Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
Congressional research reportSep 5, 2023
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16
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Updated September 5, 2023
Congressional Research Service
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R47493
SUMMARY
Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16
Aircraft
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden
Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has
engaged Congress on the issue. According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S.
officials, the Administration informally notified Congress of its intent to sell 40 new F-16s in the
Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters,
along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion. Since
Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, U.S.-Turkey cooperation
on some issues and differences on others have shaped the two countries’ relationship. Some
Members of Congress who have input on a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey have indicated that they
expect certain actions from Turkey before they will consider supporting the transaction.
R47493
September 5, 2023
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for decades, and Turkey has relied
consistently on U.S. imports for complex platforms such as aircraft and helicopters. A number of previously proposed U.S.
arms transactions with Turkey (such as for armed drones, air defense systems, and F-16 information sharing and safety
upgrades) either have stalled or faced reported congressional holds—perhaps stemming partly from bilateral differences on
technology sharing, and partly from tensions over Russia and Syria. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified a
possible sale of F-16 information sharing and safety upgrades.
Turkish air capabilities after S-400 controversy. A U.S. F-16 sale to Turkey would likely extend the service life of much
of Turkey’s fleet—and ensure its continued interoperability within NATO—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth
fighter. The United States was planning to sell up to 100 F-35s to Turkey until its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system led to a U.S. cancellation of the F-35 transfers. The F-16V could be an interim solution for
Turkey, though it lacks the stealth features of the F-35 and may be subject to production backlogs of three years or more.
NATO security considerations and the Swedish accession process. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s
potential to boost NATO militarily amid a European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in an F16 transaction. Turkey’s has NATO’s second-largest military and the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet, hosts important allied
assets and personnel, and partners in other ways within the alliance, including by contributing to missions that aid Baltic and
Mediterranean security. At the same time, several Members of Congress have argued that Turkish delays in approving NATO
accession for Sweden and Finland have threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. While Turkey approved Finland’s
NATO membership in March 2023, its approval of Sweden’s accession may be necessary before many Members of Congress
would consider backing an F-16 sale. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged in July to take steps—perhaps
contingent on additional promises or actions from Sweden—toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO
accession protocol.
Congressional review process and other key issues. The Administration may consider whether and when to move forward
with a formal notification of a proposed F-16 sale to Turkey, possibly in the face of enduring congressional concerns. Within
15 days after formal notification, Congress could block the sale via a joint resolution of disapproval under the Arms Export
Control Act. Congress also can take action at any time, up to the point of final delivery, via the regular legislative process.
Some factors that could affect congressional review of a possible F-16 sale—beyond the NATO-related issues described
above—include Turkey’s rivalry with NATO ally Greece, Turkey’s role in Syria, and the potential for questions about
Turkish domestic governance to undermine NATO decisionmaking. Reportedly, the Administration informally notified a
possible sale of up to 40 F-35s to Greece at the same time as the Turkey/F-16 informal notification. For the FY2023 National
Defense Authorization Act, the House voted to condition potential F-16 transfers to Turkey on steps discouraging overflights
of Greek territory (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900), but the final version (P.L. 117-263) did not include the condition.
Turkish alternatives to F-16s? If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials might consider Western European
alternatives such as Eurofighter Typhoons. However, Turkey may face the following challenges to a Typhoon sale: hesitancy
from consortium partner Germany, higher per unit costs, difficulties in transitioning its air force away from its U.S.-origin
fleet, and/or potential congressional notification requirements (if it includes U.S.-origin components). Obstacles to both U.S.
and European options could lead Turkey to confront a capability gap in fighter aircraft. A 2022 State Department strategy
document argued that “Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China” to fill such capability gaps in national defense.
Congressional Research Service
Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
Contents
Overview of the Possible F-16 Sale ................................................................................................ 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales and the Role of Congress................................................................... 3
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3
Turkish S-400 Acquisition and U.S. Responses.................................................................. 5
Turkey’s Role in NATO ............................................................................................................ 5
Congressional Review Process and Options ................................................................................... 8
Congressional Views ................................................................................................................. 9
Initial Reactions to a Proposed Sale.................................................................................... 9
Developments After Erdogan’s Reelection ........................................................................ 11
Key Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................... 12
Russia-Ukraine War .......................................................................................................... 12
Sweden: NATO Accession ................................................................................................ 14
Greece and Cyprus ............................................................................................................ 14
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 16
Turkish Domestic Issues ................................................................................................... 17
Alternatives to F-16s? ................................................................................................................... 17
Some Arguments for and Against Approving a Possible F-16 Sale .............................................. 18
Possible Questions for Biden Administration................................................................................ 20
Figures
Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper.................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending ................................................... 4
Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey ...................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 22
Congressional Research Service
Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
Overview of the Possible F-16 Sale
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden
Administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye), and has
engaged Congress on the issue:
the Biden administration strongly supports the package to both upgrade the existing F-16s
and to provide new ones to Türkiye, because as a [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
NATO Ally and partner, it is in our national interest and the security interest of the Alliance
that Türkiye continue to be able to operate
at the higher standards of NATO to make
Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper
sure that we have full interoperability.
On this particular matter, I can’t offer you
an assessment or get into the process until
after we formally notify our Congress, but
it’s something that we’re working on and
we’ve made very clear to Congress our
strong
support
for
the
F-16
modernization. We have longstanding
defense and security ties, and as the
President has said – as President Biden
has said – Turkish NATO interoperability
remains a priority for us....
Source: Lockheed Martin.
With regard to the F-16s, I can’t give you a timeline on formal notification. What I can tell
you is I have already been actively engaged in speaking to Congress about the
administration’s strong support for the F-16 package, the upgrade, modernization package.1
According to January 2023 media reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Administration
informally notified Congress (see “Congressional Review Process and Options” below) of its
intent to sell 40 new F-16s of the advanced Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and Viper
upgrade packages for 79 existing F-16s (see Figure 1), along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800
bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.2 Reportedly at the same time, the
Administration also informally notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters to Greece, another NATO ally and a historical Turkish rival (see “Greece and Cyprus”
below).3
The F-16 proposal takes place within a context of complicated U.S.-Turkey relations, and at a
time when a number of U.S. allies and traditional partners are evaluating their strategic options in
an era of global great-power competition.4 Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the United States
and Turkey have cooperated closely on some issues and differed sharply on others.5 A March
1 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023.
2 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Biden Administration Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey,” New
York Times, January 13, 2023; Begun Donmez Ersoz, “US Weighs Turkey, Greece Jet Sales amid NATO Expansion,”
Voice of America, January 27, 2023; “Biden to ask US Congress to approve F-16 sale to Türkiye,” Daily Sabah,
January 13, 2023.
3 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023.
