What Is Harassment? An Overview from Federal Employment Law

What Is Harassment? An Overview from

Federal Employment Law

June 29, 2026

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R49010

SUMMARY

What Is Harassment? An Overview from

Federal Employment Law

R49010

June 29, 2026

April J. Anderson

Legislative Attorney

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but

it does not expressly prohibit harassment. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to

prohibit certain forms of harassment, however, including sexual harassment. The Court has

For a copy of the full report,

established legal standards for determining when such conduct amounts to a violation. Meritor

please call 7-5700 or visit

Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67, 73 (1986). In general, harassment based on a

www.crs.gov.

protected characteristic violates employment antidiscrimination laws when it becomes severe or

pervasive. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). This assessment considers all

the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating;

and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) v. Central Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175–76 (4th Cir. 2009). Courts commonly observe that the

bar for showing actionable harassment is high, and they regularly dismiss harassment claims when plaintiffs fail to show

sufficient severity or pervasiveness. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).

Since the Supreme Court first recognized a Title VII sexual harassment claim in its unanimous 1986 Meritor decision, courts

have expanded harassment doctrines to cover other forms of employment harassment, including harassment based on sexual

orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, race, color, national origin, religion, age, disability, military reserve service,

opposition to unlawful discrimination, and participation in antidiscrimination proceedings.

Antiharassment case law is still developing, including around issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. The Supreme

Court recognized these characteristics as protected by Title VII in 2020. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020).

The EEOC, charged with enforcing Title VII, issued updated harassment guidance in 2024, including guidance addressing

these bases. EEOC, EEOC-CVG-1990-8, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Mar. 19, 1990).

After a lawsuit, the EEOC rescinded the 2024 harassment guidance in its entirety in 2026.

In addition to statutes that bar harassment, Congress has passed other laws to facilitate reporting and prevention. In recent

years, Congress has legislated to restrict nondisclosure agreements and mandatory arbitration for some harassment claims.

Antiharassment doctrine is largely judge-made. As many antiharassment obligations are not fully codified, Congress could

consider adding specific antiharassment provisions to antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, or others. It could specify examples of harassing conduct and

could expand or limit the behavior current law makes illegal.

Congressional Research Service

What Is Harassment? An Overview from Federal Employment Law

Contents

Harassment Under Title VII ............................................................................................................ 1

Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims ......................................................................................... 2

Other Bases for Harassment Claims Under Title VII ................................................................ 4

Employer Liability .................................................................................................................... 6

Harassment Under Other Antidiscrimination Statutes ..................................................................... 7

Extending Harassment Protections to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity .............................. 8

EEOC Harassment Guidance Changes .......................................................................................... 10

Other Harassment-Related Statutory Requirements: Reporting, Disclosure, and

Prevention....................................................................................................................................11

Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 12

Contacts

Author Information........................................................................................................................ 14

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What Is Harassment? An Overview from Federal Employment Law

S

everal federal employment statutes bar discriminatory harassment. This now-common1

claim is not one typically defined in the statutes themselves, however; instead, harassment

claims have primarily been recognized by courts on the theory that harassment can

significantly affect plaintiffs’ working conditions in violation of statutory protections. Since the

Supreme Court first recognized a sexual harassment claim as employment discrimination in

1986,2 antiharassment protections have expanded to cover harassment based on a worker’s

religion, disability, age, and other protected characteristics.

This report describes how the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have defined the scope

of antiharassment protections in the employment context3 and determined the limits of liability,

including recent case law applying statutory protections to harassment based on sexual orientation

and gender identity. The report also describes legislative responses in the form of harassmentrelated reporting and confidentiality laws, discusses some developments in agency enforcement,

and concludes with considerations for Congress (including recent legislative proposals).

Harassment Under Title VII

Antiharassment law began as a judicial application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

which makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate “against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin.”4 Though Title VII’s antidiscrimination provisions do not

expressly prohibit harassment, the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts have interpreted Title

VII’s prohibition on discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to

prohibit harassment.5 The Supreme Court first adopted this interpretation in the context of sexual

harassment in the 1986 case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, stating that “Title VII affords

employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,

and insult.”6 In reaching its decision, the Meritor Court acknowledged guidance and agency

precedent from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is charged

with enforcing Title VII and other employment laws, that had treated harassment as covered by

Title VII.7

Under Meritor’s interpretation, where mistreatment based on a protected characteristic is harmful

enough, it changes working conditions and can amount to a discriminatory change in the “terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.”8 When a plaintiff raises a Title VII harassment claim,

1 Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Table E2a. Charges Alleging Harassment Charge Receipts and Resolutions by

Type (All Statutes) FY 2010 - FY 2024, EEOC (2024), https://rejouer.perma.cc/replay-web-page/w/id0e8db718707d/:37a8eec1ce19687d132fe29051dca629d164e2c4958ba141d5f4133a33f0688f/20260402172354mp_/http

s://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/202502/Table_E2a._Charges_Alleging_Harassment_Charge_Receipts_and_Resolutions_by_Type_%28All_Statutes%29_F

Y_2010_-_FY_2024.xlsx [https://perma.cc/ULV4-P2HP].

