Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportNov 2, 2021

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan:

Background and Issues for Congress

November 2, 2021

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R46955

SUMMARY

Taliban Government in Afghanistan:

Background and Issues for Congress

On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan.

The announcement came weeks after the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist movement that ruled

most of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, retook effective control of the country with the

collapse of the U.S.-backed former Afghan government and its security forces amid the U.S.

military departure.

R46955

November 2, 2021

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern

Affairs

The Taliban’s return to power comes almost 20 years after a U.S.-led military campaign deposed the group in response to its

harboring of the international Islamist terrorist group Al Qaeda, which carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks . The

Taliban regrouped and began an insurgency that by 2005 was challenging U.S. and international military forces, along with

the new Afghan government and its nascent security forces, in parts of the country. After a 2009-2011 “surge,” U.S. force

levels decreased as Afghan forces took responsibility for security nationwide. Deep and abiding divisions among Afghan

political elites, along with widespread corruption, undermined the government’s authority and strengthened the Taliban,

which continued to make battlefield gains. In the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, signed in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban

agreed to take unspecified action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United

States and its allies, in return for the full withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. In 2021,

President Joseph Biden postponed the U.S. withdrawal date by several months; two weeks before that withdrawal was to

conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that

shocked many in the United States and Afghanistan. Other than an Islamic State affiliate, no viable Afghan armed opposition

to the Taliban appears to exist as of November 2021, though some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support.

Afghanistan is different in many ways from the country the Taliban last ruled in 2001. Women have been active participants

in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them, and ethnic and religious minorities, were enshrined in the country’s

2004 constitution. The Taliban are likely to reverse that progress, though their early actions suggest at least some moderation

from their extremely repressive 1996-2001 rule. The Taliban takeover is also likely to affect terrorist groups in Afghanistan

differently. The local Islamic State affiliate, a Taliban adversary, has escalated its attacks since the Taliban takeover,

challenging the group’s legitimacy, but Al Qaeda, a longtime Taliban partner, may be empowered. The Taliban takeover has

reshaped regional dynamics, presenting challenges and opportunities for U.S. adversaries and competitors.

As the Biden Administration and the 117th Congress consider the new situation in Afghanistan, a range of U.S. policy tools is

potentially available. The prospect of U.S. recognition of, and establishment of diplomatic relations with, the Taliban

government could provide some leverage over a Taliban that claims to want international legitimacy . Only the President may

extend formal recognition to another government, but Congress can restrain, condition, or otherwise influence the

implementation of recognition decisions. There appears to be broad support in Congress for maintaining terrorism-related

sanctions on the Taliban while allowing for the provision of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. It is unclear how the

Taliban might respond to additional U.S. sanctions, or what such sanctions might be intended to accomplish, were the

Administration (potentially with congressional input) to make a decision to impose them. Congress might also seek to

provide foreign assistance, both within Afghanistan and to the country’s neighbors, for various purposes. In the aftermath of

the Taliban takeover, international financial institutions blocked Afghanistan’s access to funds; similarly, in August 2021, the

Biden Administration placed a hold on U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets. Congress may exert influence over U.S.

decisionmaking on both of those issues.

Possible overall U.S. approaches to the Taliban include direct or indirect attempts to undermine the group’s rule, as well as

tacit or explicit acceptance of the group’s position. A U.S. policy response that rejects and seeks to weaken the Taliban may

have broad domestic support, given the history of conflict and Taliban policies that undermine U.S. interests. It is unclear t o

what extent, if at all, the Taliban might change their behavior in response to U.S. actions, but the group appears to be

prioritizing internal cohesion over compromises that might appeal to foreign actors. A less oppositional U.S. approach toward

the Taliban could allow for greater U.S. access to, and perhaps influence over, the group and events in Afghanistan.

Engagement with a Taliban government that acts in support of some U.S. interests and against others could compel U.S.

policymakers to weigh and prioritize those interests, posing a difficult challenge.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents

Background: The Taliban, 1994-2021................................................................................. 1

Origins, Rise to Power, and Rule: 1994-2001................................................................. 1

Fall and Beginnings of Insurgency: 2001-2014............................................................... 2

Road to Return: 2015-2021 ......................................................................................... 4

Summer 2021 Taliban Takeover.............................................................................. 7

Seizure of U.S.-supplied Military Materiel ............................................................... 8

Taliban Government ...................................................................................................... 10

Current and Potential Opposition ............................................................................... 12

Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power .................................................................... 13

Relations with Terrorist Groups ............................................................................ 14

Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities..................................... 18

U.S. Partners and U.S. Citizens Remaining in Afghanistan........................................ 22

Regional Relations and Dynamics ......................................................................... 23

U.S. Policy Tools and Possible Issues for Congress ............................................................ 27

Recognition and Diplomatic Representation ................................................................ 27

Sanctions and Terrorist Designations .......................................................................... 29

Humanitarian Concerns ....................................................................................... 32

Possible Purposes of Sanctions ............................................................................. 33

Foreign Assistance and Security Cooperation ............................................................... 34

International Financial Institutions ............................................................................. 36

U.S.-based Central Bank Reserves ............................................................................. 38

Outlook for Policymakers ......................................................................................... 40

Figures

Figure 1. Selected Taliban Cabinet Members ..................................................................... 11

Figure 2. Afghanistan and Its Neighbors ........................................................................... 24

Contacts

Author Information ....................................................................................................... 41

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Background: The Taliban, 1994-2021

The Taliban, now in their third decade of existence, began as an armed group that emerged in the

1990s out of Afghanistan’s civil war. By 1996, they had come to rule most of the country. In

2001, U.S., international, and Afghan forces deposed them, and the group soon began what would

become a nearly twenty-year insurgency. In 2021, they again control Afghanistan, arguably to a

greater extent than they did in the 1990s. The Taliban’s background may be instructive for

understanding the group’s renewed rule in 2021.

Origins, Rise to Power, and Rule: 1994-2001

In 1993-1994, Afghan Sunni Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed

the Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen. After the

1989 Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported Afghan government

in 1992, a civil war among mujahideen parties broke out. Those former fighters who had become

disillusioned with the civil war formed the backbone of the Taliban. Many members of the

movement had studied in seminaries in neighboring Pakistan and chose the name Taliban (plural

of talib, a student, in this case, of Islam) to distance themselves from the mujahideen. 1 According

to the 9/11 Commission Report, Pakistan supported the Taliban because of the group’s potential

to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally,” thus giving Pakistan

“greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what

they called ‘strategic depth.’”2 Taliban beliefs and practices were consonant with, and derived in

part from, the conservative tribal traditions of Pashtuns, who represent a plurality (though not a

majority) of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic makeup and who have traditionally ruled

Afghanistan. 3

The Taliban viewed the post-Soviet occupation government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as

weak, corrupt, and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between the mujahideen groups

(1992-1996) resulted in popular support for the Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and

more able to deliver stability; as Zalmay Khalilzad, later U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and

Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, wrote in his 2016 memoir, “I, like many,

was optimistic about the Taliban” at the outset. 4 The Taliban took control of the southern city of

Kandahar in November 1994 and launched a series of armed campaigns throughout the country

that culminated in the capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996. The Taliban reportedly received

significant direct military support from Pakistan in their offensives. 5

The Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as the group imposed strict adherence

to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including

public executions, to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music, and

dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or generally working outside the home and

1 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2000).

2 National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (2004) p. 64.

3 Like T aliban founder Mullah Omar, most of the senior figures in the T aliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of the

major Pashtun tribal confederations; most modern Afghan rulers have been from the Durrani Pashtun tribal

confederation.

Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (St. Martin’s

Press, 2016), p. 84.

4

5 Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War, Human Rights Watch, July 2001.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

publicly executed women for alleged adultery. In March 2001, the Taliban drew international

condemnation by destroying monumental sixth-century Buddha statues carved into hills above

the city of Bamiyan, which the Taliban considered idolatrous and contrary to Islamic norms.

The Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama Bin Laden eventually became the

central issue affecting international views of and relations with the Taliban. In 1996, Bin Laden

moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had previously spent most of the 1980s as a highprofile financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen. 6 Bin Laden established an alliance

with the Taliban whereby he provided millions in financial aid to the group (and military support

for Taliban efforts to complete their conquest of the country) and the Taliban provided safe haven

for AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in

Afghanistan. 7 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Kabul in April

1998, the highest-ranking U.S. official to do so in decades. In response to Richardson’s request

that the Taliban expel Bin Laden, the group “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In

any case, the Taliban said, [Bin Laden] was not a threat to the United States.”8

In response to the August 1998 AQ bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, the United States

launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan. They were unsuccessful in either

killing Bin Laden or persuading the Taliban to expel him. U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia and

Pakistan (which, along with the United Arab Emirates, formally recognized the Taliban

government) to use their influence to convince the Taliban to expel the AQ leader proved equally

unsuccessful. The United States and United Nations imposed sanctions on the Taliban as well (see

“Sanctions,” below). Taliban leadership was unmoved; their relationship with Bin Laden was

“sometimes tense” but “the foundation was deep and personal.”9

Fall and Beginnings of Insurgency: 2001-2014

On September 11, 2001, AQ operatives conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States

that killed nearly 3,000 people. In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on

September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders,

permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to such camps,

adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”10 Taliban

leaders refused, citing Bin Laden’s status as their guest and what they characterized as a lack of

evidence of his involvement in the attacks. 11

Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the perpetrators of the

attack as well as those who aided or harbored them (P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action in

Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets throughout the country

and close air support to anti-Taliban Afghan forces (known as the Northern Alliance). Limited

numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces,

6 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64.

7

Ibid,, pp. 66-67.

8 Ibid., p. 111.

9 Ibid., p. 125.

10

“T ext: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.

11 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018),

pp. 69.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

and conventional ground forces began deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks later. 12 By

November 13, the Taliban evacuated Kabul, which U.S.-backed Afghan forces soon retook.

In late November 2001, the United Nations (U.N.) convened Afghan opposition leaders in Bonn,

Germany, to form a transitional government, even as Taliban forces were still fighting in their

final redoubt, Kandahar. The Taliban were not included in those talks, at which Afghan

opposition leaders selected Hamid Karzai as the interim leader of the country. Taliban leader

Mullah Mohammad Omar and others reportedly offered to recognize Karzai and surrender their

arms and Kandahar to Afghan opposition forces in December 2001, in exchange for being

allowed to return to their homes. 13 At a December 6, 2001, press conference, Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld said an arrangement where Omar could live “in dignity” would not be

acceptable, and he cast doubt on the prospects for a negotiated settlement. 14 Some Taliban leaders

were arrested and detained; others, like Omar, escaped to Pakistan, where many AQ leaders also

fled. Some observers assert that U.S. forces, lacking AQ targets to combat, focused on low -level

Taliban fighters “because they [were] there,” sometimes becoming involved in local disputes that

were unrelated to terrorism and contributing to the growth of the insurgency.15

U.S. officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though

Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country remain.” 16 By 2005,

scattered Taliban forces had begun to regroup in southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as in

Pakistan, where many observers suspected they were being tolerated by, if not receiving active

support from, Pakistan’s security and intelligence services. 17 By 2006, Taliban forces were

reported to be clashing “daily” with U.S. and coalition forces and administering areas of southern

Afghanistan under their control. 18 To combat the growing insurgency, U.S. troop levels in

Afghanistan were increased after 2006, supplemented by a comprehensive nation building effort.

By 2009, the Taliban had expanded their presence in the north, reaching areas far from the south

and east. 19 While U.S. observers judged that the Taliban did not have significant popular support,

a combination of factors, including widespread Afghan government corruption and the Taliban’s

provision of some basic services (including justice) allowed it to make inroads in local

communities; it also extended its influence through intimidation. 20 The group also adjusted its

tactics, focusing on coordinated assaults against remote outposts of U.S. and coalition forces, as

well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 21 In response, the United States increased its

counterinsurgency efforts, with President Obama announcing in 2009 an additional increase in

12 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “T oppling the

T aliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015.

13 “T aliban Agrees to Surrender Kandahar,” ABC News, December 6, 2001; Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the

Living: America, the Taliban, and the War Through Afghan Eyes (Metropolitan Books, 2014), p. 60.

14 Defense Department Briefing, C-SPAN, December 6, 2001.

15 Gopal, op. cit., 119-123; Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and

Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018), pp. 143-144.

16 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003.

17 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “T he Sun in the Sky: the Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan

Insurgents,” Crisis States Discussion Papers, June 2010.

18 Carlotta Gall, “T aliban Surges as U.S. Shifts Some T asks to NAT O,” New York Times, June 11, 2006.

19 Carlotta Gall, “T aliban Open Nort hern Front in Afghanistan,” New York Times, November 26, 2009; “Stopping the

T aliban’s Momentum?” Carnegie Middle East Center, September 23, 2010.

Michael O’Hanlon, “Staying Power: T he U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011,” Brookings Institution, August

25, 2010.

20

21 Rob Evans, “Afghanistan war logs: How the IED became T aliban’s weapon of choice,” Guardian, July 25, 2010.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

U.S. military and development personnel and funding for Afghanistan, a “surge” of resources that

peaked with the deployment of nearly 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2010 along with

other international forces.

The surge of international forces reduced Taliban control in the south and east, but did not

eliminate it. 22 Afghan forces began assuming security responsibilities from international forces as

scheduled in mid-2011. These forces were weakened by high casualty and attrition rates and a

corrupt chain of command, and remained largely dependent on the United States for logistical and

tactical support. In contrast, the Taliban possessed a large and effective intelligence network, its

fighters remained highly motivated, and the group adopted a flexible range of tactical and

strategic approaches to expand their influence and combat U.S. and Afghan forces (such as

infiltrator or “green on blue” attacks). 23 Successful Taliban operations often both sapped the

Afghan government’s own capabilities and undermined the Afghan public’s confidence in the

government and its security forces. As the surge of U.S. forces ended in September 2012, U.S.

officials expressed confidence that it “broke the Taliban’s momentum” as they continued to

transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces.24

The Obama Administration came to assess that the conflict had no military solution and began

low-level negotiations with the Taliban as early as late 2010. 25 The talks centered largely on

confidence-building measures, including the opening of a short-lived Taliban political office in

Doha, Qatar. The refusal of the Taliban to engage with the Afghan government, and the Afghan

government’s opposition to U.S. negotiations with the Taliban at which the government was not

represented, constrained and eventually led to the dissolution of talks in 2014.

