Border Carbon Adjustments: Policy Considerations, Legislation, and Developments in the European Union
Congressional research reportOct 28, 2024
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Border Carbon Adjustments: Policy
Considerations, Legislation, and
Developments in the European Union
October 28, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48247
SUMMARY
Border Carbon Adjustments: Policy
Considerations, Legislation, and Developments
in the European Union
Policymakers may consider a wide array of options to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
including emissions caps, fees, or performance standards. Although these approaches would
likely limit or reduce U.S. GHG emissions, some policymakers have raised concerns about the
potential effects of unilateral climate policy in the United States. A central concern is that certain
domestic climate policies could cause the domestic prices of goods to increase more than the
prices of similar goods manufactured abroad, potentially creating a competitive disadvantage for
some domestic businesses. In addition, some argue that domestic climate policies could
potentially shift economic activity to countries with less stringent or less comprehensive climate
policies.
R48247
October 28, 2024
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in Environmental
Policy
Kristen Hite
Legislative Attorney
Christopher A. Casey
Analyst in International
Trade and Finance
One option to address these concerns is with a border carbon adjustment (BCA). A BCA is a fee
or a tariff on selected imported materials, often based on the GHG emissions associated with an imported material’s
production or its end use. BCAs increasingly have been a subject of high-level bilateral and multilateral discussions among
countries. After several years of debating a proposed framework, the 27-member European Union (EU) finalized legislation
on a BCA system known as the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) in May 2023. The first phase of the CBAM—
which requires reporting but does not impose a fee—went into effect on October 1, 2023. During the second phase—
scheduled to start in 2026—the EU is scheduled to impose a fee on selected imports.
When establishing a BCA, policymakers face several key questions, including (1) which materials or products to include in a
BCA, (2) which countries to include in a BCA, and (3) how to determine a BCA fee on imported materials. A BCA presents
substantial implementation challenges. Depending on design specifics, a BCA may require calculating the economic impact
of a domestic climate policy on a wide range of domestically produced goods as well as the analogous costs in other
countries. To alleviate some of these challenges, policymakers could limit the program to a select number of industries and
apply a simplified set of default values and assumptions for categories of goods. Alternatively, a BCA could allow companies
to provide measured, independently verified emissions data as an alternative to default values.
Some studies have questioned whether BCAs would be effective, considering the balance between expected benefits and
implementation challenges, and consequences that may result from them. For example, imposition of BCAs raises a range of
trade issues and other related concerns. Some analysts have expressed concern that BCAs could be (or be interpreted as)
disguised protections for domestic industry. Some experts have suggested that BCAs could negatively affect developing
countries in the short run. Further, some researchers have highlighted the potential for unintended consequences from a BCA.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees and administers multilateral trade rules and serves as a forum for trade
negotiations and trade disputes. It is uncertain whether any BCA would comply with WTO rules because a WTO dispute
settlement panel has never considered the issue. In particular, it is uncertain whether a BCA would be consistent with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles. It is also uncertain whether specific GATT exceptions might allow for a
BCA that would otherwise be deemed inconsistent with key GATT principles.
Members of Congress have introduced legislation that included market-based approaches (e.g., carbon taxes or fees, or capand-trade programs) with BCA provisions since 2007. These proposals have varied considerably in their scope, stringency
(e.g., emissions reductions requirements or tax level), and compliance options. Members in the 118th Congress have
introduced several proposals that include BCA provisions. As with market-based approaches from prior years, these
proposals vary in their design, scope, and stringency. One key difference among the bills is whether and how they would
implement a domestic price on GHG emissions (e.g., tax or fee). For example, some proposals would impose a domestic tax
on GHG emissions from selected sources. Other proposals would impose a domestic emissions charge at certain facilities,
based on a facility’s GHG emissions intensity. One proposal would not impose a domestic fee. Another would base its BCA
on the domestic methane emissions charge established in the law commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of
2022 (P.L. 117-169).
Congressional Research Service
Border Carbon Adjustments: Background, EU Developments, and Recent Legislation
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background and Context ................................................................................................................. 3
What Are Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs)? ...................................................................... 5
Which Materials or Products to Include in a BCA? ............................................................ 5
Which Countries to Include in a BCA? .............................................................................. 6
How to Determine a BCA Fee on Imported Materials? ...................................................... 7
BCA Revenues .......................................................................................................................... 9
European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ............................................................. 10
Background ............................................................................................................................. 10
Products Covered .....................................................................................................................11
CBAM Carbon Price ............................................................................................................... 13
Direct or Indirect Emissions.................................................................................................... 15
World Trade Organization (WTO) Issues ...................................................................................... 16
Other Trade-Related Issues............................................................................................................ 19
Legislation in the 118th Congress .................................................................................................. 20
BCA Proposals ........................................................................................................................ 20
The PROVE IT Act of 2024 .................................................................................................... 22
Figures
Figure 1. Exports of EU CBAM-Eligible Products to EU Countries, by Country of Export ........ 13
Figure 2. European Union Emissions Trading System Emissions Allowance Prices.................... 15
Tables
Table 1. Top Five Sources of U.S. Imports Covered by Industries Subject to S. 3422 ................. 21
Table 2. Comparison of Selected Provisions in Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA)
Proposals from the 118th Congress ............................................................................................. 24
Table 3. Selected Provisions in the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism (CBAM) .................................................................................................................. 32
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 35
Congressional Research Service
Border Carbon Adjustments: Background, EU Developments, and Recent Legislation
Introduction
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels—in the United States and around the world—remain a topic of
interest among policymakers and stakeholders.1 According to a 2023 report from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused
global warming.... Continued greenhouse gas emissions will lead to increasing global warming....
Some future changes are unavoidable and/or irreversible but can be limited by deep, rapid and
sustained global greenhouse gas emissions reduction.2
Policymakers may consider a wide array of options to reduce GHG emissions. These options include a
GHG cap-and-trade system,3 a tax or fee on GHG emissions,4 facility performance standards, tax
incentives, or direct funding, among other policy approaches.5 Although these approaches would likely
limit or reduce U.S. GHG emissions,6 some policymakers have raised concerns about the potential effects
of unilateral climate policy in the United States.7 For example, one concern is that certain domestic
climate policies could cause the domestic prices of goods to increase more than the prices of similar
goods manufactured abroad, potentially creating a competitive disadvantage for some domestic
businesses. In addition, some argue that domestic climate policies could potentially shift economic
activity to countries with less stringent or less comprehensive climate policies. Such a shift could
undermine the climate objectives of the domestic policy if the shift results in increased GHG emissions in
the other country. Whether and to what degree these outcomes occur would depend on a number of
factors. Examples of factors include the design and stringency of the domestic policy and how the
domestic policy compares to climate policies in other countries.
1 The primary greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by human activities—and estimated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in its annual inventories—include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride,
chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons. Other GHGs include carbonaceous and sulfuric aerosols,
hydrochlorofluorocarbons, and elevated tropospheric ozone pollution generated by emissions of nitrogen oxides and volatile
organic compounds, such as solvents.
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report—Summary for
Policymakers, April 2023, at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/.
3 A GHG emissions cap-and-trade system places a limit (i.e., cap) on GHG emissions from certain sources, such as power plants
and industrial facilities. An emissions cap is partitioned into emissions allowances, which typically represent the authority to emit
1 metric ton of GHG emissions. An implementing agency may allocate allowances to sources at no cost or sell them through an
auction. At the end of an established compliance period (e.g., one year), covered sources submit emissions allowances to an
implementing agency to cover the number of tons of GHGs emitted during the period. To comply with the cap, covered sources
can either reduce emissions on-site or purchase emissions allowances from other sources (i.e., trade). The European Union has
had a cap-and-trade system in place for almost 20 years. In the United States, cap-and-trade programs operate in a number of
states: California, Washington, and in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a program involving a number of
Northeast states.
4 A tax or fee on GHG emissions (often called a carbon tax) attaches a price to GHG emissions or the inputs (e.g., fossil fuels)
that create them. A carbon tax would increase the relative price of the more carbon-intensive energy sources. This result is
expected to spur innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies (e.g., renewable energy) and stimulate other behavior that may
decrease emissions. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11103, A Brief Comparison of Two Climate Change Mitigation
Approaches: Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax (or Fee), by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
5 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11791, Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Selected Policy Options, by Jonathan
L. Ramseur et al.
6 The degree to which a particular policy tool would avoid or reduce GHG emissions—and thus mitigate climate change
effects—would depend on a range of factors. This issue is beyond the scope of this report.
7 Many of these approaches are under way or being developed by national governments and subnational entities (e.g., state
governments) throughout the world.
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Border Carbon Adjustments: Background, EU Developments, and Recent Legislation
Policymakers have several options to address these potential outcomes. One option that has received
attention in recent years is a border carbon adjustment (BCA).8 A BCA is a fee or tariff on selected
imported materials. The fee is often based on the GHG emissions associated with an imported material’s
production or its end use. For example, fossil fuel end use often involves combustion, which results in
GHG emissions. Such emissions are sometimes referred to as embodied carbon or embodied emissions.9
Members of Congress have introduced GHG emissions reduction proposals that included complementary
BCA provisions since 2007.10 Members in the 118th Congress have introduced several proposals that
include BCA provisions. As with prior proposals, the bills vary in their design, scope, and stringency. One
key difference among the bills is whether and how they would implement a domestic price on GHG
emissions (e.g., tax or fee).
In addition, BCAs have increasingly been a subject of high-level bilateral and multilateral discussions
among countries. After several years of debating a proposed framework, the 27-member European Union
(EU)11 finalized legislation on a BCA system known as the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(CBAM) in May 2023.12 The CBAM is part of a larger agreement that includes changes to the EU
Emissions Trading System, a GHG emissions cap-and-trade program that has been in place since 2005.13
The first phase of the CBAM—which requires reporting but does not impose a fee—went into effect on
October 1, 2023. In the second phase—scheduled to start in 2026—the EU is scheduled to impose a fee
on selected imports.
The recent implementation of the EU CBAM has received attention from some policymakers and U.S.
stakeholders. Estimating the potential effects of the EU CBAM on U.S. industries that export to the EU is
challenging. Although the CBAM is scheduled to impose tariffs on U.S. exports, some analyses indicate
the tariffs on U.S. goods may be smaller than tariffs on goods from other countries that export to the EU,
because the GHG emissions intensity14 of some of the CBAM-eligible industries may be lower in the
United States than other countries.15 However, some of these countries may have climate policies in place
(e.g., carbon prices) that will allow their exporting industries to reduce the CBAM tariffs on their exports.
A comprehensive assessment of these issues is beyond the scope of this report.
8 Policymakers, stakeholders, and researchers refer to these mechanisms by a variety of names, including border adjustments,
border tax adjustments, border carbon adjustment mechanisms, or carbon border adjustment mechanism (the term used in the
EU), among others. This report uses the term border carbon adjustments (BCAs).
9 See, for example, EPA, “What Is Embodied Carbon?” at https://www.epa.gov/greenerproducts/what-embodied-carbon.
10 A comparison of these provisions and proposals is included in CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by Jonathan L. Ramseur. In addition, as a component of its climate
policies, California has a mechanism to address imported electricity from surrounding states. See California Air Resources
Board, “Cap-and-Trade Program,” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/cap-and-trade-program. Some argue this is a form
of a BCA. See, for example, Aaron Cosbey et al., “Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments:
Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1
(2019).
11 For more details, see CRS In Focus IF11211, The European Parliament and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick; see also
European Parliamentary Research Service, EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Implications for Climate and
Competitiveness, June 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)698889.
12 Regulation 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council, May 10, 2023, establishing a carbon border adjustment
mechanism, Official Journal of the European Union, May 16, 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
OJ:L:2023:130:FULL (hereinafter EU 2023 CBAM regulations).
13 For more information, see European Commission, “EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),” https://climate.ec.europa.eu/euaction/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en.
14 GHG emissions intensity typically refers to an industry’s (or facility’s) total GHG emissions divided by a measure of its total
production, which may be measured by weight, volume, or value.
15 See, for example, Climate Leadership Council, “Potential CBAM Impacts on U.S. Industry,” 2023, https://clcouncil.org/blog/
potential-cbam-impacts-on-u-s-industry/.