2 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67, 73 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as a violation of Title

VII and expressly holding that such claims are actionable under Title VII).

3 Although courts may apply antiharassment precedent from employment cases to other forms of harassment,

harassment outside of employment (such as in housing and federally funded programs) is beyond the scope of this

report.

4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

5 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–67, 73; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Sexual Harassment, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/sexualharassment [https://perma.cc/Z2UM-HX7H] (last visited June 1, 2026).

6

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (summarizing and agreeing with EEOC guidance and precedent).

7 Id.

8 Id. at 64.

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What Is Harassment? An Overview from Federal Employment Law

federal courts often describe the action as alleging either a “harassment” or a “hostile work

environment” claim. That these two terms are used interchangeably perhaps reflects the fact that

the statute does not expressly prohibit or define “harassment.”

Courts vary in their formulations of the overall analysis required for Title VII harassment claims,

but they generally require a plaintiff to satisfy the following elements for actionable harassment:

•

•

•

a protected category under Title VII (such as sex)9 motivated the harassment;

the plaintiff subjectively viewed the harassment as creating an abusive

environment; and

a “reasonable” person would also objectively view the work environment as

abusive, characterized by severe or pervasive mistreatment.10

In practice, most claims turn on the third element, whether the mistreatment was objectively

“severe or pervasive”11 enough to create an abusive or hostile work environment. Under this

standard, even where there is offensive or harassing conduct, a harasser’s actions will not violate

Title VII unless those acts in total were “severe or pervasive,” bringing the plaintiff’s situation in

line with other cases courts have found amounted to harassment. Federal courts consider “all the

circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.”12

Mistreatment counts if it is severe or pervasive, however; it need not be both. One very serious

event, like a sexual assault, may create a hostile environment.13 Milder mistreatment may create a

hostile environment as well if it happens every day.14 Courts often review the frequency of

harassing incidents in a case.15 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]his is not, and by its

nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.”16 Perhaps because assessing whether harassment

is “severe or pervasive” is such a fact-specific standard, and because there are so many

harassment cases to compare as precedent, federal appellate case law sometimes diverges on

seemingly similar facts.

Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims

As described above, the Supreme Court first recognized harassment as a viable theory of

employment discrimination in a sexual harassment case, and sexual harassment claims are some

9 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2).

10 See, e.g., LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating plaintiff must

show “an objectively hostile or abusive environment”); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999)

(en banc) (setting forth similar elements to establish a “hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim”).

11 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.

12 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

13 Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983–84 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ssaults within the workplace create an objectively

hostile work environment for an employee even when they are isolated.”).

14 EEOC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 150 F.4th 948, 966 (8th Cir. 2025).

15 See, e.g., LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1102 (characterizing conduct as “three isolated incidents, which occurred over a

nine-month period” to hold conduct did not amount to Title VII violation); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 984–

85 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] single battery coupled with two merely offensive remarks over a six-month period does not

create an issue of material fact as to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently severe to create a hostile work

environment.”).

16 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

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of the most common harassment claims under Title VII.17 In general, courts most readily

conclude that alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive in sexual harassment cases when

the behavior constitutes rape18 or involves physical threats at work,19 repeated solicitation for

sex,20 repeated touching of intimate body parts,21 or daily or regular verbal harassment.22

Mistreatment need not take the form of unwanted sexual advances or other sexual conduct to

constitute sexual harassment, however.23 Demonstrations of “‘anti-female animus’ can support a

sexual harassment claim.”24 This type of hostile environment is one that “is hostile because it is

‘sexist rather than sexual.’”25 It might include frequent gender-specific epithets or targeting a

worker for discipline or humiliation on account of sex.26 In one case, the Eighth Circuit27

concluded that plaintiffs could show a hostile environment after pointing to a “plethora of

offensive incidents” indicative of hostility to women, including a male worker urinating in a

female worker’s water bottle and several men urinating in another woman’s gas tank.28

As is the case with unwanted sexual advances, sexist behavior must be severe or pervasive to

qualify as harassment.29 Courts have emphasized that “conduct must be extreme to amount to a

change in the terms and conditions of employment,” and that federal law is not meant to become

17 Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Table E2b. Charges Alleging Harassment Charge Receipts and Resolutions by

Type (All Statutes) FY 2010 - FY 2024, EEOC (2024), https://www.eeoc.gov/data/enforcement-and-litigation-statistics0 [https://perma.cc/ULV4-P2HP].

18 See Lapka, 517 F.3d at 983–84 (concluding co-worker rape was severe enough to constitute actionable harassment

under Title VII); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding supervisor’s harassment, culminating in

rape, “plainly sufficient to state a claim for ‘hostile environment sexual harassment.’”) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

19 See Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 540–41, 550–52 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating conduct was severe or

pervasive enough where harasser told her at least six times that he wanted to choke her, often said he wished her dead,

told her he would kill her if she reported his comments, and made sexual comments, among other acts).

20 See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 334–35 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding conduct severe or pervasive

enough where harasser asked plaintiff to perform oral sex and have sex several times and made regular sexual

references to her private body parts, among other mistreatment).

21 See id. (indicating harasser regularly tried to touch victim, rubbed against her with his private parts, tried to grab her

waist, made “lewd and sexual comments ‘all the time’”); Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir.