4 See White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
5 CRS In Focus IF10487, Turkey (Türkiye)-U.S. Relations: Timeline and Brief Historical Context, by Jim Zanotti and
Clayton Thomas.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
2023 Wall Street Journal article identified Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and India as “midsize powers” seeking “advantages as the U.S.-led world order is
challenged” by China and Russia.6 James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s (last name pronounced air-doe-wan) May 2023
reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational decision, given not only
their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the standpoint of their
experiences.”7 U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that mutual cooperation on regional security
matters remains important to both countries.8 In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in
which we can have a constructive relationship with them.”9
After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic significance for NATO amid an
evolving European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in moving
forward with an F-16 transaction. In March 2022, an Administration official reportedly wrote to
some Members of Congress to assert “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability
interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported
by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”10
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about a possible F-16 sale since the reported
informal notification. Their support for the sale might depend on Turkish approval of NATO
accession for Sweden, and perhaps other issues as well (see “Congressional Views” below). From
a process standpoint, after a period of informal, confidential Administration-Congress
consultations, the Administration could submit formal notification to start a 15-day congressional
review period (see “Congressional Review Process and Options” below).
Turkey had previously expected to acquire up to 100 F-35s during this decade, but U.S. officials
removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 after it acquired a Russian S-400 surface-to-air
defense system (see “Turkish S-400 Acquisition and U.S. Responses” below).11 The F-16V is
marketed as an advanced fourth-generation fighter, and thus could present an interim solution for
Turkey, though the aircraft lacks the stealth characteristics of the F-35 and may be subject to
possible production backlogs (see text box below). Turkey reportedly requested the F-16V sale in
October 2021,12 and in March 2023 its embassy in Washington, DC reportedly told Newsweek:
Türkiye’s continued interoperability with NATO is of utmost importance, not only for
Türkiye, but also for NATO’s continued deterrence at its southern flank.... The U.S. has
been Türkiye’s number one partner in defense industry. We still count on our close
cooperation with the U.S. defense industry in order to maintain our military capabilities.
6 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023.
7 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
8 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023.
9 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01.
10 Then Acting [since confirmed] Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in
Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6,
2022.
11 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, and
CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by John R. Hoehn.
12 Grant Rumley and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s F-16 Request May Not Stave Off the Inevitable,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2021.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
We expect members of Congress to look beyond short-term political aspirations and not
put preconditions to the sale of military equipment to Türkiye. 13
The Possible Sale and Turkey’s Airpower Needs
A U.S. sale of F-16s to Turkey would likely modernize and extend the service life of much of Turkey’s fighter
fleet—and ensure its continued NATO interoperability—while Turkey tries to acquire or design a stealth
fighter.14 The F-16V is available for export in full-scale production or as an upgrade kit. It offers systems
integration improvements that provide an increased capability and reliability for targeting potential enemy
aircraft.15 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16V also includes modern systems like the APG-83 active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, an improved electronic warfare suite, and new cockpit software and
hardware to provide enhanced battlespace awareness to the pilot.16 These systems allow a pilot to identify and
engage more targets, an increase in lethality relative to previous F-16 variants.17
Should the U.S. and Turkish officials reach agreement on a sale, delivery of new F-16s could face a production
backlog.18 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is four
aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.19 Other countries receiving
or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain,
Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.20 Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria,
Lockheed anticipates having a backlog of 148 aircraft.21 Based on current production rates, it could take three
years or more for Turkey to start receiving new F-16Vs.
Turkey is apparently seeking to develop technology for an indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft in partnership
with companies such as BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, and/or General Electric. The program is dubbed the National
Combat Aircraft (Turkish acronym MMU, also known as TF-X), but the Turkish Air Force does not expect to
integrate the aircraft into its regular operations until the early 2030s or later.22
Background
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales and the Role of Congress
Overview
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. interests in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers as well as its role in NATO (see “Turkey’s Role in
NATO” below). Since the Cold War, Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as
13 Tom O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine,” Newsweek, March
7, 2023.
14 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,
2022.
15 Staff Sgt. Sarah M. McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower,” United States
Air Force, June 23, 2022.
16 F-16 Block 70/72 Product Card, Lockheed Martin, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheedmartin/aero/documents/F-16/Jan20_Product%20Card%20F-16%20Block%207072%20media.pdf.
17 McClanahan, “AESA Radar Launches F-16 into Next Generation of Airpower.”
18 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023.
19 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
20 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22,
2021.
21 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.
22 Gastón Dubois, “TF-X/MMU: Turkey’s future fifth-generation fighter is taking shape,” Aviacionline, January 8,
2023; Thomas Newdick, “Our First Look at Turkey’s Stealthy New Fighter,” The War Zone, November 23, 2022;
Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength and NATO
interoperability.23
Congressional legislation and oversight have shaped U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for
decades. Congress placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the 1974
Cyprus conflict in which Turkey used U.S.-origin weapons against Greek and Greek Cypriot
forces. In those military operations, Turkey took control of slightly more than one-third of the
island on behalf of Turkish Cypriots.24 Since the embargo, Turkey has focused more on
developing its defense industry (see Figure 2), and as part of that goal, one objective of Turkish
arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been to acquire technology
for future indigenous defense production.25
Over the past 15 years, some arms transfers
or export licenses Turkey has requested or
otherwise sought from the United States
either have been stalled, or reportedly faced
congressional “holds” over tensions related
to Russia and Syria.26 Examples include
•
•
Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of
Turkish Military Spending
MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator
armed drones. Turkey reportedly
requested these drones in the late
2000s, but supposedly some
Members of Congress opposed their
transfer at a time when very few
U.S. allies were receiving armed
drones.27 Turkey’s inability to
acquire U.S.-origin drones likely
reinforced the motivation for
Turkey’s successful domestic
development of the Bayraktar TB2
Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the
drone.28
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) Arms Traders Database, with some text
Patriot surface-to-air defense
modifications by CRS.
system. Turkey and the United
Note: Turkey signed the S-400 purchase agreement
States reportedly consulted
in 2017, and took delivery in 2019.
frequently between 2009 and 2018
on a possible U.S. sale of Patriot systems to Turkey. Turkish officials apparently
23 See, for example, Appendix D of CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, version
dated November 9, 2020, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41368/72. Turkey also has procurement
and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and
reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
24 Jody Brumage, “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part I” and “The Turkish Arms Embargo – Part II,” Robert C. Byrd
Center for Congressional History and Education, December 1 and 15, 2015.
25 Appendix B of CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
26 See, for example, Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two
years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020.
27 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey goes all in on drones,” Al-Monitor, December 28, 2015; Tolga Tanis, “US defense equipment
transfer to Turkey still on hold amid discord on regional issues,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 9, 2015; Burak Bekdil,
“Turkey mulls unarmed Reaper drones from US,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 4, 2014.
28 Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, July 2021.
