Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress

Congressional research reportNov 30, 1999

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Order Code RL30379

Missile Defense Options for Japan,

South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the

Defense Department Report to Congress

November 30, 1999

name redacted

Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy

name redacted

Specialist in National Security Policy

name redacted

Research Associate

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

ABSTRACT

This report reviews the unclassified 1999 Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress

on U.S. theater missile defense systems that could protect, and could be transferred to,

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It summarizes the DoD report and, for clarification, some

of its unstated assumptions. It further analyzes policy implications of the report’s findings

and assumptions, and outlines U.S. options for missile defense in East Asia. Because the

DoD report is unclassified, written on a tight time deadline, and limited in scope, it does not

address certain key issues that are raised and discussed here. The ability of these systems

to defend against all missile threats remains questionable, and it is not clear what would be

required to link three separate systems for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan into a regional

system. DoD was not asked to address political, strategic, or economic issues, but this CRS

Report identifies several such issues that emerge as possible topics for further congressional

examination. For more information on related legislation, see CRS Issue Brief IB98028,

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. This CRS Report will not be updated.

Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and

Taiwan: A Review of the

Defense Department Report to Congress

Summary

The FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) required the

Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems that could protect, and

could be transferred to, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Secretary was directed

to describe these missile defense systems and the factors used in the study in separate

classified and unclassified reports to Congress. In May 1999, the Department of

Defense (DoD) transmitted the unclassified report which provides a discussion of

five missile defense systems that are currently being developed by the United States

and could be provided to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: systems similar

to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3, Navy Area Defense (NAD), Theater High Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD), and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Phase I with Standard Missile-3

Block I, and Phase II with Standard Missile-3 Block II. The report weighed various

combinations of these systems, stating what number of missile defense units “could

reasonably be expected to provide area coverage ... against a limited attack....”

DoD’s analysis of the individual characteristics and limitations of the five systems

showed they would provide different results for different areas. For Japan, an option

like NTW Block II proved best. The differing geography of South Korea and the

threat it faces indicated a combination of THAAD-like and PAC-3-like systems

would be most effective. According to the DoD report, Taiwan could be protected

by one system similar to THAAD, NTW Block I, or NTW Block II. However,

Taiwan’s defense may well require a combination of lower-tier systems like PAC-3

or NAD and upper-tier systems like NTW (Block I or II) or THAAD for layered

defenses.

Information in the DoD report was constrained because it was unclassified, the

reporting requirement was narrow, and DoD had relatively little time to complete the

study. The DoD report focuses on the TMD requirements for coverage of particular

areas, considering the minimum number of firing units needed for maximum

coverage. It therefore remains unclear how well these U.S. TMD systems would

protect East Asia against the missiles of North Korea and China. For instance, the

report does not explain the net capabilities of the defense systems against fast

missiles, low-flying missiles, a large number of missiles, missiles carrying weapons

of mass destruction (WMD), or missiles with penetration aids, multiple warheads,

or submunitions. Some of these issues relate to the different perspectives among

foreign leaders, as well as U.S. citizens, as to the technical distinctions between

strategic missiles and theater missiles, and between national missile defense and

theater missile defense. It was also beyond the scope of report requirements to

evaluate the international political, strategic and tactical military, or foreign and

domestic economic advisability of transferring particular missile defense units to

Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan. In a context broader than that presented by the DoD

report, there are issues and options concerning alternative ways in which the United

States could provide missile defense to East Asia. For instance, it could unilaterally

deploy TMD systems with U.S. troops in Asia; sell TMD systems to one or more

parties; or co-develop and co-produce TMD or NMD systems with one or more allies

or friends.

Contents

Overview of the Department of Defense Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Legislative Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Summary of the DoD Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Analysis of the DoD Report and Issues

Beyond Its Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

TMD System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What Are Limited Ballistic Missile Attacks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Key Issues Regarding the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Ballistic Missile Threat and Asian Counter Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Capabilities and Limitations of U.S. TMD Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Three TMD Systems Versus a Regional Missile Defense System . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. Missile Defense Systems That Were Not Evaluated . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

How Are the Examples Different From U.S. TMD Systems? . . . . . . . . . . . 11

How Would U.S.-Deployed TMD Contribute to Asian Defense? . . . . . . . . 11

What Territory Would Be Considered Protected? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

How Would TMD Affect the Regional Military Balance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

How Do TMD Options Suggested Compare to Other Options? . . . . . . . . . 12

Assessment of DoD Report for Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Missile Threats to Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Japanese Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Assessment of DoD Report for Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Missile Threat to the Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Republic of Korea Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Assessment of DoD Report for Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Missile Threats to Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Scale of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Scope of Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Wide Range of Possible Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Taiwan’s Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

DoD Report’s Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Alternative Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Limits to Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Political Considerations and U.S. Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Arguments Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Arguments in Favor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

U.S. Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

U.S. Considerations in Cooperative Missile Defense Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

U.S. Options for Missile Defense in East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

List of Tables

Table 1. “Threat Missile” Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Table 2. Other Missiles in the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

This analysis was originally prepared at the request of the Honorable Frank H.

Murkowski, and is being reprinted by CRS for general congressional distribution

with his permission.

Missile Defense Options for Japan, South

Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the

Defense Department Report to Congress

Overview of the Department of Defense Report

Legislative Requirement

The FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act1 required the Secretary of

Defense to study the U.S. theater missile defense systems that could protect, and

could be transferred to, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Secretary was directed

to describe these missile defense systems and the factors used in the study in separate

classified and unclassified reports to Congress. In February 1999, Congress received

the classified report, and in May it received the unclassified2 report. The following

Congressional Research Service report reviews the Department of Defense (DoD)

unclassified report to Congress, summarizing key information and unstated

assumptions upon which the report is based, analyzing policy implications, and

outlining U.S. options for missile defense cooperation in East Asia.

The text of the legislative reporting requirement follows:

SEC. 1533. REPORT ON REQUIREMENTS FOR RESPONSE TO

INCREASED MISSILE THREAT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the architecture

requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense

system in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to protect key

regional allies of the United States.

(b) Report.--(1) Not later than January 1, 1999, the Secretary shall submit to the

Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee

on Armed Services of the Senate a report containing-(A) the results of the study conducted under subsection (a);

(B) the factors used to obtain such results; and

or under development that could be transferred to key allies of the United States in

the Asia-Pacific region to provide for their self-defense against limited ballistic

missile attacks.

(2) The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

P.L. 105-261, H.R. 3616, signed into law on October 17, 1998.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture

Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, May 1999, 15 pp. (The unclassified report.)

CRS-2

In addition, the conference report on H.R. 3616 (H.Rept. 105-736) said for the

purposes of this requirement, the term “key regional allies” refers to Japan, the

Republic of Korea, and Taiwan.

Summary of the DoD Report

The unclassified DoD report provides a discussion of five missile defense

systems that are currently being developed by the United States and could be

provided to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: systems similar to the U.S.

Patriot PAC-3, Navy Area Defense (NAD), Theater High Altitude Area Defense

(THAAD), and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Phase I with Standard Missile-3 Block

I, and Phase II with Standard Missile-3 Block II. For Japan, South Korea, and

Taiwan, the report lists a number of options, with each option stating what number

of missile defense units of which type “could reasonably be expected to provide area

coverage for each defended area against a limited attack by the different types of

TBMs likely to be arrayed against it.”3 In describing their technical methodology, the

authors of the report state:

The report quantifies the architecture force structure needed to provide

coverage against specific theater ballistic missile threats to most of the

territories for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This defense also provides

protection of the critical assets identified by the U.S. intelligence

community.4

The report stressed that potential recipients would also need a source of early

warning such as “a combination of overhead surveillance and long range phased

array early warning radars,” and a communication system.

To determine the number of TMD units needed by each country, DoD used the

following methodology:

chose potential launch sites of various types of theater ballistic

missiles

overlaid a grid on the map of each defended territory

estimated the required TMD systems and deployed them on the map

portrayed the ability of threatening missiles to strike each grid of

defended territory

determined if deployed TMD systems could intercept missiles and

protect grids

repeated the process to achieve the greatest defended area with

fewest TMD units.

Report, p. 5.

Ibid.

CRS-3

Department of Defense officials point out that:

the options discussed in the report are “illustrative architectures

based on each country’s unique political and threat environment,”

the report “is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of TMD

in the region,”

the report “does not suggest or imply a region-wide architecture

network,”

the report “does not advocate/recommend deployment of any

specific TMD architecture.”

“Because the focus of this study is possible TMD architecture, it

does not address their feasibility or desirability from political,

economic, or other security perspectives.”5

Analysis of the DoD Report and Issues

Beyond Its Scope

The following sections analyze and discuss the general approach and

assumptions of the DoD report and particular aspects of the report that apply to

Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. In the process, this paper raises some

issues important to Asian missile defense that were considered to be beyond the

scope of the DoD report. This paper will then discuss TMD options for each of the

three potential recipients, discuss implications of the DoD findings, review additional

issues for U.S. cooperation in regional TMD, and list options that are available to

the United States.

TMD System Requirements

The DoD report provides a useful analysis of the types and numbers of TMD

systems that would be required to cover the areas of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

It demonstrates that the unique geographic characteristics of the three and the threats

posed against them lead to different TMD requirements. It also points out some of

the limitations of the TMD systems that were considered. The limited nature of the

reporting requirement, the short time allowed, the security classification of specific

characteristics and capabilities of the TMD systems, the political sensitivity of

regional missile defense cooperation, and other factors prevented DoD from

discussing some other related issues.

What Are Limited Ballistic Missile Attacks?

The term “limited ballistic missile attacks” is ambiguous as to the nature and

scope of the limitations. In the debate on national missile defense, the term is used

with reference to unauthorized or accidental attacks by a major power, or attacks of

the type and scale considered possible for new missile powers. Such attacks would

The Report and, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and East Asia TMD, Briefing for

Congressional Research Service, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, March 18, 1999.

