Congressional and Presidential Authority to Impose Import Tariffs
Congressional research reportMar 19, 2026
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Congressional and Presidential Authority to
Impose Import Tariffs
Updated March 19, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48435
SUMMARY
Congressional and Presidential Authority to
Impose Import Tariffs
This report examines Congress’s constitutional power over import tariffs, Congress’s ability to
delegate tariff authority to the President within constitutional limits, the scope of specific
authorities Congress has delegated to the President to impose or adjust tariffs, and the ways in
which courts have resolved challenges to the President’s use of those authorities. The report also
provides an overview of legal debates surrounding recent tariff actions by the President.
R48435
March 19, 2026
Christopher T. Zirpoli
Legislative Attorney
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, impose tariffs, and collect revenue. As discussed
in this report, Congress has long enacted laws authorizing the President to adjust tariff rates on goods in certain
circumstances. Courts have generally upheld these laws against constitutional challenges, holding that they do not
impermissibly delegate Congress’s legislative power over tariffs to the executive branch.
This report also examines how courts have resolved legal challenges to the President’s use of statutory tariff authorities.
Courts have traditionally given deference to the President, allowing the President to impose and modify tariffs unless he
“clearly misconstrues” the scope of his authority and holding that these statutes commit certain matters to the President’s
unreviewable discretion. Some litigants and commentators question if lower federal courts must revisit aspects of this
approach in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which limited the ability of the executive branch to interpret its
own statutory authorities.
Several statutes currently authorize the President or an executive agency to impose tariffs under various circumstances. This
report provides an introduction to five such statutes: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; Sections 122, 201, and
301 of the Trade Act of 1974; and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These laws afford varying degrees of discretion to
the President. For example, some of these statutes require an executive agency to conduct an investigation and make certain
findings as a prerequisite to raising tariffs, and some set maximum limits on the duration or magnitude of tariffs they may be
used to impose.
This report summarizes how the most recent presidential administrations have used various statutes to impose or raise tariffs,
as well as how courts have resolved challenges to some of these actions. It provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s
February 2026 decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which invalidated the President’s use of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, and discusses how that decision and the underlying
litigation may impact the President’s use of other statutory authorities.
Finally, this report considers selected proposals by Members of Congress to change the current scope of the President’s tariff
authorities. While some Members have sought to delegate additional tariff authorities to the President, others view the
President’s existing authorities as overly expansive and have sought to reassert congressional control over import tariffs by
repealing or amending those authorities.
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Congressional and Presidential Authority to Impose Import Tariffs
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Separation of Powers Over Tariffs .................................................................................................. 1
Congressional Delegations of Tariff Authorities to the President ............................................. 1
Judicial Review of Presidential Tariff Actions .......................................................................... 4
Presidential Tariff Actions Reviewed for Clear Misconstruction of Law ........................... 4
Loper Bright and the Future of Clear Misconstruction Review .......................................... 6
Unreviewable Acts That Are Committed to the President’s Discretion .............................. 7
Selected Presidential Authorities to Impose Tariffs ......................................................................... 9
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Tariffs to Protect National Security .......... 10
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs to Safeguard Domestic Industries ................... 14
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing Trade Agreement Violations
and Certain Other Practices.................................................................................................. 16
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing International Payments
Problems .............................................................................................................................. 20
Section 338 of Tariff Act of 1930: Tariffs to Address Discrimination Against the
United States ........................................................................................................................ 24
Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities ........................................................................ 26
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 26
Tables
Table 1. Selected Statutory Authorities ......................................................................................... 26
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 28
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Congressional and Presidential Authority to Impose Import Tariffs
Introduction
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, impose import
tariffs, and raise revenue.1 Congress, in turn, has enacted laws giving the President the authority
to impose tariffs under certain conditions. Federal courts, for their part, have decided legal
challenges to the constitutionality of these laws and to the ways in which the President has
utilized them. Thus, although Congress holds constitutional power over tariffs, all three branches
of the U.S. government have come to play a role in determining when tariffs are imposed or
adjusted.
This report begins by examining how courts have traditionally held that Congress has broad
latitude to enact laws giving the President authority to impose tariffs for various purposes. It also
examines how courts have given broad scope to the President’s authority to impose and adjust
tariffs under these laws.2 The report notes how recent U.S. Supreme Court developments might
foreshadow stricter approaches to judicial review of the President’s tariff authorities and actions.
The second half of this report provides a legal overview of selected statutes that may authorize
the executive branch to impose tariffs in a number of different scenarios, including examples of
how some of these statutes have been used by recent administrations. The report surveys the legal
requirements to utilize each of these statutes, including how courts have resolved certain disputes
about their interpretation and use.
Separation of Powers Over Tariffs
Congressional Delegations of Tariff Authorities to the President
Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Legislative Vesting Clause, provides
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”3
Article I, Section 8 includes among Congress’s specific powers the power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations”4 and the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”5
The Constitution thus gives Congress the power to enact legislation imposing tariffs, although it
qualifies this power by providing that tariffs “shall be uniform throughout the United States”6 and
by prohibiting tariffs on U.S. exports.7
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 A separate CRS report analyzes the respective roles of Congress and the President over foreign trade agreements,
which often involve tariff reductions. See CRS Report R47679, Congressional and Executive Authority Over Foreign
Trade Agreements, by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Libr. of Cong., Overview of Legislative Vesting Clause, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-1/ALDE_00001311/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Libr. of Cong., Overview of Foreign Commerce Clause, CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-8-1/ALDE_00001057/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2026).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Libr. of Cong., Overview of Taxing Clause, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-1/ALDE_00013387/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Libr. of Cong., Uniformity Clause and Indirect Taxes, CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-3/ALDE_00013389/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2026). The Constitution also prohibits tariffs on exports. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; see also Libr. of Cong., Export Clause and Taxes, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S9-C5-1/ALDE_00013596/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
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Courts have opined that the President does not possess inherent constitutional power to impose
tariffs, notwithstanding constitutional powers the President may claim over aspects of foreign
policy.8 In 2026, the Supreme Court observed: “Regardless of what [certain precedents] might
mean for the President’s inherent wartime authority, all agree that the President enjoys no
inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime.”9 In 1976, the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals observed that, while “the President has certain ‘inherent’ powers in the conduct of
foreign relations and foreign affairs . . . [i]t is nonetheless clear that no undelegated power to
regulate commerce, or to set tariffs, inheres in the Presidency.”10
In the exercise of its constitutional powers, Congress has enacted laws granting various tariff
authorities to the President. The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have sometimes
been faced with deciding constitutional challenges to these laws in cases where plaintiffs claimed
the laws impermissibly delegated Congress’s power over legislation and tariffs to the executive
branch. Supreme Court decisions upholding tariff laws have become landmarks in the
development of a broader “nondelegation doctrine” concerning the extent to which Congress may
lawfully delegate authority to the executive branch.11
For example, in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,12 the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the
Tariff Act of 1890 directing the President to suspend duty-free importation of sugar, molasses,
coffee, tea, and hides in the event he was “satisfied that the government of any country producing
and exporting [those products], imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other
products of the United States, which . . . he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable.”13 U.S. importers adversely affected by the President’s use of this suspension
authority claimed that it unconstitutionally delegated Congress’s legislative power to the
President.14 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the challenged provision “does not, in any
real sense, invest the president with the power of legislation.”15 Rather, because the provision
required the President to suspend duty-free treatment for certain goods if he found another
country’s duties were “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable,” it made the President “the mere
agent of the law-making department.”16 Thus, the Court explained, the challenged provision
called upon the President not to make law but simply to execute a law enacted by Congress.17
Reinforcing the latitude Marshall Field afforded to Congress, the Supreme Court in J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States18 upheld a provision of the Tariff Act of 1922 requiring the
President to increase or decrease tariff rates as necessary to “equalize . . . differences in costs of
8 For information regarding the President’s constitutional powers in relation to foreign policy, see CRS Report R48524,
Congress and the Scope of the President’s Article II Foreign Policy Authorities, by Karen Sokol (2025).
9 Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, 2026 WL 477534 at *12–13 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026).
10 United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (discussing, inter alia, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
11 See generally Libr. of Cong., Overview of Nondelegation Doctrine, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-5-1/ALDE_00000014/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026) (“The
nondelegation doctrine seeks to distinguish the constitutional delegations of power to other branches of government
that may be necessary for governmental coordination from unconstitutional grants of legislative power that may violate
separation of powers principles.”).
12 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
13 Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
14 See Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 681.
15 Id.
16
Id. at 692–93.
17 See id.
18 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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production” between articles produced in the United States and “like or similar” articles produced
in foreign countries.19 As in Marshall Field, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to this
law from affected importers who argued Congress had impermissibly delegated its legislative
power to the President.20 The Court held that the challenged provision was “not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power” since it set forth “an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix [tariff] rates is directed to conform”21—namely, to vary tariff rates so as to
equalize production costs between the United States and foreign countries. J.W. Hampton set a
key precedent that Congress may delegate authority to the executive branch—in tariff and other
matters—provided that it sets forth an “intelligible principle” to govern the executive’s actions.22
Federal courts have also rejected nondelegation challenges to some of the President’s current
tariff authorities. In Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,23 the Supreme Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,24 which the
President had utilized to raise license fees on imported oil.25 The Court held that Section 232 is
constitutional because it “establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action”—namely, that an
executive agency is first required to find that an article is being imported “‘in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.’”26 In more recent cases,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has held that Algonquin
requires it to reject nondelegation challenges to Section 232 asserted by plaintiffs seeking to
enjoin (i.e., stop) the President’s proclamation of steel tariffs.27 In a lower court opinion that was
affirmed in one of these cases, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) held that it was bound
by Algonquin while noting that “the broad guideposts of . . . section 232 bestow flexibility on the
President and seem to invite the President to regulate commerce by way of means reserved for
Congress, leaving very few tools beyond his reach.”28
As the examples above illustrate, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution gives
Congress broad latitude to delegate authority to adjust tariffs to the President. The Court has not
struck down laws on any subject as violating J.W. Hampton’s “intelligible principle” standard
since 1935.29 Nevertheless, some current Justices have indicated that they would be willing to
reconsider the Court’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine.30 If the Court were to adopt a
19 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941.
20 See J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409–10.
21 Id.
22 See generally Libr. of Cong., Origin of Intelligible Principle Standard, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-5-3/ALDE_00001317/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
23 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
24 19 U.S.C. § 1862; see infra “Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Tariffs to Protect National Security.”
25 Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 553, 559.
26 Id. at 559 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)).
27 See PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v United States, 59 F.4th 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel,
Inc. v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 133 (2020) (mem.).
