The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: The Supreme Court Recognizes Statutory Immunity for Firearm Companies in Case Brought by the Government of Mexico
Congressional research reportSep 19, 2025
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The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act: The Supreme Court Recognizes Statutory
Immunity for Firearm Companies in Case
Brought by the Government of Mexico
September 19, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48715
SUMMARY
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act: The Supreme Court Recognizes Statutory
Immunity for Firearm Companies in Case
Brought by the Government of Mexico
R48715
September 19, 2025
Dave S. Sidhu
Legislative Attorney
Jordan B. Cohen
Analyst in Firearms Policy
Enacted in 2005, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) generally bars
lawsuits in federal or state court against firearm manufacturers, distributors, importers, and
dealers when a third party acquires a firearm from that distribution chain and uses it for criminal
ends. While the statute generally provides immunity to gun manufacturers and others for any
downstream misuse of their firearms, the statute contains a few exceptions to this immunity. One such exception, the
predicate exception, leaves gun manufacturers and others open to civil liability if (1) they knowingly violated a federal or
state statute regulating the sale or marketing of firearms, and (2) the defendant’s violation was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.
In 2025, the Supreme Court issued its first substantive opinion on the scope and meaning of this statute and this exception.
The opinion stems from a complaint filed by the Government of Mexico against several firearms manufacturers and a
firearms distributor. After a series of pretrial motions, the remaining defendants were Smith & Wesson (a firearms
manufacturer) and Interstate Arms (a firearms distributor). In its complaint, Mexico alleged that the defendants made and
sold firearms knowing that the firearms would end up in the hands of Mexican cartels and be used for criminal purposes.
Mexico further charged that the defendants specifically designed and marketed the firearms to be attractive to cartel
members. Mexico claimed that it suffered harm by having to respond to the resulting “murder and mayhem.” Mexico pointed
out that, at the time, its country had one firearm mercantile establishment, and that most of the guns recovered at crime
scenes in the country may be traced to guns made or sold by the defendants.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mexico’s complaint is barred by PLCAA. The district court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit) reversed, holding
that the predicate exception applies because (1) Mexico alleged a sufficient predicate violation under an aiding and abetting
theory of liability, and (2) the defendants’ actions were a proximate cause of Mexico’s injuries.
In Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the predicate
exception. On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the First Circuit’s opinion, holding that the violation
alleged by Mexico in its complaint—that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms trafficking in Mexico—was
insufficiently plausible to satisfy the statute’s predicate exception.
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The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act .......................................................................... 2
Legislative History and Purpose ............................................................................................... 2
Predicate Exception................................................................................................................... 4
Interpretations of the Predicate Exception....................................................................................... 5
Supreme Court Case: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos ............................. 10
District Court Dismisses Mexico’s Complaint Under PLCAA ............................................... 10
Background of Mexico’s Complaint Against Several Firearms Companies ..................... 10
Mexico’s Complaint Against Several Firearms Companies.............................................. 12
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Case, Invoking PLCAA .......................................... 13
The District Court Finding That the Defendants Were Entitled to Immunity Under
PLCAA .......................................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Court of Appeals Reverses the District Court Ruling ..................................................... 15
The Defendants’ Appeal to the Supreme Court ....................................................................... 16
The Supreme Court Unanimously Concluded That PLCAA’s Predicate Exception
Does Not Apply in This Case ............................................................................................... 17
Majority Opinion .............................................................................................................. 17
Concurring Opinions......................................................................................................... 19
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 20
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 20
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The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
Introduction
In 2005, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) to prohibit
lawsuits against firearm and ammunition manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers
seeking recovery for harm solely caused by the “criminal or unlawful misuse” of a firearm or
ammunition, or component part of either.1 Accordingly, PLCAA generally bars civil suits in
federal or state court against these entities when a third party criminally uses a firearm or
ammunition that has been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. PLCAA also provides,
however, that these entities may be liable under some exceptions, including the “predicate
exception” to such immunity. PLCAA’s predicate exception authorizes civil liability if (1) a
defendant knowingly violated a federal or state statute regulating the sale or marketing of
firearms, and (2) the defendant’s violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.2 Thus,
if these two conditions are met, “a suit can proceed, even though it arises from a third party’s later
misuse of a gun.”3
In 2021, the Government of Mexico filed suit against seven U.S. gun manufacturers and a U.S.
gun distributor, Interstate Arms, alleging that the defendants were civilly liable for costs
associated with gun violence in Mexico.4 The defendants responded that they were shielded from
civil liability under PLCAA,5 and Mexico responded that PLCAA’s predicate exception applied
on the theory that the defendants knowingly aided and abetted gun trafficking in Mexico.6 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit) agreed with Mexico.7
In 2025, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s decision and held that the violation
alleged by Mexico in its complaint—that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms
trafficking in Mexico—was insufficiently plausible to satisfy PLCAA’s predicate exception.8
This report offers an overview of PLCAA, including its legislative history and the text of the
predicate exception; discusses lower court rulings that served as the general backdrop for the
Supreme Court’s eventual decision; and summarizes the Mexico case that made its way to the
Supreme Court, focusing on Mexico’s complaint, the district court and First Circuit rulings, the
request for Supreme Court review, and the Supreme Court’s majority and concurring opinions.
This report then concludes with considerations for Congress.
1 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A); see also id. § 7902.
2 Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
3 Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 286 (2025).
4 Complaint at 1–8, Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Aug. 4,
2021) [hereinafter Complaint].
5 Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith &
Wesson Brands, Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2021) [hereinafter Joint Motion to Dismiss].
6 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, Estados Unidos Mexicanos v.
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2021).
7 Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 91 F.4th 511 (1st Cir. 2024), rev’d and remanded, 605
U.S. 280, 286 (2025).
8 Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 605 U.S. at 281.
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The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
Legislative History and Purpose
Prior to PLCAA, victims of shooting incidents, as well as municipalities with high incidences of
firearms-related crimes, brought numerous civil suits seeking damages and injunctive relief
against out-of-state manufacturers and sellers of firearms; one goal of these civil suits was to
inhibit the flow of firearms into illegal markets. In 1998, for example, the City of Chicago sued
22 gun manufacturers, 12 gun stores, and 4 gun distributors on the theory that the gun industry
causes a “public nuisance” by creating excess costs for Chicago’s police, fire department, and
public hospital.9 This suit followed a drafted lawsuit that was later put on hold by the City of
Philadelphia and a filed lawsuit by the City of New Orleans.10 Ultimately, this type of litigation
against U.S. gun companies occurred with plaintiffs representing 30 states—including Louisiana,
Georgia, and California (through its state legislature)—and various cities, including Chicago,
Philadelphia, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Detroit.
In 2005, Congress enacted PLCAA in response to these and similar lawsuits.11 Through PLCAA,
Congress sought to prohibit most lawsuits against firearm and ammunition manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and importers seeking recovery “for the harm solely caused by the criminal
or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product
functioned as designed and intended.”12 Accordingly, PLCAA generally bars civil suits in federal
or state court against those entities when a third party criminally uses a firearm or ammunition
that has been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. As a result, PLCAA preempts some legal
remedies that may otherwise be available to shooting victims under state law.13
The statute’s findings state that the lawsuits seeking to hold liable “an entire industry for harm
that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the legal system,” and that the businesses targeted
should not be liable for the harm caused by third parties who criminally or unlawfully misuse
firearms products that function as designed and intended.14 Senator Larry E. Craig, sponsor of the
legislation, said that the bill would end the “trend of abusive litigation targeting the firearms
industry [that] not only defies common sense and concepts of fundamental fairness, but . . . [does]
9 Fox Butterfield, Chicago Is Suing over Guns from Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/13/us/chicago-is-suing-over-guns-from-suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/HY4ESM8T].
