FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportMay 20, 2022

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act:

Context and Selected Issues for Congress

May 20, 2022

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R47110

SUMMARY

FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act:

Context and Selected Issues for Congress

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is policy legislation typically introduced and

reported each year by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed

Services Committee (SASC). The act primarily sets policy and authorizes appropriations for

activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and national security programs of the Department

of Energy (DOE). FY2022 marked the 61st consecutive year for which Congress enacted an

annual defense authorization.

R47110

May 20, 2022

Brendan W. McGarry

Analyst in U.S. Defense

Budget

On May 28, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden submitted to Congress a budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2022 that included

$768.3 billion for national defense-related activities, including discretionary and mandatory programs. Of that amount,

$743.1 billion fell within the scope of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY2022 NDAA; H.R.

4350; S. 2792; S. 1605; P.L. 117-81), with $714.8 billion for DOD activities, $27.9 billion for DOE activities, and $0.4

billion for other defense-related activities. The requested amount within the scope of the NDAA was $11.5 billion (1.6%)

more than the FY2021 authorized amount. On September 22, 2021, the SASC reported a version of the bill (S. 2792) that

would have authorized $767.7 billion. On September 23, 2021, the House passed a version of the NDAA (H.R. 4350) that

would have authorized $768.1 billion. On December 27, 2021, President Biden signed into law the FY2022 NDAA, which

authorized $768.2 billion—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the request.

The President’s budget request was the first in a decade not subject to statutory spending limits, or caps, set by the Budget

Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25; 2 U.S.C. §901), as amended. The request proposed discontinuing funding

designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), a special type of funding that

was, in effect, exempt from the caps. Instead, the Administration requested funding for contingency operations in the regular,

or base, DOD budget (i.e., funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to staff, train, and equip the military).

Following the August 2021 collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan government and its security forces and the withdrawal of

U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan, the FY2022 NDAA did not authorize funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces

Fund (ASFF). The legislation authorized funding for activities in support of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI),

including $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, through which DOD provides lethal equipment and

other support to the Ukrainian military and security forces. The legislation also authorized $7.1 billion for activities in

support of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), an effort intended to strengthen U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific

region, primarily west of the International Date Line.

The FY2022 NDAA authorized a military end-strength of 2.15 million personnel in the active and reserve components,

comparable to the requested level. The legislation supported a 2.7% military pay raise, in line with the formula in current law.

Among the programs for which Congress authorized more funding than requested were the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class

destroyer; the F-35A Lightning II fighter jet, and a Homeland [missile] Defense Radar system (HDR-H) in Hawaii. The

legislation authorized a total of $437 million for 50 earmarks (also known as congressionally directed spending or

Community Project Funding items) within DOD research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and military

construction (MILCON) accounts. Among the programs for which Congress authorized less funding than requested were the

Army’s next-generation night-vision technology (known as the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS), naval

auxiliary vessels, and a type of ship-defense missile.

The legislation required the appointment of a special trial counsel within each of the armed services to deal with sexual

assault and military justice matters; directed policy changes and oversight requirements related to various environmental

matters, including per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), burn pits, and fuel leaks; and established a commission to

review and issue recommendations to improve the effectiveness of DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and

Execution (PPBE) process. Among the issues debated by one or both chambers during consideration of the bill but not

included in the enacted version were provisions that would have required women to register for the draft.

This report compares authorizations for major defense appropriations titles, programs, and policy matters in the

Administration’s FY2022 budget request, House-passed and SASC-reported versions of the FY2022 NDAA, and enacted

legislation. This report also provides references to other CRS reports that provide in-depth analysis and contextual

information on certain defense and foreign policy issues.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Strategic Context ....................................................................................................................... 2

Budgetary Context .................................................................................................................... 5

President’s Budget Request....................................................................................................... 9

Bill Overview ................................................................................................................................ 12

Legislative Activity ................................................................................................................. 12

Summary of Discretionary Authorizations .............................................................................. 15

Selected Policy Matters ................................................................................................................. 19

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related Matters ............................... 19

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ....................................................................... 22

European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), including the Ukraine Security Assistance

Initiative (USAI) ............................................................................................................ 23

Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) ................................................................................... 24

Procurement and Related Matters ........................................................................................... 25

Limitations on Aircraft, Ship Divestments ....................................................................... 29

Additional DDG-51 Destroyers ........................................................................................ 29

F-35 Funding, Affordability Targets, and Transfer of Program Responsibilities .............. 30

Cost Estimate for B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) .................. 30

Reports on Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) ............................................ 31

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Related Matters ...................... 31

Homeland Defense Radar ................................................................................................. 35

Software and Digital Technology Pilot Programs ............................................................. 35

RDT&E Earmarks............................................................................................................. 35

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Related Matters ...................................................... 36

Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Contamination and Related Issues ............ 40

Exemption for Burn Pit Use in U.S. Military Contingency Operations............................ 42

Fuel Tank Leaks at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility ............................................ 44

Responsibility and Strategy for Global Bulk Fuel Management ...................................... 45

Military Personnel (MILPERS) and Related Matters ............................................................. 45

Military End-Strength ....................................................................................................... 47

Military Pay Raise............................................................................................................. 49

Sexual Assault in the Military ........................................................................................... 49

Requiring Women to Register for the Draft ...................................................................... 50

Extremism in the Military ................................................................................................. 50

Defense Health Program and Other Matters ........................................................................... 50

COVID-19 Vaccine Requirement ..................................................................................... 53

Anomalous Health Incidents (“Havana Syndrome”) ........................................................ 53

Selected Budgetary and Acquisition Matters .......................................................................... 53

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Commission ....................... 53

Extension of Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) .......................................................... 55

Military Construction (MILCON) and Related Matters.......................................................... 55

Incremental Funding for Large Projects ........................................................................... 59

Selected Projects in South Korea and Poland ................................................................... 60

MILCON Earmarks .......................................................................................................... 60

Prohibitions Related to Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (GTMO)............................ 60

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Department of Energy and Related Programs ......................................................................... 61

Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 62

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and U.S. Defense Budget Plans ............................................... 62

Inflation Assumptions in Defense Budget Plans ..................................................................... 63

National Defense Strategy (NDS) Funding Priorities ............................................................. 64

Tradeoffs between Shorter- and Longer-Term Defense Budget Priorities .............................. 64

Deficits and Long-Term Defense Budget Plans ...................................................................... 65

Balancing Budgetary Oversight and Flexibility ...................................................................... 65

Figures

Figure 1. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Category and Revenues, FY2001-FY2031

(Projected) .................................................................................................................................... 6

Figure 2. National Defense Outlays, FY1940-FY2026 (projected) ................................................ 8

Figure 3. National Defense Outlays as Share of Total Federal Outlays and GDP, FY1940FY2026 (projected) ...................................................................................................................... 9

Figure 4. FY2022 Budget Request by National Defense Budget Function and

Subfunctions ............................................................................................................................... 10

Figure 5. Days between Start of Fiscal Year and Enactment of Annual Defense

Authorization Acts, FY1977-FY2022 ........................................................................................ 15

Tables

Table 1. Discretionary Authorizations within the FY2022 NDAA ............................................... 12

Table 2. FY2022 NDAA: Status of Legislative Activity ............................................................... 14

Table 3. Summary of Discretionary Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA........................................ 17

Table 4. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization Act,

FY2013-FY2021 ........................................................................................................................ 18

Table 5. Authorizations for Selected DOD Overseas Activities in FY2022 NDAA ..................... 20

Table 6. Summary of Procurement Authorizations in the FY2022 NDAA ................................... 27

Table 7. Summary of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Authorizations in the

FY2022 NDAA .......................................................................................................................... 33

Table 8. Summary of Operation and Maintenance Authorizations in the FY2022 NDAA ........... 37

Table 9. Summary of Military Personnel Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA ............................... 47

Table 10. Military End-Strengths Authorized in the FY2022 NDAA ........................................... 48

Table 11. Summary of Other Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA .................................................. 52

Table 12. Summary of Military Construction Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA......................... 57

Contacts

Author Information........................................................................................................................ 66

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Introduction

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is a defense policy bill, typically introduced

and reported each year by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed

Services Committee (SASC). Unlike an appropriations act, the NDAA generally does not provide

funding (i.e., budget authority).1 The legislation sets policy and authorizes appropriations for the

Department of Defense (DOD), nuclear weapons and reactor programs of the Department of

Energy (DOE), and certain other defense-related activities.2

The NDAA is a vehicle through which Congress fulfills its responsibility as mandated in Article I,

Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution. This section of the Constitution provides Congress with the

authority to “provide for the common Defence,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide and

maintain a Navy,” and “make Rules for the ... Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” among

other powers.3

The legislation establishes or continues defense programs, projects, or activities, and provides

guidance on how appropriated funds are to be used in carrying out those efforts. While the NDAA

does not provide budget authority, historically it has provided an indicator of congressional intent

on funding for particular programs. The bill authorizes funding for DOD activities at the same

level of detail at which budget authority is provided by the corresponding defense and military

construction appropriations acts. As defense authorization and appropriations legislation can

differ on a line-item level, an authorization of appropriations can be reviewed as a funding target

rather than a ceiling.

The NDAA has a history of regular enactment; FY2022 marked the 61st consecutive year for

which an annual defense authorization was enacted.4 The bill sometimes serves as a vehicle for

legislation originating in committees other than the Armed Services committees. This report

focuses solely on defense-related matters in the legislation.

CRS Products on the NDAA

For more information on the NDAA, see CRS In Focus IF10515, Defense Primer: The NDAA Process and CRS In

Focus IF10516, Defense Primer: Navigating the NDAA. For historical information on defense authorizations, see CRS

Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021. For more information on the federal

budget process, see CRS Report R46240, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process. For more information on the

differences between authorizations and appropriations, see CRS Report R46497, Authorizations and the

Appropriations Process.

1 Budget authority is authority provided by law to a federal agency to obligate money for goods and services. For more

information, see Government Accountability Office (GAO), A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process,

September 2005, p. 20, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-734sp.pdf.

2 The national defense budget function (identified by the numerical notation 050) comprises three subfunctions:

Department of Defense (DOD)–Military (051); atomic energy defense activities primarily of the Department of Energy

(053); and other defense-related activities (054), such as FBI counterintelligence activities. For the most part, the

NDAA does not authorize funds for the national defense budget subfunction 054 (Other Defense-Related). For more

information on the national defense budget function, see the following section and CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense

Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050).

3 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, at https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a1_sec8.

4 For more information, see CRS Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Background

This section provides background on congressional action on FY2022 defense authorization

legislation, including the strategic and budgetary context in which it occurred, as well as details

on the FY2022 President’s budget request.

Strategic Context5

Congressional consideration of the FY2022 NDAA occurred as the Biden Administration was

developing strategies for national security and defense programs. By law, for example, the

President is required to submit to Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS; 50 U.S.C §3043)

and the Secretary of Defense a National Defense Strategy (NDS; 10 U.S.C. §113).6

The Biden Administration stated that efforts to align spending priorities with the President’s

Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) helped shape its FY2022 defense budget

request.7 Officials said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III planned to submit the NDS in

early 2022.8 In March 2021, the President released the INSSG, which stated that the United States

faces “growing rivalry” with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and would “work to

responsibly end America’s longest war in Afghanistan.”9

Elements of the INSSG appeared to build on aspects of the Trump Administration’s national

strategy documents, including the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS.10 The 2018 NDS unclassified

summary emphasized retaining a U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to China and Russia

rather than countering violent extremist organizations.11 This emphasis and the call for “increased

and sustained investment” to counter evolving threats from China and Russia marked a change in

weight from previous strategy documents.12 While the INSSG included references to investment

in national defense, its pledge to “increase investments in technology research, development, and

deployment” occurred in the context of risks posed by climate change.13

The Trump Administration’s 2018 NDS, however, did not address the question of pandemics or

climate change as national security threats. The Biden Administration’s INSSG, by comparison,

referenced “pandemics and other biological risks, the escalating climate crisis, cyber and digital

threats, international economic disruptions, protracted humanitarian crises,” among other

threats.14

5 This section was coordinated with Kathleen J. McInnis, former CRS Specialist in International Security.

6 See 50 U.S.C. §3043.

7 Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May

2021, Defense Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 1-3.

8 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Mara Karlin, Nominee to be Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, released July 13, 2021, p. 6.

9 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, pp. 6, 15.

10 For background and analysis on the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The

Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.

DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American

Military’s Competitive Edge, p. 1.

12 Ibid., p. 4.

13 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, p. 17.