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•
sought greater technology sharing than what U.S. officials were offering, and
then made a preliminary choice of a Chinese system in 2013 before reversing
course and later selecting the Russian S-400.29
F-16 modernization: information sharing and flight safety. In February 2019,
Turkey submitted a Letter of Request for Link 16 Multifunctional Information
Distribution Systems (MIDS) and Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance
Systems for 199 F-16 aircraft. According to a Turkish official, procuring Link 16
MIDS would be a main factor in enhancing Turkey’s NATO interoperability.30 In
April 2023, the Administration formally notified Congress of a possible sale of
avionics that would apparently include these systems.31
Turkish S-400 Acquisition and U.S. Responses
After Turkey acquired its S-400 system from Russia in July 2019, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 program. In announcing the removal, Defense Department
officials cited concerns about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35
stealth capabilities.32 In December 2020, the Trump Administration also imposed sanctions on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency (and associated individuals) under the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which targets countries
that make significant arms purchases from Russia.33 In December 2019, Congress enacted the
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92), which includes a provision
(Section 1245) prohibiting the Defense Department from transferring F-35s to Turkey unless
Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish officials have reportedly placed the S-400 in a
storage facility rather than activating it and risking additional U.S. retaliatory measures.34
Turkey’s Role in NATO
Since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, its engagement with allies (including the United States) on a
number of security challenges in its geographic vicinity has featured cooperation on many of
29 Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus, “The Tale of Turkey and the Patriots,” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2019.
30 The information in the first two sentences of this bullet comes from CRS correspondence with a Turkish official,
March 1, 2023. Per this same correspondence, other requests or contracts that are lagging behind Turkey’s delivery
schedule include various air-to-surface (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), air-to-air (Sidewinder and Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles), and naval (Harpoon missiles, Phalanx, Sea Rolling Airframe Missile) weapons systems.
31 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023.
32 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. For additional information on the S400 issue, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations. Negotiations are reportedly
ongoing between U.S. and Turkish officials on the status of F-35s technically owned by Turkey but based in the United
States, and an initial $1.4 billion Turkish payment.
33 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
34 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey put Russian S-400 missiles in a storage facility to avoid further clashes with the US,”
Nordic Monitor, December 8, 2022.
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them, and disagreement on others.35 Moreover, some specific actions Turkey has taken within the
alliance, as described below, have had implications for NATO’s strength and cohesion.
Certain tangible benefits flow to Turkey’s NATO allies due to its membership in the organization
and its defense capabilities. According to the State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy
(ICS) for Turkey, its sizable military and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.36 Turkey has NATO’s second-largest military
and the world’s third-largest F-16 fleet,37 hosts allied military assets and personnel (see Figure 3)
in a location near several conflict areas in the Middle East and elsewhere, and partners in other
ways with the United States and other allies—including in a number of NATO missions.38
Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey
Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.
35 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10487, Turkey
(Türkiye)-U.S. Relations: Timeline and Brief Historical Context, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. Also, Can
Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, ed.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 92-101.
36 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022.
37 “Turkey and NATO,” Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 25, comment 36,
December 2019; Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February
6, 2023.
38 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations
Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105. Kalev Stoicescu and Hille
Hanso, Turkey’s Future Role in NATO: An Indispensable and Difficult Ally, International Centre for Defence and
Security (Estonia), January 2022; Nicholas Fiorenza and Dylan Lehrke, “Turkey leads NATO VJTF in 2021,” Janes
Defence Weekly, January 6, 2021.
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Note: All locations are approximate.
For example, Turkish F-16s have occasionally participated in NATO Baltic Air Policing
missions,39 and in April 2022 a Turkish E-7T early warning aircraft “acted as the airborne
command and control post for fighter activities above the Baltic Sea Region during NATO’s
multinational exercise Ramstein Alloy,” which included Sweden and Finland as partner nations.40
Turkish F-16s also participated in NATO’s major Air Defender 23 exercise in June 2023.41
Additionally, Turkey regularly contributes aircraft and naval vessels to NATO’s Operation Sea
Guardian, an ongoing maritime security mission in the Mediterranean Sea.42
Nevertheless, some of Turkey’s actions under President Erdogan’s rule have arguably undermined
NATO’s strength and unity. In a few cases, Turkish stances have delayed the alliance from
achieving the unanimity needed to act. For example, in 2020 Turkey prolonged the approval of a
new NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states because it was trying to get other
alliance members to designate its Syrian Kurdish adversaries (known as the People’s Protection
Units, or the Kurdish acronym YPG) as a terrorist group.43 Turkey ultimately gave up on these
efforts and agreed to the new plan.44 Similar concerns state by Turkish officials regarding Kurdish
militant groups have played a major role in Turkish delays in approving NATO membership for
Sweden and Finland (an issue discussed further below). President Erdogan said in May 2022,
“The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the respect that is shown to our
sensitivities.”45
Additionally, Erdogan has consolidated substantial domestic control over Turkey during his time
as prime minister and president.46 This heightened degree of control has prompted some
observers to express concern that a Turkey more accountable to a leader’s personal agenda or
ideology than its democratic institutions could weaken NATO decisionmaking and contributions
to regional stability.47
39 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7,
2021.
40 NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein
Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
41 German Bundeswehr, “Air Defender 23,” at https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/airdefender-23.
42 NATO, “Operation Sea Guardian,” May 17, 2021; “NATO’s operation Sea Guardian conducts first patrols in Eastern
Mediterranean for 2023,” February 28, 2023. Infographics showing specific deployments over time available at
https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/infographics.
43 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” Reuters, July 2, 2020. The YPG, which has
partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition in Syria under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), has links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization
that has fought an on-and-off insurgency with Turkish government forces since the 1980s). Sources citing links
between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2021,
Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group,
February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April
2016.
44 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” Reuters.
45 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Washington Post, May 19, 2022. See
also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” Economist, May 30, 2022.
46 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
47 Jason Blessing et al., editors, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond. Washington, DC: Foreign
Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 2021.
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Congressional Review Process and Options
For a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major defense
equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the executive branch takes a
number of customary and official steps to facilitate congressional review.48 First, the State
Department usually provides informal notification of the proposed FMS or DCS to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). Then, a
proposed FMS or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most
cases, the State Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal
notification. This time period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential
“tiered review” process. If a Member of Congress places a hold on the proposed transaction,
formal notification usually does not proceed, though holds are not legally binding.49
Under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, as
amended), the executive branch can proceed with a notified FMS or DCS to NATO countries
(such as Turkey and Greece) 15 days after formal notification,50 subject to possible congressional
action as described below.
Joint resolution of disapproval. During the 15-day period after formal notification, Congress
may enact a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed transaction; the AECA contains procedures
for expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval. The President can
veto a resolution of disapproval, subject to congressional override by two-thirds majorities of
both houses.51
To date, Congress has not successfully blocked any proposed arms sales via joint resolutions of
disapproval. However, in some cases substantial congressional opposition has led the executive
branch to withdraw or alter sales.52
Other legislation. The process for any given arms sale can last for months or years. After the
prescribed AECA review period has passed, Congress can also use the regular legislative process
to act at any time—up to the point of final delivery—to block, condition, or otherwise influence a
sale.53 One example of legislation to block an arms transfer was the FY2020 NDAA provision
(mentioned above) restricting F-35 transfers to Turkey while it possesses the S-400.