10 For a broad overview of the lawsuits, see Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 248 (1999). For the Philadelphia lawsuit, see City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta USA, Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000); for the New Orleans lawsuit, see Morial v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-19578 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2000). The City of New Orleans’ lawsuit differed
insofar as New Orleans contended that gunmakers build their products in a negligent manner and failed to take
advantage of technology that would prevent anyone but the registered owner from firing the weapon. In essence, the
New Orleans model of suit was focused on safer gun designs, whereas the Chicago lawsuit was focused on gun
trafficking and industry marketing practices.
11 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (appellate court reversing lower
court dismissal and holding that distributors could be held liable for creating alleged nuisance); NAACP v. AcuSport,
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (gun industry held to have created public nuisance after trial; case dismissed
due to lack of organizational standing); Jefferson v. Rossi, No. 01-CV-2536, 2002 WL 32154285, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
22, 2002).
12 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b).
13 Recent Legislation, Tort Law. Civil Immunity. Congress Passes Prohibition of Qualified Civil Claims Against Gun
Manufacturers and Distributors, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2006).
14 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6).
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nothing to curb criminal gun violence.”15 An opponent of the legislation, Senator Dianne
Feinstein, countered, “the bill effectively rewrites traditional principles of liability law which
generally hold that persons and companies may be liable for their negligence, even if others are
liable as well. This bill would essentially give the gun industry blanket immunity from civil
liability cases of this type, an immunity no other industry in America has today.”16
Congressional advocacy for PLCAA was focused on seven issues. As stated in 15 U.S.C.
§ 7901(b), the purposes of PLCAA are
(1) To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers
of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused
by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others
when the product functioned as designed and intended.
(2) To preserve a citizen’s access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful
purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or recreational
shooting.
(3) To guarantee a citizen’s rights, privileges, and immunities, as applied to the States,
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to section 5
of that Amendment.
(4) To prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate and
foreign commerce.
(5) To protect the right, under the First Amendment to the Constitution, of manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and trade
associations, to speak freely, to assemble peaceably, and to petition the Government for a
redress of their grievances.
(6) To preserve and protect the Separation of Powers doctrine and important principles of
federalism, State sovereignty and comity between sister States.
(7) To exercise congressional power under article IV, section 1 (the Full Faith and Credit
Clause) of the United States Constitution.17
The first, second, third, and fourth purposes all dealt with a similar issue: that lawsuits against the
firearms industry would make it challenging to own a business that manufactures or imports
firearms for sale. In other words, much of the legislative advocacy centered primarily on reducing
the costs of lawsuits, which, without such intervention, advocates argued could raise the prices of
firearms and potentially destroy the firearms industry if a single lawsuit were successful.18
Opponents of PLCAA argued that the costs of the lawsuits were exaggerated, that most gun
companies are privately owned so there was no way of knowing their exact legal expenses, and
that 57 out of 10 million tort suits filed between 1993 and 2003 had involved the gun industry.19
One recent study found that PLCAA resulted in increased handgun production and sales, but had
minimal effect on long gun sales—concluding that “the PLCAA contributed to an increase in the
supply of handguns.”20
15 151 CONG. REC. S9061(July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Larry E. Craig).
16 151 CONG. REC. S9070 (July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
17 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b).
18 For example, see 151 CONG. REC. H8993 (October 20, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner).
19 151 CONG. REC. S8913–14 (July 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed).
20 Mark Gius, The Impact of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 on Gun Sales, 7 CURRENT RSCH.
J. OF SOC. SCIS. AND HUMANS. 114, 115 (2024).
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Senate amendment debates over PLCAA focused significantly on what the act did not do. Senator
Craig noted that PLCAA was “not a gun industry immunity bill . . . . This bill does not create a
legal shield for anybody who manufactures or sells a firearm.”21 Certain amendments were
submitted but not voted on or not added to the legislation after not being agreed to by Congress
These included amendments that would have required standards on transferring and purchasing
domestic handguns equivalent to those applied to imported handguns,22 would have closed the
“gun show loophole,”23 would have exempted lawsuits involving injuries to children from the
definition of qualified civil liability action,24 and would have expanded the definition of “armor
piercing ammunition.”25 An amendment by Senator Carl Levin was adopted in earlier versions of
the legislation, but then omitted from the final legislation. That amendment would have allowed
gun companies to continue to be sued if their recklessness or “gross negligence” was “a
proximate cause of death or injury.”26
Members of Congress have attempted to repeal PLCAA on various occasions since its passage.
For example, in every Congress between the 113th and 119th Congresses, legislation has been
introduced that would repeal parts of PLCAA or PLCAA in its entirety. Legislation titled “Equal
Access to Justice for Victims of Gun Violence Act,”27 introduced several times, would make it so
that
an action against a manufacturer, seller, or trade association for damages or relief resulting
from an alleged defect or alleged negligence with respect to a product, or conduct that
would be actionable under State common or statutory law in the absence of the Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, shall not be dismissed by a court on the basis that the
action is for damages resulting from, or for relief from, the criminal, unlawful, or volitional
use of a qualified product.28
Other legislation would repeal sections 2 through 4 of PLCAA—the section containing findings
and purposes; the section prohibiting bringing of qualified civil liability actions in federal or state
court; and the section regarding definitions—as well as the section allowing the contents of the
Firearms Trace System to no longer be immune from legal processes.29
Predicate Exception
Although PLCAA generally bars civil lawsuits in federal or state court against firearm
manufacturers, the law contains several exceptions to this general bar. As outlined in PLCAA, the
third of these exceptions, the predicate exception, applies to
21 151 CONG. REC. 18083–84 (July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Larry E. Craig).
22 Id. at 19002 (amendment submitted by Sen. Barbara Boxer).
23 Id. at 19003 (amendment submitted by Sen. Jack Reed).
24 Id. at 18188 (amendment submitted by Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
25 Id. at 18190 (amendment submitted by Sen. Edward Kennedy).
26 Id. at 18192 (amendment submitted by Sen. Carl Levin).
27 For example, in the 113th Congress, see H.R. 332, 113th Cong. (2013) (“To provide victims of gun violence access
to the same civil remedies as are available to those injured through other means.”).
28 H.R. 332, 113th Cong. (2013).
29 For example, in the 114th Congress, see H.R. 4399, 114th Cong. (2016) (“To repeal the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, and provide for the discoverability and admissibility of gun trace information in civil
proceedings”); in the 115th Congress, see H.R. 3984, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To repeal the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, and provide for the discoverability and admissibility of gun trace information in civil
proceedings”); and as introduced in the 116th, 117th, 118th, and 119th Congresses, respectively, under H.R. 3214, H.R.
2814, H.R. 4184, and H.R. 3740.