28 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340, 1344 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019).
29 See generally Libr. of Cong., Origin of Intelligible Principle Standard, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-5-3/ALDE_00001317/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
30 See Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su, 144 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2024) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“At least five Justices have already expressed an interest in reconsidering this Court’s approach to
Congress’s delegations of legislative power.”).
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stricter view of permissible delegations, some of the President’s current tariff authorities might be
subjected to new constitutional challenges.31
Judicial Review of Presidential Tariff Actions
In addition to constitutional challenges to Congress’s delegation of tariff authorities to the
executive branch, federal courts have decided legal challenges to the President’s specific uses of
those authorities. Parties claiming that the President has exceeded the scope of his statutory
authority to impose tariffs sometimes have standing to challenge those tariffs in the CIT, which
generally has exclusive original jurisdiction over such lawsuits.32 The Federal Circuit, in turn, has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the CIT33 and therefore has a key role in interpreting the
contours of the President’s tariff authorities.
As explained below, the Federal Circuit has long applied a deferential standard of review to
questions regarding the scope of the President’s statutory tariff authorities,34 although some
commentators have questioned whether recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions require the Federal
Circuit to construe the President’s authority more narrowly.35 In addition, where tariff and other
statutes commit decisions or fact-finding to the President’s discretion, the Federal Circuit has held
that the President’s discretionary acts are not subject to judicial review.36
Presidential Tariff Actions Reviewed for Clear Misconstruction of Law
In its 1985 decision Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,37 the Federal Circuit articulated a
deferential standard for reviewing claims that the President had exceeded the scope of his
statutory tariff authorities. In Maple Leaf, the court upheld “safeguard” tariffs on mushrooms
under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,38 rejecting an argument that the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC)39 report underpinning the tariffs did not provide adequate justification
for the inclusion of frozen mushrooms.40 The court reasoned: “In international trade controversies
of this highly discretionary kind—involving the President and foreign affairs—this court and its
predecessors have often reiterated the very limited role of reviewing courts.”41 Thus, the court
31 In Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc., for example, one CIT judge contrasted the “ascertainable standards” of the statutes at
issue in Marshall Field and J.W. Hampton with the “virtually unbridled discretion” Section 232 gives the President,
stating: “If the delegation permitted by section 232, as now revealed, does not constitute excessive delegation in
violation of the Constitution, what would?” 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1351–52 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). A subset of challenges to presidential proclamations that involve more than import tariffs
alone have been heard by other courts. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
in one case that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction over a case where a challenged
license fee program did not solely involve the imposition of tariffs under trade law. See Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Fed.
Energy Admin., 518 F.2d 1051, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
34 See infra “Presidential Tariff Actions Reviewed for Clear Misconstruction of Law.”
35 See infra “Loper Bright and the Future of Clear Misconstruction Review.”
36 See infra “Unreviewable Acts That Are Committed to the President’s Discretion.”
37 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
38 19 U.S.C. § 2251; see infra “Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs to Safeguard Domestic Industries.”
39 The ITC is an agency headed by up to six commissioners, no three of whom may be of the same political party. See
CRS In Focus IF12295, An Introduction to Section 337 Intellectual Property Litigation at the U.S. International Trade
Commission, by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2024).
40 See Maple Leaf, 762 F.2d at 89.
41 Id.
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held: “For a court to interpose, there has to be a clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a
significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority.”42
The Federal Circuit has applied the Maple Leaf standard in holding that tariffs imposed by more
recent administrations did not clearly misconstrue the President’s statutory tariff authority. For
instance, in Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States,43 the Federal Circuit upheld the President’s
imposition of Section 201 tariffs on certain solar products, rejecting the appellant’s argument that
the ITC was required to recommend a remedy before the President could impose such tariffs.44
Noting that “there are limited circumstances when a presidential action may be set aside if the
President acts beyond his statutory authority, but such relief is only rarely available,” the court
held that Section 201 conditioned the President’s tariff authority only on the ITC’s finding of
“serious injury” and not on the ITC’s remedy recommendation.45
Similarly, in USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States,46 the Federal Circuit upheld the President’s
imposition of national security tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.47
The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that a national security threat must be “imminent” to
impose tariffs under Section 232, holding that Section 232 “provides no basis to impose an
imminence requirement.”48 It also held that Section 232’s requirement that the President
“determine the nature and duration of the action”49 did not prevent the President from imposing
tariffs indefinitely, with no specified end date.50 The court reasoned that “claims that the
President’s actions violated the statutory authority delegated to him . . . are reviewable [only] to
determine whether the President ‘clear[ly] misconstru[ed]’ his statutory authority.”51
As Maple Leaf illustrates, the Federal Circuit has sometimes applied the “clear misconstruction”
standard not only to the President’s actions but also to predicate determinations executive
agencies must make before the President may act under certain statutes.52 For example, in USP
Holdings, the court held that a report by the Secretary of Commerce finding a threat to national
security was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).53 The APA applies across
the executive branch, providing a general avenue for courts to review final agency actions.54 The
USP Holdings court concluded the Secretary of Commerce’s report was a final agency action
because it was a separate, legally required “predicate to the President’s authority to act” under
42 Id. In Corus Grp. PLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal Circuit again upheld
the President’s imposition of Section 201 tariffs, this time on certain tin mill products. Based on the “clear
misconstruction” standard of review articulated in Maple Leaf, the court rejected appellants’ argument that the ITC
failed to provide an adequate explanation for its domestic injury determinations. See Corus Grp., 352 F.3d at 1364.
43 892 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
44 See id. at 1346.
45 Id. (citing, inter alia, Corus Grp., 352 F.3d at 1356).
46 36 F.4th 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1056 (2023) (mem.).
47 19 U.S.C. § 1862; see infra “Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Tariffs to Protect National Security.”
48 USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1368–69.
49 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
50 USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1370–71.
51 Id. at 1365 (quoting Corus Grp., 352 F.3d at 1356).
52 See, e.g., Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 90 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We cannot . . . turn this [review of
the ITC’s determination under Section 201] into the ordinary administrative review in other areas in which the court
looks to see if substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings.”).
53 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (defining reviewable actions); CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10558, Judicial Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), by Jonathan M. Gaffney (2024).
54 See Gaffney, supra note 53; CRS In Focus IF12386, Defining Final Agency Action for APA and CRA Review, by
Valerie C. Brannon (2023).
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Section 232.55 Nevertheless, the court held that the “threat determinations of the President and the
Secretary are reviewed together as a single step using an identical test”56—i.e., clear
misconstruction of the statute—and that the Secretary’s determination was not reviewable under
normal APA standards.57
In Corus Group, the Federal Circuit likewise applied the “clear misconstruction” standard—“not
the traditional APA standard of review”—in reviewing the ITC’s injury determination underlying
Section 201 tariffs.58 Applying this standard to the requirements Section 201 sets for the ITC’s
report, the court held that the ITC must provide “an internally consistent explanation for the
conclusions reached.”59
By contrast, when reviewing tariff actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974—which
commits authority to the U.S. Trade Representative rather than to the President—the Federal
Circuit applies the standard of review prescribed by the APA.60 Under this standard, courts review
whether agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”61
Loper Bright and the Future of Clear Misconstruction Review
Some litigants and commentators have questioned if the Federal Circuit must reevaluate its
deferential Maple Leaf standard in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision Loper Bright
Enterprises v. Raimondo.62 In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court overturned its 1984 precedent
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,63 which had afforded some
deference to executive agencies to interpret ambiguous terms in statutes they administer.64 The
Supreme Court held in Loper Bright that courts must “exercise their independent judgment in
deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority” and “may not defer to an
agency interpretation . . . simply because a statute is ambiguous.”65 Although Maple Leaf did not
expressly rely on or cite Chevron, it was decided less than 11 months after Chevron and arguably
gives similar deference to the President’s interpretations of his statutory tariff authorities.66
55 USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1366–68; see also Corus Grp., 352 F.3d at 1358–59 (holding that predicate findings by
the ITC were reviewable in a challenge to Section 201 tariffs).
56 USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1369.
57 See id. at 1369–70 (“USP . . . criticizes the Secretary’s threat determination as unsupported by substantial evidence.
But the Secretary’s threat determination is not reviewable under the APA arbitrary and capricious standard.”).
58 See Corus Grp., 352 F.3d at 1361.
59 Id. at 1362 (discussing 19 U.S.C. § 2252(f)).
60 See HMTX Indus. LLC v. United States, 156 F.4th 1236, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2025); see also infra “Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Certain Other Practices” (discussing HMTX
Industries).
61 5 U.S.C. § 706.
62 603 U.S. 369 (2024); see Thomas M. Beline et al., Is Trade Special? Trade Law and Deference After Loper Bright,
77 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 399 (2024).
63 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64 See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412 (“Chevron is overruled.”); CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11189, Supreme Court
Overrules Chevron Framework, by Benjamin M. Barczewski (2024).
65 Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412.
66 See Beline et al., supra note 62, at 400–01 (“[A]lthough not relying on Chevron, the [Federal Circuit] in cases such
as Maple Leaf . . . applied a standard of judicial review of equal, if not greater, deference, to Presidential action.”).
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A recent case involving tariffs on solar products illustrates the debate over Maple Leaf’s
continued viability. In Solar Energy Indus. Assoc. v. United States,67 the Federal Circuit upheld
the President’s imposition of increased Section 201 tariffs on bifacial solar panels. Applying the
Maple Leaf standard, the court held that presidential authority to modify existing Section 201
tariffs under 19 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B) includes trade-restricting as well as trade-liberalizing
changes.68 Noting differences between Section 2254(b)(1)(A) (permitting only reduction or
termination of a safeguard when U.S. industry has not made adequate efforts to adjust to import
competition) and Section 2254(b)(1)(B) (permitting reduction, modification, or termination of a
safeguard where such efforts have been made), the court held that “the President did not clearly
misconstrue Section 2254(b)(1)(B) when he interpreted it as permitting trade-restrictive
modifications.”69
Following Loper Bright, the Solar Energy plaintiffs asked the Federal Circuit to revisit its
decision. Petitioning the court to rehear the case en banc (i.e., before all of the court’s judges), the
plaintiffs argued that “the full court should reevaluate and replace” Maple Leaf, which they noted
was “even more deferential than the now-discarded standard of Chevron.”70 The court denied en
banc rehearing, but the original panel of judges issued a supplemental opinion explaining why the
outcome of the case would not change if the court interpreted Section 201 de novo (i.e., without
deference) instead of applying Maple Leaf’s “clear misconstruction” standard.71 The court
reasoned that the President’s interpretation of his Section 201 tariff authorities in this case was
correct, not merely permissible under Maple Leaf.72 Thus, the court noted, the case was not an
“appropriate vehicle for deciding whether the Maple Leaf standard should be retained.”73
While future litigation may shed light on whether Maple Leaf is still good law following Loper
Bright, Solar Energy demonstrates that replacing Maple Leaf with a stricter standard of review
would not necessarily change the outcome in a given lawsuit challenging presidential tariff
actions.74
Unreviewable Acts That Are Committed to the President’s Discretion
While the Federal Circuit reviews claims that the President acted outside the scope of his
statutory tariff authorities for “clear misconstruction” of those authorities, it has held that certain
presidential decisions are not reviewable at all. In Maple Leaf, for instance, the court noted that
“[t]he President’s findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”75
Nine years after Maple Leaf, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Dalton v. Specter that judicial
review is not available to challenge decisions that a statute commits to the President’s
67 86 F.4th 885 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Solar Energy I”), reh’g granted, 111 F.4th 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Solar Energy
II”).
