Congressional Oversight Manual
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Congressional Oversight Manual
Updated March 27, 2026
Congressional Research Service
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RL30240
SUMMARY
Congressional Oversight Manual
Congress’s legislative role does not end when it passes legislation. Oversight is fundamental to
make sure that laws are working as intended and are being administered in an effective, efficient,
and economical manner. The information that oversight can bring to Congress is essential as the
body grapples with the complexities of American government and society.
A fundamental objective of the Congressional Oversight Manual is to assist Members,
committees, and legislative staff in carrying out this vital legislative function. It is intended to
provide a broad overview of the procedural, legal, and practical issues that are likely to arise as
Congress conducts oversight. This includes information on the mechanics of oversight practice
based on House and Senate rules, common investigative techniques, and an inventory of statutes
that impact oversight activity. In addition, the Manual discusses important legal principles that
have developed around Congress’s oversight practice. The Manual is organized both to address
specific questions and to support those seeking a general introduction to or broader understanding
of oversight practice.
RL30240
March 27, 2026
Ben Wilhelm, Coordinator
Analyst in Government
Organization and
Management
Todd Garvey, Coordinator
Legislative Attorney
Christopher M. Davis,
Coordinator
Analyst on Congress and
the Legislative Process
CRS first developed the Congressional Oversight Manual more than four decades ago following
a December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was
organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and CRS at the
request of the bipartisan House leadership. CRS produced the Manual with the assistance initially of a number of House
committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate
staff and updated the Manual periodically.
Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the
oversight function, providing consultative support on matters ranging from routine oversight and basic information gathering
to the most complex and highest profile investigations conducted by Congress. Given the size and scope of the modern
executive establishment, Congress’s oversight role may be even more significant—and more demanding—than when
Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant
oversight of administration.”
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Contents
Introduction to Congressional Oversight and the Oversight Manual .............................................. 1
The Oversight Manual .............................................................................................................. 1
How to Use This Manual .......................................................................................................... 1
Defining Oversight .................................................................................................................... 2
The Oversight Toolbox ....................................................................................................... 3
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms ............................................................................................ 3
The Purposes of Oversight of the Executive Branch ................................................................ 4
Congress as an Oversight Body ....................................................................................................... 8
Authority to Conduct Oversight ................................................................................................ 8
Constitutional Provisions .................................................................................................... 9
Statutes and Oversight ...................................................................................................... 10
House and Senate Rules on Oversight .............................................................................. 10
Congressional Participants in Oversight ........................................................................... 14
Oversight and the Committee System ..................................................................................... 16
Identifying Relevant Committee Jurisdiction ................................................................... 17
General Techniques of Encouraging Oversight Coordination .......................................... 17
Development and Execution of Oversight Projects ................................................................ 17
Question 1: Which Issues Warrant Oversight? ................................................................. 18
Question 2: How to Get the Desired Information? ........................................................... 19
Question 3: What Can Be Done with This Information? .................................................. 20
Oversight Through Other Congressional Activities ................................................................ 21
Investigative Oversight.................................................................................................................. 26
Historical Background ............................................................................................................ 27
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigative Inquiries ........................... 29
The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose ..................... 30
Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President....................................... 34
Authority of Congressional Committees ................................................................................. 36
Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................ 37
Committee Rules............................................................................................................... 38
Legal Tools Available for Oversight and Investigations ......................................................... 39
Hearings ............................................................................................................................ 39
Deposition Authority......................................................................................................... 41
The Subpoena Power............................................................................................................... 42
Responding to Noncompliance: Subpoena Enforcement .................................................. 45
Criminal Provisions Protecting the Investigative Power......................................................... 52
Limitations on Congressional Authority ................................................................................. 53
Constitutional Limitations ................................................................................................ 53
Common-Law Privileges .................................................................................................. 59
Executive Privilege ........................................................................................................... 61
Statutory Limits on Congressional Access to Information ............................................... 66
Classified Material ............................................................................................................ 68
Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigations ................................ 71
The Seven Member Statute: 5 U.S.C. § 2954 ................................................................... 71
Specialized Investigations ....................................................................................................... 72
Select Oversight Tools and Techniques ......................................................................................... 75
Orientation and Periodic Review Hearings with Agencies ..................................................... 76
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Casework ................................................................................................................................. 77
Performance Audits by Inspectors General and GAO............................................................. 77
Monitoring the Federal Register ............................................................................................. 79
Monitoring the Unified Agenda............................................................................................... 79
Special Studies and Investigations by Staff, Support Agencies, and Others ........................... 79
Staff Investigations ........................................................................................................... 79
Support Agencies .............................................................................................................. 80
Outside Contractors, Consultants, and Detailees .............................................................. 80
Investigative Commissions ............................................................................................... 80
Communicating with the Media .............................................................................................. 80
Press Gallery Offices ........................................................................................................ 81
Resolutions of Inquiry ............................................................................................................. 81
Limitations and Riders on Appropriations .............................................................................. 82
Legislative Veto and Advance Notice ..................................................................................... 84
Independent Counsel ............................................................................................................... 86
Reporting, Testimony, Notice, and Consultation Requirements ............................................. 87
Testimony Requirements .................................................................................................. 89
Notice and Prior Consultation ........................................................................................... 89
Statutory Oversight Enablers ......................................................................................................... 89
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Authority ........................................................... 90
Anti-Gag Legislation and Whistleblower Protection Laws for Federal Employees ......... 90
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) ............................................................. 91
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601) ..................................................... 91
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-577) .............................................. 92
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) ..................................................... 92
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. ch. 10) ........................ 92
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) .................. 92
Public Debt Limit Increase of 2010 (P.L. 111-139) .......................................................... 93
GAO Access and Oversight Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-3) ...................................................... 93
Indirect Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Capabilities ..................................................... 93
Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. Ch. 10) .................................... 94
Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 (P.L. 97-255) .................... 94
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as Amended (P.L. 101-576, 31 U.S.C. ch. 9) ........ 95
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) (P.L. 103-62), as Amended by
the GPRA Modernization Act (P.L. 111-352, 31 U.S.C. §1101 note) ............................ 95
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. ch. 35) ................................. 95
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106, 40 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.) ........................... 96
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, as Amended by the Digital
Accountability and Transparency Act (P.L. 109-282, 31 U.S.C. §6101 note) ............... 97
Statutory Offices of Inspector General .................................................................................... 97
Inspector General Act of 1978 .......................................................................................... 97
Purpose and Role .............................................................................................................. 98
Types and Categories ........................................................................................................ 99
Authorities and Responsibilities ....................................................................................... 99
Oversight Information Sources and Consultative Services ......................................................... 103
Congressional Research Service ........................................................................................... 103
Congressional Budget Office ................................................................................................ 104
Government Accountability Office ....................................................................................... 105
Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel ............................................. 106
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Senate Legal Counsel ...................................................................................................... 106
House General Counsel................................................................................................... 107
Office of Management and Budget ....................................................................................... 108
Budget Information ................................................................................................................ 110
Nonfederal Information Resources ........................................................................................ 112
Tables
Table 1. Special Investigative Authorities Explicitly Provided to Selected Investigating
Committees................................................................................................................................. 74
Table 2. Press Gallery Names and Websites .................................................................................. 81
Appendixes
Appendix A. Illustrative Subpoena............................................................................................... 115
Appendix B. Example Congressional Oversight Letter .............................................................. 122
Appendix C. Examples of White House Response to Congressional Requests .......................... 125
Contacts
Author Information...................................................................................................................... 128
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Introduction to Congressional Oversight and the
Oversight Manual
Writing in 1993, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress defined congressional
oversight as the “review, monitoring, and supervision of the executive and the implementation of
public policy.”1 This definition captures the functional core of Congress’s oversight of the
executive branch. Nonetheless, it is the beginning, rather than an end, of understanding oversight
as it has been practiced since the First Congress. As outlined in this manual, the purposes,
practice, and tools of congressional oversight extend far beyond the confines of a simple
definition.
The Oversight Manual
CRS has published the Congressional Oversight Manual since 1978. In that time, it has been one
of the most comprehensive resources for information on congressional oversight and benefited
from the experience and knowledge of dozens of CRS experts and attorneys. Since it was first
published, the work of Congress and the resources available to conduct oversight have
significantly changed. For instance, the spread of interconnected information technology systems
and the development of the internet allow for more rapid and wide-scale collection and
preservation of information about the activities of the government and have significantly
increased the availability of that data to both the public and Congress. In addition, Congress has
developed a wide array of management, oversight, and transparency laws that facilitate oversight,
create internal controls within the executive branch, and bring more government data to the
public eye.2
CRS’s primary goal with the Oversight Manual is to provide an overview of oversight practice
that is useful to congressional stakeholders with various levels of experience. For those new to the
Hill, the Oversight Manual serves as a broad introduction to the rules and techniques of effective
oversight and the array of options available to Congress and its Members. For more experienced
hands, the Oversight Manual’s broad coverage should make it a useful desk reference for existing
oversight techniques and recent developments on relevant issues.
How to Use This Manual
The Oversight Manual is intended to be a guidebook for congressional oversight. To that end,
CRS has organized the Oversight Manual for easy navigation from the table of contents.
A large share of the Oversight Manual is devoted to a technical discussion of the legal and
procedural parameters of Congress’s oversight activities and a survey of certain well-established
techniques and tools. The initial sections provide a more general discussion of oversight,
including its purposes and a high-level review of the oversight process.
1 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress: Final Report,
committee print, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., December 1993, S.Rept. 103-215; H.Rept. 103-413 (GPO, 1993), p. 150. CRS
has used an expanded version of this definition: “Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and
supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.” See, for example, CRS Report 97936, Congressional Oversight, by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (available to congressional clients on
request).
2 See “Statutory Oversight Enablers” section below.
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This manual covers a wide variety of topics related to oversight, although it may not discuss
every potential oversight issue or provide a precise answer to every question. This is particularly
true when it comes to two topics that receive frequent attention. The first is what might be
thought of as the “art” of oversight,3 including the selection of oversight priorities and strategies.
Such decisions turn, in large part, upon the expert judgment of Members and committees as to
how their time and other resources would be best spent.
The second subject involves potential ways to adjust the laws and chamber rules governing
oversight. The Oversight Manual focuses on current oversight practices. CRS experts and
attorneys are available to answer specific questions related to any aspect of oversight, to support
specific oversight activities, and to discuss potential adjustments to the rules and practices that
enable oversight.
Defining Oversight
Oversight is an activity that can be defined in many different ways. For instance, CRS has defined
congressional oversight as the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs,
activities, and policy implementation.4 This definition encompasses a wide variety of potential
legislative activities and does not restrict the oversight function to particular purposes, goals, or
strategies.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides a more formalist definition by directing that
committees
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies
concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such
committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the
Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.5
This language could be taken to support a narrower view of what constitutes oversight that was
common during that era.6 Today many observers would likely find this definition of oversight too
limiting given the development of new channels for government information and public interest
in accountability for public officials and agencies.7 Therefore, a slightly broader definition, such
as the one offered by political scientist Joel D. Aberbach, might better reflect the modern
understanding of the activities that make up congressional oversight. Aberbach defines oversight
as
congressional review of the actions of federal departments, agencies, and commissions and
of the programs and polices they administer, including review during program and policy
implementation as well as after the fact.8
3 See Project on Government Oversight, The Art of Congressional Oversight (Project on Government Oversight, 2015),
https://docs.pogo.org/publication/2015/POGO_The-Art-of-Congressional-Oversight-Handbook.pdf.
4 See CRS Report 97-936, Congressional Oversight, by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (available to
congressional clients on request).
5 60 Stat. 832, §136.
6 Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Anchor Books, 1964), p. 9.
7 See, for example, Jennifer L. Selin and Grace Moore, “Keeping Tabs on the Executive,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2 (June 2023), pp. 186-208.
8 Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Brookings Institution, 1990), p.
218.
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The next two parts of this section introduce two additional frameworks that readers may find
useful when thinking about the variety of oversight techniques and strategies available to
Congress.
The Oversight Toolbox
Much of the organization of the Congressional Oversight Manual is based on the idea that
congressional oversight is a collection of tools and strategies that allow Congress to monitor the
executive branch and gather information on its activities. This instrumental approach may make it
particularly useful for identifying potential issues for oversight and developing and executing
effective strategies for that oversight. In addition, while the Manual is oriented toward executive
branch oversight, its lessons are also generally applicable to Congress’s oversight of other actors,
including the judicial branch and private sector entities.