CRS-4

presumably consist of fewer than 200 warheads and might not include sophisticated

penetration aids.

The DoD report does not use this meaning of the term but considers limited

missile attacks against Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to be attacks by a few (less

than five) missiles with ranges and speeds less than those of ICBMs (i.e., with ranges

and speeds of tactical or theater ballistic missiles).6 The DoD report considers theater

ballistic missiles to be those with ranges less than 3,500 km (2,170 mi). For this

report, DoD also limits the threat to missiles with conventional warheads – not

nuclear, biological, or chemical. Conventional warheads are often much larger and

heavier than warheads designed to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If

the Defense Department had included missiles armed with nuclear warheads, for

instance, some missiles would have had longer ranges and faster speeds and would

have been more difficult to intercept with a TMD system.

The report also does not consider missiles with penetration aids,

countermeasures, or altered trajectories, all of which would have decreased the

effectiveness of the TMD options presented. There are clearly benefits, but also

risks, of designing a system to defend against such a limited ballistic missile attack

but not against a more robust attack. Some analysts consider this limited threat more

plausible than some more sophisticated options. (The nature of the threat is

discussed further in the country sections of this report.) The extent to which the

attack is limited is key to findings of effectiveness of the missile defenses considered,

so it is important for all policy makers to agree on the meaning of the term “limited

ballistic missile attacks.”

Key Issues Regarding the Threat. Several aspects of the future missile

threat have received only limited attention in public reporting, and the DoD report

does fill these gaps:

What types of missiles, with what characteristics, are likely to

threaten Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the year 2008?

How many missiles might be launched against Japan, South Korea,

or Taiwan simultaneously? At what rate will potentially hostile

countries be able to launch missiles and how long are they likely to

be able to sustain missile attacks? These factors are important

because missile defense systems are limited on the number of

hostile missiles they can engage at once and over time.

Will the missile systems of potentially hostile countries have

penetration aids, such as chaff, decoys, infrared emitters, jamming

equipment, multiple reentry vehicles, or submunitions?

What warheads will the hostile missiles likely deliver?

Could North Korea use IRBMs and ICBMs on a high (lofted)

trajectory against South Korea or Japan in order to achieve higher

speed reentry, or on a fast and low trajectory, that TMD systems may

not be able to intercept?

BMDO interview.

CRS-5

Will North Korea be able to produce reentry vehicles and warheads

that can withstand the forces and temperatures of high-speed reentry

or extensive flight within the atmosphere? What testing would

North Korea require to have confidence in such reentry vehicles or

warheads?

How effective will allied missile forces and other forces be in

deterring missile attacks?

The Ballistic Missile Threat and Asian Counter Forces

The table below shows the ballistic missiles of North Korea and China that DoD

considered to be potential threats in the analysis of TMD requirements for Japan,

South Korea, and Taiwan. These North Korean and Chinese short range ballistic

missiles (SRBMs) and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) are limited in the

ways discussed in the previous section.7

Table 1. “Threat Missile” Inventory

Type

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Status

Scud-B variant

SRBM

300

1,000

In Service

Scud-C

SRBM

500

700

In Service

Nodong

MRBM

1,000-1300

1,000

In Service

Taep’o-dong-1

Two stage

MRBM

1,500- 2,000

1,000

Tested with

solid fuel third

stage on 8/31/98

CSS-5

(DF-21)

MRBM

1,800

Conventional

In Service

CSS-6

(DF-15/M-9)

SRBM

600

500

In Service

CSS-7

(DF-11/M-11)

SRBM

300

500

CSS-8

(M-7/8610)

SRBM

180

190

In Service

NORTH KOREA

CHINA

SRBM = Short-range ballistic missile, 70-1000 km (43-620 mi.)

MRBM = Medium-range ballistic missile, 1001-3000 km (621-1860 mi.)

CRS analysts compiled the table based on unclassified reports of the government, public

media, and institutional data bases.

CRS-6

North Korea, China, and Russia currently have other missiles in their

inventories or in development that are capable of reaching Japan, South Korea, or

Taiwan. Also because it will be several years before the United States, Japan, South

Korea, and Taiwan can deploy effective missile defenses, it is important to predict

the missile capabilities of potentially hostile countries several years from now. The

characteristics of other deployed missiles and missiles in development that were not

addressed in the DoD report are described in Table 2. Intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles are included in this

listing even though TMD systems have little or no capability to defend against them.

(This point is discussed later.) Surface-to-surface missiles deployed or being

developed by South Korea and Taiwan are listed because of their possible use as

deterrent or counterforce. U.S., British, and French missiles are excluded from the

chart.

Table 2. Other Missiles in the Region

Type

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Status

IRBM

4,0006,000

In Development

CSS-2 (DF3/3A)

MRBM

2650/

2800

2,150

In Service

CSS-3 (DF4)

ICBM

5,500

2,200

In Service

CSS-4 (DF5/5A)

ICBM

12,000/

13,000

3,200

In Service

CSS-5 (DF21)

MRBM

2,500

600

Nuclear

In Service

CSS-N-3

(JL-1)

SLBM

1,700

600

In Development

DF-31/JL-2

ICBM/

SLBM

8,000

700

In Development;

Tested 8/2/99

DF-41

ICBM

12,000

800

In Development

SS-1 Scud

SRBM

300+

1,000

In Service

SS-19

Stiletto

ICBM

10,000

43,500

3 Deactivated

SS-21

Scarab

SRBM

120

482

In Service

SS-24

Scalpel

ICBM

10,000

40,500

Modernized w/

one warhead

NORTH KOREA

Taep’odong-2

Two stage

CHINA

RUSSIA

CRS-7

Type

Range (km)

Payload (kg)

Status

SS-25

Sickle

ICBM

10,500

1,000

In Service, One

Warhead

SS-27 Topol

ICBM

10,500

In Production

SS-N-20

Sturgeon

SLBM

8,300

2,270

In Service

SS-N-23

Skiff

SLBM

8,300

1,360

In Service

NHK-1

SRBM

180/250?

300

In Service

NHK-A

(Hyon Mu)

SRBM

300-665

300

In Development

ATACMS

SRBM

160

1670

Ordered

Ching Feng

(Green Bee)

SRBM

130

400

In Service

Tien Chi

(Sky

Halberd)

SRBM

300

500

SSM version of

Sky Bow II SAM.

Tested 2/97

Tien Ma

(Sky Horse)

SRBM

600-950

500

In Development

SOUTH KOREA

TAIWAN

MRBM = Medium-range ballistic missile, 1001-3000 km (621-1860 mi.)

IRBM = Intermediate-range ballistic missile, 3001-5500 km (1861-3410 mi.)

ICBM = Intercontinental ballistic missile, 5501+ km (3411 + mi.)

SLBM = Submarine launched ballistic missile

Capabilities and Limitations of U.S. TMD Systems

The DoD report describes some of the characteristics of the various TMD

systems and their ability to cover the terrain with some degree of protection. It is

constrained by its unclassified status, limited time, and international political

sensitivities, and therefore does not describe the detailed capabilities of the missile

defense systems it considers for use by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. A reader

cannot determine how well the illustrative TMD systems would defend the potential

recipients, because the DoD report does not indicate:

what specific missiles each TMD system is expected to be capable

of defeating, nor generally what types of missiles with what speeds,

ranges, trajectories, warheads, and penetration aids;

where the TMD units would be located, especially the ship

positions;

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what precise geographic area each TMD system is capable of

defending;

how many incoming missiles each system could track and defeat at

one time;

how quickly the system can be reloaded;

how secure each system is from enemy attack and countermeasures;

what percent of incoming missiles is likely to be defeated by the

TMD systems described or, asked another way, what the probability

is that all incoming missiles would be defeated.

The report and other DoD sources indicate NTW can intercept only those

missiles flying at more than 100 km altitude and that THAAD can intercept only

those missiles flying at altitudes of at least 40 km. Using a maximum range

trajectory, ballistic missiles with a range of 300 km or less will have a maximum

altitude well below 100 km; using a depressed trajectory (described at pages 11 and

12) short and medium range missiles may be able to reach some targets without

exceeding a maximum altitude of 40 km. Therefore it may be possible for some

theater ballistic missiles to fly under the coverage of the upper tier systems if they do

not have to fly long distances in the relatively heavy atmosphere. However, if North

Korea or China were to depress the trajectory of SRBMs or MRBMs, they would

have to redesign the guidance and control systems, the structural components, and

the reentry vehicle.8 As discussed elsewhere, TMD systems also have a very limited

capability against fast, long-range missiles (such as ICBMs).

There are differing views on the issues of saturation and exhaustion of TMD

systems. Many analysts have raised concerns about the large inventories of missiles

and missile launchers being accumulated by North Korea and China, as well as

several Middle Eastern countries. They argue that a simultaneous attack by scores

of missiles on a relatively small target area could overwhelm (saturate) allied missile

defenses and that over time, the supply of defensive missiles could be exhausted in

attempting to intercept all the incoming missiles. Some calculations by DoD refute

this contention: a multiple-layer missile defense, using a series of upper tier TMDs

(in a shoot, look, shoot engagement) and a salvo of lower tier TMDs, would

minimize the enemy’s ability to destroy a target, even if it launched a large number

of missiles simultaneously. Therefore, an attacking force would require a very large

number of missiles and launchers to mount an effective missile attack and may well

be deterred from doing so by the presence of an effective missile defense system.

Enemy decoys and countermeasures could increase the number of interceptors

required for an adequate defense. Offensive and defensive missile systems will

continue to evolve and the balance between them will be difficult to judge, at least

until the specific systems have been produced and tested in a realistic combat

environment.