Road to Return: 2015-2021

Afghan forces officially assumed full responsibility for security nationwide at the beginning of

2015, though they were still reliant on U.S. air power, training and logistical support to sustain

their operations. 26 The year 2015 was a time of transition for the Taliban as well: the group

admitted its founder Mullah Mohammad Omar had died in 2013 and announced Mullah Akhtar

Mansour as the group’s new leader, amid reports of contention among Taliban’s leaders about the

succession. 27 Reported internal dissent did not have an apparent effect on the Taliban’s military

capabilities, with the group capturing the northern provincial capital of Kunduz for two weeks in

September-October 2015, their first seizure of a major urban area since 2001.

Mansour was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in May 2016, and succeeded by Haibatullah

Akhundzada, a religious scholar seen by some analysts as “low-key” and “a potential unifier.”28

22

Seth Jones, “Beating Back the T aliban,” Foreign Policy, March 15, 2011.

23 Ben Brandt, “T he T aliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” CTC Sentinel, June 2011; Alissa J.

Rubi, “T aliban Using Modern Means to Add to Sway,” New York Times, October 4, 2011; Rajiv Chandrasekaran,

“T aliban’s new strategy focuses more on high-profile assaults, less on territory,” Washington Post, September 18,

2012; Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, “T aliban Captives Dispute U.S. View on Afghanistan War,” New York Times,

February 1, 2012; “Afghanistan: Green on Blue Attacks Are Only a Small Part of the Problem,” CSIS, September 4,

2012.

24 “T ranscript: Obama’s Remarks On War In Afghanistan,” NPR, May 1, 2012.

25 Evan MacAskill et al., “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with T aliban,” Guardian, July 19,

2010.

26

Statement by the President on Afghanistan, White House (Archives), May 27, 2014.

27 Barnett Rubin, “T urmoil in the T aliban,” New Yorker, July 31, 2015.

28 Mujib Mashal and T aimoor Shah, “T aliban’s New Leader, More Scholar T han Fighter, Is Slow to Impose Himself,”

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

The Taliban again briefly seized Kunduz in 2016 as the group made gradual gains nationwide, as

reported in successive Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

quarterly reports to Congress. In July 2016, President Obama announced that he would maintain

8,400 U.S. forces in the country through the end of his Administration, a higher level than

planned, saying “Afghan forces are still not as strong as they need to be.”29

Taliban Organizational Structure and Finances, pre-2021

The Taliban’s post-2001 insurgency was sustained in large part by a cohesive organizational structure and

continuous access to financial resources.

Since 2016, the Taliban has been led by Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is referred to as emir of the group’s Islamic

Emirate and was supported by three deputies: Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of Haqqani Network founder Jalaluddin

Haqqani), Mohammad Yaqoob (son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar), and Abdul Ghani Baradar. All three have

prominent positions in the 2021 Taliban government. Yaqoob previously headed the group’s powerful Military

Commission, which appointed shadow governors and other officials for Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.30 Abdul Ghani

Baradar headed the Political Commission, based in Doha, Qatar, and led the Taliban’s talks with the United States

and regional diplomacy. Along with the Military and Political Commissions, the Taliban had 14 additional

commissions, including those for the judiciary, the media, health, agriculture, and antiquities. 31

The emir, his deputies, and around 20 other individuals comprised a Leadership Council or Rahbari Shura, also

described as the Quetta Shura after the Pakistani city where some members and their families lived (the United

Nations described the Quetta Shura as “not a geographical term, but an analytical concept describing the most

senior group of Taliban leaders”).32 The Quetta Shura reportedly controlled Taliban forces and activities in

southern and western provinces; another group, known as the Peshawar Shura, was responsible for other

provinces, mostly in the east. The Miram Shah Shura was headed by and comprised almost entirely of Haqqani

Network fighters.

Since at least 2012, U.N. sanctions monitors assessed that the Taliban collected over $100 million a year in

revenues. Estimates of the Taliban’s revenues in the year before their August 2021 takeover vary widely, with

U.N. sanctions monitors citing a range of $300 million to $1.6 billion in annual income, mostly from illegal mining,

opium poppy cultivation, taxation, and extortion. One expert disputes these figures, arguing that the vast majority

of Taliban revenues came from taxes on the trade of fuel and goods (79%) as opposed to illegal drugs (9%). 33

The Taliban published an open letter addressed to President Trump in August 2017, urging him to

withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan, citing what it characterized as the weakness and

ineptitude of the Afghan government. 34 Later that month, President Trump authorized an increase

in U.S. targeting authorities and force levels, though he conceded that a full withdrawal was his

“original instinct.”35 Within a year, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of

military progress against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without

Afghan government participation for the first time. 36

New York Times, July 11, 2016.

29 T he White House, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, July 6, 2016.

30 Yaqoob was appointed to head the Military Commission in May 2021, displacing Ibrahim Sadr. Sadr has been seen

as close to Iran, and his absence in the original T aliban cabinet announced on September 7, 2021, reportedly

“unnerved” T ehran; he was later appointed acting deputy interior minister. Antonio Giustozzi, “Russia and Iran:

Disappointed Friends of the T aliban?” RUSI, September 30, 2021.

31 UN Report 2020/415.

32

UN Report 2021/486.

33 David Mansfield, “A T axing Narrative: Miscalculating Revenues and Misunderstanding the Conflict in

Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, October 2021.

34

Justin Rowlatt, “T aliban open letter to Trump urges Afghan withdrawal,” BBC, August 15, 2017.

35 Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “ 'It’s a hard problem’: Inside T rump’s decision to send more troops to

Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 21, 2017.

36 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct T aliban T alks to Jump -Start Afghan Negotiations,”

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Those talks culminated in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, in which the two sides

agreed to two “interconnected” commitments: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces

by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from

using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. The U.S. withdrawal commitment

was not explicitly conditioned on the Taliban reducing violence against the Afghan government,

making concessions in prospective intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.

The United States also committed to facilitating a prisoner exchange between the Taliban and the

Afghan government, whose mutual releases of 1,000 and 5,000 prisoners, respectively, began in

May 2020. France and Australia reportedly opposed the release of some specific Taliban prisoners

accused of attacks that killed French and Australian nationals. 37 Before the prisoner release

concluded, some media reports indicated that released Taliban fighters were returning or intended

to return to the battlefield, with one June 2020 report citing a Taliban commander as saying that

released fighters would be redeployed. 38 Some Taliban prisoners released in 2020 reportedly

played roles in the military offensives that led to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover. 39 The

Afghan government concluded its controversial and sometimes contentious release of 5,000

Taliban prisoners in September 2020, after which the first direct talks between the Taliban and

Afghan government began. 40 Those negotiations were halting and did not make evident progress.

In the months after the agreement, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper asserted that the Taliban

were not fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda. 41 U.S.

officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the agreement. 42

Although no provisions in the publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks on U.S. or

Afghan forces, the Taliban, in non-public annexes accompanying the accord, reportedly

committed not to attack U.S. forces. 43 No U.S. forces were reportedly killed in Afghanistan by

Taliban forces after February 2020. Casualties among Afghan military forces and civilians

remained high as the Taliban continued a “two-track strategy” of fighting while remaining at the

negotiating table. 44

The United States had been withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement and

continued to do so afterwards, reaching a low of 2,500 by the time President Trump left office in

January 2021. 45 After an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, President Biden

announced on April 14, 2021, that while the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “perhaps not what I

would have negotiated myself,” the United States would keep to it by beginning a “final

withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021. 46 He later said the U.S. military

New York Times, July 15, 2018.

37 “Australia, France Object to Afghan Release of Some T aliban Detainees,” Radio Azadi, August 17, 2020.

38 “Freed T aliban prisoners eye return to the battlefield,” France24, June 10, 2020.

39 Alan Cullison and Saeed Shah, “T aliban Commander Who Led Attack on Afghan City Was Released From Prison

Last Year, Officials Say,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2021.

40 Mujib Mashal and Fatima Faizi, “Afghanistan to Release Last T aliban Prisoners, Removing Last Hurdle to T alks,”

New York Times, September 3, 2020.

41 “T aliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020.

42

“Violence ‘Not Consistent’ with US-T aliban Deal: US Envoy,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2020.

43 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Budget

Posture,” CQ, March 4, 2020.

44 Marvin Weinbaum, “T he T aliban’s two-track strategy,” Middle East Institute, June 8, 2020.

T homas Gibbons-Neff et al., “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its T roop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October

21, 2019.

45

46 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2021.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

mission would conclude on August 31. The Taliban accused the United States of breaching the

agreement with the extension, but continued to refrain from attacking U.S. forces.47

Summer 2021 Taliban Takeover

Throughout 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay the potential detrimental impact of the

U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance to

Afghan forces. 48 In a May 2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

Mark Milley said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterized as the

strengths of the Afghan government and military. 49 In its 2021 annual threat assessment, the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that “the Afghan Government will

struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.”50

An external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that the Taliban enjoyed a strong

advantage over the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in cohesion and

a slight advantage in force employment and that the two forces essentially split on material

resources and external support.51 The one ANDSF advantage—force size—was assessed as much

narrower than often assumed. The author concluded in his net assessment that the Taliban enjoyed

a narrow advantage over the government. The Taliban had also come to control significant

territory: in October 2018, the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available,

the group controlled or contested as much as 40% of Afghanistan and the group continued to

make gradual gains in subsequent years.

In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the

country’s rural areas, solidifying the group’s hold on some areas in which it already had a

significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some northern

areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their

2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the Taliban took

control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021. 52 The speed of the

Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one commander saying that

his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the departure of U.S.

forces. 53 In July, the Taliban began seizing border crossings with Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

On July 21, 2021, General Milley estimated that the Taliban controlled over 200 districts, but

emphasized that the Taliban had not seized any provincial capitals, where Afghan forces had been

consolidated. 54

“Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden,” Voice of Jihad, April 15,

2021.

47

48 Zahra Rahimi, “ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout,” TOLOnews, April 26, 2021.

49 T ranscript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,

Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.

50 Annual T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Directo r of National Intelligence, April

19, 2021.

51 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan Security Forces Versus the T aliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 14,

Issue 1, January 2021.

52 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to th e T aleban amid Calls for a ‘Second

Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.

Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the T aliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing

in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.

53

54 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing, U.S. Department

of Defense, July 21, 2021.

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On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured the provincial capital of Zaranj. The Taliban’s capture of

half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in the following week shocked many observers and,

reportedly, U.S. officials. 55 By August 13, U.S. officials were reportedly concerned that the

Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With the fall of Jalalabad in the east and Mazar-eSharif in the north, the Taliban captured the last major cities and eliminated the final outposts of

organized Afghan government resistance. On the morning of August 15, 2021, the Taliban began

entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country. The central province of

Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to establish an armed resistance to the

Taliban (see more below), was reportedly captured by Taliban forces in September 2021. 56

While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in

some areas, some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting. 57 In many

of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the departure of government forces (and the

handover of their weapons) through payments or through the mediation of local elders seeking to

avoid bloodshed. 58

Seizure of U.S.-supplied Military Materiel

In taking over Afghanistan, the Taliban came into possession of a large amount of equipment

supplied by the United States to the former Afghan government. The value of such equipment in

both financial and strategic terms is a matter of some dispute among observers and

policymakers. 59 Still, newly acquired equipment (see below) provides the Taliban with some

additional capabilities, as well as material for propaganda.

The Taliban had reportedly captured smaller amounts of U.S.-supplied equipment from Afghan

forces long before August 2021; one 2018 media report, citing military statistics, stated that U.S.

airstrikes had destroyed “about 40” U.S.-supplied Humvees captured by the Taliban “so as not to

allow the enemy an advantage,” in the words of a military spokesperson. 60 The Taliban reportedly

have for years been able to buy some types of equipment from Afghan forces. Special Inspector

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko said in a January 2017 speech that, “There is

also evidence that the Taliban have instructed their field commanders to simply purchase U.S.

supplied weapons, fuel, and ammunition from Afghan soldiers because to do so is both easier and

less expensive for the insurgents.”61

Determining the total amount of U.S.-supplied equipment captured by the Taliban in August 2021

is difficult. First, a comprehensive public reporting of all equipment transferred to Afghan forces

does not exist. Some U.S. government entities have published data on equipment transferred to

Afghan forces, but that data is time-limited and incomplete. For example, in a 2017 report

requested in the FY2017 House National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Government

55 Zeke Miller et al., “Biden team surprised by rapid T aliban gains in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, August 15, 2021.

56 “Afghanistan crisis: T aliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold,” BBC, September 13, 2021.

57 “ Afghanistan: T aliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021.

58 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,

2021.

59 Glenn Kessler, “No, the T aliban did not seize $85 billion of U.S. weapons,” Washington Post, August 31, 2021.

60 Jim Michaels, “U.S. gives Humvees to Afghan army, then blows them up when they fall into T aliban hands,” USA

Today, June 6, 2018. See also, for example, Richard Engel et al., “T aliban parade new weapons seized from Afghan

military as U.S. withdraws,” NBC News, July 6, 2021.

61 Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, “Afghanistan Reconstruction: Enduring Challenges for the New Administration

and Congress,” SIGAR, January 11, 2017.

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Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that through FY2016 the United States had funded the

transfer to Afghan forces of:

over 75,000 vehicles (including 22,000 Humvees and nearly 200 armored

personnel carriers);

nearly 600,000 weapons (including 485,000 rifles and pistols; 64,000 machine

guns; and 25,000 grenade launchers);

over 16,000 night vision devices; and

208 aircraft (including 110 helicopters, 60 transport/cargo airplanes, and 20 light

attack airplanes).

However, that report “did not assess the extent to which key equipment has been distributed to the

ANDSF or is in use.”62 SIGAR has in recent years published lists of the ten highest-cost items of

equipment delivered to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police by quarter, which

likely accounts for much, but not all, of the value of U.S. equipment transferred to the ANDSF

during those periods. At least some equipment provided over the past twenty years was destroyed

in combat or otherwise rendered inoperable. Such calculations are further complicated by some

Afghan forces’ removal of their equipment out of the country in August 2021. For instance,

Afghan pilots reportedly flew 46 aircraft to Uzbekistan on August 15; others to Tajikistan. 63

Additional Afghan forces fled to Iran in their U.S.-supplied vehicles. 64

Former President Trump said in an August 30, 2021, statement that the United States should

demand the return of all materiel supplied to the former Afghan government, which he asserted

totaled $85 billion. 65 The origin of that figure is unclear; it may be derived from the total amount

of U.S. reconstruction funding to support security ($88.6 billion, per the July 2021 SIGAR

quarterly report to Congress) or the cumulative amount of appropriations for the Afghanistan

Security Forces Fund or ASFF ($82.9 billion). Those funding categories supported a number of

purchases and activities, including contracted support, training, salaries, ammunition, and fuel for

Afghan forces. According to SIGAR, just under 25% of the nearly $75 billion in total ASFF

disbursements were for equipment and transportation. 66

While small arms and some vehicles are readily usable by Taliban forces (and already have been

used), it is unclear to what extent the group can utilize larger platforms, such as aircraft.