For most practitioners, oversight is usually oriented to successfully investigating a specific issue
or creating a general environment of accountability and transparency among Congress, the
executive branch, and, ultimately, the public. Depending on the situation, it may be possible to
achieve these goals through a variety of strategies, and their selection can be thought of as
picking the best tool for the job.
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Writing in 1984, political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz proposed a model
for organizing congressional oversight activities that remains a useful tool for understanding
oversight as a practice.9 In their article, the authors define two broad categories of congressional
oversight: “police patrols” and “fire alarms.”
Police patrol oversight occurs when Congress, on its own initiative, “examines a sample of
executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative
goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations.”10 This strategy involves regular and
general oversight activity by Congress and is consistent with a classic understanding of legislative
oversight being conducted directly by committees and Members. One example of this type of
oversight is the agency budget hearings held on an annual basis by the appropriations
subcommittees in both houses. Those hearings provide committee members an opportunity to
question leaders about the performance of their agencies, plans for the future, and specific issues
of concern.
Fire alarm oversight, on the other hand, occurs when “Congress establishes a system of rules,
procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to
examine administrative decisions, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional
goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”11 Fire alarm oversight
creates a system that fosters transparency and uses other stakeholders and experts to monitor
more activities with greater depth than Congress could on its own. When potential problems are
identified, the expectation is that Congress will be better able to respond by focusing attention on
known issues and working from expert analysis that has already been conducted.
An example of fire-alarm oversight is the 2014 response to disclosure of significant wait times for
care in some Veterans Health Administration facilities and the deaths of veterans waiting for care
9 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire
Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-179.
10 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166.
11 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166.
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on those lists. Media outlets (including CNN12) as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs
Office of Inspector General reported on these issues.13 Once Congress was aware of the severity
of the issues, Members responded with broad, bipartisan investigations into the agency’s
performance and passed legislation seeking to address key findings.14
The Purposes of Oversight of the Executive Branch
Congress has engaged in oversight throughout its history. Investigating how the executive branch
enforces laws, spends appropriations, and implements policies enables Congress to assess
whether federal agencies and departments are operating in an effective, efficient, and economical
manner and to gather information that may inform legislation. The expansion of the national
government and bureaucracy has only increased Congress’s need for and use of oversight to
check on and check the executive.15 This “checking” function serves to protect Congress’s
policymaking role and its place under Article I in the U.S. constitutional system of checks and
balances.
St. Clair’s Defeat: The First Congressional Investigation of the Executive Branch
On November 4, 1791, a coalition of local American Indian tribes defeated a U.S. military contingent under the
command of General Arthur St. Clair (who was also the governor of the Northwest Territory) in battle near what
is now the Ohio-Indiana border. This battle, commonly referred to as St. Clair’s Defeat, was the subject of what is
generally considered to be the first formal investigation by Congress.
The House of Representatives of the Second Congress established a special committee to investigate the battle.
The committee requested not only that General St. Clair and Secretary of War Henry Knox testify but also that
the Washington Administration produce documents related to the incident. Only a few years removed from the
debates of the Constitutional Convention and aware of the precedent-setting role of his Administration, President
Washington and his Cabinet (which included, among others, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton) carefully
considered the appropriate response to the House’s request. As recorded by Jefferson in his notes, Washington
concluded that the executive branch should “communicate such papers as the public good would permit and
ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public.” Washington then decided that, in the case
of St. Clair’s Defeat, cooperation with Congress was appropriate.
This case established two important precedents that continue to shape the relationship between Congress and the
presidency to this day. First is the assumption that compliance with congressional request should be the default for
presidential Administrations. Second is the argument that the President may decline to provide certain information
in some circumstances if doing so would be in the public interest. The second point is directly related to the
ongoing debate about the scope and nature of executive privilege.16
Congress’s oversight role is also significant because it shines the spotlight of public attention on
critical issues, which helps both lawmakers and the general public to make informed judgments
about executive performance. Woodrow Wilson, in his classic 1885 study Congressional
Government, emphasized that the “informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its
legislative function.” He added that unless Congress conducts oversight of administrative
12 See CNN, “VA Hospital Investigation,” https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/va-hospitals.
13 See Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, Veterans Health Administration: Review of Alleged
Patient Deaths, Patient Wait Times, and Scheduling Practices at the Phoenix VA Health Care System, 14-02603-267,
August 26, 2014.
14 See CRS Report R43704, Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (H.R. 3230; P.L. 113-146), by
Sidath Viranga Panangala et al.
15 See, for example, letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to President Donald Trump, June 7, 2017,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf.
16 Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege (Carolina Academic Press, 2004), pp. 10-11; and Richard H.
Johnston et al., eds., Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Association, 1903), pp. 303-305.
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activities, the “country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs
which it is most important it should understand and direct.”17
Oversight occurs in virtually all the activities of Congress and its Members and through a wide
variety of channels, organizations, and structures. These can include formal committee hearings
and informal Member contacts with executive officials, as well as casework performed by
Members, reviews and studies by staff and congressional support agencies, reports prepared by
executive branch agencies, and studies prepared by nongovernmental entities such as academic
institutions, private commissions, or think tanks.
Former Representative Lee Hamilton succinctly stated that the purpose of oversight is to
“determine what happens after a law is passed.”18 Some of the main purposes achieved in making
that determination are outlined below.
Ensure Executive Compliance with Statutory Requirements and Legislative
Intent
Congress delegates substantial discretionary authority to agency officials to engage in rulemaking
and the management of the administrative state. To ensure that these officers faithfully execute
laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken
and regulations formulated by departments and agencies.
The Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act (P.L. 104-121) is a tool that Congress may use to overturn regulations issued by
federal agencies. It was enacted in 1996 and requires agencies to report on their rulemaking activities to Congress.
The act was intended to reassert control over agency rulemaking by establishing a special set of expedited or “fast
track” legislative procedures, particularly in the Senate, for considering legislation to overturn rules.
For more information see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked Questions, by
Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report R45248, The Congressional Review Act: Determining
Which “Rules” Must Be Submitted to Congress, by Valerie C. Brannon and Maeve P. Carey.
Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations
A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient
and effective program management and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of
program goals. A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial
operations and service delivery. Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to
Congress and enhance program performance.
Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious
Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud
Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, wasteful expenditures, incompetent
management, and the subversion of governmental processes can provoke legislative and public
interest in oversight. This work frequently benefits from the audits and investigations of other
oversight officials in the federal government, including inspectors general and the Government
17 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 303. More recently, Professor Josh
Chafetz, a scholar of Congress and its role in the federal government in the 21 st century, has referred to this function as
“congressional overspeech.” Josh Chafetz, “Congressional Overspeech,” Fordham Law Review, vol. 89 (2020), p. 596.
18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops, committee
print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, p. 10.
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Accountability Office (GAO), which have specific mandates from Congress to address waste,
fraud, and abuse in agencies.
Evaluate Program Performance
Systematic program performance evaluation remains an evolving technique of oversight. Modern
program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies—such as surveys, costbenefit analyses, and efficiency studies—to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs.
Information about program performance may be useful to Congress as it makes decisions about
the structure of government programs and the amount of funding they will receive.
Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers
Many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators state that Presidents and executive
officials may ignore or misinterpret congressional intent in various areas, such as the
impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers.19 Increased oversight—as part of the
constitutional checks and balances system—can redress what many in the public and Congress
might view as executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives.
Gather Information for Potential Legislation
One of the major functions of Congress involves developing, debating, and passing legislation.
Congress gathers information to support its legislative work from a variety of sources, and
information gathered from agencies in the process of oversight can be an important part of that
process. Senator Sam Ervin described the importance of oversight to legislating as follows:
The Constitution and statutes give Congress a solemn duty to oversee the activities of the
executive branch. How else can Congress fully comprehend whether existing laws are
adequate and properly administered? How else can Congress determine what specific
additional laws are needed to guide the nation?20
Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Implement Program
Objectives
Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program
objectives can be accomplished in various ways. Numerous laws require agencies to submit
reports to Congress. Some of these are regular, occurring annually or semiannually, for instance,
while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions. Reporting
requirements may promote self-evaluation by the agency. Organizations outside of Congress—
such as offices of inspector general, GAO, and expert commissions—also advise Members and
committees on how well federal agencies are working.
GAO’s High-Risk List
Since 1990, GAO has operated its “High-Risk Program” to monitor and report on government operations that are
at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Over this period, GAO has added and removed a number
of programs and operations from what is commonly referred to as the High-Risk List based on evaluation criteria
19 See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Andrew Rudalevige, The New
Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate (University of Michigan Press, 2005); Louis
Fisher, Presidential War Power, 3rd ed. (University of Kansas Press, 2013); and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Living
Presidency: An Originalist Argument Against Its Ever-Expanding Powers (Belknap Press, 2020).
20 Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., “Introduction,” in James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (Random House, 1976), p. xiii.
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developed by GAO. Typically, GAO publishes an update to its report on the High-Risk List every two years,
coinciding with the start of a new Congress. The High-Risk List has become a popular tool for Congress to
identify programs and other activities that may benefit from additional monitoring by committees.21
Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities
Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which
provides the opportunity to assess agency and departmental expenditures in detail. Most federal
agencies and programs are required to receive recurring reauthorizations—on an annual, twoyear, five-year, or other basis—giving authorizing committees the opportunity to review agency
activities, operations, and procedures. As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can
abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds. Congress
might also increase funding for effective programs.
Protect Individual Rights and Liberties
Congressional oversight can help safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others. By
revealing abuses of authority, oversight hearings and other efforts can halt executive misconduct
and help prevent its recurrence through, for example, new legislation or indirectly by heightening
public awareness.
Draw Public Attention to Issues
Congressional oversight can provide Congress and its Members with the opportunity to highlight
issues, activities of the government, and other events that they wish to bring to the attention of the
public. Congress may believe that it will be better able to achieve a goal if public pressure or
energy is directed to a particular matter and that oversight activities may be one way to generate
that attention.
Other Purposes
The purposes of oversight can also be stated in more precise terms. Like the general purposes
noted above, these more specific purposes unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and
multifaceted dimensions of oversight. A brief list includes the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Review the agency rulemaking process
Monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services
Encourage cooperation between agencies and between the branches
Promote accountability within agencies
Appraise the administration of justice, including judicial and administrative
proceedings
Investigate constituent complaints and media critiques
Signal priorities and demonstrate activity to constituents and interest groups
21 GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and
Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743, February 25, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107743; and U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The Government Accountability Office’s 2025 High Risk
List, 119th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2025, https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-government-accountabilityoffices-2025-high-risk-list/.
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•
Assess whether program design and execution are meeting the needs of
service recipients
Thoughts on Oversight and Its Rationales from...
James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate
Justice on the first Supreme Court:
The House of Representatives … form the grand inquest of the state. They will diligently inquire
into grievances, arising both from men and things.
Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to
refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and
to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the
wisdom and will of its constituents.
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), a British utilitarian philosopher:
[T]he proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw
the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any
one considers questionable.
Congress as an Oversight Body
This section lays out several key issues related to Congress’s role as a legislative body. It begins
with a broad discussion of the constitutional sources of Congress’s oversight authority and then
proceeds to more specific discussion about how Congress operates as an oversight organization.
Next, the section considers oversight as a practice and lays out one way to model oversight as a
process. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of Congress’s working relationship with
the executive branch.
Authority to Conduct Oversight
Congress’s authority to conduct oversight comes from the Constitution and is informed by
Supreme Court decisions, federal laws, and House and Senate rules. Oversight is an implicit
constitutional responsibility of Congress. According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “it was
not considered necessary [by the Framers] to make an explicit grant of such authority. The power
to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.”22
The investigative authority of Congress has been broadly interpreted by an array of Supreme
Court decisions. For example, in Watkins v. United States,23 the Court stated that the “power of
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed laws.” There are limits to Congress’s power to investigate, including some found
in the Constitution itself (e.g., the protection accorded witnesses under the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination).
22 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Roger Burns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974, vol. 1
(Chelsea House, 1975), p. xiii.