According to DoD officials, the guidance system would have to be altered to set the missile

on a depressed course and the missile body and reentry vehicle would have to be altered to

withstand greater forces and heat generated while traveling in the atmosphere.

CRS-9

Three TMD Systems Versus a Regional Missile Defense

System

The legislation called for a study of “a theater ballistic missile defense system

in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to protect key regional allies

of the United States.” The requirement could have been interpreted to call for a study

of a single integrated regional TMD system. DoD officials have stated they did not

“suggest or imply a region-wide architecture network.”9 For several reasons the DoD

report considered separate systems for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. According to the

report, the study was “based on the unique political and military threat environment

confronting each one.” (p. 4) Also, if DoD had discussed an integrated regional

program, it would have risked damaging U.S., Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese

relations with China, while at the same time raising extensive technical and political

issues involved in making the various command, control, and communication

systems interoperable.

Japan, Korea, and Taiwan apparently have no plans to cooperate with each other

in developing or acquiring missile defense systems; indeed they have little

cooperation in any area of national security. In August 1999, Japan and Korea

conducted their first combined naval exercise. But the lack of current cooperation

would not necessarily preclude the United States from transferring some TMD assets

to each recipient, then integrating them with U.S. early warning satellites and radars,

communications, battle management, and firing units to establish a missile defense

system that could span the region.10 However, it would be political necessary for

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to agree to this integration. The United States

already shares early warning data with Japan, but it is unclear that Japan could

currently apply it to a TMD system.

In summary, the development of a regional system would raise a number of

political and economic issues, as well as military and technical issues, but might

produce more effective and efficient missile defense than would the three separate

systems. Additional resources might be required to form a regional TMD network,

or savings might be achieved by sharing certain systems and capabilities when

integrating three separate systems into a regional system. Many of these issues are

beyond the scope of the study requirement and the DoD Report but are raised in the

three sections of this report on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and in the section

on U.S. Considerations in Cooperative Missile Defense. In its future deliberations,

it will be important for Congress to know if there are fundamental problems that

render a regional missile defense infeasible, impractical, or unaffordable, as well as

if there are significant benefits of regional cooperation.

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, “Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and East Asia

TMD Briefing for Congressional Research Service,” March 18, 1999.

Some transfers might be prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

or the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty or constrained by other factors.

CRS-10

U.S. Missile Defense Systems That Were Not Evaluated

While section 1533(a) of the reporting requirement calls for “a study of the

architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic

missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to

protect key regional allies of the United States,” section 1533(b)(1)(C) states the

report shall include: “a description of any United States missile defense system

currently deployed or under development that could be transferred to key allies of the

United States in the Asia-Pacific region to provide for their self-defense against

limited ballistic missile attacks.” Based on its reading of the legislative

requirement, DoD studied only U.S. theater missile defense systems and, therefore,

limited its discussion to systems similar to five primary U.S. TMD weapon

programs: PAC-3, NAD, THAAD, NTW Phase I and NTW Phase II. Because

section 1533(b)(1)(C) refers to any U.S. missile defense system, some may suggest

that additional U.S. missile defense systems and programs should be considered, such

as Airborne Laser (ABL). However, according to DoD, the ABL or Space-based

Laser (SBL) systems are not being considered for transfer out of the United States,

and for that reason and because of time constraints were not included in the study.

Because the legislation calls for a study of any U.S. missile defense system to

provide key allies with a defense against limited ballistic missile attacks, it may

have been appropriate to consider systems that would protect Japan, Republic of

Korea, and Taiwan against all classes of missiles rather than just some classes of

missiles. Because the territories are relatively small and relatively close to the likely

attacking countries, some may have assumed that theater missile defense systems are

effectively national missile defense systems and would protect these countries

against all or most ballistic missile attacks. Japanese, Chinese, and Russian officials

have indicated confusion over the terms or over the capabilities of TMD systems.11

Actually, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan could be attacked by intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as by intermediate-range, medium-range, and

short-range ballistic missiles. TMD systems generally are not considered effective

against ICBMs because of the speed of the attacking missiles. The United States

plans not to test its TMD systems against targets traveling faster than 5 km/sec or

with ranges greater than 3,500 km, so will not be confident of their effectiveness

against ICBMs.12 (See page 14 for further discussion.) When the U.S. national

missile defense (NMD) system is developed, it may have the technology that, if

transferred or extended, could protect Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan against all

limited missile attacks. Not only does the DoD report exclude discussion of certain

missile defense systems (ABL and NMD), it also does not discuss the vulnerability

Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Numata said, “the Americans call it theater missile

defense (TMD). We call it ballistic missile defense (BMD). There is a difference there in

the sense that the United States tends to think of it in theater-wide terms, whereas we think

of it purely in the context of the defense of Japan for the purpose of self-defense.” March

2, 1999. Chinese and Russian officials have complained that TMD systems in Asia may

degrade their strategic deterrence or violate the ABM Treaty.

Many analysts contend that NTW with additional sensors for early warning and longrange tracking would be able to intercept ICBMs.

CRS-11

of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to attack by high-speed missiles such as ICBMs,

after the hypothetical acquisition of the TMD systems discussed.

How Are the Examples Different From U.S. TMD Systems?

The report indicates the illustrative TMD systems are similar to U.S. systems

under development, but it does not say how they might differ from U.S. systems.

DoD officials explained that they used the illustrative systems in the unclassified

report because the precise characteristics and capabilities of the TMD systems are

classified and because of the little time that was available to coordinate the report

throughout DoD. They also stated the characteristics of the illustrative systems were

relatively close to those of the systems being developed by the United States and that

differences did not have a profound effect on the results of the study.

How Would U.S.-Deployed TMD Contribute to Asian Defense?

Any TMD systems the United States deploys now or in the future with its

ground, sea, and air forces in Asia and the Pacific are likely to contribute to missile

defense of the region. U.S. TMD systems deployed in or near Japan, South Korea,

and Taiwan could provide them some missile defense, and the TMD systems they

acquire could contribute to the defense of U.S. forces. Whether one is studying a

region-wide system or three separate systems, the effects of relevant U.S. missile

defense systems fit the context of discussion.

What Territory Would Be Considered Protected?

The DoD report describes the TMD systems required to protect Japan, South

Korea, and Taiwan but does not clarify what territory would be protected. The report

and DoD briefing materials imply that the study refers to TMD systems that would

protect the four largest islands of Japan, but not necessarily the entire Ryukyu

Archipelago, Sakishima-gunto (the archipelago that stretches almost to Taiwan),

Senkaku Islands, Iwo Jima (Io To), or the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands. The systems

discussed for the defense of Taiwan apparently do not protect the islands off the

Chinese mainland – particularly Quemoy and Matsu that are within artillery range of

the mainland. The systems described for South Korea may or may not protect the

islands Cheju Do or Ullung Do, and, according to the report, would not protect Seoul

from all North Korean missiles. If all the territories of the three countries are

included, the coverage of South Korea’s and Taiwan’s TMD systems would probably

overlap with Japan’s and might benefit from coordination through a regional TMD

system.

How Would TMD Affect the Regional Military Balance?

Although TMD systems are inherently defensive, they can also affect a regional

military balance by reducing the effectiveness of other countries’ deterrent and

offensive combat capabilities. The TMD systems may also provide missile

technology and command, control, communication, and battle management

technology that the recipients could apply to their offensive capabilities. An

imbalance could lead to an arms race including missiles, missile defenses, WMD,

CRS-12

and advanced conventional weapons. China and North Korea are particularly

concerned that regional TMD and U.S. NMD will threaten their security systems.

Russia is also concerned about the effect of a U.S. NMD on its strategic forces.

Therefore, some U.S. analysts think missile defense can be destabilizing. Some

analysts suggest that by encouraging Japan and South Korea to acquire missile

defense systems to counter North Korean missiles, the United States is undercutting

its own efforts to persuade Pyongyang to relinquish its long range missiles. Regional

TMD efforts, according to these analysts, send signals of containment and military

supremacy, while U.S. diplomatic efforts are trying to draw North Korea into normal

relations. Others insist TMD will deter or defeat missile attacks and are therefore

stabilizing. Other countries, in their view, should not be offended by our defenses.

Such factors were not within the scope of the DoD report but may be of interest to

Congress as it considers the advisability of supporting regional TMD programs.

How Do TMD Options Suggested Compare to Other Options?

The five missile defense options discussed in the mandated DoD report address

only one aspect of missile defense: active defense. DoD has defined TMD as

comprised of four operational pillars: active defense, passive defense, attack

operations, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

(C4I) (essential for any of the other pillars).13 Although it is beyond the scope of the

legislative requirement for the DoD report, the limitations of not having all aspects

of missile defense discussed in a single report are worth noting. Similarly, the

missile defense options were not presented in the broader context of policies to

counter WMD and missiles. These broader policies might include detecting and

monitoring, preventing proliferation, deterring deployment and use, defending

against WMD, and reducing world WMD inventories.

Assessment of DoD Report for Japan

The Missile Threats to Japan

North Korea, China, and Russia have the capability to attack Japan with ballistic

missiles. Tokyo’s immediate interest in TMD is based on the threat from North

Korea.14 North Korea’s Nodong 1 MRBM with a range of 1,000-1,300 km (620-800

mi.) could reach most of Japan and the two-stage Taep’o-dong 1 MRBM with a range

of 1,500-2,000 km (900-1,200 mi.) could reach all of Japan. On August 31, 1998,

North Korea fired a three-stage rocket (apparently a Taep’o-dong 1 with a solid-fuel

third stage) over Japan ostensibly in a failed attempt to launch a satellite. If it is

ultimately successful, the three-stage rocket might have a range of more than 5,000

DoD, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense,” Joint Pub 3-01.5, February 22, 1996.