Sustainment of such platforms is a known challenge. Afghan forces relied on contracted logistics

support for maintenance on all air platforms (for some platforms, such as the C-130 and UH-60A

Blackhawk, contractors performed 100% of maintenance). 67 The Taliban may seek similar

logistical support from non-U.S. sources.68 Some argue Taliban forces have used captured U.S.supplied equipment to project authority since their 2021 takeover. 69 In September 2021, the

62 “Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded Equipment for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces,” U.S.

Government Accountability Office, August 10, 2017.

63 Abraham Mahshie, “25% of Afghan Air Force Fled, Remainder in Disarray, Sources Say,” Air Force Magazine,

August 19, 2021.

64 “Video: Afghan military flee near Iran border prior to T aliban push,” Al Arabiya News, August

14, 2021.

Joseph Coi, “T rump: US should take military action if T aliban don’t return billions in equipment,” The Hill, August

30, 2021.

66 Letter available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-09-10-CBM-SFL-Comer-Grothman-to-Sopko-SIGARre-Follow-up-Reports.pdf.

65

67

1225 Report.

68 Jonathan Schroden, “Five Myths About the T aliban’s New Arsenal,” Lawfare, September 1, 2021.

69 Alex Horton, “T aliban show off U.S.-made weapons and gear in a bid to intimidate, project authority,” Washington

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Chairwoman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Oversight and Reform wrote to SIGAR

requesting examination of, among other topics, the “extent to which the Taliban have access

to...U.S.-funded equipment and defense articles previously provided to the government of

Afghanistan and the ANDSF, and any mechanisms the U.S. government is using to recoup,

recapture, or secure this funding and equipment.”70

Taliban Government

On September 7, 2021, longtime Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid made his first official

appearance in public. He announced the names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting”

ministers that fill a “caretaker cabinet” to administer the country. The Taliban refer to this

government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom and why these individuals might be replaced going forward or

in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. The Taliban’s

government in the 1990s reportedly was also “nominally interim.”71 The Taliban reportedly intend

to “implement” the 1964 constitution of the former Afghan monarchy “without any content that

contradicts Islamic law and the principles of the Islamic Emirate,” leaving unanswered larger

questions about how the group intends to deal with the 2004 constitution, Afghanistan’s

parliament, and other elements of the post-2001 political system. 72

Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada (of whom one verified photograph exists and who has

never made an official public appearance) is to hold supreme power as the group’s emir.

Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as governor of Kandahar and foreign minister in the

1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst describes Akhund as

“relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure whose selection forestalls competition among

more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban. 73 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led

negotiations with the United States, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. Baradar released an

audio recording on September 13, 2021, denying rumors of his death or injury in a brawl with

other Taliban figures; the BBC reported on September 15, 2021, that Baradar had gone to

Kandahar after a heated disagreement with Haqqani figures (see below) over whether the

Taliban’s political or military wings deserve credit for the group’s takeover.74

Nearly all members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists.

All are male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns, mostly from southern Afghanistan. Over

half were, and remain, designated for U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior

Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up

to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani

Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Some argue the role of

Post, August 25, 2021.

70 Letter available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2021 -09-

10.CBM%20SFL%20Comer%20Grothman%20to%20Sopko-SIGAR%20re%20Follow-up%20Reports.pdf.

71

“Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.

72 S. K. Khan, “T aliban to implement monarch-era Constitution in Afghanistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, September 28, 2021;

Ziar Khan Yaad, “Fate of Afghanistan’s National Assembly Unclear,” TOLOnews, September 14, 2021.

Martine van Bijlert, “T he Focus of the T aleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”

Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.

73

74 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: T aliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September

15, 2021.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Haqqani Network-associated figures in the Taliban caretaker government is a reflection of their

outsized military import, and could make U.S. cooperation with the Taliban more difficult. 75

Figure 1. Selected Taliban Cabinet Members

Source: Created by CRS. Photographs and information from media sources; Office of Foreign Assets Control

(OFAC) and U.N. sanctions (1988 Committee) databases.

Some had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials

(such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban figures

after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their promise

to establish an “inclusive government.” Additional lists of acting deputy ministers and other

75 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,

September 10, 2021.

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officials announced by the Taliban on September 21 and October 4 include some members of

some minorities (including one Hazara) but are predominantly Pashtun. 76

The makeup of the Taliban’s government indicates that the group has prioritized internal cohesion

over reaching out to other parts of Afghan society. 77 This approach may secure Taliban rule in the

short term. Reports indicate continued dissension in the Taliban ranks, largely between the

group’s political wing (which advocates for greater inclusion of diverse elements from within

Afghan society, with an eye toward international recognition) and its military wing (which

opposes such compromises). 78 Others express skepticism that the group is at risk of fracturing. 79

Even if the Taliban succeed in preventing factional infighting, their exclusive approach to

governing may carry its own risks of inspiring opposition or insurgency against its rule.

Current and Potential Opposition

While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, it happened not because the Taliban had

massive popular support but because the former government evidently had so little. 80 The

Afghanistan that the Taliban will govern in 2021 is different in economic, political, and social

terms from the country the group ruled two decades ago. Some elements of Afghan society,

particularly in urban areas, view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility. One initial attempt

to form an armed resistance to the Taliban was short-lived and evidently collapsed. Nonviolent

protests against the group’s rule, and the Taliban’s uncompromising response to them, indicate a

potential for future unrest.

On August 17, 2021, two days after the Taliban entered Kabul, former First Vice President

Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter to be the “legitimate care taker [sic] President” and to be

“reaching out to all leaders to secure their support & consensus.”81 Saleh had previously vowed to

never submit to Taliban rule and called on Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He

relocated to the central province of Panjshir, whose strategic location and historic legacy (it was

never occupied by the Soviets in the 1980s or the Taliban in the 1990s) give it outsized import.

He was joined by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the late Northern Alliance commander Ahmad

Shah Massoud. They stated that they formed an armed resistance to the Taliban and appealed for

U.S. and international support. 82

The Taliban claim to have taken control of the province as of early September, amid reports of

continued sporadic fighting and Taliban killings of civilians. 83 Competing claims of control are

76 For the full list of 88 individuals, see Martine van Bijlert, “T he T aleban’s caretaker Cabinet and other senior

appointments,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 7, 2021.

77 “Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” op. cit.

78 Ali Latifi, “How deep are divisions among the T aliban?” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2021.

79

Michael Kugelman, “Opinion: How real is the threat of T aliban infighting?” Deutsche Welle, September 21, 2021.

80 “How the T aliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,

“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the T aliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.

81

Amrullah Saleh, T witter, August 17, 2021, 9:59AM, https://twitter.com/AmrullahSaleh2/status/

1427631191545589772. Section 60 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President “shall act in

accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” in the event of the president’s “absence, resignation or death.”

Section 67 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President shall assume the responsibilities of

president in the case of the president’s resignation, impeachment, or death; the president is to “personally tender” his

resignation to the National Assembly.

82 Ahmad Massoud, “Opinion: T he mujahideen resistance to the T aliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington

Post, August 18, 2021.

83 Natasha T urak, “Fighting continues in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley as anti-T aliban resistance vows to hold out,”

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difficult to assess, 84 but in a September 14, 2021, visit to Panjshir, New York Times reporters

found few indications of active resistance or recent heavy combat.85 Some reports indicate that

Saleh and Massoud have relocated to Tajikistan. 86 Saleh and Massoud are ethnic Tajiks

(Afghanistan’s second largest ethnic group after Pashtuns), and Tajikistan has taken a notably

hard stance against the Taliban. 87 On September 22, 2021, Representative Mike Waltz and Senator

Lindsey Graham stated they had spoken with Massoud, who expressed “his continued

commitment to resisting” the Taliban, and they called on the Biden Administration not to

recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government. 88

With the taking of Panjshir, the Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike in

the 1990s when the former Northern Alliance represented significant armed opposition and held

around 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also have stronger ties with regional powers,

including some that once supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Still, the existence

of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a rallying point or galvanize

Taliban opponents nationwide, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or other

international assistance. It is not clear how likely this prospect is.

Some Afghans in other parts of the country have demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their

rights and express opposition to the Taliban. Protests by hundreds of women in Kabul gained

significant international attention, but some Afghans demonstrated in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and

other cities as well to protest Taliban actions. 89 The Taliban carefully monitored most protests,

and violently dispersed some. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on September 8,

2021, banning unapproved demonstrations and few appear to have taken place since. U.N. High

Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on September 13 that Taliban forces had

used “increasing violence against protesters and journalists.”90 The Taliban have publicized

demonstrations in favor of Taliban rule in which some women were reportedly coerced to

participate. 91 As noted above, the Taliban’s exclusive rule and heavy-handed approach to dissent

could create greater opposition throughout the country. At the same time, this approach could also

solidify their position, at least in the short term, by suppressing active expressions of resistance.

Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power

The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may

create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in

Afghanistan, and complicates (if not renders obsolete) U.S. plans to partner with Afghan

CNBC, September 7, 2021.

84 Michael Kugelman, “Avalanche of Misinformation Follows T aliban T akeover,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2021.

Jim Huylebroek and Victor Blue, “In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at all,” New York

Times, September 17, 2021.

86

T revor Filseth, “After Renegade Province’s Fall, Panjshir Resistance Leaders Surface in T ajikistan,” National

Interest, September 23, 2021.

85

87 Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” Gandhara, September 13, 2021.

“Waltz, Graham Joint Statement on Call with Afghan Resistance Leader Ahmad Massoud,” Office of Mike Waltz,

September 22, 2021.

89 Susannah George and Ezzatullah Mehrdad, “Space for dissent opened in Afghanistan after the T aliban was ousted 20

years ago. Now the militants are trying to slam it shut,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021; Ali Latifi, “Deadly

protest in Jalalabad against removal of Afghan flag,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2021; “T housands protest against T aliban

in Kandahar over evictions,” Reuters, September 14, 2021.

88

90 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48 th Session of the Human Rights Council, September

13, 2021.

91 “Were Afghan women forced to attend the pro-Taliban rally?” TRT World, September 15, 2021.

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authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of women’s and

other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; those

rights appear at risk with the Taliban back in power. Finally, the Taliban’s takeover represents a

shock to regional diplomatic and security dynamics, with neighboring and other countries

responding in a variety of ways to the group’s new position.

Relations w ith Terrorist Groups

For decades, a variety of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have operated in Afghanistan, and the

Taliban have related to them in differing ways. Al Qaeda and the regional Islamic State affiliate

(Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K) are two of the most significant of

these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect them in different ways. The

Taliban’s relationship with Al Qaeda is the subject of strong analytical interest amid concerns of

sustained ties and continued debates about AQ capabilities. In contrast, the Taliban and ISKP are

adversaries; escalating ISKP attacks in 2021 represent a threat to the Taliban’s rule. The Taliban

takeover also has implications for Pakistani groups, most notably the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP, or Pakistani Taliban).

Al Qaeda92

Al Qaeda senior (or “core”) leaders reportedly remain in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area,

but estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect the group’s capabilities differ.

U.S. officials reportedly told some Senators in August 2021 “terror groups like al-Qaida may be

able to grow much faster than expected” in Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban takeover. 93

U.S. intelligence officials also reportedly said in September 2021 that their “current assessment”

is that Al Qaeda could “build some capability to at least threaten the homeland” in one to two

years. 94 They additionally said that the United States presently faces greater terrorism threats from

elsewhere, including Somalia, Syria, and Iraq. 95 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin

Kahl said in October 2021 testimony that Al Qaeda had the intent, but not the capability, to

conduct external operations, but that it could reconstitute that capability in “a year or two.”96

Some analysts argue Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.

counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential

Taliban constraints. 97

Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which

go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong. In June 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors

reported Al Qaeda had “minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to

92

See also CRS In Focus IF11854, Al Qaeda: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy.

93 Michael Balsamo, et al., “Concerns over US T error T hreat Rising as T aliban hold Grows,”

Associated Press, August

15, 2021.

94 Julian Barnes, “Al Qaeda Could Rebuilt in Afghanistan in a Year or T wo, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,

September 14, 2021.

95 Barnes, op. cit., Courtney McBride and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Spies See Signs of Al Qaeda Fighters Returning to

Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2021.

“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Security,” CQ

Congressional Transcripts, October 26, 2021.

96

97 Ahmad Siddiqi,

“T he West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,

“Will Afghanistan Become a T errorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.

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‘lay low’ and not jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”98 In its report on the final quarter

of 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General relayed an assessment

from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that the Taliban maintain ties to Al Qaeda and that

some AQ members were “integrated into the Taliban’s forces and command structure.”99

According to the U.N. sanctions monitors’ report, AQ-Taliban ties have been reinforced by the

groups’ shared struggle in Afghanistan and personal bonds, including marriage links. 100

For their part, Taliban spokespeople continue to claim “there was no proof [Bin Laden] was

involved” in the September 11, 2001, attacks.101 One of those spokespeople said in September

2021, “We do not see anyone in Afghanistan who has anything to do with Al Qaeda” and

reiterated the Taliban’s commitment that “from Afghanistan, there will not be any danger to any

country.”102

One analyst argues that while some parts of the Taliban oppose the group’s ties with Al Qaeda,

citing the costs of the relationship in terms of the Taliban’s international image and U.S. pressure,

shared ideology links the two groups to such an extent that a full breach between them is unlikely.

While the Taliban do not have transnational aims like Al Qaeda does, that analyst argues that Al

Qaeda “sees the Afghan Taliban as an important partner in its stewardship of global jihad,” as

evidenced by the allegiance AQ leaders have pledged to successive Taliban leaders. 103 Another

analyst has suggested that the Taliban may “provide space and financial support” for Al Qaeda

“while also restricting the activities of the group to plot and stage attacks.”104 The power dynamic

between Al Qaeda and the Taliban has changed significantly over the past 20 years: AQ financial

and military support was critical in bolstering the Taliban before 2001, but AQ seems to have

played little if any direct role in the Taliban’s 2021 return to power.

