Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional research reportFeb 28, 2025
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Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
February 28, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48440
SUMMARY
Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
Romania is a country in southeastern Europe with a population of nearly 20 million. After the
end of communist rule in Romania in 1989, the United States and Romania developed close
bilateral relations, including a strategic partnership launched in 1997. The United States
supported Romania’s economic and democratic transition, as well as its accession to NATO in
2004 and the European Union (EU) in 2007.
R48440
February 28, 2025
Sarah E. Garding
Analyst in European Affairs
U.S. officials under successive presidential Administrations have described Romania as a
steadfast ally and a strong proponent of transatlantic cooperation. For years, Romania has sought to elevate Black Sea
security as a strategic priority within NATO and the EU. The country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation and Black Sea location
have made it an important partner in addressing U.S. foreign and security policy concerns in Europe and other regions.
Romania’s role in deterrence and defense along NATO’s eastern flank increased following Russia’s initial invasion of
Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Within NATO and the EU, Romania has the longest border with Ukraine.
For decades, the U.S.-Romania relationship has generally had broad support within Congress. Deteriorating security in the
Black Sea region, particularly since 2022, has driven increased congressional interest in Romania and the broader region.
Some Members have engaged through delegations visiting Romania and through participation in the House Romania Caucus
and interparliamentary platforms. In the 117th and 118th Congress, some Members introduced legislation concerning the U.S.Romania strategic partnership (e.g., H.Res. 1222 in the 117th); Romania’s entry into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (e.g., S.
814 in the 118th); and U.S. policy toward the Black Sea region (e.g., H.R. 6367/S. 3407 in the 117th; H.R. 1680/S. 804 in the
118th). Congress enacted provisions relating to Black Sea policy in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (P.L.
118-31) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328 and accompanying explanatory statement).
The 119th Congress may weigh whether and how to shape U.S.-Romania bilateral relations using its oversight and legislative
prerogatives. Topics that may be of interest to the 119th Congress include the following:
•
Security. U.S.-Romania security cooperation encompasses joint trainings and exercises; U.S. access to
military facilities in Romania; rotational deployments of U.S. troops to Romania under Operation Atlantic
Resolve; Romania’s hosting on its territory of a U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defense system; Romania’s
cooperation with the Alabama National Guard under the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program;
and defense consultations. Congress has authorized and appropriated assistance used to support Romania’s
military modernization, infrastructure, and interoperability with NATO forces. Over the past decade,
Romania has invested in U.S. weapons and equipment as part of its defense modernization and in
Romanian military facilities used by U.S. and NATO forces.
•
Energy. U.S. engagement with Romania on energy has grown in recent years, and civil nuclear energy was
an area of close cooperation under the first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration. Since
2022, Romania’s natural gas and electricity infrastructure and supplies have helped support the energy
security of neighboring Moldova and Ukraine.
•
Political Situation. In November 2024, Romania’s political scene grew contentious following the
unexpected victory of a far-right, populist candidate in the first round of the presidential election.
Romania’s Constitutional Court subsequently annulled the presidential election amid allegations it had
been compromised by social media manipulation (primarily on TikTok) and electoral law violations, as
well as concerns about possible Russian interference. A new election is scheduled for May 2025.
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Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Political Overview ........................................................................................................................... 1
Annulment of the 2024 Presidential Election ..................................................................... 2
December 2024 Parliamentary Election ............................................................................. 5
Growth in Support for Far-Right Parties............................................................................. 6
Corruption and Rule-of-Law Concerns............................................................................... 8
Economy .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Energy ........................................................................................................................................... 10
Foreign and Security Policy ...........................................................................................................11
Black Sea Security and Russia .......................................................................................... 12
Defense Spending and Military Modernization ................................................................ 12
Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine ...................................................................... 13
U.S. and NATO Forces in Romania .................................................................................. 14
Regional Cooperation and Contributions to Security Missions ........................................ 14
U.S.-Romania Relations ................................................................................................................ 15
Economic Relations .......................................................................................................... 15
Security Cooperation ........................................................................................................ 16
Energy ............................................................................................................................... 16
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Romania ........................................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Seats in 2024-2028 Romanian Parliament ....................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 19
Congressional Research Service
Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction and Issues for Congress
Romania is a country in southeastern Europe with a population of nearly 20 million (see Figure 1
for map). Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union (EU) in 2007. The country’s
Euro-Atlantic orientation and Black Sea location have made it an important partner in addressing
U.S. foreign and security policy concerns in Europe and other regions. Romania’s military
facilities have supported NATO and U.S.-led missions in the Middle East and Europe, and
Romania hosts one of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems that the United
States contributes to NATO BMD in Europe. Romania’s role in NATO deterrence and defense
expanded when Russia first invaded Ukraine (Romania’s neighbor) in 2014 and in the wake of
Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since 2022, Romania has bolstered the energy
security of both Ukraine and Moldova, aided Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, facilitated
Ukrainian grain exports through Romanian river and Black Sea ports, and served as a logistical
hub for international support to Ukraine.
Beginning in November 2024, Romania’s
political scene grew contentious following the
unexpected victory of far-right, populist
candidate Călin Georgescu in the first round
of the presidential election. Romania’s
Constitutional Court subsequently annulled
the presidential election amid allegations it
had been compromised by social media
manipulation (primarily on TikTok) and
electoral law violations, and concerns about
possible Russian interference. An ongoing
criminal investigation into Georgescu may
affect his prospects to compete in the
presidential election scheduled for May 2025.
Romania: Basic Facts
Population: 19.05 million (2021)
Land Area: 92,043 square miles (similar to Oregon)
Ethnicity: 89.3% Romanian; 6% Hungarian; 3.4%
Roma; 0.3% Ukrainian; 0.1% German; 0.9% other
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2024 est.:
$380.56 billion; per capita GDP approximately $20,090
Political Leaders: President: Ilie Bolojan (interim);
Prime Minister: Marcel Ciolacu; Foreign Minister: Emil
Hurezeanu; Defense Minister: Angel Tîlvăr
Sources: International Monetary Fund, “World
Economic Outlook Database,” October 2024; Central
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook; Romanian National
Institute of Statistics, 2021 Population Census.
Deteriorating security in the Black Sea region,
particularly since 2022, has driven greater congressional interest in Romania, and U.S.-Romania
relations may be of interest to some Members of the 119th Congress. Areas of potential
congressional oversight and legislation include U.S. security assistance and cooperation with
Romania, bilateral cooperation on energy, and Romania’s role in Black Sea security. Members
also may assess implementation of Black Sea strategy requirements enacted in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2024 (§1247 of P.L. 118-31) and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2023 (§7019(e) of P.L. 117-328 and accompanying statement).
Political Overview
Romania is a parliamentary republic with a semi-presidential system of government. A directly
elected president is the head of state and the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. The
president also has some responsibilities in domestic and foreign affairs. The prime minister leads
the government. Romania’s bicameral parliament includes a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate.
Klaus Iohannis, whose second and final term as president expired in December 2024, initially
remained in office following the Romanian Constitutional Court’s December 6, 2024, decision to
annul Romania’s presidential election (a new election has been called for May 2025). On
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Romania: Background and U.S. Relations
February 10, 2025, facing a potential impeachment procedure in parliament, Iohannis announced
his resignation. Romanian Senate leader Ilie Bolojan assumed duties as interim president.
Marcel Ciolacu has served as prime minister since 2023; Ciolacu’s Social Democratic Party
(PSD) has governed in coalition with the National Liberal Party (PNL) since late 2021. PSD and
PNL are Romania’s largest center-left and center-right parties, respectively. The PSD-PNL
coalition has been relatively durable, despite the parties’ historical rivalry and policy differences.
After Romania’s December 1, 2024, parliamentary election, PSD and PNL formed a new
coalition government with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), with
Ciolacu remaining prime minister.
Figure 1. Romania
Source: Map created by the Congressional Research Service.
Annulment of the 2024 Presidential Election
Romania’s political situation has been volatile since late 2024. Călin Georgescu, a relatively
little-known candidate who campaigned mostly on social media and reported zero campaign
expenses, unexpectedly won the most votes (22.9%) in the first round of the presidential election
on November 24, 2024.1 Georgescu had polled below 1% in early November, about 6% in midNovember, and about 11% in final preelection polls.2 Some observers assessed that Georgescu’s
statements praising 20th century Romanian fascist leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin—
as well as remarks conveying skepticism of NATO, Ukrainian statehood, Romanian support for
Ukraine, and aspects of U.S.-Romania security cooperation—appeared to be at odds with
1 Permanent Electoral Authority, press release, November 24, 2024, https://www.roaep.ro/prezentare/comunicat-de-
presa/comunicat-de-presa-privind-veniturile-si-cheltuielile-efectuate-de-competitorii-electorali-la-alegerile-pentrupresedintele-romaniei-din-data-de-24-noiembrie-2024/.