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As of the date of this report, the CBAM is the only BCA in effect. Potential BCA developments in other
countries would likely receive similar attention from policymakers. An examination of potential BCAs in
other countries is beyond the scope of this report.16
This report is organized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
The first section provides background information and context, explains what BCAs are,
examines some of their implementation challenges, and discusses alternative approaches.
The second section examines the scope and stringency of the EU CBAM.
The third section discusses World Trade Organization (WTO) issues.
The fourth section discusses other trade-related issues involving BCAs.
The final section discusses and compares BCA legislation in the 118th Congress.
Background and Context
For decades, countries have implemented a wide range of climate change policies, including GHG
emissions reduction requirements. GHG emissions reduction policies may involve a range of approaches,
including emissions caps or fees, or regulatory standards. The motivations for these policies have varied
by country. International agreements have played a role in policy development and implementation. For
example, under the 2015 Paris Agreement, all Parties agreed to submit “Nationally Determined
Contributions” (NDCs) containing nonbinding pledges to mitigate GHG emissions, among other
actions.17 Parties agreed to update or submit new NDCs by 2020 and every five years thereafter.18 GHG
emissions reduction goals in the NDCs vary across countries, according to their “common but
differentiated responsibilities,” under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement.19 The national climate change policies required to achieve these
commitments would likely differ in terms of scope, stringency, and timing.
Assuming the NDC policies are implemented and the goals achieved, they would likely result in a range
of economic impacts within and across countries.20 For example, a 2017 study estimated the cost of
16 The Canadian government stated in 2021 that it is “exploring BCAs as a tool” to address potential impacts from its carbon
pricing policies. Canadian government officials conducted a consultation process among stakeholders seeking input on BCA
issues in the context of Canada’s national carbon tax framework (see Government of Canada, “Exploring Border Carbon
Adjustments for Canada,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/consultations/2021/border-carbonadjustments/exploring-border-carbon-adjustments-canada.html). As Canada is one of the top trading partners with the United
States, a Canadian BCA—depending on its scope and stringency—would also likely raise concerns for policymakers and affected
stakeholders (see U.S. Census, “Top Trading Partners—March 2024,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/
topyr.html#total).
17 The Paris Agreement is an international treaty under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which since 1992 has been the primary international treaty among national governments to address GHG-induced
climate change. For more information about the Paris Agreement NDCs, see CRS Report R46945, Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction Pledges by Selected Countries: Nationally Determined Contributions and Net-Zero Legislation, by Kezee Procita and
Claire M. Jordan.
18 Each successive nationally determined contribution (NDC) of a Party “will represent a progression” and “reflect its highest
possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different
national circumstances.”
19 The UNFCCC Article 2 includes the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,”
sometimes with the acronym CBD-RC, which carries over in its subsidiary Paris Agreement.
20 Based on past experience with international commitments to reduce GHG emissions (including prior U.S. targets), the degree
to which these emissions targets will be met is uncertain. For example, recent studies indicate that the United States will not meet
its 2030 emissions goal. See CRS Report R47385, U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends and Projections from the Inflation
Reduction Act, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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emissions reduction in selected countries to meet their individual NDCs.21 The study’s cost estimates are
comparable to an estimate of the carbon price (e.g., tax or fee) that would be needed in particular
countries to achieve their NDCs. Although the study’s estimated results are outdated for several reasons
(e.g., many countries have updated their NDCs since the study’s publication), the relative cost estimates
may be instructive. For example, cost estimates in China and India were lower than estimates for the EU
and Japan, as the former countries’ goals are less stringent than those of the latter countries. The U.S. cost
estimates fell between these two endpoints.22
One concern among some policymakers is that differing climate policies (described above) could cause
the domestic prices of U.S. goods to increase more than the prices of similar goods manufactured
abroad.23 Such an outcome could lead to increased market share of goods from other countries, potentially
creating a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses. A range of factors would play a role in
determining these potential outcomes. For example, factors that may influence the potential price
differences include the scope, stringency, and timing of the U.S. climate policy and how the U.S. policy
compares with climate policies in other countries. The potential concerns associated with differing
climate policies are particularly relevant for “emissions-intensive, trade-exposed” industries, such as steel
manufacturing, as discussed below.
Although some industries may become less profitable, lose market share, or reduce jobs as a result of
differing climate policies, not all businesses within a sector may be affected similarly. Depending on the
specific circumstances, some businesses may receive a competitive advantage compared to their domestic
counterparts. For example, under an emissions cap or carbon price framework, a company using
electricity produced with hydropower would experience less cost increase than a company using
electricity produced with coal. In addition, some businesses may be more energy efficient than others or
use processes that result in lower emissions. Further, some industries or companies may be able to reduce
their emissions in response to the new policies at lower cost than others.
A second key concern is that differences among countries’ climate policies could create incentives to shift
economic activities to countries with less stringent or less comprehensive climate policies, ultimately
leading to “emissions leakage.” In general, GHG emissions leakage can occur if a policy to reduce
domestic emissions (e.g., emissions cap) in one location leads to an increase in emissions in another
location, thus undermining emissions reductions resulting from the domestic climate policy.24 For
example, if one country imposes a fee on GHG emissions from certain domestic industries (thus imposing
a cost), a company in this industry may decide to move its operations to another country that does not
impose a comparable fee (thus reducing the costs to the company). Although this potential outcome would
reduce GHG emissions in the first country, the GHG emissions would continue (“leak”) in the second
country. Policymakers might consider several approaches (discussed below) to address these potential
concerns. One approach that has received interest in recent years is a BCA. The sections below discuss
the concept, scope, and logistics of a BCA approach.
21 See Keigo Akimoto et al., “The Analyses on the Economic Costs for Achieving the Nationally Determined Contributions and
the Expected Global Emission Pathways,” Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, vol. 14 (2017).
22 The study authors stated that some countries’ estimated abatement costs were zero, because these countries could meet their
NDCs using “business-as-usual” climate policies.
23 See, for example, Sen. Bill Cassidy, “Cassidy Leads Republican Senate Opposition to a Carbon Tax,” press release, October
2023, https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cassidy-leads-republican-senate-opposition-to-a-carbon-tax/.
24 Some studies have raised questions regarding the degree to which emissions leakage would be a concern under a unilateral
approach. This issue is beyond the scope of this report. See, for example, Warwick McKibbin et al., “The Role of Border Carbon
Adjustments in a U.S. Carbon Tax,” Climate Change Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018); Adele Morris, Making Border Carbon
Adjustments Work in Law and Practice, Tax Policy Center (2018); and Joseph Aldy, “Frameworks for Evaluating Policy
Approaches to Address the Competitiveness Concerns of Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” National Tax Journal, vol. 70,
no. 2 (2017).
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What Are Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs)?
A BCA is a trade-related measure, such as an import fee or tariff,25 intended to address economic
outcomes that may result from differing climate change mitigation policies among national governments
(e.g., emissions caps, prices, or standards). Generally, BCAs seek to address concerns involving domestic
competitiveness and emissions leakage (as described above).26 For example, using the scenario described
above—in which one country imposes a fee on GHG emissions from certain domestic industries—that
country may also impose a BCA (i.e., fee) on imported materials that are produced in other countries in
the same industrial sectors.
In addition, some argue that BCAs could encourage other countries to adopt comparable climate policies
to reduce the economic impact of a BCA on their exports.27 Such policies could involve a climate/trade
agreement with the country imposing the BCA.28 BCAs also provide an incentive for exporting
companies or industries to modify their operations in order to face a reduced fee when they export to a
country with a BCA.
When establishing a BCA, policymakers face several key questions, including the following:
•
•
•
Which materials or products to include in a BCA?
Which countries to include in a BCA?
How to determine a BCA fee on imported materials?29
Which Materials or Products to Include in a BCA?
Many BCA approaches would apply a fee to imported goods from industrial sectors expected to
experience the greatest impacts from unilateral climate policies. These industries are often described as
emission-intensive, trade-exposed.30 A measure of an industry’s GHG emissions intensity generally
includes the following:
•
emissions directly from its manufacturing process, such as carbon dioxide (CO2) from
cement or steel production (often referred to as direct emissions);31 and
25 A tariff is a customs duty levied on imported and exported goods and services. For more background, see CRS In Focus
IF11030, U.S. Tariff Policy: Overview, by Christopher A. Casey.
26 Michael Keen et al., Border Carbon Adjustments: Rationale, Design and Impact, International Monetary Fund, 2021,
https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2021/English/wpiea2021239-print-pdf.ashx.
27 See, for example, Adele Morris, Making Border Carbon Adjustments Work in Law and Practice, Tax Policy Center, 2018.
28 Bilateral or multilateral agreements involving BCAs and carbon pricing are sometimes described as “carbon clubs” or “climate
clubs.” See William Nordhaus, “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy,” American Economic
Review, vol. 105, no. 4 (2015), https://ycsg.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/nordhaus-climate-clubs.pdf.
29 A number of researchers have examined these questions and other design issues associated with BCAs. See, for example, Brian
Flannery et al., Framework Proposal for a US Upstream GHG Tax with WTO-Compliant Border Adjustments: 2020 Update,
Resources for the Future, 2020; Aaron Cosbey et al., “Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments:
Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1
(2019); and Samuel Kortum and David Weisbach, “The Design of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices,” National Tax Journal,
vol. 70, no. 2 (June 2017).
30 See, for example, Interagency Report, The Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competitiveness and Emission Leakage in
Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries, 2009, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-07/documents/
interagencyreport_competitiveness-emissionleakage.pdf.
31 GHG emissions in this context may be referred to as direct, onsite, or Scope 1 emissions (the terminology used in a number of
GHG reporting programs).
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•
emissions associated with the inputs (e.g., electricity, natural gas) to the manufacturing
processes (often referred to as indirect emissions).32
Emissions-intensive industries would be impacted by climate policies affecting either direct emissions
during the manufacturing process or emissions from suppliers, such as electricity generators, that may
pass higher costs through to electricity consumers. Emission-intensive industries are likely to experience
greater cost increases than less emission-intensive industries, all else being equal.
Trade-exposed industries are those that face greater international competition compared to other domestic
industries. One measure of a sector’s trade exposure is the proportional value of its exports and imports
compared with its total value of domestic production and imports.33 A trade-exposed industry would have
more difficulty passing along climate policy costs (e.g., from emissions fees) to consumers, as doing so
would likely result in a loss of its market share. These potential effects on domestic trade-exposed
industries would depend on the characteristics (e.g., stringency) of the domestic climate policy and the
climate policies imposed on their competitors in other countries, among other factors. For example, if the
United States imposed a carbon tax on GHG emissions from a trade-exposed industry, that industry would
face a competitive disadvantage if its counterpart in other countries was not subject to a comparable
carbon tax on its domestic industry.
A 2009 interagency report prepared during the consideration of federal GHG reduction legislation
identified industrial sectors that would meet specific emission-intensive, trade-exposed criteria.34 For the
most part, these sectors included industries in chemical, paper, nonmetallic minerals (e.g., cement and
glass), and primary metals (e.g., aluminum and steel) sectors.
In addition, a BCA framework may apply to materials or products, such as fossil fuels, that generate GHG
emissions when used. Some sectors in the fossil fuel industry (e.g., petroleum refining) may also be
considered emissions-intensive and trade-exposed.
Which Countries to Include in a BCA?
Policymakers may consider including or excluding materials from some countries from a BCA for a range
of reasons. For example, a BCA may exclude imports from countries that have climate policies (e.g.,
carbon prices) that are comparable to domestic policies. In recent U.S. federal legislative proposals, BCAs
would apply fees to imported goods from countries that do not have climate policies comparable with
those of the United States.35 Under this approach, the federal agency in charge of implementing the BCA
program, such as the Department of the Treasury, would generally be required to make this determination.
How such determinations of climate policy parity are made, and by whom, can raise challenging technical
and policy issues.
32 GHG emissions in this context may be referred to as indirect, upstream, or Scope 2 emissions.
33 See, for example, Interagency Report, The Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competitiveness and Emission Leakage in
Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries, 2009, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-07/documents/
interagencyreport_competitiveness-emissionleakage.pdf.