The Islamic State

The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), on the other hand, has

opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment and the two groups have often clashed. ISKP

(with 1,500-2,200 fighters, per U.N. sanctions monitors) views the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused

nationalist political project as counter to its own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The

Taliban’s takeover could represent a setback for ISKP; Taliban forces reportedly executed an

imprisoned former ISKP leader after the Taliban captured an Afghan government prison in

Kabul. 105

If the Taliban makes compromises on certain issues as the group begins governing, these steps

could prompt hardliners to defect to ISKP; some Taliban fighters have associated themselves with

ISKP in the past. The United States previously launched airstrikes in support of Taliban

98 U.N. Document S/2021/486.

99 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 -

December 31, 2020, released February 17, 2021.

100 U.N. Document S/2021/486.

101 Rachel Pannett, “Taliban Spokesman Says ‘no proof’ Bin Laden was Responsible for 9/11 attacks,” Washington

Post, August 26, 2021.

102 “T aliban say no al Qaeda or ISIS in Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 21, 2021.

103 Asfandyar Mir, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the T aliban Is Unlikely to Break T ies with Al-Qaeda,” Modern

War Institute at West Point, August 10, 2021.

104

Cole Bunzel, “Al Qaeda Versus ISIS,” Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2021.

105 Yaroslav T rifimov et al., “T aliban Consolidate Control in Afghanistan’s Capital as T housands Remain Stranded,”

Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2021.

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offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation. 106 At a September 1, 2021,

press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban

against ISKP, General Milley said, “It’s possible.”107 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected

such cooperation in October 2021, saying, “We are able to tackle [ISKP] independently.”108

ISKP was “nearly eradicated” from its main base in eastern Afghanistan in late 2019 by U.S. and

Afghan military offensives and, separately, the Taliban, but the group’s operational capabilities

appear to remain strong. 109 On August 26, 2021, ISKP carried out an attack at Kabul International

Airport that left 13 U.S. service members and more than 150 Afghans dead. The group has also

claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Taliban forces in the eastern city of Jalalabad,

as well as the October 2021 suicide bombing of a Shia mosque in the northern city of Kunduz that

left approximately one hundred people dead. Continuous ISKP attacks undermine the Taliban’s

effort to demonstrate its ability to govern and secure the country. 110 Another October 2021 ISKP

bombing, in this case of the largest Shia mosque in the southern city of Kandahar, where the

Taliban movement was born and where no known ISKP attacks had previously taken place,

represents a particularly brazen challenge to the Taliban. Experts disagree about the potency of

the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the group without external

assistance. 111 Some Afghans, including former members of the ANDSF, have reportedly taken up

arms with ISKP, attracted by ISKP cash payments and the group’s status as the sole active armed

opposition to the Taliban. 112

TTP (Pakistani Taliban)

The TTP is an umbrella organization for a number of Pakistan-based extremist groups that came

into conflict with the government of Pakistan after 2007. It began to splinter following the 2013

death of leader Hakimullah Mehsud. In 2014, some TTP members pledged allegiance to the

Islamic State and subsequently relocated to eastern Afghanistan in response to Pakistani army

operations that mostly drove the group from its safe havens in the former Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA). Continued military pressure (Mehsud’s successor was killed by a U.S.

drone strike in Afghanistan’s Kunar province in 2018) greatly reduced the group’s activity in

subsequent years. However, reunification between TTP and some former splinter groups (possibly

facilitated by AQ) since 2020 has swelled the group's ranks to between 2,500 and 6,000, per U.N.

sanctions monitors. 113 The TTP may benefit further from the Taliban takeover and the subsequent

release of TTP prisoners in Afghanistan.

While they share some ideological similarities (indicated by their common name) and have

fought alongside each other in Afghanistan, the TTP and the Taliban are separate organizations:

106 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret T aliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.

107 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the

U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.

108 Kathy Gannon, “T aliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021.

109 UN Report 2020/415.

110 Sami Yousafzai and T ucker Reals, “ISIS-K is trying to undermine Afghanistan’s T aliban regime, from inside and

out. T hat’s America’s problem too,” CBS News, October 8, 2021.

111 Samya Kullab, “Islamic State attacks test T aliban’s control in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13,

2021; Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “T he T aliban can’t take on the Islamic State a lone,” War on the Rocks,

October 14, 2021.

Yaroslav T rofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers T urn to Islamic

State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021.

112

113 U.N. document S/2021/486.

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the TTP has “distinctive anti-Pakistan objectives” and the Taliban is focused on Afghanistan. 114

However, both are largely made up of, and derive support from, ethnic Pashtuns, a group that

spans the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan could serve

as a model for TTP, which one analyst argues is shifting its focus from transnational jihad to

Pashtun-focused “ethno-separatism.”115 TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces have risen in

2021; Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said in October 2021 that his government was in

negotiations with components of the TTP, reportedly brokered by the Afghan Taliban. 116

“Over-the-horizon” Counterterrorism Strategy and Challenges

From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain

the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan without a military presence on the ground

there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what has been described as an “over-thehorizon” approach. In announcing the “final phase” of the U.S. withdrawal in April 2021,

President Biden said, “We’ll reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial

assets in the region to prevent the reemergence of [terrorist threats] to our homeland from over

the horizon.”117 In April 2021 testimony, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander

General Kenneth McKenzie said he was “conducting detailed planning” on over-the-horizon

capabilities, which would be “difficult” but “not impossible” to establish:

You will have to base your overhead ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]

from no longer within Afghanistan, where an MQ-9 [drone] can take off and be over its

target in a matter of minutes to, perhaps, much further away. We will look at all the

countries in the region. Our diplomats will reach out, and we’ll talk about places where we

could base those resources. Some of them may be very far away, and then there would be

a significant bill for those types of resources, because you’d have to cycle a lot of them in

and out.118

When asked for specifics on what “over-the-horizon” capabilities might entail, Acting Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs David Helvey said in a May 2021 hearing that

details “are best left in a classified session” and said broadly that “we are working...to establish

the types of arrangements that give us the access, basing, and overflight necessary to address the

terrorism threats.”119 The United States leased bases in the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, and

Uzbekistan (from 2001-2014, 2001-2011, and 2001-2005, respectively) to support military

operations in Afghanistan. As of November 2021, similar arrangements have not been announced

with Afghanistan’s neighbors, which may be reticent about connections with U.S. operations. For

instance, in May 2021, Pakistan’s foreign minister ruled out any U.S. use of Pakistani bases for

future operations, explaining that his government has adopted a policy that allows it to become

“only partners in peace.” In June, Pakistan’s prime minister reiterated the refusal, saying it was

114 Ibid.

115 Abdul

Basit, “T ehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Discursive Shift From Global Jihadist Rhetoric to Pashtun -Centric

Narratives,” Jamestown Foundation, September 24, 2021.

Salman Masood, “Pakistan in T alks With T aliban Militants, Even as Attacks Ramp Up,” New York Times, October

4, 2021; Zia ur Rehman, “Islamabad deeply alarmed by rise in Pakistan T aliban terrorism,” Nikkei Asia, September 28,

2021.

117 Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.

116

“House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on US Military Activities Greater Middle East and Africa,” CQ

Congressional Transcripts, April 20, 2021.

118

119 “House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 12, 2021.

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based on fear of internal retaliation. 120 CNN reported in late October 2021 that the United States

was seeking an agreement with Pakistan to use its airspace for counterterrorism operations in

Afghanistan. 121 In October 2021 testimony, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl

said, “We’re seeking to build out a more robust ecosystem for over-the-horizon CT

[counterterrorism], which would include regional players ... we’re in conversation with

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and others.”122

The closest U.S. bases to Afghanistan are in the Persian Gulf region, from which U.S. airstrikes in

Afghanistan have been launched in recent years, though U.S. aircraft must take an indirect route

to avoid Iranian airspace. The deployment of aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and operations

from Diego Garcia are other means by which the United States in theory could conduct “over-thehorizon” operations in Afghanistan. 123

With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States will likely have to alter any plans

that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its

security forces. In May 2021 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Acting

Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey said having “a willing and capable partner in Afghanistan

is a critical piece of our CT capabilities. If that goes away, it becomes much harder, greater risk,

and it will be more costly.”124 Cooperation with Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too

diplomatically or politically fraught. Collaboration with non-Taliban Afghans via clandestine or

covert action authorities could yield counterterrorism gains but carry risks with regard to broader

U.S.-Taliban relations. Some Members of Congress have argued the Administration has not been

sufficiently forthcoming with regard to future U.S. plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan. 125

An August 29, 2021, U.S. drone strike in Kabul that killed civilians may have demonstrated the

challenges associated with conducting remote counterterrorism strikes. At a September 17, 2021,

press conference, General Kenneth McKenzie said, “I would reject a parallel between this

operation and an over-the-horizon strike...because we will have an opportunity to further develop

the target and time to look at pattern of life. That time was not available to us because this was an

imminent threat to our forces,” even though “our intelligence was wrong.”126

Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities

During their former rule, the Taliban had “one of the worst human rights records in the world,”

according to U.S. assessments; one U.S. official stated in November 2001, “The human rights

abuses that the Taliban have imposed on Afghanistan are in a class by themselves. In a number of

categories, they rate in the worst possible sector.”127 While many human rights abuses continued

120 “Pakistan: No More Military Bases for US Afghan Mission,” VOA News, May 11, 2021; Imran Khan, “Pakistan Is

Ready to Be a Partner for Peace in Afghanistan, But We Will Not Host U.S. Bases,” (op -ed), Washington Post, June

21, 2021.

121 Natasha Bertrand et al., “US nearing a formal agreement to use Pakistan’s airspace to carry out military operations

in Afghanistan,” CNN, October 23, 2021.

122 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Security,” op. cit.

Paul McLeary, “T he U.S. ground war in Afghanistan is over. Now it’s the Navy’s turn,” Politico, September 3,

2021.

124 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on T ransition from Afghanistan,” op cit.

123

125

Jonathan Swan and Zachary Basu, “Red flags for Biden’s ‘over-the-horizon’ Strategy,” Axios, September 12, 2021.

126 Department of Defense, “General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. Commander of U.S. Central Command and Pentagon

Press Secretary John F. Kirby Hold a Press Briefing,” September 17, 2021.

127 “Human Rights and the T aliban,” Remarks by Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner, U.S. Department of State,

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under the U.S.-backed former Afghan government, conditions generally are seen to have

improved, leading to fears about the Taliban takeover reversing progress on human rights

achieved since 2001. Two of the most prominent, and closely watched, issues in this area are the

rights of Afghan women and girls and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. In both cases,

the Taliban’s actions since August 2021 suggest that the group’s rule will restrict many former

rights and protections for Afghan women; the picture with regard to minorities is more mixed.

Afghan Women and Girls

Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to

protecting women’s rights “within the framework of sharia.”128 Some observers question whether

Taliban statements are an attempt to assuage concerns that a rollback of women’s rights is

imminent and to dispel “rumors” about reported actions carried out by the group before its

takeover, such as forced marriages and targeted killings of women. 129 In the immediate aftermath

of the takeover, Taliban leaders called on women government employees to return to their posts,

as long as they were wearing the hijab (headscarf), and granted “amnesty” to all men and women

who worked with foreign powers.130 Taliban leaders subsequently called for women to stay home

temporarily, citing concerns over new Taliban forces who “have not yet been trained very well”

and who may mistreat, harm, or harass women.131

The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Others have

noted that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of women’s rights that often

predate the Taliban movement, particularly in rural areas, where 76% of the population resides. 132

For some Afghan women, the Taliban takeover may represent an improvement over high levels of

violence that have characterized recent years, if the group can prevent further violence and

improve security conditions. 133 This may be particularly so for those in rural areas more affected

by conflict. Fieldwork conducted in 2019 and 2020 found that “peace is an absolute priority for

some rural women, even a peace deal very much on the Taliban terms.”134

For other women, the Taliban’s takeover has increased fears of sexual violence, retaliation, and

displacement, and has created longer-term concerns over the future of women’s rights under a

Taliban government. 135 A number of women have protested in Kabul and other cities to demand

November 6, 2001.

128 “ T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021. Sharia refers broadly to

concepts and principles of Islamic religious jurisprudence that vary in their interpretation under different schools of

practice. For more, see Matthew Nelson, “T he T aliban’s (Islamic) Isolation,” Chatham House, October 21, 2020.

129 Lynne O’Donnell, “ As T aliban Expand Control, Concerns About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise,” Foreign

Policy, July 23, 2021. Other restrictions reportedly imposed in some areas of the country since May 2021 included

ordering women not leave the home without a male guardian, closing girls’ and mixed-gender schools, and banning the

use of television. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Escalation of Violent Confrontations and a

Rise in Violations of Human Rights, June 22 to July 6, 2021,” July 17, 2021.

130 “ T aliban urges government staff to return to work,” Ariana News, August 16, 2021.

131 Maggie Astor, Sharif Hassan, and Norimitsu Onishi, “ A T aliban spokesman urges women to stay home because

fighters haven’t been trained to respect them,” The New York Times, August 24, 2021.

132 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,

September 2020.

133 Anand Gopal, “T he Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021.

134 Allen and Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan”; International Crisis Group, “ What Will Peace T alks

Bode for Afghan Women?” briefing note, April 6, 2020.

135 “ ‘I worry my daughters will never know peace’: women flee the T aliban —again,” The Guardian, August 12, 2021;

Farnaz Fassihi et al., “ For Afghan Women, T aliban Stir Fears of Return to a Repressive Past ,” The New York Times,

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protection for human rights and inclusion in the Taliban government. Reports indicate some

women have been beaten by Taliban fighters while protesting, and some journalists have been

detained while covering the protests. 136 The Taliban have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation

of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the

1990s. The Taliban’s government does not include the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which was

not present in the prior Taliban government but had been a part of the former Afghan

government. 137

On September 18, 2021, the Ministry of Education announced the reopening of public secondary

schools and directed all male teachers and students to attend. The lack of reference to girls led

most to stay home and led some to describe a Taliban “ban” on girls’ education. 138 Taliban

spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said on September 20 that the Taliban was finalizing

arrangements to reopen secondary schools for girls in a “safe learning environment,” which

would happen “as soon as possible.”139

Many women’s rights advocates are skeptical of these claims and fearful that the group never

intends to allow such education. In the 1990s, the Taliban did not formally ban secondary or

higher education for girls, but similarly prohibited it on an ostensibly temporary basis due to

unspecified security concerns, a de facto ban that lasted the entirety of the group’s five-year

rule. 140

Some signs suggest that the Taliban may permit education for women and girls in at least some

cases. Schooling for girls up to sixth grade reportedly resumed in gender-segregated classrooms.

