.13.7/AFOOAT/S-078/92, 20 Feb 1992

NATO. As reported by Williamson Murray.

183

SFOR Air Component Fact Sheet,

[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/sforaircomponent .htm]; “2 Pilots Seized, Serb

Says,” New York Times, October 19, 1995: 12; and Sparks, Michael, “One Missile Away

from Disaster,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 1995: 18.

184

Hitchens, Theresa, and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Extends Life of Radar-Jamming EF-111,”

Defense News, June 19-25, 1995: 3.

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norm after it was determined that O’Grady did not have such support when shot

down.185 No additional aircraft were lost during this operation.

In summary, modern aerial refueling, AEW/AWACS, and electronic warfare

capabilities strongly influence the effectiveness of overall offensive and defensive air

operations. China’s attempts to acquire these capabilities implicitly underscore their

value. Until the PLA Air Force has effective aerial refueling, AEW, and EW

capabilities, it will have difficulty flying its Russian-design fighter aircraft against

modern air defenses or using its air defenses against attacking air forces.

Assessment of Naval Acquisitions186

General Considerations187

Scope of Discussion. This section assesses the implications of China’s

naval acquisitions for regional security. As requested, the discussion focuses on the

implications for U.S. naval forces – notably, the U.S. forces most directly affected

by these acquisitions.

Although the discussion focuses on implications for U.S. naval forces, it is

important to note that China’s naval acquisitions, like its naval forces generally, can

also be used against other naval forces in the Western Pacific, including those of

Russia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. U.S. naval forces

in the Western Pacific are considerably more capable than the forces of these and all

other navies in the region. In general, these other naval forces (when compared to

U.S. naval forces) would be more vulnerable to attack by China’s Russian-made

ships and submarines, and less able to attack them in turn.

A partial exception to this would be the Japanese navy, known more formally

as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, which is a sizeable, modern, and capable

force. The Japanese fleet includes, among other things, four Aegis-equipped

Kongou-class destroyers (very similar to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis-equipped Arleigh

Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers), more than 40 other fairly modern and capable

surface combatants (equipped in part with U.S. sensors and weapons), about 18

185

Grant, Rebecca, “Airpower Made it Work,” Air Force Magazine, November 1999: 34.

186

Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

187

Unless otherwise stated, basic information concerning the naval systems discussed in this

section is taken from the following sources: Sharpe, Richard, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships

2000-2001. Alexandria (VA), Jane’s Information Group Inc., 2000; Polmar, Norman. The

Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy. Annapolis (MD), Naval Institute Press, 1991. (5th

edition); Jackson, Paul, editor-in-chief. Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

Alexandria (VA), Jane’s Information Group, Inc., 2000; Friedman, Norman. The Naval

Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems 1997-1998. Annapolis (MD), Naval

Institute Press, 1997; Zaloga, Steven J. World Missiles Briefing. Fairfax (VA), Teal Group

Corporation, 2000. (Briefing Book Series, updated regularly).

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modern and capable diesel-electric submarines, developed ASW capability, and more

than two dozen mine warfare ships.

Compared to the U.S. Navy, however, the Japanese navy lacks, among other

things, aircraft carriers with fixed-wing aircraft and nuclear-powered attack

submarines. This reduces the ability of Japan’s navy, compared to U.S. naval forces,

to detect, track, and attack surface ships and submarines. Japan’s navy also appears

to have a proportionately less extensive at-sea replenishment (resupply) capability

than the U.S. Navy, which could limit the ability of Japan’s naval forces to operate

for a sustained period of time in areas that are outside Japan’s immediate home

waters.

In assessing the implications of China’s naval acquisition for regional security

in general, the limitations of these other regional naval forces compared to U.S. naval

forces should be kept in mind. This would be particularly important for crisis or

conflict scenarios that might involve U.S. naval forces (either initially or from start

to finish).

In addition, although parts of the discussion below are set in the possible context

of a crisis or conflict involving U.S. naval forces, the section largely does not address

the potential likelihood or nature of a crisis or conflict that might involve PLA, other

Asian, and/or U.S. forces.

