Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Congressional research reportJun 9, 2026
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Russian Military Activities in Asia:
Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
June 9, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48977
SUMMARY
Russian Military Activities in Asia:
Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Historically, Russia has claimed a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012,
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a policy by which Russia would seek to emphasize
and further develop economic and trade opportunities with Asia, in particular with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC, or China). Although Russia’s military focus has been drawn westward
since its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and has further accelerated since its full-scale invasion
of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has pursued military activities aimed at asserting influence in the
Asia-Pacific region.
R48977
June 9, 2026
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and
European Affairs
With most of its ground forces committed to fighting in Ukraine, Russia has maintained a naval and strategic air presence in
the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok and part of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent
force, is Russia’s primary military force in the region and primary tool for power projection. Russia uses the presence of its
Pacific Fleet and strategic bomber force to signal its strength to other powers in the region, including the United States.
Combined Russia and PRC military exercises and patrols are a key component of Russia’s signaling strategy. Since 2014,
Russia and the PRC have conducted increased numbers of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and combined naval
and air patrols, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities also are increasingly conducted near contested areas
(such as near Taiwan) or close to the United States, such as off the coast of Alaska. These exercises and patrols have become
more complex, involving greater coordination and communication as well as more high-end military equipment and sensitive
activities. Despite this cooperation, the Russian and PRC militaries are not interoperable; based on open-source information,
it is not clear whether the two governments seek such a high level of military integration.
U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacific
region and Russia’s military relationship with the PRC. Members of the 119th Congress may continue to assess the
implications of increased Russian military activities and Russia-PRC military cooperation for U.S. interests and consider
whether or not to pursue legislative or other options to address potential concerns. Some in Congress also may seek to shape
or monitor U.S. responses through oversight of executive branch policies, reporting requirements, or other measures.
Congressional Research Service
Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Russia’s Far East Strategy ............................................................................................................... 2
Russia-PRC Combined Military Exercises and Patrols ................................................................... 4
Combined Ground Activities..................................................................................................... 7
Combined Naval Activities ....................................................................................................... 8
Combined Air Activities ............................................................................................................ 9
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 10
Figures
Figure 1. Publicly Reported Locations of Russia-PRC Military Exercises, 2012-2024.................. 5
Figure 2. Selected Publicly Reported Russia-PRC Combined Air and Naval Patrols,
2019-2024..................................................................................................................................... 9
Tables
Table A-1. Russia-PRC Military Exercises, 2003-2024 ................................................................ 12
Appendixes
Appendix. Selected Russia-PRC Military Exercises and Patrols, 2003-2024 ............................... 12
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 17
Congressional Research Service
Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Introduction and Issues for Congress
Russia has multifaceted diplomatic, economic, and security interests in Asia, including with
respect to relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). U.S. officials have
expressed concern regarding Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacific region and the
increase in Russia-PRC combined military exercises and patrols.1 In January 2026, General
Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, highlighted broader and growing
Russia-PRC military cooperation: “Over the last several years, it’s been both in the maritime
domain with increased joint patrols, as well as in the air domain, with long range bomber patrols
being conducted jointly.”2 Additionally, according to April 2026 congressional testimony by
Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Russia is expanding its
Indo-Pacific footprint even as the war in Ukraine continues to strain Russian capacity. Russia has
maintained the pace of air and naval force modernization in its Eastern Military District.”3
Furthermore, Lieutenant General James Adams testified that the Defense Intelligence Agency’s
(DIA) 2026 worldwide threat assessment views that,
Russia relies on China as its key partner in countering the United States in the Indo-Pacific
region, and almost certainly will advance ties in 2026 by continuing military technical
cooperation, combined patrols, and sharing lessons learned from its war in Ukraine. 4
Additionally, some Members of Congress have expressed concern regarding combined RussiaPRC military exercises and patrols. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers,
for example, stated during a March 2026 hearing, “In the past two years, we’ve seen Russian and
Chinese bombers and warships operating jointly near Alaska. This is a significant demonstration
of military cooperation between our two most capable adversaries right off our shores.”5
The nature of Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia-PRC combined
exercises and patrols may be of interest to the 119th Congress. Congress could consider whether
or not to pursue the following actions, among others:
•
assessing through hearings, investigations, or reporting requirements the potential effects
of growing Russian activities in the Asia-Pacific region on U.S. national defense and
security strategy, including implications for U.S. alliances and other global commitments;
1 During March 2026 congressional testimony, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated that “[the PRC
and Russia] are our primary strategic competitors.” U.S. Congress, Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Worldwide
Threats, hearing, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 2026; Diana Nerozzi, “1 Reason Trump Won’t Give Up On Putin
Peace Deal—China,” Politico, March 17, 2026. For the purposes of this report, combined refers to the bilateral or
multilateral military operations of countries operating together.
2 NATO, “Joint Press Conference,” January 22, 2026, at https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/
2026/01/22/press-conference-cmc-saceur-sact.
3 Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region, 119th Cong.,
2nd sess., April 22, 2026, p. 5; The Russian military divides Russia into five military districts overseeing administrative
and operational tasks of forces in their assigned regions. The Eastern Military District covers Russia’s Far East region
bordering the PRC and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Jonas Kjellen, “Russia’s Revamp of Military Districts: Back to a
Centralized Future?” Swedish Defense Research Agency, June 2024
4 Statement by Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James Adams, U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee, Defense Intelligence Enterprise—Challenges,
Priorities, and Resourcing for Fiscal Year 2027, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., April 16, 2026, p. 12.
