U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban
Takeover in Afghanistan:
Frequently Asked Questions
Updated September 17, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46879
SUMMARY
U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover
in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions
On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered the Afghan capital of Kabul, completing a rapid
takeover over the country with a speed that surprised many Afghans and Americans alike. The
Taliban’s advance came as the United States was completing the military withdrawal to which it
agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord. The U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal
and evacuation operation concluded on August 30, 2021, with the departure of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan.
R46879
September 17, 2021
Clayton Thomas,
Coordinator
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Affairs
The fall of the elected Afghan government, which had been supported by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance over the course
of nearly two decades, raises significant questions about past, present, and future U.S. policy for Members of Congress. This
report provides material related to select questions associated with U.S. policy in Afghanistan, including
Background information for understanding the current situation in Afghanistan;
U.S. policy implications of the Taliban takeover;
Evacuation of U.S. citizens and some Afghans; and
The Taliban takeover and former Afghan government’s collapse;
Social and economic implications of the Taliban takeover;
Regional reactions to the Taliban’s takeover;
U.S. military operations;
Budgetary implications of the U.S. withdrawal.
Some additional lines of inquiry that Congress may wish to explore with the executive branch are included alongside specific
topics as appropriate. The report concludes with some strategic considerations Congress may wish to contemplate as it
assesses the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for the future.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
Contents
Background.................................................................................................................... 1
What are the origins of the Taliban and what was U.S. policy toward the Taliban
before 9/11? ........................................................................................................... 1
Why did the United States initially deploy military forces to Afghanistan? ......................... 3
What was the post-2001 mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan?........................................ 3
How much has DOD spent on the war in Afghanistan? .................................................... 5
When and why did the U.S. military withdrawal begin?................................................... 6
Taliban Takeover and Afghan Government Collapse ............................................................. 9
When and how did the Taliban overcome Afghan government forces? ............................... 9
What is the status of the former Afghan government?.................................................... 12
How have the Taliban acted since taking power? .......................................................... 14
What are some of the implications if the Taliban is recognized as the official
government of Afghanistan by the United States and the international community? ......... 15
U.S. Policy Implications of the Taliban Takeover ............................................................... 18
How is the Taliban’s takeover affecting the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan?........ 18
What is the situation regarding evacuations from Afghanistan?....................................... 18
What is the status of U.S. efforts to provide immigration relief to Afghans who
assisted the U.S. government in the fight against the Taliban and other forces? ............... 20
How might the reestablishment of Taliban rule affect terrorist groups in Afghanistan?........ 24
What are the prospects for continued U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan?................... 27
What U.S. policy options are available to promote human rights in Afghanistan and
respond to human rights abuses?.............................................................................. 29
What might the Taliban takeover mean for security cooperation as a national security
tool?.................................................................................................................... 31
Social and Economic Implications of the Taliban Takeover.................................................. 32
What might be the implications of the Taliban takeover for Afghan women and girls? ........ 32
How has the Taliban advance affected the humanitarian situation on the ground in
Afghanistan? ........................................................................................................ 35
What are the implications of the Taliban’s takeover for counternarcotics? ........................ 37
How might the Taliban takeover affect Afghanistan’s relationships with the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?................................................................. 38
What Afghan central bank assets did the Biden Administration put on hold, and what
are the potential implications? ................................................................................. 40
What is the status of the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan and what are the
implications of the Taliban takeover for COVID-19 control and vaccine
distribution? ......................................................................................................... 41
How have other countries reacted to the Taliban’s takeover?................................................ 43
How have NATO allies responded to the U.S. withdrawal? ............................................ 43
How have regional countries reacted to the Taliban’s takeover? ...................................... 45
U.S. Military Operations: Summary of Evacuation Efforts and Budgetary Implications............ 56
What U.S. military operations were conducted during the withdrawal from
Afghanistan? ........................................................................................................ 56
How did the United States conduct the aerial evacuation? .............................................. 59
What was the role of U.S. contractors and contract operations in Afghanistan?.................. 61
What will happen to U.S. funding provided for Afghanistan security forces? .................... 63
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
What has happened to U.S. military equipment and other personal property brought
to, or purchased for use by, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan?.............................................. 65
How much has DOD spent on withdrawing U.S. military and civilian personnel from
Afghanistan? ........................................................................................................ 68
How will the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan impact the
budget? ............................................................................................................... 69
Possible Strategic-level Congressional Questions and Considerations.................................... 70
Figures
Figure 1. Taliban Control of Provincial Capitals, August 6-15, 2021 ..................................... 11
Figure 2. C-130, C-5 and C-17 Comparison ...................................................................... 60
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 72
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
Background
What are the origins of the Taliban and what was U.S. policy
toward the Taliban before 9/11?1
In 1993-1994, Afghan Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen who had
become disillusioned with the civil war among mujahideen parties that broke out after the 1989
Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported government in 1992.