China’s Navy in General. China’s navy – more formally known as the

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – has been primarily a coastal defense force

built around ships based largely on older or obsolete Soviet technology. Since the

mid-1990s, China has embarked on an effort to develop a navy with more blue-water

capabilities and more modern technology. The apparent intent of this program is to

develop a fleet that could challenge other Asian and U.S. naval forces during times

of crisis or conflict in areas such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the East

China Sea, and (eventually) adjacent sea areas further into the Western Pacific, such

as the Philippine Sea. China’s acquisitions of Russian-made Sovremenny-class

destroyers and Kilo-class submarines form a key part of this effort.

In assessing the potential implications for U.S. naval forces of China’s purchase

of modern naval systems, a key issue will be the ability of China’s navy to maintain

them in good working condition, operate them proficiently, and support them

logistically. This, in turn, will depend on factors such as the quality, education, and

training of PLA Navy personnel, the realism and sophistication of PLA naval

exercises, and the capabilities of China’s shore-based industrial infrastructure and atsea logistical system.

A survey article on the PLA Navy by the U.S. naval attache to Beijing published

in December 1999 provided comments bearing on a number of these issues. The

article stated:

Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for sailors

to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior enlisted personnel is not

yet well developed. PLAN academic training remains fairly basic by Western

standards; however, there is an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of

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training through the use of automatic-data-processing resources. Large-scale

fleet exercises are conducted several times each year, but there is little

integration between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval

operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army.188

The article states that, along with retirements of large numbers of outdated ships

and aircraft and acquisition of more modern technology, “the Chinese Navy has

focused on improving training for both its officer and enlisted ranks and, in

consonance with overarching PLA programs, developing a cadre of experienced

noncommissioned officers,” and that the navy “has relied heavily on Russian training

for the officers and enlisted personnel who will man” its Sovremenny-class

destroyers and Kilo-class submarines.189 The article states that there are

significant tactical and doctrinal shortfalls that the PLAN has not adequately

addressed. At-sea sustainability is modest, and the PLAN has not yet

demonstrated the ability to conduct complex coordinated air and surface

operations. The training of individual sailors remains basic by Western

standards, and the PLAN lacks a corps of experienced noncommissioned

officers. From the highest echelons of the service to individual commands,

control is highly centralized, with little flexibility and creativity in subordinate

ranks.

The article also states:

Having noted these shortfalls, however, the PLAN has made remarkable progress

in its drive for modernization over the last decade. It has demonstrated the

capability to deploy naval forces as far away as South America and Australia....

The complexity and scope of fleet training have steadily increased.... Further,

improvements in individual training and the development of a corps of

noncommissioned officers offers the potential to improve the sustainability and

combat effectiveness of individual units significantly.190

Sovremenny-class Destroyers and Related Equipment

China’s Surface Combatant Force in General. The survey article on

China’s navy by the U.S. naval attache to Beijing provides the following assessment

of China’s surface combatant force and the place of China’s two Sovremenny-class

destroyers in it:

188

Kaplan, Brad, “China’s Navy Today,” Sea Power, December 1999: 29. For other recent

published overviews of China’s Navy, see Ahari, Ehsan, “China’s Naval Forces Look To

Extend Their Blue-Water Reach,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1998: 31-36, and

Downing, John, “Maritime Ambition, China’s Naval Modernisation,” Jane’s Navy

International, April 1998: 10-12, 14-15, 17.

189

190

Kaplan, Brad, “China’s Navy Today,” Sea Power, December 1999: 29.

Another article states that “The current training programme comprises specifically

increased emphasis on joint warfare, greater use of combat simulators on a regular basis and

opposing force training in environments as close as possible to real warfare conditions.”

Downing, John, “Maritime Ambition, China’s Naval Modernisation,” Jane’s Navy

International, April 1998: 14-15.