In response to North Korea’s August 31, 1998 ballistic missile shot over Japan, Sadaaki

Numata, spokesman for Japan’s Foreign Ministry said: “We are seriously concerned about

this because the deployment of missiles by North Korea does affect Japanese security and

it also affects peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” New York Times, September 1, 1998.

CRS-13

km (3,100 mi.).15 North Korea is also reportedly developing a two-stage Taep’odong 2 with a range of 4,000-6,000 km (2,500-3,700 mi.) and might extend its range

by adding a third stage. North Korea reportedly is developing, or has developed,

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that it may be able to deliver with its

ballistic missiles.

The extensive ballistic missile inventory of the People’s Republic of China, too,

is a potential threat to Japan. Officially, the Japanese leadership has not made any

public statements suggesting any connection between China’s ballistic missiles and

Tokyo’s current interests in TMD.16 However, a security specialist with the Institute

of International Policy Studies in Tokyo believes that “North Korea provides a good

excuse [for TMD], but as a matter of fact the primary target is China.”17 China has

two medium-range ballistic missiles that can hit Japan: the CSS-2 with a range of

2,800 km and the CSS-5 with a range of 1,800 km (conventional warhead) or 2,500

(nuclear). China’s CSS-3 (5,500 km) and CSS-4 (12,000/13,000 km) ICBMs could

also reach Japan, and the PRC continues to improve its missile force with the

development of at least one new mobile ICBM (DF-31), submarine launched

missiles, and new cruise missiles. China has nuclear and chemical weapons and

probably has biological weapons. It is known to have nuclear warheads for its

strategic missiles.

China could attack Japan with ICBMs which may fly too fast for the proposed

TMD systems to intercept reliably. Also, it is possible that North Korea could

modify the trajectory of its missiles to increase their effectiveness against a missile

defense system in Japan. Conceivably, North Korea could launch a three-stage

Taep’o-dong 1 or a Taep’o-dong 2 on a very steep (lofted) trajectory to a high

altitude, so that it would enter Japanese airspace at such a high speed (over 5 km/sec)

that planned TMD systems could not reliably intercept it.18 On a lower (depressed)

trajectory, Taep’o-dong missiles could theoretically attack Japan at a very high

velocity while spending less time above 100 kilometers of altitude where they might

be vulnerable to NTW. A depressed trajectory could deliver a missile from North

CBS Evening News, CBS Worldwide Inc., [http://www.wusatv9.com], Sept. 15, 1998;

New York Times, September 15, 1999.

For example, in the annual Defense of Japan white paper 1998, by the Japanese Defense

Agency, under the section detailing number and types of ballistic missiles that China has,

no mention is given assessing the implications to Japanese security of the existing Chinese

ballistic missile systems, though it is pointed out that the missile force is growing and

qualitative improvements are being made.

“The Concept: An Asian Missile Shield,” Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1999, p. 12.

Spring, Baker. “Successful Missile Defense Test Shows Technology Works,” The

Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, no. 608, June 18. Mr. Baker contends that

neither THAAD nor NTW is capable of downing a Taepo’-dong 1 missile because of its

speed. He estimated it had a maximum speed of 7-8 km/sec in the August 1998 launching.

U.S. TMD systems have not been and are not planned to be tested against targets that travel

over 5 km/sec. The Taepo’-dong 2 will probably have a greater maximum speed. But with

sufficient early warning and cueing sensors, NTW might be able to intercept ICBMs with

speeds over 5 km/sec, as many analysts have suggested NTW be used for national missile

defense.

CRS-14

Korea to Japan very quickly, reducing the time available to locate and identify the

attacking missile, obtain authorization to fire the interceptor, and to destroy the

attacking missile.19 However, it is questionable whether North Korea or China will

have built missiles, reentry vehicles, or warheads able to withstand the heat and stress

of traveling through the atmosphere for the longer periods required by a depressed

trajectory. The additional weight of material to strengthen the missile components

and protect them from heat could require a smaller warhead or greater thrust. But

that additional weight should not be a problem for Taep’o-dong missiles that have

enough thrust to send them far beyond Japan. A depressed trajectory also reduces

accuracy.20

The stress and heat generated in a depressed trajectory, and the possibility of the

reentry vehicle colliding with rocket stages and shrouds jettisoned in the atmosphere,

might be reduced by a “shaped trajectory,” i.e., one that differs substantially from a

ballistic trajectory. In this trajectory, a missile ascends on a steep path, then turns

“when outside the atmosphere to fly more nearly parallel to the earth’s surface,”

discards used stages in space, and reenters the atmosphere at a selected angle of

descent.21 North Korea or China might in the future be able to defeat proposed

theater missile defense systems by modifying the speed, flight time, and altitude of

missile attacks. Although these modifications are theoretically possible, and some

scientists contend the United States and Russia could accomplish them, there is no

publicly available information to indicate China or North Korea will attempt to or

will be able to modify their missiles in these ways.

Russia maintains a sizeable missile force consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and

cruise missiles that could strike Japan. The missile defense system Japan is

contemplating and the systems discussed in the DoD report do not appear to respond

to the threat of Russian missiles nor would they be well suited to defend against such

a threat.

The DoD report does not specify what penetration aids and countermeasures are

likely to be associated with North Korean, Chinese, or Russian missiles that may

threaten Japan. The effectiveness of missile defenses may be degraded by decoys

(including balloons), chaff, submunitions, spin-stabilized reentry vehicles (RVs), RV

reorientation, radar absorbing material (stealth), modified trajectories, distracting

heat sources, or electronic countermeasures including jammers. The use of multiple

launchings or multiple warheads could have a similar effect by requiring the defense

to acquire, track, and engage more weapons at one time.22 The unclassified version

CRS Report 90-329 F, Fast-Trajectory Strategic Ballistic Missiles: Characteristics,

Military Uses, and Implications, by Jonathan Medalia, July 10, 1990.

Gronlund, Lisbeth and David C. Wright. “Depressed Trajectory SLBMs: A Technical

Evaluation and Arms Control Possibilities,” Science & Global Security, v. 3, 1992, pp. 101160.

Ibid., pp. 9-10.

The DoD report states, “there was insufficient time to examine the effects of suppression

of TBMD systems by a potential aggressor, robustness against maximum aggressor raid

(continued...)

CRS-15

of the 1999 national intelligence estimate on the ballistic missile threat reported that,

“Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are

willing to sell the requisite technologies.” It also judged that countries such as North

Korea, Iran, and Iraq that are developing long-range missiles, could develop such

countermeasures “by the time they flight test their missiles.”23

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems

The DoD report concluded the best missile defense option of those considered

to defend Japan against North Korean Nodong or Taep’o-dong 1 missiles would be

a shipboard NTW Block II-like system. “One ship position is sufficient to provide

full national coverage.” (p. 8) This system would be able to fire twice (shoot-lookshoot) at North Korean missiles directed at the central portion of Japan. On the

other hand, four ship positions would be required for an NTW Block I-like system

to “provide nearly complete coverage of Japan with substantial shoot-look-shoot

opportunities over much of Japanese territory.” (p. 8)

The report also analyzed two land-based systems based on PAC-3 and THAAD.

It found that more than 100 PAC-3-like systems (augmented by a THAAD-like radar)

would be required for a country-wide defense of Japan with this system. The report

explained the purpose of examining the PAC-3 system “was simply to demonstrate

the large number of fire units that would be required to accomplish a ballistic missile

defense for Japan.” (p. 8) Six THAAD-like systems, or four THAAD-like systems

with three additional THAAD-like radars would be required to cover all, or nearly

all, of Japan.

The report did not indicate how many Navy Area Defense-like ships would be

required to provide lower-tier protection of Japan, although it did evaluate this

system for lower-tier protection of South Korea and Taiwan. Probably because of

NAD’s limited ability to provide protection for inland facilities and population

centers, it was not discussed for Japan’s defense against Nodong and Taep’o-dong

missiles.

The report does not comment on the ability of any of these missile defense

systems to defend against a North Korean Taep’o-dong 1 with a third stage, Taep’odong 2, Chinese MRBMs with ranges greater than 2,000 km, or Chinese or Russian

ICBMs. In keeping with the ABM Treaty demarcation agreement, the United States

will not test its TMD systems against targets with the speed of a strategic missile

(over 5 km/sec.), so it would not be safe to assume the TMD systems would be

effective against these missiles. There was also no indication in the report that Japan

would enhance the capability of the U.S. systems or test them against faster missiles.

(However, on page 5, the DoD report said a source of early warning, such as

overhead surveillance and long-range phased-array early-warning radar is essential

(...continued)

sizes, or countermeasures which could be employed on theater ballistic missiles (TBMs).”

(P. 4)

U.S. National Intelligence Council. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic

Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.” September 1999, p. 14.

CRS-16

for effective TMD.) It would thus appear that the missile defenses analyzed in the

DoD report were not considered as a reliable defense against these faster, longerrange missiles. But, if passed, the Realistic Tests for Realistic Threats National

Security Act of 1999,24 would require DoD to test NTW and THAAD “against target

missiles with velocities not less than the maximum velocity of the Taepo Dong I

missile of North Korea.” The bill also calls on DoD to review changes to the

configuration of NTW and THAAD to increase the interceptor speed beyond three

kilometers per second and to allow the interceptors to use a wide variety of sensors.