2004) (concluding conduct was severe or pervasive enough where harasser repeatedly attempted to touch victim’s

breasts, placed his hands down her pants, tried to pull off her pants, and enlisted others to hold her while he tried to

grope her).

22 See EEOC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 150 F.4th 948, 966 (8th Cir. 2025), reh’g denied, No. 24-2082, 2025 WL 3085999 (8th

Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (stating hostile environment could be found where plaintiff experienced unsanitary bathroom

conditions aimed at intimidating women, “endured discriminatory comments—up to three times a week—and saw

sexually explicit graffiti every time that she worked”); Copeland v. Ga. Dep’t Corr., 97 F.4th 766, 776 (11th Cir. 2024)

(“Undoubtedly, conduct that occurs daily (even over a shorter span of time) is frequent.”).

23 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553,

565 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Any unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s gender may,

if sufficiently severe or pervasive under the Harris standard, constitute a hostile environment in violation of Title

VII.”).

24 Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2012).

25 Id.

26 Id. at 664, 667; Sharp v. S&S Activewear, L.L.C., 69 F.4th 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding sexual harassment

claim can be based on “use of sexually degrading, gender-specific epithets”).

27 This report references a number of decisions by federal appellate courts of various regional circuits. For purposes of

brevity, references to a particular circuit in the body of this report (e.g., the Eighth Circuit) refer to the U.S. Court of

Appeals for that particular circuit.

28 Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988).

29 Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding plaintiff could make out a

harassment claim where her supervisor “made at least eighteen sexist or sexual comments in less than a year’s time”).

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a “general civility code.”30 “‘[S]imple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless

extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of

employment.’”31

Though plaintiffs often bring Title VII sexual harassment claims as “hostile work environment”

claims, they may also show a Title VII violation with evidence of “quid pro quo” harassment.32

This is evidence that a supervisor took a “tangible employment action” against an employee (such

as firing the employee or denying them a promotion)33 in relation to the supervisor’s sexual

demands.34 Though some federal appellate courts require a plaintiff to show a tangible

employment action resulting from his or her refusal to submit to demands for sexual conduct,35

other circuit courts will also accept a showing that an employee submitted to unwelcome

advances to avoid a tangible employment action.36

Other Bases for Harassment Claims Under Title VII

A quid pro quo claim is unique to sexual harassment, but other hostile environment claims

beyond those based on sex have gained recognition under Title VII. Title VII’s prohibitions

against discrimination based on race, color,37 and national origin38 have supported harassment

claims on those grounds.39 Such claims have included an employee who alleged that he found a

racial epithet written on his locker and, after a string of other insults, discovered a noose hanging

30 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998).

31 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).

32 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (as an example of quid pro quo harassment, explaining

that such claims may concern allegations that “an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a

job benefit,” which would constitute “explicit” sex discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment).

33 Id. at 761 (“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,

firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant

change in benefits.”).

34 See, e.g., Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1245 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that quid pro quo is a

term courts frequently used, before the Supreme Court’s Ellerth decision, to refer to claims “where a benefit of

employment was tied to a demand for sexual favors”).

35 See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1059–60 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that to prevail on

quid pro quo claim, plaintiff “must show that a reasonable jury could find [that her supervisor] conditioned concrete

employment benefits on her submission to sexual conduct and had her fired when she did not comply”); HernandezLoring v. Universidad Metropolitana, 233 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Under Title VII, quid pro quo sexual

harassment can be shown where a supervisor uses employer processes to punish a subordinate for refusing to comply

with sexual demands.”).

36 See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring evidence of either a refusal

that results in a tangible job detriment or submission as an implied or express condition of receiving job benefits);

Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing allegations that plaintiff was forced

to engage in sexual intercourse with her supervisor, and that “there was an implication that her continued employment

depended on her complying with [his] unwelcome sexual advances”).

37 Press Release, EEOC, Rugo Stone Sued for Discrimination Based on National Origin, Religion, and Color (Aug. 3,

2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/rugo-stone-sued-discrimination-based-national-origin-religion-andcolor#:~:text=The%20comments%20occurred,in%20the%20cup [https://perma.cc/7M86-AK97]; EEOC v. Cent.

Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 174–77 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Title VII harassment claims based on race and sex);

Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 157 F.4th 172, 193 (2d Cir. 2025) (involving race and constructive discharge).

38 EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 399–02 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing Title VII harassment claims based

on religion and national origin).

