Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent

Nuclear Fuel

January 23, 2025

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R48364

SUMMARY

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent

Nuclear Fuel

Nuclear reactors generate about 20% of U.S. commercial electric power and almost half of the

nation’s low carbon electricity generation. However, nuclear reactors also produce highly

radioactive spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that results from the fission (splitting) of uranium nuclei in

the reactor fuel. SNF must be isolated from the environment for thousands of years to prevent

harm.

R48364

January 23, 2025

Lance N. Larson

Analyst in Environmental

Policy

Mark Holt

Specialist in Energy Policy

About 91,000 metric tons of SNF is stored at nuclear plant sites around the United States,

awaiting consolidated storage and permanent underground disposal. The Nuclear Waste Policy

Act (P.L. 97-425), as amended, designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the only candidate site for a

national deep geologic repository for the disposal of SNF and other high-level nuclear waste. Political and legal opposition to

the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and operation of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.

Direct disposal of SNF, as currently planned in the United States, is called the “once through” fuel cycle. About 95% of SNF

consists of uranium from the fresh fuel that was originally loaded into the reactor and 1% consists of fissile plutonium

produced from irradiated uranium, both of which can be used in new fuel. The remaining 4% of SNF consists of highly

radioactive fragments of uranium and plutonium (fission products) that must be disposed of.

SNF can be reprocessed through chemical dissolution or melting to allow uranium and plutonium to be separated from the

fission products and made into new fuel. Repeated reprocessing of SNF is called the “closed cycle,” a major alternative to the

once-through cycle. Reprocessing is currently carried out in France, Russia, and a few other countries; however, there are no

commercial reprocessing operations in the United States. Reprocessed uranium and plutonium currently can be recycled only

once into new fuel for current reactor designs, as additional recycling would require advanced reactors, specifically fast

neutron reactors.

The United States developed technology for the reprocessing of SNF during World War II and for decades operated some of

the largest reprocessing facilities in the world, primarily for nuclear weapons material production purposes. Commercial

reprocessing activities in the United States ended during the 1970s and early 1980s because of rising costs and policy

concerns about the potential worldwide growth of stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium.

Interest in reprocessing in the United States has renewed among some policymakers and stakeholders primarily because of its

potential for reducing the volume and toxicity of nuclear waste. In principle, indefinite reprocessing of SNF could eliminate

the need for permanent disposal of uranium and plutonium, which would be made into new fuel, and require permanent

disposal of only the fission products, which would be immobilized in glass or other insoluble materials. However, there are

potential waste-related disadvantages. The degree to which total waste volumes and long-lived toxicity would be reduced by

any future reprocessing and recycling remains uncertain—along with the costs—and largely dependent on future technology

development.

Congress has supported the Department of Energy’s reprocessing research and development program in recent years through

a funding authorization in the Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z of P.L. 116-260) and subsequent annual appropriations. The

Energy Act of 2020 and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) authorized and appropriated more

than $2 billion for demonstrations of advanced reactors, including fast neutron reactors that could indefinitely recycle SNF

plutonium. In the 118th Congress, hearings on nuclear waste management and recycling were held in the House Energy and

Commerce and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committees, and the House Appropriations Committee in report

language called for commercialization of reprocessing by 2033 (H.Rept. 118-580).

Congressional Research Service

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2

The U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle .................................................................................................... 2

Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel ......................................................................................... 4

Considerations for U.S. Reprocessing ............................................................................................. 5

U.S. Policy—History and Developments .................................................................................. 6

Nonproliferation ........................................................................................................................ 6

Regulatory Framework............................................................................................................ 10

Waste Management and Contaminant Remediation Issues ..................................................... 10

Economics ............................................................................................................................... 13

Congressional Action .................................................................................................................... 15

Figures

Figure 1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle........................................................................................................... 3

Contacts

Author Information........................................................................................................................ 16

Congressional Research Service

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Introduction

Nuclear reactors produce highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel (SNF) as a result of power

production. During reactor operation, some of the uranium in nuclear fuel is split (fissioned) to

produce energy. The resulting fission products are intensely radioactive and thermally hot. Some

of the uranium also is converted to plutonium. After several years, reactor fuel can no longer

efficiently sustain a nuclear chain reaction and is placed into storage as SNF.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,1 as amended, designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the only

location where the Department of Energy (DOE) could construct a national high-level nuclear

waste repository for the permanent disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste. Political

and legal opposition to the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and

operation of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. As a result, currently SNF is stored at the

nuclear power plant where it was produced.

Reprocessing refers generally to the technical process of extracting uranium, plutonium, and

certain other elements from the SNF to be used as new fuel. Advocates of reprocessing cite two

major potential benefits: (1) extracting and reusing the fissile material (uranium-235 and

plutonium-239)2 to take advantage of the potential embedded energy value remaining after the

nuclear fuel has been “burned”3 and removed from a nuclear reactor, and (2) reducing the longlived radioactivity of nuclear waste to facilitate disposal options.

The United States developed technology for the reprocessing of SNF during World War II and for

decades operated some of the largest reprocessing facilities in the world to produce plutonium for

nuclear weapons. From 1966 to 1972, a reprocessing plant operated in West Valley, NY, to

separate uranium and plutonium for commercial reactor fuel. However, commercial reprocessing

was subsequently abandoned in the United States because of high costs and concerns about

nuclear weapons proliferation. Other countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Russia,

operate commercial reprocessing plants. Interest in reprocessing efforts in the United States has

renewed among some policymakers and stakeholders due to considerations pertaining to

alternative solutions for the management of high-level nuclear waste and the development of

“advanced” nuclear reactors, some of which would include a fuel cycle supported by reprocessed

SNF.