2 Poll figures from intelligence documents declassified by the president of Romania on December 4, 2024. See
Supreme Council of National Defense, press release, December 4, 2024, https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/
comunicate-de-presa/comunicat-de-presa1733327193.
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Romania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.3 Although Georgescu denies ties to Russia and says he
supports Romania’s NATO and EU memberships, some observers assess that some of his rhetoric
on the West, NATO, and Ukraine resembles Russian narratives.4 Another unexpected outcome in
the first round was the failure of Prime Minister Ciolacu—who appeared to be the frontrunner in
polls—to reach the runoff round. Instead, Georgescu was to face Elena Lasconi, leader of the proEuropean opposition party Save Romania Union (USR). The election results drew scrutiny to the
late-campaign surge of pro-Georgescu content on social media (in particular TikTok), the
Georgescu campaign’s compliance with Romanian electoral laws, TikTok’s responsiveness to
concerns raised by Romanian election authorities, and allegations of Russian efforts to influence
the information space in Romania and weaken social cohesion.5
On December 6, 2024—two days before the runoff between Georgescu and Lasconi was to be
held—Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election, finding that multiple
irregularities and electoral law violations had compromised its integrity.6 The court’s decision
drew from newly declassified Romanian intelligence reports describing a large-scale online effort
to aggressively promote Georgescu’s candidacy ahead of the first round. The online campaign,
according to the reports, was coordinated on Telegram and Discord channels, backed by a state
actor, and largely carried out on TikTok, where paid influencers and networks of accounts
amplified content and hashtags associated with Georgescu’s candidacy.7 Some content appeared
to violate Romanian electoral law requirements that political campaign material be labeled as
such, resulting in Georgescu’s preferential visibility on TikTok. The reports also said that
Romania’s electoral websites and systems experienced over 85,000 cyberattacks close to or on
election day, likely backed by a state actor.8 Elsewhere, the reports described growing Russian
hybrid threats targeting Romania (see below, “Black Sea Security and Russia”) and pointed to
seeming similarities between the coordinated social media campaign in Romania’s election and
alleged interference cases in Moldova and Ukraine attributed to Russia.
The reports’ findings spurred investigations into individuals and financing allegedly behind the
digital campaign, as well as into Georgescu’s compliance with Romanian campaign finance and
other electoral laws.9 Prompted in part by developments in Romania, the EU announced a formal
3 Stephen McGrath and Vadim Ghirda, “Romania’s Surprise Front-Runner Says He’s Not Pro-Russia. But Romania
Alleges He Had Moscow’s Help,” Associated Press, December 4, 2024; Clara Volintiru, “The Well-Known
Unknown,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 27, 2024; Luiza Ilie, Lili Bayer, and Andrew Gray,
“Who Is Calin Georgescu, the Man at the Centre of Romania’s Cancelled Election?,” Reuters, December 6, 2024; and
Maya Mehara, “Ukraine Called ‘Fictional State’ by European Presidential Candidate,” Newsweek, January 30, 2025.
On the Holocaust in Romania, see International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Final Report of the
International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, November 11, 2004, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/
20080226-romania-commission-executive-summary.pdf.
4 Laura Kayali and Giovanna Coi, “Why Romania’s Presidential Vote Could Shake NATO,” Politico Europe,
December 4, 2024 (hereinafter Kayali and Coi, “Romania’s Presidential Vote”); and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine, “Comment by MFA Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi on Calin Georgescu’s Provocative Statements,” January
30, 2025.
5 Supreme Council of National Defense, press release, November 28, 2024, https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/
sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302.
6 Constitutional Court of Romania, “Decision No. 32,” December 6, 2024, https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/
2024/12/Hotarare_32_2024.pdf. Days earlier, the court had validated the first-round results after the narrow margin
between Lasconi and Ciolacu prompted a recount.
7 Supreme Council of National Defense, press release, December 4, 2024.
8 Supreme Council of National Defense, press release, December 4, 2024; and Carmen Paun, “Romania’s Security
Chiefs Confirm Election Cyberattacks, Request TikTok Probe,” Politico Europe, November 28, 2024.
9 Tim Ross and Andrei Popoviciu, “Prosecutors Raid Properties of Key Georgescu Backer in Romania Election Probe,”
(continued...)
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inquiry into TikTok over a potential breach of the bloc’s Digital Services Act, which has the
stated aim of preventing harmful online activity and disinformation.10 The inquiry is to focus on
management of risks to elections or civic discourse in relation to TikTok’s recommender systems
and on TikTok’s policies on political advertising and paid political content.
Prime Minister Ciolacu said the Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the election was “the
only correct solution after the declassification of the documents,... which show that the result of
the Romanians’ vote was blatantly distorted as a result of Russia’s intervention.”11 Then-Secretary
of State Antony Blinken and some European policymakers expressed support for Romania’s
institutions and concern about reports of Russian interference.12 Other analysts, while not
disputing the gravity of the situation, nevertheless have said that the election’s annulment may
deepen Romanians’ distrust of democratic processes and galvanize further support for anti-system
narratives.13 Some who hold this view also suggest that, alongside any impacts from digital
manipulation and electoral law violations, Georgescu’s victory in the first round also reflects
genuine voter dissatisfaction with Romania’s governing parties. Georgescu and Lasconi, among
others, questioned the Constitutional Court’s impartiality and/or the underlying intelligence
evidence.14 The two candidates welcomed U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s comments about
Romania in his February 14, 2025, speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he
described the election annulment as “based on the flimsy suspicions of an intelligence agency and
enormous pressure from [Romania’s] continental neighbors.”15
Politico Europe, December 7, 2024; and Nicolae Bian and Florin Marinescu, “Exclusive: The Russian Connections of
Călin Georgescu’s Security Team—Ties to Wagner Group, the Russian Embassy, and Chechen Leader Ramzan
Kadyrov,” G4 Media, February 26, 2025 (hereinafter Bian and Marinescu, “Georgescu’s Security Team”).
10 European Commission, “Commission Opens Formal Proceedings Against TikTok on Election Risks Under the
Digital Services Act,” December 16, 2024.
11 Sarah Rainsford, “Romanian Court Annuls Result of Presidential Election First Round,” BBC, December 6, 2024.
Also see Valentina Pop, “Russian Election Meddling ‘Nearly Impossible’ to Prove, Says Romania’s President,”
Financial Times, December 19, 2024.
12 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Plenary Statement 31st OSCE
Ministerial Council, Valletta, Malta,” December 5, 2024; U.S. Department of State, “Statement on Romania’s
Presidential Elections,” December 4, 2024, https://ro.usembassy.gov/romania-presidential-elections/; United Kingdom
Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Affairs David Lammy (@DavidLammy), X post,
December 7, 2024, https://x.com/DavidLammy/status/1865331777323024475; German Foreign Office
(@GermanDiplo), X post, December 5, 2024, https://x.com/GermanyDiplo/status/1864693922833785260; Agence
France-Presse, “Macron Expresses Concern over European Elections in New Year Speech,” January 1, 2024; and
French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, “Publication of the VIGINUM Report on Information
Manipulation,” February 5, 2025.
13 Oana Popescu-Zamfir, “Romania’s Election Crisis: A Stark Warning for NATO Nations on Russian Meddling,”
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2024; Alexandru Damian, “The Annulment of Romania’s
Presidential Election Reflects Both Foreign Meddling and Domestic Failures,” London School of Economics,
December 13, 2024; Mark Gitenstein, “Romania’s Agony,” EU Observer, February 10, 2025; and Kamil Calus,
“Romania: Constitutional Court Annuls the Election,” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, December 9, 2024.
14 Irina Marica, “Romania’s Far-Right Călin Georgescu and George Simion Protest Presidential Election Annulment at
Closed Polling Stations,” Romania Insider, December 9, 2024; Keno Verseck, “What Next for Romania After Its
Recent Electoral Chaos?,” DeutscheWelle, December 20, 2024; and Victor Goury-Laffont, “Report Ties Romanian
Liberals to TikTok Campaign That Fueled Pro-Russia Candidate,” Politico Europe, December 21, 2024.