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Although it has more than 400 fast-attack missile, patrol, and torpedo boats, the

PLAN only has about 50 units that are considered major combatants by Western

standards. Many of these obsolete small combatants are being replaced by more

capable C-801/802 [anti-ship cruise] missile configured Houjian-, Houxin-, and

Huangfen-class craft. During the 1980s, in a departure from its traditional

practice of relying on Russian Navy designs, the PLAN aggressively sought to

incorporate more advanced Western technology in its indigenous shipbuilding

program. The acquisition of these technologies resulted in China’s production

of more advanced surface combatants during the past decade – including a single

6,000-ton Luhai-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), two Luhu-class DDGs

(4,200 tons), and nine Jianwei-class frigates (2,250 tons). These units are

equipped with the HQ-7 or HQ-61 short-range air defense systems that will likely

be replaced by a longer-range vertical-launch system within the next three to five

years. These ships also have integrated tactical data systems, an improved

antisubmarine warfare suite that includes embarked helicopters, and gas turbine

propulsion.

Notwithstanding these improvements, the backbone of the PLA surface fleet

remains its 16 aging Luda-class destroyers (3,250 tons) and 30 Jianghu-class

frigates (1,425 tons) that are largely inadequate to meet the requirements of

modern warfare. The planned acquisition of two 7,940-ton Russian-built

Sovremenny-class DDGs in the 2000 to 2001 period will improve the PLAN’s

surface combatant capability.... The PLAN’s HQ-61 and HQ-7 systems are

based on the French Crotale land-based surface-to-air missile system, and they

do not provide surface units with an effective area-defense capability. This

deficiency makes PLAN surface units extremely vulnerable to air attack.

The Chinese Navy also is limited by other operational constraints. Although it

has some capability to conduct shallow water antisubmarine warfare along its

littoral and in the Yellow and South China Seas, the PLAN’s antisubmarine

warfare capability remains modest at best. Towed-array sonar and sonobuoy

systems use technology that is more than 20 years old. The PLAN’s damagecontrol capability remains limited, and few units have automatic fire-fighting or

watertight door systems. Anticontamination systems also are considered to be

quite basic by Western standards. The PLAN does field a broad spectrum of

fairly sophisticated sea-skimming cruise missiles – based on either Russian Styx

[SS-N-2] or on French Exocet technology.... Despite this capability, the lack of

effective over-the-horizon targeting sensors and coordinated targeting tactics

limits the likely effectiveness of these systems.191

The 2000 report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on China’s current and

future military strategy states:

China’s fleet of major surface combatants includes about 40 frigates and 20

destroyers. All carry ASCMs [anti-ship cruise missiles], ranging from the

antiquated, first-generation CSS-N-1/SCRUBBRUSH to the more advanced

C801/SARDINE and C802/SACCADE. Two Russian-built SOVREMENNY

destroyers – both of which are scheduled for delivery in 2000 – will likely be

equipped with the SS-N-22/SUNBURN ASCM. While most of the newer

surface combatants are being equipped with short-range SAMs, the

overwhelming majority of vessels mount no SAM system at all. Despite these

191

Kaplan, Brad, “China’s Navy Today,” Sea Power, December 1999: 32.

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limitations, the PLAN’s surface fleet is expected to strive to enhance both its

readiness and endurance for extended operations. In addition, it can be expected

to conduct more realistic training exercises and deploy more advanced anti-ship

[missiles], air defense missiles and electronic counter measures.192

Sovremenny Class as a Soviet 1970s-era Design. The Sovremennyclass destroyer, also known as the Project 956/956A or Sarych-class destroyer, was

designed by the Soviets in the early to mid-1970s. A total of 17 Sovremenny-class

ships were built for the Soviet/Russian Navy – the first began construction in 1976

and entered service in 1981, and the last began construction in 1988 and entered

service in 1994. China’s two Sovremenny-class ships are the 18th and 19th built by

the former Soviet Union or Russia.

