Kosovo: Review and Analysis of Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999

Order Code RL30265

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Kosovo: Review and Analysis of

Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999

July 21, 1999

(name redacted)

Specialist in International Relations

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT

This report provides an overview of U.S. and international policy objectives in Kosovo from

1998 to mid-1999, when NATO ended an 11-week air strike operation against Yugoslavia and

began to deploy a U.N.-authorized peacekeeping force in Kosovo. It reviews stated objectives

at various points during this period. It provides an analysis of how certain policy objectives

evolved and discusses the extent to which they were or were not achieved. This report will

not be updated. Related CRS products include: IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy.

Kosovo: Review and Analysis of Policy Objectives,

1998-June 1999

Summary

Since the outbreak of violent conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo in early

1998, the United States and European countries have been actively involved in

various initiatives to end the conflict and restore peace. At first, international

objectives, as expressed by the six-nation Contact Group and the U.N. Security

Council, were limited to seeking a cease-fire in the province, ending the repression of

the Kosovo civilian population by Serb forces and improving the humanitarian

situation, and facilitating a political dialogue between the parties. As fighting

continued, the United States pressed for NATO to threaten punitive air strikes in

order to achieve compliance with U.N. demands. The Contact Group became more

involved with the possible terms of a political settlement. In early 1999, the Contact

Group sought Serb and Kosovar Albanian acceptance of a detailed interim peace plan

that would restore substantial autonomy to the Kosovo population while upholding

Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.

Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic’s rejection of the draft peace plan and his

escalating use of force in Kosovo prompted NATO to launch a sustained air

campaign, Operation Allied Force, against Serb targets throughout Yugoslavia

beginning in March 1999. NATO leaders sought to deter Belgrade from a bloodier

offensive in Kosovo and to damage Belgrade’s military capacity. In response,

however, Milosevic stepped up efforts to drive out the ethnic Albanian population

from Kosovo, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians across borders. NATO

established five key conditions for Milosevic to meet before air strikes would end: an

end to all military action in Kosovo; the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;

agreement to the stationing of a NATO-led military presence in Kosovo; agreement

to the return of all refugees; and, willingness to negotiate a political framework

agreement for Kosovo. In June, Milosevic accepted a peace framework incorporating

these demands, eventually leading to an end to the bombing campaign. U.S. and allied

officials proclaimed victory for the operation and moved quickly toward a

peacekeeping and peace implementation phase in Kosovo.

U.S. and European objectives in Kosovo remained largely consistent, although

some evolved in response to changing circumstances and met with varying degrees

of success. In late 1998, the threat of air strikes achieved the objective of averting a

humanitarian disaster, at least for a while. In 1999, however, NATO did not succeed

in deterring the largest Serbian offensives to date during the course of the air

campaign. The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is likely to improve substantially in

the absence of violent conflict. The NATO operation achieved Belgrade’s agreement

to withdraw all of its forces from Kosovo, and the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army’s

commitment to de-militarize under NATO supervision. A NATO-led peacekeeping

force, KFOR, has been deployed to Kosovo under unified command and control

arrangements, with Russian participation. Contrary to some expectations, NATO

countries generally remained unified behind the air operation, though were divided on

other military options. The objective of attaining a durable political settlement in

Kosovo remains elusive, but has been superceded to some extent by the establishment

of a virtual U.N. protectorate for Kosovo.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Review of Stated Policy Objectives, 1998-1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Contact Group and U.N. Resolutions, 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

October 1998 Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Rambouillet Draft Interim Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Operation Allied Force Objectives and Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

U.N. Resolution 1244 and KFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Evolution of Policy Objectives by Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1. Avert a humanitarian crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. Produce a military situation in Kosovo conducive to peace . . . . . . . . . . 8

3. Achieve a durable political settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4. Demonstrate NATO unity and resolve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Appendix: Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Kosovo: Review and Analysis of

Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999

Introduction

After 78 days, NATO ended its military air campaign against the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on June 10, 1999, after Yugoslav leader Slobodan

Milosevic had accepted international principles for a peaceful resolution to the conflict

in Kosovo. Kosovo, a southern province of Serbia (which, together with the much

smaller Montenegro, forms the FRY) became engulfed in violent conflict in early 1998

as Serbian and Yugoslav forces sought to eliminate, through brutally repressive

means, the separatist threat presented by armed ethnic Albanian rebels, the Kosovo

Liberation Army (KLA). Denied their former autonomous rights since Milosevic’s

ascent to power in 1989 and 1990, the majority ethnic Albanian population has sought

full independence for Kosovo. The international community has supported greater

autonomy for the Kosovo population, but generally has not backed Kosovo’s claim

to independence. As the conflict wore on, the United States and European countries

became increasingly engaged in efforts to resolve the conflict. Belgrade’s rejection

of an internationally-sponsored peace plan and refusal to accept a series of

international demands led NATO to launch Operation Allied Force in late March

1999, striking Yugoslav military targets in Kosovo and throughout Yugoslavia.