Some have argued for Congress to support reprocessing operations as an option to eliminate or

decrease the volume of nuclear waste required for a permanent repository, as well as to utilize

fuel that could be produced from SNF. On the other hand, others may argue that reprocessing

could lead to increased proliferation risks, waste management and disposal issues, and

1 P.L. 97-425, 42 U.S.C. §§10101 et seq.

2 In addition to these fissile materials, a variety of isotopes that are used in medical, industrial testing and scientific

activities can be extracted through chemical separations from spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In addition to producing energy

by reusing the fissile material, reusing the isotopes takes advantage of the energy and money invested in the original

front end of the nuclear fuel cycle for activities from mining, processing, and enrichment to create the fresh nuclear

fuel.

3 While the term burn is often used to refer to fission in a reactor, and the term high burnup reactors refers to the

process of increasingly making more efficient use of uranium, no combustion occurs and no combustion products (e.g.,

carbon dioxide [CO2], sulfur oxides [SOx], nitrogen oxides [NOx], or particulates) are emitted directly from nuclear

power production. Also, the reason for removing nuclear fuel from a reactor is not primarily the burnup or loss of

fission products (e.g., U-235), but rather the buildup of fission products that absorb neutrons and decrease the fuel’s

ability to generate heat cost-effectively. Much of the U-235, and hence the potential energy value, that is put into a

reactor as fresh fuel is later taken out as spent fuel, along with newly created fissile materials, such as plutonium, and

fission products that result from the splitting of uranium and plutonium nuclei. Reprocessing separates out these fission

products from fissile materials that can be reused for nuclear fuel.

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Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

uncertainties about costs. This report describes reprocessing in the context of the nuclear fuel

cycle and provides general considerations regarding U.S. policy, nonproliferation, the regulatory

framework, waste management and disposal, environmental concerns, and economics. The final

section discusses recent congressional action involving reprocessing, high-level waste

management, and advanced reactors.

Background

The U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The U.S. nuclear fuel cycle includes the process of extracting uranium from the earth, enriching

the uranium to increase the concentration of the fissile form of uranium (U-235), fabricating the

enriched uranium into fuel rod assemblies capable of being used in nuclear reactors for generating

electric power, and managing the resulting SNF. Commercial civilian nuclear reactors in the

United States use low-enriched uranium (LEU) oxide fuel assemblies to generate nuclear power

through fission reactions.4 The fuel rods are bundled into fuel assemblies for placement in the

reactor core. These assemblies facilitate a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction that generates

heat, which is used to drive turbines to produce electric power. Approximately every 18-24

months, the reactor fuel becomes incapable of economically producing power and must be

replaced (i.e., it is considered “spent”). Fuel assemblies removed from the reactor following

power production are called SNF.5

4 Natural uranium has an isotopic composition of approximately 0.71% U-235, the fissile isotope of uranium. Civilian

nuclear power fuel is generally enriched to 3%-5% U-235. Until 2013, uranium enrichment in the United States was

largely performed using a gaseous diffusion technology. Currently, one uranium enrichment plant, which employs gas

centrifuge technology, operates in the United States.

5 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, defines SNF as the fuel assemblies “withdrawn from a nuclear

reactor following irradiation.” 42 U.S.C. §10101.

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Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Figure 1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel - Congressional Action Needed to

Break Impasse and Develop a Permanent Disposal Solution, GAO-21-603, 2021.

SNF is currently stored in one of two ways: in storage pools or dry casks. Immediately following

power production, SNF is discharged from the reactors and stored in pools of water on-site, as it

remains intensely radioactive and thermally hot. Wet pools provide regulated conditions allowing

the fuel to cool, while water is circulated and maintained to keep it from boiling off and

uncovering the fuel. In dry cask storage, the SNF is stored in sealed, steel canisters surrounded by

radiation shielding materials, such as steel, concrete, or other materials. Wet storage capacity for

SNF can be limited, prompting most reactor sites to store SNF using a combination of wet storage

and dry casks.6 As of December 2022, 91,000 metric tons of SNF were stored in the United

States, mostly at nuclear power plant sites, increasing by about 2,200 metric tons per year.7

The U.S. nuclear power industry is considered an “open fuel cycle” or “once-through fuel cycle,”

as new uranium as fuel must be mined and processed to replace the nuclear fuel used in reactors.

The once-through fuel cycle uses only a fraction of the 0.7% of U-235 found in natural uranium,

plus a small fraction of the dominant isotope U-238 that is converted to plutonium during reactor

operation. The vast majority of the initially mined uranium is planned for disposal.

In a “closed fuel cycle,” reprocessing of SNF would extract uranium, plutonium, and certain other

elements from the SNF to be used as new fuel. Plutonium is a particularly important fissile

6 In dry storage, spent fuel is placed in sealed containers filled with inert gas and cooled by natural air circulation. For

more information, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by Mark Holt.

7 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory, December 2024,

https://curie.pnnl.gov/system/files/

SNF%20and%20Rep%20Waste%20Inventory%20PNNL%2033938%20Rev.%201.1_0.pdf.