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an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product violated a state or federal
law applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate
cause of the harm for which relief is sought including:
(I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or
failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or
State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any
person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any
fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product;
or
(II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any
other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having
reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was
prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) or (n).30
In other words, the “predicate exception” is known as such because it requires the plaintiff to
assert, as part of their claim, that the manufacturer or distributor of the firearm(s) knowingly
committed a violation of an underlying (i.e., predicate) law.
Interpretations of the Predicate Exception
Cases that proceed under this third exception often turn on whether the predicate statute is
“applicable to the sale or marketing of the product.”31 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (Second Circuit)32 in City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. held that
PLCAA barred the action because the criminal nuisance law upon which the City relied “does not
fall within the contours of the Act’s predicate exception.”33
The City had alleged that the firearms suppliers violated the State of New York’s criminal
nuisance provision, which provides that a person is guilty of such an offense if that person, by
conduct that is “either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all circumstances, knowingly or
recklessly creates or maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a considerable
number of persons.”34 While the City acknowledged that the criminal nuisance statute was one of
general applicability, it argued that the provisions could be applied to the sale or marketing of
firearms and thus fell within the predicate exception.35 The firearms suppliers, on the other hand,
30 See 15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)(iii)(II). Other exceptions include the following: actions brought against a person who was
convicted for transferring a firearm to another person knowing that other person would use it to commit a felony,
federal crime of terrorism, or drug trafficking crime, and brought by a person directly harmed by the conduct for which
the firearm transferee was ultimately convicted; actions brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence
per se; actions alleging breach of contract or warranty; product liability actions stemming from design or manufacture
defects; and actions brought by the Attorney General to enforce Chapter 44 of Title 18 or Chapter 53 of Title 26 of the
U.S. Code. These chapters generally contain the codification of the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act,
respectively. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005).
31 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
32 For brevity, this report refers to U.S. Courts of Appeals by their circuit number or name (e.g., “the First Circuit”
refers to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit).
33 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2008) (also holding that PLCAA is a valid
exercise of the powers granted to Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause and that the act does not violate the
doctrine of separation of powers or otherwise offend the Constitution).
34 Id. at 399 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45(1) (McKinney 2025)).
35 Id. at 400.
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argued that the predicate exception “was intended to include statutes that specifically and
expressly regulate the firearms industry.”36
The Second Circuit, in determining the meaning of a law “applicable to the sale or marketing of
[firearms],” agreed with neither the City nor the firearms suppliers. The court rejected the parties’
positions, finding that the firearms suppliers’ reading of PLCAA’s third exception—that is, that
the predicate statute must expressly refer to the firearms industry—was too narrow, and that the
City’s reading of this PLCAA exception (i.e., that the statute need only be “capable of being
applied”) was too broad.37 Rather, the court concluded that the predicate exception (1) does not
include the New York criminal nuisance law asserted by the plaintiffs; (2) does encompass
statutes that expressly regulate firearms, or that have been declared by courts to apply to the sale
and marketing of firearms; and (3) does cover statutes that clearly implicate the purchase and sale
of firearms, even if they do not expressly regulate firearms.38
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) in Ileto v. Glock rejected
the plaintiffs’ claim that California’s public nuisance statutes can be predicate statutes under
PLCAA’s third exception. The parties disputed whether the California tort statutes are “applicable
to the sale or marketing of [firearms],”39 and each side advanced an interpretation of “applicable”
similar to their counterparts in City of New York. The Ninth Circuit also found that the term
“‘applicable’ has a spectrum of meanings, including the two poles identified by the parties.”40 The
court in Ileto declared that PLCAA preempted common law claims, such as general tort theories
of liability, even if such claims are codified by state law, as is the case in California.41 However,
the Ninth Circuit did not go as far as the Second Circuit to outline the contours of the types of
laws that might be acceptable as predicate statutes under the exception. Rather, it declined to
“express any view on the scope of the predicate exception with respect to any other statute.”42
Although the federal courts have rejected both criminal and civil public nuisance laws as statutes
that would be encompassed by the predicate exception, one state court reached the opposite
conclusion. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, Indiana
rejected the manufacturers’ argument that the term “applicable” is limited to those statutes that
regulate the manner in which a firearm is sold or marketed, that is, “statutes specifying when,
where, how, and to whom a firearm may be sold or marketed.”43 Rather, the court found that “on
the face of the [predicate exception’s language], Indiana’s public nuisance statute appears
applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms.”44 Furthermore, the court did not believe that
PLCAA requires an underlying violation of a statute applicable to the sale or marketing of
36 Id. at 399.
37 Id. at 400.
38 Id. at 404.
39 Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).
40 Id. at 1134.
41 Id. at 1135–36. The Ninth Circuit noted that PLCAA’s second exception further bolstered its conclusion that
Congress intended to preempt common law claims, because the second exception, which allows only the common law
claims of negligent entrustment and negligence per se, “demonstrates that Congress consciously considered how to
treat tort claims.” Id. at 1136 n.6. Furthermore, the court stated that accepting the plaintiffs’ argument of recognizing
codified common law claims but not noncodified common law claims under the predicate exception would lead to “a
result that is difficult to square with Congress’ intention to create national uniformity.” Id. at 1136.
42 Id. at 1138 n.9.
43 Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
44 Id. at 432.
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firearms because “unlawful conduct was not a requirement of a public nuisance claim.”45
However, the appeals court recognized that even if PLCAA were to require an underlying
violation of a statute directly applicable to the sale of a firearm, the City had already alleged such
violations in its complaint.46 In its decision in Ileto, the Ninth Circuit remarked that City of Gary
was of “limited persuasive value” to that case because, unlike the Ninth Circuit case, the Indiana
court’s decision was based, in part, on the fact that the plaintiffs in City of Gary had alleged
violations of the state’s statutory firearms regulations.47
Although, as indicated by these cases, plaintiffs who have brought challenges under the predicate
exception often have not been successful, some claims have been allowed to proceed.48 Claims
that have been not been allowed to proceed have alleged violations of broader statutes. Cases
where the alleged violations of a statute are specific to firearms have seen more success.
For example, the New York Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Williams v. Beemiller,
Inc., allowed a civil suit against a manufacturer, distributor, and dealer to proceed under the
predicate exception.49 The complaint listed several causes of action, including that the defendants
had intentionally violated federal, state, and local legislative enactments by permitting straw
purchases to occur (i.e., the sale of firearms to an individual who purchased firearms on behalf of
another whom the dealer knew or had reasonable cause to believe was ineligible to purchase
weapons).50 The court held that the claims were not barred by PLCAA because the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged facts to support a finding that the defendants knowingly violated the Gun
Control Act, which makes it unlawful for any licensee to knowingly make any false entry in, or
fail to properly maintain, any record that the licensee is legally required to keep.51 By allowing
the suit to proceed, the court acknowledged that—unlike the rejected nuisance laws—provisions
of the Gun Control Act are “applicable to firearms” sales and therefore could be used as predicate
statutes for the predicate exception.52
Most recently, there has been increased interest in the scope of PLCAA after the Connecticut
Supreme Court ruled that a wrongful death lawsuit brought against the alleged dealer, distributor,
45 Id. (quoting the Indiana Supreme Court, who declared “generally, gun regulatory laws leave room for the defendants
to be in compliance with those regulations while still acting unreasonably and creating a public nuisance,” City of Gary
ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232–33, 1235 (Ind. 2003)).