68 See Solar Energy I, 86 F.4th at 897–98.
69 Id. at 894, 897–98.
70 Solar Energy II, 111 F.4th at 1351, 1357.
71 See id. at 1351.
72 See id. at 1354 (“Our review of the plain text of Section 2254(b)(1)(B), other provisions and the overall structure of
the Trade Act, and legislative history leads us to agree with the government that ‘modify’ here includes trade-restrictive
changes. We reach this determination without according any deference to the President’s interpretation.”).
73 Id. at 1358.
74 Cf. Beline et al., supra note 62, at 425 (“Loper Bright might not be a ‘game changer’ for trade litigation.”).
75 Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United
States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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discretion.76 In Dalton, plaintiffs sued to prevent the closure of a naval shipyard pursuant to the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.77 That statute charged a commission with
making recommendations on military base closures and gave the President authority to approve
or disapprove those recommendations in their entirety.78 Observing that the statute “does not at all
limit the President’s discretion in approving or disapproving the Commission’s
recommendations,”79 the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the President’s authority to
close bases depended on . . . the Commission’s compliance with statutory procedures.”80 Further,
it held: “Where a statute, such as [this one], commits decision-making to the discretion of the
President, judicial review of the President’s decision is not available.”81
In Motions Systems Corp. v. Bush,82 the Federal Circuit held that Dalton precluded judicial review
of the President’s decision not to grant import relief to a domestic industry pursuant to Section
103 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000.83 The statute charged the ITC and United States
Trade Representative (USTR)84 with making recommendations regarding import relief and
required the President to implement them “unless the President determines that provision of such
relief is not in the national economic interest of the United States.”85 The court held that this
statute granted the President broad, unreviewable discretion not to follow USTR’s
recommendation.86 Thus, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the President disregarded
USTR’s recommendation to impose import relief tariffs “without sufficient evidentiary support,”
holding that the plaintiff had “no colorable claim that the President exceeded his statutory
authority.”87
Summarizing the foregoing precedents, the CIT has noted a “distinction between reviewing the
substance of an exercise of discretion and reviewing an action for clear misconstruction of [a]
statute, so that the authority delegated by Congress is exceeded.”88 In the former scenario, the CIT
explained, “this court lacks the power to review the President’s lawful exercise of discretion.”89
By contrast, “where statutory language limits the President, the court may review the executive’s
actions for ‘clear misconstruction’ of such limiting language.”90
76 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
77 Pub. L. No. 101-510, div. B, title XXIX, part A, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2687 note); see Dalton, 511 U.S. at 464.
78 See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 464–65.
79 Id. at 476.
80 Id. Plaintiffs alleged, for instance, noncompliance with public hearing and information requirements. See id. at 466–
67.
81 Id. at 477.
82 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
83 Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 103, 114 Stat. 880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2451 (2006)). This provision lapsed 12 years after
the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) accession to the World Trade Organization, see id., which occurred in 2001,
see CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations, by Karen M. Sutter (2026).
84 USTR is a Cabinet-level official in the Executive Office of the President who advises the President on trade policy
and leads U.S. trade negotiations. See CRS In Focus IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy: Trade Functions of Key Federal
Agencies, by Shayerah I. Akhtar (2025).
85 19 U.S.C. § 2451(k)(1) (2006).
86 See Motion Sys., 437 F.3d at 1360.
87 Id.
88 Severstal Export GMBH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at *8 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 5, 2018).
89 Id. at *7 (citing Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474).
90 Severstal Export GMBH, 2018 WL 1705298, at *7 (quoting Corus Grp. PLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d
1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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Selected Presidential Authorities to Impose Tariffs
The following section provides a legal overview of five statutory provisions that authorize the
executive branch to impose tariffs under various circumstances, in addition to noting actions
recent administrations have taken under each statute.91 The first three provisions in this survey—
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of
1974—require a specific federal agency to conduct an investigation and make certain findings
before tariffs may be imposed. The other two provisions—Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974
and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930—do not expressly contain such requirements.92
In 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that a different statute, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA),93 does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.94 IEEPA gives
the President extensive economic authorities to address certain emergencies declared under the
National Emergencies Act (NEA).95 IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate” or “prohibit”
imports,96 but it does not specifically authorize tariffs. The Court held that IEEPA’s phrase
“regulate . . . importation” does not include tariffs, considering both the meaning of the word
“regulate” as well as statutory context.97 As discussed below, treatments of alternative tariff
authorities by lower courts and the parties in the IEEPA tariff litigation may shed light on the
President’s use of those alternative authorities following the Court’s decision.98
President Trump had invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the
PRC, based on declared emergencies concerning drug trafficking;99 global tariffs on imports from
almost all other U.S. trading partners based on a declared emergency concerning the U.S. trade
deficit;100 and various other tariffs.101 Following the Supreme Court’s decision, President Trump
91 Other CRS products discuss antidumping and countervailing duties, which are not included in this report. See, e.g.,
CRS In Focus IF10018, Trade Remedies: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, by Christopher A. Casey (2024).
92 Whereas the statutes surveyed in this report all allow the President to raise tariffs, the most recent iteration of Trade
Promotion Authority—a law allowing the President to proclaim certain tariff reductions—expired in 2021. See Zirpoli,
supra note 2, at 7– (discussing, inter alia, provisions and expiration of Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 319 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4210)).
93 Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1710).
94 Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, 2026 WL 477534, at *6 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026).
95 Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651).
96 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
97 Learning Res., 2026 WL 477534, at *10–11. For analysis of the Court’s opinion and those of the individual Justices,
see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11398, Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2026).
98 See infra “Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing International Payments Problems.”
99 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,193, Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border,
90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (Feb. 1, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,194, Imposing Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern
Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (Feb. 1, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,195, Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid
Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 1, 2025).
100 Exec. Order No. 14,257, Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to
Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 2, 2025).
101 See Exec. Order No. 14,245, Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil, 90 Fed. Reg. 13829 (Mar.
24, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,323, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, 90 Fed. Reg.
37739 (July 30, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14,329, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the
Russian Federation, 90 Fed. Reg. 38701 (Aug. 6, 2025); Exec. Order 14,380, Addressing Threats to the United States
by the Government of Cuba, 91 Fed. Reg. 5085 (Jan. 29, 2026); Exec. Order No. 14,382, Addressing Threats to the
United States by the Government of Iran, 91 Fed. Reg. 6493 (Feb. 6, 2026).
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terminated these tariff actions102 while continuing the use of IEEPA to suspend the de minimis
exemption,103 a statutory authorization for the Secretary of the Treasury to allow the duty-free
importation of up to $800 of certain merchandise per person, per day.104
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Tariffs to Protect
National Security
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962105 authorizes the President to “adjust the
imports” of articles that the Secretary of Commerce finds are “being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security.”106 In 1976, the Supreme Court held that this import-adjustment authority permits the
President to impose “monetary exactions in the form of license fees.”107 The Court reasoned that
the statutory text and its legislative history “suggest that the President’s authority extends to the
imposition of monetary exactions—i.e., license fees and duties.”108 In Learning Resources, the
Court contrasted Section 232 with IEEPA, observing that textual considerations “render[] it
natural for Section 232[] to authorize duties.”109
The first Trump Administration used Section 232 to impose tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum
(10%) imports from most trading partners while creating a process to request exclusions from the
tariffs for specific products.110 Subsequently, the United States reached agreements with many
countries placing quotas or tariff-rate quotas111 on steel and aluminum imports from those
countries in lieu of tariffs.112 In February 2025, President Trump modified these Section 232
actions to impose 25% tariffs on both steel and aluminum while terminating the exclusion
process, certain previously granted exclusions, and alternative arrangements reached with certain
countries.113 Subsequently, President Trump further increased the Section 232 tariff rate on these
products to 50%.114
102 See Exec. Order No. 14,389, Ending Certain Tariff Actions, 91 Fed. Reg. 9437 (Feb. 20, 2026); Proclamation No.
11,012, Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems, 91 Fed.
Reg. 9339 (Feb. 20, 2026).
103 See Exec. Order No. 14,388, Continuing the Suspension of Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries, 91
Fed. Reg. 9433 (Feb. 20, 2026).
104 See 19 U.S.C. § 1321. For information regarding the de minimis exemption, see CRS Report R48380, Imports and
the Section 321 (De Minimis) Exemption: Origins, Evolution, and Use, by Christopher A. Casey (2025).
105 Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–(c)).
106 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
107 Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 552 (1976).
108 Id. at 562.
109 Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, 2026 WL 477534 at *13 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026).
110 See Proclamation No. 9705, Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018);
Proclamation No. 9704, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11619 (Mar. 8, 2018).
111 Whereas “absolute (or quantitative) quotas” strictly limit the quantity of a good that may enter the United States
(e.g., from a particular country), “tariff-rate quotas” allow a specified quantity of the good to enter at a reduced tariff
rate. See 19 C.F.R. § 132.1 (2026).
112 See Proclamation No. 10,896, Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 9817 (Feb. 10, 2025);
Proclamation No. 10,895, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 9807 (Feb. 10, 2025).
113 See Proclamation No. 10,896, 90 Fed. Reg. 9817; Proclamation No. 10,895, 90 Fed. Reg. 9807; CRS Insight
IN12519, Expanded Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum, by Kyla H. Kitamura and Keigh E. Hammond (2025).
114 See Proclamation No. 10,947, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 24199
(June 3, 2025).