14 Ibid., p. 7.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

The INSSG pledged to prioritize “new resources for diplomacy and development” and identified

defense priorities as follows:



Military personnel. (“continue to invest in the people who serve in our allvolunteer forces and their families.”);

Readiness. (“sustain readiness and ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the

best trained and equipped force in the world.”);

Force structure. (“assess the appropriate structure, capabilities, and sizing of the

force, and, working with the Congress, shift our emphasis from unneeded legacy

platforms and weapons systems to free up resources for investments in the

cutting-edge technologies and capabilities that will determine our military and

national security advantage in the future.”);

Acquisition processes. (“streamline the processes for developing, testing,

acquiring, deploying, and securing [cutting-edge technologies and

capabilities].”);

DOD workforce. (“ensure that we have the skilled workforce to acquire,

integrate, and operate them.”);

Ethical technology use. (“shape ethical and normative frameworks to ensure

[cutting-edge technologies and capabilities] are used responsibly.”);

Special operations forces. (“maintain the proficiency of special operations

forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and

unconventional warfare missions.”);

Gray-zone capabilities. (“develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray

zone actions.”);15

Climate resiliency. (“prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and

clean energy.”); and

Equal opportunity. (“work to ensure that the Department of Defense is a place

of truly equal opportunity where our service members do not face discrimination

or the scourge of sexual harassment and assault.”).16

In 2018, the National Defense Strategy Commission, established by Section 942 of FY2017

NDAA (P.L. 114-328; 130 Stat. 2367) to provide an independent assessment of the NDS,

recommended that policymakers increase defense spending by 3% to 5% per year in real terms

(i.e., adjusting for inflation)—or alter expectations of the strategy and America’s global strategic

objectives.17

In written responses prepared for the SASC in response to advance policy questions for his 2021

nomination as Defense Secretary, Austin wrote, “The most urgent challenge we face is the

15 The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define “gray zone.” In general, the term refers to

military actions short of war, such as cyber and information operations. For example, one academic states that DOD

officials “use the term to denote confrontations at the low end of the conflict spectrum in which war is not yet

underway, but military coercion is occurring to alter the status quo.” For more information, see James J. Wirtz, “Life in

the ‘Gray Zone’: Observations for Contemporary Strategists,” Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 33, no. 2, 2017: 106114.

16 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, pp. 14-15, 22.

17 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National

Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute of Peace, November 2018, p. 52.

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pandemic,” referring to the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).18 Austin

described many of the concepts in the 2018 NDS as “fundamentally sound” and China as the

“pacing threat in most areas.”19 He wrote that the strategy “assumes sustained defense budget

growth, but that has not fully materialized.”20 Austin pledged to undertake a comprehensive

strategic review and called for DOD to be “prepared for modest growth in the coming years.”21

He wrote, “Given the fragile state of our economy and the large deficits required to combat the

impact of COVID, I expect fiscal pressure going forward.”22 Austin also pledged to review U.S.

nuclear posture and the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.23

In written responses prepared for the same committee for her 2021 nomination as Deputy Defense

Secretary, Kathleen H. Hicks made related points, writing, “in light of COVID-19’s ongoing

impact, the Department must be fiscally pragmatic if it is to design a successful approach to

strategic competition.”24 In earlier writing, Hicks argued DOD could reduce its annual costs by

$20 billion to $30 billion without detracting from national security objectives “after some upfront

investment.”25 In her written responses for the SASC, Hicks described some of the upfront

investments that could yield future savings as “workforce incentives—from buy-outs to recruiting

bonuses, investments in technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics, and cyber

defense.”26

In considering the FY2022 NDAA, some Members of Congress proposed increasing authorized

defense appropriations by 3% per year above inflation to prepare for long-term strategic

competition with China and Russia.27 Other Members of Congress recommended decreasing

defense spending to fund other priorities, such as response to the COVID-19 pandemic.28

Including amounts for national defense discretionary programs that were not in the jurisdiction of

HASC or SASC, discretionary programs that did not require additional authorization, and

national defense mandatory programs that were previously authorized, the total budget authority

implication of the enacted FY2022 NDAA was $790.6 billion.29 That amount was $25.1 billion

18 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Lloyd J. Austin, Nominee for Appointment to be Secretary of Defense,”

January 19, 2021, p. 3.

19 Ibid., pp. 7, 44.

20 Ibid., p. 7.

21 Ibid., p. 13.

22 Ibid., p. 14.

Ibid., pp. 67, 84.

24 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of

Defense,” February 2, 2021, p. 18.

25 Kathleen Hicks, “Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense Spending,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, at

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/getting-less. At the time of the article, Hicks was Director of the

International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

26 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks,” p. 19.

27 See, for example, House Armed Services Committee (HASC), “Rogers Amendment to Increase Defense Budget

Topline Is Adopted,” minority press release, September 1, 2021, at https://republicansarmedservices.house.gov/news/press-releases/rogers-amendment-increase-defense-budget-topline-adopted.

28 See, for example, Representative Ro Khanna, “Statement: Khanna Criticizes Defense Spending Increase in Biden’s

$1.5T 2022 Budget,” press release, April 9, 2021, at https://khanna.house.gov/media/press-releases/statement-khannacriticizes-defense-spending-increase-biden-s-15t-2022-budget; and letter from some Members of Congress to President

Joseph R. Biden, March 16, 2021, at

https://pocan.house.gov/sites/pocan.house.gov/files/documents/Biden%20Defense%20Cuts%20Letter_Final.pdf.

29 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional

Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7365.

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(3.3%) more than the President’s budget request and $38.2 billion (5.1%) more than the amount

authorized in FY2021.30 Adjusting for inflation, that amount was $24.3 billion (3.2%) more than

FY2021 (in constant FY2022 dollars).31

CRS Products on National Security and Defense Strategy

For more information on the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The Interim

National Security Strategic Guidance. For background and analysis on potential national-security implications of

COVID-19, see CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment—Overview

of Issues and Further Reading for Congress. For background and analysis on great power competition, see CRS

Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress.

Budgetary Context32

Congressional consideration of the FY2022 NDAA occurred as federal spending was projected to

continue to exceed revenues. This trend raised questions about whether pressure to reduce the

federal deficit would affect defense budget plans.

In July 2021, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected a federal deficit of $3.0 trillion

for FY2021, or 13.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).33 That percentage was the secondhighest since 1945.34 CBO attributed the size of the projected deficit in part to “the economic

disruption caused by the 2020-2021 coronavirus pandemic and the legislation enacted in

response.”35 CBO projected that spending would continue to exceed revenues over the next

decade (see Figure 1).36 From FY2022 to FY2031, CBO projected that discretionary defense

outlays would increase 23% and nondefense discretionary outlays 6%; while mandatory outlays

would increase 40% and net interest payments on the national debt 198%.37

30 Ibid., and conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283), p. 1939.

31 Based on CRS adjustment of figures to constant FY2022 dollars using GDP (chained) price index in Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), Historical Tables, Table 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the

Historical Tables: 1940-2026.”

32 This section was coordinated with Megan S. Lynch, Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process.

33 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Additional Information About the Updated Budget and Economic Outlook:

2021 to 2031, July 2021, “At a Glance,” p. 2 of the PDF.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., pp. 6, 16; and CBO, Budget and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, July 2021, Table 1-1, “CBO’s

Baseline Budget Projections, by Category,” and Table 1-4, “CBO’s Baseline Projections of Discretionary Spending.”

Outlays refer to money spent by a federal agency from authority provided by Congress.

37 Ibid.

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Figure 1. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Category and Revenues, FY2001-FY2031

(Projected)

(in trillions of nominal dollars)

Source: CRS analysis of Government Publishing Office (GPO), Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022,

Historical Tables, Table 1.4, “Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) by Fund Group: 1934-2026,” and

Table 8.1, “Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category: 1962-2026,” and Congressional Budget Office, Budget

and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, July 2021, Table 1-1, “CBO’s Baseline Budget Projections, by

Category,” and Table 1-4, “CBO’s Baseline Projections of Discretionary Spending.”

Note: 2001 through 2020 reflect OMB amounts; 2021 through 2031 reflect CBO projections.

In recent decades, during periods of widening gaps between revenues and outlays, Congress has

sometimes enacted legislation intended to reduce the deficit in part by limiting federal spending,

including defense spending.

After the deficit reached nearly 6% of GDP in 1983,38 Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and

Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L.

99-177). This legislation created annual deficit limits and stated that breaching them would

trigger automatic funding reductions equally divided between defense and non-defense

spending.39 In 1990, Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Title XIII of P.L.

101-508), which included statutory limits on discretionary spending. These limits were in effect

through 2002 and, in certain years, included a specific limit on defense spending.40

After the deficit reached nearly 10% of GDP in 2009,41 Congress enacted the Budget Control Act

of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). The legislation reinstated statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary

spending for FY2012-FY2021 and resulted in separate annual limits for defense spending.42 The

38 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, “Summary of Receipts,

Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025.”

39 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002.

40 Ibid. Defense spending limits under P.L. 101-508 were in place in FY1991, FY1992, FY1993, FY1998 and FY1999.

41 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, “Summary of Receipts,

Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025.”

42 For spending limits in FY2012 and FY2013, the BCA originally specified separate “security” and “nonsecurity”

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defense spending caps under BCA as amended applied to discretionary base budget authority for

the national defense budget function (050).43 The legislation effectively exempted certain other

types of funding from the caps, including funding designated for emergency requirements and

Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT).44 Under the BCA,

discretionary spending limits were enforced through a mechanism called sequestration, which

automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels.45 Over the past decade, Congress enacted appropriations within BCA

discretionary spending limits except in FY2013, when President Barack Obama ordered the

sequestration of budgetary resources across nonexempt federal government accounts.46 BCA

discretionary spending limits expired in FY2021.47 As part of the FY2022 budget request, the

Biden Administration proposed discontinuing funding for OCO and, instead, requested funding

for contingency operations in the base budget.48

CRS Products on Discretionary Spending Caps

For background and analysis on the expiration of discretionary spending caps under the Budget Control Act, see

CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently Asked Questions. For more information

on the BCA, see CRS Video WVB00305, Budget Control Act: Overview and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget

and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions.

Some observers have argued statutory spending limits disproportionately affect defense programs

and inadequately address projected growth in mandatory programs; others have argued they are

necessary in light of recurring deficits and increasing federal debt.49 In 2020, CBO identified

options for reducing the federal budget deficit through budgetary savings in both mandatory and

discretionary programs.50 Twelve options involved reducing funding for discretionary defense

programs (e.g., operation and maintenance, naval ship construction, aircraft).51 In 2021, CBO

categories. For more information, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act:

Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry.

43 The term base budget generally refers to funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the

military force.

44 Technically, the BCA allowed for an upward adjustment of the limits for certain types of discretionary funding. For

more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Grant A.

Driessen and Megan S. Lynch. Since 2009, the term Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO, has been used to

describe military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. For more information, see CRS Report R44519,

Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M.

Morgenstern.

45 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently

Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch.

46 Government Accountability Office (GAO), SEQUESTRATION: Observations on the Department of Defense’s

Approach in Fiscal Year 2013, GAO-14-177R, November 7, 2013, p. 13.

47 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently

Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch and Grant A. Driessen. A relatively small share of the national defense budget is

for mandatory programs. For more information, see the following section.

48 OMB, FY 2022 Discretionary Request, p. 5.

49 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently

Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry, p. 3.

50 CBO, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030, December 2020, at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/202012/56783-budget-options.pdf.

51 Ibid.

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published a report describing three options for carrying out national defense activities under a

smaller defense budget based on differing military strategies.52

For historical context, Figure 2 shows defense spending over time in both nominal and constant

FY2022 dollars, based on CRS analysis of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) figures.

The inflation-adjusted line shows the cyclical nature of defense spending during wartime. The

level of defense outlays requested for national defense in FY2022, when adjusted for inflation,

was higher than during the Cold War-era military buildup of the 1980s and lower than during the

height of post-9/11 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. OMB projected defense outlays to remain

relatively flat through FY2026.53

Figure 2. National Defense Outlays, FY1940-FY2026 (projected)

(in billions of nominal and constant FY2022 dollars)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1 and

Table 10.1.

Note: FY2021 through FY2026 reflect projections. Figures adjusted to constant FY2022 dollars using GDP

(chained) price index in Table 10.1.

Figure 3 shows defense spending over time as a share of both federal outlays and GDP, based on

OMB figures. Defense outlays steadily decreased from peaks of nearly 90% of federal outlays

and more than a third of GDP in the 1940s during World War II—to a projected 12.8% of federal

outlays and 3.3% of GDP in FY2022.54

52 CBO, Illustrative Options for National Defense Under a Smaller Defense Budget, October 2021, at

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-10/57128-defense-cuts.pdf.

53 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1, “Outlays by

Superfunction and Function: 1940-2026,” and Table 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the

Historical Tables: 1940-2026.”

54 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1, “Outlays by

Superfunction and Function: 1940-2026.”

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Figure 3. National Defense Outlays as Share of Total Federal Outlays and GDP,

FY1940-FY2026 (projected)

(in percentages)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1.

Note: FY2021 through FY2026 reflect projections.

For FY2022, Congress debated competing proposals regarding the overall size of the defense

budget. In August 2021, the Senate and House adopted an FY2022 budget resolution (S.Con.Res.

14), which recommended $765.7 billion in new budget authority for FY2022 national defense

programs and assumed “discretionary levels as proposed in the President’s budget request.”55 In

December 2021, Congress passed the FY2022 NDAA, with a total budget authority implication

of $790.6 billion.56

President’s Budget Request

The NDAA typically authorizes discretionary funding for nearly all DOD programs, national

security programs of the Department of Energy, and certain other defense-related activities. While

the NDAA does not appropriate funding (i.e., budget authority), the legislation establishes or

continues defense programs, projects, or activities, and provides guidance on how appropriated

funds are to be used in carrying out those efforts. (The statutory requirement for annual

authorization of appropriations for defense programs is codified at 10 U.S.C. §114.)

The FY2022 President’s budget requested more than $6 trillion in discretionary and mandatory

funding, of which $768.3 billion (12.4%) was for activities within the national defense budget

function.57 The national defense budget request was $14.3 billion (1.9%) more than the FY2021

55 S.Con.Res. 14, p. 4; and Senate Budget Committee, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Fiscal Year 2022, S. Prt.

117-16, August 2021, p. 6.