Many members of the movement had studied in seminaries in Pakistan and chose the name
Taliban (plural of talib, a student of Islam) to distance themselves from the mujahideen. 2 Pakistan
supported the Taliban because of the group’s potential to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and
make it a cooperative ally,” thus giving Pakistan “greater security on one of the several borders
where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called ‘strategic depth.’”3 Taliban beliefs
and practices were consonant with, and derived in part from, the conservative tribal traditions of
Pashtuns, who represent a plurality (though not a majority) of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic
makeup and who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan. 4
The Taliban viewed the post-Soviet government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as weak,
corrupt, and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between the mujahideen groups (19921996) created popular support for the Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and more able to
deliver stability; as Zalmay Khalilzad, who later served as U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation ,wrote in his 2016 memoir, “I, like many, was optimistic about the
Taliban” at the outset. 5 The Taliban took control of the southern city of Kandahar in November
1994 and launched a series of military campaigns throughout the country that culminated in the
capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as the group imposed strict adherence
to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including
public executions, to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in
health care, and publicly executed women for alleged adultery. In March 2001, the Taliban drew
international condemnation by destroying monumental sixth-century Buddha statues carved into
hills above Bamyan city, which the Taliban considered idolatrous and contrary to Islamic norms.
The United States had played a major role in supporting anti-Soviet mujahideen, but U.S.
attention to Afghanistan declined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops after the 1988 Geneva
Accords; the U.S. embassy in Kabul was evacuated for security reasons in January 1989 and
remained closed until 2001. The United States sustained some military assistance to mujahideen
1 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
2 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2000).
3 National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (2004) p. 64.
4 Like T aliban founder Mullah Omar, most of the senior figures in the T aliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of the
major Pashtun tribal confederations; most modern Afghan rulers have been from the Durrani Pashtun tribal
confederation.
5 Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (St. Martin’s
Press, 2016), p. 84.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
groups who continued to fight the Soviet-supported Afghan government. After that government
fell in 1992, there was little appetite to maintain U.S. engagement. 6
By the time the Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996, U.S. policy toward the group was unclear
as, according to one observer, “American officials issued a cacophony of statements—some
skeptical, some apparently supportive—from which it was impossible to deduce a clear
position.”7 Rising international and U.S. popular attention to the plight of Afghan women, and a
renewed focus on human rights under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, led to, by 1997, U.S.
policy shifting against the Taliban. This shift occurred despite support for the group from U.S.
partner Saudi Arabia (one of the three countries, along with Pakistan and the United Arab
Emirates, that recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan).
The Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden eventually became the
central issue affecting U.S. views of and relations with the Taliban. In 1996, bin Laden moved
from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had previously spent most of the 1980s as a high profile
financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen. Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly
introduced Bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar;8 bin Laden established an alliance with the
Taliban whereby he provided millions in financial aid to the group (and military support for
Taliban efforts to complete their conquest of the country) and the Taliban provided safe haven for
AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in
Afghanistan. 9 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Kabul in April
1998, the highest ranking U.S. official to do so in decades. In response to Richardson’s request
that the Taliban expel bin Laden, the group “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In
any case, the Taliban said, [bin Laden] was not a threat to the United States.”10
The threat posed by bin Laden became clearer on August 7, 1998, when Al Qaeda operatives
simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 200 people. In
response, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan that
were unsuccessful in either killing bin Laden or persuading the Taliban to expel him. U.S.
pressure on the Saudis and Pakistanis to use their influence to convince the Taliban to expel the
AQ leader proved equally unsuccessful. In July 1999, President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions
on the Taliban that were equivalent to those imposed on governments deemed state sponsors of
terror (E.O. 13129). United Nations Security Council travel and economic sanctions against the
Taliban were added in October with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267
and expanded with UNSCR 1333, which included an arms embargo against the Taliban, in
December 2000. In the face of these threats, Taliban leadership was unmoved; their relationship
with bin Laden was “sometimes tense” but “the foundation was deep and personal,” according to
the 9/11 Commission Report. 11
6 Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance (1989-1992) Peter Tomsen, quoted in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2005), p,
239.
7 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 338.
8
T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64.
9 T he 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 66-67.
10 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 111.
11 T he 9/11 Commission Report, p. 125.
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Why did the United States initially deploy military forces to
Afghanistan?12
On September 11, 2001, AQ operatives conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States
that killed nearly 3,000 people. In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ leaders,
permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to such camps,
adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”13 Taliban
leaders refused, citing bin Laden’s status as their guest. 14
Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) enacted on September 18, 2001
(P.L. 107-40), U.S. military action began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets
throughout the country and close air support to anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan.
Limited numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary
forces, and some conventional ground forces began deploying in Afghanistan less than two weeks
later. 15 By November 13, the Taliban evacuated Kabul, which was soon retaken by those Afghan
forces (known as the Northern Alliance).
As U.S.-backed Afghan forces drew closer to the southern city of Kandahar, birthplace of the
Taliban movement and home of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban leaders
reportedly offered terms of surrender, including an amnesty for Taliban fighters who would lay
down their arms. U.S. officials rejected such an amnesty and while many Taliban fighters and
leaders were killed or captured by U.S. or Afghan forces, others (including Mullah Omar) sought
shelter in remote or rural parts of Afghanistan or escaped to Pakistan.
What was the post-2001 mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan?16
In December 2001, Afghan delegates convened in Bonn, Germany, by the United Nations
selected Hamid Karzai to serve as head of an interim national government, marking the beginning
of post-Taliban governance. No attempt appears to have been made to include the Taliban in those
talks. 17 No Taliban members participated in the 2002 emergency loya jirga (consultative
assembly) that elected Karzai as president.
The creation of the new Afghan government also represented the beginning of a major new
mission set for U.S. forces and their international partners: helping defend and develop that
government and its nascent military. Karzai attended the January 2002 State of the Union address
where President Bush previewed this expanded mission, saying that the United States and
Afghanistan were “allies against terror” and that “we will be partners in rebuilding that
country.”18 Congress supported the Bush Administration in this approach, authorizing and
12 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
13 “T ext: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.
14 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press, 2018),
pp. 69.
15 For more on the first year of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, “T oppling the
T aliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002,” RAND Corporation, 2015.
16 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
Khalilzad later wrote, “I am skeptical that the international community could have lured the T aliban to the table at
Bonn.” Khalilzad, p. 121.
17
18 “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” White House (archived), January 29, 2002.
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appropriating funds for more expansive U.S. military and civilian assistance missions (e.g., via
the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, 2002, P.L. 107-327, reauthorized and expanded in the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004, Section 7104 of P.L. 108-458). U.S.
officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, though
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the
country remain.”19
By 2005, scattered Taliban forces had already begun to regroup in the Pashtun heartland of
eastern and southern Afghanistan, as well as across the border in Pakistan, where many observers
suspected that Pakistan’s security and intelligence services were tolerating, if not actively
supporting them. 20 The Taliban described continuing U.S. and coalition military operations in
Afghanistan as a military occupation and characterized their Afghan government adversaries as
puppets of foreign powers.21
In response to growing Taliban activity, the United States gradually increased forces to around
30,000 by the end of the George W. Bush Administration. Under the Obama Administration, the
United States and its partners further increased international force levels as part of a “surge”
which peaked at over 130,000 troops (of which around 100,000 were U.S. troops) in 2010-11, but
set a goal to end combat operations by the end of 2014.