23 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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The Supreme Court on Congress’s Power to Oversee and Investigate
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 181-182 (1927): Congress, investigating the administration of the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation
could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.” The
“potential” for legislation was sufficient. The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry—
with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975): Expanding on its holding in McGrain,
the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.”
Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch
activities from such explicit and implicit provisions as the following:
•
•
•
•
The power of the purse. The Constitution provides: “No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”24 Each year the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies. The
appropriations process allows Congress to exercise extensive control over the
activities of executive agencies. Congress can define the precise purposes for
which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures
for certain purposes.
The power to organize the executive branch. Congress has the authority to
create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies. It has
the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies and
grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators. Congress, in short,
exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally
over policy.25
The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own
enumerated powers as well as those of the executive branch. Article I grants
Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money,
regulate foreign and interstate commerce, declare war, provide for the
creation and maintenance of armed forces, and establish post offices.26
Augmenting these specific powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
gives Congress the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”27 These provisions grant broad
authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established by law.28
The Senate’s power to confirm officers of the United States. The confirmation
process not only involves the determination of a nominee’s suitability for an
executive (or judicial) position but also provides an opportunity to examine
24 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 7.
25 U.S. Const. art. I, §9; see also U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
26 U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
27 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
28 See CRS Report R45442, Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, by Todd
Garvey and Sean M. Stiff.
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•
•
the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and
programs that the nominee intends to pursue.29
The power of investigation and inquiry. A traditional method of exercising
the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and
inquiries into executive branch operations. Legislators often seek to know
how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency
officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public
perceives the programs. The investigatory method helps to ensure a more
responsible bureaucracy while supplying Congress with information needed
to formulate new legislation.
Impeachment and removal. Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful
oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior and
to eliminate such misbehavior through the conviction and removal from
office of the offending individuals.30
Statutes and Oversight
There are also numerous laws that impact how Congress conducts oversight.31 Despite its lengthy
heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,32 which required House and Senate standing committees
to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their jurisdictions.
Congress has also passed a number of laws, especially in the past half-century, that support its
oversight function directly and indirectly. Some of these statutes were designed to make executive
branch agencies more transparent. Others have established officials within agencies who are
required to perform certain routine oversight functions, including audits and investigations of
potential waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. In practice, a large amount of Congress’s
oversight activity can be traced to information gathered or disclosed through these laws. In
addition, Congress devotes significant attention to monitoring the effectiveness of these
oversight-enabling statutes and considering amendments to improve their effectiveness.
House and Senate Rules on Oversight
The House and Senate have often amended their formal rules to encourage and strengthen
committee oversight of the administration of laws. For example, House rules direct committees to
create oversight subcommittees, undertake futures research and forecasting, and review the
impact of tax expenditures within their respective jurisdictions. Senate rules require each standing
committee to include regulatory impact statements in committee reports accompanying
legislation.
29 See U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
30 See U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
31 For a detailed discussion, including specific examples of relevant statutes, see “Statutory Oversight Enablers” below.
32 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
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House Rules
House rules33 grant the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a comprehensive role
in the conduct of oversight. For example, the committee has the authority or responsibility to do
the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
“[R]eview and study on a continuing basis the operation of government
activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President” (Rule
X, clause 3).
“[R]eceive and examine reports of the Comptroller General of the United
States and submit to the House such recommendations as it considers
necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of the reports”
(Rule X, clause 4).
“[S]tudy intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the
States and municipalities and between the United States and international
organizations of which the United States is a member” (Rule X, clause 4).
“[A]t any time conduct investigations of any matter [notwithstanding
language] conferring jurisdiction over the matter to another standing
committee. The findings and recommendations of the committee in such an
investigation shall be made available to any other standing committee having
jurisdiction over the matter involved” (Rule X, clause 4).
Report to the House “the authorization and oversight plans submitted by
committees … together with any recommendations that [the committee], or
the House leadership group described above, may make to ensure the most
effective coordination of [these] plans” (Rule X, clause 2).
Choose to adopt a “rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions
by a member or counsel of the committee including pursuant to subpoena
under clause 2(m) of Rule XI” (Rule X, clause 4).
“[E]valuate the effect of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and
executive branches of the Government” (Rule X, clause 4).
House rules also provide authority for oversight by other standing committees as follows:
•
•
•
Each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall
review and study “the application, administration, execution, and
effectiveness of laws and programs addressing subjects within its
jurisdiction” and determine whether they should be “continued, curtailed, or
eliminated” (Rule X, clause 2).
Committees have the authority to “review and study on a continuing basis the
impact or probable impact of tax policies” on subjects that fall within their
jurisdictions (Rule X, clause 2).
Certain committees have special oversight authority (i.e., to review and
study, on an ongoing basis, specific subject areas that are within the
legislative jurisdictions of other committees). Special oversight is somewhat
akin to the broad oversight authority granted to the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act except
33 The rules of the House of Representatives are available at https://rules.house.gov/sites/evo-
subsites/rules.house.gov/files/documents/houserules119thupdated.pdf.
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•
•
•
•
•
that special oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause
3).
Each standing committee “having more than 20 members shall establish an
oversight subcommittee, or require its subcommittees to conduct oversight in
their respective jurisdictions” (Rule X, clauses 2 and 5).
Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately
set out and clearly identified. Each report is also to include “a statement of
general performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals
and objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding” (Rule XIII, clause
3).
“Each standing committee, or a subcommittee thereof, shall hold at least one
hearing during each 120-day period following the establishment of the
committee on the topic of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in
Government programs which that committee may authorize.” Such hearings
shall “include a focus on the most egregious instances of waste, fraud, abuse,
or mismanagement in government programs as documented by any report the
committee has received” from the Comptroller General or an inspector
general. Committee and subcommittees shall also hold “at least one hearing
on issues raised by reports issued by the [Comptroller General] indicating
that Federal programs or operations that the committee may authorize are at
high risk for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, known as the ‘high-risk list’
or ‘high-risk series’” (Rule XI, clause 2).
The chair of each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and
Rules) shall adopt in a public meeting an authorization and oversight plan for
that Congress. Committee plans shall be submitted simultaneously to the
Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and House
Administration. Additionally, “the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform shall report to the House the authorization and oversight plans [of the
committees] together with any recommendations that it, or the House
leadership group … may make to ensure the most effective coordination of
authorization and oversight plans and otherwise to achieve the[se]
objectives” (Rule X, clause 2).
“Each such plan shall include, with respect to programs and agencies within
the committee’s jurisdiction, and to the maximum extent practicable—
(A) a list of such programs or agencies with lapsed authorizations that received
funding in the prior fiscal year or, in the case of a program or agency with a
permanent authorization, which has not been subject to a comprehensive review by
the committee in the prior three Congresses;
(B) a description of each such program or agency to be authorized in the current
Congress;
(C) a description of each such program or agency to be authorized in the next
Congress, if applicable;
(D) a description of any oversight to support the authorization of each such program
or agency in the current Congress; and
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(E) recommendations for changes to existing law for moving such programs or
agencies from mandatory funding to discretionary appropriations, where appropriate”
(Rule X, clause 2).
•
“Not later than January 2 of each odd-numbered year, a committee shall
submit to the House a report on the activities of that committee. (2) Such
report shall include—
(A) “separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of that
committee under [rules X and XI] during the Congress;
(B) “a summary of the authorization and oversight plans submitted by the committee
…;
(C) “a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to
[their authorization and oversight plans];
(D) “a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that committee
and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon; and
(E) “a delineation of any [oversight] hearings” (Rule XI, clause 1).
In addition, the Speaker, with the approval of the House, may appoint special ad hoc oversight
committees for the purpose of reviewing specific matters within the jurisdictions of two or more
standing committees (Rule X, clause 2).
The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
On April 23, 2020, the House adopted H.Res. 938, which created the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. Similar to previous select committees dedicated to
specific issues, the select subcommittee was directed by the resolution to “conduct a full and complete
investigation and study” and to issue a final report to the House on a number of specific issues related to the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the federal government’s response. (See H.Res. 935 for the operational
text regarding the select subcommittee.) The select subcommittee, which was retained in the 117th Congress, held
briefings and hearings, released reports, and requested information from the executive branch as the pandemic
and the government’s response evolved.
While a large number of committees and subcommittees in both chambers have oversight jurisdiction relevant to
specific aspects of the pandemic and pandemic response, the House was able to both use and adapt its standing
rules to create a subcommittee tasked with overseeing and investigating the issue as a whole.
Senate Rules
Under Senate rules,34 each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) shall
“review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those
laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the legislative jurisdiction of that
committee” (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
In addition to this general oversight requirement, policy oversight responsibilities are granted to
specified standing committees. This duty is similar to special oversight in the House. For
example, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is authorized to “study and
review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger both in the
United States and in foreign countries and rural affairs and report thereon from time to time”
(Rule XXV, clause 1(a)).
34 The rules of the Senate are available at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.
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All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to include regulatory impact
evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule
XXVI, clause 11). The evaluations are to include matters such as:
•
•
•
an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses that would be
regulated,
a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal
privacy, and
a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result from
the regulations.
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs exercises oversight jurisdiction
over government operations generally, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Selected oversight duties assigned to the committee under Rule XXV, clause 2(k), include:
•
•
•
•
reviewing and studying on a continuing basis the operation of government
activities at all levels to determine their economy, effectiveness, and
efficiency;
receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General and submitting
recommendations as it deems necessary to the Senate;
evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and
executive branches of the government; and
studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the
states and municipalities and international organizations of which the United
States is a member.
The Senate established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under the Committee on
Government Operations on March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress) by adopting S.Res 189. The
subcommittee was an outgrowth of the 1941 “Truman Committee” (named for its chair, Senator
Harry Truman), which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war program. The
Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chair of the Government Operations Committee
transferred the functions of the Truman Committee to the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. Since then, this subcommittee (now a part of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs) has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste,
fraud, and inefficiency.35
Congressional Participants in Oversight
Committees
The most common method of conducting oversight is through the committee system. Legislative
history demonstrates that the House and Senate have long used their standing committees—as
well as joint, select, or special committees—to investigate federal activities and agencies:
•
The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs have broad
35 For more information, see Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Historical Background,” September 11, 2025, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wpcontent/uploads/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Historical%20Background%20(for%20website)%20Jan%202015%20update.p
df.
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•
oversight jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government. They have
been vested with broad investigatory powers over government-wide
activities.
Each standing committee of Congress has oversight responsibilities for
reviewing government activities principally within its jurisdiction. These
panels also have the authority to establish oversight and investigative
subcommittees. The establishment of an oversight subcommittee does not
preclude a panel’s legislative subcommittees from conducting oversight.
Certain House and Senate committees have “special oversight” or
“comprehensive policy oversight” of designated subject areas, as noted
above.
Members
Oversight is generally considered a committee activity, but Members also have the ability to
pursue oversight without working through a committee. Both casework and other project work
conducted in Members’ personal offices, including in their district or state offices, can yield
insights about bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation. These discoveries, in turn, can
lead to the adjustment of agency policies and procedures and to changes in public law.
Casework—responding to constituent requests for assistance with federal agencies36—provides
an opportunity to examine bureaucratic activity and operations, if only in a selective way. Other
constituent service activities, such as responding to inquiries about federal grants or projects or
addressing concerns about program implementation or agency operations, may also provide
Members with similar insights. The accessibility of government websites also allows interested
constituents to monitor federal activities and expenditures and to share their findings or
observations with Members, relevant committees, and legislative staff.
Individual Members may also conduct their own investigations or ad hoc hearings or direct their
staff to conduct oversight studies. While individual lawmakers lack the authority to use
compulsory processes (e.g., subpoenas) or conduct official hearings, many other options are
available.37 Members might also request GAO, an inspector general or other appropriate
government official, a private research group, or some other entity to conduct an investigation.
Members might choose to publicize this work by releasing staff reports with their findings;
sharing information with their constituents, the media, and other stakeholders; or using what they
learn to support additional oversight or legislation.
Committee Staff
As issues become more complex, the professional staff of House and Senate committees may
provide the expertise required to conduct effective oversight and investigations. Committee staff
are expected to have the experience, knowledge, and analytical skills to conduct proficient and
thorough oversight for the committees and subcommittees they serve. Committees may also call
upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, “borrow” staff from federal
departments, or employ academics and others with specialized expertise.