TMD systems, or at least upper tier TMD systems, would presumably be able

to protect against Chinese MRBMs — CSS-5 (1,800 or 2,500 km) and CSS-2 (2,800

km) – fired on a standard trajectory without extensive or sophisticated penetration

aides. But, more TMD ship positions or land-based firing units and radars than

envisioned in the DoD architecture options would be required to defend against these

Chinese missiles and against future Chinese SLBMs because they could be fired at

relatively high speeds from a wide range of locations in China, whereas missiles

launched in North Korea, “would come from a concise attack area.” (p. 7)

The report does not comment on the capability of the various TMD systems to

overcome modified trajectories and penetration aids (discussed on page 12 above).25

Depending on the expected capabilities of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian

missiles, any missile defense system that is to be able to defend Japan must be able

to overcome some or all of these countermeasures.

Japanese Considerations26

The Japanese have long been intent on maintaining a close security relationship

with the United States, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

signed in 1960. More recently, Japan has become interested in supplementing its

own self-defense forces with missile defense systems, primarily to counter the North

Korean missile threat. In August 1999, the United States and Japan signed an

agreement to conduct joint research on four components of the NTW system: nose

cone, 2nd stage propulsion, sensor, and kinetic warhead.27 Japan had committed

approximately $8 million to fund their first year of this joint effort and the Japan

Defense Agency submitted a preliminary budget request of almost $20 million for

the second year.28 According to DoD officials, the Japanese technological

contribution could be significant.

H.R. 2596, introduced by Mr. Vitter on July 22, 1999.

DoD noted this omission was due to insufficient time.

The DoD report stated, “Because the focus of this study is possible TMD architecture, it

does not address their feasibility or desirability from political, economic, or other security

perspectives. A detailed discussion of these important facets of the issue is outside the

mandate and scope of this paper.”

BMDO and “Japan Missile Defense Tops R&D Funding List,” Defense News, March 22,

1999, p. 14.

Usui, Naoki. “Japan Aims to Boost Ballistic Missile Research Funds,” Defense News,

September 20, 1999, p. 24.

CRS-17

The Japanese are well aware that China objects to the missile defense

cooperative program because it signals stronger U.S.-Japan military ties, may portend

increased Japanese militarization, might degrade China’s capability to project power

through missile attacks, and China is particularly concerned that the Japanese missile

defense system might cover Taiwan. While Japan does not wish to antagonize

China, it has apparently concluded it needs a system that is effective against North

Korean missiles, which would also be effective against some of China’s missiles.

Japanese leaders have also been constrained by Article Nine of the country’s

Constitution that renounces war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling

international disputes. Japan has traditionally eschewed offensive weapons and

foreign deployments. It has also avoided security relationships (including missile

defense) with its Asian neighbors and might be reluctant to deploy its missile

defenses in a way that would contribute to another country’s defense or that would

intrude into the territorial waters or airspace of another country. Also, Japan is

apparently not currently considering defense systems like the Airborne Laser (ABL)

or an equivalent to the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD), partly because they

could be construed as offensive or strategic systems. (However, as mentioned above,

the Japanese do not consider the proposed systems to be theater missile defense, but

missile defense of the country.) But Japan may be able to adopt somewhat more

aggressive missile defense measures (such as ABL, Space-Based Laser, or boostphase intercept) if it approves legislation currently under consideration that would

allow pre-emptive strikes against another nation when the threat of attack is

imminent.29

Japanese missile defense cooperation with its Asian neighbors might also be

restricted by the Three Principles of Arms Exports and related guidelines which

prohibit arms exports to communist countries, countries under a UN embargo, or

countries involved in, or likely to be involved in, armed conflict. Arms transfers to

other countries are restrained “in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution and

the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.”30

Japan’s preference for NTW over THAAD, which may employ space-based

sensors, is reportedly partially based on the country’s policy against the military use

of space. The DoD report acknowledges that some form of early warning and long

distance tracking, which could be space-based, would be required for an effective

TMD. It would probably need equipment and data in addition to the early warning

the United States has been sharing with Japan since 1996. Japan is developing an

indigenous Information Gathering Satellite System and is acquiring some U.S.

technology for the system.

Financial Times, “LDP debates military strikes strategy,” February 22, 1999, pg. 1. In

March 1999, the Japanese Prime Minister’s deputy press secretary said, “it is legally

possible for Japan to exercise the right of self-defense and attack bases of an enemy even

when Japan has not yet suffered any realistic damage.” Reuters, March 9, 1999.

Anthony, Ian (ed.). Arms Export Regulations. SIPRI., Oxford University Press, 1991, p.

106. Guidelines were first established in 1960, expanded in 1962, proclaimed as the Three

Principles in 1967, elaborated in 1976, and interpreted as they apply to the United States in

1983.

CRS-18

Cost is another important factor to the Japanese government. Acquisition and

operation of a comprehensive and effective missile defense system would be a large

and controversial expense for Japan’s Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces.

Additionally, Japanese industry has become leery of joint development projects and

sharing its commercially-useful technology, even though the Japanese government

wants the benefits of advanced U.S. military technology, and Japanese industry wants

the financial and technological gains that can be associated with defense contracts.

THAAD would also occupy much more land – a scarce resource in Japan – and

would offer less opportunity for Japanese participation in system development than

would NTW.

Assessment of DoD Report for Republic of Korea

Missile Threat to the Republic of Korea

The DoD report used only the North Korean short range ballistic missile

capability to represent the threat to the Republic of Korea, while excluding the

potential threat from Chinese and Russian missiles.31 North Korea has hundreds of

domestically-produced Scud-B variants (100 and 300 km range) and Scud-C (500

km) missiles that could deliver high explosive or chemical warheads or, possibly,

biological warheads.32 Pyongyang is believed to have sufficient fissile material for

one or two atomic weapons and may possibly have produced such weapons.33 North

Korea also manufactures the Nodong MRBM and has tested the Taep’o-dong 1

MRBM, neither of which was considered. The DoD report said that because of the

relatively small size of South Korea (380 km north-to-south and 260 km east-towest), “the ranges of the ballistic missiles that can be used are restricted.”

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems

Five TMD options were examined by DoD and discussed in its report. The best

option included four THAAD-like systems and seven PAC-3-like systems. This

combination would provide coverage of “all of the country beyond the immediate

reach of very short-range ballistic missiles.”34

The critical feature for the coverage achieved by this architecture is the minimum

intercept altitude for the endo-exo upper tier [THAAD] system. Able to intercept

TBMs flying to an apogee as low as 40 kilometers, the endo-exo upper tier

system could reach most of the threatening trajectories. The lower tier [PAC-3]

system would be used to protect Seoul and its environs. ...

The report describes “the architecture requirements for the defense of the ROK against

North Korean missiles....” (P. 10)

U.S. Department of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 8.

Unless North Korea has received extensive assistance from another country that has

developed and tested nuclear weapons, it is doubtful it has a reliable nuclear warhead for

its missiles.

DoD Report, p. 11, and TMD briefing by BMDO.

CRS-19

In the case of the THAAD-like... system, the high endo minimum intercept

altitude would preclude engagements for threats attacking the northern portions

of the ROK.35

This appears to indicate that THAAD-like systems could intercept North Korean

SCUD-Bs and Cs that climb above 40 km, and that PAC-3-like systems deployed

around Seoul might intercept some SCUDs that do not reach 40 km altitude.

Apparently not covered by the THAAD/PAC-3 combination are very short-range

North Korean missiles (perhaps FROGs and other battlefield rockets, as well as very

short-range SCUDs) deployed near the DMZ. The very short flight time is another

factor that makes it difficult to intercept missiles fired at Seoul from close range.

Even some North Korean artillery is within range of Seoul (just 40 kilometer/24

miles from the border with North Korea). As noted, SCUD, Nodong, and Taep’odong missiles fired with a modified trajectory may exceed the capabilities of PAC-3

and THAAD.

Less effective options discussed in the report included:

! 25 PAC-3-like units to “cover the assets identified as critical,”

! 11 NA-like ships to provide protection to coastal areas,

! 1 NTW-Block I-like ship and 25 PAC-3-like units,

! 1 NTW-Block II-like ship and 19 PAC-3-like units.

The report notes that a larger deployment of PAC-3s would allow coverage of

more of South Korea than just the identified critical assets. The Navy Area Defenselike systems “could not reach far enough inland to defend all critical assets and

population centers against all threat trajectories,” and the NTW-like system “could

not defend the northern two-thirds of the ROK against low-flying short-range

TBMs...most North Korean threats....”36

The report does not comment on the capability of the various TMD options to

overcome modified trajectories and penetration aids, such as decoys, chaff,

submunitions, multiple-simultaneous launchings, and electronic countermeasures.37

Depending on the expected capabilities of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian

missiles, any missile defense system that is to be able to defend South Korea may

have to overcome some or all of these countermeasures.

Republic of Korea Considerations

South Korea officials are quite concerned by the North Korea missile threat, and

maintain a close military alliance with the United States while they work cautiously

toward reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Since 1979, the U.S. Army has

maintained one Patriot surface-to-air missile battalion at air bases south of Seoul to

protect key U.S. and South Korean fighter aircraft capabilities. Korean officials

considered, but were not initially anxious to purchase or participate in U. S. missile

Ibid, pp. 11, 12.

Ibid.

DoD noted this omission was due to insufficient time.