39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

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in a work shed.40 The worker was so upset that he became nauseated and vomited.41 Another

employee, alleging discrimination based on color and national origin, reported almost-daily

insults, including the employee being told he was the same color as human feces.42

Title VII’s bar on discrimination based on religion also supports harassment claims.43 Allegations

in such cases have included a worker being told, after his brother’s suicide, that his relative was

suffering in hell and the employee would go there too if he did not “find God.”44 The harasser

then called on her coworker daily, for more than three weeks, to find God.45 Religious

discrimination can also take the form of harassing a worker because they have sought religious

accommodations, such as prayer breaks or time off for sabbath observance.46

Pregnancy, too, qualifies as a protected class for employment discrimination purposes, falling

under Title VII’s protections against sex discrimination. In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act amended Title VII and specified that employers may not discriminate based on pregnancy

and related medical conditions.47 Courts have recognized that pregnancy harassment, such as

managers urging pregnant workers to quit48 or to terminate a pregnancy,49 can give rise to Title

VII claims.50

Title VII not only bars sexual, racial, and religious harassment as discussed above, it also

generally bars retaliatory harassment. This happens when, for example, a plaintiff reports a

potential Title VII violation and a manager reacts by harassing the employee.51 This cause of

action arises from Title VII’s antiretaliation provisions. The statute bars retaliatory discrimination

for two types of protected activity: opposing a potential Title VII violation and participating in a

Title VII proceeding.52 Retaliatory harassment cases have gained recognition as a form of

40 Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2008).

41 Id. at 1137.

42 EEOC, supra note 37.

43 WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d at 399–02.

44 Winspear v. Cmty. Dev., Inc., 574 F.3d 604, 605–06 (8th Cir. 2009).

45 Id.

46 Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 279 (3d Cir. 2001).

47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

48 Zisumbo v. McCleod USA Telecomms. Servs., Inc., 154 F. App’x 715, 726 (10th Cir. 2005).

49 Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 854–55 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing plaintiff’s allegation that employer

told her at least six times to get an abortion, calling her at home and offering to pay for it); Hercule v. Wendy’s of N.E.

Fla., Inc., No. 10-80248-CIV, 2010 WL 1882181, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2010) (describing allegation that manager

encouraged plaintiff to have an abortion).

50 CRS Report R46821, Pregnancy and Labor: An Overview of Federal Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, by April J.

Anderson (2023).

51 Harassment, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment [https://perma.cc/G4GL-2EUJ] (last visited June 1, 2026).

52 “Opposition” is when an employee “has opposed any practice” Title VI prohibits, and “participation” is when an

employee has “participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the statute. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a); see also Hertz v. Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Protected opposition can

range from filing formal charges to voicing informal complaints to superiors.”); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d

1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff, by giving deposition testimony in a Title VII proceeding, engaged

in protected participation under Title VII). In the EEOC’s view, participation in an employer’s internal investigation

counts as “participation” for purposes of retaliation. Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and

Related Issues, EEOC (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-enforcementguidance-retaliation-and-related-issues [https://perma.cc/JS35-WDY2]. Several courts, however, have reached the

opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Every Court of

Appeals to have considered this issue squarely has held that participation in an internal employer investigation not

connected with a formal EEOC proceeding does not qualify as protected activity under the participation clause.”).

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prohibited retaliation with the EEOC53 and federal courts, except in one circuit54 where the issue

has not yet been decided.

There is disagreement among courts, however, about the standards to apply to retaliatory

harassment. Some courts apply the usual standard for harassment, requiring that mistreatment be

“severe or pervasive.”55 Other courts apply a different standard, developed for assessing

retaliation cases.56 Under this standard, mistreatment qualifies as retaliatory harassment where it

is “materially adverse,” that is, when it “‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”57 Some courts have applied a combination of

the two standards in retaliatory harassment cases.58

Employer Liability

Even when a plaintiff presents adequate evidence of harassment at work, including sufficiently

severe or pervasive mistreatment, the plaintiff must also show a reason to hold the employer

liable for the harassment.59 The Supreme Court has held that employers are not “automatically

liable” for harassment.60 Under certain parameters,61 an employer’s liability for harassment turns

on the harasser’s authority over the victim (i.e., whether they were the victim’s supervisor),

whether the harassment led to a tangible employment action such as a demotion, and whether the

employee properly invoked any reporting or complaint system.62 While harassment by a

supervisor or even a fellow employee is more likely to lead to employer liability, employers can

also be liable if they are negligent63 in allowing third parties64 (clients or customers) to harass

employees. If an employer takes reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually

53 EEOC, supra note 51.

54 The Fifth Circuit has observed that it has not “recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment cause of action.”

Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors, 850 F.3d 731, 742, n.5 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Blanchard v. Tulane Univ., 636 F. Supp.

3d 642, 654–55 (E.D. La. 2022) (“A retaliatory hostile work environment claim is not recognized by the Fifth

Circuit.”).

55 Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833, 842 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2689

(2024) (mem.) (ruling on age-based discrimination and retaliation claims and requiring severe or pervasive

mistreatment), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kellar v. Yunion, Inc., 157 F.4th 855, 871 (6th Cir. 2025); Ray

v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that retaliatory harassment must be sufficiently severe or

pervasive).

56 Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023); Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862

(11th Cir. 2020).

57 Hare v. Potter, 220 F. App’x 120, 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2007).

58 Rae v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 101, 109 (1st Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1431 (2025) (mem.)

(adjudicating claims of disability discrimination); Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 171–72 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

59 Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Beyond demonstrating a hostile work

environment, a plaintiff must show a basis for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.”).

60 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (rejecting the court of appeals’ holding that employers should

always be held strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisors).

61 These parameters are explained in more detail in CRS Report R45155, Sexual Harassment and Employment

Discrimination Under Title VII: Selected Legal Issues, by April J. Anderson (2026).