5 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the
Western Hemisphere, hearing, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2026.
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
•
evaluating existing or prospective legislation, including legislation aimed at
strengthening, eliminating, or otherwise modifying sanctions, in response to Russia-PRC
military exercises and joint patrols;
•
conducting oversight by requiring the executive branch to report to Congress on the
implications of Russia-PRC military exercises on U.S. defense strategy, policy,
budgetary, and industrial considerations, including current and projected defense projects,
as well as any plans to address those implications; and
•
engaging with counterparts and other officials in U.S. allied and partner governments to
share assessments of, and potentially coordinate responses to, Russia-PRC military
exercises and patrols.
Russia’s Far East Strategy6
Since the mid-19th century, Russia has asserted a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region.7
In the immediate post-Cold War period, Russia’s primary political, economic, and military focus
was on its western borders, relations with Europe, and the United States. Upon returning to the
Russian presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin outlined a strategic policy shift, referred to by
observers as the “turn to the East,” focusing on developing Russia’s Far East region, improving
relations with countries in Asia, and reasserting Russia’s position as a key regional power.8 In
practice, Russia’s “turn to the East” has prioritized developing relations with the PRC.9
Russia’s “turn to the East” policy was heavily focused on economic concerns, including
expanding and securing new trade and energy markets.10 Russia’s focus on boosting relations in
the region arguably increased as Russia became more politically and economically isolated after
its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022.11 President Putin denied
Russia’s isolation pressured a turn to the Far East and assert that the Russian government’s policy
is part of a long-term strategic shift. For example, in September 2022, Putin stated, “We didn’t
start boosting the Far East because we were preparing a special military operation in Donbass [a
geographic region of Ukraine]. This was long before that. It was a strategic choice based on
trends in the development of the global economy and, accordingly, the emergence of new
6 For purposes of this report, Far East refers to Russia’s territories and interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
7 Chris Miller, We Shall Be Masters: Russia Pivots to East Asia from Peter the Great to Putin (Harvard University
Press, 2021); Charles E. Ziegler, Russia in the Pacific: The Quest for Great Power Recognition (Oxford University
Press, 2024).
8 See generally, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, “We have the opportunity to assume a worthy place
in the Asia-Pacific region, the most dynamic region in the world.” President of Russia, “Address to the Federal
Assembly,” December 12, 2012, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118; David Lewis, “Strategic Culture
and Russia’s ‘Pivot to the East’: Russia, China, and the ‘Greater Eurasia,’” Marshall Center Security Insight, no. 34
(July 2019); Gilbert Rozman and Gaye Christoffersen, eds., Putin’s “Turn to the East” in the Xi Jinping Era
(Routledge, 2024).
9 Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?” Asia Policy, vol. 19, no. 1 (2015), pp. 65-87;
Deborah Welch Larson, “An Equal Partnership of Unequals: China’s and Russia’s New Status Relationship,”
International Politics, vol. 57, no. 1 (2020), p. 796.
10 CRS Report R44613, Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East”: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Emma
Chanlett-Avery.
11 Stephen Fortescue, “Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’: A Study in Policymaking,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 32, no. 5
(2016), pp. 423-454; Gilbert Rozman, “How Did the Ukraine War Change Putin’s ‘Turn to the East’?,” Asian
Perspective, vol. 47, no. 3 (2023), p. 353.
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[centers] of power in the world.”12 At the same time, despite Russia’s economic development and
infrastructure investment plans, Russia’s status in the Far East remains constrained by its reliance
on energy exports and increased dependency on the PRC.13
As the economic benefits of Russia’s policy remain limited, some analysts suggest that the
Russian government increasingly has turned to its military to assert its status as a regional
power.14 According to Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia occupies a “special position
as a unique country-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power.”15 Russia’s primary
military asset in the Asia-Pacific region is its Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok.16
Russia’s Pacific fleet has been modernized over the last decade and comprises roughly one third
of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent force.17 Alongside Russia’s strategic bomber force, the
Pacific Fleet supports Russia’s power projection in the region by conducting large-scale naval
exercises, visiting foreign ports, and patrolling contested areas (such as near Taiwan and the East
China Sea).18 Russia conducts these activities arguably to demonstrate its capabilities as a major
regional power and as part of a coercive signaling strategy.19
A key component of Russia’s Far East strategy and signaling efforts has been an increase in
military cooperation with the PRC.20 This cooperation has helped bolster Russia’s position in the
12 President of Russia, “Eastern Economic Forum Plenary Session,” September 7, 2022, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/69299.
13 Alexander Gabuev, “With Putin in Charge, Russia’s Vassalage to China Will Only Deepen,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, September 8, 2025; Katrina Northrop et al., “China and Russia Sign More Deals, but Beijing
Keeps the Upper Hand,” Washington Post, September 11, 2025; CRS In Focus IF13159, Russia-China Natural Gas
Trade, by Michael Ratner, Michael D. Sutherland, and Cory Welt.
14 Eugene Rumer et al., Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less Than Meets the Eye, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, September 3, 2020; Daniil Zhukov, “A Tangled Ball: Russian Nuclear Policy, Relations and Risks in Northeast
Asia,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, vol. 8, no. 1 (2025), pp. 91-111; New Eurasian Strategies Centre,
“Turning East: How Russia’s Ambitions in Asia Are Confronted by Reality,” September 12, 2025;
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,
March 31, 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/.