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The second Trump Administration has actively used Section 232 to investigate and impose tariffs
on many additional product categories. In March 2025, President Trump announced 25% tariffs
on imports of automobiles and auto parts, with limited exceptions for Canada and Mexico,115
based on a Section 232 investigation the Secretary of Commerce concluded in 2019.116 President
Trump has also imposed Section 232 tariffs on certain imports of trucks and buses, copper, wood
products, and semiconductor chips.117 The second Trump Administration has initiated or
concluded additional Section 232 investigations regarding several other kinds of products.118
Section 232 requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct “an appropriate investigation to
determine the effects on the national security of imports of the [subject] article” following a
petition by an “interested party” or a request by the head of any U.S. department or agency.119 The
Secretary may also self-initiate Section 232 investigations.120 In conducting this investigation, the
Secretary must consult on “methodological and policy questions” with the Secretary of
Defense,121 who may be required to provide an assessment of defense requirements for the subject
article.122 The Secretary of Commerce must also seek information from other officers, hold public
hearings, and afford interested parties an opportunity to be heard, as appropriate.123
Within 270 days of initiating the investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must submit a report
to the President containing findings and recommendations.124 Section 232 provides that “any
portion of the report . . . which does not contain classified information or proprietary information
115 See Proclamation No. 10,908, Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts into the United States, 90
Fed. Reg. 14705 (Mar. 26, 2025). The President subsequently reduced these tariffs for certain auto imports based on
framework agreements with specific trading partners. See CRS Insight IN12545, Section 232 Automotive Tariffs: Issues
for Congress, by Kyla H. Kitamura (2025).
116 See Publication of a Report on the Effect of Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts on the National Security,
86 Fed. Reg. 62028 (Nov. 8, 2021).
117 See Proclamation No. 10,984, Adjusting Imports of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Vehicle Parts, and Buses into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 48451 (Oct. 17, 2025); Proclamation No. 10,962,
Adjusting Imports of Copper into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 37727 (July 30, 2025); Proclamation No. 10,976,
Adjusting Imports of Timber, Lumber, and Their Derivative Products into the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 48127 (Sept.
29, 2025); Proclamation No. 11,002, Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment,
and Their Derivative Products into the United States, 91 Fed. Reg. 2443 (Jan. 14, 2026).
118 See Proclamation 11,001, 91 Fed. Reg. 2439 (Jan. 14, 2026); Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section
232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Robotics and Industrial Machinery, 90 Fed. Reg. 46382 (Sept. 26,
2025); Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Personal
Protective Equipment, Medical Consumables, and Medical Equipment, Including Devices, 90 Fed. Reg. 46383 (Sept.
26, 2025); Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Wind
Turbines and Their Parts and Components, 90 Fed. Reg. 41380 (Aug. 25, 2025); Notice of Request for Public
Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Their
Parts and Components, 90 Fed. Reg. 31958 (July 16, 2025); Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232
National Security Investigation of Imports of Polysilicon and its Derivatives, 90 Fed. Reg. 31955 (July 16, 2025);
Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Commercial
Aircraft and Jet Engines and Parts for Commercial Aircraft and Jet Engines, 90 Fed. Reg. 20273 (May 13, 2025);
Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Pharmaceuticals
and Pharmaceutical Ingredients, 90 Fed. Reg. 15951 (Apr. 16, 2025).
119 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A).
120 See id.
121 The Secretary of Defense is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title.” See Exec. Order 14,347, Restoring the
United States Department of War, 90 Fed. Reg. 43893 (Sept. 5, 2025).
122 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A). The Secretary of Commerce must also immediately notify the Secretary of Defense
when any Section 232 investigation is initiated. See id. § 1862(b)(1)(B).
123 See id. § 1862(b)(2)(A).
124 See id. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
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shall be published in the Federal Register.”125 Section 232 does not specify a deadline for
publication in the Federal Register. On at least one occasion, Congress has enacted legislation
compelling publication of a specific Section 232 report by a date certain.126
For the President to take action under Section 232, the Secretary of Commerce must “find[] that
an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair the national security.”127 Within 90 days after the Secretary reports an
affirmative finding, the President must determine whether he concurs and—if he does—
determine “the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be
taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten
to impair the national security.”128 Within 30 days of the President’s determination, he must give
Congress “a written statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take action, or
refused to take action.”129 If the President decides to take action, he must “implement that action
by no later than . . . 15 days after . . . the President determines to take action.”130
Section 232 does not require the President to follow the Secretary’s recommendations but permits
him to take alternative actions or no action.131 It also does not limit the amount or duration of
tariffs that the President might impose.132 If the President takes import-adjusting actions
pertaining to “imports of petroleum or petroleum products,” Congress may override the action via
a specified joint resolution of disapproval, which is subject to the President’s signature or veto.133
Section 232 contemplates that the President may respond to an affirmative finding by the
Secretary by negotiating foreign agreements to adjust importation of the articles at issue.134 It
provides that, if “no such agreement is entered into” by 180 days after the President’s
determination to take such action, or if an agreement is entered into but “is not being carried out
or is ineffective in eliminating the threat,” then “the President shall take such other actions as the
President deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article.”135 This provision may provide
some legal support for the President’s February 2025 proclamations that increased tariffs on steel
125 See id. § 1862(b)(3)(B). Implementing regulations, which arguably fall short of this statutory requirement, state that
an “executive summary” must be published in the Federal Register and that “[c]opies of the full report, excluding any
classified or proprietary information, will be available for public inspection and copying” at the Commerce
Department. 15 C.F.R. § 705.10(c) (2026).
126 See Pub. L. No. 116-93, § 112, 113 Stat. 2317, 2395–96 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251) (“Not later than
thirty days after the date of the enactment of this Act . . . the Secretary of Commerce shall[] (1) publish in the Federal
Register the report on the findings of the investigation into the effect on national security of imports of automobiles and
automotive parts . . . under section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 . . . .”).
127 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). In making this determination, the Secretary must consider certain non-exclusive factors
including the domestic production capacity needed to meet national defense requirements and the impact of foreign
competition on the economic welfare of domestic industries. See id. § 1862(d).
128 Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
129 Id. § 1862(c)(2).
130 Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B).
131 See id. § 1862(c).
132 See id.; see also USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1370–71 (holding that Section 232 allows the President to impose tariffs
indefinitely, without specifying an end date).
133
19 U.S.C. § 1862(f).
134 See id. § 1862(c)(3).
135 Id.
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and aluminum to the extent they criticize the effectiveness of “alternative” agreements previously
reached with certain countries.136
President Trump’s March 2025 proclamation imposing tariffs on automobile goods relies on
Section 232’s agreement provisions, asserting that “[USTR]’s negotiations did not lead to any
agreements of the type contemplated by section 232.”137 Section 232 does not prescribe a
deadline by which “other action” must be taken if agreements either are not entered into or prove
to be ineffective, potentially allowing the President to hold Section 232 actions in a state of
suspension and then impose tariffs several years after the conclusion of an investigation.
President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on automobile goods, for example, relies on a Section 232
investigation that concluded approximately six years earlier.138
Legal challenges to Section 232 steel tariffs have required the Federal Circuit to address
interpretive disputes about the statute. In USP Holdings, as noted above,139 the court held that
Section 232 does not require a national security threat to be “imminent” for the President to act.140
In another decision, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States,141 the court upheld the President’s
decision to double tariffs on steel imports from Turkey five months after his initial proclamation
imposing a 25% tariff on steel.142 The court held that Section 232’s time limits—requiring the
President to determine “the nature and duration of [his] action” within 90 days after the
Secretary’s report and to “implement” that action within 15 days of that determination—do not
prevent the President from adopting “a continuing course of action” that may entail further
increasing tariffs on particular countries after those time limits expire.143 In PrimeSource Building
Products, the court likewise upheld the President’s modification of steel tariffs to include certain
derivative products like nails and staples,144 holding that Section 232 allowed the President to
“take action against derivative products regardless of whether the Secretary has investigated and
reported on such derivatives.”145
Transpacific Steel and PrimeSource may provide additional legal support for the President’s later
modifications to steel and aluminum tariffs, such as raising the duty rate on these goods seven
years after the Secretary’s investigation. While the Federal Circuit noted that its decisions did not
“prejudg[e] the scope of judicial reviewability of presidential determinations” that might be based
136 See Proclamation No. 10,896, 90 Fed. Reg. 9817 (Feb. 10, 2025); Proclamation No. 10,895, 90 Fed. Reg. 9807 (Feb.
10, 2025).
137 Proclamation No. 10,908, 90 Fed. Reg. 14705 (Mar. 26, 2025); see Proclamation No. 9888, Adjusting Imports of
Automobiles and Automobile Parts into the United States, 84 Fed. Reg. 23433 (May 17, 2019) (directing USTR to
“pursue negotiation of agreements contemplated in 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A)(i) to address the threatened impairment of
the national security with respect to imported automobiles and certain automobile parts from the European Union,
Japan, and any other country the Trade Representative deems appropriate”).
138 See Proclamation No. 10,908, 90 Fed. Reg. 14705 (Mar. 26, 2025) (imposing tariffs on auto imports six years after
the 2019 conclusion of the Section 232 investigation).
139 See supra “Presidential Tariff Actions Reviewed for Clear Misconstruction of Law.”
140 36 F.4th 1359, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
141 4 F.4th 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1414 (2022) (mem.).
142 This initial proclamation applied to steel imports from all countries, including Turkey, except for Canada and
Mexico. See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625, 11626 (Mar. 8, 2018).
143 Transpac. Steel, 4 F.4th at 1318. A dissenting opinion in this case emphasized separation-of-powers concerns.
Noting that “the subject matter of § 232 flows directly [from] Congress’s constitutional power over the Tariff,” Judge
Jimmie Reyna argued that “extra care should be taken to avoid unduly expanding that delegation” and that the plain
language of Section 232 prevents the President from taking new actions outside the statutory time limits. Id. at 1338–40
(Reyna, J., dissenting).