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Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

material that can be used in nuclear reactor fuel instead of enriched uranium. Proponents of a

closed fuel cycle assert this cycle could continue indefinitely and be used to fuel some advanced

reactors so that only relatively short-lived fission products would need permanent disposal.8

High-level waste from reprocessing would initially be similar to spent fuel in heat and

radioactivity but would decay to near background levels after several hundred years because

plutonium and other long-lived radioactive materials would be removed and used as new fuel. In

addition, proponents assert the closed fuel cycle could extract from the fuel many times the

amount of energy that could be produced with the once-through cycle.9

Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

In general, reprocessing of SNF involves separating uranium, plutonium, and minor actinides10

from the SNF for reuse in other purposes, such as nuclear warhead production or fuel for further

civilian use. Because separated plutonium is one of two materials that can be used to make a

nuclear weapon (the other being enriched uranium), international controls on spent fuel

reprocessing are a fundamental element in weapons nonproliferation policy. The United States

has long sought to discourage additional countries from building reprocessing facilities. The U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) defines reprocessing as “the processes used to separate

spent nuclear reactor fuel into nuclear materials that may be recycled for use in new fuel and

material that would be discarded as waste.”11

According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), all commercial reprocessing facilities

operating in five other countries use the PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) technique,

although with some variation depending upon the fuel cycle needs.12 In general, the PUREX

technique involves a series of processing steps, including dissolving the SNF in nitric acid;

chemically separating uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) using various organic solvent extraction

methods; and finally converting the Pu and U to respective powder forms, plutonium oxide

(PuO2) and uranium oxide (UO2). In part to address issues experienced with potentially harmful

environmental releases, proliferation vulnerability, and costs, other reprocessing technologies

have been proposed, such as UREX (uranium extraction only) and UREX+,13 that would not fully

separate plutonium.14 Additionally, researchers have examined other reprocessing techniques,

such as pyroprocessing and electrometallurgical refining.15 Not all such processes for recycling

8 Argonne National Laboratory, Nuclear Fuel Recycling Could Offer Plentiful Energy, 2012, https://www.anl.gov/

article/nuclear-fuel-recycling-could-offer-plentiful-energy.

9 For example, see World Nuclear Association, “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/

information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.

10 Actinides are a group of elements on the periodic table from mass number 89 (actinium) to 103 (lawrencium). In the

context of SNF, minor actinides are typically americium, neptunium, and curium.

11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reprocessing, https://www.nrc.gov/materials/reprocessing.html#background.

12 The World Nuclear Association (WNA) identifies five countries with facilities capable of commercial reprocessing:

France, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, and India. WNA, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, updated 2020,

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.

13 There have been many different proposed UREX+ designs with various products and waste streams. See ibid.

14 M. C. Regalbuto, “Alternative Separation and Extraction: UREX+ Processes for Actinide and Targeted Fission

Product Recovery,” in Advanced Separation Techniques for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste

Treatment (Woodhead Publishing, 2011).

15 World Nuclear Association, “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” updated December 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/

information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx. See section on

“Electrometallurgical ‘Pyroprocessing.’” Additional discussion of reprocessing technology can be found in Section

4.3.6 of National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), Merits and Viability of Different

(continued...)

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SNF would result in fully separated plutonium, which is a weapons-usable material.16 If

plutonium is not fully separated from the highly radioactive fission products in SNF, it is

generally considered less attractive to be used as weapons material.

The volume and radiotoxicity of waste products from reprocessing depends on the separation

process employed, which affects both the extent to which SNF is separated and the degree of

transmutation17 of critical components.18 In general, the waste liquid remaining after reprocessing

SNF and separating Pu and U (which make up about 97% of the spent fuel) is considered highlevel waste (HLW), which is highly radioactive and thermally hot. The liquid HLW contains the

highly radioactive fission products and minor actinides that constituted about 3% of the spent fuel

before it was reprocessed.19 This liquid waste can be conditioned with certain dry materials in

order to convert (i.e., vitrify) it into a more stable borosilicate glass for long-term management.

U.S. reprocessing plants associated with defense activities stored liquid HLW in large

underground tanks where treatment and disposal remain pending. Data on existing waste

treatment technologies are available from currently operating plants such as DOE’s large HLW

glassification (i.e. vitrification) facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina (Defense

Waste Processing Facility), which started operating in 1996.

A 2023 study from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (referred to

in this report as the “NASEM study”)20 noted that reprocessing generates a wide variety of waste

streams: “Some of these waste streams are captured in waste forms for disposal in low-level

waste disposal facilities or a geologic repository, while others are released to the environment

either in liquid or gaseous forms.”21 For a future commercial reprocessing facility, any degree of

risk from emissions would be dependent upon NRC regulations governing these operations, and

compliance with those regulations.

Considerations for U.S. Reprocessing

The following sections discuss considerations associated with developing commercial

reprocessing operations in the United States. As noted above, reprocessing operations exist in five

other countries, but not in the United States. These sections provide general considerations

regarding U.S. policy, nonproliferation, the regulatory framework, waste management and

disposal, environmental concerns, and costs. These sections do not intend to address the technical

and/or economic viability of any proposed reprocessing or advanced reactor designs, nor do they

assume that any future reprocessing operations could not address these considerations.

Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023,

https://doi.org/10.17226/26500.

16 National Research Council, Review of DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research and Development Program, Washington,

DC, 2008, pp. 48-49.

17 Transmutation is a change in number of protons or neutrons in an atomic nucleus through nuclear reactions or

nuclear decay.

18 M. C. Regalbuto, “Alternative Separation and Extraction: UREX+ Processes for Actinide and Targeted Fission

Product Recovery,” in Advanced Separation Techniques for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste

Treatment (Woodhead Publishing, 2011).

19 World Nuclear Association, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/

nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.

20 NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of

Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500.

21 See ibid., p. 136.

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U.S. Policy—History and Developments

U.S. policies that support commercial reprocessing have varied since reprocessing activities

began for defense activities during World War II. Fissile materials were first produced by the U.S.

government by enriching natural uranium to uranium-235 (Oak Ridge, TN) and reprocessing

irradiated uranium fuel and separating out the plutonium (Hanford, WA) during World War II

under the Manhattan Project.

In the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA), Congress defined “fissionable materials” to include

plutonium, uranium-235, and other materials determined to be capable of releasing substantial

quantities of energy through nuclear fission.22 Congress amended the AEA in 1954 to define

“special nuclear material” to supplant “fissionable materials,” and included uranium-233, material

determined to be special nuclear material, and any artificially enriched material.23 Additionally,

the AEA of 1954 authorized the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to license commercial

nuclear reactors and eased restrictions on private companies using special nuclear materials. The

U.S. government held the title to any special nuclear materials used or produced at a licensed U.S.

facility.

