Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries

Congressional research reportJul 26, 2005

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Order Code RL30427

CRS Report for Congress

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Missile Survey:

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

of Selected Foreign Countries

Updated July 26, 2005

nae redacted

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected

Foreign Countries

Summary

This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity

in selected countries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of

Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as “a missile that is guided during

powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is

subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag” and a cruise

missile as “a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air,

sea, and land.” Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue

to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests both at home and abroad.

Approximately 35 countries currently possess operational ballistic missiles of various

ranges and approximately 25 countries have operational cruise missiles with a range

greater than 150 km (90 miles). Some analysts consider cruise missile proliferation

to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarily due to

their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy. This report will

be updated annually.

With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya’s ballistic missile

program, many view North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the

primary “rogue nation” long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security.

Russia and China continue to be the only two countries that could conceivably attack

the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons,

but improved relationships with both countries have done a great deal to diminish

this threat over past decades. India’s and Pakistan’s ongoing missile development

programs are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are

generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United

States. The renewal of dialogue between these two countries in an attempt to settle

their disputes by diplomatic means may also help in slowing proliferation as well as

preventing their potential use in this region.

The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States

has necessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying

to stem the development, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations

have been characterized as nonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the

current Bush Administration is viewed by some as having abandoned traditional

nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towards missile proliferation.

Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find the right

balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if

meaningful, long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile

proliferation can be “rolled back” by some combination of these approaches, others

note that both ballistic and cruise missiles have become such an integral part of many

countries’ national security frameworks, that it is highly unlikely that countries will

abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A Declining Ballistic Missile Threat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Missile Production and Development Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Demand for Missiles and WMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Status of Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Topol-M (SS-27 “Sickle”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bulava (SS-N-30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Iskander (SS-26 “Stone”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Conventional Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

China’s ICBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chinese SLBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chinese Missiles and Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Satellite Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

North Korea’s Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Current Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights? . . . . . . . . . 16

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Iran’s Space Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Nuclear Warhead Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Solid Propellant Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Shahab 4/5? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Developmental and Acquisition Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

U.S. Counter and Nonproliferation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix 1. Ballistic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

List of Figures

Figure 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

List of Tables

Table 1. Missiles by Categories of Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

of Selected Foreign Countries

Introduction

Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national

security interests of the United States. While weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

can be delivered by a variety of means including aircraft, artillery, and asymmetric

means, it is missile-delivered WMDs that garner the most domestic and international

attention. Countries with a WMD missile capability have the potential to influence

the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on another continent

and, in some cases, destroy population centers and national infrastructure. At the

present time, the United States is within range of the ballistic missiles of Russia,

China, and perhaps North Korea, as well as France and the United Kingdom. Several

other countries have missiles within range of U.S. overseas facilities and interests.

A number of countries are attempting to either procure or develop longer-range

ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMDs over great distances and many fear that

one day such an attack may be launched against the United States by a regional

power or rogue state where stringent political and military controls over these

weapons are not exercised.

Estimates of the missile threat to the United States continue to be controversial

for a number of reasons. One is that many missile programs have moved

underground and can also be hidden in a country’s civilian space or aerospace

industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizations to track development.

There is also some controversy still surrounding the 1995 National Intelligence

Estimate and 1998’s Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat

to the United States (P.L. 104-201) also known as the Rumsfeld Commission Report.

Despite numerous recent developments in missile programs world-wide, the

Rumsfeld Commission Report continues in 2005 to be the open source benchmark

for missile proliferation. While there is still disagreement about the extent of the

missile threat, the Bush Administration’s unwavering commitment to ballistic missile

defense has resulted in the deployment of ballistic missile interceptors at Ft. Greely,

Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.1

For detailed information on U.S. missile defense see CRS Report RL31111: Missile

Defense: The Current Debate, Mar. 23, 2005.

CRS-2

Estimates released by the U.S. Intelligence Community vary little from those

issued in the late 1990s by the Rumsfeld Committee. Iran is still assessed as being

capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)2 capable of

reaching the United States by 20153 although in the 1995 National Intelligence

Estimate (NIE) most intelligence agencies believed that this could happen before

2015. The NIE also cites North Korea as posing an ICBM threat to the United States

before 2015. Likewise, North Korea’s ballistic missile development time lines may

need to be re-evaluated as new missile programs are apparently underway. While not

posing a direct threat to the United States, the proliferation of shorter range ballistic

missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regional tensions in the

Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan.

A Declining Ballistic Missile Threat?

Some maintain that the long-range ballistic missile threat has decreased

significantly since the Cold War, primarily due to nonproliferation treaties and

arrangements.4 The most significant reduction, they argue, are in ICBMs, SLBMs,

IRBMs, and MRBMs, and that even SRBMs are “beginning to decrease as aging

inventories are retired.”5 Given these decreases, the threat is characterized by some

as follows:

There is a widespread capability to launch short-range missiles;

There is a slowly growing, but limited, capability to launch mediumrange missiles;

A decreasing number of long-range missiles from Cold War levels

that will continue to drop significantly over the next fifteen years;

A possibility that one or two new nations could acquire a limited

capability to launch long-range missiles over the next two decades;

Ballistic missiles are classified by their range as follows:

SRBM = Short-range ballistic missile, 70-1,000 km (43-620 mi.)

MRBM = Medium-range ballistic missile, 1,000-3,000 km (620-1,860 mi.)

IRBM = Intermediate-range ballistic missile, 3,000-5,500 km (1,860-3,410 mi.)

ICBM = Intercontinental ballistic missile, 5,500 km + (3,410 mi. +)

SLBM = Submarine launched ballistic missile, can be any range but tend to be in the

intermediate to intercontinental range.

Cruise missile abbreviations:

ALCM = Air-launched cruise missile.

ASM = Anti-ship missile.

CM = Cruise missile (generic).

LACM = Land attack cruise missile.

SLCM = Submarine-launched cruise missile.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air Intelligence Center, Sept. 2000, p. 15.

Joseph Cirincione, The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat, 2005, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Feb. 2005.

Ibid., p. 5

CRS-3

Likelihood of a nation attacking the United States or Europe with a

ballistic missile is exceptionally low.6

Others also note the increase in SRBMs - particularly in the 100 to 200 km

range - as well an increase in programs that modify existing surface-to-surface

unguided rockets with guidance and control sections, which adds a further low-cost

SRBM capability.7 Ballistic missiles are also considered “less expensive to maintain

than an air force,” and since “technologies can be transferred across to satellite

launch vehicles, earning hard currency,” some analysts suggest that these factors will

insure the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles.8 Given this possibility of

increased proliferation, some conjecture that the “ballistic missile and nuclear

warhead threat situation is going to become more complex and international in

nature, with whole regions likely to be involved rather than just individual

countries.”9

Missile Production and Development Facilities

One significant trend is the increasing number of missile production and

development facilities. Fifteen countries are known to produce ballistic missiles: the

United States, France, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India,

Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, and Argentina. Several other countries,

including Germany, Japan, Great Britain, South Africa, and Brazil could produce

ballistic missiles but have chosen not to. When a country has a missile production

facility, its ability to produce large quantities of missiles is limited only by its ability

to obtain certain critical materials and components. When a country acquires a large

number of missiles and launchers, it may be able to launch sustained attacks and to

overwhelm missile defense systems. Production and research facilities also enable

these regional powers to enhance the range, accuracy, destructiveness, and missile

defense penetration aids of their missiles. Another important factor is that countries

with an indigenous missile production capability also avoid export control

restrictions when trying to import missiles and missile technology from outside

sources. Finally, once a country produces missiles it can consider exporting them as

well as the production technology to still more countries for financial, political, or

ideological rewards. North Korea has been exporting missiles and missile production

facilities for a number of years, and there is concern that more countries will enter the

missile market as suppliers. Russian and Chinese organizations have been primary

sources of missile technology and, in the past, Western firms also have transferred

missile technology.

Ibid., p. 10.

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 15.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 15-16.

CRS-4

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warheads10

The primary cause for concern with missile proliferation is that missile systems

can provide countries an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapons over long distances. The most worrisome trend is the growing

number of countries with both long-range missile and WMD programs. India and

Pakistan have tested MRBMs and nuclear explosive devices. North Korea, Iran, and

Israel are suspected to have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as

well as a variety of short and medium range missiles.

Over the last several years, nuclear weapons programs have declined in number.