16 TASS, “Russia’s Pacific Fleet Demonstrates Strong Combat Readiness—Kremlin Aide,” September 2, 2025.
17 The Pacific Fleet currently has five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (25th Red Banner Submarine
Division), 18 other submarines, 11 principal surface combatants (cruiser/destroyer/frigate), and 23 patrol and coastal
combatants, among other ships. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2026; Alexey D.
Muraviev, Battle Reading the Russian Pacific Fleet 2023-2030, Sea Power Centre, 2023; Yu Koizumi, “Russian
Pacific Fleet Redux: Japan’s North as a New Center of Gravity,” War on the Rocks, October 22, 2024; Alexey D.
Muraviev, Moscow’s Pacific Trident: The Submarine Arms of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Early 2025 to 2030, Sea
Power Centre, April 14, 2025.
18 President of Russia, “July Storm Naval Exercise,” press release, July 25, 2025; TASS, “Russian Pacific Fleet
Detachment Sets Off on Long-Range Voyage to Korea Strait,” March 4, 2026; North American Aerospace Defense
Command, “NORAD Detects and Tracks Russian Aircraft Operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone,”
press release, March 4, 2026; TASS, “Russian Ships Detachment Leaves Chinese Port to Continue Long Distance
Voyage,” April 20, 2026.
19 James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, vol. 41, no. 1 (1997), pp. 68-90; Ralph Clem, “Military Exercises as Geopolitical Messaging in the NATORussia Dynamic: Reassurance, Deterrence, and (In)stability,” Texas National Security Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (2018), pp.
130-143; Samuel Charap et al., Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling, RAND, 2022.
20 Richard Weitz, “Assessing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises: Past Progress and Future Trends,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 9, 2021 (hereinafter Weitz, “Assessing Chinese-Russian Military
Exercises”); Dmitry Gorenburg et al., Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation: An Increasingly Unequal Partnership,
CNA, March 2023 (hereinafter Gorenburg et al., Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation); Oriana Skylar Mastro, “SinoRussian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security,” Security Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (2024), pp. 254290; Mark Cozad et al., Future Scenarios for Sino-Russian Military Cooperation: Possibilities, Limitations, and
Consequences, RAND, 2024.
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Asia-Pacific region and has served as a platform for the Russian government to promote
multipolarity and indicate dissatisfaction with the U.S.-led international system.21 According to
Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation”
under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025)22 2025 annual report to Congress,
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, “China and Russia
[have] deepened their strategic partnership, almost certainly driven by a shared interest in
countering the United States.”23 The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (ATA) highlighted concerns posed by Russia-PRC cooperation. The 2025 ATA states,
“Cooperation between China and Russia has the greatest potential to pose enduring risks to U.S.
interests. Their leaders probably believe they are more capable of countering perceived U.S.
aggression together than alone, given a shared belief that the United States is seeking to constrain
each adversary.”24 The 2026 ATA assesses this trend is likely to continue, noting that, “Russia is
also likely to continue collaborating with other powers, including U.S. adversaries, to jointly
oppose the U.S. where their respective interests overlap.”25
One potential aspect of a deeper Russia-PRC partnership is combined military activity,
particularly exercises and patrols.26 Since 2017, Russia and the PRC have planned military
coordination in five-year road maps, reportedly at Russia’s request. When announcing the
(unpublished) 2021-2025 road map, Russian and PRC defense ministers reportedly said it would
support “strategic coordination” and inform “strategic military exercises and joint patrols.”27
Russia-PRC Combined Military Exercises and
Patrols
Since approximately 2010, Russia and the PRC have increased the frequency of combined
military exercises and introduced combined naval and air patrols in the Asia-Pacific region and
elsewhere.28 According to the 2025 ATA, “For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used
high-profile, combined military activities primarily to signal the strength of the China–Russia
defense ties.”29 Since 2014, combined training and exercises have been both bilateral and
multilateral, have involved PRC participation in Russia’s annual strategic command staff
21 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2026 Annual Threat Assessment states, “Russia views itself as a
key geostrategic competitor of the U.S. and seeks a multipolar world order in which Russia reaches and maintains a
privileged position, equal to that of the U.S. and other great powers, including China.” Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2026, p. 29
(hereinafter, 2026 ATA).
22 The Department of Defense (DOD) is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order
14347 of September 5, 2025, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” 90 Federal Register 43893, September
10, 2025.
23 DOD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,
December 2025, p. 5 (hereinafter DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2025).
24 ODNI, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2025, p. 30 (hereinafter 2025 ATA).
25 2026 ATA, p. 29.
26 According to one study, “Multinational military exercises are among the most notable demonstrations of military
cooperation and intent.” Raymond Kuo and Brian Dylan Blankenship, “Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military
Exercises Escalate Conflict?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 66, no. 1 (January 2022), p. 3.
27 Jon Grevatt, “China, Russia Approve 2021-25 Road Map to Increase Military Co-Operation,” Janes IHS, November
24, 2021.
28 Gorenburg et al., Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation, p. 49.
29 2025 ATA, p. 30.
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exercises, and have included combined naval and long-range strategic bomber patrols. After
conducting 7 exercises or patrols in 2019, Russia and the PRC conducted 2 in 2020 (likely
because of the COVID-19 pandemic), followed by 7 exercises or patrols annually in 2022 and
2023, and 11 exercises or patrols in 2024 primarily in the Asia-Pacific region (for a full list, see
the Appendix).30 According to DOD, “In 2024, China and Russia expanded their defense
engagement, increasing the frequency, scope, and complexity of their combined military
exercises.”31 This trend continued in 2025; according to General Grynkewich’s March 2026
congressional testimony, “China’s military cooperation with Russia deepened in 2025, with the
two countries conducting their ‘Joint Sea’ combined naval exercise in the Sea of Japan as well as
a joint air patrol over the East China Sea and the Western Pacific.”32 The geographic scope of
combined military exercises also has broadened since the mid-2010s (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Publicly Reported Locations of Russia-PRC Military Exercises, 2012-2024
Source: CRS, using data from media reports, think-tank studies, and official Russian and People’s Republic of
China (PRC) press releases.