Interest in commercial reprocessing of SNF began in the 1950s. In 1966, the AEC granted a

commercial reprocessing permit to Nuclear Fuel Services for the West Valley facility, near

Buffalo, NY. The facility operated until 1972 when it shut down for upgrades to meet stricter

regulatory requirements and never operated again.24 During operation, 2,500 cubic meters (m3) of

HLW was produced, stored, and later vitrified.25 During roughly the same time, other commercial

reprocessing operations were proposed or partially constructed, but never operated.26

Nonproliferation

The reprocessing of SNF results in at least the partial separation of plutonium, a key material in

nuclear weapons. As a result, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation throughout the world

is a major element in the debate over reprocessing policy. Light water nuclear reactors (LWRs)—

the type of all commercial nuclear reactors operating in the United States—create plutonium

during operation when uranium-238 absorbs neutrons and undergoes radioactive decay to become

plutonium-239. Thus, SNF removed from a reactor includes various plutonium and uranium

isotopes. This plutonium poses relatively low proliferation risk unless it is separated from fission

products.27 Once separated through reprocessing, the plutonium could be used to produce fuel for

LWRs; fast neutron breeder reactors; or nuclear warheads, provided the availability of technical

expertise and specialized facilities.28 The 2023 NASEM study noted that “fuel cycles involving

22 P.L. 79-585.

23 P.L. 83-703.

24 Congressional Budget Office, Nuclear Reprocessing and Proliferation: Alternative Approaches and their

Implications for the Federal Budget, May 1977.

25 Qin-Hong Hu et al., “Sources of Anthropogenic Radionuclides in the Environment: A Review,” Journal of

Environmental Radioactivity (2010).

26 General Electric proposed a reprocessing plant at Morris, IL, and Allied-General Nuclear Services began

construction at a facility in Barnwell, SC.

27 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: The

National Academies Press, 1994), https://doi.org/10.17226/2345. The report proposed a “Spent Fuel Standard” as a

basis for comparing the risks to the fissile material “self-protected” in a spent fuel rod.

28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of

Reactor-Grade Plutonium, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms?formurl=document/press/pc29.html; DOE,

(continued...)

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reprocessing and separation of fissile material that could be weapons usable pose greater

proliferation and terrorism risks than the once-through uranium fuel cycle with direct disposal of

spent fuel, as the separated fissile material would not be uniformly mixed with highly radioactive

fission products.”29 International safeguards against diversion of plutonium and enriched uranium

for weapons, as discussed below, can be a means of reducing proliferation risk.

Existing global stockpiles of plutonium and uranium, which are substantial, also pose a

proliferation concern. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, as of December

31, 2022, the global stockpile of separated plutonium was 560 metric tons (MT), of which 140

MT was available for weapons.30 The remaining 420 MT of plutonium stockpiles were

characterized as not suitable for weapons, because they were produced outside of weapon

programs, covered by obligations prohibiting the use in weapons, or not directly suitable for

weapons.31 The largest stockpiles of plutonium available for weapons were generally in countries

where reprocessing has occurred for defense or commercial purposes: Russia (88.0 MT), the

United States (38.4 MT), the United Kingdom (3.2 MT), France (6.0 MT), and China (2.9 MT).

Global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were 1,245 MT as of December 31, 2022,

and mostly located in Russia (55%) and the United States (39%), with lesser amounts held in

other countries.

These existing stockpiles of plutonium and HEU can be regarded as both an energy resource for

nuclear power plant reactor fuel as well as a liability due to the storage costs and proliferation

risk. A variety of domestic and international systems and institutions provide safeguards for these

stockpiles.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 to ensure that civilian

nuclear facilities and materials, such as those related to reprocessing, are not diverted for military

uses.32 Safeguards are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material

from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses.33 Increasing the stockpiles of separated fissile

materials through reprocessing would likely increase the requirements for IAEA technical staff

“Plutonium: The First 50 Years,” DOE/DP-0137, 1996; and Gregory S. Jones, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium and Nuclear

Weapons: Ending the Debate,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 26 (2019), pp. 1-2, 61-81, https://doi.org/10.1080/

10736700.2019.1603497.

29 NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of

Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 13.

30 International Panel on Fissile Materials, Fissile Material Stocks, https://fissilematerials.org/#:~:text=

Fissile%20material%20stocks&text=

The%20global%20stockpile%20of%20separated,not%20directly%20suitable%20for%20weapons. Different countries

have different criteria for determining what material are available for weapons.

31 See ibid.

32 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental organization that has a

relationship agreement with the United Nations, has 172 member states, including the United States. The agency’s

missions include promoting nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear technology for medical and

agricultural purposes, as well as implementing safeguards agreements in more than 180 countries.

33 IAEA safeguards are designed “to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material

and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses” (IAEA, The Safeguards System of the

International Atomic Energy Agency). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires nonnuclear-weapon states

parties to conclude comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. Such agreements apply safeguards “on all nuclear

material in all nuclear activities in a State” (IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International Nuclear

Verification Series No. 3). The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a

nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the

United Kingdom, and the United States. All other countries are not nuclear weapon states. See also CRS Report

R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D.

Nikitin, and Mark Holt.