56 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7365.

57 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy

Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”

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level (excluding funds provided by the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act,

2021; P.L. 117-31).58

National defense is one of 20 major functions used by the OMB to organize budget data, and the

largest in terms of discretionary funding.59 Identified by the numerical notation 050, the national

defense budget function is the broadest measure by which the U.S. government categorizes

defense funding. The function comprises the following subfunctions:



DOD-Military (identified by the notation 051), which includes military and

intelligence activities of the DOD;



Atomic energy defense activities (053), which includes nuclear weapons and

reactor programs of the Department of Energy; and

Defense-related activities (054), which includes national security activities of

several other agencies, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation

counterintelligence activities.



Historically, DOD has accounted for the bulk—approximately 95%—of funding within the

national defense budget function. For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $727.9 billion

for DOD-Military (11.7% of the federal budget); $29.9 billion for atomic energy defense

activities (0.5%); and $10.5 billion for defense-related activities (0.2%) (see Figure 4).60

Figure 4. FY2022 Budget Request by National Defense Budget Function and

Subfunctions

(in percentages of total budget authority)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 5.1,

“Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction: 1976-2026,” at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET2022-TAB/xls/BUDGET-2022-TAB-6-1.xlsx.

58 Ibid. P.L. 117-31 was signed into law after the release of the FY2022 President’s budget request in May 2021.

59 For more information on the national defense budget function, see CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense Primer: The

National Defense Budget Function (050).

60 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy

Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”

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Note: Includes discretionary and mandatory funding; other budget functions include International Affairs (150);

General Science, Space, and Technology (250); Energy (270); Natural Resources and Environment (300);

Agriculture (350); Commerce and Housing Credit (370); Transportation (400); Community and Regional

Development (450); Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services (500); Health (550); Medicare (570);

Income Security (600); Social Security (650); Veterans Benefits and Services (700); Administration of Justice

(750); General Government (800); Net Interest (900); Allowances (920); and Undistributed Offsetting Receipts

(950).

The national defense budget request included $752.9 billion in discretionary funding and $15.4

billion for mandatory funding.61 In general, funding for discretionary programs is provided in

appropriations acts, while funding for mandatory programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, and

Medicaid) is controlled by other laws.62 For DOD, most discretionary programs are funded in

major appropriation titles, such as operation and maintenance (O&M), military personnel

(MILPERS), procurement, and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); while

mandatory programs include, among other things, certain retirement benefits (e.g., concurrent

receipt payments to the military retirement fund).63

The vast majority (approximately 97%) of funding in the national defense budget request falls

within the scope of the NDAA. The legislation generally authorizes discretionary funding for

almost all programs in the 051 and 053 subfunctions, and relatively few programs in the 054

subfunction. The 054 subfunction includes certain Department of Transportation (DOT) Maritime

Administration (MARAD) activities (e.g., Maritime Security Program).64

The national defense budget request included $743.1 billion for discretionary programs within the

scope of the NDAA.65

The House-passed NDAA would have authorized a total of $768.1 billion.66 The SASC-reported

version of the bill would have authorized a similar level, $767.7 billion, according to S.Rept. 11739.67 The enacted legislation authorized $768.2 billion—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the

request (see Table 1), according to the accompanying explanatory statement.68

61 CRS analysis of OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1,

“Policy Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”

62 For more information, see CRS Report R46240, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process.

63 Concurrent receipt in the military context typically means simultaneously receiving two types of federal monetary

benefits: military retired pay from the Department of Defense and disability compensation from the Department of

Veterans Affairs. After Congress authorized concurrent receipt in the early 2000s, DOD created additional accrual

payments to finance retirement benefits. For more information on this topic, see CRS Report R40589, Concurrent

Receipt of Military Retired Pay and Veteran Disability: Background and Issues for Congress.

64 The HASC typically authorizes appropriations for the Maritime Security Program and Tanker Security Program of

the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration. The SASC typically does not authorize appropriations for

these programs; however, the final version of the NDAA does.

65 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.

66 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 351.

67 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 381.

68 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.

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Table 1. Discretionary Authorizations within the FY2022 NDAA

(in billions of dollars of budget authority)

Budget Function

Name (Notation)

FY2022

Request

Housepassed

(H.R. 4350)

SASCReported

(S. 2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 117-81)

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

Department of

Defense-Military (051)

$714.77

$739.5

$740.0

3.5%

Atomic Energy Defense

Programs (053)

$27.94

$28.2

$27.7

$27.8

-0.3%

Defense-Related

Activities (054)

$0.38

$0.4

$0.0

$0.4

0.0%

National Defense

(050), Total

$743.09

$768.1

$767.7

$768.2

3.4%

Source: HASC report (H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1) accompanying H.R. 4350, p. 350; SASC report (S.Rept. 117-39)

accompanying S. 2792, pp. 380-381; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605; P.L.

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.

Note: For the defense-related activities budget subfunction (054), HASC typically authorizes appropriations for

certain Department of Transportation (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD) activities (e.g., Maritime

Security Program). While the Senate Armed Services Committee typically does not authorize appropriations for

these activities, the final version of the NDAA does. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages

rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested

amounts.

CRS Product on the FY2022 Defense Budget Request

For more information and analysis on the FY2022 defense budget request, see CRS Video WVB00391, FY2022

Defense Budget Request, by Kathleen J. McInnis et al.

Bill Overview

This section of the report provides an overview of legislative activity on the FY2022 NDAA,

including certain congressional actions with respect to the House-passed, SASC-reported, and

enacted versions of the bill.

Legislative Activity69

By law, the President is to send the federal budget request to Congress by the first Monday in

February.70 In practice, the President sometimes sends it later, particularly during presidential

transition years.71 On May 28, 2021, President Biden submitted the FY2022 budget request.72

Representative Adam Smith, Chair of the HASC, had said that a budget submitted on May 10 or

69 This section was coordinated with Valerie Heitshusen, Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process.

70 31 U.S.C. §1105(a).

71 According to the Government Publishing Office (GPO), the FY2018 budget was submitted on May 23, 2017; the

FY2010 budget on February 26, 2009; and the FY2002 budget on April 9, 2001. For more information, see GPO,

Budget of the United States Government, at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/budget. See also CRS Report

RS20752, Submission of the President’s Budget in Transition Years, by Taylor N. Riccard.

72 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2022, May 28, 2021, at

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/budget_fy22.pdf.

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later could affect the timing for completion of the annual NDAA by the October 1 start of the

government’s fiscal year (FY).73

On July 28-29, the seven HASC subcommittees considered and reported draft legislative

proposals (known as marks) to the full committee with recommendations for matters in the

FY2022 NDAA under their jurisdiction.74 On August 25, Chairman Smith released each

subcommittee’s proposal in preparation of the full committee markup.75 On September 1, HASC

began considering and marking up the legislation.76 On September 2, the committee voted 57-2 to

order H.R. 4350 reported to the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute reflecting

the work product of the two-day markup.77 On September 10, the committee filed its report,

H.Rept. 117-118, to accompany the legislation. (On September 17, the committee filed a

supplemental report that included the Congressional Budget Office’s cost estimate for the bill,

among other information.78) On September 21-23, the House debated and considered amendments

to H.R. 4350 and, on September 23, passed the measure by a vote of 316-113.79

Meanwhile, in the Senate, on July 19-20, the seven subcommittees of the SASC marked up draft

legislative proposals with recommendations for matters in the FY2022 NDAA under their

jurisdiction.80 Two of the markups were held in open sessions (Subcommittee on Readiness and

Management Support, and Subcommittee on Personnel), five were closed.81 On July 21, SASC

considered the legislation in a closed session and voted 23-3 to order reported an original bill

reflecting changes agreed to in markup.82 On September 22, SASC reported S. 2792 and filed the

accompanying report S.Rept. 117-39. The Senate did not vote on final passage of S. 2792. On

November 19, Senator Jack Reed, Chair of SASC, offered on the floor an amendment in the

nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3867) to H.R. 4350 to replace the text of the House-passed

73 Representative Adam Smith, transcript of remarks during American Enterprise Institute webinar hosted by

Mackenzie Eaglen, A conversation with House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith: Priorities for the

fiscal year 2022 defense budget, April 22, 2021, p. 3, at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/210422House-Armed-Services-Committee-Chairman-Adam-Smith-Transcript.pdf?x91208.

74 HASC, Hearings website, accessed September 30, 2021, at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings. The seven

HASC subcommittees are Tactical Air and Land Forces; Military Personnel; Readiness; Seapower and Projection

Forces; Strategic Forces; Intelligence and Special Operations; and Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information

Systems. Jurisdiction and membership of HASC and its subcommittees can be found at

https://armedservices.house.gov/committee-rules#0D456DEB-8D11-4DF4-A8E3-D4D778DFDA61.

75 HASC, “HASC Subcommittee Marks as Reported for H.R. 4350 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” August 25, 2021, at https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=B0078ABA-C9D1-4E33-99B5AACDC534106A.

76 Representative Adam Smith, in hearing transcript, “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022

National Defense Authorization Act, Part One,” CQ, September 1, 2021, at

https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6333701?3.

77 HASC, “Chairman Smith on the Committee’s Passage of the FY22 NDAA,” press release, September 2, 2021, at

https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=6E91A3BE-195E-4E51-82F7-FB897BC73CE5.

78 See H.Rept. 117-118, Part 2.

79 See House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 167, part 163 (September 21, 2021), pp. H4564-H4576, H4596H4861; vol. 167, part 164 (September 22, 2021), pp. H4880- H5078); and vol. 167, part 165 (September 23, 2021), pp.

H5103-H5104, H5115-H5128.

80 SASC, “Reed and Inhofe Announce FY 2022 NDAA Markup Schedule,” press release, July 8, 2021, at

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/reed-inhofe-announce-fy-2022-ndaa-markup-schedule.

81 Ibid., and SASC, “SASC Completes Markup of Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,” press

release, July 22, 2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/-sasc-completes-markup-of-fiscal-year2022-national-defense-authorization-act.

82 Ibid.

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legislation with a modified version of the SASC-reported bill. The Senate did not agree to end

debate on the amendment (S.Amdt. 3867), as modified; cloture was not invoked by a vote of 4551. While the Senate did not pass S.Amdt. 3867, it became one basis of House-Senate

negotiations.

Unlike in most years, the House and Senate did not establish a conference committee to resolve

differences between the two versions of the bill. Instead, HASC and SASC leaders negotiated a

bicameral agreement based on the two versions. On December 7, the committees released the text

of the agreement, which was filed as a House amendment to an unrelated Senate-passed bill, S.

1605.83 The same day, an explanatory statement to accompany the House amendment to S. 1605

was published in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record.84 The final text of the

NDAA made clear that this statement was to be treated as if it were the formal bicameral

statement issued by a conference committee. Also that day, the House agreed to S. 1605, as

amended, by a vote of 363-70. On December 15, the Senate agreed to the House amendment to S.

1605 by a vote of 88-11. On December 27, President Biden signed the legislation into law (P.L.

117-81).

Table 2 shows the status of legislative activity on the FY2022 NDAA.

Table 2. FY2022 NDAA: Status of Legislative Activity

House

Bill #, Date

Reported

Report

#, Date

Vote #

(yeas,

nays),

Date

Passed

H.R. 4350,

09/10/21

H.Rept.

117-118,

09/10/21

293 (316113),

09/23/21

House

amendment

to S. 1605,

12/07/21

405 (36370),

12/07/21

Public

Law

Senate

HASCSASC

Negotiated

Proposal

Explanatory

statement

published in

Congressional

Record.a

Bill #, Date

Reported

Report

#, Date

S. 2792,

09/22/21

S.Rept.

117-39,

09/22/21

House

amendment

to S. 1605,

12/07/21

Vote #

(yeas,

nays),

Date

Passed

499 (8811),

12/15/21

HASCSASC

Negotiated

Proposal

Explanatory

statement

published in

Congressional

Record.a

P.L. #,

Date

Signed

P.L. 11781,

12/27/21

Source: CRS analysis of selected actions in Congress.gov.

Note:

a. On December 7, 2021, the explanatory statement to accompany S. 1605 was published in Part 2 of the

House section of the Congressional Record.

83 See HASC, “HASC, SASC Release Text of FY22 NDAA Agreement,” press release, December 7, 2021, at

https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=8F7F4622-D0E7-46A2-99CA-65F04EE652CD; and SASC,

“SASC, HASC Release Text of FY22 NDAA Agreement,” press release, December 7, 2021, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/press-releases/sasc-hasc-release-text-of-fy22-ndaa-agreement.

84 Congressional Record, vol. 167, no. 211—Book II (December 7, 2021), pp. H7265-H7464, at

https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/12/07/167/211/CREC-2021-12-07-bk2.pdf.

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Figure 5 shows the number of days between the start of the fiscal year and enactment of the

annual defense authorization act since FY1977, when the federal government transitioned to a

fiscal year beginning October 1, 1976.

Figure 5. Days between Start of Fiscal Year and Enactment of Annual Defense

Authorization Acts, FY1977-FY2022

(in days)

Source: CRS analysis of dates of enactment of public law from CRS Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and

Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis; and P.L. 117-81.

Note: Negative values indicate number of days between enactment of annual defense authorization acts and

start of fiscal year. Annual defense authorization legislation for the fiscal years 1979, 1989, 1996, 2008, 2016, and

2021 was enacted over a presidential veto.