South Africa reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had

developed. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also abandoned earlier

nuclear weapon programs. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred to Russia

the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union. Recent revelations about

the possibility of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and Iran’s

revitalized nuclear program could reverse this favorable trend.11

Several other countries that have missiles also have chemical weapons, and

some have chemical warheads for their missiles. Bulk filled chemical warheads for

shorter-range ballistic missiles are considered relatively easy to develop while

chemical submunitions are considered somewhat more challenging. Biological

warheads are considered fairly difficult to develop because of the difficulties

associated with working with biological agents in terms of their sensitivity to

environmental conditions during missile flight and upon dispersal.It has been

reported that during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had missile warheads filled with a

variety of nerve agents and others with botulinum toxin and anthrax. China, Egypt,

India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea,

Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all have missiles and reportedly have chemical

weapons. Several countries reportedly have biological weapons programs, including

China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.12

Ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads proved to

be important weapons of terror when used against cities in the Iran-Iraq war and the

1991 Gulf War. The development of advanced conventional warheads, such as

cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, and enhanced missile reliability and accuracy

will increase the military effectiveness of missiles armed with conventional

warheads. The United States has demonstrated the military effectiveness of cruise

See also CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and

Missiles: Status and Trends.

See also CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:How Soon an Arsenal?

and CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.

See also CRS Report 98-103, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic

Missiles: The State of Proliferation. (Out of print; available from author at 7-.....)

CRS-5

missiles in several conflicts and a new generation of stealthy, more capable cruise

missiles is presently in development in a number of countries.13

The Demand for Missiles and WMD

As missiles and missile production technology have become widely available,

the demand for longer-range missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads

has increased. Because of their relatively low cost, ability to penetrate defenses,

strike deep into an enemy’s homeland, and to deliver nuclear or biological weapons

that could threaten the survival of an enemy country, missiles have become a delivery

system of choice and a symbol of national might for some countries.

The technological and military prowess of the United States was demonstrated

for the world during the 1991 Gulf War and again in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF). As a result, adversarial countries and non-state groups may be more

likely to avoid direct conventional military confrontation with the United States.

Some potential adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, continue to develop

missiles and WMD as means to counter U.S. military strength in their region and to

intimidate or deter their neighbors. At the same time, several allies and neutral

countries are also building missiles and developing WMD to promote their perceived

national security interests.

Any stigma associated with the possession or use of missiles was significantly

reduced by the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, Chinese intimidation

of Taiwan, Russian use in its Chechen conflicts, and by U.S. use of cruise missiles

in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In regional wars, missile attacks and

artillery fire on civilian population centers have become a standard form of combat,

as the use of standoff weapons (usually cruise missiles or air-to-surface guided

weapons) against hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist camps, and

WMD facilities has become a commonly-accepted U.S. military practice.

Status of Missile Proliferation

About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as having ballistic

missiles, and half of those countries are in Asia and the Middle East (see Table 1).

About 30 of these countries have, or are developing, ballistic missiles that can deliver

a 500-kilogram warhead 300 kilometers or further.14 Of the non-European countries,

fourteen have produced ballistic missiles (Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq,

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” p. 23.

Countries that adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime agree to restrict

transfers of missiles that can deliver a 500 kg warhead 300 kilometers, and related

technology, components, and material. A relatively crude, early generation nuclear warhead

is estimated to weigh about 500 kg. Countries other than the United States that are currently

reported to have missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds are: Afghanistan, Algeria,

Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, France, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan,

Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United

Kingdom, Vietnam, and Yemen. Additionally, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are in the

advanced stages of developing indigenous missiles with a range of 300 km or more.

CRS-6

Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Ukraine, and South Africa

which no longer produces missiles). In addition to these regional powers, which are

often discussed as missile proliferators, several Western and Eastern European

countries and republics of the former Soviet Union have missiles.

International pressures and domestic policy decisions have eliminated certain

missile programs in Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, and former Soviet

Republics. While the long-standing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

is credited with slowing missile proliferation, it is not known what effect — if any

— the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)

will have on proliferators.15

MTCR. The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the

United Kingdom established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on

April 16, 1987. The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and

cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering

weapons of mass destruction. It is an informal arrangement, not a treaty, consisting

of guidelines for transfers of missiles and related technology, and an annex listing

items to be controlled. The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition

or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult and

expensive if major producers restrict exports. The MTCR has no independent means

to monitor or enforce its guidelines. Nations adopt the guidelines as national policy

and are responsible for restraining their own missile-related transfers.

ICOC. On November 25, 2002, ICOC was inaugurated at the Hague, the

Netherlands. The ICOC, like the MTCR, is not a treaty but instead a set of

“fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile

proliferation.” The ICOC focuses on addressing the demand side of proliferation and

is viewed as complementing the supply side oriented MTCR. It seeks to achieve

transparency by using confidence building measures, such as information transfer on

ballistic missile programs. It also calls for pre-launch notification of ballistic missile

flight tests. Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC intends to establish a formal standing

organization to collect information and oversee the development of its confidence

building measures and information control mechanisms.

See also CRS Report RL31848, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and

International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background

and Issues for Congress.

CRS-7

Table 1. Missiles by Categories of Range

Range

Country

Intercontinental and/or

Submarine-Launched

Ballistic Missiles

(>5,500 km)

China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United

States, possibly North Korea (Taepo Dong 2 or Taepo

Dong ICBM)

Intermediate-Range

Ballistic Missiles

(3,000 - 5,500 km)

India, Iran, possibly North Korea

Medium-Range

Ballistic Missiles

(1,000 - 3,000 km)

Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, India,

Pakistan, Iran

Short-Range

Ballistic Missiles

(70 - 1,000 km)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus,

Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece,

India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Netherlands,

North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Serbia,

Slovakia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey,

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,

Vietnam, and Yemen.

Note: See the Missile Inventory Appendix at the end of this report for a listing of each missile

program by country.

Russia

Russia’s ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. Russia reportedly

plans to reduce the number of ICBMs on active duty from 496 at present to 313 by

2010.16 Some experts estimate that by 2010, these 313 ICBMs will consist of 154

silo-based missiles and 159 mobile land versions, and the number of ICBM nuclear

warheads will be cut from 1,770 to 923.17 At the end of 2004, Russia reportedly

made a number of claims about impending deployments in 2005 of new generations

of Russian missiles.18 While specifics were lacking, some speculate that the Russian

government was referring to the following four systems:

Topol-M (SS-27 “Sickle”). Russia is phasing in the silo and mobile versions

of the Topol-M to replace a variety of older ICBMs — some of which were

Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia Cuts Arsenal of Strategic Missiles, Jane’s Defense Weekly,

Apr. 13, 2005, p. 15.

Ibid.

Mark Galeotti, “Putin Puts Confidence in New Generation of Missiles,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, Feb. 2005, p. 54.

CRS-8

developed in the mid to late 1960s. The Topol-M — which began development in

the late 1980s — is widely believed to have a maneuverable reentry vehicle —

possibly including countermeasures — which Russia claims negates U.S. missile

defenses.19 The silo-based version of the Topol-M is currently operational with four

regiments (each regiment has 10 launchers) and a fifth regiment of silo-based

missiles is due to be commissioned in 2005.20 The production of the mobile version

is scheduled to begin in 2005, with between three to nine systems scheduled to enter

service in 2006 and a similar number of systems being developed annually in the

following years.21 Press reports that Russia will develop a new heavy ICBM

successor to the Topol-M are viewed by many as unlikely to be true, given Russia’s

limited defense budget - a budget that supposedly was responsible for slowing

Topol-M production to only four missiles in 2005.22

Bulava (SS-N-30). The Bulava is a submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM) that has been in design since 1986.23 This 10 warhead missile is intended to

be used with the new Borey-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the

first of which is scheduled for launch in 2006.24 The Bulava is also believed to have

a maneuverable warhead and a relatively short burn time, which is intended to make

it less susceptible to boost-phase intercept.25

Iskander (SS-26 “Stone”). The Iskander, which is reportedly currently

being brought into frontline service in Russia, was designed to defeat Western

ballistic missile defense systems — particularly the U.S. Patriot 2/3 system.26 It

comes in two versions, the “M” version for domestic use with a 400 km range and

the “E” or export version with a reported 200 km range.27 According to the Russian

press, the Iskander has four principal countermeasures: boost phase maneuvering,

depressed trajectory, low radar signature due to construction with composite

materials, and terminal phase maneuvering. Syria expressed interest in acquiring

Iskander-Es from Russia in early 200528 but strong protests from Israel — who was

supposedly concerned that the highly accurate and stealthy Iskanders would be used

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, pp. 162-163.

“Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.

Ibid.

“Russia Plans New Strategic Missiles,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Jan. 1, 2005.

Mark Galeotti, p. 54.

Ibid.

“Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.

Alon Ben-David, “Iskander-E Designed to Counter Western TMDs,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, Apr. 6, 2005.

Ibid.

CRS-9

to either destroy or evade Israel’s Arrow ballistic missile defense system — have

reportedly kept the acquisition from proceeding as intended.29

Conventional Cruise Missiles. Russia has reportedly deployed its first

conventional air launched cruise missile.30 The Kh-555 is a derivative of its Kh 55SM nuclear cruise missile and reportedly has a range of between 3,000 and 3,500

km, an accuracy of between 5 to 10 meters, and a 400 kg conventional warhead

capacity.31 These missiles, designed to be carried on Russian long-range strategic

bomber aircraft, are described by Russian press as a weapon for use in “local

conflicts and counter-terrorist operations.”32

A number of unarmed Kh-55 cruise missiles — left in the Ukraine after the

withdrawal of Russian forces — were reportedly illicitly transferred to Iran and

China.33 According to Ukranian government officials, 12 missiles were supplied to

Iran and six missiles to China in 2001. Some Western analysts believe that more

missiles could have been supplied than the 18 acknowledged by the Ukranian

government and that North Korea might have also received missiles. Some are

concerned that these Kh-55s could be modified into precision guided Kh-555s and

that they could be modified to be fired from smaller aircraft — such as SU-24s —

which would increase the utility of the missile among nations that do not have large,

long- range bomber aircraft.

China

Chinese military modernization has been called “ a threat to the United States”

which could conceivably “alter the regional balance of power” in the Pacific.34 As

part of this overall program, China is putting significant emphasis on missile

programs.

China’s ICBMs. China is believed to have a relatively small arsenal of

nuclear-armed, liquid propellant35 ICBMs capable of reaching portions of the United

Nikolai Gulko and Maksim Grgorev “Russian Missiles Chill Russian-Israeli

Relations,”Kommersant Daily, Jan. 12, 2005.

Robert Hewson, “Russian Conventional Cruise Missile Enters Service, Jane’s Defense

Weekly, Dec. 15, 2004.

Ibid.

Information in this paragraph is taken from Robert Hewson, “Ukranian Cruise Missile

Transfer Under Scrutiny, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Mar. 30, 2005 and Bill Gertz, “Missiles

Sold to China and Iran,” Washington Times, Apr. 6, 2005.

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Military Buildup Assessed as Threat to the U.S.,” Washington Times,

Feb. 18, 2005 and Edward Cody, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington

Post, Apr. 12, 2005.

Solid propellants are generally favored as they are safer to store and easier and quicker

to put into action than liquid propellant-filled missiles. Countries that produce solid

(continued...)

CRS-10

States.36 Some experts believe that China has between 20 to 30 CSS-4 — also

known as Dong Feng (DF)-5 — and DF-5A nuclear ICBMs in service and in storage,

although it is possible that these numbers may be low due to the commonality

between these missiles and similar Chinese space launch vehicles.37 It is believed

that the DF-5 series of missiles will be taken out of action starting in 2005 in favor

of newer, solid propellant missiles.38

China is continuing its development of its DF-31 road-mobile ICBM, a threestage, solid propellant missile carried inside of a canister on a transporter-launcher

vehicle.39 According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the DF-31 will achieve

an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2005-2006.40 The DF-31 is assessed as

being capable of striking targets throughout Europe and Asia, parts of Canada, and

the northwestern United States.41 A longer range DF-31A road mobile version also

is reportedly under development with a projected IOC of 2007-2009.42 The DF-31A

will enable China to strike almost the entire United States as well as Australia and

New Zealand.43 Some reports suggest that an even longer range DF-41, which could

conceivably range the entire United States, is under development for both road

mobile and silo use.44 Although there have been a number successful test flights of

the DF-31, the DF-31 is not yet believed to be fully in service and some experts

maintain that China will have from 75-100 nuclear warheads on ICBMs capable of

threatening the United States by 2018.45 Some suggest, however, that the main

purpose of China’s ICBM program is not so much the ability to attack and defeat the

(...continued)

propellant missiles are generally considered to have a more technologically-advanced

missile program than those countries who produce strictly liquid propellant missiles.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 14. According to

NASIC officials, this is the most current version of this unclassified report but NASIC hopes

to publish an update some time later in 2005.

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 42.

Ibid.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the

People’s Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the

People’s Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.

Ibid.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12.

Ibid., p. 14.

CRS-11

United States but instead to “throw a monkey wrench into the decision-making

process in Washington,” particularly in terms of U.S. intervention in Taiwan.46

Chinese SLBMs. The Chinese are continuing to develop their JL-2 SLBM

for use in China’s new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine. The JL-2’s range is

estimated to be approximately 12,000 kilometers and will likely have multiple

warheads.47 The Japanese press reported that China had test-fired what was believed

to be a JL-2 on June16, 2005 from a ballistic missile submarine off the coast of China

near Qingdao to a test area in the western Chinese desert several thousand kilometers

away.48 The Type-094 submarine is believed to be capable of carrying 16 JL-2

SLBMs and, according to one expert, when both systems become fully operational

it will be “China’s first truly intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery system.”49

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly expects China to put its first

Type-094 submarine with JL-2 SLBMs into service by 2010 with the second entering

service by 2020.50 China currently has a single XIA-class ballistic missile submarine

which can carry 12 CSS-NX-3 SLBMs (range of 1,600 km)51 but the XIA submarine

is considered so “noisy” to underwater detection systems that its chances of evading

attack submarines is considered “limited.”52 According to U.S. intelligence officials,

the Type-094/JL-2 combination will permit China, for the first time, to target

portions of the United States from operating areas near the Chinese coast.53

Chinese Missiles and Taiwan. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services

Committee on March 17, 2005, on Current and Projected National Security Threats

to the United States, the Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby stated:

China also is developing new SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missiles

(MRBMs), and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). They are a key

component of Beijing’s military modernization program. Many of these systems

will be fielded in military regions near Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous

SRBMs to those already existing in brigades near Taiwan. In addition to key

Taiwanese military and civilian facilities, Chinese missiles will be capable of

Edward Cody, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post, Apr. 12,

2005.

Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2004.

“China Test-Fires New Submarine Launched Missile,” Daily Yomiuri, Japan, June 21,

2005.

Ibid.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 18.

Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2004.

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 18.

CRS-12

targeting U.S. and allied military installations in the region to either deter outside

intervention in a crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail.54

There are numerous unclassified estimates of how many ballistic missiles China

has arrayed against Taiwan, with many of these estimates originating from Taiwanese

government officials. According to DOD55 China has deployed between 650-730

mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs to garrisons opposite Taiwan, with deployments

of these systems increasing by about 100 missiles per year. Although virtually all of

China’s SRBMs are garrisoned opposite Taiwan, they are mobile and can deploy

throughout China to take up firing positions to support other regional contingencies.

Newer versions of these missiles that are being deployed feature improved range and

accuracy and is believed to be exploring how these and other ballistic missiles can

be used for anti-access and sea-denial purposes.

Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. In April 2005, a Taiwanese

intelligence source reported that China would soon begin to deploy a new, subsonic

land-attack cruise missile (LACM).56 This missile is “expected to approximate the

performance and tactical flexibility of the U.S. RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk and will

eventually be fielded in ground, submarine, ship and air-launched versions.”57 This

missile, known as the “Hong Niao” or HN-class LACM comes in three versions with

the HN-2 version having a 1,800 km range from ground or ships and a 1,400 km

range when fired from a submarine.58 It is also believed that this LACM can carry

both nuclear and conventional payloads.59 According to Taiwanese press reports,

China is expected to deploy some 200 additional LACMs - including the new HN

series - within striking distance of Taiwan by the end of 2006.60

Satellite Guidance. China’s participation in the European Union’s (EU)

Galileo satellite navigation system reportedly has some Western defense experts

concerned that China could significantly enhance the accuracy of its ballistic and

cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions.61 The Galileo system is expected to

consist of a network of 30 satellites and ground navigation systems that are intended

to provide a highly accurate navigational system for both civilian and military use

Testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence

Agency to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mar. 17, 2005, on Current and Projected

National Security Threats to the United States.