15 Vance further stated, “Now, as I understand it, the argument was that Russian disinformation had infected the
Romanian elections, but I’d ask my European friends to have some perspective. You can believe it’s wrong for Russia
to buy social media advertisements to influence your elections. We certainly do.... But if your democracy can be
destroyed with a few hundred thousand dollars of digital advertising from a foreign country, then it wasn’t very strong
to begin with.” From Christina Lu, “Transcript: The Speech That Stunned Europe,” Foreign Policy, February 18, 2025,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/vance-speech-munich-full-text-read-transcript-europe/. Also see Catalina Mihai,
“Vance’s Munich Speech Sparks Mixed Reactions in Bucharest,” Euractiv, February 17, 2025.
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A new presidential election has been called for May 2025. The first round is scheduled for May 4,
with a runoff on May 18 if no candidate wins over 50% of the vote. Polling in January 2025
indicated that Georgescu is the frontrunner, with higher support (around 38%) than in his firstround results.16 He is backed by the largest far-right party in Romania, the Alliance for the Union
of Romanians.17 A potential new candidate is Bucharest Mayor Nicuşor Dan, who has announced
his intention to compete as an independent, pro-European candidate. Governing coalition parties
PSD, PNL, and UDMR agreed to back former PNL leader Crin Antonescu.18 Given the Romanian
president’s role in foreign affairs and security (including representing Romania at NATO and EU
leader summits), the outcome of the May 2025 election may have implications for U.S., NATO,
and EU interests.19
As of late February 2025, Georgescu’s potential candidacy in the May 2025 election is uncertain.
On February 26, 2025, the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Romanian High Court of Cassation
and Justice announced a criminal investigation into Georgescu relating to six alleged offenses:
incitement of actions against the constitutional order; sharing of false information; false
statements regarding electoral campaign financing; connection to an organization with a fascist,
racist, or xenophobic character; public promotion of persons convicted of crimes of genocide and
war crimes and extremist discourse; and connection to an organization with an antisemitic
character.20 According to preliminary media reports, police raids conducted alongside
Georgescu’s questioning “documented multiple connections between Călin Georgescu’s
entourage and Russia” and reportedly uncovered ammunition, weapons, and over $1 million in
cash in possession of a former mercenary leader described as a close associate to Georgescu.21
Georgescu accused the authorities of fabricating evidence as pretext to bar his candidacy in the
election.22
December 2024 Parliamentary Election
Romania held a parliamentary election on December 1, 2024—one week after the first round of
the presidential election. No major concerns were raised about the integrity of the parliamentary
election. PSD placed first overall in elections to both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate,
with around 22% of votes (a drop from its roughly 29% share in the 2020 parliamentary
16 Reuters, “Romanian Far-Right Presidential Candidate Leads in Polls Ahead of May Vote,” January 21, 2025.
17 Catalina Mihai, “Romanian Far-Right AUR Backs Pro-Russian Candidate Georgescu,” Euractiv, January 23, 2025
(hereinafter Mihai, “Romanian Far-Right AUR Backs Pro-Russian Candidate Georgescu”).
18 Ketrin Jochecová, “Bucharest Mayor Enters Romanian Presidential Race,” Politico Europe, December 16, 2024;
Irina Marica, “Ruling Parties Unite Under Romania’s Forward Alliance to Back Crin Antonescu’s Presidential Bid,”
Romania Insider, February 13, 2025.
19 President of Romania, “Role and Responsibilities,” https://www.presidency.ro/en/president/role-and-responsibilities;
Kayali and Coi, “Romania’s Presidential Vote.”
20 Prosecutor’s Office, “Punerea în mișcare a acțiunii penale față de un inculpat pentru săvârșirea infracțiunilor de
instigare la acțiuni împotriva ordinii constituționale, comunicarea de informații false ș.a.,” February 26, 2025,
https://www.mpublic.ro/content/c_26-02-2025-16-02; and “47 de percheziții pe raza județelor Sibiu, Mureș, Timiș,
Ilfov și Cluj,” February 26, 2025, https://www.mpublic.ro/ro/content/c_26-02-2025-08-02.
21 Quoted in Bian and Marinescu, “Georgescu’s Security Team.” Also see Cristian Stefanescu, “Romania, DRC: Who
is Mercenary Leader Horatiu Potra?” DeutscheWelle, February 13, 2025; Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “In Romania, the
Troubling Role of French-Romanian Mercenaries in the Campaign of the Pro-Russian Presidential Candidate,” Le
Monde, December 17, 2024; RFE/RL, “Romanian Court Clears Ex-Mercenary Bodyguard of Far-Right Candidate,”
December 13, 2024; and Damian Matei, “Live Breaking: Călin Georgescu a ieşit de la audieri ... ” G4 Media, February
26, 2025, https://www.g4media.ro/breaking-calin-georgescu-ridicat-de-procurori.html.
22 Bian and Marinescu, “Georgescu’s Security Team”; Damian Matei, “Romanian Presidential Hopeful Călin
Georgescu Detained by Prosecutors Amid Investigation into Russian Ties and Armed Mercenaries,” G4 Media,
February 26, 2025.
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election).23 In elections to both chambers, the far-right AUR placed second, followed by PNL,
USR, smaller far-right parties, and UDMR. PSD, PNL, and UDMR agreed to form a coalition
government, with Ciolacu reappointed prime minister.24 The government’s majority in both
chambers is slim (see Figure 2). Parties in opposition include USR and a bloc of far-right parties.
Figure 2. Seats in 2024-2028 Romanian Parliament
Source: Graphic created by CRS, using data from https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.gp (Chamber of
Deputies) and https://www.senat.ro/FisaSenatori.aspx (Senate), accessed January 24, 2025.
Notes: Under Romania’s constitution, organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities that do not win
sufficient votes for representation in the legislature have the right to one seat each in the Chamber of Deputies.
In the parliament that was inaugurated in December 2024, deputies from these organizations agreed to support
the PSD-PNL-UDMR government in the Chamber.
Growth in Support for Far-Right Parties
Far-right political parties have gained traction in recent Romanian elections—a political dynamic
also seen in some other EU member states.25 To differing degrees, Romanian far-right parties and
23 Katja Christina Plate, “Parliamentary Elections in Romania,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, December 2024.
24 Government of Romania, “Program de Guvernare: PSD-PNL-UDMR-Grupul parlamentar al minorităţilor naţionale
din Camera Deputaţilor 2024-2028,” https://gov.ro/fisiere/pagini_fisiere/Program_de_Guvernare_PSD-PNL-UDMRGrupul_minoritatilor_nationale_din_Camera_Deputatilor_2024-2028.pdf (hereinafter, Government of Romania,
“Program de Guvernare”).
25 European Center for Populism Studies, “Professor Soare: Romania’s Radical Right Populism Reflects Deep-Rooted
Socio-Economic Frustrations,” November 28, 2024 (hereinafter European Center for Populism Studies, “Romania’s
Radical Right Populism”); Liana Fix and Sophia Winograd, “How Far-Right Election Gains Are Changing Europe,”
(continued...)
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politicians express skepticism of NATO and/or the EU; espouse populist narratives on the
economy and political class; and criticize what they describe as global and European pressure
against traditional Romanian values, national identity, and sovereignty.26 Some politicians have
been criticized for praising 20th century Romanian fascist figures, making irredentist or
antisemitic statements, and using hate speech.27 According to some analysts, the growth in
support for far-right parties in Romania may stem from such factors as inequality, regional
disparities, high inflation, frustration over corruption, dissatisfaction with the political
establishment, Romania’s media environment, and a perceived sense of second-class treatment
within the EU.28
AUR, the largest far-right party in parliament, was launched in 2019 and quickly gained support,
garnering about 9% of votes in Romania’s 2020 parliamentary election and around 22% in the
2024 parliamentary election. The party’s platform lists as its four pillars Christian faith, liberty,
traditional family, and the nation. The platform also calls for Romania and Moldova’s union.29
Some observers assess that AUR has sought to broaden its appeal by softening criticism of NATO
and the EU, aligning with the European Conservatives and Reformists grouping in the European
Parliament, and sidelining more controversial party figures.30 Party leader George Simion, who
reportedly is banned from entering Moldova and Ukraine, was considered to be a likely contender
in the 2024 presidential runoff, but his campaign ultimately was eclipsed by Georgescu’s. AUR
has said it will back Georgescu in the May 2025 election. 31 Other far-right parties in parliament
include S.O.S. Romania and Young People’s Party.32
Council on Foreign Relations, October 15, 2024; and Gregoire Lory and Amandine Hess, “European Political
Landscape Shifts Right in 2024 as Far-Right Gains Ground,” Euronews, December 24, 2024.