Summary of Discretionary Authorizations

Of the $768.3 billion requested in the FY2022 President’s budget for national defense programs,85

$743.1 billion was for discretionary programs falling within the scope of the FY2022 NDAA.86

The remainder of the national defense budget request was for discretionary programs that were

not within the jurisdiction of the HASC or SASC, discretionary programs that did not require

additional authorization, or mandatory programs that were previously authorized.87

The House-passed version of the bill (H.R. 4350) would have authorized a total of $768.1 billion

for discretionary programs—$25 billion (3.4%) more than the President’s request, according to

H.Rept. 117-118.88 During the HASC markup of its version of the bill, Representative Mike

Rogers, ranking minority member of the committee, offered an amendment to increase authorized

85 GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy Net Budget

Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”

Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Congressional Record, vol. 167, no.

211—Book II (December 7, 2021), p. H7364 (link embedded in page number).

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

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appropriations by $23.9 billion. He said the increase would “ensure defense spending grows by

3% above inflation, meeting the recommendations of the bipartisan National Defense Strategy

Commission.”89 Rogers also said the increase would support the unfunded priorities of the armed

services and combatant commands, as well as provide the resources necessary to counter the

growing threat from China and other adversaries.90 The committee voted to adopt the amendment,

42-17.91 Among those on the committee who voted against the amendment was, for example,

Chair Adam Smith, who said a smaller funding increase would encourage DOD to spend money

more wisely, improve acquisition and procurement practices, and better anticipate threats: “If we

give them another $23.9 billion, it takes the pressure off. It makes it easier for them to just keep

doing what they’ve been doing.”92

In response to the House-passed legislation, the White House stated it planned to work with

Congress “to set an appropriate and responsible level of defense spending to support the security

of the nation” while also providing “appropriate resources for non-security investments and

security investments outside the Department of Defense (DOD).” 93 The White House argued in

part, “The Administration opposes the direction to add funding for platforms and systems that

cannot be affordably modernized given the need to prioritize survivable, lethal, and resilient

forces in the current threat environment and eliminate wasteful spending.”94

The SASC-reported version of the bill (S. 2792) would have authorized a similar level for

discretionary programs, $767.7 billion, according to S.Rept. 117-39. In announcing the SASC’s

completion of marking up its version of the bill, Senator James Inhofe, ranking minority member

of the committee, said, “this year’s bipartisan National Defense Authorization Act increases the

defense topline to the National Defense Strategy Commission’s recommendation of 3% to 5%

real growth. This is a big win for our national security and sends a strong message to both our

allies and adversaries that America is prepared to stand up for ourselves and our friends.”95

Among the senators who opposed the committee reporting the legislation to the Senate was, for

example, Senator Elizabeth Warren.96 In speaking on the Senate floor in opposition to the

legislation, she argued, in part, “America’s spending priorities are completely misaligned with the

threats Americans are actually facing, the things are quite literally endangering their lives—like

COVID-19 and the climate crisis.”97

89 Representative Mike Rogers, as quoted in “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022

National Defense Authorization Act, Part Two,” Congressional Quarterly, September 1, 2021, at

https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6332853?5. For more information on DOD unfunded priorities, see

CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.

90 Ibid.

91 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 552.

92 Representative Adam Smith, as quoted in “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022

National Defense Authorization Act, Part Two,” Congressional Quarterly, September 1, 2021, at

https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6332853?5.

93 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.

94 Ibid.

95 SASC, “SASC Completes Markup of Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,” press release, July 22,

2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/-sasc-completes-markup-of-fiscal-year-2022-nationaldefense-authorization-act.

96 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 555.

97 Senator Elizabeth Warren, “Warren Delivers Floor Speech in Opposition to the National Defense Authorization

Act,” November 18, 2021, at https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-delivers-floor-speech-inopposition-to-the-national-defense-authorization-act.

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The enacted legislation (S. 1605; P.L. 117-81) authorized $768.2 billion for discretionary

programs—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the request, according to the accompanying

explanatory statement.98 In terms of major titles in the bill, more than half of the overall increase

was authorized for procurement programs (see Table 3).

Table 3. Summary of Discretionary Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA

(in billions of dollars, in order of appearance in act)

Title

FY2022

Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASCreported (S.

2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 117-81)

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

Procurement

$132.21

$147.06

$144.05

$146.88

11.1%

Research and

Development

$111.96

$118.07

$116.11

$117.73

5.1%

Operation and

Maintenance

$253.62

$253.03

$260.41

$255.40

0.7%

Military

Personnel

$167.29

$166.86

$166.79

$166.90

-0.2%

Defense Health

Program and

Other DOD

$39.85

$41.07

$39.88

$39.72

-0.3%

Military

Construction

and Family

Housing

$9.85

$13.42

$12.71

$13.35

35.5%

Subtotal,

Department of

DefenseMilitary (051)

$714.77

$739.52

$739.95

$739.99

3.5%

Atomic Energy

Defense

Programs (053)

$27.94

$28.21

$27.75

$27.84

-0.3%

DefenseRelated

Activities (054)

$0.38

$0.00

$0.38

0.0%

$743.09

$768.11

$767.70

$768.21

3.4%

Total

Source: HASC report (H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R. 4350),

pp. 346-349; SASC report (S.Rept. 117-39) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA (S. 2792), pp. 378381; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362-H7364.

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to

nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.

Table 4 shows the percentage change between authorized and requested funding in the NDAA

over the past decade.

98 Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-81 in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record,

December 7, 2021, p. H7364.

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Table 4. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization

Act, FY2013-FY2021

(in billions of nominal dollars of budget authority)

Fiscal Year

2013

Public Law (P.L.)

Request

Authorized

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

P.L. 112-239

$631.60a

$633.34a

0.3%

2014

P.L. 113-66

$625.15b

$625.14b

0.0%

2015

P.L. 113-291

$577.15c

0.0%

2016

P.L. 114-92

$604.21d

$599.21d

-0.8%

2017

P.L. 114-328

$607.98e

$611.17e

0.5%

2018

P.L. 115-91

$665.72f

$692.10f

4.0%

2019

P.L. 115-232

$708.11g

$708.10g

0.0%

2020

P.L. 116-92

$741.93h

$729.93h

-1.6%

P.L. 116-283

$731.61i

0.0%

P.L. 117-81

$743.09j

$768.21j

3.4%

2021

2022

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying National

Defense Authorization Acts. Amounts include funding for Department of Defense-Military, atomic energy

defense programs, defense-related activities and, from FY2013 to FY2021, funding designated for Overseas

Contingency Operations (OCO).

Note: Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is

the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts. Links to reports or explanatory statements

are embedded in the page numbers below:

a. Conference report (H.Rept. 112-705) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2013 (P.L. 112-239), p. 687.

b. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L.

113-66) in Committee Print No. 2, December 2013, p. 780;

c. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L.

113-291) in Committee Print No. 4, December 2014, p. 994;

d. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L.

114-92) in Committee Print No. 2, November 2015, p. 887;

e. Conference report (H.Rept. 114-840) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2017 (P.L. 114-328), p. 1332;

Conference report (H.Rept. 115-404) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2018 (P.L. 115-91), p. 1111;

g. Conference report (H.Rept. 115-863) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2019 (P.L. 115-232), p. 1143.

h. Conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2020 (P.L. 116-92), p. 1545;

Conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

FY2021 (P.L. 116-283), p. 1938;

Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L.

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Selected Policy Matters

This section of the report discusses various policy matters in the FY2022 NDAA, including those

that were the subject of debate between the House and Senate, or Congress and the

Administration; received a high level of media or constituent interest; or were impacted by global

events.

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related

Matters

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress provided funding designated for

emergency requirements and later for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism

(OCO/GWOT) to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other

countries, in addition to other activities.99 When statutory spending limits were enacted as part of

the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25),100 the law established an OCO/GWOT

funding exemption from the limits.101 Some observers argued OCO funding allowed for flexible

response to contingencies, and provided a “safety valve” to the spending caps.102 Others described

OCO as a loophole—evolving from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment,

resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a “slush fund” for

activities unrelated to contingency operations (e.g., planned or regularly occurring costs to staff,

train, and equip the military force typically requested in the base budget of the Department of

Defense).103 The BCA discretionary spending limits expired in FY2021.104

The FY2022 President’s budget request was the first in a decade not subject to the BCA caps. The

budget proposed discontinuing “requests for Overseas Contingency Operations as a separate

funding category, instead funding direct war costs and enduring operations in the DOD base

budget.”105 DOD budget documentation released in May 2021 requested $42.1 billion for

activities described as “contingency operations” (without the budgetary designation), including

funding for the planned drawdown of U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan and other military

activities abroad, as well as activities in the continental United States.106 Of that amount, $14.3

billion was for direct war requirements (i.e., combat or combat support costs that were not

expected to continue after combat operations end at major contingency locations), including $8.9

99 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and

Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern.

100 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions.

101 Technically, the BCA allowed for an upward adjustment of the limits for certain types of discretionary funding. For

background and analysis, see CRS Report R45778, Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending

Limits.

102 See, for example, Mark Cancian, “Two Cheers for OCO: Grease For Budget Wheels,” Breaking Defense, October

20, 2016, at https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/two-cheers-for-oco-grease-for-budget-wheels/.

103 See, for example, Todd Harrison, “The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding,” Center

for Strategic and International Studies, January 11, 2017, at https://defense360.csis.org/enduring-dilemma-ocofunding/#1; and Sean Kennedy, “End the Pentagon’s OCO slush fund,” Defense News, October 14, 2020, at

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/14/end-the-pentagons-oco-slush-fund/.

104 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently

Asked Questions.

105 OMB, “FY2022 Discretionary Request,” press release, April 2021, p. 5.

106 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 7-3.

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billion for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and $5.4 billion for Operation

Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria.107 The remainder of contingency operations funding,

$27.8 billion, was requested for enduring requirements (i.e., costs for activities in theater and the

continental United States that were expected to remain after combat operations end).108

The House-passed version of the NDAA and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)reported version of the bill would have not authorized OCO funding. While neither version

included OCO funding, language in the legislation and accompanying documentation called for

continued transparency and DOD accountability in war spending.

Section 1065G of the House bill would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit to

Congress a report “on the obligation and expenditure of funds that were authorized to be

appropriated for overseas contingency operations for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2019.”109

The SASC bill and the enacted legislation did not include the House provision. The explanatory

statement accompanying the enacted legislation noted that “transparency in expenditures for

overseas contingency operations is critical to congressional oversight of the Department of

Defense and effective budgeting for military operations.”110 The statement directed the DOD

Comptroller to continue to provide Congress with quarterly Cost of War Execution Reports

consistent with the reporting requirement in Section 1221(c) of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163; 10 U.S.C. §113 note), as amended.111

The report accompanying the SASC bill included a provision on DOD budget documentation for

overseas contingency operations.112 The provision stated the exclusion of OCO funding from

certain documentation did “not provide the Congress and the public with the appropriate level of

detail and transparency regarding war-related costs.”113 The SASC encouraged the DOD

Comptroller “to provide separate budget exhibits for direct war-related costs and for enduring

war-related costs” in preparing the FY2023 budget request.114

The enacted legislation did not detail funding for contingency operations in separate tables. Table

5 lists requested and authorized amounts for selected DOD overseas activities previously

resourced with OCO funding (partially or fully).

Table 5. Authorizations for Selected DOD Overseas Activities in FY2022 NDAA

(in billions of dollars)

Activity (relevant

CRS product)

FY2022 Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASC-reported

(S. 2792)

Authorized (P.L.

117-81)

Afghanistan Security

Forces Fund (ASFF;

R46879, R46955)

$3.33a

$0.33b

$3.33c

$0.00d

107 Ibid., p. 7-4.

108 Ibid., p. 7-3.

109 H.R. 4350, pp. 1067-1068.

110 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7322.

111 Ibid.

112 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 239.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

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Activity (relevant

CRS product)

FY2022 Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASC-reported

(S. 2792)

Authorized (P.L.

117-81)

Counter-ISIS Train

and Equip Fund

(CTEF; IF10328,

IF11677)

$0.52e

$0.52b

$0.52c

$0.52d

Ukraine Security

Assistance Initiative

(USAI; R45008,

IF10946)

$0.25f

$0.30g

$0.30h

$0.30d

European

Deterrence

Initiative (EDI,

including USAI;

IF10946)

$3.68f

n/ai

n/aj

n/ak

Pacific Deterrence

Initiative (PDI;

IF11719, IF10607)

$5.09l

n/am

n/an

$7.11o

Source: CRS analysis of FY2022 DOD budget documentation; legislation and reports on Congress.gov, including

H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1 accompanying H.R. 4350; S.Rept. 117-39 accompanying S. 2792; explanatory statement

accompanying P.L. 117-81 in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021; HASC

and SASC executive summaries of the legislation.

Note: Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth. Links to source documents are embedded in the page numbers

below:

a. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,

Justification for FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, p. 5.

b. H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346.

c. S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378.

d. Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

e. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,

Justification for FY 2022 Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), p. 3.

DOD, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2021, p. 2.

g. H.Rept. 117-118, p. 347.

h. S.Rept. 117-39, p. 250.

H.R. 4350 and H.Rept. 117-118 did not identify a total for EDI; HASC, “Summary of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 11, stated the legislation “fully funds” EDI.

S. 2792, S.Rept. 117-39, and SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, did not identify a total

for EDI.

k. P.L. 117-81 and the accompanying explanatory statement did not identify a total for EDI. HASC, “Final Text

Summary of the FY22 NDAA,” December 7, 2021, p. 9, stated the legislation “includes a total $4 billion for

the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and additional investments for EDI purposes.”