Women have resumed attending a number of universities, though a Taliban minister said

classrooms would be gender-segregated and Islamic dress would be compulsory for women. 141 In

early October 2021, media outlets reported that secondary schooling for girls had resumed (or in

some cases not ever been suspended) in several northern provinces.142 It is unclear to what extent

this development represents a broader change in Taliban policy or if the group is adapting to local

conditions (which would itself constitute a break with how the group governed in the 1990s). 143

Foreign ministers from Turkey, Indonesia, and other Muslim-majority countries reportedly plan to

visit Kabul to encourage the Taliban to allow girls’ education. 144

August 17, 2021.

136 Yaroslav T rofimov, “ Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line T aliban Government, Face Violent Crackdown ,” Wall

Street Journal, September 8, 2021.

137 Rachel Pannett, “ Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the T aliban’s top

officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.

138 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Jalal Nazari, “Afghanistan’s T aliban Prohibit Girls from Secondary School,” Wall Street

Journal, September 19, 2021.

139 “Girls to return t o secondary school ‘soon as possible’: T aliban,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2021.

140 Margot Buff, “‘Our Futures Will Be Ruined’: Afghan Girls Fear Denial of Education Under T aliban,” Gandhara,

September 21, 2021; Rasmussen and Nazari, op. cit.

Ezzatullah Mehrdad, Gerry Shih and Miriam Berger, “ T aliban minister says women can attend university, but not

alongside men,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021.

142 “Girls Attend Schools in Kunduz, Balkh, Sar-e-Pol,” TOLOnews, October 9, 2021; “In northern Afghanistan, girls’

schools working despite ban elsewhere,” Reuters, October 12, 2021.

141

Ehsanullah Amiri and Margherita Stancati, “T aliban Allow T eenage Afghan Girls Back in Some Provincial

Schools-But Not in Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2021.

143

144 Patrick Wintour, “Muslim foreign ministers to make women’s rights plea to T aliban,” Guardian, October 13, 2021.

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Ethnic and Religious Minorities

Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities has generally been more

favorable than their stance toward Afghan women’s rights. The situation appears mixed and in

flux, particularly in the absence of formal policy directives from senior Taliban leaders.

One of the largest ethnoreligious minorities in Afghanistan is the Hazaras, who are mostly Shia

Muslims and make up around 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population. They are concentrated in their

historic homelands in central Afghanistan (the Hazarajat) as well as several parts of western

Kabul. Their persecution at the hands of Afghan rulers goes back to the late nineteenth century.

Taliban forces massacred Hazara civilians on several occasions during their 1996-2001 rule. 145

This history contributed to many Hazaras expressing fear about the Taliban’s possible return

leading up to 2021. 146 The Taliban (who have historically been mostly ethnic Pashtun Sunni

Muslims) took some actions to “portray themselves as a nationwide movement,” including

appointing a Hazara official in northern Afghanistan in 2020. 147 In recent years, Hazaras arguably

faced greater threats from ISKP, which repeatedly targeted Hazara schools, mosques, and other

sites in Kabul on an anti-Shia sectarian basis.

Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have continued to demonstrate a more accepting

official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, even as reports emerge of

massacres and forced displacement in the Hazarajat. Taliban fighters reportedly guarded Shias’

August 2021 commemoration of the holy day of Ashura, which has been marred by violence in

Afghanistan in the past. 148 One Hazara was appointed to serve in the Taliban’s cabinet, as an

acting deputy minister of health. These and other evidently supportive actions have taken place

alongside reports that Taliban fighters in central Afghanistan have forcibly evicted hundreds of

Hazara families from their homes. 149 Amnesty International has also reported that Taliban fighters

executed Hazara civilians (including former Afghan security forces) in July and August 2021. 150

Surveying these mixed messages, one observer speculated in early September 2021 that “the

Taliban political leadership’s more pragmatic approach toward the Hazara is necessary to

maintain its fragile control over all of Afghanistan,” but that persecution could increase in the

absence of international attention. 151

Afghanistan has also been home to several other religious minorities, such as Hindus and

Sikhs. 152 Afghanistan was once home to tens of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs, but their numbers

decreased precipitously after Afghanistan became engulfed in violence and instability in the

“Afghanistan: T he Massacres in Mazar-i Sharif,” Human Rights Watch, November 1998; “Massacres of Hazaras in

Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, February 1, 2001.

145

146 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “T hey Are T hriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a T aliban Deal,” New

York Times, March 27, 2019.

147

“T aliban appoints first Shia Hazara as shadow district chief of the group,” Khaama Press, April 28, 2020.

148 Jim Huylebroek, “On the ground: Kabul on edge,” New York Times, August 20, 2021.

149 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence

under T aliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021.

150 “Afghanistan: 13 Hazara killed by T aliban fighters in Daykundi province – new investigation,” Amnesty

International, October 5, 2021; “Afghanistan: T aliban responsible for brutal massacre of Hazara men – new

investigation,” Amnesty International, August 19, 2021.

151

T om Mutch, “Afghanistan’s Hazaras Get Mixed Messages From the T aliban,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2021.

152 Afghanistan’s last Jewish resident reportedly left the country weeks after the T aliban’s August 2021 takeover.

Muhammad Farooq and Joseph Krauss, “Afghanistan’s last Jew leaves after T aliban takeover,” Associated Press,

September 9, 2021.

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1970s. In 2001, the Taliban reportedly issued an order that non-Muslim minorities wear

distinctive marks on their clothing, perhaps the most public of the group’s oppressive actions

against religious minorities. 153 Many of Afghanistan’s remaining Hindus and Sikhs (numbering in

the low hundreds) sought to leave the country after the Taliban’s 2021 takeover; it is unclear how

many remain. 154 The Taliban appear to be demonstrating greater tolerance than they showed in the

past. In September 2021, a group of Hindus and Sikhs met with the Taliban-appointed mayor of

Kabul, who reportedly told them that his administration would work on behalf of their

communities, including upkeep of their places of worship. 155 Days later, a Sikh place of worship

in Kabul was vandalized, reportedly by Taliban fighters; 156 a Taliban spokesperson later wrote on

Twitter that those who had “harassed” the “Hindu minority” had been arrested. 157

U.S. Partners and U.S. Citizens Remaining in Afghanistan

Data from the State Department indicate that in the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal of

U.S. forces on August 30, 2021, the United States directly evacuated or facilitated the removal of

124,000 individuals, including 6,000 U.S. citizens. 158 Others evacuated included U.S. lawful

permanent residents, citizens from partner nations, and Afghans such as Special Immigrant Visa

(SIV) holders or applicants or others who worked with or for the United States in Afghanistan, as

well as members of their families. 159

According to the State Department, between 100 and 200 U.S. citizens remained in the country as

of mid-October 2021. 160 Thousands of Afghans who were employed on behalf of U.S. efforts

remain in the country. Many of these individuals and their families have sought to leave

Afghanistan, fearing retribution from the Taliban.

The Taliban have said that, “Thousands of soldiers who have fought us for 20 years, after the

occupation, all of them have been pardoned,” and proclaimed a general amnesty. 161 However,

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on September 13 that her

office had received “credible allegations of reprisal killings of a number of former [Afghan

military] personnel, and reports of civilians who worked for previous administrations and their

family members being arbitrarily detained,” after which some were found dead. 162

A joint statement by the United States and dozens of other countries on August 29, 2021, said,

“We have received assurances from the Taliban that all foreign nationals and any Afghan citizens

153 Pamela Constable, “T aliban Singles Out Religious Minorities,” Washington Post, May 23, 2001.

154 Seerat Chabba, “Afghanistan: What does T aliban rule mean for Sikhs and Hindus?” Deutsche Welle, September 8,

2021.

155 “Afghan Hindus, Sikhs meet T aliban-appointed Kabul Mayor, urge for upkeep of gurudwara,”

United News of

India, September 30, 2021.

156 “T aliban Vandalizes Gurudwara

in Kabul, T akes People In Custody: Report,” NDTV, October 6, 2021.

157 Zabihullah Mujahid (@Zabehulah_M33), T witter, October 9, 2021, at

https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1446767821841698816 .

158 “ T he United States Conducts Unprecedented Relocation Effort ,” Department of State, September 6, 2021.

159 For more information, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs, by Andorra

Bruno.

160 “Department Press Briefing – October 22, 2021,” Department of State, October 22, 2021.

161

“ T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.

162 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48 th Session of the Human Rights Council, September

13, 2021.

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with travel authorization from our countries will be allowed” to leave the country. 163 U.S. officials

discussed “safe passage for U.S. citizens, other foreign nationals and our Afghan partners” in a

meeting with Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar, according to an October 10, 2021, State

Department statement. The United States has continued to facilitate the departure of certain

individuals from Afghanistan since August 31, including 240 U.S. citizens, 157 lawful permanent

residents, and an unknown number of Afghans through unspecified overland routes and charter

flights as of October 22, 2021. 164 U.S. government agencies have worked with dozens of private

groups (many representing U.S. military veterans) in this effort. Additionally, on October 18 a

State Department spokesperson indicated that “probably a couple thousand” of individuals had

left Afghanistan “via a variety of means” other than U.S. government assistance. 165

While Kabul’s international airport has been partially operational since late September 2021,

some issues remain, including high prices for commercial flights brought on by insurance

premiums for operating in Afghanistan. 166 Some Afghans lack passports or other necessary travel

documents, which impedes international travel. The Taliban have reportedly expedited passport

processing. 167 The State Department has said that it is working to provide additional options for

U.S. citizens and Afghan partners to leave Afghanistan. These include facilitating charter flights

on a more routine basis and working with partners such as Qatar to enable the resumption of

normal commercial activity at Kabul International Airport. 168

Regional Relations and Dynamics

The Taliban have stated “we do not want to have any problem with the international

community.”169 Still, their August 2021 takeover has upended regional dynamics, and the

Taliban’s views of, and relations toward, Afghanistan’s neighbors vary and will likely continue to

evolve as the group begins governing.

Pakistan has long played an active and, by many accounts, disruptive and destabilizing role in

Afghan affairs, including through the provision of active and passive support to the Taliban. 170

Many observers see the Taliban’s takeover as a substantive triumph for Pakistan, bolstering its

influence in Afghanistan and advancing its decades-long efforts to limit Indian influence there. 171

Still, Pakistani officials claim that their influence over the Taliban is limited. 172

More broadly, despite some implicitly pro-Taliban statements from top Pakistani officials, the

Taliban’s takeover may present challenges and complications for Pakistan. 173 Afghanistan and

163

“Joint Statement on Afghanistan Evacuation Travel Assurances,” Department of State, August 29, 2021.

164 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan, South and Central Asia Securit y,” op. cit.

165 “Department Press Briefing – October 18, 2021,” Department of State, October 18, 2021.

166 “Afghan Civil Aviation Authority warns PIA and Kam Air to drop ticket prices,” Ariana News, October 14, 2021;

Jessica Donati, “U.S. to Resume Evacuation Flights From Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2021.

167 “30,000 Passports Issued Since Office Reopened,” TOLOnews, October 13, 2021.

168 “Department Press Briefing – October 7, 2021,” Department of State, October 7, 2021; “Department Press Brief ing

– October 14, 2021,” Department of State, October 14, 2021; “Department Press Briefing – October 18, 2021,”

Department of State, October 18, 2021.

169 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.

170

See Waldman, op. cit.

171 Jane Perlez, “T he Real Winner of the Afghan War? It’s Not Who You T hink,” New York Times, August

26, 2021.

172 “Imran Khan Urges a New Pakistan-U.S. Bond” (interview), New York Times, June 25, 2021.

173 Anchal Vohra, “Pakistan Might Soon Regret Its Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2021.

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Pakistan have long had an ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile-long border. 174

The Taliban (like past Afghan governments) have not accepted this “Durand Line.” Such

differences may exacerbate Pashtun nationalism inside Pakistan, creating a potential flashpoint in

future relations. 175 Many commentators, including some from Pakistan, express strong concerns

about the prospect that the Taliban’s takeover could also empower Islamist militant groups that

have continued to operate in Pakistani territory. 176 The presence of the TTP or Pakistani Taliban

(see above) within Afghanistan might also test relations between Pakistan and the Taliban. The

two sides have already experienced friction, including the October 2021 suspension of state-run

Pakistan International Airlines charter flights from Kabul due to “inappropriate behavior” by the

Taliban. 177

Figure 2. Afghanistan and Its Neighbors

Source: Created by CRS. U.S. Department of State and ESRI.

Pakistan’s foreign minister said in late September 2021 that “I don’t think anybody is in a rush to

recognize” the Taliban, but also called for “innovative” engagement with the group, saying “At

the same time, the international community has to realize: What’s the alternative? What are the

options? This is the reality, and can they turn away from this reality?”178 In an October 2021

174 “Afghans Who Fled the First T aliban Regime Found Precarious Sanctuary in Pakistan,” Time, August 18, 2021.

175 Madiha Afzal, “An Uneasy Limbo for US-Pakistan Relations Amidst the Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Brookings

Institution, August 6, 2021.

176 See, for example, Madiha Afzal and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why Staying in Afghanistan Is the Least Bad Choice for

Biden” (op-ed), Washington Post, March 8, 2021.

Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Suspends Flights to Kabul Over ‘Inappropriate’ T aliban Behavior,” Voice of America, October

14, 2021.

177

178 “Quershi says no rush to recognise T aliban govt in Afghanistan,” Dawn, September 21, 2021; Edith Lederer, “T he

AP Interview: Don’t isolate the T aliban, Pakistan urges,” Associated Press, September 23, 2021.

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interview, Prime Minister Khan said that Pakistan was in conversation with Afghanistan’s other

neighbors about “the timing of when to recognize the Taliban regime,” and “soon or later [the

United States] will have to” recognize the Taliban government. 179 This question is likely to

dominate U.S.-Pakistan relations for the foreseeable future: in an October 2021 visit to India,

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said that her forthcoming visit to Islamabad would be

“for a very specific and narrow purpose,” namely to discuss the new Taliban government in

Afghanistan. 180

China shares a small, sparsely inhabited border with Afghanistan and has played a relatively

limited role in Afghan affairs in recent years, motivated chiefly by what China perceives as a

threat from Islamist militants in Afghanistan. 181 Economically, Chinese investments (particularly

in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) have attracted some attention in the

past, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and

other limitations. Afghanistan has not been a significant part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in part because of tensions between Pakistan and the

former Afghan government. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s potential mineral wealth, combined with

the Taliban’s takeover, could lead to greater Chinese involvement in Afghanistan.