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and other resources to maintain these safeguards. The IAEA recognized in 2021 that it was

addressing a “growing gap between demand and resources … [with] increasing demands on the

Agency for support.”34

While domestic and international safeguards are intended to prevent the diversion of a sufficient

quantity and quality of fissile materials to fabricate a nuclear explosive device, some have

expressed concerns that these materials may be obtained by a politically unstable state or a

terrorist organization—a well-financed organization with the ability to hire or recruit the

necessary abilities to create a nuclear explosive device—if domestic reprocessing were to lack

sufficiently high security measures. Furthermore, reprocessing plants would require a high level

of security, with associated increased costs, to safeguard the materials stored at the facility.35

Another long-standing concern has been the policy signal potentially sent to other countries if the

United States resumes reprocessing. Any proposal to resume commercial reprocessing in the

United States to make reactor fuel may raise concerns about an increase in global commerce in

fissile material and undermine long-standing U.S. policy to discourage the development of

reprocessing and enrichment capacity in non-nuclear-weapon states.36

The use of plutonium-based fuel in nuclear power plants has been a recurring congressional issue.

When Congress deliberated funding for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in 2008

(see “Reprocessing Policy History, In Brief” below), the House committee report accompanying

the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008, expressed

concern that too many GNEP partner countries wanted to be nuclear fuel suppliers (producing

enriched uranium and plutonium fuel for domestic use and export) rather than recipients.

According to the report,

At the recent DOE-sponsored international ministerial meeting on GNEP, the

Administration abandoned any pretext that GNEP will promote international nuclear

nonproliferation by relenting to partner demands that “partnership” countries can continue

to produce weapons-usable plutonium in their reprocessing activities. The Committee is

disappointed that the Administration would support any effort that leads to increased

availability of plutonium anywhere in the world.37

Reprocessing Policy History, In Brief

When the commercial nuclear power industry was under development in the 1950s and 1960s by the U.S. Atomic

Energy Commission, it was widely expected that SNF from power reactors would be reprocessed to separate the

remaining uranium and plutonium for new fuel. With up to 1,000 reactors expected to be built in the United

States by the end of the 20th century, reprocessing was considered essential for making the maximum use of what

were believed to be limited uranium resources. Early reactors were designed with relatively small spent fuel pools

to hold discharged SNF until it could be shipped to a commercial reprocessing plant. However, India’s diversion of

reprocessed plutonium from its nuclear power program to produce a nuclear explosive device in 1974 generated

worldwide controversy about the future expansion of commercial reprocessing, including in the United States.

In 1976, President Ford announced that “the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless

there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of

proliferation ... [and] that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce

34 IAEA, The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2022–2023, GC(65)/(2), 2021.

35 Mark Hibbs and Fred McGoldrick, “A Realistic and Effective Policy on Sensitive Nuclear Activities,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/10/a-realistic-and-effectivepolicy-on-sensitive-nuclear-activities?lang=en.

36 CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to

Nuclear Power, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.

37 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008,

committee print, 110th Cong., H.Rept. 110-185 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 67.

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plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and

recycling in the future only if they are found to be consistent with our international objectives.” The following

year, President Carter announced a shift in policy: “We will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and

recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs.” In 1981, President Reagan announced that

he “was lifting the indefinite ban which previous administrations placed on commercial reprocessing activities in

the United States.” At the same time, however, federal funding for a commercial reprocessing plant in South

Carolina was terminated, and the project was abandoned.

In 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced in a statement on nuclear nonproliferation,

I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead and

directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to

produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of

proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of

mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

In 1993, President Clinton announced, “The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and,

accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive

purposes. The United States, however, will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in

civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.”

President George W. Bush in 2006 proposed to establish the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) with the

goal of addressing issues of nuclear proliferation and nuclear waste. Through the GNEP, countries with nuclear

fuel infrastructure, including the United States, would have supplied nuclear fuel and technologies to countries

without nuclear power capabilities. In turn, the countries using nuclear power would agree to return the SNF,

which would be reprocessed in the original country and be used as a source of fuel for reactors. In DOE’s

description, this aspect of GNEP would be nonproliferative because participating countries would be forgoing their

own enrichment and/or separations activities.

In 2009, President Obama ended work on the previous Administration’s programmatic environmental impact

statement for GNEP. The program was transformed into the International Framework for Nuclear Energy

Cooperation (IFNEC) under the Obama Administration and has continued as an international fuel cycle forum.

More recently, DOE continues to carry out reprocessing operations at various defense sites to manage SNF. For

commercial nuclear power plants, however, the 2023 NASEM study recommended that “the current U.S. policy of

using a once-through fuel cycle with the direct disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel into a repository should

continue for the foreseeable future,” but also that “DOE should develop and implement a phased, long-range

research and development program that focuses on advanced separations and transmutations technologies.”

Sources:

•

U.S. President Gerald Ford, Presidential Documents, vol. 12, no. 44 (1976), pp. 1626-1627.

•

U.S. President Jimmy Carter, “Nuclear Power, Policy Statement by the President on His Decisions Following

a Review of U.S. Policy,” Presidential Documents, vol. 13, no. 15 (April 7, 1977).

•

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, “Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy,” October 8,

1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-series-policy-initiatives-nuclearenergy.

•

U.S. President George H. W. Bush, “Statement on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts,” Public Papers of the

Presidents of the United States: George H.W. Bush, 1992, Book I, pp. 1110-1111.

•

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,”

September 27, 1993.

•

U.S. Department of Energy, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan, GNEP-167312, 2007,

https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/GNEPStrategicPlanJan2007.pdf.

•

Geoff Brumfiel, “US Nuclear Recycling Faces the Axe,” Nature, July 2, 2009.

•

International Framework for Nuclear Cooperation website, https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/jcms/j_6/home.

•

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Spent Nuclear Fuel Management,

Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Mission for H-Canyon, at the Savannah River Site,” 87 Federal Register 23504,

April 4, 2022.

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•

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles

and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors (Washington, DC: The National

Academies Press, 2023), p. 85.