U.S.-Taliban Talks Under the Obama Administration
Secret negotiations between a Taliban representative and some U.S. officials began in late 2010. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton framed those talks by stating in an early 2011 speech that the Taliban’s breaking with Al Qaeda,
renouncing violence, and abiding by the Afghan constitution were “necessary outcomes” of a prospective
negotiation rather than “preconditions.” 22 The talks centered largely on confidence-building measures, specifically
the issues of a prisoner exchange and the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar.
Multiple factors, including opposition from then-President Karzai, caused the talks to collapse in early 2012. Qatari
and Pakistani mediation led to a 2013 agreement to allow the Taliban to open an office in Doha. However, the
Taliban opened that office in June 2013 with the trappings of an official embassy, in direct violation of the terms of
the agreement; the Qatari government responded by shuttering the office less than a month later. 23 In June 2014,
Qatar coordinated the release of U.S. prisoner Bowe Bergdahl in exchange for five high -ranking Taliban officials
imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay–four of them hold positions in the Taliban government announced on September
7, 2021.24 No further talks between U.S. and Taliban officials occurred under the Obama Administration.
Though that “surge” was arguably successful in weakening Taliban advances, by 2010 the Obama
Administration assessed that military means alone would not resolve the conflict. 25 Preliminary
U.S.-Taliban negotiations were constrained by U.S. policy to require the inclusion of the Afghan
19 “Rumsfeld: Major combat over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003.
See, for example, Matt Waldman, “T he Sun in the Sky: T he Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre, June 2010.
21
See Matthew Calvin, “T he Use of English-Language Internet Propaganda by the T aliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,
2007-2010,” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, June 2011, available at https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/108;
T homas Ruttig, “How T ribal are the T aliban?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010.
20
22 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (Simon and Schuster, 2014), p. 152.
23 See Coll, Directorate S, pp. 503-508, 578-585, 636-641.
24 T he five figures, and their positions during the T aliban’s period of rule, were Mullah Mohammad Fazl, the chief of
staff of the T aliban’s military; Noorullah Noori, the T aliban commander in northern Afghanistan; Khairullah
Khairkhwa, the T aliban regime Interior Minister; Mohammad Nabi Omari, a T aliban official; and Abdul Haq Wasiq,
the T aliban regime’s deputy intelligence chief. Mujib Mashal, “Once Jailed in Guantánamo, 5 T aliban Now Face U.S.
at the Negotiating T able,” The New York Times, March 26, 2019.
25 Rod Nordland, “T roop ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan Ends with Mixed Results,” New York Times, September 21, 2012.
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government, with which the Taliban refused to meet, in any settlement (see textbox above). 26 As
international force levels were reduced in advance of the scheduled 2014 transition, NATO began
gradually transferring security duties to Afghan forces starting in 2011. Afghan forces assumed
full responsibility for security nationwide at the end of 2014 with the end of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the start of the noncombat Resolute Support Mission
(RSM) that began on January 1, 2015. In addition to training, advising, and assisting Afghan
forces as part of RSM, U.S. troops in Afghanistan also conducted counterterrorism operations;
these two “complementary missions” comprised Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.