CRS-20

defense systems. But in early November 1999, DoD announced that South Korea

had initiated competition for a missile defense system, the SAM-X program. The

system is planned to be able to intercept aircraft at a distance of 60 km and missiles

at a distance of 20 km. It will be able to track four targets at once. Raytheon will

probably compete with a proposed system of 14 PAC-3 fire units (armed with PAC-2

Guidance Enhanced Missiles) at an estimated cost of $4.2 billion. A follow-on

system, the medium-range surface-to-air missile or M-SAM, is to have a 100 km

range.38

North Korea’s strident opposition to South Korean missile defense was

apparently not a significant factor in Seoul’s initial reluctance. Missile defenses were

not the top priority of the ROK military, partly because of their inability to guarantee

the safety of Seoul and adjacent military units. Also, the Asian financial crisis

reduced funds even for higher priority military programs. ROK officials considered

acquisition of the Russian S-300 theater missile defense system, which it might have

been able to obtain in exchange for relief of Russian debt to the country. The United

States strongly urged South Korea not to acquire the Russian system that would not

be compatible with U.S. military equipment. Seoul also considered the development

of its own missile force to deter a North Korean missile attack. ROK officials are

currently negotiating to release Seoul from its 1979 agreement with the United States

not to develop a missile with a range greater than 180 km. South Korea would prefer

to join the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime and be allowed to

produce missiles with ranges of 300 km or more.

Assessment of DoD Report for Taiwan

Missile Threats to Taiwan

Scale of Attacks. The missile threat posed by the People’s Republic of China

(PRC) to Taiwan is wide-ranging, uncertain, and expanding. As the DoD report

pointed out, Taiwan faces an “evolving threat” from “multiple directions.” (p. 14)

Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles

(MRBMs) could be launched from many areas in the large territory of the PRC.

Moreover, the DoD report noted that the PRC has a range of options, including:

limited firings of 1-3 missiles, medium-scale firings of several missiles at Taiwan’s

military targets, and large-scale firings against many targets. However, the DoD

analysis considered only attacks of a few (less than five) SRBMs or shorter range

MRBMs.39 At the same time though, the DoD report warned of a PRC missile

buildup, saying that the threats faced by Taiwan from PRC short- and medium-range

ballistic missiles “are expected to increase significantly over the next several years.”

Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 29,1999, p. 17; Inside Missile Defense, Nov. 17, 1999,

p. 3.

Interview with DoD.

CRS-21

Scope of Threat. Apparently due to the legislative requirement that the

Pentagon study architecture options for TMD systems to protect Japan, South Korea,

and Taiwan, the DoD report limited its discussion to theater ballistic missiles (less

than 3,500 km in range). However, the ballistic missiles available to the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) cover a wider range, including ICBMs with much longer

range and higher speed.40 (See the table below.) The PRC has also worked on

developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that could also pose an

additional threat to Taiwan. The DoD report did not specify the PRC ballistic

missiles that could threaten Taiwan except to imply that shorter-range missiles in this

context have a range of less than 300 km (190 mi) and longer-range missiles have a

range of about 3,000 km (1,860 mi) (p. 14). However, the DoD analysis considered

some SRBMs and MRBMs (i.e., conventionally-armed CSS-5s) with ranges of 1,800

km or less.

Wide Range of Possible Threats. The PLA has at least three classes of

SRBMs that could be used against Taiwan. The PRC launched the 600 km (380 mi)range M-9 (PRC designation), or CSS-6 (U.S. designation), SRBMs into waters near

Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. There are reportedly up to 50 launchers for the M-9,

although the number of missiles can be much larger than the number of launchers,

because launchers can be used repeatedly.41 The M-11, or CSS-7, is an SRBM with

a range of about 300 km (190 mi), sufficient to fly over the Taiwan Strait (about 100

miles wide). Like other newer PRC missiles, it can be fired from a mobile

transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, there are questions about the status of

the M-11 missile and whether a new version with a range of over 300 km will be

available. The Secretary of Defense’s February 1999 report on Taiwan security

reported that the M-11 “has not yet entered the PLA’s inventory; and an improved,

longer range version may be under development.”42 The report also warned of a PRC

missile build-up, saying that “within the next several years, the size of China’s

SRBM force is expected to grow substantially.” Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said in

February 1999 that the PRC has more than 100 M-class missiles in storage that could

target Taiwan.43 According to news reports in early 1999, citing a classified

Pentagon report, China increased its SRBM deployment on the coast across from

Taiwan from 30-50 in 1995-1996 to 150-200 SRBMs (including M-9s, and possibly

M-11s). Moreover, the PLA plans to increase its number of SRBMs to 650 by

2005.44 The PLA also has M-7 (CSS-8) SRBMs that were derived from HQ-2

For details and sources, see CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by

(name redacted) and (name redacted). See also, U.S. Air Force, National Air Intelligence

Center (NAIC), “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” April 1999.

NAIC.

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress

Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1, 1999.

“Citing Threat of Chinese Missiles, Taipei Calls Defense Inadequate,” Reuters, February

11, 1999.

Walker, Tony and Stephen Fidler, “China Builds Up Taiwan Missiles,” Financial Times,

February 10, 1999; Bill Gertz, “China Moves Missiles In Direction of Taiwan,” Washington

Times, February 11, 1999.

CRS-22

surface-to-air missiles. The CSS-8 has a short range of only about 180 km (90 mi),

sufficient to cross the strait and hit targets in western Taiwan in about two minutes.45

PRC

Designatio

U.S.

Designatio

SRBM

DF-15/

M-9

CSS-6

600/500

<50 mobile TEL

SRBM

DF-11/

M-11

CSS-7

300/500

? mobile TEL

SRBM

8610/

M-7

CSS-8

180/190

? mobile

launcher

MRBM

DF-3A

CSS-2

2,800/2,150

<50 land-mobile

MRBM

DF-21

CSS-5

1,800/ ?

Conventional

<50 mobile TEL

MRBM

DF-21

CSS-5

2,500/600

Nuclear

? mobile TEL

ICBM

DF-4

CSS-3

5,500/2,200

<25 silos and landmobile

ICBM

DF-5A

CSS-4

13,000/3,200

<25 silos

Type

Range (km)/

Warhead (kg)

Launchers*

Launch

platform

*Each launcher may launch more than one missile.

There are also at least two classes of Chinese MRBMs that could be used

against Taiwan. The older DF-3A (CSS-2) MRBMs, with up to 50 launchers, have

a range of approximately 2,800 km (1,700 mi). The newer, solid-fuel DF-21 (CSS-5)

MRBMs, armed with conventional warheads, travel about 1,800 km (1,100 mi), with

up to 50 launchers deployed.46 Another version of the CSS-5, with a 2,500 km range,

is believed to be armed with a lighter nuclear warhead, but the DoD report did not

consider this nonconventional missile to be targeted at Taiwan. These longer-range,

faster MRBMs would have been a greater challenge for the Taiwan TMD system and

may have required a more robust architecture.

While the DoD report did not discuss the threats from Chinese ICBMs, there are

also at least two classes of Chinese ICBMs that potentially could threaten Taiwan,

although they are believed to be deployed for strategic nuclear deterrence. The DF-4

(CSS-3) ICBM has a limited range of about 5,500 km (3,400 mi), and the DF-5A

(CSS-4) has a range of about 13,000 km (8,000 mi). While these ranges are longer

than needed to reach Taiwan, they can be changed depending on the amount of fuel,

Stokes, Mark A., “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National

Security,” Paper for the Project for the New American Century, April 23, 1999.

NAIC.

CRS-23

the weight of the warhead, and the trajectory, including potentially a very high flight

path (lofted trajectory).

In addition, the PRC has been developing more modern ICBMs, including the

DF-31 that was test-launched on August 2, 1999, and SLBMs, including the JL-1

with a range of about 1,700 km (1,000 mi). Twelve JL-1s are intended to be

deployed on the PLA’s one XIA class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

(SSBN), but the missile apparently has not yet been successfully deployed.47 A

follow-on JL-2 SLBM is also reportedly under development for deployment on

planned 094 SSBNs.

The trajectories and speed of the PRC’s ballistic missiles would affect defenses

against them. The DoD report provided some details on these questions. It said that

the SRBMs and MRBMs threatening Taiwan have apogees “outside the atmosphere”

and that “the medium range missile also has a re-entry speed likely to preclude a high

probability of intercept by lower-tier systems.”48 However, according to another part

of the DoD report and DoD sources, if China deployed and fired ballistic missiles

with shorter ranges (less than 300 km), these missiles could “remain inside the

atmosphere for the entire trajectory” and fly beneath the coverage of exoatmospheric, upper-tier TMD systems (such as NTW).49 Depressed trajectories of

ballistic missiles could reduce the effectiveness of, or possibly defeat, certain TMD

systems considered.

Apparently assuming a conventional role for China’s theater ballistic missiles

that threaten Taiwan, the DoD report did not discuss the warheads that may be

delivered by PRC ballistic missiles, which could carry conventional warheads or

WMD. While they may carry various types of conventional warheads, the M-11 and

M-9 SRBMs as well as the MRBMs are nuclear-capable. Some in Taiwan fear that

the PRC has not ruled out the use of WMD, including nuclear weapons, against

Taiwan.50 While previously serving as Chief of General Staff, Taiwan’s Defense

Minister Tang Fei reported to the legislature on the Chinese threat, including

modernization of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.51 On July 15, 1999, the PRC

government issued a report to refute the findings of the House Select Committee on

China (Cox Committee), and the PRC’s statement included the first official

acknowledgment that it has the neutron bomb.52 Neutron bombs kill large numbers

NAIC.

The report may be referring to both CSS-2 and CSS-5 MRBMs as having re-entry speeds

that are too fast for lower-tier missile defense systems.

The endo-atmospheric flight of a 300 km-range SRBM was also indicated by a briefing

by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) of the Department of Defense,

March 18, 1999.

Liao, Hung-hsiung, “Should Taiwan Develop Strategic Nuclear Weapons?” Ch’uan-ch’iu

Fang-wei Tsa-chi, March 15, 1999, in FBIS.

Lai, Victor, “Top Military Leader Reports on Taiwan Defense Situation,” Central News

Agency, September 30, 1998, in FBIS.

People’s Republic of China, Information Office of the State Council, “Facts Speak Louder

(continued...)