Regulatory Framework

As discussed above, no commercial reprocessing facilities are currently operating in the United

States. If such a facility were proposed, it would be required to obtain an NRC license under the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and would need to adhere to any other applicable

federal permitting requirements.38 The NRC has only regulated a single operational commercial

reprocessing facility, at West Valley, NY, which operated from 1966 to 1972. In June 2007, the

NRC commissioners directed NRC staff to conduct a regulatory gap analysis and identify

regulatory requirements necessary to license reprocessing facilities.39 In 2013, NRC staff

recommended a rulemaking for reprocessing facilities based on the findings of the gap analysis.

The rulemaking activities were suspended in 2016 due to “budgetary constraints and an apparent

lack of commercial interest in reprocessing.”40 On July 28, 2021, NRC discontinued the

rulemaking activity for spent fuel reprocessing “based on the estimated costs to conduct the

rulemaking and the limited interest expressed or expected from industry to submit an application

for any type of facility involving reprocessing technologies in the near-term.”41 NRC estimated

the rulemaking would cost $2.5 million to complete, and did not anticipate reviewing a license

application for a reprocessing facility within 10-20 years. In the event that commercial

reprocessing license applications are submitted to NRC prior to implementation of new

reprocessing regulations, the NRC stated it would license those facilities under current

regulations, typically used for licensing of nuclear reactors.42

On December 29, 2022, Oklo Inc. contacted NRC to begin pre-application activities to seek a

license for a commercial-scale spent fuel reprocessing facility.43 Reportedly, Oklo is working with

Argonne National Laboratory to develop electrorefining technology and to use spent fuel

elements to produce new nuclear fuel.44

Waste Management and Contaminant Remediation Issues

Reprocessing of SNF for defense and civilian uses in the past has resulted in extensive

environmental contamination and waste management challenges, particularly the treatment and

disposal of stored HLW. Thus, the management and disposal of wastes from future reprocessing

would be an important consideration for the operation of these facilities. While reprocessing SNF

would change the nature and composition of the nuclear waste, this option would raise multiple

technical, legal, and policy considerations regarding the long-term management and disposal

waste produced from reprocessing operations. Under current law, wastes produced from

38 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq.

39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Staff Requirements—SECY-07-0081—Regulatory Options for Licensing

Facilities Associated with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), ML071800084, 2007.

40 Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI Comments on Spent Fuel Reprocessing Rulemaking, ML20154K554, 2020.

41 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Spent Fuel Reprocessing,” 86 Federal Register 40764, 2021.

42 See 10 C.F.R. Part 50 - “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.”

43 Oklo, Oklo Inc. Licensing Project Plan: Fuel Recycling Technologies (Initial), 2022,

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML22363A080.

44 Jeff Beattie, “Eight Months After NRC’s Rejection, Oklo Applies Again to License Microreactor,” Nucleonics Week,

2022, p. 3.

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reprocessing would still require disposal in a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain,

NV. This section discusses the history of the environmental problems resulting from past

reprocessing as well as technologies and regulations to reduce environmental risk at future

reprocessing plants.

U.S. government reprocessing facilities during and following World War II generally operated

prior to the establishment of regulatory requirements for nuclear waste management. Thus, the

ongoing remediation and waste management operations at sites where reprocessing activities

occurred in support of nuclear weapons production in the United States may not be analogous to

potential impacts of future commercial reprocessing operations. Historical activities at many of

these facilities resulted in the contamination of various soil, surface water, and groundwater.

Much of the understanding of the potential environmental impacts from the production of HLW

from reprocessing have stemmed from operational experiences at reprocessing facilities for U.S.

nuclear weapons production during and after World War II. Generally, the DOE Office of

Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for remediating these types of sites. The nature

of contaminants, areas affected, environmental and ecological issues, and remedial actions vary

widely at DOE-EM sites.45 Many of these DOE-EM sites require environmental remediation

activities that will remain ongoing for decades, and require long-term stewardship in perpetuity,

currently undertaken by DOE’s Office of Legacy Management, after the remedial activities are

complete. State and federal regulations for future commercial reprocessing facilities, and the

management of the associated wastes, would be required to prevent or minimize similar potential

impacts.

DOE manages HLW resulting from reprocessing SNF, generally from the historical production of

nuclear warheads. In the United States, some DOE-owned or -managed sites maintain HLW

inventories from reprocessing SNF, as well as material shipped there from commercial power

reactors in limited circumstances. In some instances, these DOE sites may store various types of

HLW and SNF.46 At these sites, DOE has vitrified some liquid HLW to be stored on-site until it

can be permanently disposed of in a future geologic repository. At some DOE sites, such as

Hanford, WA, and Savannah River Site, SC, considerable amounts of HLW remain in liquid form.

According to the Government Accountability Office,

DOE oversees the treatment and disposal of about 54 million gallons of radioactive and

hazardous waste at the Hanford Site in Washington State. Before treating the tank waste,

DOE plans to separate it into two streams: (1) a high-activity portion, which DOE estimates

will contain about 5 percent of the volume but more than 70 percent of the radioactivity;

and (2) a low-activity portion, which will contain about 95 percent of the volume.47

Additionally, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board estimates the volume of vitrified HLW

to increase from 3,200 m3 to 26,300 m3 from 2012 to 2048.48

45 For examples, see F. W. Whicker et al., “Avoiding Destructive Remediation at DOE Sites,” Science, vol. 303, no.

5664 (2004); Joana Burger et al., “Assessing Ecological Resources for Remediation and Future Land Uses on

Contaminated Lands,” Environmental Management, vol. 34 (2004); Mark J. Peterson, Rebecca A. Efroymson, and S.

Marshall Adams, “Long-Term Biological Monitoring of an Impaired Stream: Synthesis and Environmental

Management Implications,” Environmental Management, vol. 47 (2011); Joanna Burger et al., “Role of Uncertainties

in Protecting Ecological Resources During Remediation and Restoration,” Journal of Toxicology and Environmental

Health, Part A, vol. 84, no. 12 (2021).