26 European Center for Populism Studies, “Romania’s Radical Right Populism”; Kamil Calus, “A Shift Further to the
Right: Radical Parties are Gaining Popularity in Romania,” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, April 29, 2024
(hereinafter Calus, “A Shift Further to the Right”); and Mihaela Mihai, “The Alliance for the Union of Romanians
Represents a New Form of Far-Right Environmentalism,” London School of Economics, November 21, 2024.
27 U.S. Department of State, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Romania, https://www.state.gov/reports/
2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/romania/; Calus, “A Shift Further to the Right”; Andrew Higgins,
“How Romania’s Fascist and Communist Pasts Haunt Its Politics,” New York Times, December 12, 2024; Michael
Bachner and Lazar Berman, “Israeli Envoy Meets Head of Romanian Party Accused of Antisemitism, Drawing
Rebuke,” Times of Israel, August 28, 2023; Ketrin Jochecová, “Romanian MEP Slams ‘JEWS AND AMERICANS’
After Ban from Presidential Race,” Politico Europe, October 7, 2024; and Alison Mutler, “The Far-Right Firebrand
Too Dangerous to Run for Romania’s Presidency,” RFE/RL, November 21, 2024.
28 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2024—Romania; Clara Volintiru, “Romania’s Elections: All Quiet on the Eastern
Front?” German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 13, 2024; Calus, “A Shift Further to the Right”; and
European Center for Populism Studies, “Romania’s Radical Right Populism.”
29 AUR, “The Alliance for the Union of Romanians Political Party,” party program, https://partidulaur.ro/english/.
30 Euractiv, “Romania’s New Far-Right Backs Meloni Against EU’s ‘Soviet’ Approach,” August 1, 2023; Calus, “A
Shift Further to the Right”; European Center for Populism Studies, “Romania’s Radical Right Populism”; and Mihai,
“Romanian Far-Right AUR Backs Pro-Russian Candidate Georgescu.”
31 Iulian Ernst, “Romanian Radical Politician Banned in Moldova for Another Five Years,” Romanian Insider,
February 5, 2024; Catalina Mihai, “Romanian Government Publishes Reasons for Ukraine Banning Far-Right Leader,”
Euractiv, November 18, 2024; Mihai, “Romanian Far-Right AUR Backs Pro-Russian Candidate Georgescu”; and
Calus, “A Shift Further to the Right.”
32 In October 2024, the Constitutional Court banned S.O.S. leader (and Member of the European Parliament) Diana
Şoşoacă from running for the presidency due to her “promotion of a constant anti-democratic and antisemitic
discourse” and “systematic, persistent and long-lasting behavior aimed [at] undermining the constitutional foundations
of the Romanian state and its guarantees.” Quoted in Ketrin Jochecová, “Unprecedented ‘Putin-Style’ Top Court
Ruling Rocks Romanian Election,” Politico Europe, October 15, 2024.
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Corruption and Rule-of-Law Concerns
Corruption and weak rule of law have been viewed as persistent challenges in Romania.33 Due to
concern that these issues had not been resolved when Romania joined the EU in 2007, the
European Commission (the EU’s executive) continued to monitor the country’s reform efforts
under the so-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Into the mid-2010s, CVM
assessments of Romania’s anti-corruption and judicial reforms were generally positive.34 The
U.S. Department of State described the country’s anti-corruption reforms during this period as “a
model in southeastern Europe,” despite continued challenges with corruption.35
From 2017 to 2019, consecutive PSD-led governments (under prior party leadership) adopted
changes to Romania’s judicial and anti-corruption institutions, asserting that these institutions had
become politicized. The EU, as well as officials under the first Trump Administration, raised
concerns about the changes.36 Some critics viewed the measures as an effort to protect senior PSD
officials accused of corruption, including PSD’s then-leader Liviu Dragnea, whom the U.S.
Department of State designated for visa restrictions in 2019 for involvement in significant
corruption under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related
Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division F of P.L. 116-6).37 Since 2019, Romania has taken some steps
to reverse the measures. In 2023, the European Commission formally closed the CVM, citing
Romania’s progress fulfilling the commitments it made at the time of its EU accession.38
Recent EU and Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption assessments have
highlighted progress as well as continued challenges in Romania’s justice system and fight
against corruption.39 The U.S. Department of State’s 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for Romania described corruption and misuse of public funds as “widespread,” and the
U.S. Department of State’s 2024 Investment Climate Statement for Romania noted that numerous
corruption cases have been closed due to the statute of limitations on criminal liability.40 The
Department’s Integrated Country Strategy for Romania (updated in March 2024) assesses that
33 For expert and public opinion surveys, see Transparency International, 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index,
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023; and European Commission, Special Eurobarometer on Corruption:
Romania, 2022.
34 Euractiv, “Romania Praised Again in EU Justice Monitoring Report but Weaknesses Remain,” January 26, 2017.
35 U.S. Department of State, 2023 Investment Climate Statements: Romania, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023investment-climate-statements/romania/.
36 U.S. Department of State, “Romania: Proposals Affecting the Independence of the Judiciary,” November 27, 2017;
U.S. Embassy in Romania, “Major Partners of Romania Express Concern About Rule of Law,” April 3, 2019; and
Carmen Paun, “Commission Renews Warning to Romania over Rule of Law,” Politico Europe, April 15, 2019.
37 Dragnea was designated along with members of his immediate family. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesperson, “Public Designation Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption, of Romania’s Liviu Nicolae
Dragnea,” September 5, 2019, https://ro.usembassy.gov/public-designation-due-to-involvement-in-significantcorruption-of-romanias-liviu-nicolae-dragnea/.
38 European Commission, “Romania: Benchmarks Under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Are
Satisfactorily Met,” November 22, 2022; and European Commission, “Rule of Law: Commission Formally Closes the
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania,” press release, September 14, 2023.
39 European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Romania, July 24,
2024; and Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), Fifth Evaluation Round Evaluation
Report: Romania, adopted by GRECO at its 94th Plenary Meeting, 5-9 June, 2023.
40 U.S. Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania, https://www.state.gov/
reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/romania/; and U.S. Department of State, 2024 Investment
Climate Statement: Romania, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/romania/.
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corruption is among the factors contributing to “disillusionment of Romanian voters, giving a
boost to anti-system parties.”41
Economy
Economic conditions in Romania have improved considerably since the end of communist rule in
1989 and Romania’s subsequent EU integration. When adjusted for purchasing power, Romania’s
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is on par with that of Poland.42 For part of the 2000s and
2010s, Romania was among the EU’s fastest-growing economies, leveraging its low-cost, skilled
workforce; natural resources; and Black Sea ports. The U.S. Commerce Department’s Country
Commercial Guide for Romania describes the country as a leading electronics and vehicle
producer in central and eastern Europe and “a major center for mobile technology, information
security, and related hardware research.”43 Romania aims to join the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development in the near term and adopt the euro as its currency (replacing the
Romanian leu) when it meets the criteria for doing so.44
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic adversely impacted Romania’s economy,
with GDP contracting by nearly 4% in 2020.45 Russia’s war on Ukraine contributed to increased
energy costs and high inflation. Romania’s GDP grew by about 4.6% in 2022 and by 2.2% in
2023. Growth slowed to an estimated 1.9% in 2024 and is forecast to be 3.3% in 2025.
Poverty and other economic and socioeconomic challenges remain concerns in Romania. Within
the EU, Romania had the highest rate of poverty or social exclusion as of 2023, with just under
one-third of the population at risk. It also had the highest rate of severe material and social
deprivation, although the share dropped from nearly 25% in 2022 to about 20% in 2023.46 Other
economic barriers include an aging, declining population; labor shortages and workforce skills
gaps; an unpredictable legal and regulatory environment; and corruption.47 Romania also is
grappling with a high budget deficit; in 2024, the general government deficit was close to 8% (up
from 6.5% in 2023), according to the European Commission’s fall 2024 European Economic
Forecast.48 The report attributes the increase in part to “very fast growth in government spending,
mostly due to large increases in public sector wages, expenditure in goods and services, and
social transfers, including pensions.” In December 2024, the Romanian government announced
new measures aimed at lowering the deficit to 7% in 2025.49
41 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Romania, updated March 18, 2024.