144 See PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th 1255, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
145 Id. at 1262.
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on “stale information,”146 it nonetheless held that Section 232 provides “no textual basis for a
specific time limit on adjustments under a timely adopted plan.”147 It further stated that staleness
is not a concern when subsequent modifications are made “in pursuit of the same goal” as the
initial action and are based on “current information” from the Secretary.148
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs to Safeguard
Domestic Industries
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974149 authorizes the President to impose tariffs or take certain
other actions if the ITC finds that a surge in imports is causing or threatening serious injury to a
U.S. domestic industry.150 Presidential action under Section 201 is meant to facilitate the domestic
industry’s “positive adjustment to import competition,” meaning that dislocated workers can
make “an orderly transition to productive pursuits” and the domestic industry itself either
becomes able to compete successfully with the imports or transfers its resources to other
productive pursuits.151 Tariffs imposed under Section 201 are sometimes referred to as
“safeguard” or “escape clause” tariffs.152 Recent administrations have used Section 201 to impose
tariffs on solar cells and modules as well as residential washing machines.153
The ITC is required to conduct Section 201 investigations following a petition by a party
representing a domestic industry, a request by the President or USTR, or a resolution of the House
Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee.154 The ITC may also self-initiate
Section 201 investigations.155 As part of its investigation, the ITC must consider what positive
adjustment measures the domestic industry has taken or planned,156 and petitioners and others
may submit plans or commitments for the ITC’s consideration.157 The ITC generally must submit
a report including its findings and recommendations to the President within 180 days of the start
of the investigation.158
Before the President may take action under Section 201, the ITC must find based on its
investigation that “an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities
as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry
146 Transpac. Steel, 4 F.4th at 1332; accord PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc., 59 F.4th at 1262 (“As we noted in
Transpacific, a different question might be presented where the underlying finding or objective has become
substantively stale . . . .”).
147 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc., 59 F.4th at 1262.
148 Id.
149 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251). As used in this report,
“Section 201” refers generally to all of Title II, Chapter 1 of the Trade Act of 1974, which is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
2251–2255.
150 See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
151 Id. § 2252(a), (b)(1).
152 See Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
153 See Section 201 Investigations, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issueareas/enforcement/section-201-investigations [https://perma.cc/6HMJ-NTM9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2026).
154 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
155 See id. § 2252(b)(1)(A).
156 See id. § 2252(a)(6)(A).
157 See id. § 2252(a)(4), (a)(6)(B).
158 See id. § 2252(f) (noting the period may be extended to 240 days “if the petition alleges that critical circumstances
exist”).
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producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article.”159 In making its
finding, the ITC is required to “take into account all economic factors which it considers
relevant” as well as certain nonexclusive factors provided by statute.160 As noted above,161 the
Federal Circuit has rejected challenges to Section 201 tariffs in cases where plaintiffs alleged that
the ITC did not provide an adequate explanation for its injury determination162 or the inclusion of
certain goods on the lists of products subject to tariffs.163
If the ITC makes an affirmative determination, it must recommend what action would be most
effective to facilitate the domestic industry’s positive adjustment to import competition.164 The
ITC’s recommendation may include any or a combination of increased tariffs, tariff-rate quotas,
quantitative restrictions (i.e., absolute quotas), trade adjustment assistance, international
negotiations, and other measures.165 In forming its recommendations, the ITC is required to hold a
public hearing for all interested parties to present testimony and other evidence.166
Section 201 directs the President, within 60 days of receiving a report from the ITC with an
affirmative finding of injury, to take “all appropriate and feasible action within his power” to
facilitate positive adjustment by the domestic industry.167 The President is not required to follow
the ITC’s recommendation but may take any of the types of actions (e.g., imposing tariffs) the
ITC is authorized to recommend.168 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held that, even if the ITC
fails to recommend a course of action, the President may take action so long as the ITC makes the
requisite injury finding.169 If the President takes action under Section 201, he must submit a report
159 Id. § 2252(b)(1)(A). Section 201 defines “substantial cause” as “a cause which is important and not less than any
other cause.” Id. § 2252(b)(1)(B).
160 Id. § 2252(c). To find that a domestic industry has been seriously injured, the ITC must consider factors concerning
the idling of domestic industry facilities, the inability of domestic industry firms to earn reasonable profits, and
unemployment within the domestic industry. Id. § 2252(c)(1)(A). To find, alternatively, that a domestic industry is
threatened with serious injury, the ITC must consider factors concerning trends in sales, market share, inventory,
production, profits, wages, productivity, and employment in the domestic industry; inability of domestic industry firms
to generate capital or maintain research and development expenditures; and “the extent to which the United States
market is the focal point for the diversion of exports of the article concerned by reason of restraints on exports of such
article to, or on imports of such article into, third country markets.” Id. § 2252(c)(1)(B). Finally, to find that the
increased imports are a substantial cause of the injury or threat to the domestic industry, the ITC must consider whether
there is “an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic production) and a decline in the proportion of the
domestic market supplied by domestic producers.” Id. § 2252(c)(1)(C).
161 See supra “Presidential Tariff Actions Reviewed for Clear Misconstruction of Law.”
162 See Corus Grp. PLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding Section 201
tariffs on tin mill products).
163 See Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 88–90 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding Section 201 tariffs on
frozen mushroom products).
164 See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(e)(1).
165 See id. § 2252(e)(2). The ITC’s recommendation must “specify the type, amount, and duration of the action.” Id.
§ 2252(e)(3).
166 Id. § 2252(e).
167 Id. § 2253(a)(1)(A), (a)(4).
168 Id. § 2253(a)(3).
169 See Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Silfab Solar, the ITC did not make
an official recommendation because the four then-serving Commissioners disagreed as to the correct remedy, and “no
recommendation received the assent of ‘a majority of the commissioners voting’ or of ‘not less than three
commissioners.’” Id. at 1343 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(2)).
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to Congress describing those actions and his reasons for taking them, including the reasons for
any differences between his actions and the ITC’s recommendation.170
Section 201 places several limitations on the magnitude and duration of remedial actions. For
instance, tariffs imposed under Section 201 may not “increase a rate of duty to (or impose a rate)
which is more than 50 percent ad valorem above the rate (if any) existing at the time the action is
taken.”171 Actions in effect for more than one year must be “phased down at regular intervals.”172
Actions also may not stay in effect for more than four years unless the ITC makes certain findings
in a follow-on proceeding, in which case the President may extend the actions up to an additional
four years.173
The President has limited authority to modify previously imposed Section 201 tariffs, which is
generally triggered by a “midpoint review” the ITC must conduct for longer actions.174 If the
period of an initial action or an extension exceeds three years, the ITC must submit a report by
the midpoint of that period regarding the domestic industry’s progress toward positive
adjustment.175 Only after receiving this report, the President may reduce or terminate the action if
he determines that the domestic industry has not made adequate efforts toward positive
adjustment or that changed circumstances make the action ineffective.176 Alternatively, if the
majority of domestic industry representatives petition the President to modify, reduce, or
terminate the action, he may do so if he determines that the domestic industry has made a positive
adjustment.177 As noted above, the Federal Circuit has held that this limited authority to “modify”
a previous safeguard if the domestic industry has made a positive adjustment allows the President
to increase tariffs and withdraw previously granted exclusions for certain products.178
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing Trade
Agreement Violations and Certain Other Practices
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974179 allows USTR to impose tariffs in response to actions by
foreign countries that violate U.S. rights under international trade agreements or that burden or
restrict U.S. commerce in “unjustifiable,” “unreasonable,” or “discriminatory” ways.180
Recent administrations have conducted several investigations under Section 301. In 2018, USTR
used Section 301 to impose tariffs on many imports from the PRC, finding that the PRC
government engaged in actionable conduct relating to forced technology transfers, intellectual
170 See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b). In Silfab Solar, the Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he question of whether the President’s
action here ‘differs from the action recommended by the Commission’ when the ITC makes no recommendation is a
matter for Congress,” 892 F.3d at 1346 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)), apparently acknowledging that the current text
of Section 201 does not address this scenario.
171 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(3); see also id. § 2253(e)(4) (setting limits on “quantitative restrictions,” or import quotas).
172 Id. § 2253(e)(5).
173 See id. §§ 2253(e)(1), 2254(c).
174 See id. § 2254(a), (b).
175 See id. § 2254(a)(2).
176 See id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
177 See id. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
178 See Solar Energy I, 86 F.4th 885, 889–90, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2023), reh’g granted in part, Solar Energy II, 111 F.4th
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (providing additional reasoning for decision).
179 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411). As used in this report,
“Section 301” refers generally to all of Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, which is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420.
180 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a), (b).
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property, and innovation.181 In 2025, USTR concluded three Section 301 investigations initiated
by the Biden Administration, finding that other foreign practices by the PRC and Nicaragua were
actionable.182 USTR also initiated two Section 301 investigations in 2025.183 In March 2026,
following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of tariffs imposed under IEEPA, USTR initiated
multicountry Section 301 investigations purportedly related to “structural excess capacity and
production in certain manufacturing sectors” of 16 trading partners184 and “the failure to impose
and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor” on
the part of 60 countries.185
USTR is authorized but not required to conduct Section 301 investigations based on petitions
filed by “any interested person,” and it may also self-initiate Section 301 investigations.186
Generally, USTR must request consultations with the foreign country upon initiating an
investigation.187 USTR’s deadline to complete the investigation varies according to the basis and
nature of the investigation.188 Procedural requirements include providing an opportunity for
interested persons to give a “presentation of views,” including a public hearing if requested by an
interested person.189
Section 301 divides USTR’s authority into “mandatory action” and “discretionary action.”190
Mandatory action is generally required when USTR determines that “(A) the rights of the United
States under any trade agreement are being denied; or (B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign
country[] (i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the
United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United
States commerce.”191 Discretionary action is authorized when USTR determines that “(1) an act,
policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts
United States commerce, and (2) action by the United States is appropriate.”192
181 See Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to
Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 28710 (June 20, 2018).
182 See, e.g., Notice of Implementation of Action: Nicaragua’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights,
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Rule of Law, 90 Fed. Reg. 60850 (Dec. 29, 2025) (imposing tariffs
on certain imports beginning in January 2027); Notice of Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 60848 (Dec. 29, 2025) (imposing tariffs of a rate
to be announced on certain imports beginning in June 2027); Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s
Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 50947 (Nov. 13, 2025)
(suspending action for one year).
183 Initiation of Section 301 Brazil Investigation, 90 Fed. Reg. 34069 (July 18, 2025); Initiation of Section 301
Investigation: China’s Implementation of Commitments Under the Phase One Agreement; Notice of Hearing; and
Request for Public Comments, 90 Fed. Reg. 48733 (Oct. 28, 2025).
184 Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural
Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, 91 Fed. Reg. 12886 (Mar. 11, 2026).
185 Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure
to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, 91 Fed.
Reg. 12884 (Mar. 12, 2026).
186 See 19 U.S.C. § 2412.
187 See id. § 2413.
188 See id. § 2414(a).
189 See id. § 2414(b).
190
See id. § 2411(a), (b).