34 Interagency Report, The Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competitiveness and Emission Leakage in Energy-Intensive
Trade-Exposed Industries, 2009, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-07/documents/interagencyreport_competitivenessemissionleakage.pdf. Federal agencies in the Obama Administration prepared this report in response to a request from several
Senators considering H.R. 2454 (111th Congress) and related legislation. H.R. 2454 (“Waxman-Markey”) passed the House in
2009 and would have established a GHG emissions cap-and-trade program, among other provisions. The legislation included
emissions allowance rebates and other assistance for industries based on their energy intensity and trade intensity. It also included
an “international reserve allowance” system, which was a type of BCA.
35 See CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses,
by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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Policymakers may consider excluding goods from selected countries from a BCA. For example, BCAs
could exclude goods from less developed countries or materials from countries whose trade of covered
materials is below certain volume thresholds.36 The former might encourage economic development in the
exporting country. The latter might reduce the administrative burden on the country with the BCA.
However, such exclusions might raise legal concerns in the WTO (see “World Trade Organization (WTO)
Issues” below). In addition, such exclusions could potentially have unintended consequences that could
undermine the BCA policy goals. For example, such exclusions could lead to emissions leakage if
domestic industries shifted their operations to these excluded countries. The degree to which such leakage
might occur under these exclusions is uncertain, subject to a range of factors, and beyond the scope of this
report.37
How to Determine a BCA Fee on Imported Materials?
A BCA typically levies a fee on the estimated tons of GHG emissions associated with selected imported
materials, often described as a material’s embodied emissions or its carbon or emissions content.38
Levying a BCA fee would require two calculations: (1) an estimate of a material’s embodied emissions
and (2) a determination of the rate of the fee to apply to the embodied emissions.
The first calculation—embodied emissions—is generally based on estimates of the GHG emissions
generated during the manufacturing process of the imported product (e.g., steel).39 Policymakers would
need to determine the scope of the emissions they wanted to include as embodied emissions. For example,
embodied emissions generally would include direct emissions (described above) and may also include
indirect emissions. In addition, the embodied emissions may include emissions generated further
upstream in the production process. For example, embodied emissions could include emissions associated
with the extraction of raw materials—fossil fuels, iron ore, wood.40 If applicable, embodied emissions
may include the emissions generated when a product is used (e.g., fossil fuel combustion or fertilizer
application).
This first calculation presents implementation challenges.41 For example, accurately determining and
verifying the volume of GHG emissions embodied in a particular imported product is data intensive.
Depending on the BCA design, the data required to implement the program may not be available, or they
may not be available from a source deemed to be authoritative. This concern about the availability of
authoritative data led to the proposed S. 1863 (PROVE IT Act of 2024) in the 118th Congress, discussed
below.
To alleviate some of these data challenges, policymakers could limit the program to a select number of
industries and apply a simplified set of default values and assumptions for categories of materials. For
example, some have proposed using average emissions values for particular sectors (e.g., steel) and for
36 See, for example, Aaron Cosbey et al., “Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons,
Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (2019).
37 See, for example, Warwick McKibbin et al., “The Role of Border Carbon Adjustments in a U.S. Carbon Tax,” Climate Change
Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018).
38 This is sometimes referred to as embedded emissions as well.
39 See, for example, Samuel Kortum and David Weisbach, “The Design of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices,” National Tax
Journal, vol. 70, no. 2 (June 2017).
40 For a discussion of some of these options, see, for example, Silverado Policy Accelerator, “Technical Note: Carbon
Accounting for Traded Goods,” 2023, https://silverado.org/reports-and-publications/net-zero-trade-policy-a-compendium-oftechnical-notes/.
41 See, for example, Marco Sakai and John Barrett, “Border Carbon Adjustments: Addressing Emissions Embodied in Trade,”
Energy Policy, vol. 92 (2016); Sam Kortum and David Weisbach, “Border Adjustment for Carbon Emissions,” Resources for the
Future, 2016; Carolyn Fischer et al., “Carbon Taxes and Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries,” in Implementing a U.S.
Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates, ed. Ian Parry et al. (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2015).
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different countries.42 In addition, policymakers could alleviate some of the data challenges by narrowing
the scope of embodied emissions. For instance, direct (onsite) emissions data are more readily available
than indirect (offsite) emissions data. Requiring upstream emissions data would likely present further
challenges. Although these approaches may reduce the administrative burden for importing companies
and regulators, these approaches could result in less precise import price adjustments, which could
potentially affect the GHG emissions reductions achieved by the program.43
In addition, a default value approach (e.g., sectoral averages) could be a disadvantage for some exporting
firms if they have made efforts to reduce their emissions intensity, compared to others in their sector. To
address this potential outcome, a BCA could allow companies to provide measured, independently
verified emissions data as an alternative to default values. Emerging technologies, such as improved
sensors and digital ledgers, may allow for increasing reliability of tracking products through supply
chains. Although this approach may impose additional costs on an exporting company, the approach may
result in net benefits for a company (under certain circumstances) due to a reduced BCA fee for the
company’s exported materials.
The second calculation involves a determination of the rate of the fee. The rate of the fee is typically
based on a domestic carbon price in the country of import, such as a carbon tax or emissions fee.44 The
scope of a domestic carbon price may vary.45 For example, some carbon prices may apply only to GHG
emissions from fossil fuels; others may also include GHG emissions from industrial processes. Although
emissions-intensive industries may not be directly subject to a carbon price in the first approach (i.e., they
are not required to pay a fee to the government), these industries would experience cost impacts with
either approach.
While a calculation involving a carbon price and its impact on materials directly subject to the price—
often coal, natural gas, and oil—is relatively straightforward, a calculation involving a carbon price and
its impact on materials that are not directly subject to a carbon price—such as steel, cement, or
fertilizer—is more complicated. Analogous calculations for imported goods produced in other countries—
goods that might cross national borders multiple times before being shipped to the importing country—
further increase the complexity of the program.
In addition, BCA frameworks may include a policy mechanism that would adjust the import fee to
account for the climate policies (and policy costs) in place in the exporting country. For example, if an
exporting country had a domestic carbon tax of $20 per metric ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent
(mtCO2e), and the importing country had a carbon tax of $50 per mtCO2e, the rate of the BCA fee in the
importing country might be adjusted to $30 per mtCO2e.46 Although this example is relatively simple, this
42 See, for example, Michael A. Mehling et al., “Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action,” The
American Society of International Law, vol. 113, no. 3 (2019); Aaron Cosbey et al., “Developing Guidance for Implementing
Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature,” Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (2019).
43 Congressional Budget Office, Border Adjustments for Economywide Policies That Impose a Price on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 2013.
44 See, for example, Michael A. Mehling et al., “Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action,” The
American Society of International Law, vol. 113, no. 3 (2019); Aaron Cosbey et al., “Developing Guidance for Implementing
Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature,” Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1 (2019).
45 For example, see the range of proposals in CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction
Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
46 This term of measure is used because GHGs vary by global warming potential (GWP). GWP is an index developed by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that allows comparisons of the heat-trapping ability of different gases over a
period of time, typically 100 years. Consistent with international GHG reporting requirements, EPA’s most recent GHG
inventory (with data from 2022) uses the GWP values presented in the IPCC’s 2013 Fifth Assessment Report. For example, based
(continued...)
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adjustment mechanism may pose additional challenges, depending on specifics of the required
information.47 For example, an adjustment based on GHG emissions intensity between industrial sectors
in two countries would likely be more challenging, as this adjustment would likely raise concerns
regarding the availability of authoritative data.
Implementation of a BCA on imported materials would likely face additional challenges. A
comprehensive discussion of these challenges is beyond the scope of this report.
BCA Revenues
A BCA would also generate a new source of revenue for the United States. Policymakers could apply the
revenues to support a range of objectives, which may or may not be related to climate change
mitigation.48 Many proposals from prior Congresses that included carbon pricing (e.g., a GHG emissions
fee) with a BCA did not direct BCA revenues to specific purposes.49 In those situations, BCA revenues
would go to the General Fund of the Treasury.50
The policy considerations for BCA revenues may be different from the considerations for revenues
generated by a domestic fee or tax on GHG emissions.51 While a fee on U.S. GHG emissions or their
inputs (e.g., fossil fuels) would affect domestic industries and ultimately consumers,52 the economic
effects of a BCA may be more complex. Some studies indicate that a BCA could have disproportionate
impacts on developing countries.53 For that reason, some have argued that BCA revenues could be used to
support climate change objectives in these countries.54 As discussed below, distribution of BCA revenues
could raise particular concerns under the WTO.
on these GWP values, a ton of methane is 28 times more potent than a ton of CO2 when averaged over a 100-year time frame.
EPA’s inventory is available at EPA, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks,” https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks.
47 Some proposed BCA frameworks (e.g., S. 2378 from the 117th Congress) would base an import fee on a calculation of implicit
carbon prices from regulatory programs or other related policies.
48 For a general discussion of some of the considerations and trade-offs when allocating revenue from a carbon pricing
framework, see CRS Report R45625, Attaching a Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions with a Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee:
Considerations and Potential Impacts, by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Jane A. Leggett. Some of the revenue options discussed in
this report may not be applicable to revenues from a BCA.
49 See CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses,
by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
50 The Miscellaneous Receipts Act (31 U.S.C. §3302) requires officials who receive money on the U.S. government’s behalf to
“deposit the money in the Treasury as soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim.”
51 CRS Report R45625, Attaching a Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions with a Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee: Considerations
and Potential Impacts, by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Jane A. Leggett.
52 Many economic analyses have found that a fee or tax on GHG emissions (or their inputs) would produce a regressive outcome
among households, with lower-income households facing a larger impact from the tax than higher-income households. See CRS
Report R45625, Attaching a Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions with a Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee: Considerations and
Potential Impacts, by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Jane A. Leggett.
53 See, for example, African Climate Foundation and the London School of Economics and Political Science, Implications for
African Countries of a Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism in the EU, 2023, https://africanclimatefoundation.org/researcharticle/implications-for-african-countries-of-a-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-in-the-eu/.
54 See, for example, Andrei Marcu et al., The Use of CBAM Revenues, European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable
Transition, June 2024, https://ercst.org/the-use-of-cbam-revenues/.
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Border Carbon Adjustments: Background, EU Developments, and Recent Legislation
European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
After several years of debate, the EU finalized legislation on a BCA system in May 2023.55 This system is
known as the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The first phase of
CBAM—which requires reporting but does not impose a fee—went into effect in October 2023. Under
the second phase, scheduled for the beginning of 2026, the EU is scheduled to impose a fee on selected
imports.
This section provides background and context for the CBAM, describes how it functions, and compares
its effects across countries that export covered materials to the EU.
Background
The European Commission—which represents the interests of the EU as a whole and functions as the
EU’s executive—introduced a CBAM proposal in July 2021.56 The Council of the EU—which represents
the interests of the national governments of the member states—reached agreement on its approach for
the proposed BCA framework in March 2022.57 The European Parliament adopted its own position on the
BCA framework in June 2022.58 In December 2022, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU
reached a provisional agreement on a BCA framework, as part of a larger legislative and policy package
(known as “Fit for 55”) that included changes to the EU Emissions Trading System.59 The European
Parliament and the Council of the EU share legislative power and must both formally approve the
provisional agreement for it to become EU law.60 This formal approval occurred in May 2023, as the EU
finalized legislation establishing a BCA, known as the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).61
The first phase of the CBAM went into effect on October 1, 2023. During this phase, importers of eligible
products are required to report the GHG emissions embedded in their imported products.62 Starting in
2026, the CBAM is scheduled to require importers to submit payments for the GHG emissions associated
with their covered imported materials.63
55 Regulation 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council, May 10, 2023, establishing a carbon border adjustment
mechanism, Official Journal of the European Union, May 16, 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
OJ:L:2023:130:FULL.
56 For more information, see European Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” https://taxationcustoms.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.
57 Council of the European Union, “Council Agrees on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM),” press release,
March 15, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/15/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanismcbam-council-agrees-its-negotiating-mandate/.
58 European Parliament, “Climate Change: Parliament Pushes for Faster EU Action and Energy Independence,” press release,
June 22, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220616IPR33219/climate-change-parliament-pushes-forfaster-eu-action-and-energy-independence.
59 European Parliament, “Climate Change: Deal on a More Ambitious Emissions Trading System (ETS),” press release,
December 18, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221212IPR64527/climate-change-deal-on-a-moreambitious-emissions-trading-system-ets; and Council of the European Union, “‘Fit for 55’: Council and Parliament Reach
Provisional Deal on EU Emissions Trading System and the Social Climate Fund,” press release, December 18, 2022,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/18/fit-for-55-council-and-parliament-reach-provisional-dealon-eu-emissions-trading-system-and-the-social-climate-fund/.