During the course of the air campaign, numerous commentators expressed doubt

about the objectives, strategy, and conduct of the NATO operation. Some doubted

that Milosevic would yield to western demands or ever cede control of Kosovo.

Others urged NATO to prepare for a ground invasion of Yugoslavia in order to

ensure victory. After its conclusion, President Clinton and other leaders of NATO

countries proclaimed victory for Operation Allied Force, vindication of NATO’s

strategy, and a turning point for the civilian population of Kosovo. They claimed that

all of NATO’s objectives for the bombing campaign had been achieved. NATO

shortly thereafter launched a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, including forces from

Russia and other non-NATO countries, in support of an emerging U.N. protectorate

for the province. Some observers have questioned the claim of victory and the results

of the NATO operation, in view of original objectives and continued uncertainties in

Kosovo and Serbia.

This report provides an overview of stated U.S. and international policy

objectives in Kosovo from 1998 through the end of the NATO air operation against

Yugoslavia and passage of a Kosovo peace resolution by the U.N. Security Council

in June 1999. It then analyzes the evolution of certain policy objectives according to

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theme. An appendix provides a list of relevant documents and speeches referred to

throughout this report.1

Review of Stated Policy Objectives, 1998-1999

Contact Group and U.N. Resolutions, 1998

Sustained violent conflict between Kosovar Albanian guerrillas and Serbian

security forces began in late February 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

attacked Serbian police and Yugoslav Army units that, for their part, targeted and

brutally attacked known KLA strongholds and other villages throughout the province.

During this time, Belgrade mobilized and reinforced army and police forces in the

province, while hundreds of thousands of Kosovar civilians became displaced. In the

spring and summer of 1998, the international Contact Group comprised of the United

States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, convened frequently to address

the Kosovo conflict. Citing their interests in restoring peace and security to the

region, Contact Group countries agreed to support some incentives as well as limited

sanctions intended to help resolve the conflict. Statements by the Contact Group

criticized Belgrade’s indiscriminate use of force and repressive actions, but did not

challenge the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over Kosovo.

International objectives were to end the violence and to facilitate a political dialogue

between the parties.

On March 31, 1998, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1160, which

imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including

Kosovo. It called on Belgrade to engage in negotiations on the political status of

Kosovo with ethnic Albanian representatives. It called on the Kosovar Albanian

leadership to condemn all terrorist activities. It said the restrictions could be lifted

once Belgrade began a political dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian leadership,

withdrew special police units from Kosovo, allowed access to Kosovo by

humanitarian groups, and accepted a mission in Kosovo of the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Later in the year as fighting intensified, concerns grew about a looming

humanitarian disaster. Fearing for the fate of hundreds of thousands of displaced

Kosovar civilians as winter approached, the Contact Group countries pressed for

further action. U.N. Resolution 1199, passed by the Security Council on September

23, 1998, demanded that the Yugoslav and Kosovar Albanian parties institute an

immediate cease-fire, take steps to improve the humanitarian situation, and enter into

a dialogue on a negotiated political solution. It made the following additional

demands on Belgrade:

1

For a discussion of current U.S. objectives in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20125, Kosovo:

Issues and Options for U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). For information on current

developments in Kosovo, see CRS Issue Brief 98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by (name

redacted) and (name redacted), updated regularly.

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! cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and

order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;

! allow access to Kosovo by international monitoring and diplomatic missions;

! facilitate the return of all refugees and displaced persons and allow access for

humanitarian aid organizations;

! make progress to a clear timetable toward achieving a political dialogue with

the Kosovar Albanian community.

The resolution also called on Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanian community to

cooperate fully with investigations into war crimes in Kosovo by the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The resolution cited

international concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation

in Kosovo, and the flow of refugees to neighboring states. Citing Resolution 1199,

NATO moved toward approving air strikes against the FRY unless it complied with

the U.N. demands, although the resolution did not explicitly authorize the use of force

to achieve compliance. The United States asserted that the resolution and the U.N.

charter provided a sufficient legal basis for NATO air strikes, and NATO issued an

“activation order” to authorize air strikes in October. President Clinton and other

Administration officials said that the objective was to compel Milosevic’s compliance

with U.N. demands, by force if necessary.