42
Eurostat, “GDP per capita in PPS,” code prc_ppp_ind, accessed January 7, 2025.
43 U.S. Commerce Department, International Trade Administration, Romania—Country Commercial Guide, January
12, 2024.
44 Government of Romania, “Program de Guvernare”; European Central Bank, 2024 Convergence Report of the
European Central Bank, June 26, 2024.
45 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” October 2024.
46 Eurostat, “People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion in the EU, 2023,” and “Severe Material and Social
Deprivation Rate, 2023,” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. The first indicator reflects “the sum of persons who are either at
risk of poverty, or severely materially and socially deprived or living in a household with a very low work intensity,”
and the second reflects the share “experiencing an enforced lack of at least 7 out of 13 items ... that are deemed to be
desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life.”
47 U.S. Department of State, 2024 Investment Climate Statements: Romania, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024investment-climate-statements/romania/; U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
Romania—Country Commercial Guide: Market Challenges, January 12, 2024.
48 European Commission, European Economic Forecast Autumn 2024, Institutional Paper 296, November 2024.
49 Alexandru Cristea, “Romanian Govt Moves to Cut Budget Deficit to 7% in 2025,” SeeNews, December 31, 2024.
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In 2025, Romania’s economy may be adversely impacted by economic headwinds in the wider
EU economy. Trade and commerce may be boosted, however, by Romania’s (and neighboring
Bulgaria’s) full entry into the EU’s Schengen area of free movement as of January 1, 2025.50
Furthermore, Romania has access to €28.5 billion (about $29.7 billion) in grants and loans under
the EU’s COVID-19 recovery and resilience package (contingent on adoption of certain reforms)
and to €31.5 billion ($32.8 billion) in cohesion funds under the 2021-2027 EU budget, among
other EU funds.51 The U.S. Department of State’s 2024 Investment Climate Statement for
Romania notes, however, that “a demonstrated lack of administrative capacity to apply for EU
funds, as well as absorb and implement EU-funded projects may dampen the [COVID recovery
funds’] impact.”
Romania’s location and infrastructure could position the country to play a role in Ukrainian
reconstruction. Some EU funds support rail and road transport projects to enhance connectivity in
Romania and with Romania’s neighbors (including Moldova and Ukraine).52
Energy
An oil and natural gas producer, Romania is less reliant on foreign energy imports than most EU
member states. Romania is phasing out coal as a source of power generation and increasing the
use of natural gas, nuclear power (see below, “U.S.-Romania Relations ”), and renewables.53
Offshore natural gas and oil deposits and wind resources in the Black Sea could bolster
Romania’s energy security. Although delayed for several years by legal and regulatory issues,
natural gas resource development also could increase Romania’s prominence in European energy
trade as the EU’s largest natural gas producer. Romania’s Neptun Deep—an offshore natural gas
project slated to begin production in 2027—holds an estimated 100 billion cubic meters (BCM)
of gas, one of the largest in the EU. Romania’s total offshore gas reserves are an estimated 200
BCM (Romania typically consumes 10-12 BCM per year).54 Some environmental organizations
have criticized Black Sea fossil fuel projects as contrary to EU climate targets.55 A World Bank
Group study assesses that Romania could feasibly install up to 7 gigawatts (GW) of offshore
wind capacity beginning in the 2030s (as a point of reference, Europe had a total of 32.3 GW
operational offshore wind capacity in 2023). With U.S. technical assistance, Romania adopted
50 With Romania and Bulgaria’s full entry into Schengen, nearly all EU member states now belong to the Schengen
area in which internal border controls have been eliminated.
51 European Commission, “Romania’s Recovery and Resilience Plan,” https://commission.europa.eu/businesseconomy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/romanias-recovery-and-resilienceplan_en; European Commission, “EU Cohesion Policy: €31.5 Billion for Romania’s Economic, Social, and Territorial
Cohesion, Competitiveness and Green and Digital Transition in 2021-2027,” July 25, 2022; and Reuters, “European
Commission Warns Romania That Reform Delays Put Recovery Funds at Risk,” March 20, 2024.
52 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “Ambassador Kathleen Kavalec at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference,” September
25, 2024; Madalin Necsutu, “Romania Eyes Buying Moldovan Danube Port to Aid Ukraine’s Reconstruction,” Balkan
Insight, August 28, 2024; and Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “Romania’s Race to Develop Its Transportation Network with
Ukraine,” Le Monde, March 25, 2024.
53 Romanian Business Journal, “Romania Targets 2,500 MW of New Capacity in the Energy System, with Investments
in Gas-Fired and Renewable Power Plants,” January 6, 2025.
54 Madalin Necsutu, “Plan to Develop Romanian Black Sea Gas Fields Unveiled,” Balkan Insight, June 21, 2023; U.S.
Department of State, 2024 Investment Climate Statements: Romania; Georgi Gotev, “Romania on Its Way to Become
EU’s Largest Gas Producer,” Euractiv, January 10, 2025.
55 Greenpeace International, “Greenpeace Black Sea Protest: Proposed Gas Project Could Cause Tens of Thousands
Premature Deaths,” January 15, 2025.
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legislation on offshore wind in 2024. As of 2023, Romania had 3.1 GW of onshore wind energy
capacity and 1.9 GW solar capacity.56
Romania and other countries in the region are pursuing energy connectivity projects, some with
backing from the EU and/or the U.S.-supported Three Seas Initiative, which aims to boost
connectivity in the region between the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas. The Bulgaria-RomaniaHungary-Austria (BRUA) pipeline project, for instance, is intended to expand regional
transmission capacity for non-Russian gas from the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.57 As another
example, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania signed an agreement in 2022 on a green
energy partnership, the proposed centerpiece of which would be an electricity transmission cable
across the Black Sea.58 Romania’s electricity and gas infrastructure and supplies have helped
neighboring Moldova and Ukraine cope with increased energy insecurity since 2022 (see below,
“Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine”).
Foreign and Security Policy
Romania’s strategic partnership with the United States and its EU and NATO memberships are
the pillars of its national security policy.59 The country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation is grounded in
strong support among Romania’s centrist political parties and the population more generally,
although support for euroskeptic parties has increased in recent years. Romanian views of Russia
tend to be wary.60
Romanian foreign policy objectives include elevating Black Sea security as a transatlantic
priority, enhancing Romania’s profile in the EU and NATO, supporting Ukraine, maintaining a
close partnership with the United States, supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Moldova (with which Romania has historical and cultural ties), and enhancing engagement in
other global regions and in international organizations.61 Maintaining a strong allied presence
along NATO’s eastern flank, including in Romania, also is a policy concern.
56 World Bank Group, Offshore Wind Roadmap for Romania, September 2024; U.S. Embassy in Romania,
“Ambassador Kathleen Kavalec at PowerShift Summit,” October 29, 2024; International Renewable Energy Agency,
Renewable Capacity Statistics 2024, https://www.irena.org/Publications/2024/Mar/Renewable-capacity-statistics-2024.
57 Three Seas Initiative, “Project: BRUA,” projects.3seas.eu/projects/brua-development-on-the-territory-of-romania-ofthe-national-gas-transmission-system-along-the-corridor-bulgaria-romania-hungary-austria-(brua-phase-1-and-2)-andenhancement-of-the-bidirectional-gas-transmission-corridor-bulgaria-romania-hungary-austria-(brua-phase-3)-and-thedevelopment-on-the-territory-of-romania-of-the-southern-gas-transmission-corridor-for-taking-over-gas-from-theblack-sea-shore-(black-sea-podisor).
58 Reuters, “Four Leaders Sign Agreement to Bring Green Azeri Energy to Europe,” December 18, 2022; Euronews,
“Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania Launch Black Sea Power Line to Bring Green Energy to EU,” September
4, 2024.
59 Presidential Administration of Romania, National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, 2020.
60 Public opinion research generally indicates strong support among Romanians for NATO and EU membership. In a
2023 survey conducted by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, 87% of respondents in Romania viewed the
transatlantic relationship as important to dealing with security challenges and 83% supported continued NATO
membership (NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, “NATO Annual Tracking Research 2023,” March 14, 2024). A poll
conducted by INSCOP Research in December 2024 found that 87.5% of respondents viewed the West (the EU, the
United States, and NATO) as the “direction ... Romania should take in terms of political and military alliances” and
4.1% thought the country should look to the East (Russia and China) for such alliances. INSCOP Research, “INSCOP
Research Survey, Commissioned by Funky Citizens,” https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/28.01.2025Survey-Report-INSCOP-Funky-Citizens-EN.pdf.