62 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 775,

780 (1998).

63 Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998).

64 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2025) (allowing liability for non-employee harassment when the employer “knows or should

have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action”).

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harassing behavior, it can potentially avoid liability for harassment either within the company or

by third parties.65

Harassment Under Other Antidiscrimination

Statutes

Beyond Title VII, several other employment statutes support hostile environment claims. In

particular, courts have generally construed “the same phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment in other anti-discrimination statutes’” to include harassment protections.66

Harassment under these statutes generally follows the parameters courts have set out under Title

VII, including its rules, described above, for employer liability and retaliation.

Thus, citing Title VII, courts have allowed hostile environment claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).67 Disability harassment claims also arise under the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, which protects federal employees from disability discrimination.68 As one example

of a successful disability harassment suit, a worker faced ostracism, eavesdropping on her calls,

extra drug testing, and probation shortly after management learned she was HIV positive.69 Also,

after knowledge of the worker’s HIV status came out, company leadership refused to shake hands

with the employee.70

Courts have also recognized harassment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (ADEA).71 The ADEA bars discrimination based on age for workers over forty. Age

harassment claims have included such treatment as telling an older worker he should retire,

repeatedly asking about retirement plans, and sending a worker “a humorous poem on the sexual

problems of old age with the notation, ‘I think it just fits you!’”72 Further, harassment is barred

under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which bars discrimination

based on genetic information or family health history.73

Harassment claims under one employment statute, the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Relief Act of 1994 (USERRA), have fared differently in court over time based on

legislative activity. USERRA protects reserve servicemembers from discrimination based on

deployment, training, or other military service obligations.74 As originally enacted, the statute did

not include a ban on discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”;

rather, the statute barred denial of “any benefit of employment” because of a worker’s military

65 See, e.g., Crockett v. Mission Hosp. Inc., 717 F.3d 348, 356–58 (4th Cir. 2013); Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217

F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2000).

66 Carder v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. 636 F.3d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 2011), superseded by Statute as Stated in Bennett v.

Dallas Independent School Dist. N.D.Tex. (March 29, 2013); 29 U.S.C. § 29.

67 Flowers v. S. Regional Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2001); Kellar v. Yunion, Inc., 157 F.4th 855,

873 (6th Cir. 2025).

68 29 U.S.C. § 791; Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2006).

69 Flowers, 247 F.3d at 229.

70 Id.

71 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634; Stamey v. Forest River, Inc, 37 F.4th 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 2022).

72 Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1986).

73 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11; Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008); Genetic Information Discrimination,

EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/genetic-information-discrimination [https://perma.cc/F7X2-4X9E] (last visited June 1,

2026).

74 38 U.S.C. § 4311.

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status.75 In 2011, the Fifth Circuit, the first circuit court to address the issue, considered reservist

pilots’ claims that an employer harassed them by repeatedly complaining about their guard duties,

deriding them, attempting to cancel their guard-related leave, and accusing them of “scams.”76

The court ruled that as USERRA’s language was different from Title VII, harassment claims were

not included in USERRA’s protections.77 That same year, the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011

amended USERRA, adding protections to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”78

Courts have subsequently recognized that the change in language superseded the Fifth Circuit

decision, permitting claims of USERRA harassment.79

The employment statutes discussed above (the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, ADEA, GINA, and

USERRA) have another similarity to Title VII; they typically bar retaliation against employees

for complaining of discrimination.80 Accordingly, these antidiscrimination laws generally bar

employers from harassing employees on account of their making a discrimination claim or

participating in an investigation, proceeding, or suit under the laws.81

A separate statute provides myriad antiharassment protections for legislative employees. The

Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA) adopts the protections of the ADA,

Rehabilitation Act, ADEA, GINA, and Title VII for legislative employees through crossreference.82 In a rare example of legislation addressing harassment directly, the Congressional

Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, enacted in 2018, stated a goal to streamline complaint

procedures for “claims by employees alleging that employing offices have violated their CAA

rights and protections, including protections against sexual harassment.”83

Extending Harassment Protections to Sexual

Orientation and Gender Identity

As discussed above, courts have recognized harassment claims in new areas since the Supreme

Court first recognized Title VII sexual harassment claims in 1986. In 2020, the Supreme Court

ruled in Bostock v. Clayton County that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of . . .

sex” also forbids employers from making employment decisions because of an employee’s sexual

orientation or gender identity.84 Bostock’s holding opened the way for employees to bring

75 Id. § 4311(a).

76 Carder v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2011) superseded by Statute as Stated in Bennett v.

Dallas Independent School Dist. N.D. Tex. (March 29, 2013).

77

Id. at 178–79.

78 Pub. L. No. 112–56, tit. II, § 251, 125 Stat. 712, 729.

79 McDaniel v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 13-cv-06500, 2014 WL 4269126 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2014); Montoya v.

Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1013 (C.D. Cal. Aug, 13, 2013).

80 EEOC, supra note 51; 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b).

81 EEOC, supra note 51 (“Anti-discrimination laws also prohibit harassment against individuals in retaliation for filing

a discrimination charge, testifying, or participating in any way in an investigation, proceeding, or lawsuit under these

laws; or opposing employment practices that they reasonably believe discriminate against individuals, in violation of

these laws.”).