Emergency Arms Sales Authorities Available to the President
Other provisions in Section 36 of the AECA allow the President to waive congressional review requirements and
immediately sell arms if the President certifies to Congress that “an emergency exists which requires such sale in
48 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO allies
(and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading
of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense
services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all other
countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
49 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
50 For most non-NATO countries (other than Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand, for which the
duration is also 15 days), the duration is 30 days after formal notification.
51 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process.
52 For case studies of situations in which congressional action (via the AECA expedited process or other legislative
channels) resulted in changes to proposed arms sales, see Archived CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military
Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
53 CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W.
Rosen.
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the national security interests of the United States.”54 In 2019, the Trump Administration cited those authorities in
notifying Congress of immediate FMSs and DCSs to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan because of stated security
concerns for U.S. partners relating to Iran and Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.55 At a hearing to examine the sales,
testimony from a State Department official suggested that Senator Menendez (then serving as SFRC Ranking
Member) had placed a hold on the sales some months prior to the Administration’s invocation of emergency
authority.56 Although the sales proceeded, the Senate and House later passed three joint resolutions of
disapproval (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38); President Trump vetoed them all.57 To date, Biden
Administration officials have not publicly indicated whether they might consider invoking emergency authorities in
an F-16 case for Turkey.
Congressional Views
Initial Reactions to a Proposed Sale
Some Members of Congress with input in approving the possible F-16 sale to Turkey have
indicated that they expect certain actions or policy changes from Turkey before they will consider
supporting the transaction (see “Key Issues for Congress” below). Within a context of strong
congressional support for Swedish and Finnish NATO accession,58 a bipartisan group of 29
Senators argued in a February 2023 letter to President Biden that Turkish delay on the issue has
threatened alliance unity in countering Russia. The group, led by Senate NATO Observer Group
Co-Chairs Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis, suggested that they might consider supporting the F16 sale only if Turkey approves accession for both Sweden and Finland.59 Following a March
2023 meeting in Washington, DC with high-level Turkish officials and U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey Jeff Flake, Senators Shaheen and Tillis reiterated the “serious global security
implications” of expeditious Turkish approval of Swedish and Finnish accession.60 In line with
Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament approved
Finland’s application to join NATO later that month.61 Finland formally joined the alliance in
April.
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Chairman Michael
McCaul and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks, comprise the four committee leaders or “four
corners” who can reportedly place holds (though, as mentioned earlier, the holds are not legally
binding) on arms sales during the informal notification process.62
54 For more information, including past invocations of the emergency authorities, see CRS Report R44984, Arms Sales
in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
55 Arms Sales Notification; Congressional Record, vol. 165, no. 93 (Senate – June 4, 2019), pp. S3203-S3209.
56 CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Emergency Arms Sales,” June
12, 2019.
57 United States Senate, Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump, at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/
TrumpDJ.htm.
58 CRS Insight IN11949, NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces Delay, by Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin,
and Andrew S. Bowen. Senate Treaty Document 117-3 approved ratifying the accession protocols in August 2022 by a
95-1 vote.
59 February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
60 Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, “Shaheen, Tillis Issue Joint Statement Following Meeting with Turkish Officials & U.S.
Ambassador to Türkiye,” March 15, 2023.
61 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023.
62 Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years.”
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Chairman Menendez was cited in January 2023 as supporting the F-35 sale to Greece.63 At the
same time, he was quoted as saying the following in strong opposition to the F-16 sale to Turkey:
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.64
In statements to Newsweek in early March, Menendez reiterated these points, called on Turkey to
change course on its policies regarding airspace tensions with Greece and the Sweden/Finland
NATO accession issue, and warned Turkey against any further Russian arms purchases—urging it
to fully reject military cooperation with Russia.65 Later, in a March SFRC hearing featuring
Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish
foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey did not deserve to receive F-16s unless it
addresses some of the issues he mentioned.66 Despite apparent congressional acquiescence to the
Administration’s plan (mentioned above) to move forward on a proposed F-16 avionics sale to
Turkey that would enhance its NATO interoperability, SFRC Chairman Menendez said in April—
after formal notification to Congress of the avionics sale—that he continued to oppose the sale of
F-16s to Turkey.67
Ranking Member Risch has said that Turkey has made a “better case” for receiving the F-16 than
the F-35 because they use F-16s “to guard the eastern flank of NATO.” He also warned that “if
they’re not playing ball with the rest of NATO on Sweden and Finland, why in the world do we
want them as part of the club?”68
Other Members of Congress have expressed varying views on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey. In
2022, at least two indicated support or openness to a sale and suggested that U.S. national
interests were connected to maintaining bilateral defense cooperation with Turkey.69 In contrast,
34 Representatives sent a letter to President Biden on July 8, 2022, strongly opposing a sale and
noting that it could potentially reward President Erdogan for “ignoring Turkey’s alliance
commitments to the United States and NATO and the vast human rights abuses his regime
continues to commit at home and abroad.”70
In July 2022, the House passed a version of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) with a provision
(Section 1271) that would have conditioned F-16-related transfers on a presidential certification
sharing U.S. steps taken to prevent “repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.”
Before passing the bill, the House voted 244-179 to add Section 1271, with then-HFAC Chairman
63 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
64 Ibid.
65 O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.”
66 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=
105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
67 “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023.
68 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,”
Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023.
69 House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member (then Chairman) Adam Smith, quoted in Bryant Harris,
“Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4, 2022; Sen. Lindsey
Graham, quoted in Olafimihan Oshin, “Graham visits Turkey, says he will ‘do all in my power’ to close F-16s sale,”
The Hill, July 3, 2022.
70 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pallone-evo.house.gov/files/
20220705%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Sales%20Final.pdf.
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Meeks voting in favor and then-Ranking Member McCaul against.71 The final James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, enacted in December
2022) excluded this condition. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the act said, “We
believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized
territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”72
Developments After Erdogan’s Reelection
As Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle has ended, congressional committee leaders’ concerns
regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. A few days before President
Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he and the
other three committee leaders “will approve the transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s
membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes
and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”73 McCaul also said, “We’ve been assured that after the
[Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will be recognized as a NATO ally.”74
As of early June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to
provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.75
Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of August, with Turkey and Hungary the
only alliance members not to have approved it. After President Erdogan’s reelection, President
Biden said in late May that Erdogan “wants to work on something on the F-16s. I told him we
wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”76 Secretary Blinken said a few days later that
while the Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey
with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are.77 President Erdogan agreed in
July to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely
with it to “ensure ratification,”78 but later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider
Swedish accession until October (after its summer recess). Erdogan also said that he expected
Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will take to implement a June 2022 trilateral
memorandum—aimed at strengthening legal measures and policies (including extradition) against
Kurdish militants and others that Turkey deems terrorists—before sending the accession protocol
to parliament.79
71 Roll call for Amendment No. 399 to H.R. 7900, at https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2022/roll339.xml.