Note: See the Appendix for further information.
Russia and the PRC appear to have derived a range of benefits from these military activities. The
size and frequency of exercises and combined patrols has increased, providing both operational
and signaling benefits.33 According to April 2025 testimony by General Christopher G. Cavoli,
30 Gorenburg et al., Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation, p. 52.
31 DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025, p. 5.
32 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States
European Command and United States Transportation Command in Review of the Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2027 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 2026.
33 “These exercises have gradually increased in size, scale, and complexity since their establishment and may offer the
two militaries opportunities for modest advancements in combined capabilities during peace time operations. Russia is
the PLA’s most consistent and most advanced foreign military partner. China and Russia probably utilize the
opportunity to exercise together as a means to highlight military cooperation regionally and globally.” DOD, Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025, p. 34.
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then-Commander of U.S. European Command, “Russia and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]
continue to expand the scope of their regularly conducted, combined-military exercises and
increase their training on more sophisticated weapons platforms.”34
These exercises and patrols may have improved trust and familiarity between Russian and PRC
forces. Some exercises have involved the two militaries allowing each other access to their
respective air and naval bases (such access currently appears limited to military exercises and
patrols). Expanding such access could increase the range and presence of combined operations in
strategically important areas, such as the Sea of Japan or South China Sea.35 For the PRC’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has had no major combat experience since the late
1970s, exercising with Russian forces offers an opportunity to train with and learn from a military
with combat experience from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.36
In addition to operational military benefits, combined exercises and patrols have a strong political
and symbolic component.37 They arguably have enabled the Russian government to signal its
displeasure with what it has described as U.S. global hegemony, especially in and around
contested or sensitive regions.38 In July 2024, Russian and PRC bombers conducted a combined
strategic patrol in international airspace near Alaska for the first time; it was also the first time
PLA bomber aircraft entered the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone.39 According to March
2025 testimony by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, “[Russia] has increased
combined military exercises with China to signal shared fortitude against the United States and
U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region.”40 According to General Gregory M. Guillot, Commander
of U.S. Northern Command, in March 2026 testimony,
China and Russia are advancing their strategic partnership to counter the United States and
its allies…While none of the relationships among our principal adversaries constitutes a
formal military alliance, their shared perception of the United States as a threat to their core
34 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States
European Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 2025.
35 Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “Putin’s Ukraine Invasion: Turbocharging Sino-Russian Collaboration
in Energy, Maritime Security, and Beyond?” Naval War College Review, vol. 75, no. 4 (Autumn 2022), pp. 19-20.
36 According to General Christopher Cavoli in his April 2025 testimony, “at the military level, operationally and
tactically, [the PRC is] studying the conflict [in Ukraine] very, very hard in ways that we know they would apply … to
any potential conflict in Taiwan.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the
Posture of United States European Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 3, 2025.
37 Kaori Kaneko et al., “U.S. Bombers Join Japanese Jets in Show of Force After China-Russia Drills, Tokyo Says,”
Reuters, December 11, 2025.
38 Paul Schwartz, “Russia-China Joint Exercises: The View from Russia,” in Understanding the Broader Transatlantic
Security Implications of Greater Sino Russian Military Alignment, eds. Max Bergmann and Andrew Lohsen (CSIS,
2022), pp. 18-27; Heather Williams et al., “Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise Near Alaska?”
CSIS, July 30, 2024.
39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States
European Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 2025.
40 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess., March
25, 2025. Additionally, the congressionally mandated 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy noted that
the Russia-PRC partnership “is aimed at challenging U.S. leadership internationally.” Jane Harman et al., Commission
on the National Defense Strategy, RAND, July 2024, p. 10.
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security interests could form the foundation of a wartime partnership, complicating U.S.
military planning and advancing each adversary’s ability to threaten the homeland.41
There are limitations to Russia-PRC combined military exercises. Russia and the PRC do not
share a formal defense pact, and the two countries’ military forces are not interoperable.42 Rather
than integrating into combined operations and command and control, Russian and PRC units
often exercise side by side in highly scripted operations that may not replicate real-world
situations and conditions.43 Nevertheless, both militaries may gain from combined exercises,
including by exchanging best practices, familiarizing each other with their command practices,
and exploring emerging capabilities (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones). Side-by-side
operations also may provide an opportunity for the two militaries to practice deconfliction
processes, even if their forces are not interoperable.44
Combined Ground Activities
The locations of combined ground military exercises have expanded since the mid-2010s (see
Figure 1). Most land exercises have taken place in Russia’s central and western regions and in
the PRC’s northeastern region. Prior to 2014, most Russia-PRC military exercises, such as the
Peace Mission series, were conducted under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) and nominally characterized by participants as counterterrorism exercises.45
Compared with naval exercises (see below), Russian and PRC ground forces’ interactions have
been less frequent and have involved smaller numbers of troops and command staff—especially
since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.46 The PRC’s largest ground force contribution to
Russia’s annual strategic command staff exercises occurred during the Vostok 2018 military
exercise (in Russia’s Eastern Military District), reportedly numbering over 3,000 PLA troops.47
41 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the
Western Hemisphere, hearing, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2026.