82 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1438.

83 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 115-397, 132 Stat. 5297 (2018); 2 U.S.C.

§ 1311(A).

84 Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 660, 654, 683 (2020). The Court in Bostock expressly declined to “address

bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind.” Id. at 681. The decision therefore gave little guidance on

whether a Title VII harassment claim is available when transgender employees allege discrimination in access to or

(continued...)

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harassment claims based on mistreatment because of sexual orientation or gender identity.

Accordingly, courts have now considered claims of harassment on such bases, generally applying

the same legal standards that apply to other sexual harassment claims under Title VII.85 As the

Fifth Circuit observed, “the Court expanded the groups of individuals protected by Title VII” but

“in no way altered the preexisting legal standard for sexual harassment.”86

In particular, courts have observed that harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity

must meet the severe or pervasive threshold applicable to other harassment claims.87 Accordingly,

courts have considered issues such as the frequency and severity of mistreatment, as is common

in harassment claims, even under novel fact patterns. For example, in one case, the Sixth Circuit

rejected a harassment claim based on allegations that coworkers sent an employee Bible verses

after he came out as gay and gave him gifts such as pink nail polish.88 These actions “could be

seen as targeting his sexual orientation,” the court acknowledged, but comparing his situation

with fact patterns in other sexual harassment cases, the court found his alleged mistreatment was

not severe or pervasive.89 Similarly, another Sixth Circuit panel found that an employer

mistreated an employee because of his sexual orientation by directing him to act more masculine

(removing body piercings and changing his hairstyle) and to take down his relationship status on

Facebook (showing he was dating a man),90 but these isolated actions did not create a hostile

work environment in the court’s view.91

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Copeland v. Georgia Department of Corrections held that a

transgender prison guard did raise a potentially viable harassment claim.92 Among other things,

the court pointed to allegations that staff and supervisors consistently laughed at and taunted the

plaintiff and called him “ma’am” on the prison-wide radio system. This happened daily, three or

four times a day, according to plaintiff.93 At times, coworkers pushed the plaintiff or blocked his

way. He identified thirty-four coworkers who participated in this behavior. They also allegedly

joked about him in front of inmates, who joined in.94 This treatment, the court concluded, would

qualify as pervasive.95 A factfinder could also find this mistreatment severe, the court concluded,

given that supervisors participated and considering the context: dangerous work in a correctional

institution.96

harassment in same-sex spaces, or what such a claim might look like. Bostock also did not make clear whether refusing

to use an employee’s preferred name or pronoun is harassment or whether it can contribute to a hostile environment,

nor did the decision address other issues of sexual identity, such as bisexuality. See Howse v. Topre Am. Corp., No. 24cv-00034, 2025 WL 2174857, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2025) (“[T]he rationale of the [Bostock] decision provides no

basis to conclude that discrimination against men who are attracted to men is impermissibly ‘based on sex,’ but

discrimination against men who are attracted to men and women is not.”); Nancy C. Marcus, Bostock v. Clayton

County and the Problem of Bisexual Erasure, 115 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 223, 228 (2020).

85 See, e.g., Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2021); Kilpatrick v. HCA Hum. Res., LLC, No.

22-5307, 2023 WL 1961223, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2023).

86 Newbury, 991 F.3d at 677.

87 Id.

88 Kilpatrick, 2023 WL 1961223, at *4.

89 Id.

90 Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co., 32 F.4th 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2022).

91 Id. at 606.

92 97 F.4th 766, 770 (11th Cir. 2024).

93 Id. at 771.

94

Id.

95 Id. at 777.

96 Id. at 778. The plaintiff was allegedly attacked and injured by an inmate. Id.

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EEOC Harassment Guidance Changes

The EEOC implements Title VII and several other employment discrimination laws, investigating

violations and issuing guidance.97 EEOC guidance around harassment has fluctuated in recent

years. The EEOC initially issued updated harassment guidance in 2024,98 adding language to

implement the Bostock decision (interpreting Title VII to protect discrimination based on gender

identity and sexual orientation). Building on the decision in Bostock, the guidance identified

workplace behaviors that could create a hostile environment based on sexual orientation or

gender identity. In particular, the guidance identified, as examples of harassing behavior,

“repeated and intentional use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s known

gender identity (misgendering); or the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated

facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.”99 The guidance stated that it “replaced”

several previous EEOC guidance documents, including its 1990 Policy Guidance on Current

Issues of Sexual Harassment.100 The 1990 harassment guidance on EEOC’s website is labeled

“superseded” and “rescinded.”101

Following issuance of the 2024 guidance, the State of Texas and the Heritage Foundation sued,

claiming the updated guidance exceeded the EEOC’s authority by “requiring bathroom, dress, and

pronoun accommodations.”102 In May 2025, a district court vacated portions of the guidance as

contrary to law.103 The vacated portions included the section “outlining harassment based on

sexual orientation and gender identity.”104 The district court reasoned that the guidance went

beyond Bostock’s holding that firing a worker based on his or her gender identity or sexual

orientation violates Title VII,105 as Bostock did not address issues of gender-segregated spaces or

use of pronouns. Accordingly, the court held, the guidance impermissibly expanded Title VII, as

“Title VII does not bar workplace employment policies that protect the inherent differences

between men and women.”106

After the decision, the EEOC marked the vacated portions in the guidance posted on its

website.107 Then, on January 22, 2026, the EEOC rescinded the 2024 harassment guidance in its

97 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.