72 Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed
Services, on H.Res. 1512, James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023; Congressional
Record, vol. 168, no. 191 (House – December 8, 2022), p. H9499.
73 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023.
74 Gould et al.
75 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023.
76 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.
77 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability,” May 30, 2023.
78 NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July
10, 2023.
79 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters, July 12, 2023. Text of
Trilateral Memorandum at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-memo.pdf.
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SFRC Chairman Menendez said in May that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some
Members of Congress,80 but is only “part of the equation” for him.81 He suggested that if Turkey
approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other
neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications
that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”82 In July, after Erdogan
pledged to take steps toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession
protocol, Menendez called for additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s
security in the region before approving the sale.83 Risch, McCaul, and Meeks voiced general
optimism on a path forward, but stopped short of expressing assent to the sale, with Meeks saying
that Turkey cannot resume its violations of Greek airspace.84 Shortly thereafter, Erdogan said that
Turkish F-16s have never been used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”85
If the tiered review process for the possible F-16 sale persists amid congressional committee
leaders’ concerns, the Administration may consider whether, when, and how (1) to address any
continuing concerns, and/or (2) to move forward with a formal notification of the sale. Chairman
Menendez has said that Secretary Blinken has “assured him he will respect his hold.”86
Key Issues for Congress
Several additional issues could have implications for the congressional review process on the
possible sale, and vice versa. Brief summaries of each issue and its relevance for the process are
set forth below; for more detailed discussion, see, CRS Report R44000, Turkey (Türkiye): Major
Issues and U.S. Relations; and CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, both by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
Russia-Ukraine War
Background. While Turkey’s cooperation with Russia on some issues has presented challenges
for U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense has helped address those
80 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February
2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if
accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks
Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter
from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
81 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023.
82 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the
matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al.
83
David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” Washington Examiner,
July 11, 2023.
84 Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Politico, July 11, 2023. On July
8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s
include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it
resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security
interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-snapbackmechanisms.pdf.
85 “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” Kathimerini, July 12, 2023.
86 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters.
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challenges to some extent.87 Regarding the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on Turkey’s strategic
calculations, one analyst has written:
Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but
it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey
as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.88
U.S. officials have voiced appreciation for many Turkish actions. These include denouncing
Russia’s invasion, supplying Ukraine with military equipment, closing the Bosphorus (alt.
Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits to belligerent warships, helping broker efforts to export
Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea, and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe.89
At the same time, Turkey’s policies regarding economic and energy cooperation with Russia have
apparently generated some U.S. concerns.90 Instead of imposing sanctions on Russia like the
United States, other NATO allies, and the European Union (EU), Turkey has instead boosted
trade with Russia in some areas.91 In early 2023, U.S. officials warned counterparts in Turkey
(and some non-NATO countries) about possible penalties for businesses that supply Russia’s
defense industry in contravention of U.S. sanctions or export controls.92 Turkey’s then-Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or
technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed
information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses would not use
Turkey to bypass Western sanctions.93 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs
on sanctioned goods from transiting its territory to Russia.94 In April 2023, the Department of the
Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting
Russia or Russian entities.95
Relevance for congressional review process. As mentioned in the introduction to this report,
Turkey’s potential to boost NATO in countering Russia may partly explain the Administration’s
support for an F-16 transaction and Congress could possibly consider it in assessing a proposed
sale. Turkey’s procurement decisions and future plans for the S-400, along with its mediation
efforts and other interactions with Russia and Ukraine, may affect how U.S. officials and
lawmakers gauge Turkey’s Western alignment and pursue options to encourage it—including with
regard to F-16s.
87 February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden, text available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf; O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for
Ukraine.”
88 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” SWP
Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), May 20, 2022.
89 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.” For open source reporting about possible Turkish military supplies to Ukraine, see Stijn Mitzer and Joost
Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, November 21, 2022.
90 See, for example, Jared Malsin, “Ghost Fleet Helps Russia Evade Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2023.
91 Soner Cagaptay, “Unpacking Turkey’s Non-Binary Ukraine War Policy,” Hoover Institution, March 7, 2023.
92 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023; Jared Malsin, “Russia’s Ukraine War Effort Fueled
by Turkish Exports,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Partners to Weed Out Illicit
Trade with Russia,” New York Times, February 4, 2023.
93 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
94 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.
95 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the
World,” April 12, 2023.
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Sweden: NATO Accession
Background. As noted above, some Members of Congress have expressed strong support for
Swedish NATO accession, and some Members argue that Turkish delays on the issue have
threatened alliance unity in countering Russia.96 Before approving Swedish accession, Turkey has
sought to have Sweden take additional steps, per the June 2022 trilateral memorandum mentioned
above.
Relevance for congressional review process. Congressional leaders have signaled reluctance to
consider approving an F-16 sale to Turkey unless its parliament ratifies the NATO accession
protocols for Sweden, though Turkish officials have opposed any U.S. resort to the accession
issue as a precondition.97 President Erdogan’s July pledge to take steps toward Turkish
parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession protocol came after new Swedish antiterrorism legislation took effect in June, and two court rulings anticipated some extradition to
Turkey.98 President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment. As
mentioned above, Erdogan has said that he expects Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will
take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to
parliament.99 Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the
following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application:
•
•
•
At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale.100
The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.101
Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with
the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries.102
Greece and Cyprus
Background. Congress also could consider long-standing bilateral tensions between Turkey and
Greece in assessing a potential arms sale. Specific considerations might include how a potential
sale could affect the balance of military power between Turkey and Greece (see text box), as well
as Turkey’s role in various bilateral disputes—including over the ethnically divided island of
Cyprus.
Turkish and Greek Defense Capabilities and the U.S. Role
Historically, the United States has frequently linked military assistance provided to Turkey and Greece in a way
that maintains a careful balance between its two NATO allies.103 Airpower plays a role in this balance, as do
96 See footnote 59 and footnote 60.
97 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability”; “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Kalin,” TRT World, March 26, 2023.
98 “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,”
Associated Press, June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK
militants,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2023.
99 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters.
100 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Al-Monitor,
July 12, 2023.
101 “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” Reuters, July 13, 2023.
102 Ibid.
103 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 99. For background, CRS Report 90-29, Greece and Turkey: The
Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid, by Ellen Laipson, revised December 26, 1989, is available to Members and staff upon
request.