36 See CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office, by R. Eric Petersen and Sarah J. Eckman.
37 See “Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigations” below.
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Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of oversight. Their
informal contacts with executive officials at all levels constitute one of Congress’s most effective
techniques for performing its “continuous watchfulness” function.
Personal Staff
Constituent letters, complaints, and requests for projects and assistance frequently bring issues
and deficiencies in federal programs and administration to the attention of Members and their
personal office staff. The casework performed by a Member’s staff for constituents can be an
effective oversight tool.
Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight and legislative interests of
the Member. The relationship between casework and the oversight function is facilitated by a
regular exchange of ideas among the Member, legislative aides, and caseworkers on problems
brought to the office’s attention by constituents. Caseworkers may also become aware of certain
issues through their interactions with agency employees. Telephone and email inquiries,
reinforced with written requests, can focus agency attention on issues raised by caseworkers and
Members’ constituents. Casework might also prompt legislative initiatives to resolve those
problems.
Caseworkers and other legislative staffers may seek to maximize service to their Member’s
constituents by reaching out to the staff of the subcommittees and committees that handle the
areas of concern to the Member’s constituents. Through this interaction, the staff of the pertinent
standing committee(s) can be made aware of the problems with the agency or program in
question, assess how widespread and significant they are, determine their causes, and recommend
corrective action.
Congressional Support Agencies and Offices
Many of the other agencies and offices within the legislative branch may be able to support the
overall operations of the House and Senate. Additional offices that might play a role in oversight
include, among others, the House General Counsel’s Office, the House Parliamentarian’s Office,
the Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, the House Clerk’s Office, the Secretary of the Senate’s
Office, the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, the Senate and House Historian’s Office, and the
Senate Library.
For further detail on the role of GAO, CRS, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and these
other offices, see “Oversight Information Sources and Consultative Services” later in this report.
Oversight and the Committee System
A persistent challenge for Congress in conducting oversight is coordination among committees—
within each chamber as well as between the two houses. The final report of the House Select
Committee on Committees of the 93rd Congress noted, “Review findings and recommendations
developed by one committee are seldom shared on a timely basis with another committee, and, if
they are made available, then often the findings are transmitted in a form that is difficult for
Members to use.”38 Oversight coordination between House and Senate committees is also
38 U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Committees, Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 Part 2, Report of
the Select Committee on Committees U.S. House of Representatives to Accompany H. Res. 988 Together with
Supplemental Views, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1974 (GPO, 1974), p. 68.
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uncommon, and it occurs primarily in the aftermath of perceived major policy failures or
prominent inter-branch conflicts, as with the Iran-Contra affair and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Inter-committee cooperation on oversight can be beneficial for a variety of reasons. For example,
it can help minimize unnecessary duplication and conflict and inhibit agencies from playing one
committee against another. There are formal and informal ways to achieve oversight coordination
among committees.
Identifying Relevant Committee Jurisdiction
A basic step in conducting oversight involves identifying the committee(s) with jurisdiction over
the policy matter or programs of interest. The committee jurisdictional statements in House Rule
X and Senate Rule XXV specify the subjects that fall within each committee’s jurisdiction. In
general, the rules do not address specific departments, agencies, programs, or laws but are stated
in broad subject terms. Therefore, multiple committees may exercise some jurisdiction—
especially in regard to oversight—over the same departments and agencies or over different
elements of the same agency activities. While the House and Senate Parliamentarians are the sole
definitive arbiters of committee jurisdiction, CRS can assist congressional staff with the
identification of the potential committee(s) of jurisdiction for proposed oversight activities.39
General Techniques of Encouraging Oversight Coordination
House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV provide broad authority to the standing committees of each
chamber to investigate matters within their respective jurisdictions. Committees undertake
oversight activities on their own initiative in the full committee or in one or more subcommittees.
In some cases they may also coordinate their activities with other committees (for instance, by
convening a joint hearing on a subject of mutual interest). Alternatively, to supplement the
existing standing committee system, the House or Senate can establish select or special
committees to probe issues and agencies, promote public understanding of national concerns, or
coordinate oversight of issues that span the jurisdictions of multiple standing committees. Given
the wide range of subjects each committee is responsible for, the creation of a select committee
can enable greater sustained focus on a particular area of congressional concern.
When developing oversight and authorization plans, committee chairs are directed to “coordinate
with other committees of jurisdiction to ensure that programs and agencies are subject to routine,
comprehensive authorization efforts.”40 Authorization and oversight plans assembled by the
House’s standing committees are delivered to the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform and are printed as reports of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, along
with that committee’s own recommendations.41 The Senate does not have a similar requirement.
Development and Execution of Oversight Projects
Congress’s oversight practice can range from day-to-day activities, such as assisting constituents
in their interactions with agencies, to much more formal actions, such as impeachment
39 On House rules governing committee jurisdiction and referral, see CRS Report R46251, Committee Jurisdiction and
Referral in the House, by Mark J. Oleszek. Jurisdiction and referral in the Senate is the subject of CRS Report R46815,
Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate, by Mark J. Oleszek.
40 House Rule X(2)(d)(4).
41 See, for instance, U.S. Congress, Committee on Oversight and Reform, Authorization and Oversight Plan for All
House Committees, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 2021, H.Rept. 117-17 (GPO, 2021).
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proceedings and special committees and subcommittees tasked with investigating specific
issues.42
While oversight comes in a variety of forms, planning for and executing oversight actions can be
laid out as a three-question process. While the process outlined within these questions appears to
have a beginning, a middle, and an end, oversight may not always unfold in a typical, or even
predictable, manner.
Question 1: Which Issues Warrant Oversight?
Any information that Members or their staff learn about activities of the executive branch might
become the basis for oversight. Congress might receive information from constituents, agency
officials (who may or may not be acting as whistleblowers), inspectors general, GAO, interest
groups, or the media. Information can also come in other forms, including congressionally
mandated reports and other government publications, agency responses to questions during or
outside of committee hearings, or personal observations of executive branch activities.
The decision about which potential oversight matters to pursue is based on the judgment and
goals of congressional leaders, committees, and individual Members. These decisions may
include factors that are outside the scope of the Oversight Manual.43 However, there are logistical
and technical considerations that may be relevant to these discussions. Those considerations
might include Congress’s authority to conduct particular oversight activities, the resources
required to successfully complete an oversight project, and the anticipated outcome of successful
oversight.
Authority to Conduct Oversight
While Congress’s authority to conduct oversight is expansive, it is not unlimited. Cases may arise
where it is not entirely clear whether Congress has the authority to take a specific action or gather
particular information. This can be a complicated question that involves contested questions of
law and the appropriate separation of powers.44 Unresolved questions about the limits of
Congress’s oversight authority might not dissuade Congress from conducting oversight in those
areas. Nonetheless, understanding the issues that could arise might be useful when determining
whether to proceed.
Resources
Oversight has costs. Of particular importance are Member and staff time, both of which can be
scarce resources.45 Resource limitations might guide the decisions of Members and committees
42 For such a guide for investigative hearings, see Morton Rosenberg, “When Congress Comes Calling: A Study on the
Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry,” Constitution Project, 2017, pp. 33-38,
https://docs.pogo.org/report/2017/POGO_TCP_When_Congress_Comes_Calling.pdf. See also Project on Government
Oversight, The Art of Congressional Oversight.
43 Political scientist Morris Ogul identifies seven “opportunity factors” that impact the likelihood of oversight. In
Ogul’s discussion those factors are legal authority to conduct oversight, staff resources, the subject matter at issue,
committee structure, status of the interested Members on the relevant committee, relations with the executive branch,
and the priorities of Members. Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy (University of Pittsburgh Press,
1976), pp. 11-22.
44 See “Investigative Oversight” below.
45 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, Final Report, 116th
Cong., 2nd sess., October 2020, pp. 98-127, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-116hrpt562/pdf/GPO(continued...)
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regarding potential oversight opportunities and between oversight and other legislative activities.
Available resources may also influence the scope of particular investigations and the products
they produce.
Anticipated Outcome
Another practical question that might be considered is the probable outcome for a particular
oversight action. It is not possible to know, in advance, the outputs or outcomes of oversight
activity. With experience, though, Members and staff may develop a strong sense of how and
where oversight projects are likely to go and how long they might take.
Question 2: How to Get the Desired Information?
Once the decision to investigate a particular oversight matter has been made and goals for that
activity have been set, it is important to formulate a plan for conducting that oversight. Such a
plan does not necessarily have to be complex or take any particular form. There are many cases
when a telephone call to an agency contact or identification of publicly available documents
could be enough to satisfy Congress’s oversight needs, while other matters have been litigated all
the way to the Supreme Court.
What Information Is Available and Who Has It?
Having identified preliminary goals for an oversight action, it is useful to determine what relevant
information may be available and which agency or official is likely to have it. For instance, when
investigating an allegation of mismanagement within an agency, the agency’s own records and
officials are likely to be a major source of information.
It might not be obvious early in the process that certain information would be useful to
Congress’s activities even if it is readily available. Moreover, it may be difficult to determine
where documents or officials with relevant information can be found even if Congress has a good
sense of the type of information it needs to complete its work. This is especially true when an
issue involves the activities or jurisdiction of multiple agencies.
The Watergate Investigation and President Nixon’s Oval Office Tapes
Among the best known of all congressional oversight actions are the investigations of the Watergate break-in and
the Nixon Administration that culminated in the resignation of President Richard Nixon on August 9, 1974. The
most compelling information to come out of these investigations was taped conversations in the Oval Office
involving President Nixon himself. White House advisor John Dean first raised the possible existence of a taping
system in the Oval Office while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.
Committee investigative staff followed up on Dean’s comments, and another Administration official, Alexander
Butterfield, confirmed the existence of the taping system. The discovery of these tapes, which played an important
role in compelling President Nixon’s resignation, might never have occurred had Congress not already been
investigating the Watergate break-in.46
CRPT-116hrpt562.pdf. Beginning in the 118th Congress, the Modernization Committee was succeeded by the
Subcommittee on Modernization and Innovation of the Committee on House Administration.
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, The Final Report of the Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974, S.Rept. 93-981
(GPO, 1974); and James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (Random House, 1976), pp. 23-26.
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How Can Congress Get the Information?
Sometimes gathering information is the biggest challenge Congress faces when conducting
oversight. Much of this manual is devoted to the variety of tools available to Congress to obtain
information even in the face of resistance from the executive branch.47
In many other cases, information is already available to Congress either because disclosure is
required by statute or because a federal agency, other organization, or individual has chosen to
release the information to Congress or the public. Additionally, it is often possible to obtain
information via direct communication between Members or staff and agency officials. There are
strong incentives for agencies to engage with Congress, and they may provide information upon
request in many instances.48
Question 3: What Can Be Done with This Information?
Most would agree that oversight has the ability to “throw light on activities of government” and
fosters an environment of increased accountability for officials.49 Oversight, especially oversight
that includes “police patrol” strategies, is likely to have these benefits across the government,
even though Congress does not have the capacity to directly monitor the activities of millions of
federal employees and contractors.50
Oversight can directly support Congress’s legislative function. Oversight provides information on
the state of the government that can be applied when Congress makes decisions on agency
budgets and program authorizations and may lead to other legislation. How the knowledge gained
from oversight can be applied in those other functions depends on the nature of that information
and the priorities and preferences of Congress. More concretely, as discussed throughout this
report, oversight can lead to a variety of specific products and other outputs. While oversight
questions are often resolved when congressional stakeholders receive enough information to
resolve their questions or concerns, many projects lead to public-facing actions such as committee
hearings, the publication of investigative reports, and legislative responses. While it is not always
possible to foresee where or how far particular oversight actions will go, an understanding of the
benefits, costs, advantages, and disadvantages of these options may be useful when making other
decisions throughout the process.
In addition, one can also consider the form that the findings and conclusions in these products
might take. Professor Kenneth Lowande identifies four classes of congressional oversight reports:
1. Finding: a conclusion of fact about past events
2. Evaluation: a judgment regarding a past event
3. Prediction: an expectation about a likely future outcome based on current
conditions
47 For an extended discussion of how Congress can obtain information, see “Oversight Through Other Congressional
Activities” below.
48 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben
Wilhelm.
49 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops,
committee print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, pp. 11-12 (remarks by Lee Hamilton).