191 See id. § 2411(a)(1).
192 See id. § 2411(b).
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Upon making an affirmative determination, USTR is authorized, under the direction of the
President, to impose duties or other import restrictions, withdraw or suspend trade agreement
concessions, or enter into an agreement with a foreign government to stop the offending conduct
or compensate the United States.193 Section 301 does not set a maximum rate for tariffs that
USTR may impose.194 Actions taken under Section 301—including any tariffs—terminate
automatically after four years unless any petitioner or representative of a domestic industry
benefiting from the action requests continuation, in which case USTR may extend the action.195
For example, in 2022, USTR determined that the tariffs first imposed in 2018 on imports from the
PRC would remain in effect.196
USTR may sometimes modify or terminate an action under Section 301, provided it solicits views
from any petitioners, domestic industry representatives, and other interested persons and reports
its reasons to Congress.197 Section 301 allows USTR to “modify or terminate any action, subject
to the specific direction, if any, of the President,” under any of three conditions. First, USTR may
modify or terminate an action if the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, or
dispute settlement proceedings under other trade agreements,198 finds that the foreign practice at
issue does not deny or violate U.S. rights.199 Second, USTR may modify or terminate an action if
“the burden or restriction on United States commerce of the denial rights, or of the acts, policies,
and practices, that are the subject of such action has increased or decreased.”200 Third, USTR may
modify or terminate a discretionary action that “is no longer appropriate.”201
In 2025, the Federal Circuit analyzed the scope of USTR’s authority to modify Section 301 tariffs
in HMTX Industries LLC v. United States.202 Following USTR’s initial action imposing tariffs on
certain PRC imports in 2018, the PRC imposed retaliatory tariffs on certain articles from the
United States.203 USTR responded, in turn, by imposing tariffs on additional lists of PRC
imports.204 In HMTX Industries, the Federal Circuit upheld these additional tariffs as a
193 See id. § 2411(c).
194 Section 301 provides nonexclusive examples of foreign government practices that may trigger USTR’s authority,
including subsidizing the construction of commercial vessels for shipping goods between the United States and other
countries, denying adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, failing to provide a minimum
working age for the employment of children, or denying workers’ rights to organize and collectively bargain. See id. §
2411(d)(2), (3)(B).
195 See 19 U.S.C. § 2417(c). Unlike Section 201, Section 301 does not limit the number of times a continuation may be
requested or granted.
196 See Continuation of Actions: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, 87 Fed. Reg. 55073 (Sept. 8, 2022).
197 See 19 U.S.C. § 2417(a), (b). As one example, in 2024, USTR modified the above-referenced action regarding
imports from the PRC to impose higher tariff rates on certain products, including a 100% rate on electric vehicles. See
Notice of Modification: China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and
Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 76581 (Sept. 18, 2024).
198 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade Agreements, by
Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs (2024).
199 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)(2), 2417(a)(1)(A).
200 Id. § 2417(a)(1)(B).
201 Id. §§ 2411(b), 2417(a)(1)(C).
202 156 F.4th 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
203 See id. at 1245.
204 See Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 47974 (Sept. 21, 2018); Notice of Modification of Section
301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, 84 Fed. Reg. 43304 (Aug. 20, 2019).
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permissible modification of the Section 301 action.205 On February 20, 2026, HMTX Industries
petitioned the Supreme Court to hear an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s decision; at the time of
this writing, the Supreme Court has not announced whether it will hear this appeal.206
In HMTX Industries, the Federal Circuit was faced with determining which of Section 301’s
modification provisions, if any, supported the additional tariffs. The court rested its decision on
19 U.S.C. § 2417(a)(1)(C), which allows modification or termination of an action that “is no
longer appropriate.”207 In prior Section 301 actions, USTR had invoked Section 2417(a)(1)(C)
only to reduce or terminate the action, not to impose additional tariffs. The plaintiffs in HMTX
Industries argued that Section 2417(a)(1)(C) permits only tariff-reducing modifications.208 The
court instead agreed with the government’s contention that Section 2417(a)(1)(C) “extends to
situations in which prior, predictive action proved insufficient to its stated purpose, necessitating
increased action that is more appropriate.”209 Having held that Section 2417(a)(1)(C) authorized
the challenged modification, the court declined to address the government’s alternative argument,
that Section 2417(a)(1)(B) also authorized the modification.210
In addition to disputing USTR’s substantive authority to modify Section 301 actions, the parties
to HMTX Industries disputed the applicable standard for judicial review, in light of the fact that
Section 301 grants authority to USTR “subject to the specific direction, if any, of the
President.”211 The Federal Circuit held that USTR’s action was an agency action reviewable under
the APA, rejecting the government’s argument that it was a nonreviewable presidential action.212
The court applied the standard of review set forth in the APA, requiring the court to interpret
statutory provisions and set aside agency actions that are, inter alia, “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “unsupported by substantial
evidence.”213
In the trial court proceedings in HMTX Industries, the CIT had held that USTR’s modification
was procedurally defective,214 as it did not conform with the APA’s requirements for notice-andcomment rulemaking.215 Specifically, the CIT found that USTR had not adequately responded to
critical comments submitted during the rulemaking.216 While the APA exempts agencies from
these procedural requirements “to the extent that there is involved . . . a military or foreign affairs
205 See HMTX Indus. LLC v. United States, 156 F.4th 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
206 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, HMTX Indus., LLC v. United States, No. 25-1012 (U.S. filed Feb. 20, 2026).
207 19 U.S.C. § 2417(a)(1)(C).
208 See HMTX Indus., 156 F.4th at 1252.
209
See id.
210 See id. at 1242. Conversely, the trial court (the CIT) had upheld the additional tariffs as permitted by Section
2417(a)(1)(B) and declined to analyze Section 2417(a)(1)(C). See In re Section 301 Cases, 570 F. Supp. 3d 1306,
1334–35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2022) (Section 301 Cases I). As noted above, Section 2417(a)(1)(B) permits modification if
“the burden or restriction on United States commerce of the denial rights, or of the acts, policies, and practices, that are
the subject of such action has increased or decreased.” 19 U.S.C. § 2417(a)(1)(B). The CIT rejected plaintiff’s
argument that this provision would permit modification only in response to changes in the PRC intellectual property
practices that were the subject of the Section 301 investigation, and thus would not permit modification in response to
the PRC’s retaliatory tariffs. See Section 301 Cases I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 1333–34.
211 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B), (b)(2).
212 See HMTX Indus., 156 F.4th at 1249–50. The court observed that, “[i]n 1988, Congress transferred authority to
enforce Section 301 from the President to USTR.” Id. at 1250.
213 See id. at 1249 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
214
See Section 301 Cases I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 1343.
215 See id. at 1338.
216 See id. at 1340–41.
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function of the United States,”217 both the CIT and, subsequently, the Federal Circuit held that
USTR’s action did not fall under this foreign affairs exception.218 After giving USTR an
opportunity to provide additional explanation for the modified tariffs, the CIT upheld the
modification.219 The Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed that the CIT was not required to vacate the
modified tariffs due to this procedural violation and that “the additional detail USTR provided on
remand cured the original deficiencies.”220
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing
International Payments Problems
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974221 directs the President to take measures that may include a
temporary import surcharge (tariff) when necessary to address “large and serious United States
balance-of-payments deficits” or certain other situations that present “fundamental international
payments problems.”222 Section 122 was enacted in the wake of a temporary 10% tariff President
Richard Nixon proclaimed in 1971 to address balance-of-payments problems, particularly a
decline in U.S. gold reserves supporting the value of the dollar.223 In 1975, the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals held that Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,224 which
contained the same “regulate . . . importation” phrase now found in IEEPA, provided legal
authority for this tariff, reversing a trial court decision to the contrary.225 The appellate court
observed that future such tariffs “must, of course, comply” with Section 122, which had been
enacted while the legal challenge to the 1971 proclamation was being litigated.226
Section 122 was first used to impose tariffs in 2026, more than 50 years after its enactment. On
February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision holding that the President could not use
IEEPA to impose tariffs.227 Later that day, President Trump issued a proclamation imposing a
10% tariff on most U.S. imports under Section 122.228 This proclamation provided justifications
overlapping with those in President Trump’s April 2025 executive order imposing worldwide
tariffs of 10% or greater under IEEPA, including shared references to “large and persistent” U.S.
217 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
218 See HMTX Indus., 156 F.4th at 1257 (“USTR’s decision to repeatedly publish its proposed modifications
undermines the notion that ‘definitely undesirable international consequences’ were at risk in public rulemaking.”)
(quoting Am. Ass’n of Exporters & Imps-Textile & Apparel Grp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir.
1985)); Section 301 Cases I, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 1335–37.
219 See In re Section 301 Cases, 628 F. Supp. 3d 1235 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023).
220 HMTX Indus., 156 F.4th at 1258.
221 Pub. L. 93-618, § 122, 88 Stat. 1978, 1987 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132).
222 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a).
223 See United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
224 Now codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b).
225 See Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 583–84. For more information on Yoshida and its relationship to recent debates over
IEEPA, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11281, Legal Authority for the President to Impose Tariffs Under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
226 Id. at 582 n.33.
227 See Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, 2026 WL 477534 at *6 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026).
228 Proclamation No. 11,012, Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments
Problems, 91 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 20, 2026).
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trade deficits.229 In March 2026, two dozen states and certain private parties filed lawsuits
challenging the President’s authority to impose this tariff.230
Section 122 provides that, “[w]henever fundamental international payments problems require
special import measures to restrict imports” in order “(1) to deal with large and serious United
States balance-of-payments deficits, (2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of
the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or (3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an
international balance-of-payments disequilibrium,” the President “shall proclaim, for a period not
exceeding 150 days,” either or both of “(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15
percent ad valorem, in the form of duties . . . on articles imported into the United States” or, under
specified circumstances, “(B) temporary limitations through the use of quotas on the importation
of articles into the United States.”231 In his February 20, 2026, proclamation, President Trump
cited all three of the above justifications (i.e., balance-of-payments deficits, dollar depreciation,
and an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium).232
Some have suggested that Section 122 might authorize the President to impose tariffs in response
to U.S. trade deficits,233 which occur when the value of imports in goods and services exceeds
that of exports.234 As used in Section 122, the term “balance-of-payments deficits” may be
susceptible to at least two interpretations: a broader interpretation that includes trade deficits, and
a narrower interpretation that does not. A glossary by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
defines balance of payments as a “[r]ecord of transactions between U.S. residents and foreign
residents during a given time period [that i]ncludes transactions in goods, services, income,
assets, and liabilities.”235 On the broader interpretation of Section 122, a balance-of-payments
deficit could potentially refer to a deficit in any combination of these transactions, including a
trade deficit. In V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States,236 the CIT espoused this view of Section
122, opining that “[t]rade deficits are one of the key balance-of-payment deficits.”237 Based on its
229 Compare Exec. Order No. 14,257, Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That
Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 2, 2025)
(imposing tariffs under IEEPA), with Proclamation No. 11,012, 91 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9340 (Feb. 20, 2026) (noting
problems concerning “large and persistent trade deficits”).