Sovremenny-class ships are about 512 feet long and have a full load

displacement of about 7,900 tons. In terms of size and date of design, the

Sovremenny-class design is roughly comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Spruance (DD963) class destroyer design.193 The Sovremenny class was designed and built by the

Soviets as part of an effort in the Cold War years of 1970s and 1980s to deploy a

blue-water fleet capable of challenging the U.S. and allied naval forces for control

of certain sea areas during a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Under the Soviets’ concept of operations, Sovremenny-class ships would

operate as part of integrated naval formations composed of ships with differing and

complementary capabilities. The Sovremenny class, with four 130-mm (5.1-inch)

guns in two twin mounts and 8 SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCMs, was designed with an

emphasis on anti-surface warfare. The ship is also equipped with a fairly capable (by

Soviet/Russian Navy standards) area air-defense system that includes the SA-N-7

Gadfly surface-to-air missile (SAM).194 The ship’s ASW features, which include

facilities for embarking one Ka-27/Ka-28 Helix ASW helicopter, are more modest

– a characteristic consistent with the Soviets’ intent to operate Sovremenny-class

ships in naval formations that also included Udaloy-class ASW destroyers.

Intent of China’s Purchase. As a 1970s/1980s-era Soviet-designed

warship, China’s Sovremenny-class ships are considerably more technologically

modern, complex, and capable than most other PLAN surface combatants. This fact,

plus China’s decision to purchase two of the ships, has led some Western observers

to conclude that China acquired them in large part, if not primarily, for the purpose

of updating its surface-combatant technology base and accelerating its indigenous

surface combatant design and construction efforts. Under this interpretation, one of

192

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

193

The Spruance-class was designed in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The first ship in the class

began construction in 1972 and entered service in 1975. The ships are 563 feet long and

have a full load displacement of about 8,300 tons.

194

One article states that on the first of China’s two Sovremenny-class ships, “SA-N-7

Gadfly is probably the temporary fit, with [the newer] SA-N-12 Grizzly to be fitted in due

course. Unconfirmed reports state that it is already fitted.” Farrer, Mark. China’s Navy

Comes Of Age. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 2000: 31.

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the ships could be kept in port for purposes of studying or reverse-engineering its

technology, while the other could be periodically sent to sea for purposes of gaining

proficiency in operating modern surface combatants. Although China could use the

ships in the near term to impress and intimidate other naval forces in the region, the

primary importance of the ships under this interpretation would be to enhance

China’s ability to field a larger fleet of indigenously-produced modern surface

combatants over the longer run.

Several articles in the defense trade press, however, have reported that China is

negotiating with Russia to purchase at least two additional Sovremenny-class

ships.195 These reports, if true, suggest two possibilities. One is that China is

acquiring Sovremenny-class ships not just to support a longer-run modernization

effort built around indigenous designs, but to significantly improve China’s

capabilities in the nearer term as well. The other is that PRC officials may now have

doubts about the ability of China’s naval technological and industrial base to

assimilate modern surface-combatant technologies and produce modern indigenous

ships quickly enough to meet its longer-run naval modernization goals. If so, China

may be seeking to acquire additional Sovremenny-class ships as a hedge against a

potentially slow rate of progress in its indigenous shipbuilding effort.

China’s Ability to Operate. Since these ships are considerably more modern

and complex than most other PLAN surface combatants, they may pose a challenge

to the PLAN in terms of training proficient crews, developing effective operational

doctrine, and properly maintaining key systems. One recent article states that the first

of China’s Sovremenny-class ships “represents a logistics and support difficulty....”

It also, however, states that “the Chinese have learned much from the Israeli training

they have received in integrated logistic support (ILS). The Russians were reported

to have been surprised by the ILS and training packages purchased [by China] with

the two ships.”196

Another article states: “Military analysts say it could take China years of training

before its navy can handle such a sophisticated ship in an actual conflict.... [M]any

of the weapons systems China has purchased require extensive training and

sophisticated electronics and software to be used effectively. The People’s

195

See, for example, “Russian Anti-Ship Missile Developments,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

August 30, 2000: 26; Gertz, Bill, “Russia Readies Warship For China,” Washington Times,

July 12, 2000: 1; Farrer, Mark, “China’s Navy Comes Of Age,” Asia-Pacific Defence

Reporter, April/May 2000: 31; Novichkov, Nikolai, “Four Sovremennys In Total For

Beijing,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 15, 2000: 12; Sly, Liz, “China’s New Warship

Makes Waves Off Taiwan,” Chicago Tribune, February 12, 2000; Smith, Craig S., “New

Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York Times, February 9, 2000;

Brodie, Jonathan, “China Moves To Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships And

Submarines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 22, 1999: 13; Opall-Rome, Barbara,

“Economics, Russian Reluctance Slow PLA Arms Drive,” Defense News, February 8, 1999:

9. The additional Sovremenny-class ships reportedly would be transferred directly from the

Russian Navy, which would permit the ships to enter service with the PLA Navy years

earlier than if the ships are built on order for China.