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additional factors like the countries’ respective naval and land-based military capabilities, manpower and population
resources, economic and social capital, defense industries, and international relationships.104
Turkey’s air force has approximately 232 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 40, Block 50, and Block 50+
configuration, which account for the majority of its 262 in-service fighter aircraft.105 First acquired in 1987, most of
Turkey’s F-16s have undergone several upgrades since initial procurement.106 The most recent upgrade,
completed in 2009, gave Turkey’s F-16s capabilities similar to current U.S. F-16s.
Greece has approximately 154 F-16s in service in Block 30, Block 50, and Block 52+ configuration, which account
for the majority of its 221 in-service fighter aircraft.107 In 2017, the Trump Administration formally notified
Congress of the possible sale of up to 123 Viper upgrade kits to Greece,108 with the United States and Greece
eventually agreeing to a reported total of 83—enabling upgrades to the majority of Greece’s aging F-16 fleet at a
cost of roughly $1.5 billion. The first two F-16Vs were delivered in September 2022, with all upgrades scheduled
to be complete by late 2027.109 Additionally, Greece has begun accepting delivery from France of 24 Rafale F-3R
fighters, the last of which are due to be delivered in 2024.110
While airpower comparisons between Turkey and Greece involve many factors (e.g., training, sustainment,
logistics), one journalist has written that a potential Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing
procurement of Rafales and the F-16 upgrades—“will give the Hellenic [Greek] Air Force a technological edge
over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.”111
In May 2022, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis appeared to imply concern about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions—such as a potential F-16 sale—while addressing a May 2022 joint session of Congress;112
subsequently President Erdogan temporarily suspended contact with him. While long-standing Turkey-Greece
disputes persist,113 tensions have somewhat subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts
in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek disaster relief assistance to Turkey after Turkey
experienced major earthquakes on February 6, 2023.114
Amid these potential airpower developments and ongoing Turkey-Greece disputes, various other aspects of U.S.Greece military cooperation (including basing, materiel transshipment, and defense transactions) have expanded. 115
In this context, and following the United States’s removal of a decades-long arms embargo that it had imposed on
the Republic of Cyprus,116 Turkish officials have claimed that the U.S. approach to the region appears
104 Alexander Gale, “Greece vs Turkey: The Military Balance in the Aegean,” Greek Reporter, November 26, 2022.
105 “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at
https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
106 Gareth Jennings, “Turkey Unveils Domestic AESA Radar for Manned, Unmanned Combat Aircraft,” Janes Defence
Weekly, November 10, 2022.
107 “Greece – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, February 4, 2022 (posted March 3, 2023); “Greece” at
https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article5.html.
108 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece - Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,” Transmittal No: 17-54, October 17, 2017.
109 Nicholas Paphitis, “Greece gets first 2 upgraded F-16s out of a total 83,” Associated Press, September 12, 2022.
110 Paul Iddon, “Even if Turkey Gets Modernized F-16s, Greece Will Still Have a Technological Edge in Airpower,”
Forbes, July 2, 2022.
111 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023.
112 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022.
113 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
114 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023.
115 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.
116 State Department, “Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2023,”
September 16, 2022.
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imbalanced.117 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake has denied any shift in U.S. security posture, explaining that
collective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.118
Relevance for congressional review process. After Greek officials voiced concerns about
Turkish actions in the Aegean Sea region, some Members of Congress supported the provision
during the FY2023 NDAA process that sought to place conditions on F-16 transactions with
Turkey (as discussed above).119 This issue could affect congressional deliberations going forward,
depending on the tenor of future U.S.-Turkey-Greece interactions and the respective outcomes of
upcoming scheduled elections in Turkey and Greece. At a March 2023 HFAC hearing, Secretary
Blinken responded to a question about potential threats to Greece from Turkey by reiterating his
view that an F-16 sale to Turkey is important for NATO. He then said that the Administration is
working to defuse any tensions between NATO allies like Turkey and Greece so that “they do not
engage in either actions or rhetoric that would inflame the situation.”120
Syria
Background. Another factor for Congress could be Turkey’s policies and military operations in
northern Syria. Amid the compartmentalized disputes arising during the Syrian civil war among
external actors, a major U.S.-Turkey point of contention has been U.S. support for the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurdish YPG. The SDF helped end the Islamic State’s
territorial control over parts of northeast Syria, but the YPG has links to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (Kurdish acronym PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has clashed with
Turkish authorities for decades.121
Relevance for congressional review process. If Turkey were to launch a new military ground
operation in Syria or use F-16s against the SDF/YPG or civilians in Syria or Iraq, such a
development could affect Administration and congressional sentiment toward Turkey and the
proposed F-16 sale.122 A previous Turkish-led incursion into northern Syria in 2019 generated
negative congressional responses. In June 2022, the four SFRC-HFAC leaders (Menendez, Risch,
McCaul, and Meeks) urged the Turkish government and its allied Syrian militias to refrain from
any military operation so that the focus could remain on ensuring the “enduring defeat” of the
Islamic State and avoiding “further humanitarian disaster.”123 HFAC’s McCaul and Meeks issued
a similar joint statement in December after a November bombing in Istanbul triggered some
Turkish military responses in Syria and public discussion of a possible ground operation.124
117 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January
17, 2023; “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.
118 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928.
119 See, for example, the November 14, 2022 letter from 22 Representatives to leadership of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and House Armed Services Committee, text available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/11.14.22-rep.-pappas-fy23-ndaa-conference-letter-on-turkey-f-16-saleprovision.pdf.
120 HFAC Hearing, March 23, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558913042?0&deliveryId=
105435727&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7696303.
121 See footnote 43.
122 Bryant Harris, “Senators want to block Turkey F-16 sale until NATO expansion succeeds,” Defense News, February
2, 2023; Ersoz, “F-16 Deal Contingent on Turkey’s Support for NATO Expansion, Syria.”
123 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks, Risch, Menendez Statement on Threatened Turkish Incursion
into Northern Syria,” June 15, 2022.
124 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “McCaul, Meeks Statement on Situation in Northern Syria,” December 3, 2022.
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Turkish Domestic Issues
Background. Domestic developments in Turkey are another consideration for Congress. Many
U.S. lawmakers have alleged that “gross violation of human rights and democratic backsliding”
have occurred under Erdogan’s rule.125
Relevance for congressional review process. Assessments of Turkish domestic issues could
factor into congressional positions on a potential F-16 sale.
Alternatives to F-16s?
Turkish officials have hinted that if they are unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials
have hinted that they might consider using Western European alternatives, following the example
of several U.S. partners in the Middle East.126 One member of Turkey’s presidential commission
on national security and foreign policy stated in March, “Diversification both in brands and
supplier sources is the only method to avoid future political noise of interest groups. Defense
dependency to a single country often makes a country vulnerable to foreign political pressure.”127
Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s.128 The
following issues could complicate such acquisitions:
•
•
•
•
Uncertainty of approval from Germany or other consortium partners.
Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom—the Typhoon consortium
partners—would need to agree on selling the aircraft to Turkey, and Germany has
reportedly blocked the export of some materials to the Turkish arms industry.129
Cost and logistical issues. Open sources estimate that Typhoon per unit costs
could be approximately twice those of F-16Vs,130 and one consortium executive
has hinted at potential production delays “because the industry has adapted to the
very low demand signal that was there for many years.”131
Transition challenges. Turkey’s air force could face difficulties and a lengthy
transition period adjusting to a non-F-16 platform.132
Possible congressional notification requirement. European weapons transfers
to Turkey would be subject to the congressional review process described above
if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin defense articles meeting the
specified notification threshold.133 Previously, Congress received notification in
connection with some non-NATO countries’ proposed purchases of U.S.
125 See, for example, February 26, 2021 letter from 177 Representatives to Secretary of State Blinken, text available at
https://moulton.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Turkey%20Letter%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
126 Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force.”
127 Cagri Erhan, quoted in O’Connor, “U.S.-Turkish Fighter Jet Feud Risks NATO Crisis at Crucial Time for Ukraine.”
128 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye,
January 20, 2023.
129 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.
130 Valius Venckunas, “Top 10 most expensive fighter jets in 2021,” Aerotime Hub, March 29, 2021.
131 Sakshi Tiwari, “Airbus Stares at ‘Death’ of Eurofighter Typhoons While Lockheed Martin Walks Away with
Monstrous European Deals,” EurAsian Times, February 21, 2023.
132 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
133 See footnote 48.
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equipment for Typhoons, namely Link 16 MIDS and various munitions (Saudi
Arabia),134 and SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods (Kuwait and Qatar).135
If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and encounters obstacles to procuring European alternatives, its
next steps toward preserving its military aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would
be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,
Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in
areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability. 136
While serving as President Erdogan’s spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin (now serving as Turkey’s
intelligence chief) said in February 2023 that if the United States does not sell F-16s to Turkey,
Turkey will follow a similar pathway with fighter aircraft that it took in developing key domestic
components for its globally recognized drone industry, “and the US defense companies will be on
the losing end in all of this.”137 However, a prominent Turkish defense analyst has written that
Turkey’s defense industry “cannot extend its performance in drone warfare to each and every
aspect of military planning,” and still relies on NATO allies for complex systems and platforms
such as fifth-generation aircraft.138
Some Arguments for and Against Approving a
Possible F-16 Sale
CRS has surveyed arguments and potential arguments by proponents and opponents of a possible
F-16 sale to Turkey, and has summarized them below. The arguments presented are illustrative,
not exhaustive. CRS neither endorses nor opposes any of these arguments nor does CRS support
or oppose any other position regarding the issues discussed in the report.
In Favor of a Sale
Against a Sale
Weighing the importance of bolstering NATO against U.S.-Turkey policy differences
Turkey’s ability to help NATO and other countries—
including Ukraine—counter Russian threats and
geopolitical ambitions makes an F-16 sale important to
keep Turkey firmly aligned with NATO allies on this
priority.
U.S.-Turkey divergences on Russia and other issues
should not disrupt efforts to strengthen NATO defense
An F-16 sale to Turkey will not change its
demonstrated inclination to hedge between NATO
allies and Russia, or to counter Russia in Ukraine and
other places important to Turkey’s own security
interests.
NATO allies should be held to a higher standard in
preserving alliance strength and unity. Thus, Turkey’s
134 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021.
135
DDTC Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC
Transmittal 20-074, September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).
136 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
137 Seda Sevencan, “US defense companies on ‘losing end’ if F-16 sale to Türkiye blocked,” Anadolu Agency, February
2, 2023. For background on the establishment of Turkey’s drone industry, see Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National
Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection. For discussion of possible Turkish domestic efforts to upgrade some
of its F-16s, see Boyko Nikolov, “Here’s how Turkey will upgrade F-16 Block 30, 40, and 50 to Block 70,”
BulgarianMilitary.com, March 27, 2023; Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16
jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts modernizing its F-16 with
indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022.
138 Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, p. 96.
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In Favor of a Sale
Against a Sale
capabilities and deterrence via Turkey’s air fleet. Other
major U.S. arms purchasers near Turkey (such as Israel,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) also have
some notable divergences with U.S. policy on Russia.
Having Turkey as a partner might remain important to
U.S. interests even if Turkey is not fully aligned with
U.S. priorities.
differences with U.S. policy on Russia, Sweden’s NATO
accession, and Greece/Cyprus should be less tolerable
to the United States than its tensions with non-NATO
partners. Moreover, the downside from any potential
Turkish use of F-16Vs to harm other U.S. partners (e.g.,
Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, or the SDF/YPG)
arguably outweighs any advantage Turkey might provide
to NATO with an upgraded F-16 fleet.
Relationship of an F-16 sale to the Sweden NATO accession issue
Approving a sale now could induce Turkey to support
NATO membership for Sweden, a key U.S. policy goal.
Turkish parliamentary approval of NATO accession for
Sweden would signal Turkey’s support for alliance
strength and unity, and thus should remove any
remaining reservations to a sale in Congress and the
Administration.
Approving a sale before Turkish approval of Sweden
joining NATO could cede U.S. leverage on the issue.
Approving a sale after Turkey agrees to Swedish
accession would encourage NATO countries to extract
concessions in the service of their own agendas by
temporarily delaying important, otherwise unanimously
or near-unanimously supported actions.
Balance of power between Turkey and Greece
With Greece receiving upgrades to its F-16 fleet and
potentially receiving F-35 Joint Strike Fighters,
upgrading Turkey’s F-16 fleet is important. It would
show U.S. sensitivity to maintaining a reasonable
balance of power, and thus reduce the potential for (1)
Turkey-Greece conflict or (2) the alienation of a
Turkish ally that arguably provides unique strategic
advantages to NATO in terms of its manpower, overall
military capabilities, influence with Muslim-majority
countries, and control of the straits between the
Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Because Turkey’s military, population, and economy are
significantly larger than Greece, and Turkey maintains
various military advantages over Greece, some Greek
airpower advantages arguably help maintain regional
balance, and thus should not compel an upgrade to
Turkey’s F-16 fleet. The United States should reward
Greece for the level of cooperation it has shown by
inviting additional NATO use of its bases and
territory—including to bolster Ukraine and Eastern
Europe.
Weighing security interests and democratic values
Turkey’s geopolitical importance gives it outsized value
for advancing critical U.S. interests in the surrounding
region. Advancing those interests sometimes
necessitates close U.S. ties with countries struggling to
maintain the rule of law.
The United States would have more influence—
including on democratic values—by bolstering ties with
Turkey via an F-16 sale than by reducing those ties.
Under President Erdogan, Turkey has become
increasingly authoritarian, making it a less stable and
reliable partner.