October 1998 Agreements

At the last minute, NATO air strikes were averted by Milosevic’s agreement to

terms worked out after many sessions with U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke. Milosevic

agreed to comply with all provisions of U.N. Resolutions 1160 and 1199. He signed

two subsequent agreements with NATO and the OSCE establishing unarmed air and

ground verification missions, known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). In

addition, the Serbian government issued a unilateral statement that offered new

elections in Kosovo within nine months, to be supervised by the OSCE. NATO

commanders concluded a deal with Milosevic that reportedly required him to

withdraw 4,000-5,000 Yugoslav army and 4,000 Serbian special police units from

Kosovo (out of a combined total of about 30,000). After verifying initial compliance

with these terms, NATO suspended the activation order for air strikes but stood ready

to reinstate it. In announcing news of the Holbrooke agreement on October 12, 1998,

President Clinton stated that his objective was “to end the violence in Kosovo which

threatens to spill over into neighboring countries, and to spark instability in the heart

of Europe,...to reverse a humanitarian catastrophe in the making,...and to seek a

negotiated peace.”

With the agreement, Holbrooke obtained Milosevic’s commitment to adhere to

U.N. demands for the first time. The presence in Kosovo of over 1,000 international

verifiers of the Holbrooke agreements and many humanitarian organizations facilitated

the delivery of aid to the province, preventing widespread starvation of displaced

persons. However, compliance broke down almost immediately with numerous

violations of the cease-fire by both the Serb and Kosovar sides, according to reports

by the OSCE verification mission. After initially withdrawing some forces in

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accordance with NATO demands, Belgrade sent additional army and police units to

Kosovo in apparent preparation for a major offensive, without NATO retaliation.

Moreover, little progress was made toward achieving a political settlement through

the shuttle diplomacy efforts of U.S. envoy Chris Hill. By January 1999, compliance

with the cease-fire was practically non-existent. The January 15 massacre of 45

Kosovar Albanian civilians in Racak2 elicited widespread international outrage and

sparked renewed diplomatic efforts to try to resolve the conflict. At a January 29

meeting, the Contact Group summoned Yugoslav and Kosovar parties to negotiations

on a political settlement in Rambouillet, France. The goal was to achieve agreement,

within a short deadline, on an internationally-sponsored settlement providing

“substantial autonomy” for Kosovo, to be secured with the deployment in Kosovo of

an international security force.

Rambouillet Draft Interim Agreement

On February 6, peace talks opened at Rambouillet, sponsored by France and

Britain and led by U.S., EU, and Russian negotiators. In a speech prior to the

opening of the talks, Secretary of State Albright stated that the aim was to establish

a “durable and fair interim agreement that will create a peaceful political framework

for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo’s status for several years.”

Albright warned both parties that this diplomatic effort was backed by the threat of

military action by NATO. NATO also prepared to embark on a peacekeeping mission

if a political framework agreement were reached.

Negotiators circulated a draft Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government

in Kosovo. The lengthy document proposed establishing a system of democratic selfgovernment for Kosovo while upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the FRY. Elections would be held in Kosovo within nine months. Human rights of

all citizens in Kosovo would be guaranteed. The agreement called for outside

involvement with the presence of international civil and military missions. It invited

NATO to deploy a military force to ensure compliance and provide a secure

environment, allowing NATO full and unimpeded access to all FRY territory. Most,

but not all, Yugoslav forces would have to leave Kosovo in phases, although the

presence of a limited border force would be allowed. A local, multi-ethnic police

force would be created. All other forces, including the KLA, would be demilitarized.

The agreement would be valid for a period of three years, after which an international

conference would be held to establish a mechanism, understood to include a

referendum, for determining Kosovo’s final status.

Talks were extended an extra week, and then suspended after achieving

preliminary approval by the Kosovar Albanian delegation but no acceptance by

Belgrade. Conference sponsors said they had reached consensus on many aspects of

the autonomous arrangements for Kosovo, but not on the so-called implementation

chapters, including the international presence in Kosovo. After further delay, the

Kosovar delegation finally signed the Rambouillet accords on March 18. As Belgrade

continued to refuse to accept the terms of Rambouillet, especially with regard to an

international security presence, the Kosovo talks in France were adjourned, having

2

OSCE Permanent Council statement, January 18, 1999.

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failed to achieve the goal of a political settlement. Meanwhile, as the Rambouillet

talks proceeded to their unsuccessful conclusion, violence continued to escalate in

Kosovo.

Operation Allied Force Objectives and Conditions

In response to Belgrade’s attacks in Kosovo and intransigence at the peace talks,

NATO revived its threat of air strikes. On March 22, 1999, President Clinton said

NATO’s objectives in Kosovo were to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace

that restored self-government to the Kosovars. On March 23, NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana said the air campaign was the international community’s

response to Milosevic’s failure to meet three core demands:

! acceptance of the interim political settlement negotiated at Rambouillet;

! observance of limits on the FRY army and police forces agreed in October;

! ending the excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo.