60 For more information on the legislative process in the EU, see European Parliament, “Interinstitutional Negotiations,”
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/olp/en/interinstitutional-negotiations.
61
EU 2023 CBAM regulations.
62 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 2.
63 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 6.
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The CBAM complements the EU’s principal GHG mitigation policy mechanism: the Emissions Trading
System (ETS). The ETS is a GHG emissions cap-and-trade program that started in 2005 and covers
emissions from the electricity sector, selected energy-intensive industries, and aviation.64 Similar to other
cap-and-trade systems, the ETS emissions cap is partitioned into emissions allowances. One emissions
allowance represents the authority to emit 1 mtCO2e. The emissions cap creates a new commodity—the
emissions allowance. Policymakers may decide to distribute the emissions allowances to covered entities
at no cost (based on, for example, previous years’ emissions), sell the allowances (e.g., through an
auction), or use some combination of these strategies. The distribution of emissions allowances is
typically a source of significant debate during a cap-and-trade program’s development, because the
allowances have monetary value.
In the EU ETS, electricity generators generally purchase emissions allowances through government
auctions, but covered industrial facilities have received a portion of their allowances for free since 2005.65
The rationale for this approach is generally the same as the rationale for a BCA: to address concerns of
competitiveness with international firms that do not face comparable GHG mitigation and avoid
emissions leakage.66
The CBAM is part of a larger reform package that amends other components of the EU ETS.67 In
particular, the reforms reduce the ETS emissions cap and gradually eliminate the allocation of free
allowances. The CBAM will be phased in as free emissions allocation is phased out. Following the
reporting period that started in October 2023, the CBAM starts in 2026 in a limited form, reaching full
implementation in 2034, when the level of free allowances reaches zero.68 During this phase-in period, the
CBAM is scheduled to apply only to the percentage of emissions that do not benefit from free allowances.
The CBAM implementation requirements will change over time. The EU is still developing some of these
requirements through a regulatory process. For example, during the reporting period, the EU Commission
will screen CBAM reports and report issues to the relevant EU country. In 2026, an external independent
body will need to verify the data provided by an importer.69 During both the reporting and fee period,
importers could be subject to penalties for false reporting of embodied emissions data.70
Products Covered
As EU policymakers worked to establish the CBAM, they debated which products would be subject to the
border fee.71 The enacted (May 2023) CBAM list of applicable imported goods includes
•
cement materials,
64 For more information, see the European Commission EU ETS website, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-
trading-system-eu-ets_en.
65 For more background on the free allocation, see the European Commission, “Allocation to Industrial Installations,”
https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/allocation-industrialinstallations_en#allocation-based-on-benchmarks.
66 See, for example, European Commission, “Free Allocation,” https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-tradingsystem-eu-ets/free-allocation_en.
67 For more information, see European Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” https://taxationcustoms.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.
68 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Chapter IX.
69 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 8.
70 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 26.
71 The European Commission’s July 2021 proposed CBAM applied to a selected number of goods: iron and steel, cement,
fertilizer, aluminum, and imported electricity. The European Parliament June 2022 proposal would have added organic
chemicals, plastics, hydrogen, and ammonia to the scope of coverage.
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•
•
•
•
•
iron and steel products,
aluminum products,
fertilizers and related chemicals (e.g., ammonia),
hydrogen, and
electricity.72
The covered materials and products are listed in the EU regulations by their Combined Nomenclature
(“CN”) codes, the classification system the EU uses for trade and related purposes.
In addition, the regulations include a review process by which EU policymakers may consider whether to
expand the scope of the covered goods listed above.73
The CBAM covers imports of goods from all non-EU countries. Countries that participate with the EU
ETS or have their own emissions trading systems linked with the ETS (e.g., Switzerland) are excluded
from the CBAM.74 In addition, the CBAM includes an adjustment mechanism to account for a carbon
price in place in the exporting country.75
The EU CBAM is expected to affect countries differently, depending in part on the value of their CBAMeligible exports to the EU and the percentage of their CBAM-eligible exports relative to their total value
of exports. Figure 1 compares countries using these two measures.76 As the figure indicates (in the left
column), U.S. exports of CBAM-eligible materials to the EU accounted for approximately $1.3 billion in
2019. By comparison, Russian exports accounted for approximately $10 billion. The right column of the
figure illustrates the percentage of CBAM-eligible exports compared to each country’s total export value.
For example, Mozambique’s CBAM-eligible exports to the EU accounted for 17.5% of the total value of
all of the country’s exports. The United States is not listed in the right column of Figure 1 because the
U.S. CBAM-eligible exports to the EU accounted for 0.08% of total U.S. exports of goods in 2019 and
would be too small to indicate on this figure.77 According to U.S. Census data, the total value of U.S.
exports (goods) to the EU was $1.65 trillion in 2019.78
72 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Annex I.
73 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 30.
74 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 2. These countries are listed in Annex III and include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and
Switzerland.
75 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 9.
76 The data in the figure are from Guilherme Magacho et al., “Impacts of the CBAM on EU Trade Partners: Consequences for
Developing Countries,” Climate Policy (2023).
77 The figure’s right column includes countries with CBAM-eligible exports to the EU that accounted for approximately 1% or
more of their total value of all of the country’s exports.
78 Exports include both goods and services. The 0.08% calculation above includes only the value of exported goods. U.S. exports
of services were valued at $876 billion in 2019. See U.S. Census, “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, Annual
Revision,” press release, June 2020, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/ft900_index.html.
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Figure 1. Exports of EU CBAM-Eligible Products to EU Countries, by Country of Export
Left Column: Value of CBAM-Eligible Exports (U.S. Dollars)
Right Column: Percentage of CBAM-Eligible Exports Compared to Country’s Total Export Value (2019 Data)
Source: Guilherme Magacho et al., “Impacts of the CBAM on EU Trade Partners: Consequences for Developing
Countries,” Climate Policy (2023).
Notes: “EU CBAM” means European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The United States is not listed in the
right column because the U.S. CBAM-eligible exports to the EU accounted for 0.08% of total U.S. exports of goods in
2019. The figure’s right column includes countries with CBAM-eligible exports to the EU that accounted for approximately
1% or more of their total value of all of the country’s exports.
CBAM Carbon Price
The CBAM would attach its fee to imported goods through a certificate process. One certificate would
equate to 1 metric ton of CO2 emissions. Companies importing covered products into the EU would need
to purchase certificates through national authorities. Once a year, importers would need to surrender the
number of certificates that matched the emissions associated with their imported covered products.
CBAM certificates would not be tradeable or bankable, but companies may sell a limited quantity of
unused certificates back to a national authority.79
Should the CBAM import payment go into effect as planned in 2026, the certificate price (i.e., CBAM
payment) would equal the most recent weekly average auction price for the EU ETS emissions allowance.
If an auction were not held in a particular week, the CBAM certificate price would equal the closing price
in the most recent emissions allowance auction.80 The CBAM allows importers to reduce the number of
certificates purchased (thus reducing the fee) if the country of origin imposed a “carbon price” before the
covered product was exported. The EU CBAM regulations define a carbon price as a “monetary amount
paid in a third country, under a carbon emissions reduction scheme, in the form of a tax, levy or fee or in
the form of emission allowances under a greenhouse gas emissions trading system, calculated on
greenhouse gases covered by such a measure, and released during the production of goods.”81
79
EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Chapter IV.
80 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 21.
81 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 3 (for definition of carbon price) and Article 6.
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Figure 2 illustrates the EU ETS allowance prices between 2005 and 2023. The scope and stringency of
the EU ETS has changed over time, and as the figure indicates, allowance prices began to increase in
2020. A number of factors likely played a role in the allowance price increases. For instance, in 2019, the
EU established a mechanism called the market stability reserve, which reduced the supply of allowances
in the market.82 In 2021, the EU ETS entered a new phase (Phase 4), which included a reduction in the
cap of the program, thus reducing the supply of emissions allowances.83
The figure also indicates that allowance prices fluctuated in 2022 and 2023, ranging from about $65 per
MTCO2e to just over $100 MTCO2e. The average price for the EU ETS emission allowances in 2023 was
$90 per metric ton of CO2e emissions. This value is considerably higher than 2023 emissions allowance
prices in U.S. state and regional GHG emissions reduction programs. As a point of comparison, the
average emissions allowance price in 2023 from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was $14
per metric ton.84 The 2023 average allowance price in California’s cap-and-trade program was $33 per
metric ton.85
82 For more information, see European Commission, “Market Stability Reserve,” https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-
emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/market-stability-reserve_en.
83 For more information, see European Parliament Research Service, “Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ Package,” May 2023,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)698890.
84 RGGI is a cap-and-trade program involving a number of Northeast states. This is the average settlement price from the RGGI
allowance auctions in 2023. See RGGI, “Elements of RGGI,” https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements. For
more background, see CRS Report R41836, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Background, Impacts, and Selected Issues,
by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
85 California implements a GHG emissions cap-and-trade program that covers electric power, selected industries, and fossil fuel
distributors. For more information, see California Air Resources Board, “Cap-and-Trade Program,” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/cap-and-trade-program. The average allowance price is based on the auction settlement prices from 2023; see
California Air Resources Board, “Cap-and-Trade Program Data Dashboard,” https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/capand-trade-program/program-data/cap-and-trade-program-data-dashboard.
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Figure 2. European Union Emissions Trading System Emissions Allowance Prices
2005-2023 (not adjusted for inflation)
Source: Created by the Congressional Research Service with data from International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP),
Allowance Price Explorer, https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/documentation-allowance-price-explorer. ICAP sourced its
data from the European Energy Exchange Group, https://www.eex.com/en/market-data/eex-group-datasource.
Direct or Indirect Emissions
During the development of CBAM, EU policymakers debated whether to include indirect emissions
within the scope of the program.86 The enacted CBAM requires importers to include information on both
direct and indirect emissions during the transitional reporting phase (2023-2025). When the CBAM price
goes into effect in 2026, importers must include indirect emissions for certain products subject to the
CBAM.87 These products initially include cement and fertilizer products.88 Importers may need to account
for indirect emissions in other CBAM products in later years, depending in part on the outcomes of the
CBAM review process.89
86 The European Commission’s initial legislative proposal for CBAM (in July 2021) applied only to direct GHG emissions
generated from the onsite production of covered materials (European Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism:
Questions and Answers,” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_3661). The European Parliament’s
CBAM proposal (from June 2022) included indirect emissions (EU Parliament, “CBAM: Parliament Pushes for Higher Ambition
in New Carbon Leakage Instrument,” press release, June 22, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/
20220603IPR32157/cbam-parliament-pushes-for-higher-ambition-in-new-carbon-leakage-instrument).
87 EU 2023 CBAM regulations, Article 7. Annex II of the regulations contains the list of imported goods that are not subject to
the calculations of indirect emissions.
88 For further information, see EU Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Questions and Answers,”
updated February 2024, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en#faq.
89 The review process is scheduled to assess whether more products should account for indirect emissions. See EU 2023 CBAM
regulations, Article 30.
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World Trade Organization (WTO) Issues
The WTO is the 164-member international organization created to oversee and administer multilateral
trade rules, serve as a forum for trade negotiations, and resolve trade disputes.90 The WTO builds on the
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its subsequent amendments.91 The GATT is
one of the WTO agreements that set forth broadly applicable rules that affect international trade in goods
and services.92
As discussed above, policymakers can design BCAs in different ways. BCAs can vary by scope,
stringency, and implementation. This section examines some of the issues BCAs may encounter within
the WTO and the GATT. The relevance of the issues discussed below (and in the following section) to a
particular BCA, such as the EU CBAM, will depend on that BCA’s specific design parameters.