230 See Complaint, State of Oregon v. Trump, No. 26-1472 (Ct. Int’l Trade, filed Mar. 5, 2026); Complaint, Burlap &
Barrel, Inc. v. Trump, No. 26-1606 (Ct. Int’l Trade, filed Mar. 9, 2026).
231 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). Section 122(b) provides, though, that if “the President determines that the imposition of import
restrictions under subsection (a) will be contrary to the national interest of the United States, then he may refrain from
proclaiming such restrictions,” in which case he shall “immediately” inform Congress of that determination and engage
in certain consultations “as to the reasons for such determination.” Id. § 2132(b).
232 See Proclamation No. 11,012, 91 Fed. Reg. at 9339.
233 Gavin Bade, Trump Trade Advisers Plot Dollar Devaluation, POLITICO (Apr. 15, 2024),
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/15/devaluing-dollar-trump-trade-war-00152009 (“One legal tool that’s been
floated is Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes tariffs of up to 15 percent against countries that have
‘large and serious’ trade surpluses with the U.S.”).
234 See CRS In Focus IF10156, U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, by Shayerah I. Akhtar, Cathleen D.
Cimino-Isaacs, and Karen M. Sutter (2024).
235 Balance of Payments: Glossary, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.bea.gov/help/glossary/balance-payments [https://perma.cc/6W88-X5D5]; see also V.O.S. Selections, Inc.
v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1375 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025) (discussing BEA definition). Similarly, one general
dictionary defines balance of payments as “a summary of the international transactions of a country or region over a
period of time including commodity and service transactions, capital transactions, and gold movements.” Balance of
Payments, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/balance%20of%20payments
[https://perma.cc/B5VY-6UWF] (last visited Mar. 10, 2026).
236 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350.
237 Id. at 1375.
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understanding that “tariffs responding to a trade deficit fit under Section 122” as well as
additional reasoning, the CIT held that such tariffs were not authorized by IEEPA.238
On the appeals of V.O.S. Selections to the Federal Circuit and, later, the Supreme Court (where it
was consolidated with Learning Resources), neither court adopted the CIT’s reasoning that
Section 122 displaced IEEPA. At the Federal Circuit, a dissenting opinion and the government
argued for a narrower interpretation of balance-of-payments deficit that excludes trade deficits.
The dissent—which argued that IEEPA authorized the challenged tariffs—disagreed with the
CIT’s reasoning that Section 122 displaces the President’s authority to impose tariffs in response
to trade deficits under IEEPA.239 The dissent contended that “a goods trade deficit alone is not
enough for application of . . . section 122” and that the trade deficit-related emergency underlying
the worldwide IEEPA tariffs was not a “fundamental international payments problem” within the
meaning of Section 122.240 In a brief to the Federal Circuit, the government likewise argued that
Section 122 “does [not] have any obvious application here, where the concerns the President
identified in declaring an emergency arise from trade deficits, which are conceptually distinct
from balance-of-payments deficits.”241
Sources regarding the meaning of balance-of-payments deficit from the time surrounding the
enactment of Section 122 may indicate that the term refers not to trade deficits but to more
inclusive measures of international payments including capital flows as well as goods and
services trade.242 The U.S. government regularly reported three such “overall” measures of the
U.S. balance of payments in the years surrounding Section 122’s enactment but ceased to report
them in 1976.243 At the time, some commentators noted that the end of the post-World War II
international monetary system of fixed exchange rates (the Bretton Woods system) in 1973 had
rendered the overall balance-of-payments measures obsolete.244 Historical sources such as these
238 See id. (“Section 122 removes the President’s power to impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments
deficits, and specifically trade deficits, from the broader powers granted to a president during a national emergency
under IEEPA by establishing an explicit non-emergency statute with greater limitations.”).
239 V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, 149 F.4th 1312, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (Taranto, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 1371–75.
241 Reply Brief for Appellants at 13, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1812 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 2025). The
government might not be prevented from advancing inconsistent arguments regarding the interpretation of Section 122
in future litigation, given that the government was not the prevailing party in V.O.S. Selections. Cf. New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (indicating that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not preclude a party from
adopting an inconsistent position in a later proceeding if the party did not “succeed[] in persuading a court to accept
that party’s earlier position,” while noting that there is no “exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of
judicial estoppel”).
242 See BEA, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONCEPTS, DATA SOURCES, AND
ESTIMATING PROCEDURES 17 (1990), https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/internat/bpa/meth/bopmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG6FPE4B] (contrasting “overall balances, measuring balance of payments surpluses or deficits,” with “partial balances,”
including “merchandise trade” and “goods and services”).
243 See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Balance of Payments Statistics, in BEA, U.S.
DEP’T OF COM., SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 20–21 (1976), https://apps.bea.gov/scb/issues/1976/scb-1976-june.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G24-DHHS] (recommending the Department of Commerce cease publishing all three previously
reported “overall” measures: the net liquidity balance, the balance on current account and long-term capital, and the
official reserve transactions (ORT) balance).
244 See Janice M. Westerfield, A Lower Profile for the U.S. Balance of Payments, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. BUS.
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1976, at 11, 15 (“The new international monetary system not only reduces the importance of balanceof-payments measures but also makes the old reporting system obsolete. . . . As the international monetary system
moved to floating exchange rates, these overall measures came to be misinterpreted by the public.”); Edwin L. Dale,
Jr., U.S. to End Some of Payments Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1976, at 43 (“All three of these measures of surplus or
deficit published up to now will be dropped because they are no longer meaningful, particularly in a world of floating
currency exchange rates. . . . In brief, the balance of payments is no longer a serious preoccupation of the Government .
(continued...)
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may be relevant to a court’s determination of what Section 122 meant at the time of its enactment
and, consequently, the scope of authority it provides the President today.245
To the extent that legislative history may also be relevant to determining the legal meaning of
Section 122, it may support the conclusion that balance-of-payments deficit does not refer to trade
deficits.246 An earlier-introduced version of Section 122 specified that a substantial deficit in
either of two of the overall balance-of-payments measures for four consecutive quarters would
qualify as a “serious balance-of-payments deficit.”247 A later report stated the House Ways and
Means Committee had considered and rejected such precise formulas.248 In 1974, the year
Congress passed Section 122, the Senate Finance Committee reported that “under present
circumstances [Section 122] authority is not likely to be utilized,”249 possibly referring to the
then-recent collapse of the Bretton Woods system. One Member argued that the end of Bretton
Woods made Section 122 “superfluous and unwise.”250
Section 122 also provides contextual evidence that “balance-of-payments deficits” does not refer
to trade deficits. While Section 122(a) refers to the “balance-of-payments,” Section 122(c)—
which allows tariff reductions in some scenarios—refers to the “balance-of-trade.”251 A court
might presume that this distinction was intentional and infer that Congress meant these terms to
have different meanings.252 Legislative history may corroborate this inference. In a previously
introduced version of Section 122, both subsections referred to the “balance-of-payments,”253 but
a Senate Finance Committee report explained that this term was deliberately amended to
“balance-of-trade” in what became Section 122(c).254
Unlike the tariff statutes surveyed above (but like IEEPA), Section 122 does not condition the
President’s authority on any investigation or factual finding by an executive agency,255 such as the
. . . [T]here is no longer any need to seek to ‘balance’ the nation’s total international payments by Government action,
even if the total payments picture could be accurately measured.”).
245 See, e.g., Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, 2026 WL 477534 at *13–14 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026) (consulting
law dictionary definition of “regulate” from the 1970s, when IEEPA was enacted).
246 See CRS Report R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, by Valerie C. Brannon, at 39–44
(2023) (regarding the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
247 See Trade Reform Act of 1973, 93 H.R. 6767, 93d Cong. (as introduced in House, Apr. 10, 1973) (“[A] serious
balance-of-payments deficit shall be considered to exist whenever the President determines that—(A) the balance of
payments (as measured either on the official reserve transactions basis or by the balance on current account and longterm capital) has been in substantial deficit over a period of four consecutive calendar quarters . . . .”).
248 H. REP. NO. 93-571, at 28–29 (1973) (“The committee considered various formulas for defining a serious balanceof-payments deficit, including a specific formulation based on the existence of a substantial deficit over a certain period
of time, but . . . it is not possible to formulate a definition with mathematical exactness.”).
249 S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 88 (1974).
250 119 CONG. REC. 40568 (1973) (statement of Rep. Henry S. Reuss). Rep. Reuss explained that, “[i]f the United States
continues to let the dollar float in exchange markets, as we are wisely doing now, the exercise of this authority would
prevent the deterioration or appreciation of the external value of the dollar which would be necessary to eliminate a
balance-of-payments deficit or surplus, as the case may be.” Id. Rep. Reuss further observed that, if the United States
returned to a system of fixed exchange rates, Section 122 authorities would not be practically useful to address balanceof-payments problems. See id.
251 19 U.S.C. § 2132(c).
252 See Brannon, supra note 246, at 55 (2023) (regarding the presumption of consistent usage).
253 Trade Reform Act of 1973, 93 H.R. 10710, 93d Cong. (as introduced in House, Oct. 3, 1973).
254 See S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 89 (1974) (“It is possible, indeed likely, that there will be a large influx of short term
and long term funds from oil-producing countries which could create a large payments surplus while at the same time,
the United States may be suffering a large trade deficit. In these circumstances, eliminating or reducing barriers to U.S.
imports would not be a proper remedy . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
255 See 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a).
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ITC256 or Department of Commerce,257 nor does it directly commit the tariff authority to an
agency, such as USTR.258 Section 122 provides that, subject to the 150-day limit on presidential
action, “[t]he President may at any time, consistent with the provisions of this section, suspend,
modify, or terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation.”259
Section 122 limits the President’s authority to impose different tariff rates either on different
goods or on imports from different countries. It generally requires that import restrictions “shall
be of broad and uniform application with respect to product coverage,” subject to specified
exceptions concerning “the needs of the United States economy” and “import restricting actions
[that would] be unnecessary or ineffective . . . such as with respect to articles already subject to
import restrictions, goods in transit, or goods under binding contract.”260 It also generally requires
that surcharges “be applied consistently with the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment,”
barring the imposition of different rates on imports from different countries.261 As an exception to
this nondiscrimination requirement, Section 122 states, “if the President determines that the
purposes of [Section 122] will best be served by action against one or more countries having large
or persistent balance-of-payments surpluses, he may exempt all other countries from such
action.”262
Section 338 of Tariff Act of 1930: Tariffs to Address Discrimination
Against the United States
Section 338 of the Trade Act of 1930263 directs the President to impose tariffs on articles produced
by, or imported on the vessels of, foreign countries that discriminate against U.S. commerce in
certain ways.264 As of the time of this writing, the United States has never imposed tariffs under
Section 338, although some international trade lawyers observe the statute has sometimes been
used as “leverage” in negotiations with other countries.265 Some news reports indicate Section
338 might be a potential means for the Trump Administration to impose tariffs in response to
other countries’ tariffs and nontariff barriers.266
Section 338 directs the President to impose tariffs “whenever he shall find as a fact” that a foreign
country either (1) imposes on U.S. products “any unreasonable charge, exaction, regulation, or
limitation which is not equally enforced upon the like articles of every foreign country” or
256 Cf. supra “Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs to Safeguard Domestic Industries.”
257 Cf. supra “Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Tariffs to Protect National Security.”
258 Cf. supra “Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Certain Other
Practices.”