On the first day of NATO’s air operation (March 24), President Clinton gave an

address to the nation in which he outlined three objectives of the mission:

! to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose;

! to deter an even bloodier offensive by Yugoslavia against innocent civilians in

Kosovo;

! if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military’s capacity to harm the

people of Kosovo; to limit Milosevic’s ability to make war in Kosovo.

As NATO began Operation Allied Force on March 24, Milosevic accelerated his

massive ethnic cleansing campaign to drive out most of the ethnic Albanian population

from Kosovo. The United States and other countries stepped up efforts to aid states

neighboring Kosovo as they received hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees. In

spite of the increased violence in Kosovo, NATO periodically expressed resolve to

continue the air campaign until its objectives were met. As conditions for the bombing

to cease, NATO established five core demands on Belgrade. NATO’s objectives were

for Milosevic to:

! stop all military action, violence and repression in Kosovo;

! withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces;

! agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

! agree to the return of all refugees and access to them by humanitarian aid

organizations;

! provide assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet

Accords to establish a political framework agreement for Kosovo.

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NATO said it should provide the “core” of the international military presence, under

unified command and control. It subsequently specified that all Serbian and FRY

forces had to withdraw from Kosovo.

On the diplomatic side, NATO countries worked with Russia in the context of

the Group of 8 in an effort to reach Milosevic. On May 6, the G8 adopted general

principles for a Kosovo political solution. The G8 statement called for the

deployment of “effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and

adopted by the United Nations,” making no mention of NATO. It also called for the

establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the U.N.

Security Council, signaling a shift away from a negotiated settlement between the

parties and toward an international protectorate. G8 countries continued to work on

these principles and on a draft U.N. resolution that would embrace the G8 principles.

On June 3, FRY President Milosevic accepted a peace framework presented to him

by Russian and EU envoys Viktor Chernomyrdin and Martii Ahtisaari. This text,

negotiated beforehand between U.S., Russian, and European officials, restored

NATO’s “substantial participation” and united command in the international security

presence. It also called for the withdrawal of all FRY military, Serbian police, and

paramilitary forces from Kosovo. (Texts of the G8 statement and peace framework

are included as appendices to U.N. resolution 1244.) The NATO air campaign was

suspended on June 10, after Belgrade began to comply with the terms of the Military

Technical Agreement (MTA) worked out the previous day between NATO and the

Yugoslav Army. The MTA detailed terms of a cessation of hostilities and the phased

full withdrawal of all army and police units from Kosovo. The Military Technical

Agreement also addressed terms of the deployment of a NATO-led Kosovo Force

(KFOR) in Kosovo. On June 10, President Clinton claimed that Milosevic’s

acceptance of the peace framework met NATO’s three core objectives: the

withdrawal of Serb forces, the deployment of an international security force with

NATO at the core, and the return of Kosovo civilians to their homes, to live in

security and self-government.

U.N. Resolution 1244 and KFOR

On June 10, the U.N. Security Council passed, 14 to 0, with China abstaining,

Resolution 1244. A goal of the resolution was stated to be resolving the grave

humanitarian situation in Kosovo and ensuring the safe return of all refugees and

displaced persons. The resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of the FRY; it did not describe the status of Kosovo. It stated that a political solution

would be based on the general principles made in the May and June G8 statements.

It outlined the preliminary structure and missions of the international civil and security

presences in Kosovo. The U.N. Secretary-General subsequently issued reports

outlining the concept and structure of the international civil presence in Kosovo

(S/1999/672 and S/1999/779).

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Evolution of Policy Objectives by Theme

The overriding U.S. and international objective to achieve peace and stability in

Kosovo and the rest of southeastern Europe remained consistent during this period

and will likely continue to guide international policy. The interest of the United States

and other countries in achieving this broad objective was fueled by the perceived

threat of the conflict expanding to other countries, including members of NATO, and

the prospect of prolonged and massive human suffering in the Balkans. It was

tempered, in the eyes of some observers, by questions about the U.S. stake in

Kosovo, uncertainties regarding the use of military force to achieve political

objectives in Kosovo, and concerns about the strategy of NATO’s air campaign. It

was also complicated by the actions of Slobodan Milosevic. As a result, many

underlying objectives evolved to varying degrees as the situation on the ground

changed over time and as the United States and other countries reacted to these

changes.

Four components of the goal to restore peace and stability included the

objectives of averting a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and the region, securing a stable

military situation on the ground conducive to a peace settlement, achieving a durable

political settlement for Kosovo, and maintaining consensus within NATO. The

evolution of each component is reviewed below.