196

Farrer, Mark, “China’s Navy Comes Of Age,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May

2000: 31.

CRS-49

Liberation Army has not demonstrated prowess in mastering such technology.”197 A

third article, paraphrasing an unnamed U.S. senior defense official, stated that “China

is expected to take up to two years to fully integrate the missile ships into the Chinese

Navy.”198

Regarding China’s ability to operate these ships far from home ports for

extended periods of time, the survey article by the U.S. naval attache states: “The

Navy’s underway replenishment capability remains largely underdeveloped, and the

sustainability of PLAN [naval] units is likely to be severely limited by this

shortcoming.”199

Comparison with Western Surface Combatants. Compared to modern

surface combatants in the U.S. Navy and other Western navies, the Sovremenny class

design, though capable, is now a somewhat older design that lacks features found in

state-of-the-art surface combatants. The Sovremenny-class design, for example,

includes oil-fired steam turbine engines rather than the gas turbine engines used on

more recent Soviet/Russian, U.S., and European surface combatants. The

Sovremenny-class design does not appear to incorporate significant shaping features

for signature reduction (i.e., low observability), as certain more recent surface

combatant designs do. Moreover, the Sovremenny’s air-defense system, though

fairly capable, is considerably less sophisticated than the Aegis air-defense system

installed on U.S. Navy Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG51) class destroyers.200

Capability of SS-N-22 Against Surface Ships.201 The SS-N-22 anti-ship

cruise missile, code named Sunburn by NATO and known in Russia as the 3M-80

Moskit missile, is considered by many observers to be the most threatening shiplaunched ASCM in service today. Developed by Russia’s Raduga missile design

bureau, the SS-N-22 is a supersonic (Mach 2.5), low-flying (7 to 20 meters, or about

23 to 66 feet, above the surface of the water) ASCM that performs evasive 15-g

maneuvers as it flies the final 5 to 7 kilometers (about 2.7 to 3.8 nautical miles) to its

target. The missile has a range of 160 kilometers (about 86 nautical miles). It uses

active and passive radar guidance and can be armed with either a 300-kilogram (660pound) conventional high explosive warhead or (in the Russian Navy) a 200-kiloton

nuclear warhead.202

197

Smith, Craig S., “New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York

Times, February 9, 2000.

198

Gertz, Bill, “China Will Get Russian Ship This Week,” Washington Times, December 23,

1999: 1.

199

Kaplan, Brad, “China’s Navy Today,” Sea Power, December 1999: 32.

200

The Sovremenny’s air-defense system might be more comparable to the pre-Aegis New

Threat Upgrade (NTU) air-defense system installed on the U.S. Navy’s now-retired Kidd

(DDG-993) class destroyers and Leahy (CG-16) and Belknap (CG-26) class cruisers.

201

For a discussion of China’s purchase of SS-N-22s, see Saradzhyan, Simon, “Russians

Tout Antiship Sunburn Missile for Chinese,” Defense News, October 12-18, 1998: 28.

202

The characteristics of the SS-N-22 are described variously by different sources, perhaps

in part because the missile has undergone improvements since it was first deployed. The

CRS-50

If Russia sold the missiles to China with only conventional warheads, one

question would be whether China would want (and be able) to design a nuclear

warhead for the missile and successfully integrate it into the missile’s design.203

Equipping the SS-N-22 with a nuclear warhead would greatly increase its lethality.

Although the conventional warhead on the missile is large enough so that one hit

from a single missile could seriously damage or possibly even sink a U.S. Navy

major surface combatant, a hit from one or possibly even a few conventionally-armed

SS-N-22s might not be enough to halt flight operations on a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier

because of the carrier’s much larger size and its high degree of

compartmentalization.204 A nuclear-armed SS-N-22, however, could easily destroy

description above follows that provided in the 2000-2001 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships.