259 19 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
260 19 U.S.C. § 2132(e). In addition, the statute prohibits either imposing or making exceptions to import restrictions
“for the purpose of protecting individual domestic industries from import competition.” Id.
261 Id. § 2132(d)(1); see 19 U.S.C. § 2481(9) (defining “nondiscriminatory treatment” as “trade treatment based on
normal trade relations (known under international law as most-favored-nation treatment)”). For an overview of how the
most-favored-nation obligation relates to U.S. tariffs, see CRS In Focus IF12995, International Trade Agreements and
U.S. Tariff Laws, by Christopher T. Zirpoli, Christopher A. Casey, and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs (2025).
262 19 U.S.C. § 2132(d)(2).
263 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338, 46 Stat. 704 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338).
264 See 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
265 See John K. Veroneau & Catherine H. Gibson, Presidential Tariff Authority, 111 AM. J. INT’L LAW 957, 958 (2017).
266 See David Lawder, Trump May Dust Off 1930 Trade Discrimination Law to Back Reciprocal US Tariffs, REUTERS
(Feb. 12, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-may-dust-off-1930-trade-discrimination-law-back-reciprocalus-tariffs-2025-02-12/.
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(2) disadvantages and discriminates against U.S. commerce “by or in respect to any customs,
tonnage, or port duty, fee, charge, exaction, classification, regulation, condition, restriction, or
prohibition”—provided he finds that doing so will serve the public interest.267 Section 338 also
permits the President to “suspend, revoke, supplement, or amend any such proclamation” if he
deems it is in the public interest.268
The President’s authority under Section 338 appears to overlap with that of USTR under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which also authorizes tariffs in response to certain “discriminatory”
practices by foreign countries.269 Unlike Section 301, Section 338 does not appear to require any
agency investigation or determination as a prerequisite to imposing tariffs.270 Section 338 charges
the ITC with “ascertain[ing]” and informing the President of relevant instances of discrimination:
It shall be the duty of the [ITC] to ascertain and at all times to be informed whether any of
the discriminations against the commerce of the United States enumerated in . . . this
section are practiced by any country; and if and when such discriminatory acts are
disclosed, it shall be the duty of the commission to bring the matter to the attention of the
President, together with recommendations.271
This provision, together with Section 338’s placement in Part II of the Tariff Act of 1930
(concerning the ITC), may raise a question as to whether the ITC must find that discrimination
has occurred before the President may impose tariffs.272 By authorizing the President to impose
tariffs “whenever he shall find as a fact” that discrimination has occurred,273 however, Section
388 does not appear to condition the President’s authority on such a finding by the ITC.
Tariffs under Section 338 may not exceed 50% of the value of the goods.274 Certain language in
Section 338 also appears to limit the President to imposing such additional duty rates as will
“offset” either the burden or disadvantage to U.S. commerce or the benefit to a third-party
country resulting from the foreign measures at issue. Specifically, Section 338 directs the
President to impose “such new or additional rate or rates of duty as he shall determine will offset”
the burden or disadvantage to U.S. commerce.275 Further, if the President “shall determine” that
such additional duties “do not effectively remove such imposition or discrimination” and that an
industry in a third country benefits from the foreign measures at issue, the President is authorized
to impose “such new or additional rate or rates of duty . . . as he shall determine will offset such
benefits.”276 Because Section 338 expressly commits to the President both the initial “find[ing] as
a fact” that a foreign country has taken actionable measures as well as the “determin[ation]” of
267 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
268 Id. § 1338(c).
269 See supra “Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Tariffs Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Certain Other
Practices.”
270 See Veroneau & Gibson, supra note 265, at 3 (“Because a recommendation by the Commission is not a necessary
condition for presidential action under Section 338, it appears the president could make the factual findings and adjust
tariffs unilaterally.”) (emphasis in original).
271 19 U.S.C. § 1338(g).
272 See generally Veroneau & Gibson, supra note 265, at 3 (“The extent to which the Commission may constrain the
president’s authority under Section 338 . . . is unclear.”).
273 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).
274
See id. § 1338(d), (e).
275 Id. § 1338(d).
276 Id. § 1338(e).
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what additional rates will offset those measures, courts might be unwilling to review these
decisions in light of Supreme Court precedent.277
Comparison of Selected Statutory Authorities
Table 1 compares the statutory authorities surveyed above in terms of their subject matter, which
agency (if any) is required to make findings as a prerequisite to imposing tariffs, the maximum
duration and rate (if any) of tariffs, and selected examples of their use.
Table 1. Selected Statutory Authorities
Summary of Key Provisions and Examples
Section 232
Section 201
Section 301
Section 122
Section 338
U.S. Code
Reference
19 U.S.C.
§ 1862
19 U.S.C.
§§ 2251–2255
19 U.S.C.
§§ 2411–2420
19 U.S.C.
§ 2132
19 U.S.C.
§ 1338
Subject
Matter
Articles
imported in
quantities or
circumstances
that threaten
national security
Injury to
domestic
industry from
import surges
Trade
agreement
violations;
certain other
practices
International
payments
problems incl.
balance-ofpayments
deficits
Burdens or
discrimination
against U.S.
commerce
Agency
Required to
Make Findings
Secretary of
Commerce
ITC
USTR
None
None
Limit on
Duration of
Action
None
4 years; may be
extended to 8
years in total
4 years; may be
extended with
no upper limit
150 days
None
Limit on
Tariff Rate
None
50%; note
phasedown
requirement
None
15%; note
uniformity
requirements
Offsetting rates
up to 50%
Selected
Tariff
Examples
Steel and
aluminum,
2018–;
automobiles,
2025–
Solar cell
products, 2018–
2026
Certain imports
from PRC,
2018–
Worldwide
surcharge,
2026–
Never used to
impose tariffs
Source: Compiled by CRS based on U.S. Code and CRS analysis of selected tariff actions.
Considerations for Congress
The U.S. Constitution grants the tariff power to Congress. Although the Supreme Court has held
that Congress has wide latitude to delegate tariff authority to the President, Congress is ultimately
responsible for determining what tariff authorities the President should have and what limitations
those authorities place on presidential discretion.
If Congress believes existing authorities are inadequate or insufficiently specific, it may consider
legislation delegating additional authorities to the President. For example, one bill introduced in
the 119th Congress would authorize the President to determine whether a foreign country imposes
tariff rates or nontariff barriers that are significantly higher than those of the United States as to
277 See supra “Unreviewable Acts That Are Committed to the President’s Discretion.”
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particular goods and, if so, to impose U.S. tariffs on those goods up to the rate applied by the
foreign country.278 Congress could potentially also expand the President’s authority under existing
authorities, such as by removing some of the above-described procedural requirements in various
tariff statutes. In addition, the Supreme Court’s holding that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs
would not necessarily prevent Congress from amending the statute to include that authority,
although such amendments could potentially confront constitutional challenges concerning the
nondelegation doctrine.279
Alternatively, Congress may repeal, amend, or place restrictions on existing statutory authorities.
One bill introduced in the 119th Congress, for example, would repeal Section 338.280 Other
proposals in the 119th Congress seek to condition certain exercises of the President’s tariff
authorities on the enactment of a joint resolution of approval, permitting simple majorities of both
houses of Congress to decide whether to allow (or continue) executive tariff actions.281 For
instance, companion bills introduced in the Senate and the House would cause tariffs imposed by
the President to expire after 60 days unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval.282
Another bill would require a joint resolution of approval before the President could impose tariffs
under certain statutes on imports from countries with which the United States has a free trade
agreement, member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and certain nonNATO allies.283 A different bill would require a joint resolution of approval for the President to
take action under Section 232 while restricting the kinds of imported articles to which that statute
may apply, among other reforms.284
In light of judicial precedent that has given the President broad latitude to exercise his tariff
authorities, Congress may consider whether existing tariff authorities provide suitable guardrails
around executive action. Since the Federal Circuit has traditionally permitted the President to act
under his tariff authorities unless he “clearly misconstrues” their scope, Congress may consider
whether limitations on presidential authority in these statutes are sufficiently clear. In addition,
since courts have held that presidential actions and fact-findings are unreviewable when
committed to his discretion by statute, Congress may consider whether existing authorities give
too little or too much discretion to the President, including whether and in what manner executive
agencies should be required to conduct investigations and make findings before the President may
act.
278 U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act, H.R. 735, 119th Cong. (2025). This bill also provides that Congress may terminate the
President’s action via enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. See id.
279 For discussion of potential nondelegation challenges to the use of IEEPA as a tariff authority, see CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB11281, Legal Authority for the President to Impose Tariffs Under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli (2025).
280 Repealing Outdated and Unilateral Tariff Authorities Act, H.R. 2464, 119th Cong. (2025).
281 Cf. CRS Report R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use,
coordinated by Christopher A. Casey (2025), at 11, 37, 53 (discussing the contrast between this approach and the
current requirement for a joint resolution of disapproval to terminate an emergency declaration supporting action taken
under IEEPA).
282 Trade Review Act of 2025, S. 1272/H.R. 2665, 119th Cong. (2025); see also Reclaiming Congressional Trade
Authority Act of 2025, H.R. 2712, 119th Cong. (2025) (requiring a joint resolution of approval and specified reports
from the ITC and Secretary of Defense to impose tariffs under Section 232 or IEEPA, among other reforms).
283 Stopping Tariffs on Allies and Bolstering Legislative Exercise of (STABLE) Trade Policy Act, S. 348, 119th Cong.
(2025).
284 Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2025, H.R. 1903, 119th Cong. (2025).
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Author Information
Christopher T. Zirpoli
Legislative Attorney
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.