61 See Government of Romania, “Program de Guvernare”; and President of Romania, “Foreign Policy,”
https://www.presidency.ro/en/commitments/foreign-policy.
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Black Sea Security and Russia
A key focus of Romania’s security policy is the Black Sea region (BSR). Romania has been a
leading advocate of a stronger NATO presence in the BSR and a more cohesive EU approach to
the region. It plays an integral role in NATO’s BSR deterrence and defense posture by hosting
allied troops, equipment, and aircraft at several bases. Russia’s actions in the BSR pose particular
concerns for Romania, including Russian support for breakaway territories in Moldova and
Georgia, war on Ukraine, and alleged hybrid threats targeting the BSR.
Romanian intelligence reports declassified in December 2024 (see above, “Annulment of the
2024 Presidential Election”) assess that Romania increasingly is a target for Russian hybrid
threats, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and efforts to shape the information space and boost
anti-system parties and narratives. Some nongovernmental analyses share this conclusion. A 2024
study assesses that Romania, as a NATO frontline state bordering Ukraine and hosting allied
personnel, is now “a prime target for Russian political warfare campaigns,” with Russia aiming to
“create a climate of uncertainty and anxiety” in Romanian society, “fracture the cohesion of
Romanian society,” “erode trust in the NATO alliance and EU institutions,” and weaken popular
support for Ukraine.62 A joint analysis by investigative platforms Intelligence Online and Snoop
assessed that a “pro-Russian network gravitating around the Russia-tied marketing agency
AdNow” was active in the context of Romania’s 2024 presidential election as part of its longerterm presence allegedly seeking to manipulate Romania’s information environment.63 Other
concerns include Russian violations of Romanian airspace, Russian drone debris on Romanian
territory, Russian strikes against infrastructure on the Ukrainian side of the Ukraine-Romania
Danube River border, and global positioning system jamming.64
Defense Spending and Military Modernization
Romania has increased its defense spending since 2014, driven in part by concerns about Black
Sea security. Estimated defense spending in 2024 was 2.25% of GDP (compared to 1.35% of
GDP in 2014).65 Romania’s defense spending focuses on replacing Cold War-era equipment and
systems and includes such U.S. equipment and weapons as Patriot air defense systems, High
Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Piranha V 8x8 armored fighting vehicles, Naval
Strike Missile Coastal Defense Systems, Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, Javelin anti-tank missiles,
AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II air-to-air missiles, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles
(AMRAAM), Sentinel radar systems, Abrams main battle tanks, and upgraded F-16 aircraft.66 In
September 2024, the U.S. Department of State made a determination approving a possible
62 Daniel Ioniţa et. al., “Norway and Romania: Navigating Information Warfare,” New Strategy Center and Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, April 2024.
63 Intelligence Online and Snoop, “AdNow Exposed: How Romania Became a Test Lab for Russian Interference in the
West,” December 3, 2024, https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2024/12/03/adnow-exposedhow-romania-became-a-test-lab-for-russian-interference-in-the-west,110347109-evl. Also see Marton Dunai, “From
Vaccines to Votes: Russian Ad Agency Influences Europeans,” Financial Times, December 24, 2024.
64 Sofia Security Forum, New Strategy Centre, and Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, “NATO’s Role
in Addressing Security Threats and Challenges in the Black Sea: Time for a Comprehensive Strategic Approach for the
Region?,” November 2023; and Georgi A. Angelov, “Suspected Russian GPS Jamming Risks Fresh Dangers in Black
Sea Region,” RFE/RL, October 26, 2023.
65 NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024),” June 2024, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf.
66 Ministry of National Defence, “Minister of National Defence Pays a Visit to the 74 th PATRIOT Regiment,” February
8, 2023; Le Monde, “Romania to Send Patriot Missile System to Ukraine,” June 20, 2024; Kristen Pittman, “U.S. Army
Supports Romania’s First PATRIOT Live-Fire Exercise,” U.S. Army, December 18, 2023; Defense Security
Cooperation Agency notifications are available at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales.
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$7.2 billion sale of 32 F-35 fighter jets to Romania; Romania signed a letter and offer of
acceptance in November 2024.67
Romania is seeking to modernize its domestic defense industry and upgrade its military
installations. In 2024, for example, Romanian state-owned defense company ROMARM and
German firm Rheinmetall reached an agreement to build a gunpowder factory; the EU has
committed partial financing for the project under an initiative to boost ammunition production in
the EU.68 Romania also is investing in upgrades to various military installations used by U.S. and
NATO forces. The most high-profile such investment is a roughly $3 billion expansion of Mihail
Kogălniceanu Air Base that would make it among the largest in Europe (U.S. security assistance
also has supported the expansion, see below, “Security Cooperation”). The base has hosted U.S.
forces and equipment for decades and serves as a key Black Sea hub for NATO.69
Response to Russia’s War Against Ukraine
In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, Romania has been a strong supporter of
Ukraine and has served as a hub for international support for Ukraine. Romania has backed
successive EU sanctions packages against Russia, hosts F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots, and
supports NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defense posture along the alliance’s eastern flank.
Romania has aided Ukrainians fleeing the conflict and hosted an estimated 177,715 refugees as of
December 1, 2024.70 According to the Kiel Institute, a nongovernmental organization that tracks
international aid to Ukraine, Romania has provided around €1.12 billion (about $1.17 billion) in
aid to Ukraine; that aid amount is equivalent to about 0.4% of Romania’s GDP and includes a
Patriot air defense system.71 In July 2024, Ukraine and Romania signed a 10-year security
cooperation agreement.72
Romania also has helped facilitate Ukrainian grain exports and bolster Moldova’s and Ukraine’s
energy security. Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023,
Ukraine and Romania signed an agreement to expand Ukrainian exports via Romania’s Black Sea
port of Constanţa. According to the U.S. Embassy in Romania, Romania “stands out in Europe
for the critical role it has played in supporting the export of Ukrainian grain to world markets.”73
Amid increased energy insecurity in Ukraine and Moldova since 2022, Romania has helped
stabilize electricity and natural gas supply to the two countries and has provided emergency
67 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Romania—F-35 Aircraft, Transmittal No. 24-94, September 13, 2024;
Lockheed Martin, “Romania Becomes the 20th Member of the F-35 Global Alliance,” November 21, 2024.
68 Juster Domingo, “Rheinmetall to Build Gunpowder Factory in Romania,” Defense Post, March 21, 2024; Defence
Industry Europe, “Rheinmetall and ROMARM to Build Powder Factory in Romania,” March 17, 2024; European
Commission, “ASAP Results: Boosting Ammunition Production,” https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/
document/download/b694b109-fa2c-493e-bf1e-87768ae6469e_en?filename=ASAP%20factsheet.pdf; Rheinmetall,
“EU Funding for Rheinmetall to Expand Ammunition Production,” March 26, 2024.
69 Romania Insider, “Romania Plans to Spend EUR 2.5 bln to Rebuild Military Base at NATO Standards,” September
24, 2019; U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Romania: Strategic Partners for 25 Years,” November 28,
2022; Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Romania Launches Expansion of Air Base Near Ukraine,” Defense News, June 13,
2024.
70 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation.”
71 Kiel Institute, “Ukraine Aid Tracker,” December 2024 update; Tony Wesolowsky, “From Neighbors to Power
Partners: Romania’s Deepening Ties with Ukraine,” RFE/RL, October 22, 2024. Aid figures may not reflect all aid
transactions.
72 See President of Ukraine, “Agreement on Security Cooperation Between Ukraine and Romania,” July 11, 2024.
73 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “U.S.-Romanian Cooperation to Counter Russia’s Threat to Global Food Security,”
September 18, 2023.