DOD, Pacific Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), May 2021, p. 15.

m. HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p.

12, stated the legislation would have provided “at least” $8.8 billion for PDI.

n. S. 2792, S.Rept. 117-39, and SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, did not identify a total

for PDI; S. 2792 would have authorized “such sums as may be necessary” for PDI.

o. Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7328-H7330.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

CRS Products on Overseas Contingency Operations Funding

For background and analysis on funding for Overseas Contingency Operations, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas

Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status and CRS In Focus IF10143, Foreign Affairs Overseas Contingency

Operations (OCO) Funding: Background and Current Status.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

In considering the FY2022 NDAA and other legislation, Congress expressed significant interest

in how developments in Afghanistan—including the collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan

government and its security forces and the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the

country in August 2021—would change plans for the use of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

(ASFF) amounts appropriated for FY2021 and prior years, and requested for FY2022.

In a May 2021 justification of its FY2022 budget request for the ASFF, DOD stated, given the

planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the $3.3 billion requested for ASFF was

“even more important than previously to maintain the viability of the Afghan forces and

strengthening the Afghan government leverage in negotiations to end the war on terms that

preserve a democratic form of government.”115

The SASC bill, marked up in July, would have authorized the requested amount of funding ($3.33

billion) for ASFF and limited the use of some funds until the Secretary of Defense provided a

report to congressional committees on aspects of the assistance and certified that the Afghan

government was meeting certain measures of progress.116

The House bill, passed in September, would have authorized a total of $325 million for ASFF for

“contract close-out and other close-out operations.”117

In response to the SASC-reported and House-passed legislation, the White House stated, in part,

that the termination of the ASFF “will involve, at a minimum, closing out several hundred

contracts and in many cases negotiating financial settlements with the contractors, developing a

full accounting for all ASFF-funded equipment and supplies that are outside Afghanistan, and

assessing potential contract settlement costs and the cost of transporting and storing ASFF-funded

materiel for purposes of treating it as DOD stocks.”118

The enacted legislation did not authorize funding for ASFF.119 The accompanying explanatory

statement noted “there are sufficient funds from the previous fiscal year that will remain available

for the termination of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and related support to the security forces of

the Government of Afghanistan.” 120 The statement directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a

report to the congressional defense committees on the status of ASFF funds, contracts, and

115 DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,

Justification for the FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), p. 7.

116 S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 248, 485.

117 H.R. 4350, p. 1265.

118 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf; and

White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.

119 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

120 Ibid., p. H7338.

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equipment.121 Section 1092 of the enacted legislation required the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy to provide quarterly briefings to the congressional defense committees on the security

situation in Afghanistan and DOD’s efforts to counter terrorist groups in the country, among other

information.122 Section 1094 of the legislation, cited as the Afghanistan War Commission Act of

2021, established the Afghanistan War Commission to study U.S. involvement in the country

from 2001 to 2021, including key decisions pertaining to the war, and to develop lessons learned

and policy recommendations.123

CRS Products on Afghanistan

For background and analysis on Afghanistan, see CRS Report R46955, Taliban Government in Afghanistan:

Background and Issues for Congress and CRS Report R46879, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in

Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions.

European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), including the Ukraine Security

Assistance Initiative (USAI)

The President’s budget requested $3.7 billion for activities associated with the European

Deterrence Initiative (EDI), a DOD effort intended to bolster the security of U.S. allies and

partners following Russia’s 2014 invasion and subsequent annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea

region.124 Of the total for EDI, $250 million was for Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative

(USAI), through which DOD and the State Department provide intelligence support, personnel

training, lethal equipment and logistics support, supplies and other service to the Ukrainian

military and security forces.125

DOD documentation supporting its FY2022 budget request allocated EDI funding across more

than 200 budget line items. However, HASC and SASC reports accompanying their versions of

the NDAA, and the explanatory statement accompanying the enacted legislation, did not single

out EDI activities within all such lines. Thus, in many cases, one could not determine how an

increase or decrease to a particular line affected the EDI activity. Certain reports described

adjustments as EDI-related but it was not clear how they compared to the original DOD

proposal.126

An executive summary of the House-passed legislation released by the HASC stated the bill

would have “fully” funded the EDI request and invested in “substantial additional capabilities

that support deterrence in the European Command area of operations.”127 The legislation would

have authorized $300 million for USAI.128

121 Ibid.

122 135 Stat. 1934.

123 135 Stat. 1935.

124 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by

Paul Belkin and Hibbah Kaileh.

125 DOD, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2021, p. 20.

126 See, for example, S.Rept. 117-39, p. 477.

127 HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 11.

128 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 347.

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The SASC-reported bill would have authorized an unspecified amount of funding for EDI

activities and $300 million for USAI (of which $75 million would have been available for lethal

assistance).129

The enacted legislation and the accompanying explanatory statement did not identify a total

amount authorized for EDI.130 An executive summary of S. 1605 released by the HASC stated the

legislation included “a total $4 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and additional

investments for EDI purposes.”131 The legislation authorized $300 million for USAI. Section

1303 of the enacted legislation directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional

defense committees a report on the U.S. defense investment in Europe, including EDI.132

CRS Products on the European Deterrence Initiative

For background on the European Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence

Initiative: A Budgetary Overview and CRS In Focus IF11130, United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues.

Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)

The FY2022 President’s budget requested $5.1 billion for activities associated with the Pacific

Deterrence Initiative, an effort intended to strengthen U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific

region, primarily west of the International Date Line, in part by “providing survivable strike and

stand-off capability in a denied environment.”133 More than half of the funding was requested for

the Navy to procure ships, including an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer to conduct

offensive or defensive operations and a T-AO fleet oiler to supply fuel and dry cargo at sea.134

DOD has described the funding as a “subset of the Department’s FY 2022 budget request, not a

separate fund, in targeted investments for the Indo-Pacific region.”135 The HASC and SASCreported versions of the NDAA, like the aforementioned European Deterrence Initiative, did not

single out PDI activities within all relevant budgetary line items. Thus, in many cases, one could

not determine how an increase or decrease to a particular line affected the PDI activity. A

summary released by the HASC of the House-passed version of the NDAA stated the legislation

would have authorized “at least” $8.8 billion for PDI.136 The SASC-reported version of the bill

would have authorized “such sums as may be necessary” for PDI.137 A summary of S. 2792

released by the SASC stated the legislation would have extended and modified the initiative.138

The enacted legislation authorized $7.1 billion for activities associated with PDI, according to a

table in the accompanying explanatory statement that identified PDI activities within relevant

129 SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, p. 2; and S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 113, 250.

130 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

131 HASC, “Final Text Summary of the FY22 NDAA,” December 7, 2021, p. 9.

132 135 Stat. 1998.

133 DOD, Pacific Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), May 2021, p. 1.

134 Ibid, p. 9. For more information, see the “Additional DDG-51 Destroyers” section below and CRS Report RL32109,

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.

135 Ibid., p. 1.

136 HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 12.

137 S. 2792, p. 579.

138 SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, p. 2.

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budgetary line items.139 The explanatory statement criticized the Administration’s PDI request for

emphasizing weapon systems rather than force posture, capabilities, and activities in the region:

We note that the PDI budget request for fiscal year 2022 was improperly focused on

platforms, including the DDG-51, T-AO fleet oiler, and F-35, as opposed to improving the

joint posture and enabling capabilities necessary to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

region. Therefore, we identified approximately $7.1 billion in investments that support and

attempt to improve the current posture, capabilities, and activities of U.S. forces in the

Indo-Pacific region, as reflected in the budgetary display below, that more accurately

reflect a baseline from which to measure progress against the objectives of the PDI. 140

CRS Products on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative

For background on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China Sea

Disputes.

Procurement and Related Matters

The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for the vast majority of DOD procurement

programs in Title I of Division A of the legislation.141 DOD procurement accounts fund the

purchase of new equipment and modifications to existing weapons, including ships, aircraft,

ground combat vehicles, munitions, and various other products and services.142 The Departments

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have multiple procurement accounts, including those associated

with subordinate services (i.e., Marine Corps and Space Force). The Procurement, Defense-Wide

account supports Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Missile Defense Agency, and

various other agencies reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.143 Congress typically

appropriates,144 and in the FY2022 NDAA authorized, funding for the National Guard and

Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) to procure items for the reserve components.145

President’s Budget Request

The FY2022 President’s budget requested $133.6 billion in discretionary funding for DOD

procurement programs—$8 billion (6%) less than the enacted FY2021 level.146 Of this amount,

$132.2 billion fell within Title I of the NDAA.147 In a memorandum to DOD employees, Defense

Secretary Austin identified among his priorities efforts to innovate and modernize the department,

including divesting “legacy systems and programs that no longer meet our security needs.”148 In

139 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7328-H7330.

140 Ibid.

141 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10599, Defense Primer: Procurement.

142 For more information, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An Orientation.

143 Ibid.

144 See, for example, 134 Stat. 1345.

145 135 Stat. 2266.

146 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.

147 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

148 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,

2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/04/2002593656/-1/-1/0/SECRETARY-LLOYD-J-AUSTIN-III-

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an overview of the FY2022 DOD budget request, the department identified $2.8 billion in

divestments among the military departments and SOCOM, including certain ships (e.g.,

Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Littoral Combat Ships),149 aircraft (e.g., A-10 close

air support aircraft and KC-10 and KC-135 refueling tankers),150 and other systems.151

House-Passed NDAA

The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $147.1 billion for procurement programs—

$14.9 billion (11.2%) more than the request.152 The House legislation would have authorized $17

billion in increases to the request (i.e., funding beyond the amounts for certain programs

requested in the budget or for programs not requested in the budget). The net effect of these

increases would have been offset by $2.15 billion in decreases to other programs.

The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the House bill’s “restoration of funding to systems

that limit DOD’s ability to divest or retire lower priority platforms not relevant to tomorrow’s

battlefield.”153

SASC-Reported NDAA

The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $144.1 billion for procurement programs—

$11.8 billion (9.0%) more than the request.154 The legislation would have authorized $12.4 billion

in increases to the request. The net effect of these increases would have been offset by $0.6

billion in decreases to other programs.

The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the SASC bill’s restoration of funding for certain

“vulnerable and costly platforms that no longer meet mission or security needs.”155

Enacted NDAA

The enacted NDAA authorized $146.9 billion for procurement programs—$14.7 billion (11.1%)

more than the request.156 The legislation authorized $16.4 billion in increases to the request,

including for certain DOD unfunded priorities.157 The net effect of these increases was offset by

MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF.

149 For additional background and analysis on these programs, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and

Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress and CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship

(LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.

150 For additional background and analysis on these programs, see CRS Report R43843, Proposed Retirement of A-10

Aircraft: Background in Brief and CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-46A Pegasus Tanker Aircraft Program.

151 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 3-8.

152 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying

the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.

H7362.

153 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.

154 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

155 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.

156 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House

section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

157 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

$1.7 billion in decreases to other programs. Among the accounts with the biggest increases from

the requested levels were National Guard and Reserve Equipment, ground combat vehicles, ships,

and aircraft. Among those accounts with the biggest decreases were ammunition. See Table 6.

Table 6. Summary of Procurement Authorizations in the FY2022 NDAA

(in billions of dollars)

Account

FY2022

Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASC-reported

(S. 2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 11781)

% Change

(Authorized

-Request)

Aircraft Procurement,

Army

$2.81

$3.31

$3.13

$3.36

19.6%

Missile Procurement,

Army

$3.56

$3.65

$3.69

$3.65

2.5%

Weapons & Tracked

Combat Vehicles, Army

$3.88

$4.72

$4.53

$4.70

21.1%

Procurement of

Ammunition, Army

$2.16

$2.44

$2.46

13.8%

Other Procurement,

Army

$8.87

$8.93

$8.88

$8.99

1.3%

Aircraft Procurement,

Navy

$16.48

$19.61

$19.18

$19.8

20.2%

Weapons

Procurement, Navy

$4.22

$4.13

$4.34

$4.13

-2.0%

Procurement of

Ammunition, Navy &

Marine Corps

$0.99

$0.98

$1.03

$0.90

-8.7%

Shipbuilding &

Conversion, Navy

$22.57

$28.42

$25.12

$27.28

20.9%

Other Procurement,

Navy

$10.88

$11.03

$11.52

$11.17

2.7%

Procurement, Marine

Corps

$3.04

$3.62

$3.72

$3.62

19.0%

Aircraft Procurement,

Air Force

$15.73

$17.47

$18.6

$18.13

15.3%

Missile Procurement,

Air Force

$2.67

$2.57

$2.67

$2.58

-3.5%

Procurement of

Ammunition, Air Force

$0.80

$0.79

$0.80

$0.71

-10.1%

Other Procurement,

Air Force

$25.25

$25.79

$25.73

$25.75

2.0%

Procurement, Space

Force

$2.77

$2.80

$2.79

0.7%

Procurement, DefenseWide

$5.55

$5.89

$5.88

$5.92

6.8%

National Guard &

Reserve Equipment

$0.00

$0.95

$0.00

$0.95

n/a

$132.21

$147.06

$144.05

$146.88

11.1%

Total

Congressional Research Service

FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346; S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and explanatory

statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional

Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

Note: Totals for request and authorized amounts from explanatory statement; totals for House-passed and

SASC-reported from committee reports. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest

hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between

authorized and requested amounts.