42 Additionally, both Russia and the PRC continue to express a level of mutual distrust. Reports of leaked Russian
planning documents—purportedly from 2008 to 2014—suggested that Russian officials were concerned about the
superiority of the PRC’s conventional forces. It is unclear to what extent these Russian concerns might persist in light
of deepening Russia-PRC ties since 2014. Max Seddon and Chris Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria
for Nuclear Strike,” Financial Times, February 28, 2024; John Stanko and Spenser Warren, “Russian Threat Perception
and Nuclear Strategy in Its Plans for War with China,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2024.
43 See Michael Connell et al., Training in the Russian Armed Forces: An Assessment of Recent Reforms and Their
Impact on Russian Operations in Ukraine, CNA, September 2023.
44 Deconfliction refers to a process of identifying and resolving competing activities in an area of joint or combined
operations. Weitz, “Assessing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,” p. 3.
45 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization established in 2001 by China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to strengthen cooperation on a range of issues,
particularly in “combating terrorism, separatism and extremism.” Other countries have since joined the SCO. SCO,
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 15, 2001.
46 According to DOD, “China-Russia exercises during the past few years have been less focused on large-scale troop
operations, probably due to the strain of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” DOD, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025, p. 5.
47 Weitz, “Assessing PRC-Russian Military Exercises,” p. 3.
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Combined Naval Activities
Russia views its navy as central to its great power aspirations, both globally and in the AsiaPacific region.48 According to the DIA, “Russia’s Navy very likely will remain Russia’s primary
global power projection tool over the next year as its ground forces and the majority of its
aerospace forces remain committed in Ukraine.”49 The importance of Russia’s navy may be one
reason why Russia-PRC naval exercises and patrols have been more extensive than comparable
ground military exercises, and may indicate a greater level of familiarity and trust between naval
partners.50 These naval exercises have included anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, air
defense, anti-piracy, and live-fire operations. In 2024, Russia held its largest naval exercise since
the fall of the Soviet Union, named Ocean 2024; the exercise included a PRC naval contingent.51
Russia and the PRC also have included third countries in their naval exercises. In 2019, Russia
and the PRC for the first time conducted trilateral exercises with both South Africa and Iran;
subsequent exercises followed in 2022 (Iran), 2023 (combined with South Africa and Iran), 2024
(Iran), and 2025 (Iran). In January 2026, Russia, the PRC, Iran, and South Africa conducted a
combined naval exercise.52
On occasion, these exercises have been conducted near sensitive or disputed areas in maritime
Asia (for locations, see Figure 2). For example, the 2016 and 2024 iterations of the Joint Sea
exercise took place in the South China Sea, while Joint Sea 2019 included a circumnavigation of
Japan’s Honshu Island via two straits in Japan’s territorial sea. In August 2025, Russia and the
PRC conducted their first combined submarine patrol in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea.53
Some observers have suggested that the geographic pattern of Russia-PRC naval exercises in Asia
indicates that Russia’s leadership is more willing to engage in exercises that risk antagonizing
PRC neighbors than PRC leaders are willing to antagonize European countries.54
48 Some observers argue that the Russian Navy will play an even more central role in Russian power projection in the
future. For example, the Swedish Defence Research Agency states, “Widening the perspective, the Russian Navy
(which has not yet played a major role in the SVO [Special Military Operation], save for the Black Sea Fleet), is rather
viewed as a potential instrument of global influence in the future.” Maria Engqvist, ed., The Future of Warfare in
Russian Military Thinking, Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2026, p. 9. See also Nikolai Evmenov et al., “Main
Trends in the Change of the Nature and Context of Military Threats to the Russian Federation from Ocean and Sea
Directions,” Voennaia mysl’ [Military Thought], no. 5 (2023), pp. 19-25; Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s Future Naval
Capabilities,” in The Sea in Russian Strategy, eds. Andrew Monaghan and Richard Connolly (Manchester University
Press, 2023), pp. 168-202; Andrew Monaghan, “Russia’s Naval Futures: New Horizons 2050,” NATO Defense
College, December 16, 2025.
49 Statement by Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James Adams, U.S. Congress, House
Armed Services Committee, Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee, Defense Intelligence Enterprise—
Challenges, Priorities, and Resourcing for Fiscal Year 2027, 119th Cong., 2nd sess., April 16, 2026.
50 Reid Standish, “China, Russia Launch Joint Naval Drills in Pacific Amid Strengthening Military Ties,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, August 3, 2025.
51 President of Russia, “Ocean 2024 Strategic Command and Staff Exercise,” September 10, 2024, at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75083; Tomasz Grotnik, “Ocean-2024—Russian Navy Flexes Its Muscles,
China Assists,” Naval News, September 13, 2024.
52 Reuters, “South Africa Probes Iran’s Role in BRICS+ Naval Drills,” January 16, 2026.
53 TASS, “Russian, Chinese Submarines Conduct First Joint Patrol in Asia-Pacific Region,” August 27, 2025.
54 “Russia was perhaps more willing to send its troops to an exercise with possible ramifications for its partnership with
India than China was to alarm its Western economic partners in Europe.” Gorenburg et al., Russian-Chinese Military
Cooperation, p. 53.
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Figure 2. Selected Publicly Reported Russia-PRC Combined Air and Naval Patrols,
2019-2024
Source: CRS, using data from media reports, think-tank studies, and official Russian and People’s Republic of
China (PRC) press releases.