Information in this section is taken from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual

Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, publically

released on July 19, 2005, pp. 4,12.

Richard Fisher Jr., “China’s New Strategic Cruise Missiles: From the Land, Sea, and Air,

International Strategy and Assessment Center, Washington, June 3, 2005.

Ibid.

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 69.

Ibid., p. 70.

“1,000 Chinese Missiles Near Taiwan by 2006,” Taepi Times, April 24, 2005.

David Lague, “Guiding China’s Missiles: EU Satellite Project Could Improve Accuracy,”

International Herald Tribune, Apr. 19, 2005.

CRS-13

and is expected to enter service in 2008.62 By increasing the accuracy of its missiles,

China would be able to strike more targets with its missile force with significantly

enhanced accuracy and would not have to employ multiple missiles to insure that

each target is sufficiently covered.

North Korea63

North Korea’s ballistic missile program continues to trouble both the United

States and its allies from a variety of perspectives. Despite international pressure and

trade sanctions, North Korea is continuing to increase, diversify, and improve its

missile fleet. In conjunction, North Korea publically declared itself a nuclear power

in 2003 and many analysts believe that its nuclear program is focused on developing

nuclear warheads for both short, medium, and longer-range ballistic missiles. North

Korea is also widely believed to have either acquired or developed chemical and

possibly biological warheads for its ballistic missiles. North Korea has allegedly

exported ballistic missiles and associated technologies to a number of countries and

some analysts suggest that these transfers have advanced the recipient’s missile

programs by many years. Finally, North Korea has conducted a number of missile

test firings during and between negotiations, which many analysts feel were intended

to influence the United States and countries in the region. North Korea’s March

2005 announcement that it was no longer observing a self-imposed moratorium on

long-range missile testing64 has fueled speculation that North Korea may be preparing

to test its longer range missiles.

North Korea’s Missiles. North Korea’s arsenal consists primarily of shorterrange Scuds, and a number of longer range No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles.

North Korea is believed to have approximately 700 Scud C (Hwasong 6) SRBMs

with a 500 km range and some analysts believe that a considerable portion of North

Korea’s estimated 250 tons of chemical and biological agents would be delivered by

these missiles.65 North Korea’s Scud-Cs have sufficient range to strike targets

throughout South Korea. North Korea’s estimated 100, 1,300 km range, No Dong

missiles enable North Korea to strike U.S. military bases in Japan with both

conventional and WMD warheads.66 North Korea launched a version of its Taepo

Dong missile in August 1998 over the Japanese islands, allegedly to put a satellite

into orbit. Since this launch there has been speculation that other Taepo Dong

versions were under development.

Prior to September 9, 2003 — the 55th anniversary of the founding of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — U.S. and international press speculated

Ibid.

For additional information see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile

Threat to the United States.

“North Korea Makes Missile Test Threat,” BBC News, Mar. 3, 2005.

Yihong Chang and James Folely, “Pyongyang Goes for Broke,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, Mar. 1, 2003, p. 8.

Ibid.

CRS-14

that North Korea might display a new, longer-range version of the Taepo Dong

missile, as well as an unnamed intermediate range missile, during military parades

held in Pyongyang. U.S. government officials referred to the allegedly longer-range

version of the Taepo Dong as “Taepo Dong X.”67

According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Taepo Dong X is believed to be

based on the former Soviet Navy SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistic missile that

North Korea may have possibly obtained from Russia between 1992 and 1998.68 An

unnamed congressional source reportedly noted that the Russian Pacific Fleet, which

deployed the SS-N-6, was “desperately disorganized and underfunded” during the

period between 1992 and 1998, suggesting that North Korea might have obtained SSN-6 technology from the Russian Navy or the missile’s designer, the Makeyev

Design Bureau, without the knowledge or approval of the Russian government.

The South Korean press reported on September 8, 2003, that South Korean

intelligence officials had identified what they believed were 10 new intermediate

range ballistic missiles and five launch pads at North Korea’s Mirim Aerodrome.69

South Korean officials also suggested that this new missile had been under

development since the early 1990s and could have a maximum range of 3,600 kms.70

According to the report, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence officials

inferred from the shape of the missile that the new North Korean missiles were based

on the Soviet-designed SS-N-6.71 According to one U.S. press report, unnamed U.S.

officials confirmed the accuracy of South Korean press reports and further elaborated

by stating that the unnamed intermediate range ballistic missile was road mobile72,

making these missiles more difficult to locate and destroy. With the capability to

accommodate a reentry vehicle weighing approximately 1,500 lbs (680 kgs)73 a North

Korean missile derived from the SS-N-6 could conceivably accommodate a heavier

and less sophisticated nuclear weapon — the type which many experts believe North

Korea is capable of producing.

While there appears to be some disagreement in the ranges for the SS-N-6 and

the possible North Korean SS-N-6 variant (3,000 to 3,600 kilometers, depending on

the source) a missile with a 2,500 kilometer range would enable North Korea to

strike U.S. military forces in Japan and Okinawa and with a 3,500 kilometer range

to strike Guam, a U.S. territory with a substantial and growing U.S. military

Bill Gertz,” North Korea to Display New Missiles,” Washington Times, Sept. 9, 2003.

Information in this paragraph is from Sonny Efron, “N. Korea Working on Missile

Accuracy,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 2003.

“North Said to Deploy Longer Range Missiles,” Joong Ang Daily, Sept. 9, 2003.

Ibid.

“North Korea to Display New Missiles,” p. 1.

“R-27/SS-N-6 SERB,” Federation of American Scientists, July 13, 2000, p. 1.

CRS-15

presence.74 If this is the case, such a missile would represent a significant increase

in North Korea’s ability to deliver a nuclear weapon at extended ranges.

Current Assessments. While specifics on North Korea’s missile

development programs continue to be vague, statements by U.S. military officials in

early 2005 suggest that North Korea’s missile programs continue to evolve. U.S.

Army General Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, reportedly stated

in March 2005 that “the regime’s continued development of a three-stage variant of

the Taepo Dong missile, which could be operational within the next decade, could

also provide North Korea with the capability to directly target the United States.”75

General LaPorte also expressed his concerns over North Korea’s medium and

intermediate range missiles and their potential to strike Okinawa, Guam, and possibly

Alaska.76 In open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April

28, 2005, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director, DIA stated in response to questions

on North Korean missile capabilities that North Korea had the capability to arm a

missile with a nuclear device and that a two-stage nuclear missile which could reach

portions of the United States was also within North Korean capabilities.77 Admiral

Jacoby qualified these controversial statements during the hearing, saying that

without flight testing, these attributed capabilities were theoretical in nature.78 These

statements, suggesting that North Korea had achieved a nuclear missile capability,

resulted in a great deal of controversy - reportedly “stunning senators” at the hearing

and eliciting a response from the Pentagon later that day suggesting that Admiral

Jacoby had overstated North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities.79

While most experts agree that North Korea’s ballistic missile program is

progressing, others suggest that the North Korean missile program suffers from a

number of significant problems. Peter Hayes, the Director of the Nautilus Institute

for Security and Sustainability, in Berkeley, California, who specializes in North

Korean nuclear and energy issues, notes that North Korean missiles are unreliable.80

In terms of reliability, he suggests that the combined probability that a North Korean

missile would both take off and then stage as intended was around 49 percent and

that any hostile North Korean launch guaranteed an almost 100 percent retaliatory

Joseph S. Bermudez, North Korea’s Long-Range Missiles, p. 5.

“NK’s Taepodong Missiles Could be Operational by 2015: LaPorte,” Korea Times, Mar.

11, 2005.

Ibid.

Reuters Transcript of Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Defense

Intelligence Budget, Apr. 28, 2005.

Ibid.

Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korean Nuclear Advance is Cited,” Washington

Post, Apr. 29, 2005 and Greg Miller and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Downplays Remarks on N.

Korea’s Arms Ability, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 30, 2005.

Peter Hayes, “Defense Intelligence Agency Says North Korea has Nuclear Armed

Missiles,” Nautilus Organization, May 3, 2005, [http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/

sr/2005/0537AHayes.html].