1. Avert a humanitarian crisis

The escalation of violent conflict between the Serb forces and Kosovar rebels

since early 1998 produced a rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in

Kosovo. This phenomenon, and the prospect of a greater humanitarian catastrophe,

increased the incentive of the international community, for the first time, to engage

in efforts to reach a political settlement for Kosovo.3 During 1998, the international

community made frequent demands on Belgrade to cease offensive operations and

dispatched diplomatic missions to promote a negotiated peace process. As the

humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate with growing numbers of civilian

casualties, refugees and displaced persons, and reports of atrocities, NATO countries

agreed to back up diplomatic demands with the threat of air strikes. Under this threat,

Milosevic agreed to international demands in October 1998. The agreements

achieved a pause in the conflict, which was intended to bolster diplomatic efforts for

a political resolution. Thus, a worst-case humanitarian predicament was temporarily

averted, as humanitarian aid agencies gained access to the Kosovo population in need.

However, by early 1999, violence had resumed and escalated.

One objective of NATO’s Operation Allied Force was to deter Milosevic from

further aggression against civilians in Kosovo, according to statements made by the

President and other Administration and NATO officials. The allied military campaign

failed to achieve this objective. Unlike in October when he withdrew some of his

forces before a NATO military threat, this time Milosevic unleashed his largest ethnic

cleansing campaign to date, driving over 800,000 Kosovars across the border within

3

Kosovo was not addressed, for example, at the 1995 Dayton negotiations on BosniaHerzegovina.

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a few weeks. The massive influx of refugees to the poor and fragile neighboring

countries of Albania and Macedonia threatened to spread instability rather than

contain it. The Serb campaign also displaced hundreds of thousands more inside the

province. Refugee accounts told of numerous massacres and other war crimes

committed by Serbian forces during this time. International observer and aid missions

withdrew from Kosovo prior to the bombing campaign. International aid agencies

were therefore unable to provide humanitarian relief to the displaced population inside

Kosovo, though they assisted refugees in neighboring countries (with the assistance

of NATO forces stationed in these countries). In response to these events, western

leaders pledged to ensure the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their

homes. In an op-ed article, President Clinton wrote that “the question now is not

whether (Milosevic’s) ethnic cleansing will be reversed, but when.”4

With the subsequent agreement to deploy a NATO-led force in Kosovo and the

remarkably swift return of most of the refugees, the humanitarian situation in Kosovo

has improved and is likely to show further improvement. Meeting this objective will

depend on how the peace process progresses, what conditions returning Kosovar

refugees find in their home towns, and how effectively humanitarian and

reconstruction efforts proceed. Meanwhile, the mass exodus of ethnic Serbs from

Kosovo since the start of KFOR’s deployment in Kosovo has created new

humanitarian challenges in Serbia.

2. Produce a military situation in Kosovo conducive to peace

Through 1998, an objective of the international community was to induce

Yugoslav Army (VJ) forces stationed in Kosovo to return to their garrisons and

demand that extra Serbian special police (MUP) units, the ones most responsible for

the repression of Kosovar civilians, withdraw from the province. At the same time,

the United States and its allies demanded that the KLA refrain from terrorist attacks

on Serb police and the Yugoslav army. This limited objective reflected an

acknowledgment of Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo and little support by western

countries for the tactics or independence goals of the KLA. Under the October 1998

accords, Milosevic was to have reduced the number of Yugoslav army and Serbian

police units in Kosovo to roughly the levels they were before the conflict erupted at

the start of the year. According to the Defense Department, Milosevic would have

been considered to be in compliance if 11,000 VJ troops and 10,000 MUP police

remained in Kosovo.5

The worsening of the fighting by the end of 1998 and into 1999 caused a reevaluation of the desired levels of Serbian forces in Kosovo. The Rambouillet

agreement called for the phased withdrawal of most Yugoslav army and Serbian

special police (MUP) forces over a period of months. It allowed 1,500 Yugoslav

Army personnel to serve in border guard battalions, and up to an additional 1,000

troops to serve in border security functions. It also allowed 2,500 MUP police to

remain in Kosovo for up to two years. These allowed presences granted Belgrade

4

The New York Times, May 23, 1999.

5

Department of Defense background briefing, October 27, 1998.

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some physical vestiges of sovereign control over its borders. As for the KLA, the

Rambouillet agreement called for the demilitarization of all other forces under terms

worked out by KFOR, and restrictions on where they could carry arms.

After Rambouillet failed, and especially after Milosevic significantly escalated the

ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the United States and NATO seized upon a new objective

of getting all Yugoslav and Serbian forces out of Kosovo. It was thought that only

a total Serbian withdrawal, with the introduction of an international security presence,

would provide for enough security for the Kosovar refugees to return home. On June

9, Yugoslav and Serbian military officials and NATO KFOR commander Gen.

Jackson signed a Military Technical Agreement on the phased withdrawal of all

Yugoslav and Serbian forces and on KFOR. On June 21, the KLA concluded an

accord with NATO on its demilitarization and the cantonment of most of its weapons.