Selected Increases and Decreases

Among the largest line-item increases for procurement programs in the enacted NDAA from

requested amounts, in terms of dollar value, were



$2.9 billion for the Navy to procure two more DDG-51 destroyers (for a total of

three ships);158



$1.1 billion for the Air Force to modify F-35A conventional takeoff and landing

aircraft to the Block 4 software configuration (also called Continuous Capability

Development and Delivery, or C2D2);159

$950 million for the military Departments to buy National Guard and Reserve

Equipment;160

$889 million for the Navy to procure 12 F/A-18E/F fighter attack aircraft;161 and

$749 million for the Navy to procure nine additional V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft (for a

total of 17 aircraft).162



Among the largest line-item decreases for procurement programs, in terms of dollar value, were



$263.5 million for the Army to procure next-generation night vision devices

(mostly for the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS);163

$180 million for the Navy to procure three fewer auxiliary vessels—used

commercial cargo ships kept on reserve for military sealift (i.e., the transportation

by sea of equipment and supplies during combat operations);164

$87.1 million for the Navy to modify the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile

(ESSM), a surface-to-air missile intended for ship defense;165

$76.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for the Navy to procure a

TAO-205 John Lewis-class oiler in a future fiscal year;166 and

158 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7375.

159 Ibid., p. H7381.

160 Ibid., p. H7386.

161 Ibid., p. H7371. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G

Aircraft Program.

162 Ibid., p. H7372. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft

Program.

163 Ibid., p. H7370. Note this amount includes a $50 million funding transfer to a line in the Research, Development,

Test, and Evaluation, Army account for engineering development of night vision systems.

164 Ibid., p. H7375. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45725, Shipping Under the Jones Act:

Legislative and Regulatory Background.

165 Ibid., p. H7374.

166 Ibid., p. H7375. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205)

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress



$75.5 million for the Air Force’s Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a GPSbased guidance kit for bombs.167

Limitations on Aircraft, Ship Divestments

Various provisions in the enacted NDAA limited DOD’s ability to divest certain aircraft and

ships, either by prohibiting the use or limiting the availability of funds for their retirement or

inactivation, or by establishing minimum inventory requirements. For example, Section 134

prohibited the use of funds for the retirement of A-10 aircraft; Section 137 limited the number of

KC-135 tankers available for retirement; and Section 138 established a minimum inventory

requirement for tactical airlift aircraft (e.g., C-130 cargo aircraft). Similarly, Section 1018

prohibited the use of funds for the retirement of Mark VI patrol boats and Section 1019 limited

the availability of funds for the retirement of Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers.

CRS Products on Selected DOD Acquisition Programs

For additional background and analysis on A-10 aircraft, see CRS Report R43843, Proposed Retirement of A-10

Aircraft: Background in Brief; on C-130 aircraft, see CRS Report R43618, C-130 Hercules: Background, Sustainment,

Modernization, Issues for Congress; and on Ticonderoga-class cruisers, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser

and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.

Additional DDG-51 Destroyers

For FY2022, the Navy requested $2 billion for the procurement of one DDG-51 guided-missile

destroyer rather than two ships projected under the prior-year budget submission. While officials

described the change in part as an affordability measure, the Navy identified an additional $1.7

billion to procure a second destroyer in FY2022 on its unfunded priorities list.168 The service said

the additional funding was needed to complete a multi-ship procurement and to conduct missions

in a “demanding” environment.169 In recommending authorization for a multi-year procurement

of DDG-51 Flight III destroyers beginning in FY2023, the HASC expressed concern that “the

Navy is not adequately planning for the DDG(X) procurement” and noted the service’s most

recent shipbuilding proposal reduced a destroyer in FY2022 and violated the current multiyear

procurement contract. The enacted NDAA authorized $2.9 billion for the Navy to procure two

more DDG-51s than requested, for a total of $4.9 billion for three ships.170

CRS Products on Navy Destroyers

For additional background and analysis on Navy destroyer programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and

DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-

Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress.

167 Ibid., p. H7383. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45996, Precision-Guided Munitions:

Background and Issues for Congress, by John R. Hoehn.

168 DOD unfunded priorities generally refer to reports submitted to Congress pursuant to United States Code provisions

(10 U.S.C. §222a and 10 U.S.C. §222b) listing military programs, activities, or mission requirements that were not

included in the President's annual budget request but that the department would fund with additional appropriations.

For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.

169 Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer, Navy Tactical Grid Systems Top $5.5B FY 22 Navy Unfunded List,” USNI News,

updated June 5, 2021, at https://news.usni.org/2021/06/01/destroyer-navy-tactical-grid-systems-top-5-5b-fy-22-navyunfunded-list.

170 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7375.

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Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress; and CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and

Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.

F-35 Funding, Affordability Targets, and Transfer of Program Responsibilities

The enacted NDAA authorized more funding than requested for the F-35 aircraft, including an

additional $1.1 billion for the Air Force to modify F-35A conventional takeoff and landing

aircraft to the Block 4 software configuration (also called Continuous Capability Development

and Delivery, or C2D2).171 Section 141 of the enacted NDAA required the Secretaries of the Air

Force and Navy to limit their inventories of F-35 aircraft beginning in FY2029 unless they meet

certain affordability targets based on a “cost per tail” calculation, which is derived from operating

and support costs (not development and procurement costs).172 The Administration had described

such affordability targets as “outdated” and “unrealistic”—and cited as an example a $4.1 million

affordability target for the F-35A (in constant 2012 dollars).173 GAO recently put this figure at

$7.8 million—a difference estimated to result in a cost overrun for the Air Force of $4.4 billion in

2036.174 Section 142 of the legislation required the Secretary of Defense to transfer “all functions

relating to the management, planning, and execution of sustainment activities for the F-35 aircraft

program from the F-35 Joint Program Office” to the aforementioned service secretaries. Some

observers have previously argued that the overhead structure of a joint office is unnecessary after

production; and that the F-35 is, in effect, three separate aircraft with less commonality than

originally envisioned.175

CRS Products on F-35 Aircraft

For additional background and analysis on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

Program; CRS Report R41131, F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress; and CRS Podcast

WPD00003, The F-35.

Cost Estimate for B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP)

Section 135 of the enacted NDAA limited the availability of a portion of funding for the Air

Force’s B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) to replace the TF33 engines on

the B-52H Stratofortress bomber fleet until the Secretary of Defense submits a report to the

congressional defense committees detailing a cost estimate for the program.176 The Biden

Administration had argued that establishing such an estimate was “premature” and “inadequate,”

and that limiting funds could delay the program.177

171 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.

172 According to GAO, “Cost per tail per year is defined as the average annual operating and support cost per aircraft

(tail) in a given fleet. It is generally estimated by dividing total operating and support costs of an aircraft fleet by the

total number of aircraft.” For more information, see GAO, F-35 SUSTAINMENT: DOD Needs to Cut Billions in

Estimated Costs to Achieve Affordability, GAO-21-439, July 2021, p. 37, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21439.pdf.

173 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.

174

Ibid.

175 For more information, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, p. 19.

176 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11413, B-52 Re-Engining Program Begins.

177 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

Congressional Research Service

FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

CRS Product on B-52 Engine Replacement Program

For more information on the B-52 engine replacement program, see CRS Insight IN11413, B-52 Re-Engining

Program Begins.

Reports on Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS)

The enacted NDAA authorized $263.5 million less funding than requested for the Army to

procure next-generation night vision devices (mostly for the Integrated Visual Augmentation

System, or IVAS).178 In addition, Section 115 of the enacted NDAA limited the availability of a

portion of funding for the Army’s Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), a mixedreality headset based on the HoloLens developed by Microsoft Corporation,179 until the Secretary

of the Army submits a report to the congressional defense committees certifying that the

technology is reliable enough to meet operational needs and providing other information; and

until the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation submits an assessment of the

aforementioned report.

CRS Products on Soldier Enhancement Programs

For more information on Army night-vision programs, see CRS In Focus IF12010, Military Applications of Extended

Reality; and CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence.

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Related

Matters

The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for most DOD research, development, test, and

evaluation (RDT&E) programs in Title II of Division A.180 The department’s RDT&E accounts

fund a range of activities, including basic research on emerging technologies, advanced research

on current or near-term operational needs, and, most recently, software and digital technology

pilot programs.181 Such efforts are carried out by DOD, as well as laboratories in other federal

agencies, universities, companies in the private sector, and other entities.182 The NDAA

authorizes appropriations for RDT&E accounts of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force.

The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide, account funds activities of the

Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and

other agencies reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Operational Test and

Evaluation, Defense account funds the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

for oversight of major defense programs, live fire test and evaluation, and other activities.

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.

178 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7370.

179 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12010, Military Applications of Extended Reality and CRS In Focus

IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence.

180 Title XIV of the NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for various other research and development activities,

including those associated with the destruction of chemical agents and munitions, Defense Health Program, and Office

of the Inspector General.

181 For more information, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An Orientation.

182 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.

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President’s Budget Request

The FY2022 President’s budget requested $112 billion in discretionary funding for the

department’s RDT&E programs—$5.5 billion (5%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.183 All

of this funding fell within Title II of Division A of the NDAA.184 In a memorandum to DOD

employees, Defense Secretary Austin said DOD’s ability to innovate “at a speed and scale” to

counter threats depends in part on “a commitment to rapid experimentation and fielding of

capabilities.”185 In an overview of the FY2022 budget request, DOD described the level of

RDT&E funding as “the most ever.” 186 The document also identified amounts for certain

advanced technologies, including



$3.8 billion for hypersonic technologies (e.g., the Army’s Long Range

Hypersonic Weapon, or LRHW; the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike, or CPS;

and the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW);187

$2.3 billion for various microelectronics efforts;

$874 million for artificial intelligence activities;188 and

$398 million for 5G wireless networks.189

House-Passed NDAA

The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $118.1 billion for RDT&E programs—$6.1

billion (5.5%) more than the request.190 The House legislation would have authorized $7.4 billion

in increases to the request (i.e., funding beyond the amounts for certain programs requested in the

budget or for programs not requested in the budget). The net effect of these increases would have

been offset by $1.3 billion in decreases to other programs.

SASC-Reported NDAA

The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $116.1 billion for RDT&E programs—$4.2

billion (3.7%) more than the request.191 The SASC legislation would have authorized $4.4 billion

183 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.

184 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

185 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,

2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/04/2002593656/-1/-1/0/SECRETARY-LLOYD-J-AUSTIN-IIIMESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF.

186

DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1. For additional background

and analysis, see CRS Report R46869, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2022.

187 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for

Congress.

188 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security.

189 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile

Technologies.

190 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying

the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.

H7362.

191 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

in increases to the request. The net effect of these increases would have been offset by more than

$0.2 billion in decreases to other programs.

Enacted NDAA

The enacted NDAA authorized $117.7 billion for RDT&E programs—$5.8 billion (5.1%) more

than the request.192 The legislation authorized $6.5 billion in increases to the request, including

for certain DOD unfunded priorities.193 The net effect of these increases was offset by $0.7 billion

in decreases to other programs. Among the accounts with the biggest increases from the request

were Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide and Operational Test and

Evaluation, Defense. See Table 7.

Table 7. Summary of Research, Development,Test and Evaluation Authorizations in

the FY2022 NDAA

(in billions of dollars)

Account

FY2022

Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASC-reported

(S. 2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 117-81)

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

RDT&E, Army

$12.80

$13.41

$13.11

$13.31

4.0%

RDT&E, Navy

$22.64

$23.18

$23.77

$23.10

2.0%

RDT&E, Air

Force

$39.18

$39.44

$40.10

$40.50

3.4%

RDT&E, Space

Force

$11.27

$11.60

$11.80

$11.79

4.6%

RDT&E,

Defense-Wide

$25.86

$30.25

$27.13

$28.78

11.3%

OT&E, Defense

$0.22

$0.24

9.2%

$111.96

$118.11

$116.14

$117.73

5.1%

Total

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81)

in the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362, H7386-H7416.

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to

nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.

Selected Increases and Decreases

Among the largest increases, in terms of dollar value, for RDT&E line items from the budget

request to the enacted NDAA, were



$315 million for defense-wide information and communications technology to implement

recommendations from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and

accelerate applied research into quantum computing, among other activities;194

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

192 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House

section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

193 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.

194 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress



$263 million for Air Force aerospace sensors to conduct applied research on

microelectronics, among other activities;195



$257 million for Air Force advanced engine development of prototype turbines for nextgeneration combat aircraft;196



$246.3 million for the defense-wide manufacturing science and technology program for

biotechnology innovation, among other activities;197 and



$218 million for defense-wide technology analysis to support research into using existing

radiofrequency signals, such as those from commercial satellites—so-called signals of

opportunity—for the purpose of obtaining position, navigating, and timing (PNT)

information, among other activities.198

Among the largest decreases, in terms of dollar value, for RDT&E line items from the budget

request to the enacted NDAA, were



$89.8 million for Army technology maturation initiatives (conferees described most of

the reduction as an “[i]nsufficient justification”);199



$64.6 million for the ballistic missile defense segment that develops programs intended to

destroy short- to intermediate-range missiles during their final phase of flight (conferees

described the reduction as “[u]njustified request, lacking acquisition strategy”);200



$60.1 million for Navy [Take Charge and Move Out] TACAMO modernization to

develop a replacement for E-6 command-and-control aircraft, designed to provide a

secure communications platform during a nuclear attack (conferees described the

reduction as “[u]njustified air vehicle acquisition strategy”);201



$55 million for Air Force B-52 squadrons to improve the bomber fleet’s weapons systems

through development and testing of hardware and software (conferees described the

reduction as a “rapid prototyping materiel contract delay” associated with the

Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP);202 and



$47 million for Navy unmanned surface vehicle enabling capabilities, including

autonomy development, machinery qualification efforts, and sensor acquisition, among

other activities (conferees described the reduction as “USV machinery qualification

insufficient justification”).203

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7409.