The Chinese government has signaled its support for the Taliban since its takeover of

Afghanistan’s government, and met with the group both before and after the takeover. Although

Chinese officials have emphasized the importance of establishing an “inclusive political

structure” in the country, some analysts have concluded that China’s recognition of the Taliban as

the Afghanistan’s government is “all but inevitable182 China does appear supportive of the

Taliban’s government, despite its previous calls for the group to establish an “inclusive political

structure.”183 China’s foreign minister said in September 2021 that economic sanctions on

Afghanistan should end and that the country’s foreign exchange reserves belong to the Afghan

people and should not be used to exact political pressure. 184 For their part, the Taliban have

indicated they intend to cooperate closely with China, with a Taliban spokesperson reportedly

suggesting in one foreign media interview that China would be the Afghan government’s most

important partner going forward. 185 The Taliban’s reported ‘removal’ of Uyghur militants from

the Afghanistan-China border area may reflect and presage closer ties, including security

cooperation, between the two countries. 186

Iran’s interests in Afghanistan include preserving its historic influence in western Afghanistan,

protecting Afghanistan’s Shia minority (the Hazaras), and reducing the flow of refugees into Iran

(Iran hosts millions of documented and undocumented Afghans). The Iranian government

welcomed the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (which President Ebrahim Raisi

179 “One on One – Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan,” TRT World, October 2, 2021. Available at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKrq2k1WiXs.

180 Shah Meer Baloch and Julian Borger, “Biden administration delivers brusque message to Pakistan,” Guardian,

October 10, 2021.

181 Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks, April 8, 2020.

182 Derek Grossman, “Chinese Recognition of the T aliban Is All but Inevitable,” Foreign Policy, August

27, 2021.

183 Ibid.

184 “Chinese FM says economic sanctions on Afghanistan must end,” Reuters, September 23, 2021.

Mattia Sorbi, “Afghanistan, il portavoce dei talebani Zabiullah Mujahid: ‘Chiediamo all’Italia di riconosceri. La

Cina ci finanziera,” La Repubblica, September 1, 2021.

185

186 Reid Standish, “T aliban ‘Removing’ Uyghur Militants from Afghanistan’s Border with China,” RFE/RL, October 5,

2021.

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characterized as a “defeat”) and has called for national unity in the country. 187 Some have

speculated that Iran, as it did during the 1990s, might support Afghans in northern, western, and

central Afghanistan against the Taliban, particularly if Hazaras reject and seek to resist a Talibanled government. 188 Iranian officials condemned the Taliban’s September 2021 takeover of

Panjshir and expressed concern about the makeup of the Taliban government. 189 Other analysts

argue Iran is unlikely to oppose the Taliban, to avoid further instability, and will continue to seek

accommodation with the group. 190

Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have

responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover, including the only regional rejection of the

group’s government. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear to be prioritizing economic ties,

including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and

have had official engagements with the Taliban (such as the Uzbek foreign minister’s October

2021 visit to Kabul). 191 Tajikistan on the other hand has rejected the Taliban’s government and

emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s own historical

struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ethnolinguistic ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s

second largest ethnic group) who oppose the Taliban’s rule. Tajikistan has reportedly offered

refuge to prominent anti-Taliban Afghan leaders such as Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud,

and its officials have criticized the Taliban government, prompting the Taliban to warn Tajikistan

against interfering in Afghan affairs. 192

Russia has long expressed concerns about instability in Afghanistan and the potential spread of

radical Islam, drugs, and refugees throughout the neighboring Central Asia region and into

Russia. 193 Initial Russian statements suggest the Russian government seeks to continue to build

on its relations with the Taliban (including inviting the group to participate in October 2021

multilateral talks in Moscow), though it has concerns about the effect of the Taliban’s takeover on

traditional Russian concerns.194 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a September 25,

2021, press conference, “The question of international recognition of the Taliban at the present

juncture is not on the table” and that Russia was working with the United States, China, and

Pakistan to ensure the Taliban keep their promises to govern inclusively. 195 Russian officials have

also expressed support for Tajikistan, which hosts Russia’s largest external military base.

187 Maziar Motamedi, “US ‘defeat’ in Afghanistan a chance for peace: Iran president,” Al Jazeera, August

16, 2021.

188 “Former Afghan Vice President Karim Khalili Warns T he T aliban Rulers: ‘Afghanistan’s Shi’ite Minority, T he

Hazara Community, Will Resume Armed Confrontation,’” MEMRI, September 24, 2021.

189 Farzin Nadimi, “Iran Sets Its Eyes on Afghanistan,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2021; “Iran

condemns T aliban for assault on holdout fighters in Panjshir Valley,” Times of Israel, September 6, 2021; Maziar

Motamedi, “Iran insists on ‘inclusive’ government in Afghanistan,” Al Jazeera, September 9, 2021.

Murat Sofuoglu, “After a short honeymoon, are Iran -Taliban relations deteriorating?” TRT World, September 9,

2021.

191

Bruce Pannier, “For the T urkmen and Uzbek leaders, a meeting of minds on Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 9,

2021.

190

192 Catherine Putz, “T ensions Rise Between T ajikistan and the T aliban,” Diplomat, October 5, 2021.

Nurlan Aliyev, “How Russia Views Afghanistan T oday,” War on the Rocks, October 19, 2020; T om Balmforth and

Gabrielle T etrault-Farber, “For Russia, U.S. Afghan Exit Creates Security T hreat on Southern Flank,” Reuters, July 8,

2021; Robyn Dixon, “Why Afghanistan’s Growing Chaos Alarms Leaders from T ajikistan to Russia,” Washington

Post, July 9, 2021; and Kathy Gannon, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Mstyslav Chernov, “Russia: Afghan Insta bility

Heightens with Hasty U.S. Retreat,” Associated Press, July 16, 2021.

193

194

“Situation in Afghanistan not easy, terrorists entering from Syria, Iraq, says Putin,” ANI News, October 14, 2021.

195 Edith Lederer, “Russia says it’s in sync with US, China, Pakistan on T aliban,” Associated Press, September 26,

2021.

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U.S. Policy Tools and Possible Issues for Congress

Congress can influence decisions on what U.S. foreign policy tools might be best suited related to

the Taliban. The nature of that influence varies, a reflection of the constitutional delegation of

foreign policy powers across all three branches of government. In some areas, congressional

powers and prerogatives are relatively strong and established. In other areas, the congressional

role is less direct. For instance, only the President can extend recognition to foreign governments,

though Congress can play an important role in determining the parameters of diplomatic

engagement and representation. In areas such as the disposition of U.S.-based Afghan central

bank assets, the Administration has taken steps to prevent Taliban access that some in Congress

welcome, but Congress has not precluded the Administration from changing that decision. The

following sections outline selected U.S. policy issues, along with consideration of possible

congressional action.

Recognition and Diplomatic Representation

In September 2021, Secretary Blinken stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs

Committee that the Taliban is “the de facto government of Afghanistan” following their takeover

of the country. 196 The United States now faces the question of whether to recognize formally the

Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. This decision has attracted congressional interest given

its potentially wide-ranging implications for other U.S. priorities.

According to one expert, recognition is different from, but related to, the establishment of

diplomatic representation, which refers only to the exchange of ambassadors and associated

rights. 197 Formal recognition may be conferred explicitly via oral and written statements or

implicitly by concluding an international treaty, sending or receiving diplomatic representation, or

other means. In 2015’s Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court held that “the President alone

effects the formal act of recognition,” citing the need for the United States to “have a single

policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are

not.”198 Despite this finding that “the formal act of recognition is an executive power that

Congress may not qualify,” Congress has considerable powers to influence the implementation of

any recognition decisions. The Senate may decline to confirm an ambassador, and Congress may

limit or refuse to fund embassy construction, or take other actions, in the process making

recognition “a hollow act.” Still, according to the Supreme Court, “none of these acts would alter

the President’s recognition decision.”199 The consequences of formal recognition are partly legal

in nature: recognized governments may sue in U.S. courts and benefit from sovereign immunity

as well as the act of state doctrine. The international consequences of U.S. recognition (or its

absence) are also significant.

U.S. relations with Afghanistan before 2001 demonstrates the variety of ways in which the U.S.

government may relate to another government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in

January 1989, due to security concerns following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which

concluded in February 1989. Still, the State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor wrote in its

Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1989-1990 that the United States

196 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September 13,

2021.

197 Scott Anderson, “History and Recognition of the T aliban,” Lawfare, August 26, 2021.

198 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. __ (2015).

199 Ibid.

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maintained diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, it stated, “Before American

personnel were evacuated, the U.S. Embassy did not conduct normal diplomatic relations with the

current Kabul regime [the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, led by

Mohammad Najibullah]. Our limited presence there did not imply acceptance of the regime as the

lawful government in Afghanistan.”200

The Soviet-backed government survived until April 1992, when opposition mujahideen forces

entered Kabul. After selecting Burhanuddin Rabbani as the nation’s president, those mujahideen

forces soon started fighting each other in a devastating civil war that culminated in the Taliban’s

takeover of Kabul in September 1996. Despite Rabbani’s relocation to the small part of northern

Afghanistan under the control of the opposition Northern Alliance, Rabanni appointees were

present in most world embassies, including Afghanistan’s embassy in Washington (reportedly

leading to disputes between embassy employees there about whether to fly the flag of the

Rabbani government or the Taliban). 201

The United States did not recognize the 1996-2001 Taliban government, maintaining that between

1996 and 2000, “there was no functioning central government” in Afghanistan. 202 A U.S. official

said in 2000 that Afghanistan was not designated as a state sponsor of terror “because we don’t

recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, nor does the U.N.”203 This lack of

recognition did not preclude some limited official U.S.-Taliban contacts, including an April 1998

visit to Afghanistan by then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson and Assistant Secretary

of State Karl Inderfurth. In May 1997, the Taliban government was recognized by three countries:

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Military action by the United States and international and Afghan partners after the September 11,

2001, terrorist attacks removed the Taliban from power, with many of their leaders killed,

detained, or in hiding. U.N.-convened talks between a number of anti-Taliban factions in

Germany led to the formation of an Interim Authority for Afghanistan, which the United States

recognized as the government of Afghanistan when it assumed power on December 22, 2001.204

The United States had previously, on December 16, 2001, opened a Liaison Office in Kabul. A

spokesperson said at the time, “The United States has continued to maintain diplomatic relations

with the state of Afghanistan, even though we have not for some time recognized that the Taliban

or anyone else is capable of speaking for Afghanistan internationally.”205

The U.S. embassy in Kabul was fully evacuated by the evening of August 15, 2021, hours after

Taliban fighters entered the city. Some personnel were transferred to Doha, where an Afghanistan

affairs mission was established. In the past, the United States has similarly relocated diplomats to

outside of unstable countries (e.g., to Malta and Tunisia from Libya in 2014; to Saudi Arabia from

Yemen in 2015; and to Colombia from Venezuela in 2019), sometimes for years at a time. 206 U.S.

200 Available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/139393.pdf.

201 T odd Beamon, “Flag switch sparks tension at Afghan embassy,” Washington Post, May 29, 1997; Eric Lekus, “T he

Afghan Ambiguity in D.C.,” Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1997.

202 See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, U.S. Departm ent of State.

“Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Michael Sheehan, Counter -T errorism Coordinator, On-the-Record

Briefing on the 1999 Annual ‘Patterns of Global T errorism’ Report,” U.S. Department of State, May 1, 2000.

204 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 2001, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State,

pp. 423-426.

203

205

Ibid.

206 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “After Afghanistan pullout, US pursues long-distance diplomacy from Qatar,” Al-Monitor,

September 8, 2021.

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officials met with a Taliban delegation led by acting foreign minister Muttaqi in Doha in October

2021 for talks a State Department official described as “candid and professional.”207

U.S. officials have said that U.S. recognition of the Taliban government is not under

consideration in the short term; White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, asked on September 7,

2021, about a timeline to recognize the Taliban, said, “there is no rush to recognition. It really is

going to be dependent on what steps the Taliban takes.”208

No other government has, as of November 2021, extended formal recognition to the Taliban

government. However, several embassies (including those of Russia, China, Iran, Qatar, Turkey,

and the Central Asian republics) reportedly remain open in Kabul. Additionally, some senior

regional officials (including Pakistan’s intelligence chief and the Qatari and Uzbek foreign

ministers) have had formal meetings with high-ranking Taliban officials, as have the U.N.

Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and the British Prime Minister’s

Representative for the Afghan Transition. Taliban figures have reportedly taken up positions at

Afghan diplomatic facilities in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan said his

government’s issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals “does not mean recognition.”209

Many Members of Congress have expressed opposition to the possibility of U.S. recognition of

the Taliban government. No Afghan alternative to the Taliban with requisite security capability in

Afghanistan or political support appears to exist at present (see “Current and Potential

Opposition,” above). Some in Congress have called on the Administration to withhold recognition

from the Taliban in favor of a “government-in-exile” led by former First Vice President Saleh. 210

Some Members of Congress have also introduced legislation that seeks to constrain the ability of

the executive branch to recognize or establish diplomatic ties with the Taliban government:

H.Res. 604, introduced by Rep. Dan Crenshaw on August 24, 2021, would

express the sense of the House that the United States should not extend

diplomatic recognition and relations to the Taliban and should recognize Saleh as

“Acting President.”

S. 2745, introduced by Senator Marco Rubio on September 14, 2021, would

prohibit the use of funds to implement or enforce any U.S. policy that extends

diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government.

H.R. 5272, introduced by Representative John Curtis on September 17, 2021,

would, among other provisions, direct the Secretary of State to instruct the U.S.

representatives of all international organizations to advocate that those

organizations not recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.

Sanctions and Terrorist Designations

Since the late 1990s, the Taliban have been subject to a variety of U.S. sanctions. Some Members

have introduced additional sanctions-related proposals, including measures to mandate the

Taliban’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The United States first imposed sanctions on the Taliban in July 1999, when President Bill

Clinton signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13129 that declared the Taliban’s harboring of Al Qaeda a

207

“T aliban, US conclude ‘candid, professional’ talks in Doha,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2021.

208 “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki En Route Queens, New York,” White House, September 7, 2021.