Notwithstanding the potential exceptions discussed below, it remains unsettled whether a BCA would be
consistent with the GATT, including with respect to GATT provisions that prohibit countries from
unjustifiably discriminating between “like” products for imported versus domestically produced products
or among countries with most favored nation status.93
A key WTO issue is whether a country’s BCA imposes a fee on imported products in excess of internal
taxes on “like” domestic products. The GATT explicitly allows WTO members to impose “on the
importation of any product ... a charge equivalent to an internal tax ... in respect of the like domestic
product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in
whole or in part.”94 However, a country generally may not impose a BCA on imported products in excess
of the internal tax imposed on “like” domestic products.95
Depending on the design and scope of a BCA, it may be difficult to determine if a BCA would be in
excess of the tax or fee on “like” domestic products. For example, some U.S. legislative proposals from
prior Congresses and the 118th Congress (see Table 2 below) would levy an emissions fee or carbon tax
only on fossil fuels.96 The fee would be based on the GHG emissions generated when a consumer
ultimately uses the fuel.97 Under these proposals, although carbon-intensive materials such as steel,
cement, and certain chemicals would not be directly subject to the proposed tax or fee, the fee on fossil
fuels would have a disproportionate economic effect on these industries, as they are energy-intensive and
trade-exposed industries (discussed above).
90 See generally World Trade Organization, “The WTO,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (accessed July 10,
2024).
91 Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2013), p.
45; CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction, coordinated by Cathleen D. CiminoIsaacs; WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994 (hereinafter GATT).
92 Texts of WTO agreements are available at World Trade Organization, WTO Legal Texts, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/legal_e.htm (accessed July 29, 2024).
93 GATT Articles II:2(a), III:2.
94 GATT Article II:2(a) (emphasis added).
95 Ibid; see also GATT Article III:2 (allowing import charges so long as they are equivalent to an internal tax). In addition,
Article I of the GATT sets forth the agreement’s most-favored-nation treatment obligation, which generally prohibits a WTO
member from discriminating against imported products of one WTO member country as compared to products of another WTO
member, including by taxing one WTO member’s products in excess of another member’s “like” products. This provision might
be relevant if a BCA imposes a higher tax on the products of one WTO member as compared to another.
96 See, for example, H.R. 5744 (118th Congress) and S. 685 and H.R. 2451 (117th Congress), among others. For more details, see
CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by
Jonathan L. Ramseur.
97 See, for example, S. 685 and H.R. 2451 (117th Congress), among others. For more details, see CRS Report R45472, MarketBased Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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Even if a BCA were to treat imports differently than “like” domestic products or were otherwise viewed
as imposing discriminatory treatment on imports, certain specific exceptions may apply, such as those for
environmental protection or national security under GATT Articles XX and XXI. Those exceptions could
allow a country to implement a BCA even if it were otherwise deemed inconsistent with principles such
as nondiscrimination and most favored nation status, as reflected in key GATT provisions.98 For example,
the GATT environmental exceptions allow for discriminatory treatment if “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health” or related to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”99
While a BCA might satisfy at least one of these criteria, a BCA measure would not be excepted if deemed
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or a
“disguised restriction on international trade.”100 That is, any measure must not discriminate between
countries on criteria other than carbon content. Alternatively, a country might invoke a national security
exception if it determined that action to address climate change constituted a national security
emergency.101 Whether any BCA would satisfy any of these GATT exceptions and the associated
conditions would likely be fact-dependent.102
While compliance with the GATT is the subject of much of the scholarly analysis on BCAs, it also
remains unsettled whether a BCA could be challenged under other authorities, such as the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.103 TBTs are obstacles to trade imposed by standards, regulations, and
procedures that countries use to determine compliance based on specific product characteristics.104 The
TBT Agreement has nondiscrimination requirements and imposes a common set of rules on how countries
98 GATT Articles XX (a)–(j); XXI.
99 GATT Article XX. For example, the WTO appellate body determined that a U.S. ban on shrimp imports harvested with nets
that harmed sea turtles was related to the exhaustible conservation of natural resources (GATT Article XX(g)), and was not
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination provided the United States had undertaken good-faith measures to negotiate an
international agreement to protect sea turtles. See WTO, “Shrimp-Turtle (DS58) and Shrimp-Turtle (Article 21.5-Malaysia),”
WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/
ds58sum_e.pdf.
100 GATT Article XX; see also WTO, “Shrimp-Turtle (DS58) and Shrimp-Turtle (Article 21.5-Malaysia),” WTO Dispute
Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/
ds58sum_e.pdf (initially finding shrimp import bans to be unjustifiably discriminatory due to the “coercive” nature affecting
foreign governments’ policy decisions and “because of the rigidity and inflexibility in its application, and the lack of
transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations” but ultimately upholding the trade measure
imposed so long as there was a good-faith effort to negotiate an international agreement and exempt certain countries based on
specific criteria intended to increase flexibility and equity).
101 GATT Article XXI. It is unclear whether a WTO panel would accept this rationale. Some WTO members have expressed
concern that overuse of the national security exception would undermine the world trading system because countries might enact
protectionist measures under the guise of national security. See, for example, WTO Council for Trade in Goods, “National
Security Cited in Two Trade Concerns at Goods Council Meeting,” June 30, 2017, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm. However, the exception is not necessarily self-judging; see WTO, Panel Report, Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R, adopted April 26, 2019.
102 See, for example, WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 158-59, October 12, 1998. Some countries have asked for more details about whether the European
Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is WTO-compliant. See, for example, WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment, “Report of the Meeting Held on 16 and 20 November 2020,” WT/CTE/M/70, at Para 1.86, https://docs.wto.org/
dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/CTE/M70.pdf&Open=True.
103 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (hereinafter TBT Agreement), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm; 19 U.S.C. § 2503.
See also WTO TBT web portal, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm (accessed June 18, 2024). U.S. Trade
Representative, “Technical Barriers to Trade,” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-issues/technicalbarriers-trade (accessed June 18, 2024) (noting free-trade agreements to which the United States is a party also have TBT
provisions).
104 See generally WTO, Understanding the WTO: Standards and Safety, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm4_e.htm#TRS (accessed Sept. 27, 2024).
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should administer such technical regulations and set standards for products.105 The TBT Agreement
specifies that “technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective.”106 Environmental protection is a legitimate objective under the terms of the TBT
Agreement.107 However, the measures taken must be the least trade-restrictive measure to achieve the
objective.108 Moreover, the TBT Agreement requires that members make use of international standards
when available unless such standards would be ineffective in meeting the objective.109 Policymakers
considering a BCA therefore may consider whether alternative measures, particularly ones that make use
of international standards, could accomplish the same climate-related objective with fewer restrictions.
One way that Congress could document consideration of alternatives and the necessity of measures
proposed is by including expert assessments of the proposed measures in the legislative record.
A dispute about a BCA’s compliance with the GATT, the TBT Agreement, or other trade agreements
under the WTO’s purview would be resolved under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism based on
the WTO’s rules and procedures.110 Although the appellate body of the dispute settlement mechanism has
not had a sitting member since 2020, the nonappellate dispute settlement body remains available to
receive and assess complaints of violations of trade agreements brought by one WTO member against
another.111 The WTO BCAs have already been the subject of WTO discussions, 112 and countries have
expressed concerns about whether the EU’s CBAM complies with WTO rules.113 Although some WTO
members have expressed concerns about whether BCAs, including the EU’s CBAM, would comply with
the GATT, the TBT Agreement, or other trade agreements under the WTO’s purview, no WTO dispute
settlement panel has considered the question.
Although there is no dispute settlement panel or appellate report on the subject, one relatively
comprehensive survey of the legal literature and the minutes of the WTO’s Committee for Trade and
Environment suggested that “a shared understanding supporting the idea that BCA[s] (especially BCA[s]
on imports) would likely be WTO-compatible emerged over the years.”114 However, any challenge to
BCA compatibility would likely be case-specific and is difficult to predict in the abstract. Further, even if
105 TBT Agreement Article 2 (regulations), Article 4 (standards), Articles 5-6 (conformity assessments).
106 Ibid. Article 2.
107 Ibid. Other legitimate objectives include “national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health.”
108 See ibid. Article 2.2.
109 Ibid. Article 2.4.
110 WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf. The WTO dispute settlement process can clarify the existing provisions of agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law, but it “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements” (DSU Article 3.2).
111 For more information on the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and Appellate Body, see WTO, Dispute Settlement,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (accessed October 15, 2024); WTO, Dispute Settlement—Appellate
Body, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (accessed October 15, 2024); see also CRS Report
R46852, The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Appellate Body: Key Disputes and Controversies, by Nina Hart and Brandon
Murrill. Some countries—though not the United States—have also established their own Multi-Party Interim Appeal
Arrangement (MPIA), which leaves open the possibility that the EU CBAM could potentially be considered in that context even
if the WTO Appellate Body remains inoperative.
112 See, for example, Committee on Trade and Environment meeting minutes from June 12, 2023, WT/CTE/M/78 (reporting
multiple references to Europe’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, including a request by China for multilateral discussions
on border carbon adjustments), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/CTE/M78.pdf.
113 See, for example, Committee on Trade and Environment meeting minutes from June 12, 2023, WT/CTE/M/78 (reporting
multiple references to Europe’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, including a request by China for multilateral discussions
on border carbon adjustments), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/CTE/M78.pdf.
114 Laurie Durel, “Border Carbon Adjustment Compliance and the WTO: the International Evolution of Law,” Journal of
International Economic Law, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 2024), pp. 28-29.
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a WTO dispute settlement panel were to consider a BCA challenge, it would be unlikely to produce a final
decision in the near term.115
A Related WTO Trade Dispute: Malaysian Palm Oil
Although BCAs have not been challenged to date under WTO dispute settlement procedures, other trade restrictions that
distinguish among products based on the amount of climate emissions attributed to them have been formally challenged
under the GATT and TBT Agreement. In 2024, Malaysia successfully challenged a component of EU rules restricting palm oil
imports based on indirect land use changes, including with respect to their associated GHG emissions.116 In that case, a
WTO panel generally found that the EU had provided a “reasonable basis” for distinguishing between different products
based in part on their risk of being associated with increased emissions, which on a conceptual level was a priori
legitimate.117 However, some of the technical aspects of how the EU accounted for and regulated embedded emissions in
palm oil imports were deemed more trade-restrictive than necessary, unjustifiably discriminatory, and otherwise
inconsistent with various provisions of the TBT Agreement.118 With regard to the GATT, while the panel found that the
regulations were discriminatory owing to differential treatment between producers, it concluded that those differences
were also justified under the Article XX exceptions, as both related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
and necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life.119 It is unclear whether a BCA would face similar challenges.
Other Trade-Related Issues
The potential imposition of BCAs in general raises a range of trade issues and other related concerns. For
example, some analysts have expressed concern that BCA-related tariffs could be (or be interpreted as)
disguised protections for domestic industry.120 That is, some have argued that countries could use subtle
adjustments to the complex calculations often involved in the proposed BCAs to privilege domestic
industries.121 While some approaches, such as CBAM, can attempt to mitigate some of these concerns,
such calculations are an inherent part of any BCA.
Similarly, experts have suggested that BCAs could negatively affect developing countries in the short run,
particularly if they are applied broadly and uniformly without adjusting for more tailored equity and
115 Under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Agreement, a panel report is adopted unless one of the parties notifies the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of its decision to appeal within 60 days of the report’s issuance or the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report. See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement
Annex 2, Article 16:4, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#16. While a party can decide to appeal
consistent with Article 16:4, the appellate body cannot render a decision until reconstituted, thus effectively stalling the final
report through a process sometimes referred to as “appealing into the void.” See, for example, International Institute for
Sustainable Development, “Ending the WTO Dispute Settlement Crisis: Where to from Here?” 2022, https://www.iisd.org/
articles/united-states-must-propose-solutions-end-wto-dispute-settlement-crisis. For general information on the WTO dispute
settlement process, see CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade Agreements, by Christopher A.
Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
116 WTO Dispute Settlement Body Report, EU and Certain Member States—Palm Oil (Malaysia), adopted April 26, 2024,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/600R.pdf.
117 Ibid at 183-184.
118 Ibid. at 202 (inconsistency with TBT Article 2.1 due to underlying data, design, and implementation deficiencies resulting in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination), 219 (inconsistency with TBT Article 2.9 related to regulatory transparency and
commenting), 237 (inconsistency with TBT Article 5.1 due certification procedures creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade),
245 (inconsistency with TBT Article 5.6 based on inadequate notice to foreign producers so as to enable compliance).