CRS-16

strike by the United States.81 Hayes also maintains that “the North Koreans are

terrible at systems engineering,” and that each new missile type becomes “a new type

of unknown operating characteristic” suggesting that a North Korean missile attack

might look like an “uncontrolled fireworks display.”82 Although there are a variety

of assessments as to the state and viability of North Korea’s long-range missile

program, some suggest that these missiles serve another purpose. The London-based

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) offers the possibility that North

Korea’s longer range missiles are:

designed more for bargaining leverage and trading for political and economic

benefits than for military use. In a sense, both are probably true - by developing

greater missile capabilities, North Korea can drive up the price for agreeing to

restrain or abandon parts of its missile programme and at the same time be in a

stronger position to test and deploy such systems if negotiations fail.83

Missile Proliferation. North Korea has been called “the world’s most prolific

exporter of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials and technology.”84

Over the past 20 years, North Korea is credited with having sold several hundred

Scuds and NoDong missiles, components, related technologies, and production

facilities, primarily to Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya,

Pakistan, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. These missile sales - possibly

amounting to several hundred million dollars - constituted a significant portion of

North Korea’s hard currency earnings over the years and likely were also exchanged

with Iran for oil and with Pakistan for nuclear technology. There is speculation,

however, that revenues from missile sales have been declining in recent years as

some of North Korea’s traditional customers, Iran for example, have developed an

indigenous missile production capability and others such as Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan,

and the United Arab Emirates have been pressured by Washington to end their

missile-related dealings with North Korea.

A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights? On March 3, 2005,

North Korea announced a end to their 1999 self-imposed moratorium on test firing

long-range missiles.85 On May 1, 2005, North Korea launched a short-ranged

ballistic missile - believed to be an upgraded version of a Soviet-era SS-21 - with a

range of about 75 miles into the Sea of Japan, short of the Japanese coast.86 A similar

test in April 2004 of an SS-21 reportedly failed and South Korean defense experts

Ibid.

North Korea’s Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, International Institute for

Strategic Studies, London, Jan. 2004, p. 83.

Information in this paragraph, unless otherwise footnoted, is taken from North Korea’s

Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies,

London, Jan. 2004, p. 81.

“North Korea Ends Missile-Test Moratorium, Raising Nuclear Stakes,” Agence Francee

Presse, Mar. 3, 2005.

Brian Knowlton, “N. Korea is Said to Test Missile,” International Herald Tribune, May

2, 2005.

CRS-17

speculate the this upgraded SS-21 has the capability to reach south of Seoul where

U.S. military bases are to be relocated.87 While some do not expect that North Korea

will test longer-range ballistic missiles such as 1998’s Taepo Dong missile test over

the island of Japan due to the political fallout, the possibility exists that North Korea

could conduct such a test if they feel that its nuclear or missile program is threatened

by Western pressure.

Figure 1.

“North’s Missile a Modified SS-21,” Joongang Ilbo, May 4, 2005.

CRS-18

Figure 2.

CRS-19

Iran

Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is the focus of significant interest, largely

due to Iran’s resurgent nuclear program.88 Some experts are concerned that Iran may

develop nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that can not only strike targets throughout

the Middle East - Israel, in particular - but also parts of Europe and beyond.89

Iran’s Space Program? On January 5, 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister

reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within the next 18 months.90

Although this deadline has passed without a launch, some U.S. intelligence analysts

remain concerned that such a launch - likely involving a modified Shahab-3 missile would not only elevate Iran’s stature but also serve as a “Trojan Horse” “to help Iran

develop both range and warhead improvements to the already upgraded Shahab-3

under the cover of a civilian space program.91 This upgraded Shabab-3, which was

flight tested three to four times between July and October 2004, reportedly has a

number of modifications that suggest that this missile is being modified to

accommodate a nuclear warhead.92 The upgraded Shahab-3, with a more bulbous

nose and up to 15% more propellant capacity, suggests a reentry vehicle similar to

the Russian SS-9 ICBM.93 Experts also maintain that this new configuration could

facilitate additional modification for the addition of a small solid propellant upper

stage and satellite payload.94 This Shahab version could therefore become a “dualuse” missile, thereby making it more difficult for intelligence analysts to separate

ballistic missile development activities from space launch ones.

Nuclear Warhead Development. Iran is reportedly also developing a

missile reentry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for use in its Shahab

missiles.95 U.S. officials, commenting after former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s

November 17, 2004, disclosure that Iran was developing nuclear warheads for its

missiles, stated that the warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design and

includes the “physics package” - the nuclear weapons components designed to fit

inside of the reentry vehicle.96 The anonymous U.S. officials stated the information

on Iranian warhead development “came from reliable intelligence sources” and not

from Iranian opposition groups that have provided unreliable information in the

For additional information on Iran’s nuclear program see CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s

Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.

For additional information see CRS Report RS21548, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities.

“Iran Plans to Launch Satellite Within 18 Months,” CNN.com, Jan. 6, 2004.

Craig Covault, “Iran’s “Sputnik”,” Aviation Week & space Technology, Nov. 29, 2004,

p. 36.

Ibid.

Bill Gertz, “U.S. Told of Iranian Effort to Create Nuclear Warhead,” Washington Times,

Dec. 2, 2004.

Ibid.

CRS-20

past.97 Another report suggests that Iran is smuggling ceramic matrix composite

(CMC) - a composite graphite material that, in addition to a variety of commercial

uses, is considered ideal for use as heat shields on missile reentry vehicles.98

International CMC trading for use in reentry vehicles and missile warheads is

controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime — a voluntary arrangement

on the export of missiles and associated technologies.99

Solid Propellant Tests. On May 31, 2005, Iran reportedly announced that

it had successfully tested a new solid-fuel motor which could be incorporated into the

upgraded Shahab-3, which is currently based on liquid-fuel technology.100 If these

claims are true, this could represent a significant breakthrough for Iran’s ballistic

missile program. Solid propellant-based missiles, unlike liquid propellant ones, can

be kept in storage for years, require less maintenance, and are generally more reliable

and accurate. In addition, a solid propellant capability is generally considered a prerequisite for developing longer range missiles. The maximum range for a single

stage missile is approximately 2,000 kms and in order to achieve greater ranges, a

two or three stage missile is required. The in-flight separation and ignition of these

additional stages are considered a very complex scientific and engineering processes

and “in order to maintain the accuracy of the missile, it needs to be using solid

fuel.”101

Shahab 4/5? There has been a great deal of speculation surrounding upgraded

versions of the Shahab 3 - the so-called Shahab-4/5. On October 3, 2002, Iranian

Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, the chairman of the Iranian Aerospace Industries

Organization, told journalists that Iran “had no plans to develop long-range missiles

in order to strike the United States, since the U.S. is not one of Iran’s strategic

defense targets and instead had oriented its ballistic missile development against its

principal regional adversary - Israel.”102 Some believe that this statement suggests

that Iran will not pursue specific Shahab-4/5 programs as the upgrdaed Shahab-3 is

capable of striking Israel and regional targets. One expert postulates that Iran’s

previously discussed “improved Shahab-3” might in fact be Iran’s way of developing

more capable, longer range Shahab missiles without hanging politically contentious

Shahab-4 or 5 labels on such programs.103

Ibid.

Tyler Marshall and Sonni Efron, “Iran Said to Smuggle Material for Warheads,” Los

Angeles Times, May 21, 2005.

For additional information see CRS Report RL 31848, Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR) and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile

Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress.

100

Stefan Smith, “Iran Makes Ballistic Missile Breakthrough,” Agence France Presse, May

31, 2005.

101

Ibid.

102

Missile Defense Briefing Report No. 74, American Foreign Policy Council, Oct. 8, 2002,

p. 1.

103

Paul Hughes.

CRS-21

Figure 3.

CRS-22

India104

India has an extensive missile and space program. In addition to antitank,

surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles, it produces SRBMs and is developing MRBMs

and IRBMs. India’s test of nuclear devices in 1998, its possibly arming some

missiles with nuclear warheads, and its long-running conflict with Pakistan over

Kashmir make its missile force a cause of concern. The Prithvi series of liquid fuel

theater missiles includes a 150 km and a 250 km model that are in production and a

350 km model currently in development. The Dhanush is reportedly a naval version

of the Prithvi with a range of 250 km. The Agni I reportedly has a 700 - 750 km

range and is both rail and road-mobile.105 The Agni II, also rail and road-mobile, is

said to have a range of at least 1,500 km, much more range than necessary to reach

all of Pakistan.106 India has long refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

as a non-weapon state, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and is not

a partner of the Missile Technology Control Regime or other multilateral export

control mechanisms. While India claims it needs these strategic weapons to deter

China, many analysts believe that they are a destabilizing factor in South Asia. India

also obtained the lease of a Russian submarine capable of carrying nuclear-capable

cruise missiles with a 300 km range in December 2002.107 This capability will likely

not only further destabilize the region but will also greatly enhance the survivability

of India’s nuclear weapons by providing them with a triad — a land, air, and seabased nuclear weapons delivery capability.