209 T ahir Khan, “T aliban Install Diplomats in Pakistan Embassy, Mission,” Voice of America, October 29, 2021.

210 Najibullah Lalzoy, “Former Afghan officials announce government in exile,” Khaama Press, September 29, 2021.

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national emergency. 211 Under E.O. 13129, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign

Assets Control was authorize to block all property in the United States that the Taliban controlled

or that supported the group, and to block all transactions that benefitted the Taliban (including

exports to or imports from “the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban”). Presidents

Clinton and George W. Bush extended the national emergency under E.O. 13129 for two yearlong periods.

On September 23, 2001, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, President Bush issued E.O.

13224, blocking the U.S.-based property of and prohibiting transactions with persons who

“support or otherwise associate with” terrorists, as designated by the President. That list of

designated individuals is referred to as the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list, and

originally comprised 27 individuals and entities (such as Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden). On

July 2, 2002, with the Taliban no longer in power, President Bush issued E.O. 13268, terminating

the national emergency declared by E.O. 13129 and adding the Taliban and then-leader Mullah

Mohammad Omar to the list of entities designated as SDGTs under E.O. 13224. Both remain

designated as SDGTs (Omar died in 2013; sanctions remain in place to cover any issues that arise

regarding the distribution of or claim made to any remaining estate or assets still in the United

States). E.O. 13886, issued by President Trump in September 2019, amended E.O. 13224 to

authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the U.S.-based accounts of foreign financial

institutions that facilitate transactions for designated entities.

The SDGT list is often compared to the separate, and statutorily established, list of designated

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). 212 Designation as an FTO makes it unlawful to provide

“material support or resources” to the designated group (including activities conducted outside

the United States) and prohibits a designated members from entering the United States. An FTO

designation arguably has greater scope than SDGT designation, which blocks the group’s U.S.based property. 213 The State Department says FTO designation “stigmatizes and isolates”

designated organizations, “heightens public awareness and knowledge” about them, and “signals

to other governments” U.S. concerns. 214 FTO designations may be blocked or revoked by an Act

of Congress.

The Taliban have not been designated as an FTO. A resolution that would have supported such a

designation was introduced in the House in 2015 (H.Con.Res. 13) and not considered further.

Some argued that the Taliban’s designation as an FTO could forestall the possibility of a political

settlement between the Taliban and the U.S.-backed Afghan government, a long-sought U.S.

goal. 215 The Haqqani Network (a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban) was designated as

an FTO in 2012, after Congress passed a law (P.L. 112-168) calling for FTO designation and

211 Cited statutes are the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National

Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of T itle 3, United States Code.

212 See “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September

13, 2021.

213

Some question the practical impact of FT O designation on groups, such as the Haqqani Network, whose members

and assets are largely not in the United States. “Politics, Strategy and the Haqqani Network,” Small Wars Journal,

September 6, 2012. In its 2020 T errorist Assets Report, the Treasury Department reported that, as of 2020, it had

blocked $3,857 in funds related to the Haqqani Network. Terrorist Assets Report, Calendar Year 2020, Office of

Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, released September 8, 2021. For more on “material support,”

see CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B .

“Foreign T errorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, available at https://www.state.gov/foreign-terroristorganizations/.

214

215 Masood Farivar, “Why Isn’t the Afghan T aliban on US List of Foreign T error Groups?” VOA, February 20, 2017.

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directing the Administration to submit a report on whether the group met the criteria for such

designation.

With the Taliban back in power, some have advocated (including through the introduction of

legislation, listed above) that the Administration designate the group as an FTO. In supporting

this approach, they in some cases identify the prominence of the FTO-designated Haqqani

Network within the Taliban and the Taliban’s longstanding ties with Al Qaeda. Others have

spoken against such designation, questioning its utility (given existing sanctions on the group).

These observers also argue that it might unnecessarily complicate the delivery of humanitarian

assistance, citing for comparison the complications that arose for delivering humanitarian

assistance when the Trump Administration designated Yemen’s Houthis as an FTO in January

2021. 216

In the wake of the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, some Members have introduced legislation

related to sanctions on the Taliban, including via FTO designation:

On August 31, 2021, Representative Mike Gallagher introduced H.R. 5127,

which would, among other provisions, prohibit the use of funds for any activity

that would support the removal of bilateral or multilateral sanctions on the

Taliban.

On September 10, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5236, which

would prohibit the removal of any existing sanctions on the Taliban absent

legislation specifically providing for such removal.

On September 14, 2021, Senator Lindsay Graham and Representative Michael

Waltz introduced S.Res. 358 and H.Res. 645, respectively, which would express

the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that the Secretary of State should

designate the Taliban as an FTO and their takeover as a coup d’etat. 217

On September 14, 2021, Senator Marco Rubio introduced S. 2745, which would

direct the Secretary of State to designate the Taliban as an FTO. It would also

direct the President to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who provide

support to or are involved in transactions with the Taliban.

On September 21, 2021, Senator Tom Cotton introduced S. 2770, which would

direct the Secretary of State to designate the Taliban as an FTO.

On September 27, 2021, Senator James Risch introduced S. 2863, which would

direct the President to impose sanctions on Taliban members and others who

support terrorist groups, engage in human rights abuses, and play a role in

international narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. The measure would also direct

the President to impose those same sanctions on any foreign person who the

President determines provides material support to the Taliban.

Independent of congressional action, the President could choose to declare a national emergency

with respect to conditions in Afghanistan and propose possible sanctions pursuant to IEEPA with

regard to criteria of the Administration’s choosing. In other cases, the executive branch has done

so in order to exert potential U.S. influence over political transitions and assert U.S. priorities

with regard to governance, conflict, human rights, and outside interference.

216 See CRS Insight IN11585, Yemen: Recent Terrorism Designations, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp.

217 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations.

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Humanitarian Concerns

Congress appears to possess consensus on maintaining terrorism-related sanctions on the Taliban

to prevent the group’s access to financial resources while allowing for the provision of

humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern

about the potential impact of sanctions on the Afghan people in light of the overlapping and

growing economic, financial, and humanitarian crises in the country.

Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in

Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

pandemic. Indicators suggest that conditions continue to worsen: the World Food Programme

reported in early September 2021 that the proportion of Afghans reporting insufficient food

consumption increased from 80% to 93% after the Taliban’s takeover.218 U.N. Children’s Fund

(UNICEF) estimated that “at least 1 million” Afghan children are “at risk of dying due to severe

acute malnutrition without immediate treatment.”219 Looking ahead, the U.N. Development

Programme (UNDP) warned in September 2021 that, under various scenarios, real gross domestic

product (GDP) could decline by as much as 13% by June 2022, leading to “near-universal

poverty” (97% of Afghanistan’s population). 220

It remains unclear to what extent, if at all, U.S. sanctions are affecting humanitarian conditions in

Afghanistan. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other entities delivering

humanitarian assistance in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan may curtail or suspend their activities

in order to avoid civil and criminal penalties for sanctions violations, reputational risks, and other

potential hazards. 221 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the Department of the Treasury has issued

several licenses outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the

provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan:

The Treasury Department reportedly issued a specific license (specific licenses

are generally not made public) on August 25, 2021, authorizing the U.S

government and its implementing partners to facilitate targeted humanitarian

assistance in Afghanistan. 222

On September 24, 2021, Treasury issued two General Licenses:

 General License 14, to authorize otherwise sanction-able transactions with

the Taliban or Haqqani Network by the United States, U.N. agencies and

other multilateral institutions, and NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance

and “other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan,” except

for financial transfers. 223

218 “Afghanistan Food Security Update,” World Food Programme, September 10, 2021.

219 “Half of Afghanistan’s children under five expected to suffer from acut e malnutrition as hunger takes root for

millions,” UNICEF Afghanistan, October 5, 2021.

“Economic Instability and Uncertainty in Afghanistan after August 15: A Rapid Appraisal,” UNDP Afghanistan,

September 9, 2021.

221 Kelly Moss and Jacob Kurtzer, “U.S. Sanctions Squeeze Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan,” CSIS,

September 29, 2021.

220

Daphne Psaledakis, “EXCLUSIVE: U.S. T reasury issued new license to ease flow of aid in Afghanistan,” Reuters,

August 31, 2021.

222

223 Available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl14.pdf.

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General License 15, to authorize all otherwise sanction-able transactions with

the Taliban or Haqqani Network necessary for the export of agricultural

commodities (including food) and medicine to Afghanistan. 224

It was reported in October 2021 that the UNDP would assume responsibility for direc t payments

to medical workers in Afghanistan (a program formerly funded by the World Bank; see more

below), a development “facilitated” by the licenses above. 225 Treasury reportedly also informed

financial institutions that they may process remittances (whic h Western Union and other firms

had suspended after the Taliban takeover), a key source of income for many Afghans. 226

Even with the licenses and other Treasury actions above, the sometimes amorphous nature of the

Taliban (which is more of a movement with which individuals associate to varying degrees than a

formal organization), and the historically unprecedented situation of a U.S. SDGT-designated

entity taking effective control of a country, make the path forward unclear.

At an October 5, 2021, Senate hearing, one expert recommended that the Administration provide

a more explicit explanation of how it views the application of sanctions on the Taliban. 227 Further,

he outlined three potential options: (1) applying only to the explicitly sanctioned entities, rather

than the government or the state (comparable to the U.S. sanctions regime imposed on entities

and individuals in Burma); (2) applying to the de facto government, but not the state (comparable

to Venezuela); or (3) applying to both the government and the state (comparable to Iran). The

first two options might provide some flexibility for the U.S. government in determining which

transactions are sanctionable. Some mechanisms to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran

(including the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement, founded in February 2020) could serve as

models for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, though they have had

relatively little affect.

Possible Purposes of Sanctions

The debate over potential FTO designation and other possible measures raises questions about

what U.S. sanctions on the Taliban might be intended to achieve. The United States may seek to

affect the perception of the Taliban within Afghanistan, isolate the Taliban internationally, or

spur changes in Taliban governance. If the United States seeks to use sanctions to change Taliban

behavior or compel the group to make policy changes (such as in how it treats women’s rights or

relates to terrorist groups), the Taliban have given few signs that they are susceptible to such

pressure.

The Taliban may be willing to tolerate significant levels of sanctions-related economic distress in

exchange for an unfettered approach to governance. Many countries, including those like Russia

with which the Taliban have developed more regular ties, have expressed a desire for the Taliban

to form an “inclusive” government. The government announced by the Taliban in September

2021, composed almost entirely of male Pashtuns who are longtime Taliban loyalists, indicates

that the advantages of maintaining internal cohesion for the Taliban may outweigh the benefits of

satisfying appeals from the international community. Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan

224 Available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl15.pdf.

225 Karen DeYoung, “U.N. agency to pay salaries of Afghan health-care workers to help stave off humanitarian crisis,”

Washington Post, October 6, 2021.

226

Andrea Shalal, “U.S. allows personal remittances to flow to Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.

227 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional

Transcripts, October 5, 2021.

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Muttaqi said in a September 2021 press conference, “We want to have good relations with the

world’s countries, but want them to not pressure Afghanistan, because pressure does not

work.”228

The United States may seek to use sanctions to undermine the Taliban’s hold on power. The

group has never appeared to have significant nationwide popular support, and sporadic protests

against Taliban rule have occurred since their August 2021 return to power. However, no

nationally organized opposition exists at present, with all former Afghan leaders having fled the

country, been sidelined by the Taliban, or expressed support for the group. Sanctions-related

economic distress could inspire popular support for potential anti-Taliban alternatives, but could

also reinforce Taliban appeals for popular support as the group portrays itself as having overcome

foreign interference to reestablish Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence. 229

The United States may seek to use sanctions to isolate the Taliban internationally (for whatever

reason), though that effort could be constrained by Taliban efforts to establish economic and

other ties with other states. While no foreign countries have recognized the Taliban’s

government, the level of Taliban engagement with the international community far exceeds that

of the 1990s. Regional trade appears reduced but has continued, with some Afghan

businesspeople reportedly welcoming what they characterize as the Taliban’s less corrupt

approach to administration. 230 At the same time, sanctions could exacerbate the Taliban’s

governance challenges, given the group’s lack of experience and capacity. 231 Some may also

support sanctions as an end in itself, as a tool to punish a former military adversary and a

governing entity deemed objectionable. 232

Foreign Assistance and Security Cooperation

Non-humanitarian foreign assistance was a significant part of prior U.S. efforts to stabilize

Afghanistan and support its former government. According to SIGAR, as of June 30, 2021,

Congress appropriated nearly $125 billion for reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan

(not including humanitarian assistance or agency operations) since FY2002. Of this $125 billion,

nearly $89 billion was for security and $36 billion was for governance and development. The

Taliban’s August 2021 takeover raises significant concerns about U.S. assistance going forward,

both for Afghanistan and more broadly.

Since the Taliban’s takeover, the group’s leaders have called for greater international assistance as

the country faces looming and intersecting financial, economic, and humanitarian crises. 233 U.S.

officials maintain, as a State Department spokesperson said on September 24, 2021, that “the

Taliban will need and in fact want international assistance.” However, in a September 2021

Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken indicated potential limits to the

kinds of aid the Taliban accepts or facilitates: “while the Taliban seeks and probably will support

and protect basic humanitarian assistance...it may be a different story when it comes to things that

228 Avik Roy, “Will coordinate with countries pledging humanitarian aid to Afghanistan: T aliban,” Hindustan Times,

September 14, 2021.

229 “T aliban declare Afghanistan ‘free, sovereign’ nation, vow ‘good relations’ with rest of world,” Arab News, August

31, 2021.

230 Secunder Kermani, “Afghanistan: Life under T aliban rule one month on,” BBC, September 15, 2021.

231 “Afghan merchants fear for future as T aliban take-over raises costs,” France 24, September 21, 2021.

Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization, Vol. 43,

No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 301-322.

232

233 “T aliban call for international aid as WHO chief visits Kabul,” Express Tribune, September 21, 2021.

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are directed specifically at women and girls.”234 In some areas, such as economic development

and education, U.S. interests may intersect with the Taliban’s, allowing for some limited

cooperation. It is unlikely that large-scale U.S. foreign assistance could resume in the continued

absence of U.S. diplomatic personnel, given statutorily mandated oversight requirements. 235

Secretary Blinken also said “we should be looking at and maybe building upon previous

verification and distribution models and mechanisms in other countries, including those

developed by the United Nations, where assistance can successfully incentivize positive actions

by the government.”236 Congress might also consider development assistance as a means of

influencing how the Taliban govern; however, it remains unclear whether U.S. or other foreign

assistance represents a sufficient incentive for the Taliban to moderate its policies or otherwise

compromise on key issues. The limits of the international community’s leverage appear reflected

in the Taliban’s establishment of a non-inclusive government.