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energy assistance. As Russia halted gas delivery to Moldova at the start of 2025, Romania
pledged to help Moldova cope with the impact on electricity supply.74
U.S. and NATO Forces in Romania
Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the United States began to maintain rotations of
troops in Romania under Operation Atlantic Resolve. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
the United States deployed additional troops to Romania. Most U.S. troops are hosted at Mihail
Kogălniceanu Air Base (reportedly 1,800 as of June 2024, although the total varies at any given
time in accordance with exercises and other unit movements). Romania also has hosted U.S.
troops at Câmpia Turzii Air Base, Cincu Center, and other facilities, and it hosts the U.S. Aegis
Ashore BMD system in Deveselu.75
U.S., European, and NATO officials have welcomed Romania’s long-standing commitment to the
alliance’s deterrence and defense posture along the eastern flank. Romania has invested in
upgrading its facilities that host U.S. and NATO troops and support air policing.76 Romania also
hosts one of the four new multinational battlegroups that NATO deployed in 2022; France leads
the battlegroup in Romania, with additional contributions from Belgium and Luxemburg as of
February 2025.77 The battlegroup, which is based in Cincu, is to be raised to brigade level in
2025.78 Romania hosts a NATO air policing mission and Multinational Divisional Headquarters
Southeast, among other alliance initiatives in the BSR.
Regional Cooperation and Contributions to Security Missions
Romania is active in various regional initiatives, including the U.S.-supported Three Seas
Initiative; in Black Sea regional organizations; and in strategic coordination platforms, such as the
Bucharest Nine, Moldova-Romania-Ukraine trilateral, and Poland-Romania-Turkey trilateral. In
2024, Romania signed an agreement with Bulgaria and Turkey to establish the Mine
Countermeasures Black Sea task force, aimed at “facilitating the safety of navigation by
countering the threats posed by sea means.”79 In July 2024, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece
signed a Letter of Intent on a Military Mobility Corridor across the three countries’ borders, with
the aim of responding “more effectively to the current and future security challenges.”80
74 Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine Plans Record Power Imports After Russian Attacks on Energy Systems,” Reuters, May 15,
2024; Kateryna Hodunova, “Moldova to Import Electricity from Romania, Ukraine as Russia Halts Gas Supply,” Kyiv
Independent, January 1, 2025; Aura Sabadus, “Wartime Ukraine’s European Energy Integration Continues,” Atlantic
Council, December 19, 2023; Catalina Mihai, “Romania Ready to Support Moldova amid Energy Crisis,” Euractiv,
December 16, 2024.
75 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Calls Up More Troops to Europe,” March 7, 2022; U.S.
Department of Defense, “Posture Updates in Support of Allies in Europe,” February 22, 2022; U.S. Department of
State, “The United States and Romania: Strategic Partners for 25 Years,” November 28, 2022; Nick Thorpe,
“Romanian Village Set to Become NATO’s Biggest Airbase in Europe,” BBC, June 22, 2024.
76 NATO, “Secretary General Praises Romania’s Role in NATO,” November 28, 2022; NATO, “NATO’s Military
Presence in the East of the Alliance,” December 21, 2022 (hereinafter NATO, “NATO’s Military Presence”);
Romanian Ministry of National Defence, “Romanian-American Joint Committee Meeting,” December 15, 2022.
77 NATO, “NATO’s Military Presence.”
78 Radu Dumitrescu, “Belgium to Increase Troops in NATO Battle Group,” Romania Insider, December 12, 2024.
79 Ministry of National Defence, “Minister Tîlvãr Will Sign, at Istanbul, the Memorandum of Understanding on the
Establishment of a Task Force to Counter the Sea Mines in the Black Sea—MCM Black Sea,” January 10, 2024.
80 Ministry of National Defence, “Letter of Intent Signed Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece for the Creation of a Military
Mobility Corridor,” July 11, 2024.
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Romania has provided “significant contributions of troops, equipment, and other assistance” to
NATO and coalition missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo, and elsewhere and contributes
to global UN peacekeeping missions and EU missions.81 A Romanian Brigadier General
commands the EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic, and in January 2025
Romania assumed command of the EU security mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR
Althea) for a one-year period.82
U.S.-Romania Relations
The United States and Romania developed close ties after the end of communist rule in Romania
in 1989, including through a strategic partnership launched in 1997. Recent U.S. presidential
Administrations have described Romania as a steadfast ally and maintained close cooperation
with the country, particularly on security.83 According to the U.S. Department of State,
“Romania’s promotion of greater cooperation among its Black Sea neighbors in the domain of
defense, among other areas, complements the U.S. goal of enhancing stability in this sensitive and
important region.”84 In January 2025, Romania was designated into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program
(VWP), a long-standing Romanian objective in its relationship with the United States (Romanians
are expected to be able to apply for travel under the VWP by the end of March 2025).85 The U.S.Romania relationship has generally had broad support in Congress, and Romania has welcomed
congressional interest in the BSR.86 An ongoing security concern for Romanian officials is
maintaining a robust NATO and U.S. presence in Romania and other eastern flank countries.
Economic Relations
In 2023, U.S. exports of goods and services to Romania were $2.3 billion and U.S. imports from
Romania were $4.9 billion. The same year, U.S. foreign direct investment in Romania was about
$2.1 billion. An estimated 75,400 persons in Romania were employed by majority-owned foreign
affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises.87 Key areas of U.S. investment include information
technology and telecommunications, vehicle manufacturing, energy, and services. According to
the U.S. Commercial Service, additional best-prospects sectors for U.S. firms are agribusiness,
defense, and health. Market challenges (see above, “Economy”) may impact U.S. economic
activity in Romania.88
81 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Romania,” January 20, 2025.
82 Romanian Ministry of National Defence, “Romania Has Taken Over Command of EUFOR,” January 21, 2025.
83 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century Between
the United States of America and Romania,” September 13, 2011; U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S.-Romania Chart
10-Year Road Map for Military Cooperation,” October 8, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With
Romania,” June 21, 2024.
84 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Romania,” January 20, 2025.
85 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Mayorkas and Secretary Blinken Announce Designation of
Romania into the Visa Waiver Program,” January 10, 2025; U.S. Embassy in Romania, “Common Questions and
Answers on Visa Waiver Program,” January 10, 2025.
86 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Welcomes Introduction of Legislation in the U.S. Senate to
Establish a U.S. Black Sea Strategy,” July 13, 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “U.S. Senate Passes Black Sea
Security Act,” July 28, 2023.
87 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Romania—International Trade and Investment Country Facts,”
https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#356.
88 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Romania—Country Commercial Guide: Market
Opportunities, January 12, 2024.
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Security Cooperation
A 2005 bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement enables U.S. use of several bases in Romania,
some of which served as logistical hubs for missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2020, under the
first Trump Administration, the United States and Romania signed a 10-year Roadmap for
Defense Cooperation to reinforce and expand ties. As noted above, the United States deploys
rotational troops to Romania under Operation Atlantic Resolve. In addition, approximately 100200 U.S. sailors and contractors are on persistent rotation at the U.S. Naval Support Facility
Deveselu, the site of a U.S. Aegis Ashore BMD system. Operational since 2016, the Aegis Ashore
system is one of two such U.S. contributions to NATO BMD under the U.S. European Phased
Adaptive Approach (the other is in Poland).89
U.S. security cooperation priorities in Romania have included cybersecurity, Black Sea maritime
domain awareness, countering Russian influence, border security, nonproliferation, military
modernization, and improved interoperability with NATO. From FY2020 to FY2024, the United
States provided about $316 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and about $5.2 million
in International Military Education & Training assistance to Romania.90 About $220 million in
financing under the U.S. Department of Defense’s European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has
supported construction projects at Romanian military installations, including Câmpia Turzii Base,
Mihail Kogălniceanu Base, and Cincu Training Center, supplementing Romanian investment in
the facilities.91 The FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159) extended authority to carry out a $21.7 million
project at Mihail Kogălniceanu Base authorized in the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232). In
September 2024, the United States and Romania signed a $920 million FMF direct loan
agreement; the Department of State also announced a $60 million FMF grant toward the loan’s
servicing costs. The U.S. Embassy in Romania said the loan was to be used, in part, to support a
“joint U.S.-Romanian, public-private initiative to produce artillery ammunition.”92
Energy
Energy is a growing area of U.S.-Romania cooperation, particularly civil nuclear energy.
Romania’s nuclear power plant in Cernavodă generates about one-fifth of the country’s
electricity; Romania aims to increase overall capacity by adding two new reactors and
refurbishing an existing reactor. A U.S.-Romania intergovernmental cooperation agreement
signed in 2020, under the first Trump Administration, outlines a “multi-decade relationship on
89 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “United States Missile Defense Site at Deveselu Air Base in Romania,”
https://ro.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/implementing-missile-defense-europe/united-states-ballistic-missile-defensesite-at-deveselu-air-base-in-romania/; U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic,
https://www.surflant.usff.navy.mil/Organization/Supporting-Commands/US-Aegis-Ashore-Missile-Defense-Systems/
US-Aegis-Ashore-Missile-Defense-System-Romania/About-Us/.