98 EEOC, EEOC-CVG-2024-1, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 17 (Apr. 29, 2024),

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67f14b136c5a8838cca88ae0/t/695b09bc75670a15a51b4f70/1767573948611/

[https://perma.cc/9U8Y-CAU8].

99 Id.

100

Id.; EEOC, EEOC-CVG-1990-8, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Mar. 19, 1990),

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-current-issues-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/3M4PD6L6].

101 EEOC, supra note 100.

102 Texas v. EEOC, 785 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2025).

103 Id.

104 Id. at 195.

105 Id. at 189.

106 Id.

107 Sarah N. Niemiroski & Linda L. Yoder, Employment Law Letter, EEOC Rescinds Guidance on Workplace

Harassment: Employee Safeguards Remain, SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP (Jan. 26, 2026),

https://www.employmentlawletter.com/2026/01/eeoc-rescinds-guidance-on-workplace-harassment-employeesafeguards-remain/#:~:text=Portions%20of%20the%202024,guidance%20on%20its%20website

[https://perma.cc/VW8Q-Q3ZQ]; Harassment in the Workplace, EEOC,

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-harassment-workplace [https://perma.cc/D7R8-MHUP]

(last visited June 1, 2026).

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entirety,108 with the EEOC Chair emphasizing that “[r]escinding this guidance does not give

employers license to engage in unlawful harassment.”109 Laws “against discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation, and Supreme Court precedent interpreting those laws, remain firmly

in place,” she stated,110 reiterating the EEOC’s goal of “preventing and remedying unlawful

workplace harassment.”111 In rescinding the 2024 guidance, the EEOC did not state whether it

considered its 1990 guidance to be reinstated. As of this writing, the EEOC still maintains a

website stating that “[h]arassment is a form of employment discrimination that violates” Title VII,

the ADEA, and the ADA.112

In a further indication of the EEOC’s current position with respect to harassment, the EEOC’s

Office of Federal Employment issued a decision on February 26, 2026, regarding transgender

employees in federal workplaces.113 Overturning a prior decision, the EEOC stated that federal

agencies may restrict employees from using facilities aligned with their gender identity.114 The

decision followed an executive order defining sex as an “immutable biological classification.”115

Other Harassment-Related Statutory Requirements:

Reporting, Disclosure, and Prevention

While Congress has not codified harassment doctrines in federal antidiscrimination law, it has

legislated on related matters. The CAA, passed in 2018, has specific provisions addressing

harassment claims against Members of Congress.116 Members must reimburse the U.S. Treasury

for any awards or settlements resolving claims that a Member of Congress personally engaged in

harassment based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, veteran status, or

retaliation for reporting the aforementioned harassment.117 The Office of Congressional

Workplace Rights (OCWR), which administers the CAA, must publish an annual report detailing

payments made to resolve harassment claims.118 OCWR is also tasked with compiling “workplace

environment” surveys, including collecting information about sexual harassment.119

The Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (No

FEAR Act) requires federal agencies to give employees notice of antiharassment protections and

108 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Commission Votes to Rescind 2024 Harassment Guidance (Jan. 23, 2026)

https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-commission-votes-rescind-2024-harassment-guidance [https://perma.cc/93MSFBH9].

109 Id.

110 Id.

111 Id.

112 Harassment, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment [https://perma.cc/G4GL-2EUJ] (last visited June 1, 2026).

113 Selina S. v. Driscoll, No. 2025003976 (EEOC 2026), https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/202602/2025003976.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY4D-NA6E].

114 Lusardi v. McHugh, No. 0120133395 (EEOC 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/

migrated_files/decisions/0120133395.txt [https://perma.cc/ZW5S-GRQN].

115 Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 20, 2025).

116 2 U.S.C. § 1415; CRS In Focus IF13236, The Congressional Accountability Act’s Employment Discrimination

Provisions, by Abigail A. Graber (2026); CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10384, The Congressional Accountability Act of

1995 Reform Act: An Overview, by Christine J. Back (2019).

117

2 U.S.C. § 1415(d).

118 Id. §§ 1381(l), 1415(d).

119 Id. § 1388.

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to provide antidiscrimination training.120 Agencies must report discrimination complaints and

discipline, including those for harassment, to Congress and other agencies.121 They must also post

complaint data on their public websites.122

In 2022, Congress passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual

Harassment Act of 2021.123 The law bars employers from seeking enforcement of pre-dispute

arbitration provisions or class action waivers in cases of sexual harassment and sexual assault. A

covered sexual harassment dispute is one alleging harassment in violation of federal, tribal, or

state law.124 Although an employer cannot impose arbitration under the act, a person alleging

harassment could choose to implement the arbitration agreement and seek arbitration.