119 Ibid. at 284.
120 Peter Holmes et al., “Border Carbon Adjustments and the Potential for Protectionism,” Climate Policy, vol. 11, no. 2 (2011);
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Divergent Climate Change Policies Among Countries Could Spark a Trade War. The WTO Should Step
In,” Peterson Institution for International Economics, 2021, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/
divergent-climate-change-policies-among-countries-could.
121 Ibid.; see also WTO Dispute Settlement Body Report, EU and Certain Member States—Palm Oil (Malaysia), adopted April
26, 2024, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/600R.pdf.
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climate considerations.122 A survey conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) notes that the EU’s CBAM, for example, “could impact the development of
poorer countries and reduce their opportunities for export-led development.”123 However, the study also
noted that the impact would be highly variable, and certain developing countries could gain advantages.
For example, a 2020 study argued that because the steel industries of India and Turkey generally emit
lower GHG emissions for a given output of steel compared to other countries’ steel industries, India and
Turkey would likely “take crude steel share from China, Russia, and the Ukraine” if the EU implemented
a BCA-related tariff.124
Further, some researchers have highlighted the potential for unintended consequences from a BCA. For
example, some studies have found that a border adjustment, like any tariff, may reduce demand for
imported goods and thus for foreign currency, leading to an appreciation of domestic currency. As the
domestic currency increases in value, exports become more expensive in foreign markets and may lead to
lower net exports.125 Some of the concerns may be lessened to some degree if a larger number of nations
establish comparable emissions reduction policies.
Legislation in the 118th Congress
Members of Congress have introduced legislation that included market-based approaches (e.g., carbon
taxes or fees, or cap-and-trade programs) with BCA provisions since 2007.126 These proposals have varied
considerably in their scope, stringency (e.g., emissions reductions requirements or tax level), and
compliance options. In general, the main focus of the proposals from prior Congresses involved the
domestic carbon price the legislation would have imposed on GHG emissions. In recent years, the main
focus of comparable proposals has arguably shifted to placing a carbon price on imported materials.
BCA Proposals
Members in the 118th Congress have introduced several proposals that include BCA provisions, as well as
other provisions:
•
•
•
•
S. 3198, Foreign Pollution Fee Act of 2023, introduced by Senator Cassidy on November
2, 2023;
S. 3422, Clean Competition Act, introduced by Senator Whitehouse on December 6,
2023;
S. 5107, America’s Clean Future Fund Act, introduced by Senator Durbin on September
19, 2024;
H.R. 5744, Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2023, introduced by
Representative Carbajal on September 27, 2023;
122 See, for example, Elena Ianchovichina and Harun Onder, “Carbon Border Taxes: What Are Their Implications for Developing
Countries?” Brookings Institution, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/10/05/carbon-border-taxeswhat-are-their-implications-for-developing-countries/.
123 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trade and Development:
Transitioning to a New Normal (Geneva: United Nations, 2021), p. 11.
124 Ben Aylor et al., “How an EU Carbon Border Tax Could Jolt World Trade,” Boston Consulting Group, June 30, 2020,
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/how-an-eu-carbon-border-tax-could-jolt-world-trade.
125 See, for example, Warwick McKibbin et al., “The Role of Border Carbon Adjustments in a U.S. Carbon Tax,” Climate
Change Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018).
126 A comparison of these provisions and proposals is included in CRS Report R45472, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 117th Congresses, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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•
•
•
H.R. 6665, Modernizing America with Rebuilding to Kickstart the Economy of the
Twenty-first Century with a Historic Infrastructure-Centered Expansion Act (MARKET
CHOICE Act), introduced by Representative Fitzpatrick on December 7, 2023;
H.R. 6622, Clean Competition Act, introduced by Representative DelBene on December
8, 2023; and
H.R. 8962, Methane Border Adjustment Mechanism Act, introduced by Representative
Brownley on July 9, 2024.
Each of the proposals above (with the exception of H.R. 8962) would establish a BCA that applies to
imported materials from specific industries, such as iron and steel. Although the lists of materials covered
in the above bills are not identical, the lists have substantial overlap.
Table 1 lists the countries that account for the five largest sources of U.S. imports covered by industries
that are subject to S. 3422 (based on 2022 data). Table 1 uses the list of materials subject to S. 3422 as
one case study. As the scope of the BCA proposals are relatively similar, the information in Table 1
provides relevant context for each of the bills.127
The covered industries in S. 3422 are linked with North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes.128 In 2022, imports of goods from all countries that fall under the NAICS codes included
in S. 3422 were valued at approximately $449 billion.129 As the table indicates, Canadian imports
accounted for the largest source of imports—about 40% of the total—that would be subject to S. 3422.
Imports of crude oil from Canada accounted for approximately 60% of the total value of Canadian
imports subject to S. 3422 in 2022. Crude oil imports from Mexico accounted for about 50% of the total
value of Mexican imports.
Table 1. Top Five Sources of U.S. Imports Covered by Industries Subject to S. 3422
(based on 2022 data)
Country
Value of Imports ($)
Canada
180,177,202,080
Mexico
35,470,505,874
Saudi Arabia
21,016,186,153
China
16,063,801,536
Brazil
15,332,842,832
Source: Prepared by CRS; data from U.S. Census Bureau, Imports for Consumption, 2022.
Notes: Based on NAICS codes in S. 3422 (as introduced): 211120 (petroleum extraction), 211130 (natural gas
extraction), 322110 (pulp mills), 322130 (paperboard mills), 324110 (petroleum refining), 324121 (asphalt paving mixture
and blocks), 324122 (asphalt shingle and coating materials), 324199 (all other petroleum and coal products), 325110
(petrochemicals), 325120 (industrial gas), 325193 (ethyl alcohol), 325199 (other basic organic chemicals), 325311
(nitrogenous fertilizers), 327211 (glass), 327212 (glass), 327213 (glass), 327215 (glass), 327310 (cement), 327410 (lime and
gypsum), 327420 (lime and gypsum), 331110 (iron and steel), 331313 (aluminum), and 331314 (aluminum). Note that
127 With the exception of H.R. 8962, which applies only to imports of petroleum and natural gas.
128 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) “is the standard used by
Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing
statistical data related to the U.S. business economy” (https://www.census.gov/naics/).
129 Calculated by CRS by converting the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes listed in S. 3422 to
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), using the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Dataweb. See U.S. Census Bureau,
“Imports for Consumption,” 2022, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/index.html.
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NAICS 212114 (surface coal mining), 212115 (underground coal mining), and 322120 (paper mills) do not have a NAICSto-HTS conversion and were not included in the above data.
Table 2 below provides a comparison of selected provisions in the above-listed proposals, and Table 3
includes comparable provisions from the EU CBAM. As with other market-based approaches, the above
proposals vary in their design, scope, and stringency. One key difference among the bills is whether and
how they would implement a domestic price on GHG emissions (e.g., tax or fee). For example, S. 5107,
H.R. 5744, and H.R. 6665 would impose a domestic tax on GHG emissions from selected sources. S.
3422 and H.R. 6622 (identical bills) would impose a domestic emissions charge at certain facilities, based
on a facility’s GHG emissions intensity as compared to the emissions intensity for the relevant industry.
By comparison, S. 3422 explicitly states that it would not impose a new carbon fee or charge on domestic
entities. H.R. 8962 would not impose a new fee on emissions, but it would base its BCA on the domestic
methane emissions charge established in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.130
Most of the proposals above would apply a fee to a list of specific imported materials. H.R. 8962 applies
only to imported petroleum and natural gas.
The PROVE IT Act of 2024
In addition to the legislative proposals listed above, a related proposal from the 118th Congress—the
PROVE IT Act of 2024—would address issues and challenges involved in the implementation of a BCA
framework. S. 1863 (Providing Reliable, Objective, Verifiable Emissions Intensity and Transparency Act
of 2023; PROVE IT Act of 2024) was introduced on June 7, 2023. The Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works reported the bill (now titled the PROVE IT Act of 2024) with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute on January 25, 2024.
Although the proposal does not itself establish a BCA framework, its provisions would potentially support
a future BCA framework. In particular, the PROVE IT Act of 2024 would support a BCA framework that
uses differences in GHG emissions intensities to determine both domestic fees and import fees. As
discussed above (and identified in Table 2 below), several of the proposals in the 118th Congress employ
this approach.
As discussed above, a central challenge with BCA implementation concerns the availability, quality, and
authoritativeness of the underlying data needed to assess import fees. Several of the legislative BCA
proposals compared below (in Table 2) would base their import fees on differences between the GHG
emissions intensity of a particular good (e.g., steel) produced in the United States and the intensity of the
same good produced in a foreign country. The GHG emissions intensity for a commercial product is
generally understood to be a measure of GHG emissions associated with the production of a unit of value
or amount of the material.
Policymakers and stakeholders have cited recent analyses to support the argument that certain U.S.
industries are less GHG-emissions-intensive than some of their counterparts in other countries.131
According to the PROVE IT Act of 2024 sponsors, the bill would seek to “obtain high-quality data to
130 For more information, see CRS Report R47206, Inflation Reduction Act Methane Emissions Charge: In Brief, by Jonathan L.
Ramseur.
131 See, for example, Sachin Nimbalkar, Potential Decarbonization Strategies and Challenges for the U.S. Iron and Steel
Industry, Department of Energy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/
Nimbalkar%20-%20ORNL%20-%20Decarbonizing%20US%20Steel%20Industry.pdf. The Department of Energy document
cites A. Hasanbeigi and C. Springer, How Clean Is the U.S. Steel Industry? An International Benchmarking of Energy and CO2
Intensities, Global Efficiency Intelligence, 2019; Catrina Rorke and Greg Bertelsen, America’s Carbon Advantage, Climate
Leadership Council, 2020, https://clcouncil.org/report/americas-carbon-advantage/.
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back up” these claims.132 These data could be used to support the proposals (identified above) that rely on
GHG emissions intensity differences to set their fees.
To meet these objectives, the PROVE IT Act of 2024 would direct the Department of Energy (in
coordination with a number of other agencies) to, among other things,
•
•
•
•
determine the GHG emissions intensities of specific products produced in the United
States and identify data gaps;133
determine the GHG emissions intensities (“with reasonable accuracy”) of specific
products made in applicable countries,134 and identify data gaps;135
determine relative differences in GHG emissions intensities for specific products from the
United States and the selected countries; and
submit a report to Congress two years after enactment and every five years thereafter.
The bill would prioritize certain products for the agencies to assess first, such as those that would be
subject to the EU CBAM. In addition, the bill includes a clarification, explicitly stating that the bill would
not impose a new carbon fee or charge or establish a new mandatory reporting program for the covered
products.
132 See, for example, Office of Sen. Chris Coons, “Senators Coons, Cramer Introduce Legislation to Study Global Emissions
Intensity and Hold Countries with Dirty Production Accountable,” press release, August 9, 2023, https://www.coons.senate.gov/
news/press-releases/senators-coons-cramer-introduce-legislation-to-study-global-emissions-intensity-and-hold-countries-withdirty-production-accountable.
133 The list of specific products generally mirrors the list of covered products in S. 3198.
134 Covered countries include several categories: members of the Group of Seven; countries that are signatories to free-trade
agreements with the United States; “foreign countries of concern” (as defined in 15 U.S.C. §4651), which includes the
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic
of Iran; and countries that hold more than a de minimis share of the global market of a particular product (as determined by the
Department of the Treasury).
135 The proposal instructs the Department of Energy to incorporate findings from similar activities conducted pursuant to Section
40416(a) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. In addition, the bill instructs the department to use other existing data
sources, such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program.
Congressional Research Service
23
Table 2. Comparison of Selected Provisions in Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) Proposals from the 118th Congress
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
S. 3198
Foreign Pollution Fee
Act of 2023
Sen. Cassidy
Nov. 2, 2023
CRS-24
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
The bill would establish a BCA
framework for specific
products based on the
difference between the GHG
emissions intensity of the
imported product and the
GHG emissions intensity of
similar products in the United
States.
Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) would be directed
to make necessary
determinations through the
rulemaking process.
The bill explicitly states that it
would not impose a new
carbon fee or charge on
domestic entities.
The bill would encourage
international partnerships to
reduce or eliminate the import
fee.
The bill would create a new
Advisory Board, composed of
directors of the National
Laboratories, federal agencies,
and industry, to help with
implementation details.