90 The figures were calculated using obligations data from foreignassistance.gov, a U.S. Agency for International
Development- and Department of State-managed database that collects foreign assistance data from across the U.S.
government. The data on the website are reported by U.S. government agencies and reflect the fiscal year in which the
funds were obligated; the data do not include the year in which the funds were appropriated. Foreignassistance.gov is
regularly updated, most recently on December 19, 2024. These figures may be subject to change and may not reflect
complete data for recent fiscal years.
91 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Romanian and U.S. Officials in Campia Turzii Celebrate New Facilities at Air Base
71, Part of More Than $100 Million in U.S. Investments in the Romanian Base,” September 19, 2023.
92 Quoted in U.S. Embassy in Romania, “Ambassador Kathleen Kavalec at the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Loan
Signing Ceremony,” September 25, 2024. See also Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Signing of FMF Direct
Loan,” September 25, 2024; U.S. Department of State, “$920 Million U.S.-Romania Foreign Military Financing Direct
Loan Strengthens NATO,” September 25, 2024.
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civil nuclear advancement.”93 The same year, the two governments signed an agreement on
modernizing and expanding Cernavodă (in doing so, Romania canceled plans to cooperate with
China General Nuclear Power Corporation). In 2023, the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank
approved a $57 million loan to support preconstruction engineering and feasibility studies for the
project.94 In November 2024, Romania’s Nuclearelectrica signed a contract with a consortium of
U.S., Canadian, and Italian firms to proceed on the two new reactors.95
Small modular reactor (SMR) technology is an area of bilateral cooperation, as well. In 2021,
Romania’s state nuclear energy company reached an agreement with U.S. firm NuScale Power on
the possible deployment of SMRs in Romania, a “first-of-its-kind U.S. technology” aimed at
“bringing emerging nuclear technologies to bear on the climate crisis.”96 Under the Biden
Administration, multiple U.S. government agencies supported potential SMR deployment in
Romania. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided around $15 million in grants to
help identify potential SMR plant sites and fund a front-end engineering and design (FEED)
study.97 At the Group of Seven (G7) leaders’ summit in Japan in May 2023, then-President Biden
announced up to $275 million in early stage SMR support from the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the United Arab Emirates for the procurement of materials, advancement
of FEED work, and finalization of site studies. At that time, the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) also issued letters of interest outlining up
to $3 billion (Ex-Im) and $1 billion (DFC) in potential support for the SMR project.98 In July
2024, U.S. and Romanian officials announced the launch of the second phase of the FEED study
to “position the project to move to a final investment decision and construction.”99 In October
2024, Ex-Im Bank’s Board of Directors approved a $98 million loan for pre-project services.100
Issues for Congress
U.S.-Romania relations were of interest to the 117th and 118th Congresses. Some Members
engaged through delegations visiting the country and participation in the House Romania Caucus
and interparliamentary platforms. In 2023, a group of U.S. Senators urged then-President Biden
to hold a bilateral meeting with the President of Romania, stating that Russia’s war on Ukraine
made it “imperative that the United States take all possible actions to maintain our longstanding
partnership with Romania, a valued NATO Ally.”101 Following the first (November 24, 2024)
93 U.S. Embassy in Romania, U.S.-Romania Cooperation on Small Modular Reactors: Fact Sheet, November 2, 2021.
94 Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the United States Board of Directors Unanimously
Approves Financing for Three Transactions in Energy and Transportation Sectors,” September 22, 2023.
95 U.S. Department of Energy, “U.S. Department of Energy Showcases Clean Energy Achievements at COP29,”
November 25, 2024; Government of Canada, “$3 Billion in Federal Export Finance to Support Canadian Businesses
While Providing Clean Energy Security for Romania,” September 19, 2023; and Nuclearelectrica, press release,
November 15, 2024.
96 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “U.S.-Romania Cooperation on Small Modular Reactors: Fact Sheet,” November 2, 2021
(hereinafter U.S. Embassy in Romania, “U.S.-Romania Cooperation”).
97 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “U.S.-Romania Cooperation”; U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA),
“USTDA, Romania Expand Nuclear Energy Partnership,” October 27, 2022.
98 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Multinational Public-Private Partners Look to Provide Up to $275
Million to Advance the Romania Small Modular Reactor Project; United States Issues Letters of Interest for Up to $4
Billion,” May 20, 2023.
99 U.S. Embassy in Romania, “U.S. and Romania Announce Milestone in Small Modular Reactor Project, Advancing
Romania One Step Closer to Clean Technology Leadership in the Region,” July 24, 2024; Euractiv, “Romania Expects
€5.5bn Price Tag and 2025 Final Investment Decision for Small Modular Reactor,” March 22, 2024.
100 Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the United States Board of Directors Supports
More than $1 Billion in Transactions,” October 1, 2024.
101 The text of the letter is available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/potus_romania_letter.pdf.
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round of Romania’s subsequently annulled presidential election, some Members of Congress
expressed concern about allegations of Russian interference.102
Under the 117th Congress, legislation was introduced concerning the U.S.-Romania Strategic
Partnership (H.Res. 1222). Under the 118th Congress, legislation was introduced on Romania’s
entry into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (S. 814).
Congressional interest in Romania during the 117th and 118th Congresses also corresponded to
growing concern about Black Sea security and congressional oversight of U.S. policy toward the
BSR. In both chambers, some Members introduced bills with Black Sea policy requirements
(H.R. 6367/S. 3407 in the 117th; H.R. 1680/S. 804 in the 118th). Congress enacted language in the
FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) urging cooperation with Black Sea allies and partners. It also
enacted language in the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) calling on the United States and NATO to
consider adopting intergovernmental and interagency Black Sea strategies, describing the region
as “critical to United States interests and to the security of NATO in the region.” Congress
enacted Black Sea strategy requirements in P.L. 118-31 and P.L. 117-328 (see below). Some
Members raised questions about Romania and Black Sea policy in oversight hearings in 2021 and
2023. In 2022, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe cochaired a multilateral
roundtable in Romania on Black Sea security, comprising Members and senior-level Black Sea
regional government officials.103
Romania and U.S.-Romania relations may be of interest to some Members of the 119th Congress.
Some areas of potential legislation and oversight activity include security assistance and
cooperation with Romania, bilateral energy cooperation, U.S.-Romanian cooperation on shared
priorities in the BSR and the Western Balkans, the implications of ongoing political developments
in Romania for U.S. priorities in the bilateral relationship, and the second Trump Administration’s
foreign policy toward Romania and the BSR more broadly. Members also may assess
implementation of Black Sea strategy requirements under the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) and
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328 and accompanying explanatory
statement):
•
•
P.L. 118-31 directed the President to direct the National Security Council to
develop an interagency strategy regarding the BSR and Black Sea states,
outlining goals and objectives relating to security assistance, energy security and
diversification, countering Russian and Chinese economic coercion in the region
and deepening U.S. and allied partners’ economic ties to the region, expanding
U.S. high-level engagement with the region, and increasing U.S. coordination on
the Black Sea region with the EU and NATO.
In the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-328, Congress directed the
Secretary of State (along with heads of relevant federal agencies) to submit to
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for working with NATO allies to
deepen economic ties with, and strengthen economic and security assistance for,
Black Sea states, including to support efforts to bolster democratic resilience.
102 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Chairman Wilson and Ranking Member Cohen Condemn
Russian Malign Interference in Romanian Election,” December 5, 2024; Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
“Shaheen, Ricketts, Cardin, Risch, Statement on Putin’s Assault on Romania’s Presidential Election,” December 16,
2024; Representative Mike Turner, statement posted on Facebook, December 20, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/
RepMikeTurner/photos/my-statement-with-nato-parliamentary-assembly-president-congressman-gerry-connol/
1183665853116434/; Senator Chris Coons (@ChrisCoons), X post, January 2, 2025, https://x.com/ChrisCoons/status/
1874931728231682052.
103 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Black Sea Security Summit,” https://www.csce.gov/hearings/
black-sea-security-summit/.
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Author Information
Sarah E. Garding
Analyst in European Affairs
Acknowledgments
CRS Visual Information Specialist Juan Pablo Madrid created the Romanian parliament graphic for this
report. CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analyst Cassandra Higgins and CRS Visual Information
Specialist Mari Lee created the map.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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Congressional Research Service
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