Under the accord, the international community would give consideration to allowing

KLA members to join a new Kosovo police force or form a force similar to a national

guard.

The other dimension to providing a secure environment in Kosovo has been the

deployment of an international security presence in the province. Planning and ideas

for this mission have evolved with fluctuations in the peace process. The October

1998 agreements allowed only civilian ground and unarmed aerial monitoring missions

to verify compliance with peace terms. The Rambouillet agreement specifically

invited NATO to deploy an international force (KFOR) to Kosovo and the rest of the

FRY. NATO’s initial planning for KFOR envisaged a force of about 28,000 troops.

At Rambouillet and afterward, Yugoslavia rejected the presence of any foreign

military force on its territory. During the course of the NATO air campaign, NATO

upheld its condition that Belgrade accept an international security force in Kosovo

with NATO “at its core.” U.S. officials continued to insist that this meant that the

force must have NATO command and control and rules of engagement. They

expressed willingness to arrange for the participation of non-NATO members, such

as Russia, along the lines of the command arrangements of the NATO force in Bosnia.

Only such a force, they argued, could provide the security to allow refugees to return

home and the KLA to disarm.6

Russian negotiators, the West’s primary link to Milosevic, sought,

unsuccessfully, to downplay the NATO role in the future security presence.

Moreover, the May G8 statement referred only to “effective international civil and

security presences,” an apparent compromise on terminology. Finally in June,

Milosevic accepted the principle of an “international security presence with substantial

NATO participation...under unified command and control,” clearing the way for U.S.

and NATO agreement on deploying the force in Kosovo. NATO’s plans, meanwhile,

had evolved to a peace force in Kosovo of about 50,000. The increase in size from

earlier plans reflected the more challenging conditions on the ground, with much

larger numbers of refugees to be returned to Kosovo and with greater infrastructure

6

For example, see Op-Ed: “A Just and Necessary War,” by President Clinton, The New York

Times, May 23, 1999.

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damage resulting from the air strikes and from the actions of Serbian forces.7

KFOR’s deployment, according to the terms of the MTA, is limited to Kosovo.

Russia’s possible participation in KFOR provided another element of uncertainty

after some 200 Russian troops entered Kosovo from Bosnia and unexpectedly

assumed control of Pristina airport on June 12. Russia reportedly sought control of

its own sector in Kosovo, while western governments feared that that development

would lead to Kosovo’s partition. On June 18, U.S. and Russian officials concluded

an accord on Russia’s participation in KFOR. It provides for 3,600 Russian troops

to serve in KFOR in the U.S., German, and French sectors of KFOR, and does not

give Russia its own sector.

In summary, meeting the objective of achieving a favorable security situation on

the ground appears more promising after the NATO bombing than before. The terms

governing both the presence of the local forces and the international security force are

stronger now than the terms outlined in either the October agreements or the

Rambouillet accords. All Yugoslav army and police forces have formally completed

withdrawal from the province, the Yugoslav military remains damaged by the NATO

air campaign,8 and deployment of a larger international force under unified NATO

command and control has commenced.

On the other hand, the continuation of the conflict and the increased level of

brutalities through half of 1999 may have exacerbated the security situation in pockets

of Kosovo where returning Albanian refugees seek retribution against local Serbs, or

where there is any remaining Serbian resistence to the Albanians’ return. The

continued presence of ethnic Albanian and/or Serbian paramilitaries, with possibly

hidden caches of armaments, may present future challenges to KFOR. The prolonged

fighting in Kosovo may have allowed the Serbian military to lay additional mines

throughout the province. In addition, U.N. resolution 1244 calls for “an agreed

number,” as yet unspecified, of Yugoslav military and Serb police personnel to be

permitted to return to Kosovo to liaise with the international civil and security

presence, mark and clear minefields, maintain a “presence” at Serb patrimonial sites

in Kosovo, and maintain a “presence” at key border crossings. The actions and

performance of the Russian troops in KFOR will also likely affect the security

situation on the ground.

3. Achieve a durable political settlement

Following months of shuttle diplomacy led by the U.S. envoys, Rambouillet was

the first attempt by the international community, in particular the Europeans, to bring

the Serb and Kosovar Albanian parties together under international auspices to agree

on an interim peace arrangement for Kosovo. As reviewed earlier, Rambouillet

7

KFOR’s ultimate size is likely to be even larger. NATO and non-NATO countries have

volunteered to contribute a total of over 55,000 troops to KFOR. Department of Defense

press briefing, June 24, 1999.

8

The extent of the actual damage incurred by the Yugoslav Army during Operation Allied

Force has been the subject of recent speculation in the press. For example, see “Damage to

Serb Military Less than Expected,” The New York Times, June 28, 1999.