How much has DOD spent on the war in Afghanistan?27
According to the most recent DOD Cost of War quarterly report, from September 11, 2001,
through March 31, 2021, the Department obligated a total of $837.3 billion in current dollars for
military operations (i.e., Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel28 ) and
reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. 29 (An obligation is a commitment for the payment of
goods and services.) 30 According to DOD, department annual obligations in current dollars for
activities in Afghanistan peaked at $98 billion in FY2012 and decreased to $40 billion in FY2020,
the last full fiscal year for which data are available. 31
According to SIGAR’s most recent quarterly report to Congress, from October 1, 2001, through
June 30, 2021, Congress has appropriated or the U.S. government has otherwise made available
approximately $145 billion in current dollars to federal agencies, including DOD, for
reconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan. 32 According to SIGAR, of that total,
approximately $83 billion in current dollars went to the ASFF, which is included in the Cost of
War figure above. 33
Some nongovernmental observers provide higher estimates of the cost of U.S. government
activities in Afghanistan over the past two decades. For example, as of April 15, 2021, the Costs
of War Project of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
estimated U.S. costs to date for the war in Afghanistan at $2.26 trillion. 34 In addition to funding
26 Evan MacAskill and Simon T isdall, “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with T aliban,” The
Guardian (UK), July 19, 2010.
27 T his section was prepared by Brendan McGarry, Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget.
28 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel is the U.S. contribution to the NAT O-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise,
and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. For more information, see NAT O, “ Resolute Support Mission in
Afghanistan,” updated July 6, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.
29 DOD, FY 2021 Quarter 2 Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2021 , on file with author.
30 GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP, September 2005, p. 70, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-734sp.pdf. T his document states in part: “An agency incurs an obligation, for
example, when it places an order, signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases a service, or takes other actions that
require the government to make payments to the public or from one government account to another.”
31 DOD, FY 2021 Quarter 2 Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2021, on file with author.
32
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30,
2021.
33 Ibid. DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, De fense
Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 7-2, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/
FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
34 Figure is in nominal dollars. Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War
website, accessed August 16, 2021.
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for overseas contingency operations of the DOD and State Department, the estimate includes
amounts for what it describes as other war-related costs, such as interest on the national debt from
borrowing, increases to the DOD base budget, and medical care for U.S. veterans who served in
Afghanistan. 35
When and why did the U.S. military withdrawal begin?36
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S.
troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from their 20092011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops. 37 In June 2017, President Trump delegated
to Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to around
3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September 2017. 38
Those additional forces (all of which were dedicated to NATO-led RSM) arrived in Afghanistan
within months, putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country between 14,000 and 15,000
by the end of 2017. 39
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the lack of military progress
against the Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan
government participation for the first time. As those talks developed under Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express
frustration with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces,
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can.”40 U.S. force levels began
to contract in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top
U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradually reduced
by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.41
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the
United States committed to withdrawing all of its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian
personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a
complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021. In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any
groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not allowing those
35
Ibid.
36 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Kathleen McInnis, Specialist
in International Security.
37 While the level was reported publicly at 8,400, media outlets reported in August 2017 that the figure was actually
around 11,000 on any given day due to units rotating in and out of theater. See Gordon Lubold and Nancy Youssef,
“ U.S. Has More T roops in Afghanistan T han Publicly Disclosed,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2017. See also CRS
Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007 -2020, by Heidi M.
Peters.
T ara Copp, “Mattis signs orders to send about 3,500 more US troops to Afghanistan,” Military Times, September 11,
2017.
38
39 Dan Lamothe, “T rump added troops in Afghanistan. But NAT O is still short of meeting its goal,” Washington Post,
November 9, 2017; Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this
spring,” Washington Post, January 21, 2018. As of September 30, 2017, the total number of active duty and reserve
forces in Afghanistan was 15,298. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency
by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017.
40 Kevin Baron, “T rump Says US T roops Shouldn’t be ‘Policemen’ in Afghanistan. So Why Are T hey T here?”
DefenseOne, July 22, 2019; “T rump Wants to Get Out Of Afghanistan ‘As Quickly As He Can,’” TOLOnews, August
1, 2019.
41 T homas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its T roop Force in Afghanistan,” New York
Times, October 21, 2019.
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groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not
conditioned on the Taliban reducing violence against the Afghan government, making
concessions in intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.