50 See generally McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked.”
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4. Recommendation: a proposal to make policy or other changes intended to
produce a desired effect51
This typology may be a useful lens for both refining the goals for an oversight project and
identifying strategies to achieve those goals. If, for instance, one goal of a particular oversight
activity is to gather information to support future legislation, then it may be useful to pursue lines
of inquiry that will inform legislative recommendations.
Oversight Through Other Congressional Activities
Congress’s constitutional functions also include consideration of legislation, appropriations,
Senate confirmation of presidential nominees, and the exercise of the impeachment power.
Oversight often has a symbiotic relationship with these other duties. For instance, oversight
regularly helps Congress identify issues that it wishes to legislate upon and helps Congress design
its proposals.
This section identifies major areas of congressional activity and how they relate to and facilitate
oversight. Congress has a central role in the development of the budget, the operations of
agencies and general management of the executive branch, confirmation of appointees to senior
positions across the government, and the consideration and approval of all legislation.
The Legislative Process
While oversight is frequently considered to be adjacent to legislative authority, there are
important ways in which the two activities overlap. Oversight, for instance, can influence
legislative priorities or identify areas of interest. In some cases, Congress establishes reporting
and study requirements for GAO, inspectors general, and agencies that generate
recommendations for agency or congressional action, which in turn provide both oversight
information and ideas for potential legislation.
As Congress has expanded its use of statutory tools that facilitate oversight, it has devoted more
attention to developing such legislation, overseeing its implementation, and evaluating its
effectiveness.52
The Budget Process53
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,54 as amended, enhanced the
legislative branch’s capacity to shape the federal budget. The act has had major institutional and
procedural effects on Congress:
51 Lowande, Kenneth and Mark A. Weiss, “The Politics of Predicting the Future” (unpublished working paper, July 12,
2024).
52 One example of such legislation is the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352) which, among other things,
updated the system for Congress and the executive branch to identify and consider the elimination of reporting
requirements that are no longer useful. See CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements:
Annual Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass.
53 For a general overview of the budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,
coordinated by James V. Saturno; and CRS In Focus IF11032, Budgetary Decisionmaking in Congress, by Megan S.
Lynch. CRS also reports regularly on legislative activity on the budget and appropriations as well as actions that affect
the budget process itself. See, for example, CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions,
by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch; and CRS Report R47384, Changes to House Rules Affecting the
Congressional Budget Process Included in H.Res. 5 (118th Congress), by James V. Saturno and Megan S. Lynch.
54 P.L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§607-688.
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•
•
Institutionally, Congress created three new entities: the Senate Committee on
the Budget, the House Committee on the Budget, and CBO.
Procedurally, the act established methods that permit Congress to determine
budget policy as a whole; relate revenue and spending decisions; determine
priorities among competing national programs; and ensure that revenue,
spending, and debt legislation are consistent with the overall budget policy.
The budget process coexists with the established authorization and appropriation procedures and
significantly affects each:
•
•
•
On the authorization side, the act requires committees to submit their
budgetary “views and estimates” on matters under their jurisdictions to the
Committee on the Budget not later than six weeks after the President submits
a budget or at such time that the Budget Committee might request.
On the appropriations side, new contract and borrowing authority must go
through the appropriations process. Subcommittees of the Appropriations
Committees are assigned financial allocations that determine how much may
be included in the measures they report. (The tax and appropriations panels
of each house also submit budgetary views and estimates to their respective
Budget Committees.)
In deciding spending, revenue, credit, and debt issues, Congress is sensitive
to trends in the overall composition of the annual federal budget
(expenditures for defense, entitlements, interest on the debt, and domestic
discretionary programs).55
These reforms have the potential to strengthen oversight by enabling Congress to better relate
program priorities to financial claims on the national budget. Each committee, knowing that it
will receive a fixed amount of the total to be included in a budget resolution, has an incentive to
scrutinize existing programs to make room for new programs or expanded funding of ongoing
projects or to assess whether programs have outlived their usefulness.
The Authorization Process
Through its authorization power, Congress exercises significant control over government
agencies. The entire authorization process56 may involve a host of oversight tools—hearings,
studies, and reports—but the key to the process is the authorization statute.
An authorization statute creates and shapes government programs and agencies, and it contains
the statement of legislative policy for the agency. Authorization is the first lever in congressional
exercise of the power of the purse. It usually allows an agency to be funded, but it does not
guarantee financing of agencies and programs. Frequently, authorizations establish dollar ceilings
on the amounts that can be appropriated.
55 See, for example, CRS Report R45941, The Annual Sequester of Mandatory Spending through FY2029, by Charles
S. Konigsberg; and CRS Insight IN11148, The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit, by
Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch.
56 See CRS Report R46497, Authorizations and the Appropriations Process, by James V. Saturno.
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The authorization-reauthorization process is a significant oversight tool. Through this process,
Members can become informed about the work of an agency and are given an opportunity to
direct the agency’s effort.57
Expiration of an agency’s program can provide an opportunity for in-depth oversight. In recent
decades, there has been a mix of permanent authorizations—which do not require regular
reauthorization legislation—and periodic authorizations, which can be annual or multiyear.
Periodic reauthorizations increase the likelihood that an agency will be scrutinized systematically.
An agency’s understanding that it must come to the legislative committee for renewed authority
increases the influence of the committee. This condition helps to account for the appeal of shortterm authorizations.
The Congressional Budget Office’s “Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring
Authorizations” Report
One resource that may be useful for determining potential oversight targets is CBO’s annual report Expired and
Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations. By law, CBO is required to annually submit a report to Congress listing
programs and activities funded during that fiscal year that do not have enacted authorizations and do not have
authorizations enacted for the next fiscal year.
The latest version of CBO’s report is available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61543.
In addition, the authorization process gives committees an opportunity to exercise informal,
nonstatutory controls over the agency. Nonstatutory controls used by committees to exercise
direction over the administration of laws include statements made in:
•
•
•
•
committee hearings,
committee reports accompanying legislation,
floor debate, and
contacts and correspondence with the agency.
If agencies fail to comply with these informal directives, the authorization committees can apply
sanctions or move to convert the informal directive to a statutory command.
The Appropriations Process
The appropriations process is among Congress’s most significant forms of oversight. Its strategic
position stems from the constitutional requirement that “no Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”58 This “power of the purse”
allows the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations to play a prominent role in oversight.
The oversight function of the Committees on Appropriations derives from their responsibility to
examine the budget requests of the agencies as contained in the President’s budget. The decisions
of the committees are conditioned on their assessments of the agencies’ need for their budget
requests as indicated by past performance. In practice, the entire record of an agency is fair game
for the required assessment. This comprehensive overview and the “carrot and stick” of
appropriations recommendations (i.e., the authority of the committees to withhold or reduce
appropriations to uncooperative agencies) make the committees significant focal points of
57 See CRS Report R46107, FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues,
coordinated by Bryce H. P. Mendez.
58 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 17. For a more detailed discussion of Congress’s appropriations power, see CRS Report
R46417, Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, by Sean M. Stiff.
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congressional oversight and are a key source of their power in Congress and in the federal
government generally.59
Enacted appropriations legislation frequently contains at least five types of statutory controls on
agencies:
1. It specifies the purpose for which funds may be used.
2. It defines the specified funding level for the agency as a whole as well as for
programs and divisions within the agency.
3. It sets time limits on the availability of funds for obligation.
4. It may contain limitation provisions. For example, in Division A of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2022,60 Congress included the following
condition: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this
Act may be used for first-class travel by the employees or agencies funded by
this Act in contravention of sections 301-10.122 through 301-10.124 of title 41,
Code of Federal Regulations.”61
5. It may stipulate how an agency’s budget can be reprogrammed (shifting funds
within an appropriations account) or transferred (shifted between appropriations
accounts).
Nonstatutory controls are a major form of oversight. Committee expectations and requirements
may be conveyed through committee reports, hearings, letters to agency heads, and other
communications. Agencies are not legally obligated to abide by nonstatutory recommendations,
but failure to do so may result in a loss of funds and flexibility the following year.
An Example of Nonstatutory Control of Agency Appropriations
The conference report for the third Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) includes the
following directive:
Paper Reduction Efforts.—The Conferees urge the Department of the Interior, EPA, Forest Service,
and Indian Health Service to work with the Office of Management and Budget to reduce printing
and reproduction costs and direct each agency to report to the Committees within 90 days of
enactment of this Act on steps being undertaken to achieve this goal and how much each agency
expects to save by implementing these measures.62
The Confirmation Process
By establishing a public record of the policy views of nominees, congressional hearings allow
lawmakers to call appointed officials to account at a later time. Since at least the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978,63 which encouraged greater scrutiny of nominations, Senate committees
have set aside more time to probe the qualifications, independence, and policy views of
59 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben
Wilhelm.
60 The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
FY2022.
61 P.L. 117-103, Division A, §710.
62 U.S. Congress, House Conference Committee, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of
Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, And for Other Purposes, Conference Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 31,
116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, H.Rept. 116-9 (GPO, 2019), p. 707.
63 P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. §§101 et seq.
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presidential nominees, seeking information on everything from their physical health to their
financial assets. The confirmation process can assist in oversight in at least three ways:
1. The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law.”64 The consideration of appointments to
executive branch leadership positions is a major responsibility of the Senate and
especially of Senate committees, which review and hold hearings regarding the
qualifications of nominees.
2. Confirmation hearings serve as an opportunity for senatorial oversight and
influence beyond the consideration of a nominee’s qualifications and vision,
providing a forum for the discussion of the policies and programs that would be
under the nominee’s purview. The confirmation process as an oversight tool can
be used to provide policy direction to nominees, inform nominees of
congressional interests, and seek commitments on future behavior.
3. Once the Senate has confirmed a nominee, oversight includes following up to
ensure that the nominee fulfills any commitments made during confirmation
hearings. Subsequent hearings and committee investigations can explore whether
such commitments have been kept.
The President also has authority regarding a number of other appointments that do not require the
advice and consent of the Senate, including, under certain circumstances, recess appointments65
and designations under the Vacancies Act.66
The Impeachment Process
The impeachment power is a unique tool available to Congress under the Constitution.
Impeachment applies to the President, the Vice President, and other federal civil officers in the
executive and judicial branches.67 Impeachment offers Congress:
•
•
an auxiliary constitutional method for obtaining information that might
otherwise not be made available and
an implied threat of removal for an official whose conduct exceeds
acceptable boundaries.
Impeachment procedures differ from those of conventional congressional oversight. The most
significant procedural differences center on the roles played by each house of Congress. The
House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach.68 A simple majority is needed in the
House to approve articles of impeachment. The Senate has the sole power to try an
64 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
65 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 3. For more information on recess appointments, see CRS Report R44997, The Vacancies
Act: A Legal Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon.
66 5 U.S.C. §§3345 et seq. For more information on the Vacancies Act, see CRS Report RS21412, Temporarily Filling
Presidentially Appointed, Senate-Confirmed Positions, by Henry B. Hogue.
67 U.S. Const. art. II, §4. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd
Garvey.
68 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 5. See CRS Report R45769, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives, by
Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene.
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impeachment.69 A two-thirds majority is required in the Senate to convict and remove the
individual from office. Should the Senate deem it appropriate in a given case, it may, by majority
vote, impose an additional judgment of disqualification from holding further federal offices of
honor, trust, or profit.70
The impeachment process is infrequently used. The House has voted to impeach officials in at
least 22 cases.71 The Senate has voted to convict in eight cases, all pertaining to federal judges.72
The most recent executive impeachment trial was that of Department of Homeland Security
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas in 2024, and the most recent judicial impeachment trial was that of
U.S. District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. in 2010. A number of constitutional and
procedural issues were addressed in the impeachment trials of President Bill Clinton and
President Donald Trump, although the answers to some of these questions remain ambiguous. For
example:
•
•
•
The impeachment process has been continued from one Congress to the
next,73 although the procedural steps vary depending upon the stage in the
process.
The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment as “Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”74 However, the meaning and scope
of high Crimes and Misdemeanors remains in some dispute and depends on
the interpretation of individual legislators.75
The Constitution provides for impeachment of the “President, Vice President,
and all civil Officers of the United States.”76 While the outer limit of the
“civil Officers” language is not altogether clear, past precedents suggest that
it covers at least federal judges and senior executive officers.