Note: See the Appendix for further information.
Combined Air Activities
Russia-PRC air exercises and training since 2014 have become more complex, involving greater
coordination and communication (e.g., the use of bilingual command information systems) and
more sensitive activities (e.g., strategic bomber patrols).55 In 2019, Russia and the PRC began
conducting combined strategic bomber patrols, often concentrating these patrols in the Yellow
Sea, East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan (for locations, see Figure 2). Admiral John Aquilino,
then commander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified to Congress in March 2024:
The increasing frequency of combined activity is cause for concern. In addition to naval
drills, Russia continues to partner with the PLA in strategic bomber patrols in the western
Pacific near Guam. Russia is also increasingly collaborating with the PLA to execute
combined air patrols that regularly cross into Japan and the Republic of Korea’s Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), further threatening our allies. 56
The aforementioned July 2024 combined bomber flight patrol off the coast of Alaska indicated an
increased level of cooperation and coordination between Russia and PRC militaries, including
allowing access to sensitive strategic bomber airbases (also known as “access transfer”).
According to General Cavoli, “These patrols marked the first time Chinese bombers departed
from the same airbase with Russian bombers, the first time Chinese bombers entered the Alaskan
55 Simone McCarthy, “China and Russia Are Ramping Up Joint Military Drills. What’s Their End Goal?,” CNN,
September 17, 2024.
56 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the
Indo-Pacific Region, hearing, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., March 20, 2024.
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Air Defense Identification Zone, and the first time Chinese nuclear-capable H-6N bombers took
part in a combined patrol.”57 In February 2025 testimony, General Gregory M. Guillot,
Commander of U.S. Northern Command, noted, “Such ‘access transfer’ accelerates and extends
China’s ability to threaten North America in the air domain and raises the specter of coordinated
military operations in the event of a strategic conflict.”58
Considerations for Congress
Congress has previously introduced legislation regarding various aspects of Russia-PRC military
cooperation. Since 2022, some Members of Congress have introduced legislation seeking to
address PRC military support of Russia.59 The 117th and 118th Congress also passed two National
Defense Authorization Acts with provisions related to Russia-PRC military relations.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (P.L. 118-31):
•
Section 1649 requires the Commander of Strategic Command to submit a notification to
congressional defense committees in the event that he or she determines, in consultation
with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “that militarily significant
cooperation between [Russia] and [the PRC] related to nuclear or strategic capabilities is
likely to occur or has likely occurred.”
In the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (P.L. 117-263):
•
•
•
Section 5523 requires the U.S. Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit to
certain congressional committees a report analyzing the impact of Russia’s war
against Ukraine on the PRC’s objectives with respect to Taiwan.
Section 5599 requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce and the Director of National intelligence as appropriate, to submit to
certain congressional committees a report every 90 days on whether and how the
PRC has provided support for Russia with respect to Russia’s war against
Ukraine for two years or until the Secretary of State determines that the conflict
in Ukraine has ended.
Section 6525 of Division F (the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023) requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
heads of elements of the intelligence community that the Director deems
appropriate, to submit to certain congressional committees a report every 180
days on whether and how the PRC has provided support to Russia with respect to
its war against Ukraine for two years or until the Secretary of State determines
that the conflict in Ukraine has ended.
Members of the 119th Congress may wish to assess the national and global implications of
increased Russian military activity in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as if Russia-PRC military
exercises and patrols may pose potential threats to U.S. interests and to the security and stability
57 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States
European Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 2025.
58 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States
Northern Command and United States Southern Command in Review of the Defense authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 119th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2025.
59 See, for example, S. 3877 and H.R. 8043.
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
of U.S. allies and partners. As part of this process, Members may seek to consult directly with the
executive branch, conduct oversight individually or through committee briefings or hearings,
develop and propose legislative directives or resolutions, or conduct exchanges with counterparts
in allied or partner countries.60
•
•
If Members of Congress seek further information on the nature and extent of
Russia-PRC military exercises and patrols, they could engage with the executive
branch through private consultations and/or public or closed hearings or consider
legislation requiring the executive branch to provide information or assessments.
Currently, Section 1241 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60) modifies and extends the annual Report on Military and
Security Developments Involving the Russian Federation to include “an
assessment of the military cooperation between Russia and the People’s Republic
of China, including defense trade, joint military exercises, and the sharing of
military intelligence.”61 Congress may consider a separate report on Russia-PRC
military activities, including whether to require or request the intelligence
community to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the state and
trajectory of Russia-PRC military relations and direct that the NIE be provided in
classified and unclassified versions.62
In conducting oversight of the executive branch, Congress could consider
whether to establish an annual reporting requirement to document executive
branch actions taken to address issues related to Russia-PRC military exercises
and patrols. Congress also could consider specific legislative directives, such as
the establishment of a new office or an interagency task force to formulate and
implement policies to address Russian military activity in the Asia-Pacific region
and Russia-PRC military relations. For example, Congress could direct current
working groups or structures to focus on Russian military activity in the region
and cooperation with the PRC, such as the “Adversary Alignment” working
group established under Section 1273 of the of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), to include the PRC, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea. Section 1273 requires the working group provide to
Congress a report on the “Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral Cooperation
Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of the United
States.”
60 CRS In Focus IF12858, Congress and National Security: Selected Tools and Issues for the 119th Congress,
coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
61 The original reporting requirement is found in Section 1234 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283; 134 Stat. 3936).