Questions of U.S. aid to the Taliban also relate to the contentious question of international

recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government, which U.S. officials have said will

depend on the Taliban’s actions, including how it treats Afghan women and girls. Lack of U.S.

recognition may constrain or complicate the delivery of aid, but would not preclude it. Shortly

after the Taliban takeover, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, “there are a range of

different diplomatic relationships the United States has with countries around the world,

including some in very difficult or nonexistent relationships with governments where we still

provide forms of aid to people.”237 Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation that

would prohibit or condition all U.S. assistance (including humanitarian assistance) that would

benefit the Taliban:

On August 27, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5121, which

would terminate Afghanistan’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

On August 31, 2021, Representative Mike Gallagher introduced H.R. 5127,

which would, among other provisions, prohibit the use of funds for any activity

that would support the Taliban, including payments to the Taliban (either directly

or through third parties) and the removal of bilateral or multilateral sanctions on

the Taliban.

On September 3, 2021, Representative Carlos Gimenez introduced H.R. 5164,

which would prohibit the provision of U.S. funds to the Taliban or to other

persons who might make such funds available to benefit the Taliban.

On September 10, 2021, Representative Scott Perry introduced H.R. 5236, which

would prohibit the use of U.S. funds to support the Taliban, including financial,

humanitarian, or materiel assistance.

On September 27, 2021, Senator James Risch introduced S. 2863, which would

suspend U.S. assistance to governments or organizations assessed by the

“Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September

14, 2021.

235 Section 7044(a)(1)(F) of Division K of P.L. 117-260.

234

“Secretary Antony J. Blinken Opening Remarks at Ministerial on Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State,

September 8, 2021.

236

237 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” White House, August

17, 2021.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

Secretary of State to provide material support to the Taliban (with a national

security waiver and humanitarian exceptions).

Administration actions (possibly with congressional input) may also place limits on U.S. foreign

assistance. During the Taliban’s 1990s rule, U.S. aid to Afghanistan was restricted by successive

presidential determinations under Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,

that Afghanistan was a major drug producing and/or major drug transit country unable to receive

most forms of U.S. bilateral assistance. Since 2001, successive Administrations have continued to

designate Afghanistan as a major drug producing and/or major drug transit country but have not

subjected it to aid limitations. 238 The Taliban successfully banned opium production for a brief

period of their 1996-2001 rule, but profited from narcotics production and trafficking during their

insurgency, leading to questions about how they might approach the issue after their 2021

takeover.

Security assistance may also be an element of the U.S. policy response to the Taliban

government. Some Members have called for U.S. support to anti-Taliban opposition led by

Ahmad Massoud, though those calls largely predate the reported Taliban capture of the opposition

stronghold of Panjshir. One Member reportedly said in August 2021 that “we’re going to take a

play out of Charlie Wilson’s playbook,” referring to the former Congressman known for his role

in securing material support for anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. 239 The United States

might also consider security assistance to the country’s neighbors as they confront the impacts of

the Taliban’s takeover on humanitarian conditions and regional terrorist groups. Two of

Afghanistan’s six neighbors are not U.S. partners (Iran and China), and the United States has had

varying degrees of cooperation with the other four (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Turkmenistan), including on border security issues.

International Financial Institutions

International financial institutions (IFIs) provided or facilitated billions of dollars in assistance to

Afghanistan over the past twenty years. Their decision to block the country’s access to funds after

the Taliban takeover, due to lack of clarity among the international community over recognizing a

Taliban government in Afghanistan, creates new complications. The United States plays a

leadership role in IFI decisions, giving Congress potential influence on related U.S. approaches.

International Monetary Fund

On August 2, 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an allocation of $650

billion in “special drawing rights” (SDRs), its fourth and largest ever such allocation, to

supplement global reserves during the global pandemic. SDRs are international reserve assets that

can be converted into “hard” currency (such as dollars and euros that are widely used in

international transactions) through trades with other IMF members. SDRs are allocated to IMF

members in proportion to their weight in the global economy, and Afghanistan’s share is

approximately $440 million. The new SDRs were to be made available to all IMF member

countries on August 23, and many policymakers expressed concern that the Taliban might gain

access to these new funds. 240 The United States reportedly negotiated to pause the SDR

238 For more, see CRS Report R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries,

by Liana W. Rosen.

239 Alexander Ward, “Conservatives are backing Afghanistan’s resistance movement,” Politico, August 27, 2021.

240 “IMF Funding for the T aliban?” (editorial), Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2021.

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allocation. 241 On August 17, 2021, Representative French Hill and 17 other lawmakers wrote to

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen urging the United States to intervene and help prevent the Taliban

from accessing IMF resources. 242

Days after the Taliban takeover, on August 18, 2021, an IMF spokesperson said,

As is always the case, the IMF is guided by the views of the international community.

There is currently a lack of clarity within the international community regarding

recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot

access the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or other IMF resources.

That spokesperson added on September 16, 2021, “our engagement with Afghanistan has been

suspended until there is clarity within the international community on the recognition of the

government” but that “we stand ready to work with the international community to advocate for

urgent actions to stall a looming humanitarian crisis.”243 As of November 2021, the Taliban have

not gained access to the SDRs.

World Bank and Other Multilateral Development Banks

Afghanistan has received significant support from multilateral development banks, including the

World Bank ($5.3 billion from 2002-February 2021) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)

($6.4 billion from 2002-June 2021). Both institutions’ funds have supported grants and loans to

projects in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and other sectors. The World Bank had $1.2 billion

in active projects in Afghanistan as of February 2021.

On August 25, 2021, a World Bank spokesperson reportedly said “We have paused disbursements

in our operations in Afghanistan and we are closely monitoring and assessing the situation in line

with our internal policies and procedures,” citing concerns about “the country’s development

prospects, especially for women.”244 World Bank staff based in Kabul had days earlier reportedly

been evacuated to Pakistan. 245 In a factsheet published in September 2021, the ADB said it “will

continue to assist Afghanistan with COVID-19 pandemic recovery” as well as the agriculture,

energy, natural resources, and other sectors.

On September 23, 2021, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for the IMF and World Bank to

release Afghan government accounts “as soon as possible,” alongside criticism of other sanctions

on Afghanistan and the U.S. freezing of DAB assets (see below). In October 2021, the

administration of direct payments to basic health providers in Afghanistan, a program formerly

funded by the World Bank, was reported to be taken over by the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) with funding from the Global Fund, an international health organization. 246

Those funds (which amount to $15 million for October 2021) are to be deposited in a UNDP

account in an Afghan commercial bank, as permitted by licenses issued by the U.S. Treasury in

September 2021, after which UNDP will distribute the funds to NGO implementers. Without

making reference to this or other specific arrangements, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres

241 David Lawder, “IMF blocks Afghanistan’s access to SDR reserves over lack of clarity on government,” Reuters,

August 18, 2021.

242

T he letter is available at https://hill.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20210817ltrtosecyellenresdrstoafghanistan.pdf.

243 “T ranscript of IMF Press Briefing,” IMF, September 16, 2021.

244 “Afghanistan: World Bank halts aid after T aliban takeover,” BBC, August 25, 2021.

245

“World Bank’s Kabul-based staff evacuated to Pakistan- internal memo,” Reuters, August 20, 2021.

246 Karen DeYoung, “U.N. agency to pay salaries of Afghan health -care workers to help stave off humanitarian crisis,”

Washington Post, October 6, 2021.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

said on October 11, 2021, “We must seek ways to create the conditions that would allow Afghan

professionals and civil servants to continue working to serve the Afghan population,” and further

called on the international community to “take action and inject liquidity into the Afghan

economy to avoid collapse.”247

U.S. Policy and Congressional Role

As the largest shareholder in both the IMF (16.5% voting share) and the World Bank (16% voting

share), the United States has a role in their decisionmaking. Within the Executive Branch, the

Treasury Department is the lead agency on the IFIs. Congress plays a role in shaping U.S. policy

at the IFIs. Congress authorizes and appropriates U.S. financial contributions to the institutions. It

also passes legislation directing the U.S. representatives at the institutions to use its “voice and

vote” to advocate for specific policies, including prohibiting U.S. support for loans to certain

countries or under certain conditions. 248

Some Members have, since the Taliban’s takeover, introduced measures that would direct U.S.

actions at the IMF, including:

H.R. 5055, introduced by Representative Andy Biggs on August 20, 2021, would

require the Secretary of the Treasury to oppose the IMF’s recognition of the

Taliban as Afghanistan’s government, subject to a presidential waiver certifying

Taliban actions to uphold women’s rights and not support international terrorist

groups.

H.R. 5316, introduced by Representative Gregory Steube on September 21, 2021,

would prevent allocations of SDRs at the IMF for countries that perpetrate

genocide or are state sponsors of terrorism.

No similar measures related to other IFIs have been introduced.

U.S.-based Central Bank Reserves

When Taliban opposition forces entered Kabul in November 2001, the Afghan central bank had

around $90,000 in foreign exchange reserves; Taliban fighters reportedly took the rest (over $5

million) as they fled the city. 249 In January 2002, the United Nations removed the central bank

from its list of sanctioned authorities, and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury authorized the

Federal Reserve to unblock over $200 million in central bank assets frozen in 1999 under E.O.

13129. 250 Over the next 18 years, the bank (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) built up over $10

billion in assets as of June 21, 2021, the date of the latest DAB monthly statement. 251

As of June 2021, these assets included $1.3 billion in gold held at the Federal Reserve Bank of

New York; $6.2 billion in investments, including U.S. Treasury bills at the Federal Reserve Bank

of New York; and funds managed by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank, a

247 “Opening remarks to the press on Afghanistan,” United Nations Secretary-General, October 11, 2021.

248

See CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M.

Nelson and CRS Report R42019, The International Monetary Fund, by Martin A. Weiss.

249 Andrew Higgins, “Afghanistan’s Looted Central Bank Offers Scant Reserves for Rebuilding,” Wall Street Journal,

December 4, 2001.

250

“T reasury signs license unblocking frozen Afghan assets,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 24, 2002.

251 T he value of these assets inside Afghanistan is dependent on the exchange rate of Afghanistan’s currency, the

afghani, and other factors.

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Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress

branch of the World Bank. DAB also reported $1.9 billion in assets deposited at other foreign

banks. The bank also reported a number of assets within Afghanistan, including approximately

$144 million in gold and silver held at the Presidential Palace in Kabul and nearly $321 million in

foreign currency cash reserves held at the head office and bank branches throughout the

country. 252

The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover led to fears that the group would have unfettered access to

the entirety of the central bank’s $10 billion in assets. The Taliban reportedly visited the central

bank and asked to inspect its reserves, only to be told that most were located in New York. 253

About 5% of central bank assets were physically located in Afghanistan at the time of the

Taliban’s takeover.

On August 15, 2021, the day the Taliban entered Kabul, the Treasury Department blocked DAB

assets held in U.S. accounts. Administration officials have not stated the process or authorities

under which the assets have been blocked, but one former official has speculated that the

Taliban’s continued designation as an SDGT under E.O. 13224 provided the authority. 254

The Taliban appear to view the unblocking of DAB assets as a critical issue. The Taliban acting

foreign minister reportedly raised it in October 2021 meetings with U.S. officials in Doha, and

Taliban spokesmen amplified September 2021 demonstrations in Kabul over the U.S. hold on

Afghan reserves. 255 Some Afghans not aligned with the Taliban appear to agree on the issue’s

urgency. One Afghan central bank board member (and appointee of former president Ghani)

called in September 2021 for the international community to “allow Afghanistan to gain limited

and monitored access to its reserves” to prevent “an economic collapse.”256 One former U.S.

official has echoed support for this approach, suggesting that DAB funds abroad could be used to

finance approved bilateral trade. He asserted in October 2021 testimony before the Senate

Banking Committee that while “there [will] be some seepage to the Taliban,” material goods are

less fungible than currency, offering fewer chances for assistance to boost the Taliban. 257

On September 10, 2021, Representative Madison Cawthorn introduced H.Res. 627, which would

express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Biden Administration should continue

to hold all Afghan government assets held in U.S. financial institutions. Congress could also

direct the Administration to continue to block those assets via legislation, though no such

legislation has been introduced as of November 2021. The Biden Administration appears unlikely,

in the short term, to unblock them. In October 2021 testimony, Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally

Adeyemo said, “I see...no situation in which we would allow the Taliban to have access to the

reserves that belong to the Afghan people.”258

252

Da Afghanistan Bank, Statement of Financial Position as at 31 Jawza 1400 (21 Jun 2021), available at

https://dab.gov.af/sites/default/files/202108/Monthly%20Financial%20statement%20%20for%20the%20month%20of%20Jawza%20%201400%20%28English

%29%20%20.pdf.

253 Joe Boone, “How exile changed the T aliban,” Financial Times, August 25, 2021.

254 Jeff Stein, “ Biden Administration freezes billions of dollars in Afghan reserves, depriving T aliban of cash,”

Washington Post, August 17, 2021.

255 “Hundreds Protest in Kabul to Demand Release of Afghan Foreign Reserves,” Reuters, September 24, 2021.

256 Josh Smith, “Afghanistan central bank board member urges Biden, IMF to release funds,” Reuters, September 1,

2021.

257 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional

Transcripts, October 5, 2021.

258 “Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on International Sanctions Policy,” CQ

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Outlook for Policymakers

The United States’ relations with the Taliban have been complicated and often contentious. The

United States refused to recognize the group’s rule in the 1990s, and led a military effort to

depose it in 2001. Given the history of the Taliban, and the legacy of adversarial U.S.-Taliban

relations, the prospect of working with the group is objectionable to many Americans. Some

Members have referred to U.S. citizens and others who remain in Afghanistan but seek to leave as

“behind enemy lines.”259 Moreover, the Taliban’s values and policies are at odds with or actively

undermine several U.S. interests. A U.S. policy approach that rejects the group and actively seeks

to weaken it may have broad support.

Such an approach could entail a lack of formal U.S. recognition of the Taliban government and

penalties for states that do recognize the Taliban; materiel or other support for Taliban adversaries

(inside and outside of Afghanistan); broader and stricter sanctions on the Taliban, its members,

and those who are assessed to provide support to it; U.S. action to prevent the release of IFI assets

to Afghanistan; and continued U.S. blocking of Afghan central bank reserves. Pursued separately

or in combination, these pressures would be intended to weaken or eve

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