India reportedly tested an Agni I missile on January 9, 2003.108 In September

2003, the Indian government announced that they would create two additional Prithvi

missile groups armed with conventional warheads and an Agni I regiment and an

Agni II regiment which could be armed with nuclear warheads.109 There was also

speculation that India was preparing to test their 3,000 km Agni III missile. The

Indian government reportedly hinted in October 2003 that they would test the Agni

III as early as November 2003110 but government statements later that month

suggested that a test flight would be postponed until 2004 pending the completion of

additional testing.111 In March 2005, it was reported that the first Agni III test fight

was expected by the end of 2005 and some believe that developmental difficulties as

104

See also CRS Report RL32115, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South

Asia.

105

Rose Gordon, “India Conducts Four Missile Tests,” Arms Control Today, Mar. 2003.

106

Ibid.

107

India to Lease Nuclear Sub, Moscow Times, Dec. 3, 2002, p.3.

108

Rose Gordon.

109

“Army Takes its Agni and the Nuclear Age,” Indian Express, Sept. 24, 2003.

110

David C. Isby, “India Prepares to Test 3,000 km-Range Agni III,” Jane’s Missiles and

Rockets, Nov. 1, 2003.

111

“Test Put Off for Agni-III, Brahmos Takes Off,” Financial Times, Oct. 30, 2003.

CRS-23

well as pressure from the United States have caused delays in the test launch.112 India

also successfully test-fired its supersonic, 290 km range, Brahmos cruise missile on

October 30, 2003. 113 India is also testing its Dhanush naval variant, with a reported

test launch in October 2004 from an underwater container simulating a ballistic

missile submarine launch tube.114 India jointly developed the supersonic Brahmos,

which can carry a 200 kg payload, with Russia.115 In December 2004, Russia and

India agreed to build between 360 and 370 missiles annually, with first deliveries

going to the Indian Armed Forces.116 India reportedly also plans to export the

Brahmos.117

Pakistan118

While it says it is not in an arms race with India, Pakistan has reacted to India’s

missile programs with its own and has tested nuclear devices following India’s

nuclear tests. It has received extensive help from China and North Korea in

developing and producing missiles. China also helped Pakistan with the

development of nuclear weapons. The Hatf-2 and 3 are solid fuel SRBMs that are

probably based on the Chinese M-11 and M-9 respectively. The Ghauri-I and

Ghauri-II are reportedly based on (or copies of) North Korea’s Nodong or even its

Taepo Dong-1 missile. The Shaheen/Ghaznavi series are reportedly solid fuel

missiles of uncertain origin. The Pakistani missiles and nuclear weapons are said to

constitute a deterrent force against India’s numerically-superior conventional forces,

but are seen by many as greatly increasing the possibility of nuclear warfare.

Pakistan and India have been characterized by some analysts as having

conducted routine flight tests of their missiles in 2004 - 2005 and in March 2004,

Pakistan made its first flight test of its Shaheen-II missile, a two-stage, solid

propellant missile with a reported range of 2,000 km.119 The Shaheen-II was

reportedly successfully test fired again in March 2005.120

On November 7, 2003, during a meeting in Seoul with South Korean

government officials, Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, reportedly

stated that Pakistan had obtained short-range missiles and technology from North

112

“First Test of India’s Agni III Missile Due this Year,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, Mar. 7, 2005.

113

See “Test Put Off for Agni-III, Brahmos Takes Off” and “India Test Fires Supersonic

BrahMos Missile,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur,” Nov. 9, 2003.

114

“India Tests Naval Missile,” Statesman, Oct. 9, 204.

115

“India Test Fires Supersonic Brahmos Missile.”

116

Rahul Bedi, “Indian Defense Industry,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Feb. 2, 2005, p. 29.

117

Ibid.

118

See also CRS Report RL32115, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South

Asia.

119

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 15.

120

“Pakistan Test Fires Longest Range Missile,” Associated Press, Mar. 20, 2005.

CRS-24

Korea but that Pakistan could now make the missiles itself.121 During the same

meeting, he stated that Pakistan had not traded nuclear technology for missiles and

that there was currently “no interaction with North Korea whatsoever on any defense

related matters.”122 Analysts suggest that this statement may indicate that Pakistan

is now capable of producing Ghauri missiles, considered by many experts to be

copies of the North Korean No Dong, indigenously and that publically severing ties

with North Korea might lessen U.S. pressure regarding Pakistani-North Korean

cooperation. Having publically proclaimed the end to this relationship, Pakistan

would assume considerable risk if they re-initiated missile-related dealings with

North Korea.

Cruise Missiles123

According to the latest published unclassified assessment from the DOD’s

National Air and Space Intelligence Center:

Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles will expand in the next decade.

At least nine countries will be involved in producing these weapons. The

majority of new LACMs will be very accurate, conventionally armed, and

available for export. The high accuracy of many LACMs will allow them

to inflict serious damage on important targets, even when the missiles are

armed only with conventional warheads. U.S. defense systems could be

severely stressed by low-flying stealthy cruise missiles that can

simultaneously attack a target from several directions.124

U.S. vulnerability to cruise missile attack was highlighted during the 2003 Iraq

War. During the conflict, U.S. and Kuwaiti Patriot theater missile defense batteries

intercepted and destroyed all nine Iraqi ballistic missiles launched against the

Coalition but failed to detect or intercept the five HY-2/CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise

missiles launched against Kuwait.125 All the more troubling was the fact that the HY2/CSSC-3 missiles were developed in the 1970s and are considered large and slow

compared to more modern cruise missiles. This demonstrated vulnerability could

further the attractiveness of cruise missiles to countries looking for a means to strike

U.S. targets.

121

“Musharraf Says N Korea Links Over”, BBC News, Nov. 7, 2003.

122

Ibid.

123

For additional information see CRS Report RS21252, Cruise Missile Proliferation.

124

“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence

Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 25.

125

Thomas G. Mahnken, “The Cruise Missile Challenge,” Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, Washington, March 2005, p. 1.

CRS-25

Developmental and Acquisition Efforts.126 As already discussed, China

is developing the HN series of land attack cruise missiles as well as a number of

other anti-ship, and air, ground, submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles. China

is also reportedly developing a ram-jet powered127 cruise missile (FF-1 and YJ-91)

and has sold YJ-1 and YJ-2 missiles to Iran, where these missiles are now being

indigenously produced under license to the Chinese government. It is not

unreasonable to assume that China will export more cruise missiles in the future and

that more countries will, in turn, begin building cruise missiles under license, with

some eventually achieving self-sufficiency in cruise missile production.

India has reportedly purchased the Russian SS-N-27 cruise missile for land,

ship, and submarine use in addition to its joint Brahmos program. There have also

been reports that Taiwan has tested a ramjet powered Hsiung-Feng 3 cruise missile

and that Israel is developing a nuclear armed cruise missile, reports which the Israeli

government denies. France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, South Africa, and the United

Kingdom all have either individual or cooperative land attack cruise missile

programs ongoing and, like the Chinese, some of these advanced missiles could be

exported to other countries, further complicating the security environment.

Implications

Based on reported program progress, it is reasonable to conclude that the

development and acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles continues to remain a

central security goal for a number of countries of concern to the United States. While

shorter-range ballistic missiles are of concern, particularly in terms of their use on the

battlefield, a number of combat proven and developmental ballistic missile defense

systems — such as the U.S. Patriot and the Israeli Arrow — provide a means to

counter these systems. China, a country that has had long-range ballistic missiles and

nuclear warheads for a number of decades, appears to be modernizing and upgrading

its capability, not necessarily to directly rival or surpass the United States but, as

some suggest, as a means to obtain even greater strategic “freedom of action.” Some

speculate that Iran and North Korea — countries with a significant U.S. military

presence near their borders — are attempting to achieve a basic nuclear missile

capability in order to deter U.S. military action. Some believe that these countries

in various stages of nuclear missile development can be deterred from further

progress, either through diplomacy or some form of coercion. Others say that, short

of physical destruction of their programs, countries like North Korea and Iran will

eventually achieve the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to various ranges with

ballistic missiles. Cruise missile programs are far more widespread than ballistic

missile programs, largely due to their relative affordability and the dual use nature

of their technology. While cruise missiles may not be able to deliver significant

payloads over great distances, their stealth and accuracy afford their possessors a

potential asymmetric advantage.