CRS-24

of people with radiation without destroying buildings and equipment. Some analysts

considered this announcement to be a threat meant to intimidate Taiwan, since the

timing of the report came soon after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui angered Beijing

on July 9, 1999, by saying that cross-strait relations are “special state-to-state ties.”53

As noted above, a PRC MRBM with a nuclear warhead would have a longer range

and higher velocity than one with a heavy high explosive warhead. Although it

would present a greater challenge to a TMD system and a greater risk to Taiwan, the

nuclear-tipped MRBM was not considered in the DoD report.

In addition, as a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China has

acknowledged that it has chemical weapon facilities and stockpiles.54 On May 21,

1997, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions confirming that Chinese entities

had contributed to chemical weapon proliferation in Iran.55 As for biological

weapons, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported in 1998 that

“there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program.”56

Also, the DoD report did not specify what types of conventional warheads,

penetration aids, and countermeasures are likely to be associated with Chinese

missiles that may threaten Taiwan. Indeed, in September 1999, the Intelligence

Community publicly confirmed that China has developed “numerous

countermeasures” and likely is willing to sell the technology to other countries.57 The

effectiveness of missile defenses may be degraded by decoys, chaff, submunitions,

multiple-simultaneous launchings, modified trajectories, or electronic

countermeasures. The use of multiple warheads could have a similar effect by

requiring the defense to acquire, track, and engage more weapons at one time.58

Potential Capabilities and Limitations of TMD Systems

Taiwan’s Considerations. Taiwan has a number of options should it decide

to seek missile defenses beyond the Modified Air Defense System (MADS), a Patriot

(...continued)

Than Words and Lies Will Collapse by Themselves — Further Refutation of the Cox

Report,” July 15, 1999.

Faison, Seth, “Is China Waving a Bomb at Taiwan?,” New York Times, July 16, 1999.

Lippman, Thomas, “Poison Gas Treaty Process Reveals Previously Unknown Production

Sites,” Washington Post, September 28, 1997.

See CRS Issue Brief 92056, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Current Policy Issues, by (name redacted).

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Adherence to and Compliance With Arms

Control Agreements,” 1997 Annual Report.

National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile

Threat to the United States Through 2015,” September 1999.

The DoD report states, “there was insufficient time to examine the effects of suppression

of TBMD systems by a potential aggressor, robustness against maximum aggressor raid

sizes, or countermeasures which could be employed on theater ballistic missiles (TBMs).”

(p. 4)

CRS-25

system, acquired in 1997 to protect Taipei. Taiwan may consider several factors in

selecting a system to counter the PRC’s possible use of SRBMs as well as longer

range ballistic missiles. The possibility that the missiles could carry nonconventional as well as conventional warheads may require greater emphasis on the

interception of missiles over the PRC or over the sea, farther from Taiwan. A

Chinese attack with lofted ICBMs, depressed MRBMs, or shorter range missiles may

be able to defeat the TBMDs discussed. It is not clear how effective a sea-based

upper tier system would be if Taiwan were attacked with SLBMs launched from a

submarine east, north, or south of the island.

DoD Report’s Options. The DoD report noted that either the land-based or

the sea-based lower tier system could adequately defend “most of Taiwan’s critical

assets,” but neither system could provide “any defense” against longer range theater

ballistic missiles. Thus, the report said that “to address the full range of threats

[SRBMs and MRBMs], three land- and sea-based upper tier options were explored.”

The DoD report found that one land-based upper tier system, with an additional

THAAD-like radar, could cover the “entire island of Taiwan” and could intercept

both missiles flying inside the atmosphere (endo-atmosphere) and outside (exoatmosphere). Alternatively, one sea-based upper-tier system, like NTW, with only

one ship position, could cover “all of Taiwan.” A sea-based option could be the NTW

SM-3 Block I Missile (with Aegis Spy-1 radar) or the NTW Block II system.59

However, while the DoD report found that either one land-based or one seabased upper-tier option is sufficient to defend Taiwan, it did not compare their

respective advantages or disadvantages. Both sea-based upper tier systems are exoatmospheric and would not intercept SRBMs or MRBMs on trajectories that remain

inside the atmosphere. While THAAD is expected to have the capability to defend

against ballistic missiles flying inside the atmosphere as low as 40 km, NTW has a

minimum intercept altitude of about 100 km (p. 11). On the other hand, the NTW

system could intercept some incoming missiles (possibly with non-conventional

warheads) in their ascent, mid-course, and descent phases outside the atmosphere,60

potentially farther away from Taiwan. The DoD report also did not discuss the

effectiveness and vulnerability of various possible locations of the one ship position

needed for a sea-based, upper-tier option (i.e., in the Taiwan Strait or east of Taiwan).

Alternative Options. Thus, Taiwan may need to further enhance defenses

against the PRC’s missiles with a combination of both an upper tier system and

another system to defend against low altitude missiles and to provide “layered

defenses” (or “defense-in-depth”). Rather than the DoD report’s options of a single

system similar to THAAD, NTW Block I, or NTW Block II, Taiwan’s defense may

well require a set of alternative options (with one or more units of each system):

The DoD report states the upper tier systems could protect all of Taiwan, although it also

says the upper tier systems could not defend the upper portions of South Korea. NTW could

not defend the upper 250 km of South Korea, although it can reportedly defend all of

Taiwan which is only 175 km from mainland China. (Pp. 10 and 14)

BMDO interview.

CRS-26

1. Land-based Lower Tier (PAC-3) and Sea-based Exo Upper Tier (NTW Block

I or Block II), or

2. Sea-based Lower Tier (NAD) and Sea-based Exo Upper Tier (NTW Block

I or Block II), or

3. Land-based Lower Tier (PAC-3) and Land-based Endo-Exo Upper Tier

(THAAD), or

4. Sea-based Lower Tier (NAD) and Land-based Endo-Exo Upper Tier

(THAAD).

Limits to Missile Defense. Nonetheless, in the context of military

considerations discussed within the scope of the DoD report, there are limitations to

Taiwan’s pursuit of the above missile defense options.

First, while the upper-tier missile defense systems provide better protection for

Taiwan against Chinese MRBMs or high altitude SRBMs, they are not expected to

reach initial operational capability until after 2007. On the other hand, the lower-tier

systems are expected to be operational sooner (PAC-3 in FY 2001 and NAD in FY

2003).

Second, with the PRC’s reported build-up of its missile force and its range of

options (from limited to large-scale missile firings), there may be concern that

Taiwan could face a large-scale missile threat from many directions that could strain

its missile defenses. Furthermore, a ballistic missile could cross the Taiwan Strait

in only minutes, making it very difficult for decision-makers to react and missile

defenses to intercept. For example, a ballistic missile with a range of 600 km, such

as the M-9, would travel at a maximum velocity of 2.4 km/second, crossing the Strait

in a few minutes. In spring 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin Kramer

provided an idea of the capability of Taiwan’s MADS (a system in the PAC-3 family)

to defend against many incoming missiles. He told the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee that,

The PLA is expected to deploy substantial numbers of ballistic missiles which

could overcome a limited theater missile defense architecture. Assuming two

interceptors are dedicated against each incoming missile and a 100 percent

probability of kill, a Patriot-derived MADS battalion theoretically could halt a

near simultaneous barrage of 48 SRBMs directed against targets within the

battalion’s area of coverage. A 100 percent probability of kill, however, is not

likely. Larger SRBM salvos could ensure at least some ballistic missiles reach

their targets.61

Third, apparently because the legislative requirement called for architecture

requirements against limited ballistic missile attacks only, the DoD report did not

discuss the threat of PRC cruise missiles. The upper-tier missile defense systems

discussed in the DoD report as more effective options for Taiwan would not defend

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing on U.S.-Taiwan Relations: The

20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. March 25, 1999.

CRS-27

against the PRC’s land-, air-, or ship-launched cruise missiles. The lower-tier PAC-3

system and MADS could provide some defense against cruise missiles.62 In February

1999, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Fei warned that the PRC is stressing the

development of cruise missiles and has acquired Russian cruise missile technology

after 1996. Moreover, he reportedly said that the threat to Taiwan from cruise

missiles will eventually pose a greater threat than that of ballistic missiles.63 The

Secretary of Defense’s report on Taiwan security also confirmed that China is

developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), with a “relatively high development

priority” and an “aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology and

subsystems, particularly from Russia.” That DoD report on Taiwan security

predicted that the PRC’s first LACM to be produced will probably be air-launched

and could be operational early in the 21st century. Moreover, the PRC is improving

its C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The report warned that the

PLA Navy could “saturate the Taiwan Navy with barrages of ASCMs.” The PLA is

planning to acquire Russian SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCMs deployed on two

Sovremenny-class destroyers. China is also expected to deploy submerged-launch

cruise missiles on its submarines, according to the Defense Secretary.64 The

warheads on the PRC’s cruise missiles may be conventional or carry WMD.

Fourth, the five missile defense options for Taiwan discussed in the DoD report

on missile defense in East Asia address only one aspect of missile defense.

According to DoD, TMD is comprised of four operational pillars: active defense,

passive defense, attack operations, and C4I (essential for any of the other pillars).65

As pointed out in the Defense Secretary’s report on Taiwan security, “exclusive

reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM/C3I [battle

management/command, control, communications, intelligence], however, will not

sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing

is projected to possess in 2005.”66 Taiwan’s defense planners may prefer to develop

aspects of missile defense other than the active defense options discussed in the DoD

report on TMD. For example, there is reportedly growing support in Taiwan for the

development and deployment of ballistic missiles to deter Chinese missile attacks by

targeting the PRC’s major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, for retaliation.67

Similarly, the DoD report did not discuss other possible missile defense options such

as the Airborne Laser and Space-Based Laser (boost-phase intercept systems) that

could destroy the enemy missiles near their launch sites and associated structures.