46 Id. at 433.
47 Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1135 n.5 (“Indeed, the City of Gary court distinguished the facts of this case on that basis.”); Smith
& Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422, 433 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Here, unlike in Ileto, the City alleged
activity on the part of the Manufacturers that facilitates unlawful sales and violates regulatory statutes.”)).
48 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 170–71 (D.C. 2008) (holding that the District
of Columbia’s Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990 does not qualify as a predicate statute
because it does not impose any duty on firearms manufacturers or sellers to operate in any particular manner or
according to any standards of reasonableness and that Congress could not have intended “to exempt an action founded
on so attenuated a connection between statutory ‘violation’ and an injury from the reach of those civil actions the
PLCAA proscribes”).
49
952 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). The plaintiffs, an injured student and his father, alleged that the licensed
dealer sold eighty-seven handguns, including the weapon used to shoot the student in 2003, to a gun trafficker in one
transaction in Ohio, as well as more than fifty additional sales within a period of months. Id.
50 Id. at 338.
51 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(m) (making it unlawful for any Federal Firearms Licensee knowingly to make any false
entry in, or fail to appropriately maintain, any record that the licensee is required to keep by law). See also 18 U.S.C. §
923(g) (requiring a Federal Firearms Licensee to maintain records on the identity of an individual to whom the licensee
transfers firearms).
52 Williams, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 338. (“[W]e agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in dismissing the complaint
inasmuch as [the plaintiffs] sufficiently alleged that defendants knowingly violated various federal and state statutes
applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms within the meaning of the PLCAA’s predicate exception.”).
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and manufacturer of the Bushmaster XM15-E2S semi-automatic rifle (“Bushmaster”) used in the
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting could proceed.53 The plaintiffs in Soto v. Bushmaster
Firearms International claimed, among other things, that the defendants violated the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
conducting commerce.54 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants advertised the Bushmaster in a
manner that violated CUTPA by promoting “illegal offensive use of the rifle.”55 The plaintiffs
contended, for example, that the defendants encouraged using the Bushmaster for “waging war
and killing human beings,”56 as opposed to using the rifle for lawful purposes, such as hunting,
target practice, or self-defense. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants’ marketing
contributed to the victims’ injuries because the assailant, who “had dreamed as a child” of joining
the U.S. Army and thus was “especially susceptible to militaristic marketing,” had selected the
Bushmaster, among other available firearms, to bring to Sandy Hook because of its marketed
association with military use.57 With respect to PLCAA, the plaintiffs contended that the alleged
claims fit within PLCAA’s enumerated exception: when a manufacturer or seller knowingly
violates a state or federal law “applicable to” the sale or marketing of firearms, and that violation
“was a proximate cause” of the harm the lawsuit seeks to vindicate.58
The court adopted a broad view of the predicate exception, holding that CUTPA is a state law
applicable to the sale or marketing of a firearm and, thus, the defendants could not avail
themselves of PLCAA’s immunity.59 Turning first to PLCAA’s text, the court reviewed
dictionaries available at the time Congress enacted the statute and explained that “applicable”
principally means “capable of being applied.”60 CUTPA, the court continued, “clearly is capable
of being applied to the sale and marketing of firearms.”61 The court rejected the defendants’ call
for a narrower reading of the predicate exception—one that would limit its scope to statutes that
directly, expressly, or exclusively apply to firearms—because, the court explained, “Congress is
presumed to be aware that the wrongful marketing of dangerous items such as firearms for unsafe
or illegal purposes traditionally has been and continues to be regulated primarily by consumer
protection and unfair trade practice laws” like CUTPA, “rather than by firearms specific
statutes.”62
The court further noted that, “although the [PLCAA] findings indicate that Congress sought to
immunize the firearms industry from liability for third-party conduct,” those findings emphasize
that such immunity “extended only to ‘harm that is solely caused by others.’”63 Here, the court
reasoned, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ marketing of the Bushmaster violated CUTPA
and directly caused the Sandy Hook shooting, and Congress never “indicat[ed] that firearm sellers
should evade liability for injuries that result if they promote illegal use of their products.”64
53 Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 285 (Conn. 2019).
54 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (2025) (“Unfair Trade Practices Prohibited.”).
55 Soto, 202 A.3d at 284.
56 Id. at 277.
57 Id. at 278.
58 Id. at 301.
59 Id. at 306–07.
60 Id. at 311.
61 Id. at 302.
62 Id. at 308.
63 Id. at 309 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79019(a)(6) (emphasis added by the court)).
64 Id. at 59.
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The court further reasoned that its reading of PLCAA’s text is bolstered by the statute’s legislative
history. The court explained that, during legislative debate, several congressmen who
cosponsored PLCAA stressed their intent to quash the rising number of lawsuits they viewed to
be designed to harass and endanger the firearms industry.65 But, the court added, the legislation
was not intended, as the bill’s principal sponsor remarked, to “bar the courthouse doors to victims
who have been harmed by the negligence or misdeeds of anyone in the gun industry.”66
Finally, the court opined that its interpretation of the predicate exception is consistent with that of
the Second Circuit—the federal circuit in which the State of Connecticut sits and which is
persuasive authority for Connecticut’s interpretation of federal law. As discussed above, in City of
New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the Second Circuit reviewed whether PLCAA barred New York
City from seeking a court order to abate an alleged public nuisance caused by the defendant
firearm supplier’s distribution practices. Like the Connecticut court, the Second Circuit
concluded that “nothing in the statute . . . requires any express language regarding firearms to be
included in a statute in order for that statute to fall within the predicate exception.”67
Still, the Second Circuit clarified that the predicate exception “was meant to apply only to statutes
that actually regulate the firearms industry.”68 In particular, the Second Circuit held that the
predicate exception would apply to statutes that do not expressly regulate firearms if (1) courts
have applied the statute to the sale and marketing of firearms, or (2) the statute “clearly can be
said to implicate the purchase and sale of firearms.”69 The Second Circuit ultimately held that
New York City’s criminal nuisance statute is a law of general applicability that does not fit into
any of those two categories.
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Soto determined that CUTPA was distinguishable
from the New York City law reviewed in Beretta and fit into the Second Circuit’s enumerated
categories. To support this conclusion, the Connecticut Supreme Court pointed to past cases in
which CUTPA had been applied to the sale of firearms.70 The result of this litigation was a $73
million settlement in 2022 between the families of the victims of the 2012 Sandy Hook
Elementary School shooting and Remington Arms Company.71 Remington—the principal
defendant in the case—also declared bankruptcy in 2018 and 2020.72 In addition, following the
ruling, California and New Jersey adopted consumer protection laws that placed obligations and
prohibitions on the gun industry in those states.73
65 Id. at 318–19 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S9106–07 (July 27, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Max Baucus)).
66 Id. at 302 (citing 51 CONG. REC. S9099 (July 27, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Larry E. Craig)).
67 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 400 (2nd Cir. 2008).
68 Id. at 404.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 399–400.
71 Emily Field & Y. Peter Kang, 4 Takeaways from $73M Remington Deal over Sandy Hook, LAW 360, Feb. 15, 2022.
72 Peg Brickley, Bankrupt Gun Maker Remington Outdoor to Be Broken Up and Sold, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept.