126

Information in this paragraph is taken from Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42,

Jan. 2005, p. 16.

127

Ramjet engines provide increased speed and performance over the more commonly used

turbojet cruise missile engines and are generally lower volume and weight than turbojets,

but ramjet engines are not considered particularly fuel efficient.

CRS-26

In order to address the implications of progressively improving and diversified

ballistic and cruise missile threats, the United States has relied on nonproliferation

and counterproliferation activities in various combinations and in varied degrees of

application. Some analysts contend that past Administrations relied too heavily on

nonproliferation activities (which are considerably less expensive and controversial

than many counterproliferation programs) and blame this imbalance for the current

state of missile proliferation. The current Bush Administration is accused by other

experts as being too heavily skewed in the direction of counterproliferation, as

witnessed by the National Missile Defense Program and the Proliferation Security

Initiative, but still other experts note that much of the emphasis on

counterproliferation is an inevitable result of the events of September 11, 2001.

U.S. Counter and Nonproliferation Policy128

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in

September 2002 calls for “proactive counterproliferation efforts” and “strengthened

nonproliferation efforts” against terrorist and hostile states.129 While missiles are not

singled out in the strategy, they are implicitly part of the Administration’s definition

of WMD. The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction goes into far greater detail on how the threat of WMDs and missiles will

be dealt with.130 This strategy explicitly states that “The United States, our friends

and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to

prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles.” The primary means

by which this goal is to be achieved is through counterproliferation and

nonproliferation activities. The strategy states that “effective interdiction is a critical

part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means.” Another

approach is the widely publicized concept of preemption. While preemption has

been an underlying assumption in previous national security strategies, it has

assumed a prominent role in the current strategy. Some have called for preempting

WMD and missile programs in North Korea and Iran, but the use of eliminating

Iraq’s WMDs as the basis for going to war in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent

revelation that Iraq had previously eliminated these programs, has likely eliminated

preemption from further practical consideration.

In the area of nonproliferation, the strategy calls for the “strengthening of the

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including the support for universal

adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile

Proliferation.” Also part of this strategy is the implementation of bilateral and

multilateral agreements to stop the spread of missile proliferation.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on

May 31, 2003, is an international initiative which focuses on the interdiction of

128

See also CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.

129

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sept. 2002, p. 14.

130

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2002.

CRS-27

shipment of WMD and associated delivery systems and technology.131 More than 60

countries currently support the PSI and while details surrounding its implementation

are few — largely attributed to intelligence and security considerations — U.S.

Secretary of State Rice noted that the PSI was responsible for stopping 11 WMDrelated transfers since 2004 - although it is unclear how many of these transfers were

missile-related.

On June 29, 2005, President Bush issued an unclassified Executive Order titled

“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their

Supporters”132 intended to freeze assets of individuals or companies in the United

States that are doing business with entities in Iran, North Korea, an Syria suspected

to be involved in WMD proliferation. The Executive Order Annex contains the

name of eight companies and freezes their U.S. assets and prohibits U.S. citizens or

companies from conducting business transactions with them.

While there appears to be little emphasis placed on the MTCR and Code of

Conduct by the Administration, the PSI and moves to freeze assets of companies

involved in WMD proliferation suggest that the Administration is embarking on a

more aggressive form of nonproliferation. While some may consider these moves

confrontational and, in the case of the PSI, somewhat questionable from a legal

perspective, others suggest that traditional treaties and agreements — which generally

are not subscribed to by nations of concern — have done little to deter more

aggressive countries such as North Korea and Iran from advancing their missile

programs.

131

For additional information see CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI).

132

See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050629.html].

CRS-28

Appendix 1. Ballistic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Inventory133

(See Footnote 3 on page CRS-2 for abbreviations - blank spaces indicate data unknown)

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

300

1,000

Liquid

Status

REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Armenia

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

Belarus

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

<50

300

1,000

Liquid

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

<100

120

482

Solid

SS-25 Sickle

ICBM

10,500

1,000

Solid

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

<50

300

1,000

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

<50

120

482

Solid

SS-18 Satan

ICBM

11,000

8,800

Liquid

SS-1, SS-1C Scud

Mod 2

SRBM

>250

300+

1,000

Liquid

SS-11 Sego

ICBM

13,000/ 10,600

1,100

Liquid

All

Deactivated

SS-13 Savage

ICBM

9,400

1,800

Solid

All Deactivated

SS-17 Spanker

ICBM

10,000

400

Liquid

All Deactivated

Kazakhstan

Russia

133

All moved to

Russia

All Deactivated

Information from this chart is taken from the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace Missile Chart,

[http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm] , March 4, 2004 and Cruise Missiles: Potential Delivery

Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. Government Publication, April 2000, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005.

CRS-29

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

SS-18 Satan

ICBM

186

9,000/

11,000

8,800

Liquid

24 Deactivated

SS-19 Stiletto

ICBM

170

10,000

43,500

Liquid

3 Deactivated

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

>200

120

482

Solid

SS-24 Scalpel

ICBM

10,000

40,500

Solid

Modernized w/

one warhead

SS-25 Sickle

ICBM

360

10,500

1,000

Solid

In Service, One

Warhead

SS-27 Topol M

ICBM

~10

10,500

Solid

Modified SS25, former SSX-29, In

Production

AS-2 Kipper

ALCM

120

1,000

Turbojet

AS-3 Kangaroo

ALCM

650

2,300

Turbojet

AS-15 Kent (Kh65SE/Kh-101)

ALCM

600/3,000

410/150

Turbofan

AS-19 Koala

ALCM

4000

875?

Alfa

Supersoni

c CM

600

SS-N-6 Serb

SLBM

3,000

680

Liquid

All Removed

from Subs

SS-N-8 Sawfly

SLBM

208

7,800/

9,100

3,600

Liquid

All Removed

from Subs

SS-N-17 Snipe

SLBM

3,900

1,135

Solid

12 Deactivated

782

Motors

Status

Two Versions

Development

Terminated

Development

CRS-30

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

SS-N-18 Stingray

SLBM

208

6,500/

8,000

1,315

Liquid

SS-N-20 Sturgeon

SLBM

120

8,300

2,270

Solid

SS-N-21 Sampson

SLCM

3,000

150

Turbofan

SS-N-23 Skiff

SLBM

8,300

1,360

Liquid

SS-N-24 Scorpion

SLCM

Turkmenistan

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

<50

100+

300

Ukraine

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

<100

100+

SS-19 Stiletto

ICBM

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

<100

SS-24 Scalpel

ICBM

AS-15 Kent

ALCM

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

SS-23 Spider

SRBM

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

SS-23 Spider

SRBM

SSBS S3D

IRBM

S45/S5

IRBM

112

4,000

Motors

Status

All Removed

from Subs

Turbofan

Canceled

1,000

Liquid

Possible

300

1,000

Liquid

10,000

43,500

Liquid

120

482

Solid

10,000

40,500

Solid

46 Deactivated

600/3,000

410/150

Turbofan

Reported Sent

to Russia

300

1,00

500

450

300

1,000

70/120

482

500

450

3,500

60 Being

Dismantled

EUROPE

Bulgaria

Czech

Republic

France

4,500+

Solid

Scrapped

Solid

18 Deactivated

Sept 1996

Canceled

CRS-31

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Hades

SRBM

500

480

M-20/M-4

SLBM

3,000/

5,000

Solid

In Service

M-45 (variant of M4)

SLBM

5,000

Solid

In Service

M-51

SLBM

8,000

Solid

Development

Apache/

Apache AI

ALCM

140/

250-400

520/

400

Turbojet

In Service

SCALP (formerly

Super Apache)

500-800

400

ASMP

300

Rkt/

Ramjet

In Service

ASLP

1,300

Rkt/

Ramjet

Development

Dual Role

300

145

Turbojet

Development

350

500

Turbojet

In Dev. with

Sweden

160

1,670

Solid

In Service

300

1,000

Teseo Mk3

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

In Storage

Development

Germany

Taurus (KEPD-350)

Greece

ATACMS

SRBM

Hungary

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

Italy

Teseo

Dual Role

300+

160

Turbojet

Development,

Stealth Otomat

Netherlands

ATACMS

SRBM

160

1,670

Solid

In Service

Destroyed or

Transferred

CRS-32

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

300

1,000

Liquid

Transferred

300

1,000

Liquid

Storage

Poland

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

Romania

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

Serbia

K-15 Krajina

(perhaps modified

SA-2)