Covered products would
include materials listed in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS) with six-digit
subheadings in the following
categories:
Importers would be required
to pay a fee at time of
importation based on a
measure of the amount of the
covered product multiplied by
the “variable charge”; the
variable charge is an “ad
valorem fee”b that would be
based on the GHG intensity
differencec between the
covered product and the GHG
intensity of the same type of
product in the United States
(referred to as the “baseline”
GHG intensity).
Products with greater intensity
differences would have higher
fees.d The fee would change
over time, using a tiered
system (i.e., different charges
for different magnitudes of
intensity differences) that seeks
to incrementally reduce the
average intensity difference
specific to each covered
product. These intensity
reduction goals would be
implemented in several phases;
variable charges would be
established to meet the goals,
while “minimizing any potential
increase in domestic costs.”
Treasury would be able to
adjust the charge if it
determines that a country is
attempting to “circumvent” the
The import fee for a covered
product would be zero
under certain conditions:
(1) The covered product (A)
comes from a country that
has formed an international
partnership meeting the
conditions of the bill; and (B)
the product’s intensity
difference is less than 50%;
these agreements must
provide for a comparable
system of reduction in GHG
emissions intensity, among
other things; agreements can
apply to one or multiple
products and involve one or
more countries.
(2) The GHG intensity
difference between the
imported product and similar
U.S. products is less than or
equal to 10%.
(3) Treasury determines a
covered product does not
have “sufficient domestic
production” (as defined in
the bill).
(4) Treasury determines a
covered product fulfills a
contract with Department of
Defense (or a Department of
Defense contractor).
(5) A covered product
comes from a country with a
•
•
•
•
•
•
aluminum;
biofuels;
cement;
crude oil;
glass;
hydrogen, methanol, or
ammonia;
• iron and steel;
• lithium-ion batteries;
• selected minerals;
• natural gas;
• petrochemicals;
• plastics;
• pulp and paper;
• refined petroleum products;
• solar cells and panels; and
• wind turbines.
The bill would include a
process of allocating intensity
from crude oil and minerals to
“resulting products.”
The bill would include a
petition process to add
covered products.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
The bill does not include
specific provisions for BCA
revenue distribution.
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
CRS-25
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
fee (e.g., through price
decreases or subsidies).
The bill would create a
National Laboratory Advisory
Board on Global Pollution
Challenges to work with
Treasury to develop GHG
intensity values specific to
covered products (generally to
six-digit HTS subheadings) by
country of origin. Values would
include both point source and
“upstream” GHG emissions (as
defined in the bill).
The bill would authorize the
use of certain sources of data,
give preference to EPA’s data
from its GHG reporting
program, and allow EPA to
alter this program to collect
information that would support
the bill.
The bill would provide specific
methodologies for calculating
intensity values, including
treatment of recycled
materials, carbon capture,
products with multiple parts
(including de minimis amounts),
products from facilities subject
to certain agreements, and
foreign ownership.
Treasury would be required to
increase the GHG intensity
value for covered products by
20% under certain conditions,
which generally involve the
robustness of the foreign data.
congressionally approved
“free trade agreement,” if all
of the product parts are
made in that country and the
intensity difference is less
than 50%.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
Treasury would be able to
adjust specific intensity values
based on input from countries
under certain conditions, which
generally involve data quality.
The U.S. Trade Representative
would be able to form an
agreement (under certain
conditions) with a facility in a
foreign country to set a GHG
intensity value specific to that
facility.
S. 3422
Clean Competition Act
Sen. Whitehouse
Dec. 6, 2023
CRS-26
The bill would impose a
domestic emissions charge at
certain facilities, based on an
annual carbon price and the
degree to which a facility’s
carbon intensity exceeds the
intensity of the relevant
industrial sector. The charge
would increase over time,
based on the degree of
intensity exceedance.
The Department of the
Treasury (Treasury) would
determine the carbon intensity
for covered industries; covered
entities would be allowed to
petition for a different carbon
intensity of a specific good.
Treasury would be required to
establish a reporting program
for facilities to provide data for
calculating their carbon
intensity (e.g., process
emissions, electricity use,
The domestic charge would
apply to facilities that are
required to report GHG
emissions to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) GHG
Reporting Program (40 C.F.R.
Part 98) and produce primary
goods in covered national
industries (as defined in the
bill), including
• petroleum and natural gas
extraction;
• surface coal mining;
• underground coal mining;
• iron and steel;
• aluminum;
• chemical manufacturing;
• pulp and paper;
• paperboard mills;
• petroleum refineries;
• asphalt;
• glass;
• hydrogen production;
• adipic acid production;
• ethyl alcohol;
Imports of carbon-intensive
goods (and finished goods)
would be subject to a charge
based on the domestic carbon
price and the difference in
carbon intensities between the
imported good and the carbon
intensity of the relevant U.S.
industrial sector. Carbon
intensity would be a measure
of “covered emissions” from a
facility divided by total weight
of primary goods produced at
the facility.
The default measure of carbon
intensity for imported goods
would be the exporting
country’s gross domestic
product divided by total
production-based emissions.
Treasury would be required to
determine the intensity
measure for the relevant
industrial sector in the
exporting country (emissions
Primary goods produced in a
“relatively least developed
country” would be excluded
from the import charge
(unless the country produces
a primary good that accounts
for at least 3% of total global
exports by value).a
The import charge would be
waived or reduced if
Treasury determines (with
coordination with other
agencies) the exporting
country imposes “explicit
costs” on GHG emissions
that are materially similar to
the domestic charge.
U.S. facilities that export
covered materials (and
finished goods) would be
able to seek refund based on
payment of the domestic
charge.
The bill would generate
revenues from a charge on
domestic facilities and
imported goods; the bill
would effectively combine
the two revenue streams
and distribute them as
follows:
The bill would allocate 75%
of these emissions charge
revenues to Treasury to
establish and implement a
competitive grant program
to eligible entities for
investments in technology
that reduce their carbon
intensity; and allocate 25% of
the total revenues to the
Department of State for
multilateral assistance to
support climate and clean
energy programs.
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
S. 5107
America’s Clean Future
Fund Act
Sen. Durbin
September 19, 2024
CRS-27
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
weight of primary goods
produced).
The domestic carbon price
would start at $55, increasing
annually by 5% plus inflation.
The bill would create a BCA
framework that imposes a
charge on certain imported
goods based on the domestic
carbon price and the carbon
intensity differences between
imported materials and their
U.S. counterparts.
• nitrogenous fertilizers; and
• petrochemicals.
The import charge would apply
to primary goods imported
into the United States from the
same industries listed above.
divided by total weight of
product in that sector).
An importer would be able to
submit a petition supporting a
carbon intensity specific to a
particular manufacturer in the
exporting country.
The bill would impose a fee on
fossil fuels and selected GHG
emissions sources.
The fee on fossil fuels would
start in 2026 at $65/mtCO2e,
increasing annually by $10 plus
inflation; if specified emission
targets are not met, the fee
increases would be greater.
The fee on other sources
would start in 2028.
The bill would provide a rebate
for carbon capture,
sequestration, and utilization
activities, if certain conditions
were met.
The bill would create a BCA
that imposes a fee on carbonintensive products and provide
a rebate for exporters of fossil
fuels and carbon-intensive
products.
The fee would apply to coal at
coal mines and importers,
crude oil at refineries and
importers, and natural gas at
producing wells and importers.
The fee would also apply to
sources in the “energy and
industrial sectors” that emit
25,000 mtCO2e or more of
CO2 or methane per year.
Imports of carbon-intensive
products would be subject to a
fee (determined by Treasury)
that is equivalent to the
difference in (1) costs domestic
producers of comparable
products incur due to the fee
and (2) the comparable costs
imposed by the exporting
nation.
The bill defines carbonintensive products to include
• iron, steel, and steel mill
products;
• aluminum;
• cement;
• glass;
• pulp and paper;
• chemicals; and
• industrial ceramics.
Treasury would be able to add
more products to the above
list.
Exemptions from BCA
The bill does not include
specific provisions for
exemptions from the fee.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
Th bill would establish a
trust fund that receives
appropriations equal to fees
received in the Treasury
from the domestic fees and
import fees.
The trust fund would
allocate expenditures during
the first 10 years as follows:
70% for direct payments to
eligible individuals, phasing
out at certain income levels;
5% for agricultural and
forestry sequestration;
10% for grants to support
transition assistance to a
lower carbon economy;
15% for a newly established
Climate Change Finance
Corporation to finance
“clean energy” and climate
change resiliency activities.
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
H.R. 5744
Energy Innovation and
Carbon Dividend Act of
2023
Rep. Carbajal
September 27, 2023
The bill would impose a
domestic fee on fossil fuels
used, sold, or transferred at
“covered entities,” which
include coal mines, petroleum
refineries, and specific natural
gas distribution entities.
The fee would be based on the
fuel’s GHG emissions content.
The rate of the fee would start
at $15 per mtCO2ee and
increase annually by inflation
plus $10/mtCO2e. The fee
would increase by $15/
mtCO2e if certain emissions
targets are not met and cease if
total GHG emissions from
fossil fuels decrease by 90%
compared to 2005 levels.
The bill would provide a rebate
for fuels used on a farm and for
fuels or their derivatives used
by U.S. Armed Forces; and
provide a rebate for specific
carbon capture and
sequestration activities.
The bill would also establish a
BCA on imported fossil fuels
and carbon-intensive products.
The domestic fee would apply
to fossil fuels.
The import fee would apply to
fossil fuels and carbon-intensive
products. The initial list of such
products includes
The BCA would impose a fee
on imported fossil fuels that
would equate to the domestic
fee on fossil fuels.
The BCA would impose a fee
on imported carbon-intensive
products “equal to the total
carbon fee which would have
accumulated upon the [GHG]
content of the imported
carbon-intensive product had
the imported carbon-intensive
product been produced
domestically and subject to the
domestic carbon fee.”f
Treasury would determine
whether to reduce a fee on
imported materials (fuels or
products) based on explicit
GHG emissions prices imposed
in the exporting country.
The BCA would provide a
credit or refund to exporters
of covered fuels, based on the
tax levied on the fuels. The
BCA would also allow a credit
or refund to exporters of
carbon-intensive products,
equal to the “total carbon fees
accumulated upon the [GHG]
content of the exported
carbon-intensive product.”f
The bill does not include
specific provisions for
exemptions from the fee.
The bill states that revenues
collected from the domestic
fee and BCA fee “may be
used to supplement
appropriations” to the U.S.
Customs and Border
Protection for BCA
administration; and “then”
to the Green Climate Fund.g
H.R. 6665
MARKET CHOICE Act
Rep. Fitzpatrick
December 7, 2023
The bill would impose a tax on
fossil fuels based on their
potential GHG emissions,
GHG emissions from specific
industrial sources, and GHG
The domestic tax would apply
to fossil fuels and GHG
emissions from facilities—in
specific industrial source
categories—that emit more
The bill would impose a tax on
imports on covered goods, as
determined by Treasury. The
tax would be equivalent to the
costs (associated with the
The BCA would exclude
least developed countries (as
identified by the United
Nations); and countries
responsible for (1) less than
The bill would establish a
trust fund that receives
appropriations equal to 75%
of the bill’s tax revenue,
including both the domestic
CRS-28
• iron and steel;
• aluminum;
• cement;
• glass;
• pulp and paper;
• chemicals; and
• industrial ceramics.
The bill would direct Treasury
(in consultation with EPA) to
add more products through a
regulatory process.
Exemptions from BCA
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
General Framework
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
emissions from specific
products.
The domestic tax rate would
start (in 2025) at $35 per
mtCO2e, increasing annually by
5% plus inflation; if covered
emissions do not meet
emissions reduction schedule,
the tax rate would increase by
an additional $4 per mtCO2e.
The bill would also establish a
BCA on imported covered
goods and a rebate for
exporters of covered goods.
The bill would repeal specific
existing taxes on fuels,
including gasoline and aviation
fuel.
than 25,000 mtCO2e per year,
including
domestic tax) on comparable
domestic manufactured goods.
Covered goods would include
those that meet specific GHG
emissions intensity and trade
intensity thresholds (as
determined by Treasury).
The bill would authorize the
use of certain sources of data,
and, in certain situations,
authorize Treasury to use the
“best available data” and
“economic and engineering
models” to make specific
determinations.