27, 2020.
73 See Robert J. Spitzer, The Sandy Hook-Remington Settlement: Consequences for Gun Policy, ROCKEFELLER INST. OF
GOV’T., Mar. 21, 2022; Gun Industry Immunity in California, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., Dec. 31, 2023; and Gun Industry
Immunity in New Jersey, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., Apr. 17, 2024.
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Supreme Court Case: Smith & Wesson Brands v.
Estados Unidos Mexicanos
District Court Dismisses Mexico’s Complaint Under PLCAA
Background of Mexico’s Complaint Against Several Firearms Companies
In 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Mexican government
estimated that 200,000 firearms are smuggled from the United States into Mexico each year.74
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) trace data75 indicate that 65.5%
of guns recovered in Mexico in 2022 and submitted to ATF for tracing were either manufactured
in the United States or legally imported into the United States before being recovered in
Mexico.76 Also, 67.3% of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced by ATF between 2019 and
2024 were U.S.-sourced.77 Out of those U.S.-sourced firearms recovered in Mexico and traced by
ATF, 51,623 (52.9%) were traced to a U.S. purchaser.78 ATF data also indicate that, between 2017
and 2021, a small percentage (0.1%) of U.S.-sourced crime guns recovered in Mexico during that
same period had been possessed at the time of the crime by the known initial purchaser of the
firearm.79 These data may suggest that the crime guns recovered in Mexico were likely strawpurchased, sold on the black market, or stolen.80
For Mexican citizens who do not have a professional need to possess a firearm in Mexico,
Mexican federal law requires them to buy a weapon from a “mercantile establishment” (i.e., not
an individual seller).81 In Mexico, there are reportedly two legal mercantile establishments in the
entire country that sell firearms.82 These stores are in compounds run by the Mexican military,
and visitors must pass through a metal detector, leave cell phones in lockers, and provide the
following: photographic ID, a gun acquisition form, proof of no federal criminal record, medical
74 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-322, FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: U.S. EFFORTS TO DISRUPT GUN
SMUGGLING INTO MEXICO WOULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL DATA AND ANALYSIS (2021).
75 “Firearms tracing is the systematic tracking of the movement of a firearm recovered by law enforcement officials
from its first sale by the manufacturer or importer through the distribution chain (wholesaler/retailer) to identify the
first retail purchaser.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-223, U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT FIREARMS
TRAFFICKING TO MEXICO HAVE IMPROVED, BUT SOME COLLABORATION CHALLENGES REMAIN 1 n.1 (2016).
76 Id.
77 See ATF, FIREARMS TRACE DATA: MEXICO - 2019–2024 (Apr. 3, 2025), https://www.atf.gov/resourcecenter/firearms-trace-data-mexico-2019-2024 [https://perma.cc/MY45-4MQQ].
78 Id.
79 See ATF, NATIONAL FIREARMS COMMERCE AND TRAFFICKING ASSESSMENT (NFCTA): CRIME GUNS – VOLUME TWO,
PART IV - CRIME GUNS RECOVERED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TRACED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 11,
2023), https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-tracedle/download#page=16 [https://perma.cc/JR5U-YK5M].
80 A straw purchase is a firearm purchase made by someone who is allowed to purchase a firearm on behalf of a person
who is prohibited from owning a firearm. For classes of prohibited persons, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). For more
information about straw purchases, see CRS In Focus IF12190, Gun Control: Straw Purchase and Gun Trafficking
Provisions in P.L. 117-159 (2024).
81 For information about Mexican firearms law, see L. LIBR. OF CONG., MEXICO: FIREARMS LAWS (Feb. 2009),
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2019669439/2019669439.pdf#page=5 [https://perma.cc/U23EVJR9]. For many years, there was only one mercantile establishment in Mexico that sold firearms, but a new store was
opened in 2019 in Apodaca, Nuevo León.
82 James Wagner, At Mexico’s 2 Legal Gun Shops, a Conflicted View of Firearms Is on Display, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/world/americas/mexico-us-gun-stores.html.
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and psychological evaluations, a drug test, proof of residence and employment, a birth certificate,
tax number, and a $25 fee.83
There is an additional legal avenue for those serving in the Mexican military or law enforcement
to acquire firearms: They may purchase weapons on the 600 series in the U.S. Commerce Control
List (CCL) from Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) based in the United States.84 These weapons
include small arms and related ammunition (weapons that were listed in Categories I–III on the
U.S. Munitions List), fully automatic firearms, and arms that are on the Wassenaar Arrangement
Munitions List.85 After receiving a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce to export
firearms, an individual Federal Firearms Licensee can export firearms on these lists to authorized
buyers in authorized foreign countries.86
From October 15, 2013, to June 30, 2023, Mexico received the sixth most shipments of 600 series
weapons from the United States via these legal means, with a total dollar value of $969.9
million.87 While the initial sale may be legal, these firearms can be diverted at various points after
delivery via straw purchases, secondary sales through private sellers, or theft.88
In some cases, according to U.S. federal criminal indictments, Mexico-based transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) allegedly send members into the United States with illicit drugs
and use the proceeds from selling these drugs in the United States to buy firearms, which are then
smuggled across the border into Mexico.89
The United States has taken various actions to prevent firearms trafficking to Mexico. In June
2022, Congress and President Biden enacted the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (P.L.117159), which amended the Gun Control Act with several substantive, firearm trafficking-related
provisions. These amendments addressed straw purchases, gun trafficking, and related criminal
activity.90
83 Id.
84 15 C.F.R. § 774.
85 U.S. Dep’t of Com., Bureau of Indus. and Sec. (BIS), DEEMED EXPORTS FAQS – 600 SERIES ITEMS,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/deemed-exports/deemed-exports-faqs/cat/62-600-series-items2#faq_302 [https://perma.cc/5YUB-NSB4] (last visited Aug. 13, 2025).
86 Id. The BIS notes that some countries “are subject to special license requirements and policies other than those that
are defined by the Commerce Country Chart in conjunction with other portions of the EAR [Export Administration
Regulations].” These countries are Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. For more information on what countries
and objects require export authorization, see BIS, COUNTRY GUIDANCE, https://www.bis.gov/licensing/countryguidance [https://perma.cc/G26Y-4NVU] (last visited Aug. 13, 2025).
87 BIS, 2023 JUNE STATISTICS OF BIS EXPORTS UNDER USML TO CCL REGULATORY CHANGES (2023),
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/ote-data-portal/ecr-analysis/3364-2023-junestatistics-of-bis-exports-under-usml-to-ccl-regulatory-changes/file#page=2 [https://perma.cc/PF3M-9Y4A].
88 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT GUN TRAFFICKING 1 (2021),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/08/Gun-Trafficking-FAQ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BBM5-6U3F].
89 These enforcers are sponsored and hired by TCOs to find surrogates that are willing to straw-purchase “militarystyle” firearms from Federal Firearms Licensees. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), unauthorized immigrants and
nonimmigrant visitors (with exceptions in the latter case) are ineligible to receive or possess firearms. For example, see
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Indictment Names Six in Scheme to Provide
High-Powered Firearms and Huge Quantities of Ammunition to Mexican Drug Cartel (Jan. 24, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/indictment-names-six-scheme-provide-high-powered-firearms-and-hugequantities [https://perma.cc/ME4J-EMB7].