CRS-11

granted autonomous self-government in Kosovo while maintaining Yugoslav

sovereignty over the province. The peace agreement was to remain in force for three

years. At the end of this period, the international community would convene a special

conference “to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis

of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts

regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act.”

Eventually signing the Rambouillet agreement, the Kosovar Albanian delegation made

clear that it understood this provision to mean that a popular referendum would

determine the final status of the province. The Rambouillet process was suspended

after the Yugoslav delegation refused to accept the interim accord.

In contrast, U.N. resolution 1244 outlines the general principles of a political

solution to Kosovo without the signatures or overt consent of the Yugoslav or

Kosovar parties.9 It assigns all civil and security responsibilities and functions to an

international administration, effectively establishing a U.N. protectorate. It says that

the international civil presence will promote the establishment of substantial autonomy

and self-government in Kosovo, “taking full account of annex 2 (the AhtisaariChernomyrdin principles) and of the Rambouillet accords.” It does not specify either

a final status or a mechanism for a final status for Kosovo, although it refers to

application of the resolution “pending a final settlement.” It remains thus unclear as

to what entity the transitional U.N. arrangement will eventually transfer authority.

The resolution authorizes the establishment of the civil and security presences

for an initial period of one year, implying a soft deadline, although it also says they are

to continue thereafter unless decided otherwise by the Security Council. As it

eschews a clear outline of a final political settlement for Kosovo, the U.N. resolution

provides no “exit strategy” for the international civil and security administration of

Kosovo. In a June report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that

his Special Representative will be responsible for facilitating a political process

“designed to determine the future political status of Kosovo, taking into account the

Rambouillet accords.”10

With regard to the structure of the international civil presence, the U.N.

resolution differs from Rambouillet in that it increases the role and authority of the

United Nations. Many other regional organizations, such as the European Union and

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are to become involved

with peace implementation. However, all civil functions are to fall under the authority

of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (named to be Bernard

Kouchner of France). Rambouillet, in contrast, assigned a larger and more

autonomous role to the OSCE. Similar to Rambouillet is the separation of military

and civilian commands and structures, with KFOR remaining separate and distinct

from the civil mission, though with “close coordination” between the two.

9

Milosevic did accept the general principles worked out by the G8 and endorsed by the U.N.

Security Council, and has thus far complied with the provisions regarding the withdrawal of

his forces and acceptance of the NATO-led force in Kosovo. The KLA, likewise, committed

to demilitarize.

10

For a discussion of potential future models for Kosovo, see CRS Report RL30187,

Kosovo’s Future Status: Alternative Models, by (name redacted).

CRS-12

With peace implementation efforts having just begun, it is premature to assess

whether the objective of reaching a durable political settlement is likely to be

achieved. Much will depend on the leadership exercised by the international civil

administration and how it interprets what “substantial autonomy” means in practice.

Other important factors will be the level of engagement and resources provided by the

international community, and the extent to which KFOR is able to provide a secure

environment for, or directly assist, civilian peace implementation and reconstruction

efforts.

A growing concern is that delays in getting a U.N. administrative infrastructure

in place could delay progress across the board, especially the establishment of

effective civil police administration. Delays have already prompted KLA members to

seize control of administrative functions in numerous Kosovar towns. For the time

being, KFOR will remain responsible for maintaining law and order in the absence of

an effective civilian police force, although KFOR commanders are eager to turn that

task over to the U.N. Another concern is whether the U.N. Security Council,

especially permanent members Russia and China, can maintain a unified position in its

oversight function. A third concern is that peace efforts in Kosovo cannot be

insulated from potentially severe political instability in Serbia. Yugoslav leader

Slobodan Milosevic remains in power, though for how long remains uncertain. U.S.

officials have stated that Milosevic must step down from power and the United States

has even offered a reward for information leading to his arrest and transfer to the

Hague war crimes tribunal. The outcome of Serbia’s crisis of political leadership will

likely have enormous consequences for the shape of peace developments in Kosovo.

4. Demonstrate NATO unity and resolve

Observers have speculated that Milosevic’s strategy was to ride out the NATO

air campaign and wait for differences among the NATO allies to cause a rift within

the alliance and an end to the air strikes. Many observers believed that Milosevic had

good reason to question unity among NATO’s 19 members on a lengthy air strike

campaign against Yugoslavia. Before October, when NATO first threatened air

strikes, some NATO members questioned the international legal basis for NATO’s

threat, as it came without specific U.N. Security Council authorization. In March

1999, some NATO member governments, such as Greece and Italy, continued to

convey serious misgivings about engaging in air strikes. Popular support for the

NATO action in member countries also varied greatly. In the end, however, all 19

NATO countries remained unified behind the air strikes for the duration of the

campaign.