The bill would provide a rebate
to exporters of goods that are
both energy-intensive and
trade-intensive; the rebate
would be related to the
increased costs of inputs (i.e.,
fossil fuels) subject to the
domestic tax.
0.5% of total global GHG
emissions and (2) less than
5% of global production in a
covered industrial sector.
The BCA would authorize
the President to exclude
sectors and materials if the
President determines the
application “would not be in
the national interest,
economic interest, or
environmental interest of the
United States.”
• iron and steel;
• underground coal mining;
• coal processing;
• petroleum refineries;
• cement;
• petrochemicals;
• lime;
• ammonia;
• aluminum;
• soda ash;
• ferroalloy;
• phosphoric acid;
• glass;
• zinc;
• petroleum and natural gas
extraction;
• lead;
• magnesium;
• nitric acid;
• adipic acid;
• semiconductor manufacture;
and
• electrical transmission and
distribution.
The domestic tax would also
apply to facilities that
manufacture or import
specified products or combust
biomass with emissions above
25,000 mtCO2e.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
tax and the BCA tax
revenue. The bill does not
provide a specific allocation
for the remaining 25% of
revenue.
“As provided in
appropriations acts,” the
trust fund would be available
to provide annual funding for
the following infrastructure
programs between FY2025
and FY2034:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
CRS-29
70% to the Federal
Highway Trust Fund;
10% to states for grants
to low-income
households;
4.2% for various energyrelated research and
development
objectives;
4.0% for mitigation and
adaptation
infrastructure projects;
3.0% for displaced
energy workers;
2.5% for the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund;
1.5% for a Department
of Energy
weatherization
program;
1.5% for the Abandoned
Mine Reclamation Fund;
1.0% for the
Reforestation Trust
Fund;
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
Exemptions from BCA
•
•
•
H.R. 6622
Clean Competition Act
Rep. DelBene
December 8, 2023
This proposal is identical to
S. 3422 (Whitehouse)
CRS-30
The bill would impose a
domestic emissions charge at
certain facilities, based on an
annual carbon price and the
degree to which a facility’s
carbon intensity exceeds the
intensity of the relevant
industrial sector. The charge
would increase over time,
based on the degree of
intensity exceedance.
Treasury would determine the
carbon intensity for covered
industries; covered entities
would be allowed to petition
for a different carbon intensity
of a specific good.
Treasury would be required to
establish a reporting program
for facilities to provide data for
calculating their carbon
intensity (e.g., process
emissions, electricity use,
weight of primary goods
produced).
The domestic carbon price
would start at $55, increasing
annually by 5% plus inflation.
The domestic charge would
apply to facilities that are
required to report GHG
emissions to the EPA’s GHG
Reporting Program (40 C.F.R.
Part 98) and produce primary
goods in covered national
industries (as defined in the
bill), including
• petroleum and natural gas
extraction;
• surface coal mining;
• underground coal mining;
• iron and steel;
• aluminum;
• chemical manufacturing;
• pulp and paper;
• paperboard mills;
• petroleum refineries;
• asphalt;
• glass;
• hydrogen production;
• adipic acid production;
• ethyl alcohol;
• nitrogenous fertilizers; and
• petrochemicals.
Imports of carbon-intensive
goods (and finished goods)
would be subject to a charge
based on the domestic carbon
price and the difference in
carbon intensities between the
imported good and the carbon
intensity of the relevant U.S.
industrial sector. Carbon
intensity would be a measure
of “covered emissions” from a
facility divided by total weight
of primary goods produced at
the facility.
The default measure of carbon
intensity for imported goods
would be the exporting
country’s gross domestic
product divided by total
production-based emissions.
Treasury would be required to
determine the intensity
measure for the relevant
industrial sector in the
exporting country (emissions
divided by total weight of
product in that sector).
Primary goods produced in a
“relatively least developed
country” would be excluded
from the import charge
(unless the country produces
a primary good that accounts
for at least 3% of total global
exports by value).a
The import charge would be
waived or reduced if
Treasury determines (with
coordination with other
agencies) the exporting
country imposes “explicit
costs” on GHG emissions
that are materially similar to
the domestic charge.
U.S. facilities that export
covered materials (and
finished goods) would be
able to seek a refund based
on payment of the domestic
charge.
0.5% to support
agricultural GHG
sequestration projects;
0.1% to decrease the
environmental impact
of renewable energy
activities; and
0.1% for the Leaking
Underground Storage
Tank Trust Fund.
The bill would generate
revenues from a charge on
domestic facilities and
imported goods; the bill
would effectively combine
the two revenue streams
and distribute them as
follows:
The bill would allocate 75%
of these emissions charge
revenues to Treasury to
establish and implement a
competitive grant program
to eligible entities for
investments in technology
that reduce their carbon
intensity; authorize Treasury
to “recapture” grant funds
under certain conditions;
and allocate 25% of the total
revenues to the Department
of State for multilateral
assistance to support climate
and clean energy programs.
Bill Number
Congress Title
Sponsor
Date
H.R. 8962h
Methane Border
Adjustment Mechanism
Act
Rep. Brownley
July 9, 2024
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
The bill would create a BCA
framework that imposes a
charge on certain imported
goods based on the domestic
carbon price and the carbon
intensity differences between
imported materials and their
U.S. counterparts.
The import charge would apply
to primary goods imported
into the United States from the
same industries listed above.
An importer would be able to
submit a petition supporting a
carbon intensity specific to a
particular manufacturer in the
exporting country.
The bill would create a BCA
framework that imposes a tax
on imported petroleum and
natural gas.
The tax would be based on the
domestic methane emissions
charge established in Section
136 of the Clean Air Act by the
Inflation Reduction Act of
2022.
The tax would apply to
imported petroleum and
natural gas.
The tax would be based on a
country’s total methane
emissions charge. This term is
defined as the total amount of
charges from facilities in
another country, if they were
subject to the Clean Air Act
Section 136 charge on methane
emissions from specific facilities
in the oil and gas industry.i
The amount of tax would be
based on the ratio—as
determined by Treasury—of
the volume or energy content
of the imported substance to
the total volume or energy
content of that substance that
is produced in its origin
country.
The bill would provide an
alternative mechanism, subject
to certain conditions, for
assessing the tax on imported
materials.
Exemptions from BCA
The bill does not include
specific provisions for
exemptions from the tax.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
The bill does not include
specific provisions for BCA
revenue distribution.
Source: Prepared by CRS.
a. S. 3422 cross-references the definition of relatively least developed country in Section 124 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2151v), which references
the list of least developed country from the United Nations General Assembly. This list is available at United Nations, “List of LDCs,” https://www.un.org/ohrlls/
content/list-ldcs.
CRS-31
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
The World Trade Organization defines an ad valorem tariff as a “tariff rate expressed as a percentage of the value of the goods to be imported or exported.” See
World Trade Organization, Dictionary of Policy Terms, Fifth Edition, 2007.
The bill uses the term pollution throughout its text, including the key terms pollution intensity and pollution intensity difference. The bill defines pollution as “greenhouse
gas emissions.” To avoid confusion and allow for easier comparisons among the BCA proposals, CRS substitutes GHG emissions for pollution in the above table’s
entry for this bill.
The bill does not explicitly address situations in which an imported material’s GHG emissions intensity is lower than its counterpart in the United States.
This term of measure is used because GHGs vary by global warming potential (GWP). GWP is an index developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) that allows comparisons of the heat-trapping ability of different gases over a period of time, typically 100 years. Consistent with international GHG
reporting requirements, EPA’s most recent GHG inventory (with data from 2022) uses the GWP values presented in the IPCC’s 2013 Fifth Assessment Report. For
example, based on these GWP values, a ton of methane is 28 times more potent than a ton of CO2 when averaged over a 100-year time frame. EPA’s inventory is
available at EPA, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks,” https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks.
The implementation of this provision is uncertain, as carbon-intensive products are not directly subject to a domestic fee. The bill would direct Treasury (in
consultation with EPA) to implement the BCA.
For more information on the Green Climate Fund, see CRS In Focus IF10763, U.S. International Climate Finance: A Primer, by Richard K. Lattanzio.
As of the date of this report, the official text of this proposal was not available at Congress.gov. CRS obtained the text of this bill from Rep. Brownley’s website,
“Brownley Introduces Legislation to Reduce Global Methane Emissions,” press release, July 9, 2024, https://juliabrownley.house.gov/brownley-introduces-legislationto-reduce-global-methane-emissions/.
The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA; P.L. 117-169) added Section 136 to the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7436). The emissions charge in Section 136 applies only to
methane emissions from specific types of facilities that are required to report their GHG emissions to the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program
(GHGRP). For more information, see CRS Report R47206, Inflation Reduction Act Methane Emissions Charge: In Brief, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
Table 3. Selected Provisions in the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
Effective Date
General Framework
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
The first phase of the
CBAM—which requires
reporting but does not
impose a fee—went into
effect on October 1,
2023.
During the second
phase—scheduled to
start in 2026—the EU
will impose a fee on
selected imports.
CBAM requires importers to
submit payments (beginning in
2026) for the GHG emissions
associated with their covered
imported materials.
CBAM regulations identify
applicable covered materials by
their Combined Nomenclature
codes (the EU’s trade
classification system), including
CBAM indirectly attaches a
carbon price to the GHG
emissions “embedded” with
imported products.
The carbon price equals the
weekly average auction price
for the EU ETS emissions
allowance; the average price in
2023 was $90 per metric ton
of CO2e emissions.a
CBAM attaches the price to
imported goods through a
certificate process. One
CBAM covers imports of
goods from all non-EU
countries.
Countries that participate
with the EU ETS or have
their own emissions trading
systems linked with the ETS
(e.g., Switzerland) are
excluded from the CBAM.
CBAM includes a de minimis
exemption, which generally
applies to covered materials
CRS-32
CBAM complements the EU’s
principal GHG mitigation policy
mechanism: the Emissions
Trading System (ETS). The ETS
is a GHG emissions cap-andtrade program that started in
2005 and covers emissions
from the electricity sector,
• cement materials;
• iron and steel products;
• aluminum products;
• fertilizers and related
chemicals (e.g., ammonia);
• hydrogen; and
• electricity.
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
EU countries retain 25% of
the CBAM revenues; the
remaining 75% go into the
EU budget.d
Effective Date
General Framework
selected energy-intensive
industries, and aviation.
Scope of Materials
BCA Mechanism
Exemptions from BCA
CBAM regulations include a
process by which EU
policymakers may expand the
list above.
certificate equates with 1
metric ton of CO2e emissions.
Companies importing covered
products into the EU need to
purchase certificates through
national authorities and
annually surrender the number
of certificates that matches the
emissions associated with their
imported products.
CBAM is scheduled to phase in
over a number of years;
following a reporting period
that started in October 2023,
the CBAM fee is scheduled to
start in 2026 in a limited form
and reach its full
implementation in 2034.
During the first period, both
direct and indirect emissions
must be reported; after the
reporting period, the scope
varies by product.b
During this phase-in period
(2026-2034), the CBAM is
scheduled to apply only to the
percentage of emissions that
do not benefit from free
allowances.
CBAM includes an adjustment
mechanism to account for a
carbon price in place in the
exporting country.
with a total value of €150 or
less.c
Distribution of BCA
Revenue
Source: Prepared by CRS.
a. This value is higher than 2023 emissions allowance prices in U.S. state and regional GHG emissions reduction programs. As a point of comparison, the average
emissions allowance price in 2023 from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was $14 per metric ton. The 2023 average allowance price in California’s
cap-and-trade program was $33 per metric ton.
b. In general, direct emissions include emissions from an onsite process, such as CO2 from cement or steel production. Indirect emissions include (for example)
emissions from the inputs, such as electricity generated offsite but used to run an onsite process.
CRS-33
c.
d.
CRS-34
European Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Questions and Answers,” updated November 28, 2023, https://taxationcustoms.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en#guidance.
European Commission, “Questions and Answers: An Adjusted Package for the Next Generation of Own Resources,” June 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_3329. Further details are beyond the scope of this report.
Border Carbon Adjustments: Background, EU Developments, and Recent Legislation
Author Information
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in Environmental Policy
Christopher A. Casey
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Kristen Hite
Legislative Attorney
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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Congressional Research Service
R48247 · VERSION 1 · NEW
35
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