46 CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson.

47 Government Accountability Office, Hanford Cleanup: DOE Should Validate Its Analysis of High-Level Waste

Treatment Alternatives, GAO-23-106093, May 2023, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106093.pdf.

48 U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Six Overarching Recommendations for How to Move the Nation’s

Nuclear Waste Management Program Forward: A Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy, 2021.

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The origin of radioactive waste, rather than its radiologic characteristics, often determines its

classification and disposal requirements. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)49 defines SNF as

being “withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation”50 and HLW as “highly radioactive

material from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.”51 Although they are quite different technically,

both fall under the broader definition of “high-level radioactive waste.”52 SNF is sometimes

referred to as “used” nuclear fuel.

The NWPA authorized DOE to site a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of SNF and

HLW. Congress amended the NWPA in 1987 to designate Yucca Mountain as the only location to

be considered by DOE to construct a national high-level nuclear waste repository. Political and

legal opposition to the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and operation

of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. NWPA authorized DOE to enter into agreements with

nuclear utilities and other reactor owners to collect fees to pay for DOE’s disposal of the SNF.

However, because DOE had not begun operating a permanent repository as required by NWPA,

the federal government has paid roughly $10.6 billion to nuclear utilities and other reactor owners

pursuant to court settlements and final judgments as of September 30, 2023.53 Under current law,

without the availability of a long-term geologic repository or consolidated interim storage facility,

all SNF and HLW will remain on site at 80 facilities in the United States, which are

predominantly commercial nuclear power plants and DOE facilities.54

One of the main intended benefits of SNF reprocessing would be to decrease or eliminate the

disposal of plutonium, uranium, and long-lived fission products in the SNF. Some research

indicates that reprocessing SNF would decrease the surface footprint and volume required for a

geologic repository, as well as reduce the overall radiotoxicity of certain waste forms intended for

repository disposal.55 The degree to which reprocessing could affect the total required HLW

storage would depend on the types of reprocessing technologies employed and the waste

characterizations. Nevertheless, studies have generally found that any fuel cycle concept would

require some form of waste management in a geologic repository.

In the United States, wastes produced by commercial reprocessing would be regulated by NRC

under the AEA. HLW produced from reprocessing may include a mix of radiological and

chemical constituents. Depending upon the type of operation and the wastes produced, the facility

may require permitting under other federal environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act or the

Clean Water Act. Discharges or emissions into the environment would also be subject to the terms

of the NRC license and other federal permits, and the federal agency issuing the license or permit

would be responsible for enforcing compliance with those requirements. The extent to which a

release of constituents would affect the environment would depend on the nature of the

49 P.L. 97-425.

50 42 U.S.C. §10101(23).

51 42 U.S.C. §10101(12).

52 See 42 U.S.C. §10101(23), 10 C.F.R. §60.2, 10 C.F.R. §63.2, and 40 C.F.R. §197.2. Under 42 U.S.C. §10101(12):

The term “high-level radioactive waste” means—

(A) the highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including

liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid

waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations; and

(B) other highly radioactive material that the Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule

requires permanent isolation.

53 U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, FY2023.

54 CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson.

55 Robin Taylor et al., “A Review of Environmental and Economic Implications of Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Part One Wastes and Environmental Impacts,” Energies, vol. 15, no. 1433 (2022).

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constituents, the duration of the release, the amount of the release, and the location of the

incident, among other factors.

In addition to the potential benefits described above, some stakeholders contend another benefit

of reprocessing may be the reduced need for uranium production and the associated

environmental impacts. For example, the 2023 NASEM study found that the “main advantage” of

SNF reprocessing and recycling of uranium and plutonium “is the conservation of uranium

resources at the front end of the fuel cycle and the associated reduction in the environmental

impact of uranium mining.”56

Economics

Economic costs and benefits are an important consideration for private and public investments in

commercial reprocessing. Currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants have faced economic

challenges due to increasing competition from power plants using natural gas and renewable

energy.57 For commercial reprocessing to be economically viable, it would need to produce

nuclear reactor fuel (made with reprocessed plutonium and/or uranium) at a price competitive

with existing uranium fuel, or reduce nuclear plants’ waste management costs. Given the

economic challenges already faced by some U.S. nuclear power plants and uncertainties

regarding costs of reprocessing, government policy interventions may be necessary for

commercial reprocessing to be economically viable.

In 2003, a Harvard University study concluded that reprocessing “will be more expensive than

direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium

(kgU)58—a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then.”59 Furthermore, that study

argued that its findings may be conservative, as the study did not include other potential costs

associated with reprocessing, such as costs for storage of separated plutonium or removal of

americium, additional security, licensing and shutdown costs, and geologic disposal of spent

mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.60 The principal author of the study reiterated those findings in a 2021

presentation to the NASEM Committee on Advanced Reactors and Fuel Cycles, contending that a

kilogram of plutonium fuel would cost six times as much as a kilogram of conventional uranium

fuel.61

56 See NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects

of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 158.

57 Steve Clemmer et al., The Nuclear Power Dilemma, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/

sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-full-report.pdf.

58 This amount would be approximately $164 per pound. In comparison, the average uranium spot price for October

2024 was $80.50 per pound. Cameco, Uranium Price, https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price.

59 Matthew Bunn et al., The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Harvard University,

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Final Report, 2003.

60 For more information about MOX fuel use in the United States, see Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The Use of

MOX Fuel in the United States: Bibliography of Important Documents and Discussion of Key Issues, ORNL/LTR 2012/315, https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub38036.pdf.

61 Matthew Bunn, “The Economics of Reprocessing and Recycling vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,”

presentation to the Committee on Advanced Reactors and Fuel Cycles of the National Academies of Sciences,

Engineering, and Medicine, 2021.