Until Turkey takes steps to strengthen its democratic
institutions and civil liberties, the United States should
not sell advanced weaponry to a country whose
leadership falls short in embodying ideals found in
NATO’s founding treaty.
Impact of continued U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation
Selling and upgrading F-16s would preserve an
important node of U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation.
Extending Turkey’s reliance on the United States for
airpower decades into the future could be beneficial in
encouraging broader ties and establishing U.S. leverage
with Turkey.
Selling F-16s would reinforce to Turkey that the U.S.
executive branch and Congress remain open to major
defense industrial cooperation, thus deterring Turkey
from pursuing Russian or Chinese alternatives.
Selling F-16s to Turkey could contribute billions of
dollars to the military industrial base and extend the life
Congressional Research Service
Upgrading Turkey’s fleet of F-16s deepens U.S.
commitments to Turkey, giving leverage to a partner
whose interests increasingly diverge from America’s.
Turkey’s existing F-16s did not prevent it from
purchasing significant Russian military materiel (the S400), deepening economic ties with Russia, and
previously exploring Chinese arms purchases.
Lockheed already anticipates orders to build 148 new
F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft. Thus, a Turkish sale is not
critical for either the production line or the U.S.
military industrial base.
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Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft
In Favor of a Sale
Against a Sale
of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72 production
line in South Carolina.
Urgency of bolstering interoperability and safety/deconfliction measures
Turkey’s current F-16s are aging and require upgrades
to increase interoperability with NATO allies and boost
safety/deconfliction measures for training and
operations (both among its domestic aircraft and with
its NATO partners—such as Greece—in multilateral
contexts). Now that Turkey is no longer in line to
receive F-35s, it should at least receive modernized F16s with an extended service life.
Turkey was on track to upgrade its air force’s
interoperability and safety/deconfliction measures with
the F-35 program, and U.S. officials and lawmakers
warned that a Russian S-400 acquisition would lead to
removal from the program and U.S. sanctions. To justify
U.S. help in bolstering its air capabilities, Turkey should
reduce friction with U.S. policies, including by reversing
course on the S-400.
Other potential Turkish fighter aircraft options (including from Russia or China)
Quick U.S. approval of a sale should take place because
Turkey has a number of options for purchasing fighter
aircraft. U.S. unwillingness to sell F-16s to Turkey, or a
prolonged review process, could motivate Turkey to
consider deals with foreign suppliers, possibly including
Russia or China.
Any pressure Turkey perceives regarding actions
affecting a sale or its timing stems from Turkey’s past
actions, which have limited its options. Turkish pursuit
of Russian or Chinese fighters would conflict with
Turkey’s declared priority to maintain NATO
interoperability.
Viability of a Western alternative to the F-16
The Eurofighter Typhoon is not a realistic alternative
for Turkey, given that it would still be subject to the
approval of European countries like Germany—and
perhaps Congress—as well as the significant financial
and logistical challenges of switching to a new airframe.
The United States does not need to sell additional F16s or upgrade kits to Turkey, as Turkey is reportedly
in discussions to purchase Typhoons. Typhoons have
been viable fleet supplements for several countries that
also fly U.S. fighters, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Oman.
Perspectives on congressional action
New F-16s might not be delivered for at least three
years, based on the current production rate and
backlog. In that light, Congress should not shrink from
approving a sale in 2023 when there is sufficient reason
to do so. Approving the sale would not prevent a future
Congress or Administration from stopping or altering
the sale in response to Turkish actions against U.S.
interests.
Tiered review and the AECA process are designed to
empower Congress, and it should not shrink from
blocking or disapproving this potential sale in 2023
when there is sufficient reason to do so. Blocking the
sale would not prevent a future Administration from
initiating a similar sale if Turkey aligns itself more
closely with U.S. priorities.
Possible Questions for Biden Administration
As Members of Congress evaluate their stances on a possible F-16 sale to Turkey, they could seek
further information from the Administration by posing questions such as those set forth below.
•
•
•
What are the most compelling reasons for and against an F-16 sale to Turkey?
How would a sale advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the RussiaUkraine war? How would it strengthen Turkey’s capacity to bolster NATO’s
capabilities and deterrence?
What are the likely consequences if the United States decides not to sell F-16s to
Turkey, in terms of Turkey’s fleet safety and NATO interoperability, defense
procurement options, and broader strategic and foreign policy alignment with the
United States and NATO or Russia?
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
What actions by the Administration—or other developments—might encourage
or discourage Turkey to approve NATO membership for Sweden? What factors
may increase or decrease the likelihood of Turkey and its parliament approving
Swedish accession in the coming weeks or months?
If Turkey’s parliament agrees to have Sweden join NATO, would that affect the
Administration’s timing on formally notifying a possible sale to Turkey?
How do other NATO allies view a potential F-16 sale to Turkey? How might a
potential sale, or decision not to sell, impact alliance unity and cohesion?
What criteria would the Administration use when deciding whether to proceed
with a proposed F-16 sale despite a congressional hold?
How might Turkey use F-16s in opposition to U.S. interests? What kind of
safeguards or commitments are in place or could be taken to prevent Turkey from
using F-16s against other U.S. allies or partners such as Greece, the Republic of
Cyprus, and the SDF/YPG?
What are the most important considerations for U.S. officials in assessing the
Turkey-Greece balance of power and taking actions that might affect it? How
should these considerations affect the timing of next steps—including formal
congressional notification—for possible F-16 and F-35 sales, respectively, for
Turkey and Greece?
What can the Administration and other actors do to encourage Turkey to move
closer to the West and further from Russia, including on energy and economic
cooperation, and on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export controls?
Are there any circumstances, short of Turkey returning or transferring its Russian
S-400 system, under which an Administration might seek to work with Congress
to sell F-35s to Turkey and lift or waive CAATSA sanctions?
Does the Administration plan to require Turkish leaders to take any actions
regarding domestic governance or human rights—and if so, what type—as
conditions of an F-16 sale?
What geopolitical implications would result from one or more countries—either
within or outside of NATO—supplanting the United States as Turkey’s primary
fighter aircraft supplier?
Would a Turkish purchase of Eurofighter Typhoons include U.S.-origin
equipment? If so, what kind, and would it be subject to AECA-mandated
congressional notification?
Is Turkey capable of partnering with other countries to expedite the indigenous
development of an advanced fighter, given that it developed its own armed drone
capability over the past decade? If so, what other countries would be Turkey’s
most likely industrial partners?
If an F-16 sale proceeds, what is the delivery timeline—both for new F-16Vs and
for upgrades? What developments, including those involving foreign customers,
could potentially hasten or slow expected deliveries?
Might Turkish domestic contractors be involved in any aspects of co-production,
installation, or sustainment, and if so, under what circumstances and to what
extent?
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Author Information
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Acknowledgments
Patrick Parrish, former National Defense Fellow, was a co-author of the original version of this report.
Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
R47493 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED
22
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.