Investigative Oversight77
This section provides an overview of some of the more common legal issues that committees may
face in the course of conducting oversight and investigations. It begins by briefly describing the
historical development of the legislative “power of inquiry” and follows with a general summary
of Congress’s authority under the U.S. Constitution to perform oversight and investigations. It
69 U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. 7. See CRS Report R46185, The Impeachment Process in the Senate, by Elizabeth Rybicki
and Michael Greene.
70 While the Constitution does not speak to the vote threshold necessary for disqualification, this has been the practice
of the Senate across history. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd
Garvey.
71 See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. In addition to the
21 instances identified in this report from 1789 to 2023, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro
Mayorkas was impeached in February 2024. See H.Res. 863 (119th Congress).
72 See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey.
73 For example, the House of Representatives impeached President Clinton on December 19, 1998, near the conclusion
of the 105th Congress. Shortly after the 106th Congress convened on January 3, 1999, the Senate conducted a trial. See
CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey.
74 U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
75 CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey.
76 U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
77 This report is not intended to address all the legal issues that committees, Members, and staff may encounter when
engaged in investigative activities. Congressional offices with legal questions on Congress’s investigatory powers may
contact CRS legislative attorneys.
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then discusses the legal tools commonly used by congressional committees in conducting that
oversight as well as the mechanisms used by Congress to enforce its demands for information.
The section then briefly discusses possible legal limitations on the investigative power, including
those arising from the Constitution, common law, and statutory restrictions.
Historical Background
The rich and varied history of legislative investigations, which can be traced from the English
Parliament to American colonial legislatures and through to the U.S. Congress, has played a
leading role in establishing the nature and contours of the congressional “power of inquiry.”78
This history supports the unmistakable conclusion that the power to investigate has long been
considered an essential attribute of legislative bodies.
It is difficult to identify with precision the emergence of Parliament’s protean investigatory
powers. By the early 17th century however, Parliament had apparently recognized its power to
investigate by requiring—on a case-by-case basis—the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documents in furtherance of the body’s “duty to inquire into every Step of publick
management.... ”79 These early investigations carried out by parliamentary committees focused on
the king’s ministers, in order to oversee their execution of the law, as well as private parties.80 As
the gathering of information relating to both the passage of new laws and the administration of
existing laws became seen as an essential ingredient of the legislative process, compulsory
investigatory powers were provided on a more general and permanent basis to established
parliamentary committees of inquiry.81 This overarching historical notion of the power of inquiry
as a necessary component of the legislative power was transported to America, where it was
incorporated into the practice of colonial governments and, after independence, to U.S. state
governments.82
The Constitutional Convention saw almost no discussion of Congress’s power to conduct
oversight and investigations, although individual members of the convention appear to have
understood Congress to clearly possess “inquisitorial” powers.83 A proposal to explicitly provide
78 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress
throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or
decide upon due investigation not to legislate.... ”).
79 13 R. CHANDLER, HISTORY & PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 172 (1743); ERNEST J. EBERLING,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 34 (1928) (noting that Parliament viewed the subpoena power as “too serious
a matter for general delegation”).
80 James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153,
161–62 (1926).
81 Id. at 163–64.
82 Id. at 165–68 (highlighting examples of colonial and state legislatures engaging in investigations). While English
Parliamentary practice often informs the powers of Congress, it is clear that the usefulness of parliamentary precedents
in defining Congress’s investigatory powers is somewhat limited due to significant distinctions between the two
legislative bodies. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested, Parliament’s investigatory and contempt powers
were derived from the bodies’ authority to exercise a “blend[]” of both legislative and judicial powers. Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 533 (1917) (concluding that the English contempt power “rested upon an assumed blending of
legislative and judicial authority possessed by the Parliament”). Congress, under the separation of powers doctrine,
exercises no judicial power. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1880) (suggesting that “no judicial power is
vested in the Congress”). Thus, unlike Parliament, any authority to investigate and subsequently enforce its orders must
rest solely on legislative authority provided to the body by the Constitution.
83 See e.g., 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (1937) (remarks of George
Mason) (Members of Congress “are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must meet
(continued...)
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Congress with the power to punish for contempt—a power Parliament often used as a means to
effectuate its investigatory powers—was made but not acted upon.84 Nevertheless, it is likely that
the general view was that no express enumeration of the power of inquiry or the power to punish
for contempt was considered necessary because the Framers’ conception of legislative power,
based on centuries of consistent practice by both Parliament and colonial legislatures, included
the ability to gather information relevant to the conduct of the House and Senate’s legislative
functions.85 As one scholar has put it, the contemporary understanding of legislative power at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution “possessed a content sufficiently broad to include the use
of committees of inquiry with powers to send for persons and paper.”86
Long-standing and unbroken congressional practice confirms this view. Congress has exhibited a
robust view of its own investigatory powers from its outset, especially in regard to the
legislature’s role in overseeing the administration of government.87 During the First Congress, the
House appointed five Members to investigate Senator Robert Morris’s prior activities as
superintendent of finance under the Articles of Confederation.88 The House later established a
special investigating committee in 1792 for the purpose of inquiring into Major General Arthur
St. Clair’s disastrous military excursion into the Northwest Territory in which nearly 700 federal
troops were killed by the Western Confederacy of American Indians.89 The act of authorizing such
a committee set an important precedent in that adoption of the resolution was preceded by a
debate over whether it was appropriate—and constitutional—for the House to investigate the
matter or whether it was preferable to urge the President to carry out the inquiry.90 Although some
asserted that the House lacked authority to inquire into executive operations, that position was
defeated, and the investigating committee was established with clear authority to “call for such
persons, papers and records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”91
The investigation itself also established important precedents for Congress’s authority to gather
information from the executive branch, including in relation to sensitive military matters. After
some discussion within Washington’s Cabinet of the President’s authority to withhold requested
information from Congress, the special committee obtained documents from both the War
Department and the Treasury Department as well as testimony from Cabinet officials Henry Knox
and Alexander Hamilton.92
Congress also acted swiftly to use federal law and internal rules to strengthen its investigatory
powers. In 1798, Congress enacted a statute recognizing its powers to not only obtain evidence
through testimony but to do so from witnesses under oath.93 The statute specifically authorized
frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices”); 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES
WILSON 219 (1804) (noting the traditional power of legislators to act as “grand inquisitors of the realm”).
84 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 80, at 340; JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 171 (2017).
85 Landis, supra note 77, at 169–70.
86 Id. at 169.
87 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444 (1960) (“The investigative function of [legislative] committees is as old as the
Republic.”); EBERLING, supra note 76, at 33.
88 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1514 (1790); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801, at 20 (1997) (“Thus, within a year of its first meeting, in the face of an explicit constitutional challenge, the
House of Representatives flatly asserted a broad power to investigate the conduct of a former executive.... ”).
89 TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 17–19 (1974).
90 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490–94 (1792).
91 TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 22.
92 Id. at 23–24.
93 Act of May 3, 1798, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 554.
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the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and a chair of a select committee to
administer oaths to witnesses testifying before Congress.94 During this same time period, both the
House and the Senate began to delegate to ad hoc select committees the authority to call for
papers or persons. Committee investigations have continued apace to the modern day,
representing a pervasive and nearly ubiquitous aspect of the legislative function,95 as has
Congress’s use of statutory provisions and internal chamber rules to support committee
investigations. The investigatory power is therefore thoroughly rooted in history and stands on an
equal footing with Congress’s other legislative powers.96
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigative
Inquiries
Although the “power of inquiry” was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has nonetheless described investigations as so central to the legislative function as to be
implicit in Article I’s vesting of “legislative Powers” in the Congress.97 In the seminal case of
McGrain v. Daugherty, a unanimous Supreme Court declared that “the power of inquiry—with
process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”98
Congressional investigations are therefore properly characterized as an implied constitutional
power of Congress.99 It is a power that serves both to ensure that Congress can make effective
and informed legislative decisions and to check executive power, thereby sustaining Congress’s
role in the United States’ constitutional scheme of separated powers.100
This power to gather information related to the legislative function is both critical in purpose, as
Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information,” and extensive in
scope, as Congress is empowered to obtain pertinent testimony and documents through
investigations into nearly any matter properly before the body.101 In Eastland v. United States
94 Id. The power to administer oaths was expanded to all standing committee chairs in 1817. Act of Feb. 8, 1817, ch.
10, 3 Stat. 345. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 167 (1927).
95 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (noting that Congress has “assiduously” performed
oversight “[f]rom the earliest times in its history”).
96 Id. at 187; WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (15th ed. 1913) (asserting that the “informing
function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function”). See also J. William Fulbright,
Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441 (1951) (describing
the power of investigation as “perhaps the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative function”).
97 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (“The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process.”).
98 See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174.
99 Id.; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197 (concluding that the investigative power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the
legislative process”). Although the Supreme Court has at times referred to the investigative power as an “inherent”
power, id. at 187, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to it as an implied power. While an inherent power may not be
tethered to a textual grant of authority, an implied power is derived by implication from an enumerated power. See
Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–43
(2001).
100 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955) (“Without the power to investigate—including of course the
authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress could be seriously
handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively.”) (citations omitted).
101 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175 (“A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess
it.”). Congress’s oversight function is subject to a variety of legal limitations. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund,
421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“Although the power to investigate is necessarily broad it is not unlimited.... We have
(continued...)
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Servicemen’s Fund, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that the “scope of [Congress’s] power
of inquiry ... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate
under the Constitution.”102 Similarly, in Watkins v. United States, the Court emphasized that the
“power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”103 “That
power,” the Court established, “is broad” and “encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”104 and
“comprehends probes into departments of the federal government to expose corruption,
inefficiency, or waste.”105 Included within the scope of the power is the authority to initiate
investigations, hold hearings, request testimony or documents from witnesses, and—in situations
where either a government or private party is not forthcoming—compel compliance with
congressional requests through the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas.106
The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed both the importance and breadth of Congress’s
investigatory power in Trump v. Mazars.107 There, the Court observed, “Without information,
Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively.’”108 As such,
Congress’s investigatory powers must be understood to include “inquiries into the administration
of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and ‘surveys of defects in our social, economic or
political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.’”109
The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose
Broad as the investigative power may be, it is not unlimited.110 The Supreme Court has cautioned
that because the power to investigate derives from Article I’s grant of “legislative powers,” it may
be exercised only “in aid of the legislative function.”111 No inquiry “is an end in itself” but
instead “must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”112 The
Supreme Court has generally implemented this principle by requiring that compulsory committee
investigative actions—including subpoenas for documents or testimony—serve a valid legislative
purpose.
This “legislative purpose” requirement is generous, permitting investigations into any topic upon
which legislation could be had or over which Congress may properly exercise authority.113 This
made it clear [] that Congress is not invested with a ‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs.’ The subject of any
inquiry always must be one ‘on which legislation could be had.’”) (citations omitted); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591
U.S. 848, 862-63 (2020) (noting that the power to conduct investigations is “subject to several limitations” including
those arising from “constitutional rights”).
102 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504, n. 15 (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)).
103 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175 (noting that the “power of inquiry” was “intended to be effectively exercised, and
therefore to carry with them such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to that end.”).
107 Mazars, 591 U.S. at 862.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing McGrain, 273 U.S at 161, 174-75).
110 The legislative purpose test generally governs the scope of the investigative power granted (implicitly) to each
house of Congress by the Constitution. That grant of power is then limited by other constitutional constraints. Id. at
2031-32. For a discussion of other constitutional limitations on congressional investigations see infra “Constitutional
Limitations.”