90 For further information, see CRS Report R47310, Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (P.L. 117-159): Section-bySection Summary, coordinated by Johnathan H. Duff (2022), and CRS In Focus IF12190, Gun Control: Straw Purchase
and Gun Trafficking Provisions in P.L. 117-159 (2024).
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Additionally, to prevent legal sales from being diverted after being delivered to their intended
recipient, on October 27, 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated a 90-day pause on
issuing new firearms export licenses in order to make it harder to export small arms and
ammunition to foreign recipients who have not been vetted by the United States.91
Following the pause, on April 30, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule (IFR) that restricts private transfers of firearms
out of the United States.92 This IFR made three changes affecting private firearms exports.
First, 36 countries are labeled by the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices and the Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug
Producing Countries, as well as by reputable nongovernmental reports, as having a “substantial
risk that lawful firearms exports to nongovernmental end users will be diverted or misused.”93
These countries are to be treated with a “presumption of denial” for granting a license to export
weapons abroad, whereas the previous policy was one of “general approval.”94 The seller can
overcome this presumption of denial only by successfully arguing their sale does not contain risk,
such as if the purchaser is protecting U.S. interests or is otherwise trustworthy.95 Additionally, 17
countries in the Organization of American States are no longer to be treated with a policy of
general approval, and instead are to be considered on a case-by-case basis because of their higher
risks for firearms diversion or misuse.96
The second change is that export licenses provided to U.S. sellers now last one to two years
instead of the previous four to five years, resulting in sellers having to more frequently make the
case that the sale meets existing requirements.97
Finally, the third change is that, in their applications, potential exporters need to include purchase
orders and passport identifications from the intended recipient to show that it is an actual person
who is interested in and allowed to receive a firearm.98
Mexico’s Complaint Against Several Firearms Companies
On August 4, 2021, the Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit in federal district court against
seven U.S. gun manufacturers—Smith & Wesson, Beretta, Century International Arms, Colt,
Glock, Ruger, and Barrett—and a U.S. gun distributor, Interstate Arms.99 The complaint alleged
that “[a]lmost all guns recovered at crime scenes in Mexico—70% to 90% of them—were
trafficked from the U.S.”; that guns made by six of the defendant-manufacturers “are most often
recovered in Mexico”; that defendant Barrett’s “.50 caliber sniper rifle is a weapon of war prized
91 BIS, FIREARMS PAUSE & REVIEW : FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2023),
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/3374-2023-10-27-bis-faqs-firearms-pause-andreview/file [https://perma.cc/D63K-FV8G].
92 Revision of Firearms License Requirements, 15 Fed. Reg. 34680 (Apr. 30, 2024) (to be codified in scattered
provisions in 15 C.F.R.). Some gun trade groups suggest that the pause has cost U.S. sellers over $250 million since
October 2023; see Larry Keane, President Biden’s Whole-of-Government Gun Control Crusade Confronts Reality,
NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (May 6, 2024), https://www.nssf.org/articles/president-bidens-whole-of-governmentgun-control-crusade-confronts-reality/ [https://perma.cc/PHX9-C49E].
93 15 Fed. Reg. at 34696.
94 Id. at 34693.
95 Id. at 34682.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 34695.
98 Id. at 34694.
99 Complaint at 9–11.
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by the drug cartels”; and that it is the defendant-distributor “through which all but one of the
defendant-manufacturers sell their guns for re-sale to gun dealers throughout the U.S.”100
The Government of Mexico claimed that the defendants knowingly design their weapons—
including weapons designed to be modified to be machineguns—to have a high degree of
lethality, and market and sell the weapons as such, and that the defendants, through the use of
“reckless and corrupt” channels, are “supplying” these weapons to the cartels in Mexico.101 The
complaint alleged that the Department of Justice had recommended reforms to the defendantmanufacturers, which, according to the Government of Mexico, these defendants ignored.102
The Government of Mexico pointed out that the defendants produce most of the “half million
guns [that are] annually . . . trafficked from the U.S. into Mexico.”103 Mexico asserted that the
defendants are on notice of the consequences of their design, distribution, and marketing plans,
yet have “refused” to take reform efforts to mitigate the flow of their weapons to Mexico.104 The
Government of Mexico averred that the defendants aided and abetted in the trafficking of
firearms into Mexico, in contravention of Mexico law and the Gun Control Act.105 In general and
in short, Mexico argued that “while the actionable harm occurs south of the U.S. border, it is
caused by Defendants’ conduct north of the border.”106
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Case, Invoking PLCAA
On November 22, 2021, the defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the Government of
Mexico’s lawsuit.107 The defendants cited 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3) for the proposition that
“Congress enacted the PLCAA to immunize federally licensed firearms manufacturers and sellers
from actions seeking ‘. . . relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties,
including criminals.’”108 The defendants argued that the Government of Mexico’s complaint
satisfies neither component of the predicate exception.109
In particular, the defendants argued that the Government of Mexico has claimed violations of
generally applicable laws, including public nuisance and consumer protection laws;110 that the
defendants are not subject to Mexican law, including any prohibition on aiding and abetting
firearms trafficking;111 and that “[t]he complaint does not plead the required connection between
any alleged statutory violation and any alleged injury,”112 listing eight steps between the
100 Id. at 1.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 91.
103 Id. at 2.
104 Id. at 5–6.
105 Id. at 15–16, 18.
106 Id. at 8.
107 Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5; see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Individual defendants also lodged
separate motions to dismiss, triggering separate responses from the Government of Mexico. See Docket, Estados
Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2021).
108 Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3)). The motion raises arguments in
addition to one based on PLCAA, such as claiming that the Government of Mexico lacks standing. Id. at 6. This
summary focuses on the arguments that the Supreme Court has agreed to review. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280 (2025) (No. 23-1141).
109 Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 13.
110 Id. at 14, 21.
111 Id. at 39.
112 Id. at 23.
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defendants’ actions and any crime in Mexico to suggest that the causal chain is too attenuated to
support liability.113
On January 31, 2022, the Government of Mexico responded to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.114 The Government of Mexico asserted, in part, that the complaint properly alleged that
the defendants violated federal firearms laws, specifically the trafficking of firearms designed to
be easily converted into prohibited machineguns.115 According to the Government of Mexico, the
defendants sold firearms to distributors and dealers with knowledge that the firearms would be
resold to traffickers and cartels, with foreseeability that the cartels would use those firearms to
impose the harms felt by Mexico.116 This foreseeability, the complaint continued, negates the
defendants’ argument that there is an insufficient causal connection between the defendants’
misconduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.117
On March 14, 2022, the defendants filed their reply.118 In their brief, the defendants emphasized
their position that PLCAA’s predicate exception does not apply, and that the defendants are
therefore immune from the allegations in the complaint, because Mexico failed to adequately
allege that the defendants knowingly violated a specific subset of federal or state laws applicable
to the “sale or marketing” of firearms, a limitation that is necessary, the defendants added, to
avert the possibility that the exception will swallow the statute.119
With respect to Mexico’s argument that the defendants knowingly sold semiautomatic weapons
easily converted into prohibited machineguns, the defendants answered that this argument is
implausible, as it would imply that the defendants have been knowingly selling machineguns for
“decades” with prosecutors doing “nothing about it.”120 The relevant firearms are not
machineguns under federal law in any case, the defendants argued.121 To the extent that the
defendants were aware that a “small percentage” of end users may use the firearms in crime, this
would not convert the defendants into accomplices, any more than would manufacturers of
products “from kitchen knives to baseball bats to sports cars,” the defendants asserted.122 The
defendants also argued that the touchstone of causation for purposes of the predicate exception is
not foreseeability, but proximate causation—and, here, the defendants’ actions—were too remote
relative to the alleged harms.123
113 Id. at 32–33.
114 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, Estados Unidos Mexicanos
v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2022).