Another Jane’s publication recently provided a somewhat different description of the

weapon:

The missile is powered by a solid rocket booster/ramjet sustainer combination

delivering a maximum speed of M2.1 [Mach 2.1] at low altitude and a maximum

range of up to 120km [about 65 nautical miles], depending on flight profile. The

later 3M82 Moskit-M version is thought to extend range to 150km [about 81

nautical miles]. The weapon’s Altair-designed multichannel seeker uses active

radar, anti-radiation and home-on-jam modes. Approaching its target at an

altitude of around 20m [about 66 feet], Moskit can execute a terminal ‘S’

manoeuvre (pulling up to 15g) to evade close-in defenses. The 300kg [660pound] penetrating warhead contains 150kg [330 pounds] of high explosive.

Raduga has publicised a number of further improvements to Moskit. These

include more internal fuel (pushing range to 200km [about 108 nautical miles]),

an improved warhead and seeker updates. (Russian anti-ship missile

developments. Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 30, 2000: 26.)

For an article discussing the SS-N-22 in some detail, see Zaloga, Steven J. Russia’s Moskit

Anti-Ship Missile. Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1996: 155-158. See also Friedman,

Norman. Russians Unveil Two Missiles. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993: 107108, and Bonsignore, Ezio. New Data On Russian Anti-Ship Missiles. Military

Technology, No. 4, 1993: 64-66, 68-69.

203

On this issue, one article states: “Conventions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,

as well as Russia’s own strategic interests, make it unlikely that the missiles will be

delivered with nuclear warheads. But Russia could provide, or China could develop,

technology that would enable the missiles to deliver a Chinese nuclear warhead.” Smith,

Craig S., “New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York Times,

February 9, 2000.

204

Russian marketing literature on the SS-N-22 states that 1.2 SS-N-22s are required to

disable a destroyer-sized ship, while 1.5 would be required to disable a 20,000-ton troop

transport ship. (Zaloga, Steven J., “Russia’s Moskit Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, April 1996: 157; Friedman, Norman, “Russians Unveil Two Missiles,” U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, June 1993: 107-108.) To attack U.S. Navy aircraft carriers more

successfully with conventionally armed cruise missiles, the Soviets designed the very large

SS-N-19 Shipwreck ASCM, which has a 1,650-pound conventional warhead. These

missiles were installed on Russia’s Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, Kirov-class cruisers, and

Oscar-class submarines. The Kirov-class ships, with a full load displacement of about

24,000 tons, are much larger than the Sovremenny-class ships. One article, however, states:

“Even one of [the SS-N-22's] conventional warheads could sink a cruiser or disable a carrier,

depending on where it hits, military analysts say.” (Smith, Craig S., “New Chinese Guided-

CRS-51

a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier (and any other nearby ships), even if the warhead

detonates at some distance from the carrier (which is a possibility if the missile is

equipped with a so-called salvage fuze that immediately detonates the warhead if the

missile is intercepted during its approach to the target ship).

The SS-N-22's designers have stated openly that the missile was developed to

defeat the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air-defense system. A 1993 article, for example, states:

This author had the rare privilege of a long and open technical/operational

discussion with Prof. Igor S. Seleznyov, Director of the Raduga bureau and

Programme Head for the 3M-80.... Prof. Seleznyov confirmed that in the Russian

Navy’s view, the main interest of a highly supersonic anti-ship missile lies in

exactly the same key factor as identified by Western designers and users alike –

namely the sharp reduction in the time available for the target to identify the

attacking missile and react accordingly....

In particular, Prof. Seleznyov indicated that all the cinematic [kinematic]

characteristics of the 3M-80 have been optimised for the specific purpose of

overcoming the defensive barrier of the US AEGIS system. The starting point

was an in-depth analysis of the AEGIS’ characteristics, as regards detection

range, processing speed and reaction times (I judged it indelicate to enquire

about how these data were obtained), as w

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