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Other researchers have reported costs of “closed cycles” are on average higher than “open cycles”

by between less than 5% to 20%; however, they report there may be overlap in costs depending

upon the various operation factors, assumptions, and uncertainties.62

When Congress deliberated about funding GNEP in 2008, the House Appropriations Committee

expressed concern regarding the life cycle costs of the program:

Embarking on a costly process leading to major new construction projects is unwise,

particularly where there is no urgency, and the Department has failed to persuade the

Committee of the critical need to proceed with GNEP now. In addition, before the

Department can expect the Committee to support funding for a major new initiative, the

Department must provide a complete and credible estimate of the life-cycle costs of the

program [and] demonstrate that it can manage and control the costs of its ongoing

projects.63

The 2023 NASEM study reviewed previous studies of reprocessing economics and made the

following observation:

Like all such studies, the specific methodologies vary, and there are many important

assumptions made regarding the input data used to calculate costs, making cost

comparisons challenging. A common conclusion reached across many cost and modeling

studies is that, while spent fuel management represents a relatively small fraction of the

total LCOE [levelized cost of electricity], differences in that area could result in large

absolute costs depending on the size of the nuclear program and the duration of electricity

generation.64

A more positive assessment of reprocessing economics is provided by the French nuclear fuel

services company Orano, which has operated a commercial reprocessing plant at La Hague,

France, since 1966. According to Orano, its costs for SNF reprocessing per mewagatt-hour of

electricity generated have dropped 40% during the past 10 years. “The cost of used fuel recycling

for French society represents less than 2% of the national electricity bill, or around €10 per year

per household,” according to the company. “This amount is going down each year thanks to

increased competitiveness made possible by efficient management of industrial facilities, use of

innovative processes and technologies, and optimized use of fuel in reactors.” Orano further

contends that the cost of reprocessing/recycling is “roughly equivalent” to that of the oncethrough fuel cycle.65 The experiences of Orano may not represent those of potential reprocessing

plants in the United States, due to differences in regulatory requirements among countries.

As this discussion indicates, the extent to which any reprocessing technology could be a viable,

cost-effective alternative to current plans for storage and disposal of SNF would depend on a host

of factors.

62 Robin Tayler et al., “A Review of Environmental and Economic Implications of Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle—

Part Two: Economic Impacts,” Energies, vol. 15, no. 2472 (2022).

63 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008,

committee print, 110th Cong., H.Rept. 110-185 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 68.

64 See NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects

of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 130.

65 Orano, “All About Used Fuel Processing and Recycling,” accessed January 7, 2025, https://www.orano.group/en/

unpacking-nuclear/all-about-used-fuel-processing-and-recycling.

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Congressional Action

Congress has enacted a variety of measures in recent years to develop advanced nuclear reactor

technologies, including SNF reprocessing and recycling.66 In the most recent example, President

Biden signed the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy

(ADVANCE) Act on July 9, 2024 (Division B of P.L. 118-870), which includes a provision to

reimburse NRC licensing fees paid by the first U.S. advanced reactor that uses recycled nuclear

fuel. The Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z of P.L. 116-260) authorized $60 million per year

through FY2025 for DOE advanced fuel cycle research, development, demonstration, and

commercial application activities, including “fuel recycling and transmutation technologies,

including advanced reprocessing technologies.”

Congress appropriated $322 million for all DOE fuel cycle research and development programs

in FY2024, including about $45 million for Material Recovery and Waste Form Development

(MRWFD), which includes reprocessing technologies.67 For FY2025, the House Appropriations

Committee recommended in report language that DOE use at least $10 million in the MRWFD

program “to continue the Department’s competitive, cost-shared program for reprocessing spent

nuclear fuel” with the goal of commercial application by 2033.68

The Energy Act of 2020 also authorized $2.14 billion through FY2025 for DOE’s Advanced

Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP), which includes fast neutron reactors that would be

necessary for indefinite recycling of plutonium fuel. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

(IIJA) authorized and appropriated $2.477 billion for ARDP through FY2025, in addition to

regular annual appropriations for the program. ARDP is currently funding up to 50% of the cost

of two advanced reactor demonstrations in Wyoming and Texas.69

Reprocessing is not currently being proposed in conjunction with the ARDP demonstration

projects. If reprocessing were used to supply fuel for any of these or other commercial advanced

reactor designs, the extent to which it would resolve issues discussed previously in this report

would depend on a host of factors. As discussed above, these technologies would not eliminate

the need to manage nuclear waste resulting from such operations.

Members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy, Climate,

and Grid Security expressed interest in SNF recycling as a potential element of U.S. nuclear

waste management policy during an April 10, 2024, hearing on “American Nuclear Energy

Expansion: Spent Fuel Policy and Innovation.”70 The Senate Energy and Natural Resources

Committee held a hearing on the nuclear fuel cycle on March 9, 2023, that included discussions

of reprocessing and recycling of advanced reactor fuels.71

66 For example, see the Joint Explanatory Statement (Division C for H.R. 1865) accompanying the Further

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), and §40321 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L.

117-58), and §13105 of the Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169).

67 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Act, 2024, P.L. 118-42, Division D. The exact amount for

Material Recovery and Waste Form Development is not specified.

68 House Committee on Appropriations, Report to Accompany Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, H.Rept. 118-580, 2025, p. 112.

69 DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “Advanced Reactor Demonstration Projects,” accessed July 11, 2024.

70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security,

American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Spent Fuel Policy and Innovation, hearing, 118th Cong., April 10, 2024.

71 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Full Committee Hearing to Examine the

Nuclear Fuel Cycle, hearing, 118th Cong., March 9, 2023.

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Author Information

Lance N. Larson

Analyst in Environmental Policy

Mark Holt

Specialist in Energy Policy

Disclaimer

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