111 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
112 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
113 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
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includes investigations undertaken by Congress to inform itself about how existing laws function,
whether new laws are necessary, and if old laws should be repealed or altered.114 Investigations
into whether the executive branch is complying with its obligation to faithfully execute laws
passed by Congress also serve a legislative purpose, as do “probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”115 The Supreme Court also appears to
have recognized Congress’s legitimate role in informing the public “concerning the workings of
its government”—a task the legislature has “assiduously performed” since “the earliest times in
its history.”116
In practice, the legislative purpose requirement rarely acts as a significant restriction on
legislative investigations, especially those relating to government operations. This is principally
because the scope of what constitutes a permissible legislative purpose is broad but also because
the application of the legislative purpose test has generally been quite deferential to the
investigating committee. For example, in addition to broadly interpreting the scope of the types of
investigations that aid the legislative function, the Supreme Court has at times effectively adopted
a presumption that committees act with a legislative purpose when engaged in an investigation of
governmental activity.117 This can be seen, for example, in McGrain, a case arising out of a
congressional investigation of the Attorney General’s failure to prosecute certain individuals
following the Teapot Dome scandal.118 Initially, a federal district court had invalidated the
congressional committee’s attempts to obtain testimony from the Attorney General’s brother, a
private citizen. The lower court reasoned that the committee’s purpose was not legislative in
nature but was undertaken to “determine the guilt of the Attorney General” and to “put him on
trial,” which Congress “has no power to do.”119 The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected
this characterization of the committee’s purpose, holding instead that
the subject to be investigated was the administration of the Department of Justice—whether
its functions were being properly discharged or were being neglected or misdirected, and
particularly whether the Attorney General and his assistants were performing or neglecting
their duties.... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be
materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. 120
114 Id.
115 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
116 Id. at 200 n.33; In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270,
1281 (D.D.C. 1973) (“It is apparent as well that a committee’s legislative purpose may legitimately include the
publication of information.”). But see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (holding that with respect to
Speech or Debate Clause immunity that “the transmittal of [] information by individual Members in order to inform the
public and other Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative
process”); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (D. Md. 1980) (“The Supreme Court, however, has
never advocated a broad reading of the “informing function.”). Justice Brennan voiced perhaps the fullest explanation
of Congress’s “informing function” in his dissenting opinion in Gravel v. United States. 408 U.S. 606, 638-64 (1972)
(Brennan, J. dissenting). Brennan’s position was not adopted by the majority opinion.
117 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927) (holding that “the only legitimate object the Senate could have in
ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was such that the presumption
should be indulged that this was the real object”); id. (“We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body
was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed.... ”) (citation omitted).
118 Id. at 150-54.
119 Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 1924).
120 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177.
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In light of this oversight role, the Court held that “the only legitimate object the Senate could
have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was
such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real object.”121
The judiciary’s application of the legislative purpose test is informed by other principles that have
previously reflected a reluctance to question a committee’s reasons for seeking information. The
Supreme Court has made clear that when “Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional
power,” the courts should not inquire into “the motives which spurred the exercise of” the
investigative power.122 Even evidence of bad intent has not “vitiate[d]” an otherwise valid
investigation.123
Nor is a committee required to “declare in advance” the purpose of an inquiry or its ultimate
legislative or oversight goal.124 The Supreme Court has stated, “The very nature of the
investigative function—like any research—is that it takes the searchers up some ‘blind alleys’ and
into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end
result.”125
The judicial reluctance to question congressional motives and the general presumption that
committees act with a legislative purpose both play a significant role in limiting the effectiveness
of raising legislative purpose as a defense to an otherwise valid congressional subpoena.
However, the courts have acknowledged at least two general classes of investigations in which
Congress may generally lack a legislative purpose: (1) investigations into private conduct with no
relation to the legislative function and (2) investigations that usurp functions committed to
another branch of government.
Investigations into Private Conduct with No Relation to the Legislative
Function
Congress does not act with a legislative purpose when investigating private conduct that has no
nexus to the legislative function. In the 1880 decision of Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court held broadly that Congress does not “possess[] the general power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen.”126 But the Court has subsequently described the “loose
language” of Kilbourn and its narrow conception of Congress’s investigative power as “severely
discredited.”127 For example, in discussing the reach of Kilbourn, the Court appears to have made
a distinction between investigating purely private conduct of private citizens, which would not
typically serve a legislative purpose, and investigating the private conduct of public office
121 Id. at 178.
122 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959). Judicial attempts to look inside the minds of Members
“misperceives the [c]ourt’s role, which is not to determine the validity of the legislative purpose by ‘testing the motives
of committee members’ based on public statements.” See Senate Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations v. Ferrer, 199
F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2016).
123 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957) (concluding that courts should not “test[] the motives of
committee members” when evaluating an investigation’s purpose).
124 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897) (noting that “it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should
declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation was concluded”).
125 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975).
126 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881). In that case the Court invalidated the House’s imprisonment of a member of the public
during an investigation into the collapse of a private real estate pool. Taking a restrictive view of Congress’s
investigation authorities, the opinion also questioned the House’s authority to punish witnesses for noncompliance with
investigative requests unless the inquiry was connected to either impeachment or the House’s power to judge the
election and qualification of its Members. Id.
127 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 613 n.16 (1962).
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holders, which may, in some circumstances, serve a legislative purpose due to Congress’s role in
preserving good government.128 For example, in Hutcheson v. United States, the Court held, “At
most, Kilbourn is authority for the proposition that Congress cannot constitutionally inquire ‘into
the private affairs of individuals who hold no office under the government’ when the investigation
‘could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred.’”129
Despite its criticism of Kilbourn, the Court has still expressed concern that congressional
investigations into private conduct could infringe on personal privacy. In the 1957 decision of
Watkins v. United States, the Court, in an opinion overturning a criminal contempt of Congress
conviction on due process grounds, also discussed more generally Congress’s investigative
powers and described the legislative branch as having “no general authority to expose the private
affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress.”130 Although
acknowledging that “[t]he public is, of course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of
its government,” that justification for government oversight “cannot be inflated into a general
power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of
individuals.”131 As such, an investigation into “individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any
legislative purpose,” as are attempts to “expose for the sake of exposure.”132
Functions Committed to Another Branch of Government
A second class of investigations that may lack a legislative purpose are those that appear to usurp
functions exclusively committed to another branch of government. In Barenblatt v. United States,
the Supreme Court explained, “Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, [Congress]
cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.”133 The Court elaborated on
this separation of powers line of reasoning in Watkins, where it stated that Congress is not “a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government ... Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible.”134 Most recently, in Mazars, the
Court reaffirmed that
Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because “those
powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.” Thus
Congress may not use subpoenas to “try” someone “before [a] committee for any crime or
wrongdoing.”135
While it is clear that Congress cannot arrogate to itself either the executive or judicial function by
attempting to directly enforce the law or otherwise prosecute and try an individual for
wrongdoing, it is not clear how this separation of powers constraint applies to investigations
touching on other exclusive functions of the executive or judicial branches.136 In Tenney v.
128 The Court also appears to have distinguished investigations into private conduct of the President. See infra
“Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President.”
129 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 46.
130 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
131 Id. at 200.
132 Id. at 198, 200.
133 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
134 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
135 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848, 863 (2020).
136 Congress’s impeachment function, which has at time been characterized as possessing “judicial” features, arguably
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Brandhove, for example, the Court suggested, “To find that a committee’s investigation has
exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of
functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.”137
Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President
The legislative purpose test appears to apply with greater scrutiny and less deference to Congress
when a committee is investigating the President. In Trump v. Mazars, President Trump brought
suit in his personal capacity to block his banks and accounting firm from complying with various
committee subpoenas for the President’s personal financial records.138 Applying the deferential
legislative purpose standard used by the Court in previous cases,139 the opinions below concluded
that the committees had a valid legislative purpose for seeking the President’s personal records.140
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mazars presented the Court with its first opportunity to directly
consider the legislative purpose test in a congressional investigation of the President.
The Mazars opinion clarified that in the context of congressional investigations the President
must, as a constitutional matter, be treated differently than others.141 The opinion described the
courts below as having mistakenly “treated these cases much like any other,” applying standards
and principles established in “precedents that do not involve the President’s papers.”142
Subpoenas for the President’s personal records, the Court determined, involve significant
separation of powers concerns that trigger a different, more scrutinizing approach to the scope of
Congress’s power. But the Court rejected as inappropriate invitations to import the heightened
“demonstrated, specific need” or “demonstrably critical” standards that had been used in prior
cases involving executive privilege—a privilege not at issue in Mazars due to the personal nature
of the documents sought.143 Instead, the Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court identified at
least four “special considerations” to help lower courts to appropriately balance the “legislative
interests of Congress” with “the ‘unique position’ of the President” when a committee subpoena
seeks the President’s private papers144:
represents an exception to this general prohibition. See CRS Report R45983, Congressional Access to Information in
an Impeachment Investigation, by Todd Garvey at 6-11.
137 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
138 The challenged subpoenas were issued as part of different ongoing committee investigations: The House Committee
on Oversight and Reform sought information in connection to its review of federal ethics laws, the House Financial
Services Committee sought information in connection to its investigation into abuses of the financial system, and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence sought information in connection to its investigation into foreign
interference in U.S. elections. See generally CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10517, Trump v. Mazars: Implications for
Congressional Oversight, by Todd Garvey.
139 See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10301, Legislative Purpose and Adviser Immunity in Congressional Investigations, by
Todd Garvey.
140 Mazars, 591 U.S. at 857-58.
141 Id. at 853-54; see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 192 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (noting that the court
would not “proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual”). The Mazars opinion also treated a
congressional investigation as “different” from a “judicial proceeding.” Mazars, 591 U.S. at 854.
142 Mazars, 591 U.S. at 866.
143 Id. at 864. (“We disagree that these demanding standards apply here.... We decline to transplant that protection root
and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate sensitive
Executive Branch deliberations.”). The Court also rejected the House’s proposed approach, which it characterized as
failing to “take adequate account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for
the President’s information.” Id. at 866.
144 Id. at 869.
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1. A reviewing court should “carefully assess whether the asserted legislative
purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his
papers.”145 The Court elaborated that Congress’s “interests are not sufficiently
powerful to justify access to the President’s personal papers when other sources
could provide Congress the information it needs.”146
2. Courts “should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to
support Congress’s legislative objective.”147 Specific demands, the High Court
reasoned, are less likely to “intrude” on the operation of the Presidency.148
3. Courts “should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to
establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose.”149 To this end,
Congress’s position is strengthened when a congressional committee can provide
“detailed and substantial evidence” of its legislative purpose.150
4. Courts “should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the President by a
subpoena.”151 Here the Court reasoned that in comparison to the burdens imposed
by judicial subpoenas, the burdens imposed on the President by congressional
subpoenas “should be carefully scrutinized, for they stem from a rival political
branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President and incentives to use
subpoenas for institutional advantage.”152
These “special considerations” appear to subject congressional subpoenas for the President’s
personal records to a less deferential standard than other congressional subpoenas. The Court
cautioned that “other considerations,” besides those specifically identified, might also be relevant,
as “one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list” of
factors to be considered by a reviewing court.153
145 Id.
146 Id. at 870.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 871.
152 Id.
153 Id. It appears that the Mazars test may also apply to cases involving former Presidents in at least a narrow set of
“specific circumstances.” See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39 F.4th 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“We do not accept the
Committee’s invitation to abandon the Supreme Court’s Mazars test in the Mazars case itself. Whatever may be the
appropriate standard when Congress issues a subpoena to a former President, the subpoena in this case, when issued,
sought a sitting President’s information. President Trump then brought this challenge while still in office; that same
challenge remains pending; and the subpoena remains unchanged in all respects. At least in these specific
circumstances, we do not understand that the Mazars test instantly ceased to apply—and a different standard
immediately took hold—on the day President Trump left office.”). See also Comm. on Ways & Means v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 45 F.4th 324, 333-34 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[I]t is likely law of the circuit that a Congressional request for a
sitting President’s personal information is evaluated under the heightened Mazars standard regardless of whether the
President in question remains in office.”); Bragg v. Jordan, 669 F.Supp.3d 257, 270 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (describing
the argument that Mazars “broadly governs subpoenas ‘seeking a current or former president’s information’” as
“clearly incorrect”). In Trump v. Thompson, a case involving the records of then-former President Trump, a circuit
court stated that the separation of powers concerns that animated Mazars “necessarily have less traction when the
request is for records from a former administration, since the objecting former President no longer occupies the ‘unique
position of the President.... ’” 20 F.4th 10, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2021). In denying a subsequent application for a stay in that
case, the Supreme Court clarified that “[a]ny discussion of the Court of Appeals concerning President Trump’s status as
a former President must therefore be regarded as nonbinding dicta. Trump v. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 680 (2022).
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Mazars’s “special considerations” appear to be tailored to presidential records.154 To view the
case otherwise—for example, to apply the “special considerations” to congressional subpoenas
issued as part of a more typical oversight investigation into agency activity—would put the
opinion in tension with previous precedent, including the principles established in McGrain.155
Nothing in the Mazars opinion appears to signal that the majority intended to alter previously
established principles in congressional investigations not involving the President.