The agreement also stated that up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government
(which was not a party to the agreement) and up to 1,000 Afghan personnel captured by the
Taliban “will be released” in March 2020. Per the agreement, intra-Afghan negotiations were also
to begin that month, but talks remained unscheduled for months amid political gridlock in Kabul
and disagreements over the prisoner release. The parties to the conflict completed the prisoner
release in early September 2020, removing the main obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which began
in Doha on September 12, 2020.
Throughout 2020, U.S. officials stated that the Taliban were not in full compliance with the
agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 one month ahead of the mid-July
2020 deadline in the U.S.-Taliban accord. 42 Confusion about the United States’ future military
posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Trump
Administration officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have the small
remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by
Christmas!”43
On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “we
will implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces” from
Afghanistan, and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting
Secretary Miller characterized the drawdown (announced alongside a similar reduction of U.S.
forces from Iraq) as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it
“does not equate to a change in U.S. policy or objectives.”44 On January 15, 2021, Acting
Secretary Miller confirmed that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500. 45
President Biden, who took office on January 20, 2021, reportedly opposed the Obama
Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels as Vice President in 2009, and expressed
skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan as a candidate during the 2020 primary campaign. 46
As President, he said in a March 16, 2021, interview that the U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a
very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but
would be “tough.”47 He also said an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in
process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press
conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year. 48
42 Kylie Atwood and Ryan Browne, “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30,
2020; “T aliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says,” Reuters, May 5, 2020; Robert Burns,
“US General: T aliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal,” Associated Press, June 10, 2020.
43 “U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be ‘home by Christmas’: T rump,” Reuters, October 7, 2020.
44 “Acting Secretary Miller Announces T roop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Department of Defense, November 17,
2020.
45 “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan,” Departm ent of Defense
January 15, 2021.
46 Coll, Directorate S, op. cit., pp. 353-354, 367; “Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation,” CBS News, February 23,
2020.
47 “T RANSCRIPT : ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos interviews President Joe Biden,” ABC News, March 17, 2021.
48 “President Biden Holds News Conference,” C-SPAN, March 25, 2021.
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On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final
withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021. 49 In a written response, the
Taliban accused the United States of breaching the February 2020 agreement and stated that the
U.S. decision to stay beyond May 1 “in principle opens the way for [Taliban forces] to take every
necessary countermeasure, hence the American side will be held responsible for all future
consequences.”50 A senior Administration official said after the withdrawal announcement, “We
have communicated to the Taliban in no uncertain terms that if they do conduct attacks against
U.S. or allied forces … we will hit back hard.”51 On August 26, 2021, U.S. forces and Afghan
nationals were killed in an attack in Kabul claimed by the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan,
which has been in conflict with the Taliban. Still, the attack may raise questions about the
Taliban’s compliance with the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, in which the Taliban
commit “to prevent any group or individual … from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the
security of the United States.
Some observers contend that the Biden Administration could have chosen to ignore the agreement
and retained a small force in the country comprising several thousand troops in order to facilitate
an intra-Afghan peace agreement. 52 According to this view, the costs of retaining such a force
would have been small compared to the security risks associated with the Afghan government’s
collapse. By contrast, President Biden argued that retaining such a force would not have been
feasible; the small number of U.S. troops would not have been sufficient to deter Taliban forces
and a re-escalation of U.S. forces and military capabilities into Afghanistan would ultimately
have been required. 53 Still others contend that even assuming a minimal footprint could have been
feasible, doing so would not have been worth risking further U.S. resources and lives. 54
The final stage of the planned U.S. military withdrawal began on May 1, 2021, and by June,
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that as much as 44% of the “retrograde
process” was complete. 55 Most NATO allies and other U.S. partners withdrew their forces by
July. 56 On July 8, President Biden announced that “our military mission in Afghanistan will
conclude on August 31st .” A rapid Taliban advance, culminating in the August taking of Kabul
and the emergency evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and some Afghans out of Afghanistan,
prompted the United States to deploy several thousand additional troops to facilitate the
evacuation.