62 The Director of National Intelligence oversees the National Intelligence Council, which produces National
Intelligence Estimates. CRS In Focus IF10470, The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), by Michael E. DeVine.
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Appendix. Selected Russia-PRC Military Exercises
and Patrols, 2003-2024
Table A-1. Russia-PRC Military Exercises, 2003-2024
Date
Name and Description
Location(s)
August 6-12, 2003
Coalition 2003
The PRC and Russia participated in the first
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
multilateral counterterrorism exercise.
Usharal, Kazakhstan
Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous
Region, PRC
Multilateral
August 18-25, 2005
Peace Mission 2005
The first bilateral military exercise between
the PRC and Russia.
Vladivostok, Russia
Shandong Peninsula,
PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
March 2-5, 2006
East-Antiterror 2006
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Ulugbek, Uzbekistan
Tashkent,
Uzbekistan
Multilateral
May 28-31, 2007
Issyk-Kul Antiterror 2007
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Lake Issyk-Kul,
Kyrgyz Republic
Multilateral
August 9-17, 2007
Peace Mission 2007
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Urumqi, Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous
Region, PRC
Chelyabinsk, Russia
Multilateral
September 4-6, 2007
Cooperation 2007 (also referred to as
Sodruzhestvo 2007)
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Khabarovsk, Russia
Moscow, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
April 17-19, 2009
Norak Antiterror 2009
SCO-led command-staff counterterrorist
exercise.
Fakhrabad Training
Grounds, Tajikistan
Multilateral
July 22-26, 2009
Peace Mission 2009
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Khabarovsk, Russia
Taonan Tactical
Training Base, Jilin
Province, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
Observers from
SCO member
countries
(Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan)
September 18, 2009
Peace Blue Shield 2009
Naval exercise.
Gulf of Aden
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 10-25,
2010
Peace Mission 2010
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Zhambyl,
Kazakhstan
Multilateral
April 22-27, 2012
Joint Sea 2012 (also referred to as Naval
Interaction)
Naval exercise between the PRC and Russia.
Yellow Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
Congressional Research Service
Participants
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Date
Name and Description
Location(s)
Participants
June 8-14, 2012
Peace Mission 2012
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Sughd Province,
Tajikistan
Multilateral
June 10-20, 2013
Cooperation-2013
Counterterrorism exercise between the PRC
and Russia.
Beijing, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 5-12, 2013
Joint Sea 2013
Naval exercises.
Peter the Great
Gulf, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 27-August 15,
2013
Peace Mission 2013
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Chebarkul Military
Range, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
May 20-26, 2014
Joint Sea 2014
Naval exercise between the PRC and Russia.
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
August 24-29, 2014
Peace Mission 2014
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Zhurihe Training
Base, Inner
Mongolia
Autonomous
Region, PRC
Multilateral
October 31, 2014
Border Defense Cooperation 2014
Exercise between the PRC and Russia to
defend against cross-border criminal and
terrorist activities.
Jilin Province, PRC
Khasan, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
Phase 1: May 11-21,
2015
Phase I1: August 2028, 2015
Joint Sea 2015
Naval exercise.
Phase I:
Mediterranean Sea
(Eastern part)
Phase II: Peter the
Great Gulf
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 15-17,
2015
Central Asia-Antiterror 2015
SCO counterterrorism exercises.
Bishkek, Kyrgyz
Republic
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
May 23-28, 2016
Aerospace Security 2016
The PRC and Russia held an anti-ballistic
missile, computer-simulated command post
exercise.
Moscow, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 3-14, 2016
Cooperation 2016
The PRC and Russia participated in
counterterrorism exercises.
Moscow, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 12-20,
2016
Joint Sea 2016
Naval exercise between the PRC and Russia.
South China Sea
(east of Zhanjiang,
Guangdong
Province, PRC)
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 15-21,
2016
Peace Mission 2016
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyz
Republic
Balykchy, Kyrgyz
Republic
Multilateral
Phase 1: July 21-27,
2017
Phase I1: September
22-26, 2017
Joint Sea 2017
The PRC and Russia held their first naval
exercise in the Baltic Sea. Phase II exercises
occurred in the Sea of Okhotsk for the first
time.
Phase 1: Baltic Sea
Phase II:
Vladivostok, Russia
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Date
Name and Description
Location(s)
Participants
December 2-13,
2017
Cooperation-2017
Counterterrorism exercises.
Yinchuan, Ningxia
Hui Autonomous
Region, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
December 11-16,
2017
Aerospace Security 2017
The PRC and Russia held an anti-ballistic
missile defense computer-simulated
command post exercise.
Beijing, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
August 24-29, 2018
Peace Mission 2018
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Chelyabinsk, Russia
Multilateral
September 11-17,
2018
Vostok 2018
The PRC participated in Russia’s large-scale
military exercise.
Siberia, Russia
Far East, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
April 29-May 4, 2019
Joint Sea 2019
Naval exercise between the PRC and Russia.
Qingdao, PRC
East China Sea
Yellow Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 23, 2019
Combined Strategic Air Patrol 2019
The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF) and the Russian Aerospace
Forces conducted a combined long-range air
patrol in the Indo-Pacific region for the first
time.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 16-21,
2019
Tsentr 2019
The PRC participated in Russia’s annual war
games.
North Caucasus,
Russia
Western Siberia,
Russia
Multilateral
October 11-22, 2019
Cooperation 2019
Counterterrorism exercises.