Congress also passed the Speak Out Act the same year, aimed at restricting agreements that bar

sexual harassment victims from discussing their experiences.125 The Act bars judicial enforcement

of pre-dispute nondisclosure or nondisparagement agreements if the dispute involves sexual

assault or sexual harassment in violation of federal, tribal, or state law.126 Congress indicated in

the Act’s findings that “[s]exual harassment and assault remain pervasive in the workplace and

throughout civic society, affecting millions of Americans.”127 This context suggests the law seeks

to target contract provisions seen in employment or other relationships that require an employee

or customer not to discuss any sexual harassment that may occur, even if it occurs years after the

agreement. The Act does not address any confidentiality agreements that are part of a postharassment settlement.

Many states have codified their own employment harassment protections, with some explicitly

addressing protections for sexual orientation and gender identity,128 requiring written

antiharassment policies, or calling for notification of rights or training.129

Considerations for Congress

Antiharassment doctrine is defined through case law, extending beyond sexual harassment and

beyond Title VII to bar harassment on grounds including disability, religion, family status, age,

and military service.

As many antiharassment obligations are not fully codified, Congress could consider adding

specific antiharassment provisions to antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA, Title VII, and

120 5 U.S.C. § 2301; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203 (2025); Questions and Answers: No FEAR Act, EEOC,

https://www.eeoc.gov/no-fear/questions-and-answers-no-fear-act [https://perma.cc/S2JN-Z8JZ] (last visited June 2,

2026).

121 5 U.S.C. § 2301.

122 Comparative Data, FY 2019-FY 2024: Equal Employment Opportunity Data Posted Pursuant to the No FEAR Act,

U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/equal-employment-opportunity/no-fear-act/#url=Comparative

[https://perma.cc/JL5S-987T] (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).

123 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402; Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).

124 9 U.S.C. § 401.

125 42 U.S.C. §§ 19401–19404.

126 Id. §§ 19403(a), 19402(4).

127 Id. § 19401(1).

128 Iris Hentze & Rebecca Tyus, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Aug. 12,

2021), https://www.ncsl.org/labor-and-employment/sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/54QE4YNK]; Rob Hopkirk et al., State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 25 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1043 (2024).

129 Which States Require a Written Harassment Prevention Policy?, ADP: HR TIP OF THE WEEK (June 30, 2025),

https://sbshrs.adpinfo.com/blog/which-states-require-a-written-harassment-prevention-policy [https://perma.cc/XN99Q6EN].

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others. Congress could either broaden or narrow the range of actionable harassment claims. For

example, it could change the “severe or pervasive” standard to make it easier for plaintiffs to

show harassment, perhaps by specifying prohibited conduct. It could also specify examples of

harassing conduct, including rules for gender identity and use of gender-segregated spaces. It

could, conversely, act to limit potential claims by imposing a more restrictive standard, possibly

specifying conduct that does not support a harassment claim.

In addressing harassment rules, Congress could draft uniform mandates for various employers,

consistent with its Commerce Clause authority, or it could draft narrow rules, aimed at federal

workers or federal contractors. It could extend antiharassment mandates to small employers (as

those with fewer than fifteen employees are currently excluded from Title VII). Congress could

also address issues of training, notice, and confidentiality. It could require reporting of harassment

complaints, broadening requirements that currently apply to federal employers. Alternatively,

Congress could require private employers to adopt formal antidiscrimination policies, as is

required in some state laws.

Legislation introduced in the 119th Congress would address some of these considerations in

specific ways. The BE HEARD in the Workplace Act of 2026, originally proposed in 2019,130

aims to “prevent and reduce prohibited discrimination, including harassment, in

employment.”131 It would restrict mandatory arbitration and pre-employment confidentiality

agreements—going beyond the Speak Out Act’s provisions, which make such agreements

unenforceable in court. The Act would also require posting nondiscrimination policies (which

must define harassment), training for workers, and surveys of harassment.132 It would address

the application of Bostock by specifying how employers need to accommodate variations in

gender identity.133 The bill would impose fines for offenders134 and it would expand Title VII’s

reach by amending it to apply to small employers. 135

In addition, the bill would clarify standards of proof for discrimination and employment

harassment, codifying some of the judicial developments discussed above. It would specify quid

pro quo harassment as unlawful and it would define other harassment as conduct having “the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”136 The Act would amend several

employment discrimination laws to address disability, age, and religious harassment.

Another proposal from the 119th Congress, the Protections and Transparency in the Workplace

Act, would require covered publicly traded companies to report claims of harassment, defined as

potential violations of listed federal antidiscrimination statutes.137 Settlement, judgments, and

payments connected to covered discrimination and harassment claims would also require

disclosure.138

130 BE HEARD in the Workplace Act of 2026, H.R. 7583, 119th Cong. (2026); BE HEARD in the Workplace Act,

H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. (2019).

131 H.R. 7583, § 3.

132 Id. §§ 101, 102, 105, 111.

133 Id. § 1101.

134 Id. § 101.

135 Id. § 202; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

136

H.R. 7583, § 204.

137 Protections and Transparency in the Workplace Act, H.R. 4599, 119th Cong. (2025).

138 Id. § 2(b).

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Author Information

April J. Anderson

Legislative Attorney

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan

shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and

under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other

than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in

connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not

subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in

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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

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