115 Id. at 22.
116 Id. at 24.
117 Id. at 34–35.
118 Joint Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands,
Inc., No. 21-11269 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2022).
119 Id. at 17–20.
120 Id. at 21.
121 Id. at 22.
122 Id. at 23.
123 Id. at 26.
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The District Court Finding That the Defendants Were Entitled to Immunity
Under PLCAA
On September 30, 2022, the federal district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.124
The court found that, “[i]n 2019 alone, there were more than 3.9 million crimes committed in
Mexico with U.S.-manufactured guns,”125 but the court framed the lawsuit as one in which the
Government of Mexico was seeking to hold the defendants responsible for an “indirect cause” of
these crimes: “the marketing and sales practices of American gun manufacturers and
distributors.”126
The court held that “[t]he PLCAA unequivocally bars lawsuits seeking to hold gun manufacturers
responsible for the acts of individuals using guns for their intended purpose,”127 dismissing counts
one through six and nine on account of PLCAA.128 The court reasoned that PLCAA’s predicate
exception applies only to allegations of violations of statutes. Here, however, the court observed
that counts one through six and nine in the complaint do not state a violation of a statute but
instead press causes of action arising under common law.129 Such a limiting construction is also
supported, the court said, by the concern that an opposite interpretation would end up turning the
exception into the general rule.130
Having concluded that PLCAA does not apply to common law claims, the court did not address
the second leading parties’ causation arguments in the context of the applicability of PLCAA. The
court dismissed the remaining state consumer protection claims on other grounds.131
U.S. Court of Appeals Reverses the District Court Ruling
On December 5, 2022, the Government of Mexico lodged its appeal with the First Circuit.132 On
January 24, 2024, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.133 First, the court determined that PLCAA’s predicate exception
124 Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 633 F. Supp.3d 425 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2022), rev’d
and remanded, 91 F.4th 511 (1st Cir. 2024), rev’d and remanded, 605 U.S. 280 (2025).
125 Id. at 431.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 432. The court’s determination that Mexico possessed standing, see id. at 438–40, is beyond the scope of this
report.
128 Id. at 441.
129 Id. at 446.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 450–55.
132 Notice of Appeal, Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 91 F.4th 511 (1st Cir. 2024) (No.
22-1823).
133 Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 91 F.4th 511 (1st Cir. 2024), rev’d and remanded, 605
U.S. 280 (2025). This section focuses primarily on the issues that the Supreme Court agreed to hear on further appeal.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280
(2025) (No. 23-1141). It thus does not address one aspect of the court’s holding, specifically that PLCAA applies
extraterritorially to claims brought by a foreign government for harms that culminate outside of the United States, see
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 91 F.4th at 522–25, and that this holding does not violate considerations of international
comity. See id. at 525–26. The court explained,
It may be that Mexico, as it claims, would be unable to pursue its lawsuit in the only forum that
could provide effective injunctive relief. But that is a necessary consequence of Congress’s
decision to protect the U.S. firearm industry by regulating the types of lawsuits that can be
adjudicated by U.S. courts . . . . [W]e hold that the PLCAA applies to lawsuits by foreign
(continued...)
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applies to common law claims, not just statutory causes of action.134 The court interpreted the
predicate exception’s reference to actions “in which” a manufacturer or seller violates a statute to
mean that the predicate exception covers common law claims that support statutory causes of
action.135
The panel also held that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants’ actions are a
proximate cause of the harms felt in Mexico—using an aiding and abetting theory of liability, the
panel found that the defendants sold military-grade weapons, intending that some would be sold
further to cartels; the defendants made specific design and marketing decisions to have these
weapons better appeal to the cartels; the defendants profited from some decisions; and the
defendants ignored the recommendations of the federal government.136 Critically, the panel
credited the complaint for “expressly alleg[ing] that the defendants did know which dealers were
making illegal sales.”137 The court asserted that the defendants “are not mere passive observers of
the buyer’s illegal activity, but more akin to a calculated and willing participant in the supply
chain that ends with a profitable illegal firearm market in Mexico.”138
The court concluded its proximate cause analysis by determining that the complaint adequately
alleged that it was foreseeable that the defendants’ firearms would “end up in the hands of
Mexican cartels,” that the defendants “intended to bring about that result,” and that it was further
foreseeable that the cartels would use the defendants’ firearms to commit violent crimes.139 The
court responded to the defendants’ arguments against the existence of proximate cause by adding
that a third party’s intervening unlawful acts cannot categorically break the chain of proximate
cause; otherwise, the predicate exception would be reduced to a nullity.140 The court also took
note that at least some of Mexico’s alleged injuries, including the cost of increased law
enforcement, may be traced “directly from the illegal trafficking of guns into Mexico and . . . are
not merely derivative of the harm suffered by the victims of gun violence.”141
The Defendants’ Appeal to the Supreme Court
The defendants filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court,142 asking the Court to address
the following two questions:
governmental entities for harm suffered outside this country, just as it applies to lawsuits by
domestic governmental entities for harm suffered in this country.
Id. at 526.
134 Id. at 527.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 529–33; see also id. at 534 (characterizing Mexico’s proximate cause argument as “straightforward:
defendants aid and abet the trafficking of guns to the Mexican drug cartels, and this trafficking has foreseeably required
the Mexican government to incur significant costs in response to the increased threats and violence accompanying drug
cartels armed with an arsenal of military-grade weapons.”); id. at 535 (“the complaint alleges not only that it was
foreseeable that defendants’ guns would end up in the hands of Mexican cartels, but also that defendants actually
intended to bring about that result.”).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 531. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants’ production or selling of semiautomatic
weapons that can be easily converted into prohibited machineguns serves as an additional predicate exception piercing
PLCAA’s immunity. See id. at 532–34.
139 Id. at 535.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 537.
142 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280 (2025)
(No. 23-1141).