Authority of Congressional Committees
The implied constitutional authority to conduct investigations resides independently in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, but each chamber has delegated responsibility for
carrying out the investigative role to its standing and select committees.156 For example, under
House rules, a standing House committee may conduct “such investigations and studies as it
considers necessary or appropriate in the exercise of its responsibilities.”157 In the Senate, each
standing committee “may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction.”158 As a
result, the power of inquiry and investigation is exercised primarily by committees of Congress
rather than by the full House or Senate. And that investigative role is more than a discretionary
power; it is a statutory duty. Under 2 U.S.C. § 190d, “each standing committee of the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,
administration, and execution of those laws ... the subject matter of which is within the
jurisdiction of that committee.”159
The enabling chamber rule or resolution that gives a committee life is also the charter that defines
the grant and limitations of the committee’s investigative powers. The committee charter
constrains committees in two meaningful ways. First, as a creation of its parent house, a
congressional committee may inquire only into matters within the scope of the authority that has
been delegated to it—that is, within its jurisdiction.160 Second, in conducting investigations, a
committee must generally comply with any procedural requirements contained in its charter, its
own rules, or the rules of the parent chamber.161
Enforcement of these limitations by the courts, like judicial scrutiny of other internal
congressional matters, is generally quite limited.162 The Speech or Debate Clause generally
154 It is unclear how Mazars may apply to investigations focused on official conduct and seeking governmental records.
See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10517, Trump v. Mazars: Implications for Congressional Oversight, by Todd Garvey. It
could be argued that the standards adopted in Mazars are applicable only when a congressional committee directly
targets the personal or private records of a President. Under that interpretation, judicially imposed limits on Congress’s
authority to obtain official records of the President would be reviewed under the deferential “legislative purpose”
standard applied in previous cases (though, even if the subpoena is validly issued under this standard, the President
might still invoke applicable privileges to withhold some records). On the other hand, it could be argued that the
“special considerations” test set forth in Mazars applies to requests for either personal or official presidential records.
Even then, the considerations may apply differently to requests for official records compared to the President’s private
information.
155
See supra “The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose.”
156 See, e.g., House Rule X(2); House Rule XI(1)(b); House Rule XI(2)(m); Senate Rule XXV; Senate Rule XXVI(1).
157 House Rule XI(1)(b).
158 Senate Rule XXVI(1).
159 2 U.S.C. § 190d(a).
160 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (“Plainly these committees are restricted to the missions
delegated to them.... No witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.”).
161 See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1963).
162 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of
determining that a committee’s inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province.”).
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prevents direct challenges to how a committee carries out its legislative and investigative
operations.163 As a result, it is generally only when the committee seeks to enforce a subpoena or
other investigative demands that a court is presented with the opportunity to determine
compliance with procedural rules.164 Even then, courts are generally reluctant to examine internal
matters unless a House, Senate, or committee rule implicates constitutional rights.165 However, it
does appear that when a court is forced to either construe the scope of a committee’s jurisdiction
or interpret committee rules, it generally looks to the words of the rule or resolution itself and
then, if necessary, to the usual sources of legislative history such as floor debate, legislative
reports, and prior committee practice and interpretation.166
Jurisdiction
A committee may not exercise compulsory investigative powers in connection to matters outside
of its jurisdiction.167 This jurisdictional limitation is fundamental to the operation of a committee,
as it arises from the very nature of the “source” of the committee’s authority: the delegation from
the parent body.168 A committee “is restricted to the missions delegated to it by the parent body,”
and “no witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.”169 For
standing committees, that jurisdictional delegation can generally be found in House Rule X and
Senate Rule XXV.170
The consequence of a committee exceeding its jurisdiction is apparent from United States v.
Rumely.171 There, the secretary of an organization that published and sold books of “particular
political tendentiousness” challenged his conviction for contempt of Congress on the grounds that
the committee that cited him for contempt had exceeded its jurisdiction.172 The resolution
establishing the committee, which the Supreme Court viewed as “the controlling charter of the
committee’s powers,” had authorized the committee to investigate “lobbying activities intended to
influence ... legislation.”173 The Court interpreted the phrase lobbying activities to extend only to
“representation made directly to the Congress” and thus concluded that the committee had no
163 Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975).
164 Judicial review of subpoenas is also quite narrow. See “Error! Reference source not found.” infra.
165 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (declaring that the House’s rulemaking authority “is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and, within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal”).
166 See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209. Courts have also construed delegations of investigatory powers narrowly when
necessary to avoid “passing on serious constitutional questions.” Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
167 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42, 44 (1953); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198, 206 (“Plainly these
committees are restricted to the missions delegated to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the
Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere. No witness can be compelled to make
disclosures on matters outside that area.”).
168 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206.
169 Id.
170 See House Rule X, 119th Cong. (2025); Senate Rule XXV, 119th Cong. (2025). Jurisdictional authority for
“special” investigations may be given to a standing committee, a joint committee of both houses, or a special
subcommittee of a standing committee, among other options.
171 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 42-48.
172 Id. at 42, 48.
173 Id. at 44.
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authority to investigate or enforce a subpoena against a witness who had sought only to influence
public opinion.174
In adopting this interpretation of lobbying activities, the Court expressly stated that it gave the
committee’s jurisdiction a “more restricted scope” in part to avoid the possibility that
enforcement of the subpoena would violate the witness’s First Amendment right to engage in
political speech.175 The Court has followed a similar approach in subsequent cases, at times
adopting a narrow interpretation of either a committee jurisdiction or the scope of an individual
investigation in order to avoid the possibility of a constitutional conflict on the grounds that
“[p]rotected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by
the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a particular legislative need.”176
Committee Rules
A committee must also generally comply with chamber and committee rules relating to the
conduct of investigations.177 For example, in Yellin v. United States, the Supreme Court
overturned a contempt conviction stemming from a witness’s refusal to answer questions in a
public hearing.178 The witness had argued that the conviction was improper because the
committee had failed to comply with its own rules regarding the availability of closed, or
executive, sessions.179 Those rules expressly required that in determining whether to close a
hearing, the committee consider the possible injury to the witness’s reputation that may result
from a public hearing.180 The Court held that in exercising investigative powers, a committee may
be “held to observance of its rules.”181 Finding that the committee had not given due
consideration to the witness’s requests for a private hearing, the Court overturned the contempt
conviction.182 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Gojack v. United States.183 There a
committee rule required that all “major investigations” be initiated only with the majority
174 Id. at 47.
175 Id. (“Certainly it does no violence to the phrase ‘lobbying activities’ to give it a more restricted scope. To give such
meaning is not barred by intellectual honesty. So to interpret is in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional
doubt.”).
176 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 224 (1957); Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(holding that if Congress had intended a committee to begin an investigation “sure to provoke the serious and difficult
constitutional questions ... it would have spelled out this intention in words more explicit than the general terms found
in the authorizing resolutions under consideration.” But see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 121 (1959)
(rejecting the avoidance approach adopted in Rumely on the grounds that Congress had placed a clarifying “legislative
gloss” on the meaning of the applicable committee rule).
177 House Rule XI(2) and Senate Rule XXVI(2) require that committees adopt written rules of procedure and publish
them in the Congressional Record. The failure to publish such rules has resulted in the invalidation of a perjury
prosecution. United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to publish committee rule
setting one Senator as a quorum for taking hearing testimony was a sufficient ground to reverse a perjury conviction).
178 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1963).
179 Id. at 113-14.
180 Id. at 114. The committee rule provided: “If a majority of the Committee or Subcommittee ... believes that the
interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the
reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an Executive Session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.” Id. at 114-15.
181 Id. (citing Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949)).
182 Id.
183 Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 703-04 (1966).
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approval of the committee.184 The underlying investigation that gave rise to the contempt
prosecution had not been authorized. Thus, the court reversed the conviction.185
Legal Tools Available for Oversight and Investigations
There is no single method or set of procedures for engaging in legislative oversight or conducting
an investigation.186 Although public attention often focuses on public hearings and subpoenaed
witnesses, congressional committees frequently rely on informal tools to gather the information
necessary to accomplish their investigative goals, such as staff-level communication and contacts
and voluntary compliance with document and briefing requests.187 In many ways, these informal
and voluntary tools represent the unseen but predominant components of congressional
investigations.
Committees also have more formal mechanisms for collecting necessary testimony from relevant
witnesses. Chief among these tools are hearings and, when authorized, depositions.
Hearings
As previously noted, standing committees of the House and Senate are authorized to hold
hearings for purposes of receiving testimony.188 This testimony is often received under oath.189
Both the House and the Senate, as well as individual committees, have adopted a variety of rules
governing the conduct of hearings. These rules include quorum requirements, basic procedural
constraints, and witness and minority protections.190 For example, both chambers permit a
reduced quorum for taking testimony and receiving evidence. House committees are required to
have at least two Members present to take testimony.191 Senate rules allow the taking of testimony
with one Member in attendance.192 Most committees have adopted the minimum quorum
requirement, and some require a higher quorum for sworn rather than unsworn testimony.193
Senate and House rules also limit the authority of their committees to meet in closed session.194
For example, the House requires testimony to be held in closed session if a majority of a
committee or subcommittee determines it “may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any
184 Id. at 706.
185 Id. at 712.
186 See, e.g., CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A CRITICAL AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Roger A. Bruns et al. eds., 2011).
187 A congressional committee “gathers information through formal investigations, but also obtains information in a
number of other ways, including through requests made to relevant Federal agencies, to lobbyists with expertise in a
particular field, and to stakeholders.” SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F.
Supp. 3d 199, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
188 House Rule XI(m)(1); Senate Rule XXVI(1).
189 Many committees leave the swearing of witnesses to the discretion of the chair, while others require that all
witnesses be sworn. Compare House Comm. on Agriculture, Rule VII(b) (“The Chairman of the Committee, or any
member of the Committee designated by the Chairman, may administer oaths to any witnesses.), with Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, Rule II(4) (“All witnesses who testify to matters of fact shall be sworn unless the Committee waives
the oath.”).
190 As a general matter, House Rule XI and Senate Rule XXVI govern committee hearing procedures.
191 House Rule XI(2)(h)(2).
192 Senate Rule XXVI(7)(a)(2).
193 See, e.g., House Comm. on the Judiciary Rule II; Senate Comm. on Appropriations Rule II(3).
194 House Rule XI(2)(k)(5); Senate Rule XXVI(5)(b).
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person.”195 Such testimony taken in closed session is normally releasable only by a majority vote
of the committee. Similarly, confidential material received in a closed session requires a majority
vote for release.
In oversight and investigative hearings, the chair usually makes an opening statement. In the case
of an investigative hearing, the opening statement can be an important means of defining the
subject matter of the hearing and thereby establishing the pertinence of questions asked the
witnesses.196 A witness does not have the right to make a statement before being questioned, but
the opportunity is usually accorded. Committee rules may prescribe the length of such statements
and also require that written statements be submitted in advance of the hearing.197 Questioning of
witnesses may be structured so that Members alternate for specified lengths of time.
A congressional investigative hearing is unique and generally should not be analogized to a
criminal proceeding, as the same constitutional rights do not attach. Because the Constitution is
generally applicable to all forms of government action, most provisions of the Bill of Rights
apply to Congress’s investigative activities as they do to congressional legislation.198 For
example, witnesses in a committee hearing may assert their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.199 But not all constitutional rights are applicable to congressional investigations.200
Consider, for example, a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to present one’s own
evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.201 The D.C. Circuit has held that “the
distinguishing factors” between a legislative investigation and a criminal proceeding “cause”
congressional investigations “to be outside the guarantees of ... the confrontation right guaranteed
in criminal proceedings by the Sixth Amendment.”202 A witness in a committee hearing therefore
has no right to offer his or her own evidence or cross-examine other witnesses, though a
committee may, at its discretion, afford a witness such an opportunity.203 The application of
another Sixth Amendment right—the right to effective assistance of counsel—may also not apply
in a congressional investigation.204 Nevertheless, House, Senate, and committee rules afford
witnesses a limited form of that right. Under House rules, the role of counsel is restricted to
195 House Rule XI(2)(k)(5).
196 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 209 (1957) (“There are several sources that can outline the ‘question
under inquiry’ in such a way that the rules against vagueness are satisfied. The authorizing resolution, the remarks of
the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make
the to
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