BMDO.

Wu, Sofia, “Tang Fei Says PRC Cruise Missiles to Post Threat by 2005,” Taiwan Central

News Agency, February 9, 1999.

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress

Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1, 1999.

DoD, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense,” Joint Pub 3-01.5, Feb. 22, 1996.

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress

Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1, 1999.

Opall-Rome, Barbara, “Support Mounts In Taiwan For Ballistic Missiles,” Defense News,

April 26, 1999.

CRS-28

Fifth, Taiwan may conclude that its pursuit of missile defense options (through

indigenous development, U.S. arms sales, or co-development) may be an inefficient

and expensive use of limited defense resources. For example, the unspecified shipposition required in a sea-based upper-tier system could be provided by the U.S.

Navy, and not necessarily the Taiwan Navy. There may also be other options to

lessen cross-strait tensions, including dialogue and confidence-building measures,

provided Beijing is willing to pursue meaningful exchanges.

Political Considerations and U.S. Options

Arguments Against. While beyond the scope of the DoD report on TMD

options, there are political and security considerations concerning the possible

transfer of U.S. missile defense systems to Taiwan. Foremost, the PRC favors the

“one China” policy and objects to increases in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially

those perceived to increase Taiwan’s potential offensive capability. The PRC

strenuously opposes U.S. TMD transfers to Taiwan as spurring its movement towards

independence by reestablishing close U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan akin to

an alliance – a relationship that some say is more important for Taiwan’s defense

than simply acquiring weapon systems. The PRC also argues that missile defenses

in Asia would be destabilizing and would prompt the PRC to engage in an arms race

by responding with additional deployments of missiles. Some U.S. policymakers are

concerned about the negative impact on U.S.-PRC relations that would obstruct the

pursuit of important U.S. interests that require PRC cooperation, including improved

cross-strait relations, stability in Korea, weapon nonproliferation, and expanded U.S.

exports to China. Some are concerned about provoking the PRC with narrow

military solutions that derail efforts to improve cross-Strait relations which ultimately

provide Taiwan with lasting security. Finally, U.S.-Taiwan missile defense

cooperation could complicate critical U.S.-Japan cooperation in missile defense by

aggravating Chinese concerns about a U.S.-led coalition to contain China and any

possible Japanese links to Taiwan’s missile defense systems.

Arguments in Favor. Those in the United States and Taiwan who support

the potential deployment of missile defense systems in Taiwan point out that the PRC

already has been building up its offensive missile force in a destabilizing manner.

Facing such a real and growing threat, Taiwan needs to respond with TMD systems

as one way to improve its defenses against potential PRC intimidation and attacks.

Some are confident that the TMD systems proposed would significantly mitigate the

PRC missile threat. Along with missile defense systems, deepened military

cooperation with the United States would help to enhance Taiwan’s military

hardware as well as military thinking and training (software). Improved early

warning systems could improve stability in a potentially volatile situation and avoid

miscalculations. Taiwan’s acquisition of active defense systems may be preferable

to its possible pursuit of offensive missile systems for deterrence or even warfighting.

Some say that Taiwan’s defense is ultimately its responsibility, and its pursuit of

TMD systems is one way to shore up defenses. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

(P.L. 96-8) requires that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such

defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable

Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (sec. 3(a)). In the summer

of 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell testified to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee that the TRA has been “the most successful piece of

CRS-29

legislative leadership in foreign policy in recent history.”68 In 1999, moreover, some

in Congress introduced the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (S. 693, Helms; H.R.

1838, DeLay), specifically authorizing the President to sell TMD-related systems and

other items to Taiwan. (The International Relations Committee later amended the

House version, removing specific references to particular systems. The

Administration and others in Congress oppose the bill as unnecessary and

counterproductive, since it could jeopardize the current situation of maintaining

strong but unofficial ties to Taipei while pursuing engagement with Beijing.)

U.S. Options. Thus, U.S. policy has a broad range of options. The United

States could focus on development and deployment of TMD systems in Asia that

could cover Taiwan — without transfers of TMD systems or technology to Taiwan.

Such development and deployment may or may not involve allies, such as Japan.

Alternatively, the United States could sell one missile defense system or a

combination of TMD systems to Taiwan without technology transfers. On the other

hand, U.S. sales may include sharing related technology with Taiwan in codevelopment and co-production. Finally, U.S. policy may examine the possible

development of other missile defense options in Taiwan in addition to the active

defense options discussed in the DoD report.

U.S. Considerations in Cooperative Missile Defense

Programs

Beyond the architecture requirements for establishing and operating missile

defenses for East Asia, there are numerous security, political, and economic issues

policy-makers might consider. A thorough discussion of these considerations was

beyond the scope of the DoD report. The topics will only be mentioned here to

indicate the complexity of the issue and possible implications of entering or

establishing a joint missile defense system.

Associated with the acquisition of missile defense systems by Japan,

South Korea, or Taiwan would be improved protection of U.S.

troops and facilities abroad, and possibly a reduced call for U.S.

units to provide missile defense.

Plans to establish a missile defense system could provoke hostilities

as North Korea or China saw its offensive military capability

eroding.

If the allies were able to establish a very effective defense, it might

tend to dissuade North Korea and China from expanding their

missile forces because they would be of little use. However, a

marginally effective missile defense could encourage those countries

to increase their missile inventories and improve their missiles’

ability to penetrate defenses. Some analysts think North Korea and

Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 4, 1999.

CRS-30

China are determined to modernize their missile forces regardless of

allied defenses and that some level of arms race will continue in the

region.

Cooperation in missile defense is seen as a sign of close security and

political relations between the United States and its three partners.

Many see these close relations as contributing to stability and peace

in the region, but China and North Korea perceive them as

hegemonic, threatening, and destabilizing. American analysts

disagree on the net political-military effects of East Asian missile

defenses, depending in part on the technical characteristics and

capabilities of the systems to be considered.

Expending political capital and large sums of money on various

missile defense options may occur at the expense of other political

or military solutions that some analysts see as more effective.

Cooperative missile defense provides an opportunity for Japan,

South Korea, and Taiwan to share technology and lucrative defense

contracts while sharing the economic burden of defending the

region. It has often been difficult for the United States to manage a

joint research and development program that is acceptable to all the

businesses and governments of participating countries.

The transfer of cutting-edge missile defense technology to Japan,

South Korea, or Taiwan could have far-reaching implications for

their military and industrial capabilities that may or may not be in

the best interest of the United States, and could also violate U.S.

obligations under the ABM Treaty and the Missile Technology

Control Regime.

CRS-31

U.S. Options for Missile Defense in East Asia

The United States could pursue regional missile defense cooperation by sharing

any of a dozen systems, or any combination of them, with Japan, South Korea, or

Taiwan, or could deploy U.S. TMD systems in East Asia without their participation.

The DoD report discussed several of these missile defense options in terms of the

architecture requirements. The options considered by DoD are shaded in the table

below. Hypothetically, several other systems, including those associated with NMD,

might be shared with East Asia, although transfers may be constrained by the ABM

treaty or the Missile Technology Control Regime. Those options not considered in

the DoD report are not shaded in the table. Summarizing preceding discussions

above, the U.S. systems that might be shared include:

CLASS

SYSTEM

TARGET

Lower Tier

Land-Based

Sea-Based

Patriot PAC-3

SRBMs in Terminal Phase,

Cruise Missiles

MEADS

SRBMs in Terminal Phase,

Cruise Missiles

NAD

SRBMs in Terminal Phase,

Cruise Missiles

Upper Tier

Land-Based

Sea-Based

THAAD

(Upper-EndoAtmosphere,

Exo-Atmosphere)

SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs with

an Apogee of 40+ km (25 mi.)

in Midcourse and Terminal

Phase

NTW, Block I or II

(Exo-Atmosphere)

SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs with

altitude of 100+ km in Ascent,

Midcourse, or Exo-Descent

Phase

Air-Based

Airborne Laser

Any Ballistic Missile within

several hundred km of aircraft

Space-Based

Space-based Laser

Any Ballistic Missile within

view of satellite

Air-Based

Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle with Interceptor

Any Ballistic Missile within

range (tens of km?)

Boost Phase Intercept

CRS-32

CLASS

SYSTEM

TARGET

Land-Based

Similar to initial or

augmented systems

planned for U.S.

ICBMs +

Sea-Based

Augmented NTW

(Endo-Atmosphere)

MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs

at high altitude

Space-Based

Similar to U.S. research

program

ICBMs +

NMD

Radar/Sensors/Electronics

Land-Based

Sea-Based

Space-Based

Battle Management/C3

Equipment associated

with each U.S. system

Providing missile defense for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan may take any of several

forms. The United States could interact with one, two, or all three of them in the

following ways:

Unilaterally develop, produce, and deploy missile defense units with

U.S. troops, providing some missile defense for East Asia,

Deploy some additional U.S. MD protection for allied and friendly

forces or cities,

Provide allies and friends early warning of missile attacks (from

space-, sea-, air-, or land-based sensors),

Sell U.S. MD systems to allies and friends,

Sell components, materials, and technology to help allies and friends

develop MD, or to help them enhance units previously transferred,

Co-develop and co-produce U.S. MD with allies and friends,

Integrate U.S. and Asian MD systems for regional coverage,

Integrate allies and friends or geographic areas into U.S. NMD,

Sell, co-produce, or co-develop NMD with allies and friends.

As Congress considers the TMD architecture options discussed in the DoD

report, additional information on the capabilities of potentially hostile missile forces,

the specific capabilities of U.S. missile defense systems, and the advantages and

disadvantages of sharing missile defense systems through various mechanisms, may

be of interest.

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