195 Ibid., p. H7400.

196 Ibid., p. H7401.

197 Ibid., p. H7410.

198 Ibid., p. H7414.

199 Ibid., p. H7390.

200 Ibid., p. H7412.

201 Ibid., p. H7397.

202 Ibid., p. H7403.

203 Ibid., p. H7396.

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FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Homeland Defense Radar

The House-passed and SASC-reported NDAAs would have authorized funding for the defensewide Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, a missile defense radar intended to help defend Hawaii

from long-range ballistic missile threats and to address operational requirements identified by

U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The enacted NDAA

authorized $75 million for the radar. INDOPACOM had requested a total of $60 million (in both

RDT&E and military construction funding) on its unfunded priorities list for the radar and related

infrastructure as part of a plan to begin operating the system in FY2024.204 The Administration

had opposed additional funding for the radar in part because other associated systems have been

delayed or canceled.205 It argued, “Hawaii is currently defended against missile threats to the

same extent as the rest of the United States, and DOD is currently investing in other capabilities,

such as the Next Generation Interceptor, which will support the long-term defense of Hawaii.”206

Software and Digital Technology Pilot Programs

For FY2022, DOD requested $2.3 billion for 13 software and digital technology pilot programs

within a relatively new budget activity in various RDT&E accounts. This budget activity, known

as 6.8 and created in FY2021, is intended to provide DOD with greater acquisition and budgetary

flexibility for modern software development in part by allowing such funding to be used for

“agile research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, production, modification, and

operation and maintenance.”207 The enacted NDAA supported the Administration’s request for

software and digital technology pilot programs, including authorizing an additional $36 million

for the defense-wide Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team initiative, formerly known as

Project Maven, which seeks to accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence into DOD

systems in part by automating tasks associated with object identification and tracking.208

RDT&E Earmarks

For RDT&E accounts, the enacted NDAA authorized $98 million for 29 earmarks (also known as

congressionally directed spending or Community Project Funding items).209 The vast majority of

such funding was for universities, where DOD typically spends nearly half of its basic research

budget.210 Specific items included aerospace composite research, a deployable launch facility, and

microfabrication technology, among others.

204 Jason Sherman, “INDOPACOM ranks additional funding for Guam defense system, Hawaii missile defense radar

on FY-22 wish list,” Inside Defense, June 11, 2021, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/indopacom-ranksadditional-funding-guam-defense-system-hawaii-missile-defense-radar-fy-22.

205 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.

206 Ibid.

207 134 Stat. 1335. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.

208 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House

section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7416. For additional background and analysis, see CRS

Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI):

Considerations for Congress.

209 Ibid., pp. H7462-H7463. (Note that certain Community Project Funding Items are repeated in the table.) For

additional background and analysis on earmarks, see CRS Report R45429, Lifting the Earmark Moratorium:

Frequently Asked Questions.

210 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.

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CRS Products on Congressional Earmarks

For additional background and analysis on congressional earmarks, see CRS Report RS22866, Earmark Disclosure

Rules in the House: Member and Committee Requirements; and CRS Report RS22867, Earmark Disclosure Rules in the

Senate: Member and Committee Requirements.

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Related Matters

The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for most DOD Operation and Maintenance

(O&M) activities in Title III of Division A.211 DOD O&M accounts cover the operating costs of

the active and reserve components of the armed services, including fuel; supplies; spare parts;

routine maintenance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, electronic equipment, and facilities;

recruiting; training; professional education; administrative activities; and headquarters and supply

operations.212 O&M accounts also fund the pay and benefits of DOD civilian employees; various

overseas activities (i.e., the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative; Counter-ISIS Train and

Equipment Fund; Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid),213 environmental restoration

activities; and the DOD Acquisition Workforce Development Fund; among other efforts. DOD

has identified certain O&M line items (also known as Sub-Activity Groups, or SAGs) as related

to military readiness, which DOD defines as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the

demands of assigned missions.”214

President’s Budget Request

The FY2022 President’s budget requested $290.4 billion in discretionary funding for the

department’s O&M programs—$7.0 billion (2.5%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.215 Of

this amount, $255.4 billion fell within Title III of Division A of the NDAA.216 In a memorandum

to DOD employees, Defense Secretary Austin said, “The Department will prioritize China as our

number one pacing challenge and develop the right operational concepts, capabilities, and plans

to bolster deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage.”217 Austin also said force readiness

is enhanced when department officials “fully embrace a diversity of backgrounds, experiences,

and thought.”218 In an overview of the FY2022 budget request, DOD described the provision of

reliable, predictable, and on-time funding from Congress as a “critical” factor for sustaining

211 Ibid., pp. H7362-H7363. Appropriations for the Defense Health Program and certain other activities funded in DOD

O&M accounts are typically authorized in Title XIV of the NDAA.

212 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An

Orientation.

213 For more information on FY2022 authorizations for contingency operations, see the “Overseas Contingency

Operations (OCO) Funding and Related Matters” section.

214 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R46559, The Fundamentals of Military Readiness,

Summary and Appendix C.

215 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.

216 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7363.

217 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,

2021, p. 1.

218 Ibid., p. 2.

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readiness, in part by allowing the armed services to “properly plan training events and exercises,

order long-lead depot supplies and parts, and make other key readiness investments.”219

House-Passed NDAA

The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $253 billion for O&M activities in Title III of

Division A—effectively flat from the request ($0.6 billion, or 0.2%, less than the request).220

SASC-Reported NDAA

The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $260.4 billion for O&M activities in Title III

of Division A—$6.8 billion (2.7%) more than the request.221

Enacted NDAA

The enacted NDAA authorized $255.4 billion for O&M activities in Title III of Division A—$1.8

billion (0.7%) more than the request.222 The legislation authorized $6.4 billion in increases to the

request, including for certain DOD unfunded priorities.223 The net effect of these increases was

offset by $4.6 billion in decreases to other programs. See Table 8.

Table 8. Summary of Operation and Maintenance Authorizations in the FY2022

NDAA

(in billions of dollars)

Account

FY2022

Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASCreported

(S. 2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 11781)

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

Operation and Maintenance,

Army

$54.62

$52.54

$57.14

$55.6

1.8%

Operation and Maintenance,

Army Reserve

$3.00

$2.99

-0.3%

Operation and Maintenance,

Army National Guard

$7.65

$7.69

$7.62

$7.61

-0.5%

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

$3.33

$0.33

$3.33

$0.00

-100.0%

Counter ISIS Train and Equip

Fund (CTEF)

$0.52

$.52

$0.52

0.0%

Operation and Maintenance,

Navy

$60.44

$61.81

$61.86

$61.92

2.4%

Operation and Maintenance,

Marine Corps

$9.02

$9.07

$9.19

1.8%

219 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget

Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 4-1.

220 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying

the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.

H7362.

221 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

222 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House

section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.

223 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.

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Account

FY2022

Request

House-passed

(H.R. 4350)

SASCreported

(S. 2792)

Authorized

(P.L. 11781)

% Change

(AuthorizedRequest)

Operation and Maintenance,

Navy Reserve

$1.15

$1.13

$1.15

-0.2%

Operation and Maintenance,

Marine Corps Reserve

$0.29

$0.33

$.32

$0.33

16.1%

Operation and Maintenance, Air

Force

$53.88

$53.42

$56.12

$54.49

1.1%

Operation and Maintenance,

Space Force

$3.44

$3.75

$3.61

4.9%

Operation and Maintenance, Air

Force Reserve

$3.35

$3.19

$3.32

$3.31

-1.1%

Operation and Maintenance, Air

National Guard

$6.57

$6.55

$6.56

$6.57

-0.1%

Operation and Maintenance,

Defense-Wide

$44.92

$46.62

$45.08

$45.71

1.8%

Ukraine Security Assistance

$0.00

$0.30

$0.00a

$0.30

n/a

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces

$0.02

15,589

$0.02

0.0%

DOD Acquisition Workforce

Development Fund

$0.05

0.0%

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,

and Civic Aid

$0.11

$0.65

$0.14

$0.15

36.3%

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Account

$0.24

$0.34

$0.24

$0.34

43.8%

Environmental Restoration

$1.03

$1.70

$1.03

$1.55

50.3%

$253.62

$253.03

$260.41

$255.40

0.7%

Total

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, pp. 346-347; S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 378-379, 476-505;

and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362-H7363, H7416-H7434.

Note: Totals for request and authorized amounts from explanatory statement; totals for House-passed and

SASC-reported from committee reports. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest

hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between

authorized and requested amounts.

a. The SASC-reported legislation would have authorized $300 million for Ukraine Security Assistance as part

of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide account in the table. For more information on this

assistance, see the “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related Matters” section earlier

in this report.

Selected Increases and Decreases

Among the largest increases, in terms of dollar value, for O&M line items from the budget

request to the enacted NDAA, were



A combined total of $1.6 billion for several line items associated with the armed

services’ facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) activities,

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

which includes facility maintenance and repair projects typically costing less than

$2 million each;224

$316.9 million for Air Force contractor logistics support and system support,

mainly to sustain F-35 fighter aircraft and maintain F-35 aircraft and A-10 closeair support aircraft;225

$280.4 million for Navy mission and other flight operations to expand the flying

hour program, which funds fuel and other consumable items for aircraft;226

$247 million for Navy combatant commanders direct mission support, mostly for

program increases and unfunded priorities of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

(INDOPACOM);227 and

$222.2 million for Navy aircraft depot maintenance for several dozen airframes

and hundreds of engines and engine modules for E-2 airborne command-andcontrol aircraft, E-6B airborne command post aircraft, F/A-18E/F/G fighterattack aircraft, and P-8A maritime surveillance aircraft, and MH-60R/S

helicopters.228

Among the largest decreases, in terms of dollar value, for O&M line items from the budget

request to the enacted NDAA, were



A combined total of $3.3 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund;229

$100 million for Army theater level assets (conferees described the reduction as

“[u]njustified growth”);230



$70 million for Air Force base support (conferees described the reduction as

“[u]njustified growth”);231

$66.9 million for defense-wide classified programs (conferees described the

reduction as a “[c]lassified adjustment”);232 and

A combined total of $55.3 million for Air Force and Air Force Reserve primary

combat forces (conference described the reductions as “[u]njustified growth”).233



224 See, for example, the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House

section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7418, H7424, H7426. For more information on FSRM,

see CRS Report R44710, Military Construction: Authorities, Process, and Frequently Asked Questions.

225 Ibid., pp. H7426-H7427.

226 Ibid., p. H7422.

227 Ibid., p. H7423.

228 Ibid., p. H7422.

229 Ibid. For more information on this topic, see the “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related

Matters” section earlier in this report.

230 Ibid., p. H7417.

231 Ibid., p. H7427.

232 Ibid., p. H7432.

233 Ibid., pp. H7426, H7429.

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Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Contamination and Related

Issues234

Congress has included provisions to address per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in each

NDAA for the past five fiscal years from FY2018 through FY2022. PFAS are a large, diverse

group of fluorinated compounds that have been used for several decades in numerous

commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications including use as an ingredient in aqueous

film forming foam (AFFF) for extinguishing petroleum-based liquid fuel fires. Some studies of a

subset of PFAS have identified potential associations with various health effects at certain

exposure levels, but the toxicity of most PFAS is less studied.235

Some PFAS—primarily perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—

have been detected in drinking water sources, other environmental media, and dairy milk at

various locations, some of which have been associated with releases of these chemicals from the

use of AFFF at U.S. military facilities. The production and civilian uses of PFAS also have

released some of these chemicals into the environment.236 The disposal of AFFF and other

materials containing PFAS, procurement of materials containing these chemicals, and the

development of non-fluorinated alternatives to AFFF have presented additional issues for DOD

and others.

DOD has identified known or suspected releases of PFAS at 700 DOD and National Guard

facilities from the use of AFFF, as of the end of FY2021.237 DOD has been investigating these

releases under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program to determine whether actions are

warranted to protect human health and the environment.238 In July 2021, DOD estimated $1.1

billion obligated through FY2020 and $2.1 billion in future costs to investigate and remediate

these releases, but noted uncertainties in these costs given pending investigations, future federal

and state standards, and challenges in separating costs at sites with multiple contaminants.239

Congress included multiple provisions to address PFAS in the FY2022 NDAA,240 some of which

originated in the House and others in the Senate. The House and Senate proposed additional

PFAS provisions that were not adopted, some of which in the House-passed bill focused on the

regulatory role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).241 PFAS provisions in the enacted

FY2022 NDAA build upon certain requirements in prior NDAAs:



Section 341 codified the membership and functions of the DOD PFAS Task

Force and requires DOD to complete Preliminary Assessments and Site

234 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on PFAS

contamination and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.

235 For more information, see: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for

Perfluoroalkyls, May 2021, at https://wwwn.cdc.gov/TSP/ToxProfiles/ToxProfiles.aspx?id=1117&tid=237.

236 For additional information about PFAS and related issues, see CRS Report R45986, Federal Role in Responding to

Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS).