As the campaign wore on, some NATO governments came to favor the idea of

instituting a “pause” in the air strikes to allow time for Milosevic to comply with

NATO demands. The NATO summit in Washington on April 23-24, viewed as a

critical juncture for maintaining allied unity on Kosovo, considered this proposal. The

summit’s statement on Kosovo for the first time specified that NATO would consider

suspending the air strikes once Belgrade “began” to withdraw forces from Kosovo

and accepted NATO’s five conditions. Elsewhere in the statement, however, it was

said that there would be “no compromise” and that the operation would continue.

U.S. officials concluded then and afterward that NATO countries became more, not

less, unified as the campaign wore on. Other observers questioned the durability of

CRS-13

allied consensus behind an even longer air campaign, especially if the ground invasion

option were to come under active consideration.

The need for building and maintaining consensus within the 19-member alliance

constrained to some extent decision-making on the conduct of the operation. Alliance

cohesion may have necessitated a more incremental approach to the campaign than

originally foreseen. NATO officials have conceded that the alliance’s "command by

committee" hampered the military leaders’ ability to carry out an effective and flexible

campaign, or to escalate the bombing.11 On other military options, NATO members

remained divided. For example, NATO member governments objected to the NATO

commander’s plans to enforce an oil and fuel embargo against Yugoslavia with deadly

force. On the potential for NATO launching a ground offensive operation against

Yugoslavia, Defense Secretary Cohen said repeatedly that there was no consensus

among NATO countries on this prospect. Many observers have contended that the

removal of this option from consideration severely limited the effectiveness of the air

campaign. British Prime Minister Blair was both lauded and criticized for pressing

NATO consideration of a ground offensive as the air campaign wore on.

With the official termination of the air campaign in mid-June, NATO countries

are now engaged in deploying forces to Operation Joint Guardian, the peacekeeping

mission undertaken by KFOR. Within NATO, the peacekeeping mission is much less

divisive than were the air strikes. However, the KFOR mission is not without risks.

Moreover, the current perceived need for KFOR to remain deployed in Kosovo for

many years may pose challenges to alliance unity over time.

11

See “War Effort Restrained by Politics, Clark Says,” The Washington Post, July 20, 1999,

and “NATO general sees strategy shortcomings,” The Financial Times, May 5, 1999.

CRS-14

Appendix: Documentation

(reverse chronological order)

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration

Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779. July 12, 1999. (Available at the U.N. website,

http://www.un.org)

“Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK.” June 20, 1999.

(Available

at

the

U.S.

Information

Agency

website,

http://www.usia.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/)

“Agreement on Russian Participation in KFOR,” U.S. Department of Defense news

release. June 18, 1999. (See USIA website.)

Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council

Resolution 1244, S/1999/672. June 12, 1999. (See U.N. website.)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. June 10, 1999. [Includes Group of 8

principles adopted on May 6 and agreement on principles accepted by Milosevic

on June 3.] (See U.N. website.)

Statement by the President. June 10, 1999. (Available at the White House website,

http://www.whitehouse.gov)

Text of the Military Technical Agreement. June 9, 1999. (See USIA website.)

“A Just and Necessary War,” by William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed, The New York

Times. May 23, 1999.

“Statement on Kosovo,” NATO Washington summit. April 23-24, 1999. (Available

at the NATO website, http://www.nato.int)

“The Situation in and around Kosovo,” North Atlantic Council statement. April 12,

1999. (See NATO website.)

“U.S. and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo,” Fact Sheet by the Department

of State. March 26, 1999. (Available at the State Department website,

http://www.state.gov)

Statement by the President to the Nation. The White House. March 24, 1999. (See

White House website.)

Press Statement by Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO. March 23, 1999.

(See NATO website.)

Remarks by the President on the Situation in Kosovo. The White House. March 22,

1999. (See White House website.)

CRS-15

“Clinton on Kosovo: We Can Make a Difference,” The New York Times, February 14,

1999.

Rambouillet Agreement, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in

Kosovo. Department of State. February 23, 1999. (See USIA website.)

Albright Policy Address on Kosovo, U.S. Institute of Peace. February 4, 1999. (See

State Department website.)

Statement to the Press, NATO Secretary-General Solana. January 30, 1999. (See

NATO website.)

Conclusions of the Contact Group, London, January 29, 1999. (See USIA website.)

Joint Statement on Kosovo, Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister

Ivanov. January 26, 1999. (See State Department website.)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1203. October 24, 1998. (See U.N. website.)

“The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission,” updated November 26, 1998. (Available

at the OSCE website, http://www.osceprag.cz)

“Agreement of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.” October 16, 1998. (See

OSCE website.)

“Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between NATO and the FRY,” October 15,

1998. (See NATO website.)

Clinton Remarks on Kosovo. October 8, 1998. (See White House website.)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199. September 23, 1998. (See U.N. website.)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1160. March 31, 1998. (See U.N. website.)

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