Novosibirsk, Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
November 9-22,
2019
Field Training Exercise of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting
Plus Experts’ Working Group on
Counter-Terrorism
The PRC, Russia, and members of ASEAN
conducted military counterterrorism
exercises.
Guangxi, PRC
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, ASEAN
members)
November 24-30,
2019
Naval Operation Mosi
First trilateral exercise with the PRC, Russia,
and South Africa.
South African coast
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and South
Africa)
December 27-30,
2019
Marine Security Belt 2019
First trilateral naval exercises with the PRC,
Russia, and Iran.
Gulf of Oman
Indian Ocean
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and Iran)
September 21-26,
2020
Kavkaz 2020 (Caucasus 2020)
The PRC participated in the Russian
military’s large-scale annual exercises.
Southern Military
District, Russia
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Multilateral
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Date
Name and Description
Location(s)
Participants
December 22, 2020
Combined Strategic Air Patrol 2020
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
August 9-13, 2021
Interaction 2021
Large-scale exercise between the PRC and
Russia.
Ningxia, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 11-25,
2021
Peace Mission 2021
SCO counterterrorism exercise.
Orenburg, Russia
Multilateral
October 14-23, 2021
Joint Sea 2021
Naval exercise.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
November 19, 2021
Combined Strategic Air Patrol 2021
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
January 18-20, 2022
Marine Security Belt/CHIRU 2022
Anti-piracy patrols/naval exercises.
Gulf of Oman
Northern Indian
Ocean
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and Iran)
January 24, 2022
Peaceful Sea 2022
Naval exercise.
Arabian Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
May 24, 2022
Combined Strategic Air Patrol 2022
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Western Pacific
Ocean
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 1-7, 2022
Vostok 2022
Russian military exercises, involving multiple
countries, including the PRC, in Russia’s Far
East.
Russian Far East,
Siberia
Multilateral
September 26, 2022
Combined Naval Patrol 2022
Naval patrol.
Bering Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
November 30, 2022
Combined Strategic Air Patrol 2022
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
December 21-27,
2022
Joint Sea 2022
Naval exercise.
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
February 17-27, 2023
Mosi II 2023 (also called Operation Mosi)
Naval exercise with the PRC, Russia, and
South Africa.
South African Coast
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and South
Africa)
March 15-19, 2023
Marine Security Belt 2023
Naval exercise with the PRC, Russia, and
Iran.
Gulf of Oman
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and Iran)
June 6-7, 2023
Combined Strategic Air Patrol
Strategic air patrol by the PRC and Russia.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 5-11, 2023
Combined Naval Exercise 2023
Naval exercise.
Shanghai, PRC
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 20-23, 2023
Joint Sea 2023
Air and naval drill in the Sea of Japan.
Sea of Japan
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Date
Name and Description
Location(s)
Participants
August 2023
Combined Naval Patrol 2023
Russia-PRC naval patrol near Alaska.
Bering Sea
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
December 14, 2023
Combined Strategic Air Patrol
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
March 11-15, 2024
Marine Security Belt 2024
Combined naval exercise with the PRC,
Russia, and Iran.
Gulf of Oman
Multilateral (PRC,
Russia, and Iran)
June 25, 2024
Border Defense Cooperation 2024
Anti-terrorism exercise between the PRC
and Russia.
Heihe, Dongbei,
PRC
Blagoveshchensk,
Russia
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 3-5, 2024
Combined Naval Patrol
Russia-PRC naval patrol.
Korea Strait (near
Jeju Island) to the
East China Sea
Transited Osumi
Strait, Japan
Pacific Ocean
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 14-17, 2024
Joint Sea 2024
Naval exercise.
Guangdong
Province, PRC
South China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 25, 2024
Combined Strategic Air Patrol
The patrol involved bombers from both
countries flying over the Bering Sea for the
first time. The U.S.-Canadian North
American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) intercepted two Russian and two
PRC bombers flying near Alaska.
Bering Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
July 28, 2024
Combined Naval Exercise
Naval exercise in the Gulf of Finland.
Gulf of Finland
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 10-27,
2024
Northern/Interaction 2024
Naval exercise.
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 27, 2024
Combined Naval Patrol
Following Northern/Interaction Naval
Exercise.
Sea of Japan
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
September 10-16,
2024
Ocean 2024
Russia-led naval exercises.
Far East Coast,
Russia
Sea of Japan
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
October 7, 2024
Joint Naval Drills
Anti-submarine and air defense drills.
East China Sea
Philippine Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
November 29-30,
2024
Combined Strategic Air Patrol
Air patrol.
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Bilateral (PRC,
Russia)
Sources: CRS, using data from official Russia and People’s Republic of China (PRC) press releases; Department
of Defense (DOD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China, December 2025; Matthew Stein, Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity, Foreign Military
Studies Office, January 20, 2021; Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), “China-Russia Joint Military
Exercises,” https://Chinapower.csis.org/data/china-russia-joint-military-exercises/; Richard Weitz, “Assessing
China-Russian Military Exercises: Past Progress and Future Trends,” CSIS, July 2021; Dmitry Gorenburg et al.,
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Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols
Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation: An Increasingly Unequal Partnership, CNA, 2023; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “SinoRussian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security,” Security Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (2024), pp. 254290; and media reports.
Notes: For inclusion in the table, an event had to be confirmed by at least two sources. Some events included in
other data sets were excluded if no corresponding information could be located. The table is limited to events
conducted through 2024 and confirmed by the 2025 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China. The table includes events conducted under the auspices of the SCO but
does not include Coast Guard exercises. Locations are approximate.
Author Information
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
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