237 DOD, Progress at the 700 Installations Being Assessed for PFAS Use or Potential Release, September 30, 2021, at

https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/24/2002926249/-1/-1/0/DOD-PFAS-PROGRESS-AS-OF-SEPT-30-2021.PDF.

238 The Defense Environmental Restoration Program is authorized at 10 U.S.C. §§2700-2715, and is subject to the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675).

239 DOD, Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances Cleanup Costs, July 2021, at https://www.denix.osd.mil/derp/featuredcontent/reports/pfas-cleanup-cost/PFAS%20Cleanup%20Costs.pdf.

240 P.L. 117-81, Division A, Title III, Operation and Maintenance, Subtitle D, Treatment of Perfluoroalkyl Substances

and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances, §§341-349.

241 H.R. 4350, Division E, Title LXIV—Other Matters, §§6419-6422.

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

Inspections242 within two years of enactment at DOD and National Guard

facilities in the United States where DOD has identified PFAS releases as of

March 31, 2021.

Section 342 extended the authority for DOD to transfer funding through FY2023

to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Agency for Toxic

Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) for an ongoing PFAS multi-site health

effects study and PFAS exposure assessments, pursuant to the FY2018 NDAA.243

Section 343 required DOD to establish a temporary moratorium, to begin no later

than 120 days after enactment, on the use of incineration to dispose of AFFF and

certain other PFAS-containing materials until DOD issues guidelines for

implementing incineration criteria and EPA interim guidance on the destruction

and disposal of PFAS directed in the FY2020 NDAA,244 or if earlier, until EPA

promulgates a final rule for the destruction and disposal of PFAS.

Section 344 required DOD to complete a review, within 180 days of enactment,

of its practices for the prevention and mitigation of spills of AFFF, and issue

guidance within 90 days after this review to establish best practices.

Section 345 required public disclosure of DOD testing results for PFAS in

contaminated water, pursuant to the FY2020 NDAA.245

Section 346 required DOD to complete a review, within 180 days of enactment,

of its mutual support agreements with other entities that provide fire suppression

services at DOD facilities, and issue guidance within 90 days after completion of

this review to establish best practices to prevent and mitigate spills of AFFF.

Section 347 directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a

study of certain materials procured by DOD that contain various PFAS.

Section 348 required DOD to report, within 270 days of enactment, on the

estimated schedule and costs of remediating PFAS releases at DOD and National

Guard facilities, and Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), in the United States

at which DOD identified PFAS releases as of March 31, 2021.

Section 349 required DOD to report, within 60 days of enactment, on the status

of investigating and remediating PFAS releases at 50 DOD and National Guard

facilities in the United States listed in that provision.

Section 4201 authorized $20 million for continued research and development of

AFFF alternatives and AFFF remediation and disposal technologies, and an

additional $25 million for other PFAS remediation and disposal technologies.

Section 4301 authorized $357.1 million in the DOD Environmental Restoration

accounts for the continuing investigation and remediation of PFAS releases

($175.0 million for the Air Force, $98.8 million for the Army, $167.3 million for

the Navy, and $74.0 million for FUDS).

242 Preliminary Assessments and Site Inspections are the initial steps of the site investigation phase for remedial actions

under CERCLA, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §300.420.

243 P.L. 115-91, §316, as amended.

244 P.L. 116-92, §330 (incineration criteria) and §7361 (EPA guidelines).

245 P.L. 116-92, §331.

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In the debate prior to enactment, DOD procurement of PFAS-containing materials also received

attention. The FY2021 NDAA prohibited DOD, as of April 1, 2023, from procuring certain items

containing PFOA or PFOS (nonstick cookware, cooking utensils, and upholstered furniture,

carpets, and rugs that have been treated with stain-resistant coatings).246 The House-passed

FY2022 NDAA (section 317) would have broadened this prohibition to include additional items

and applied it to any PFAS.247 The Administration expressed concern with this broader House

provision and argued in part that it “would prohibit DOD from procuring a wide range of items

that may contain PFAS” and, if implemented, “would not be feasible for DOD to test all of these

items to determine if they contain PFAS.”248 The enacted FY2022 NDAA did not include this

House provision and instead directed GAO in Section 347 to conduct a study as noted above, and

provide a briefing to HASC and SASC on DOD procurement of certain items containing PFAS.

In lieu of certain other provisions that were not adopted, the explanatory statement for the

FY2022 NDAA also included language directing DOD to continue research of phytoremediation

and other remediation technologies, and to report to HASC and SASC on the acquisition and

remediation of off-base properties contaminated with PFOA or PFOS from Air Force activities.249

The FY2020 NDAA authorized the criteria for these property acquisitions.250

PFAS Contamination

For additional information about PFAS and related issues, see CRS Report R45986, Federal Role in Responding to

Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), coordinated by David M. Bearden; CRS Report R45793,

PFAS and Drinking Water: Selected EPA and Congressional Actions, by Elena H. Humphreys; and CRS Report R45998,

Contaminants of Emerging Concern Under the Clean Water Act, by Laura Gatz.

Exemption for Burn Pit Use in U.S. Military Contingency Operations251

Congress has included provisions in multiple NDAAs to address the use of “burn pits” to manage

waste during U.S. military contingency operations in foreign nations,252 and to assess potential

health effects that may be associated with burn pit emissions. The FY2022 NDAA authorized

additional criteria for the continued use of burn pits.253

As amended, the FY2010 NDAA restricted the use of burn pits to manage certain “covered”

wastes during U.S. military contingency operations in foreign nations, unless waste disposal

246 P.L. 116-283, §333.

247 H.R. 4350, §317.

248 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.

249 Congressional Record, Vol. 167, No. 211, December 7, 2021, Book II, p. H7278.

250 P.L. 116-92, §344.

251 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on DOD burn pit use

and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.

252 For example, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Respiratory Health Effects of

Airborne Hazards Exposures in the Southwest Asia Theater of Military Operations, 2020.

253 For many years, DOD has managed wastes during combat or other field deployments in foreign nations through the

use of open burning in pits. Although open burning can offer a practical and efficient method to reduce the volume of

wastes for disposal, the combustion process may emit pollutants that could present health risks from inhalation or other

exposures. Concern about the use of burn pits has heightened over the past two decades during operations in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and certain other nations. Studies of potential health risks that may be associated with burn pit emissions

have been ongoing.

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alternatives are infeasible.254 In an April 2019 report, DOD identified the continued use of burn

pits at nine locations (seven in Syria, one in Afghanistan, and one in Egypt).255 In this report,

DOD observed that burn pits may continue to be the only feasible alternative to manage wastes at

some contingency locations in the future, given available technologies and the practical feasibility

of field conditions. The FY2020 NDAA required DOD to develop a plan for phasing out the use

of burn pits at the nine locations identified in the April 2019 report, and to identify all locations

where burn pits have been used during U.S. military operations.256

Section 316 of the FY2022 NDAA amended the FY2010 NDAA authorizing the Secretary of

Defense to exempt a contingency location in a foreign nation from the general prohibition on the

use of burn pits if doing so “is in the paramount interest of the United States.” Otherwise, the

general prohibition that has been in place would continue to apply under which burn pits may be

used at a contingency location if alternative waste disposal methods are infeasible. If the new

exemption is used, the Secretary is required to report to HASC and SASC to identify the location,

size and duration of burn pit operations, number of personnel assigned to the location, efforts to

mitigate potential health risks, and the need and rationale for the exemption. After signing the

final bill, President Biden noted his opposition to the use of burn pits and requested that the

Secretary seek presidential approval prior to exercising the exemption authority.257

The enacted exemption is a modified version of the SASC-reported bill (Section 314)258 with a

reporting requirement added. The House-passed bill (Section 314) would have repealed the

general prohibition and exceptions for the use of burn pits in the FY2010 NDAA, and more

broadly prohibited the use of burn pits unless the President exempted a location if doing so was in

the “paramount interest of the United States.”259 This provision also included reporting

requirements for such an exemption that are similar to those added in the final bill. Another

provision in the House-passed bill (Section 323) would have required DOD to include a budget

line item for alternatives to burn pits in its annual budget requests, which was not adopted.260

The FY2022 NDAA included two other provisions (Section 725 and Section 6602) related to burn

pits. Section 725 required the Secretary of Defense to provide mandatory training to medical

providers of DOD on potential health effects that may be associated with exposures to burn pit

emissions.261 Section 6602 required the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to add Egypt and Syria to

the scope of the Airborne Hazards and Open Burn Pit Registry.262

254 P.L. 111-84, Section 317, as amended (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2701 note), including the definition of “covered

waste” that identifies which wastes are prohibited from disposal through open burning unless alternatives are infeasible.

255 DOD, Open Burn Pit Report to Congress, April 2019, at

https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Congress/Open%20Burn%20Pit%20Report-2019.pdf.

256 P.L. 116-92, §333-334.

257 White House, “Statement by the President on S. 1605, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2022,” press release, December 27, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/12/27/statement-by-the-president-on-s-1605-the-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2022/.

258 S. 2792, §314.

259 H.R. 4350, §314.

260 H.R. 4350, §323.

261 The House-passed bill (H.R. 4350, §719) and SASC-reported bill (S. 2792, §724) included identical provisions.

262 This provision originated in the House-passed bill (H.R. 4350, §6409).

Congressional Research Service

FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

Fuel Tank Leaks at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility263

Congress has included bill or report language in each NDAA for the past eight fiscal years from

FY2015 through FY2022 to address fuel tank leaks, environmental contamination, and impacts

on drinking water sources at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii. The U.S. Navy

and Defense Logistics Agency administer this facility as part of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

The Red Hill facility has supplied fuel for the Pacific Fleet since the World War II era.264

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health of the State of

Hawaii entered into an Administrative Order on Consent with the U.S. Navy and Defense

Logistics Agency for investigating and remediating contamination from fuel tank leaks at the Red

Hill facility in January 2014.265 The parties entered into this Consent Order pursuant to the Solid

Waste Disposal Act (often referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or

RCRA)266 and applicable state law. RCRA Subtitle I applies to the regulation of underground

storage tanks and the remediation of petroleum contamination from tank leaks. Potential health

risks associated with more recent fuel tank leaks at the Red Hill facility discovered in November

2021 led to an interruption of the water supplies at the facility and temporary relocation of

affected individuals.267 Contamination from these leaks would add to existing challenges from

past leaks.

Section 318 of the FY2022 NDAA included a modified provision from the House-passed bill

(Section 331)268 directing the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to take the following

actions at the Red Hill facility to address the fuel tank leaks:



an independent inspection of the “pipeline system, supporting infrastructure, and

appurtenances, including valves and any other corrosion prone equipment”; and

a life-cycle sustainment plan, which shall consider the “current condition and

service life of the tanks, pipeline system, and support equipment.”

Section 318 also required the Secretary of Defense to assess possible alternatives to the Red Hill

facility for bulk fuel storage, including consideration of at least three locations outside of Hawaii.

Section 318 required this alternatives assessment to be based on needs to support the fuel

requirements of the Pacific Fleet, the costs and timeline for recapitalization of the Red Hill

facility to attain certain industry inspection standards specified in Section 318, and the costs and

timeline to establish an alternative location for secure bulk fuel storage.

Within one year of enactment, Section 318 required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to

the congressional defense committees on the independent inspection, life-cycle sustainment plan,

263 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on fuel tank leaks at

the Red Hill facility and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.

264 For information on the operational history of the Red Hill facility, see Commander Navy Region Hawaii, “About

Red Hill,” at https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrh/om/red-hill-tank/about-red-hill.html.

265 For the Administrative Order on Consent and supporting documents, see U.S. EPA, “Red Hill Administrative Order

on Consent,” at https://www.epa.gov/red-hill/red-hill-administrative-order-consent.

266 42 U.S.C. §§6901 et seq.

267 For more information, see: (1) U.S. Navy Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, “JBPHH Water Updates,” at

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/JBPHH-Water-Updates; (2) U.S. EPA, “Drinking Water Emergency at Joint Base Pearl

Harbor-Hickam, Honolulu, Hawaii,” at https://www.epa.gov/red-hill/drinking-water-emergency-joint-base-pearlharbor-hickam-honolulu-hawaii-november-2021; and (3) Hawaii Department of Health, “DOH Investigation into Navy

Water System,” at https://health.hawaii.gov/about/navy-water-system-quality-updates.

268 H.R. 4350, §331.

Congressional Research Service

FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress

alternatives assessment, and “options on improving the security and maintenance of the Red Hill

Bulk Fuel Storage Facility.”

Subsequent to enactment of the FY2022 NDAA, Secretary of Defense Austin announced the

planned closure of the Red Hill facility in a memorandum issued on March 7, 2022, outlining

certain conditions for the closure decision.269 The decommissioning of the fuel tanks, and

investigation and remediation of environmental contamination from the tank leaks, would be

subject to RCRA Subtitle I and applicable state law.

Responsibility and Strategy for Global Bulk Fuel Management

The House-passed NDAA included a provision (Section 342) that would have required the

Secretary of Defense to designate a single combatant command to be responsible for global bulk

fuel management and delivery.270 The provision also would have required the combatant

commander of the so-designated command to submit a strategy on the matter to the congressional

defense committees. The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the provision, arguing in part

that it would “not address the challenges posed by the degraded availability and survivability of

assets supporting the distribution of fuel to dispersed and austere operating locations and the need

for rapid decision-making in support of changing operational environments.”271 The enacted

NDAA included a provision (Section 352) that identified

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