SRBM

150

Slovakia

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

300

1,000

SS-21 Scarab

SRBM

<50

70/120

482

SS-23 Spider

SRBM

<50

500

Alada

200+

500

Turbojet

Proposed

Capricornio

MRBM

1300

500

Solid

Postponed in

1994,

Reportedly an

SLV

Turkey

ATACMS

SRBM

160+

1,670

Solid

In Service

United

Kingdom

Trident D-5, UGM

133

SLBM

12,000

Nuclear

Solid

3 Boats In

Service

Tomahawk BGM109

SLCM

1,600

320

Solid

Storm Shadow

250-400

400

Turbojet

Spain

CHINA

120

500-2,000

In Service

CRS-33

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

CSS-2 (DF-3/3A)

MRBM

6-10

14-18

2,790 +

2,150

Liquid

In Service

CSS-3 (DF-4)

ICBM

10-14

20-24

5,470+

2,200

Liquid

In Service

CSS-4 (DF-5/5A)

ICBM

8,460+

3,200

Liquid

In Service

CSS-5 (DF-21)

MRBM

34-38

19-23

1,770+

600

Solid

In Service

CSS-N-3 (JL-1)

SLBM

10-14

1,770+

600

Solid

In Service

CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)

SRBM

70-80

230-240

600

500

Solid

In Service

CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11)

SRBM

100-120

420-460

300

500

Solid

In Service

CSS-8 (M-7/8610)

SRBM

150

190

Solid

In Service

DF-25

MRBM

1,700

2,000

Solid

May be 2

stages of DF31

DF-31/JL-2

ICBM/

SLBM

8,00011,840

700

Solid

Development

DF-41

ICBM

12,000

800

Solid

Development

Xiong Ying ?

LACM

1,500-2,000

Turbofan

Development

Status

unknown

REST OF THE WORLD

Afghanistan

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

Algeria

SS-1 Scud-B

Argentina

Brazil

<50

300

1,000

Liquid

SRBM

300

1,000

Liquid

Alacran

SRBM

200

500

Solid

MB/EE-150

SRBM

150

500

Solid

Terminated

SS-300

SRBM

300

1,000

Solid

Terminated

CRS-34

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

SS-600

SRBM

600

500

Solid

Terminated

Congo, Dem.

Rep. Of

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

300

1,000

Liquid

Possibly

Received from

Iran

Egypt

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Scud derivative

(Project T)

SRBM

450

Liquid

In Service?

Scud-C

SRBM

500

Liquid

Vector (Condor II)

SRBM

800-1,000

Solid

Possibly in

Development

Prithvi-150

SRBM

Prithvi-250

India

<50

100+

700

150

800-1,000

Liquid

In Service

SRBM

250

500-750

Liquid

In Production

Prithvi-350

SRBM

350

750-1,000

Liquid

Development

Dhanush- Naval

Prithvi

SLBM

250

Liquid

Development

Agni

MRBM

1,400- 2,500

1,000

Solid/

Liquid

Development/

Tested

Agni II

IRBM

3,000

1,000

Agni III

IRBM

3,5005,000

Development

Surya

MRBMICBM

2,000-5,000

Development

CRS-35

Designation

Iran

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

300

500

Solid

Development

150

190

Solid

In Service

Solid

Possible

Sagarika

SLCM or

SLBM

CSS-8 (M-7/8610)

SRBM

CSS-6 (M-9)

SRBM

600

500

CSS-7 (M-11) variant

SRBM

300

500

Mushak-120 (Iran130, Nazeat)

SRBM

130

500 or 190

Solid

In Service

Mushak-160

SRBM

160

190

Solid

In Service

Mushak-200

SRBM

200

500

Solid

Development

Solid

Development

with Chinese

help

Liquid

Tested 2004

Similar to

Nodong

<50

200

NP-110

170

Possible

Development

Shahab-3/Nodong

Variant

MRBM

1,300-1,500

750

Shahab-4

MRBM

2,000-2,500

(or 4,000)

1000

Shahab-5

ICBM

10,000

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

<50

200+

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Iran 7000 (Scud-C

variant)

SRBM

<50

100+

600/

700

500

Liquid

In Service

Zelzal (Earthquake) 1

SRBM

Solid

In Production

100-150

Possibly in

Development

Possibly in

Development

CRS-36

Designation

Israel

Korea, North

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

Zelzal 2

SRBM

350-400

Solid

In Production

Zelzal 3

MRBM

1,000-1,500

Solid

Development

Two unnamed

programs

ICBM?

5,500/

10,000

750

Jericho 1 (YA-1)

SRBM

~50

500

750

Solid

In Service

Jericho 2 (YA-3)

MRBM

~100

1,500

1,000

Solid

In Service

Jericho 3 (extended

range)

MRBM/

IRBM/

ICBM

2,000-4,80011,500

1,000

Solid/

liquid

Development

Popeye Turbo

ASM

350

895

Turbojet

Delilah

Derivative (Star-1)

ALCM

400

450

Turbojet

Development

Modular Stand-Off

Vehicle

ALCM

100

675

None

Development

Scud-B variant

SRBM

100+

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Scud-C

SRBM

100+

500

700

Liquid

In Service

Nodong

MRBM

1,000-1300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Taepo Dong-1

MRBM

1,500- 2,000

1,000

Liquid

Used with solid

fuel third stage

in satellite

launch attempt

8/31/98

Taepo Dong-2

IRBM

4,0006,000

Liquid?

Development

Development,

Unconfirmed

CRS-37

Designation

Korea, South

Pakistan

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

SS-N-6 Variant

MRBM/

IRBM

<10

3,000 - 3,600

680

Taepo Dong X

ICBM

NHK-1 (Baekgom)

SRBM

180

300

NHK-A (Hyon Mu)

SRBM

180

300

NHK Extended

Range

SRBM

300

ATACMS

SRBM

Hatf-1

Motors

Liquid

Status

Development

Possibly in

Development

w/ SS-N-6 as

first stage

111

Solid

In Service

Tested at

reduced range

160

1,670

Solid

Rocket

80-100

500

Solid

In Service

Hatf-2

SRBM

280

500

Solid

Development

Hatf-3 (Possibly the

Tarmuk, a version of

M-9)

SRBM

750-800

500

Solid

Indian press

reports M-9type project

M-11 (CSS-7/DF11)

SRBM

300

500

Solid

Missiles or

parts and

factory from

China. May be

basis for Hatf-2

40?

CRS-38

Designation

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

Ghauri (or Mk III or

HATF-V)

MRBM

1,000-1,500

600 or 700

Liquid

Development

with China and

North Korea;

similar to

Nodong;

Ghauri II (or HATFVI

MRBM

1,500-2,300

700

Liquid

Development

Shaheen I (HATF-4)

SRBM

600-700

320

Solid

Development

Shaheen II/

Ghaznavi/

Ghazni

MRBM

2,0003,000

Solid?

Development

May be related

to NK Taepo

Dong Tested in

2004-2005

Abdali

MRBM

2,500

Saudi Arabia

CSS-2 (DF-3)

MRBM

South Africa

Arniston

MRBM

4+/0?

Torgos (MultiPurpose Standoff

Weapon)

LACM

SS-21

SRBM

36+

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

100s

Scud-C

SRBM

50+

Syria

~50

Development

2,400/

2,800

2,150

Liquid

Possibly not

operational

1,450

1,000

Solid

Suspended

Turbojet

Development

482

Solid

In Service

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

600

500

Liquid

In Service

300

Designation

Taiwan

Type

Launchers

Missiles

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Motors

Status

Hsiung Feng-3

300

Ching Feng (Green

Bee)

SRBM

130

400

Tien Chi (Sky

Halberd)

SRBM

300

500

SSM version of

Sky Bow II

SAM. Tested

2/97

Tien Ma (Sky Horse)

SRBM

600-1,000

500

Development

United Arab

Emirates

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

300

1,000

Black Shahine

(Version of Apache)

ALCM

140-300

520

Vietnam

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

<50

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Yemen

SS-21

SRBM

<50

24?

482

Solid

In Service

SS-1 Scud-B

SRBM

<50

18?

300

1,000

Liquid

In Service

Development

Liquid

In Service

Bought From

Matra Bae

Dynamics

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