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1. whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the
proximate cause of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from
violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico; and
2. whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to
“aiding and abetting” illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies
allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.143
On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for review.144 On
March 4, 2025, the Court held oral argument.145
The Supreme Court Unanimously Concluded That PLCAA’s
Predicate Exception Does Not Apply in This Case
Majority Opinion
On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that
Mexico’s complaint did not adequately demonstrate that the defendants “aided and abetted
unlawful sales routing guns to Mexican drug cartels.”146 The Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Kagan, began its discussion by recognizing that PLCAA was enacted in response to a rise
in civil suits against gun manufacturers and sellers,147 that PLCAA generally bars such civil suits
arising out of the misuse of firearms by third parties,148 and that the predicate exception “opens a
path to making a gun manufacturer civilly liable for the way a third party has used the weapon it
made.”149 The Court emphasized that the predicate exception expressly permits a civil suit against
a gun manufacturer to proceed if the manufacturer itself “aids and abets a federal gun crime.”150
The Court framed the central issue before it as whether Mexico’s complaint sufficiently alleges
aiding and abetting.151
In reviewing that complaint, the Court acknowledged that Mexico has a “severe gun violence
problem”; that firearms imported from the United States are used to commit “serious crimes,”
including murder; and that Mexico alleges that upward of 90% of the firearms recovered at crime
scenes originated in the United States.152 The Court identified three arguments from Mexico’s
complaint: (1) “the manufacturers supply firearms to retail dealers whom they know illegally sell
to Mexican gun traffickers,”153 (2) “the manufacturers have failed to impose the kind of controls
on their distribution networks that would prevent illegal sales to Mexican traffickers,”154 and (3)
143 Id. at i.
144 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2023 TERM ORDER LIST (Oct. 4, 2024),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100424zr_o7jp.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4TA-XAMB].
145 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 605 U.S. 280 (No. 23-1141),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1141_8m59.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR45S4MJ].
146 Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 605 U.S. at 285.
147 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7903(a)(3)).
148 Id. at 286.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 286–87.
151 Id. at 287–88.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 288.
154 Id. at 289.
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“manufacturers make ‘design and marketing decisions’ intended to stimulate cartel members’
demand for their products.”155 The Court stated that “[b]ecause Mexico relies exclusively on an
aiding-and-abetting theory,” it must “plausibly alleg[e] that the manufacturers have aided and
abetted gun dealers’ firearms offenses (such as sales to straw purchasers), so as to proximately
cause harm to Mexico.”156
Knowingly Selling Firearms to Distributors Who Sell to Traffickers
To answer Mexico’s first argument, the Court recounted general aiding and abetting liability
principles. The Court observed that aiding and abetting liability requires “participat[ion]”157 in
“specific wrongful acts.”158 In contrast, “omissions” or “incidental” conduct, the Court explained,
are not enough to establish aiding and abetting liability.159
The Court recalled two cases applying this framework. In one case, the Court held that to sustain
a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory, the defendant must not only have knowledge of
a user’s unlawful conduct, but must also be “join[ed] both mind and hand” in wanting to achieve
that unlawful conduct and actively helping to achieve that unlawful conduct, such as through
special treatment of the third-party actor.160 In the other case, the Court determined that a
defendant’s “arm’s length, passive, and largely indifferent” conduct fell short of the required
showing for aiding and abetting liability.161 The Court’s analysis therefore boiled down to whether
Mexico’s complaint alleged conduct that resembled the former or the latter case.
In determining that Mexico’s complaint was inadequate to support aiding and abetting liability,
the Court found that the complaint did not “pinpoint . . . any specific criminal transactions that the
defendants (allegedly) assisted,”162 nor did the complaint allege that the defendants favorably
treated any unlawful users to further any such criminal activity.163 Rather, the Court stressed, the
complaint “repeatedly states that the manufacturers treat rogue dealers just the same as they do
law-abiding ones—selling to everyone, and on equivalent terms.”164
Even if the defendants treated rogue dealers in a better fashion, the Court stated, the complaint
suffered from failing to connect the defendants further downstream to the actors who ultimately
acquired firearms from the middleman dealers.165 The complaint seems speculative, the Court
added, as to whether the defendants had sufficient knowledge of, let alone an active intent to
further, those connections.166 The Court conceded that the complaint alleges that the defendants
could have done more to curb the supply of firearms to rogue dealers, but, referencing precedent,
the Court assessed that this allegation amounts to the defendants’ acting with “‘indifference,’
rather than assistance.”167
155 Id. at 290 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 23, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., 605 U.S. 280 (2025) (No. 23-1141)).
156 Id. at 291.
157 Id. at 292 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
158 Id. at 292 (quoting Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471 (2023)).
159 Id. (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 489).
160 Id. at 293 (quoting Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943)).
161 Id. (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 493, 500).
162 Id. at 294.
163 Id. at 295.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 296.
167 Id. at 297 (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 500).
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Failing to Impose Controls on the Distribution Network
For the same reason, the Court rejected Mexico’s second line of argument, specifically that “the
manufacturers have declined to suitably regulate the dealers’ practices[.]”168 That is, the
defendants’ alleged failure to curb middlemen from making unlawful sales is the type of “passive
nonfeasance” or a “failure to stop” that the Court has deemed to be inadequate for aiding and
abetting liability.169
Designing and Marketing Firearms to Appeal to Cartels
The Court characterized Mexico’s third salvo—that the defendants designed and marketed their
firearms to enhance demand among the cartel—as being “nothing of consequence.”170 The Court
pointed out that the firearms in question, including assault weapons and weapons with Spanishlanguage names, are widely legal and/or purchased by many others.171 In other words, the Court
determined that the broad appeal of the relevant firearms to both cartels and noncartel users
undermines the suggestion that the defendants specially assisted the cartels.
*
*
*
In closing, the Court opined that its holding aligns with Congress’s purpose in enacting PLCAA,
to “halt a flurry of lawsuits attempting to make gun manufacturers pay for the downstream harms
resulting from misuse of their products.”172 If the predicate exception were construed to
encompass Mexico’s allegations, the Court wrote, the “exception . . . would swallow most of the
rule.”173 “We doubt Congress intended to draft such a capacious way out of PLCAA, and in fact it
did not,” the Court concluded.174
Concurring Opinions
Justice Thomas penned a solo concurring opinion to address the flip side of the case: While the
Court held only that Mexico’s complaint does not cross the plausibility threshold, Justice Thomas
sought to clarify when that bar might be satisfied.175 According to Justice Thomas, the predicate
exception requires more than an allegation, but, at a minimum, a “finding of guilt or liability in an
adjudication regarding the [predicate] violation.”176
Justice Jackson, writing for herself, authored a concurring opinion suggesting that the predicate
violation must be a violation of a federal or state statute.177 Here, Justice Jackson asserted, the
complaint fails because “Mexico does not tether its claims to alleged statutory breaches.”178
168 Id.
169 Id. (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 500).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 298.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 299.
174 Id.
175 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 300 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
177 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 302 (Jackson, J., concurring). The complaint does state that the defendants violated the Gun Control Act. See
Complaint supra note 4, at 18.
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Considerations for Congress
As PLCAA and the predicate exception are creatures of federal statute, Congress has options to
address the Court’s ruling in Smith & Wesson. Congress could amend the predicate exception,
strengthening the immunity it confers on firearms manufacturers and distributors by codifying the
Supreme Court’s holding. Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute to narrow the predicate
exception to the extent that it disagrees with the Court’s conclusion. An amendment could include
clarifying language as to what legal violations by actors in the firearms industry may trigger the
predicate exception, when a firearms entity bears sufficient causal responsibility for any
downstream misuse of a firearms, and when and if plaintiffs may bring an action under PLCAA
for harms occurring outside of the United States.
Author Information
Dave S. Sidhu
Legislative Attorney
Jordan B. Cohen
Analyst in Firearms Policy
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.