On August 14, President Biden released a statement saying in part, “One more year, or five more
years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot
or will not hold its own country. And an endless American presence in the middle of another
49 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2021.
50 “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden,” Voice of Jihad, April 15,
2021.
51 White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021.
52 United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Study Group: Final Report, February 2021.
53 T he White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan , July 8, 2021.
54 Vanda Felbab-Brown, The US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is the right one, T he Brookings Institution,
April 15, 2021.
55
“Update on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan May 31, 2021,” CENT COM, June 1, 2021.
56 Geir Moulson and Kathy Gannon, “Most European troops exit Afghanistan quietly after 20 years,” Associated Press,
June 30, 2021.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
country’s civil conflict was not acceptable to me.”57 He reiterated that position in an August 16,
2021, address, saying, “there never was a good time to withdraw U.S. forces.”58
Some contend that the United States did not fully factor effective war termination into its
Afghanistan campaign strategies and force designs, resulting in a military effort that did not
enable a satisfactory conclusion to the war.59 At an operational level, some observers question the
robustness of the plan to withdraw U.S. troops and key Afghan partners from Afghanistan. 60 Such
questions are also related to intelligence estimates of ANDSF abilities to resist the Taliban
advance. Congress may scrutinize whether, and how, military campaign planning could have
managed these perceived strategic and operational flaws. 61
Taliban Takeover and Afghan Government Collapse
When and how did the Taliban overcome Afghan
government forces?62
Throughout 2020 and 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay the potential detrimental impact
of the U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance
to Afghan forces. 63 In a May 2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Mark Milley said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterized as
the strengths of the Afghan government and military. 64 In its 2021 annual threat assessment, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that “the Afghan Government will
struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.”65
An external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that the Taliban enjoyed a strong
advantage over the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in cohesion and
a slight advantage in force employment and that the two forces essentially split on material
resources and external support. The one ANDSF advantage, size, was assessed as much narrower
than often assumed. The author concluded in his net assessment that the Taliban enjoyed a narrow
advantage over the government. 66 The Taliban had also come to control significant territory: in
October 2018, the last time the U.S. government made such data publicly available, the group
57 T he White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Afghanistan,” August 14, 2021.
T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” August 16, 2021.
Christopher D. Kolenda, Zero Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong about War (University Press of Kentucky,
Forthcoming).
58
59
60 Devan Cole, Daniella Diaz, Melanie Zanona, Lauren Fox and Jennifer Hansler, “ T op Republican on foreign affairs
committee slams Biden over ‘unmitigated disaster’ in Afghanistan ,” CNN Politics, August 15, 2021. See
https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/15/politics/michael-mccaul-afghanistan-withdrawal-criticism-cnntv/index.html
61
See, for example, discussion in Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, What We Need to Learn:
Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction , August 2021.
62 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Kathleen McInnis, Specialist
in International Security.
63
Zahra Rahimi, “ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout,” TOLOnews, April 26, 2021.
64 T ranscript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing,
Department of Defense, May 6, 2021.
65
Annual T hreat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April
19, 2021.
66 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan Security Forces Versus the T aliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 14,
Issue 1, January 2021.
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controlled or contested as much as 40% of Afghanistan and the group continued to make gradual
gains in subsequent years.
In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the
country’s rural areas, solidifying the group’s hold on some areas in which it already had a
significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some northern
areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s, making their
2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the Taliban took
control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021. 67 The speed of the
Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one commander saying that
his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the departure of U.S.
forces. 68 In July, the Taliban began seizing border crossings with Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan,
depriving the Afghan government of critical customs revenues. On July 21, 2021, General Milley
estimated that over 200 districts were under Taliban control, but emphasized that the Taliban had
not seized any provincial capitals, where Afghan forces had been consolidated. 69
On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured their first provincial capital, a notable achievement given
that U.S. commanders and others had often pointed to the Taliban’s inability to take and control a
provincial capital in recent years as evidence of the Afghan government’s relative strength. The
Taliban’s capture of half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in the following week surprised
many observers and, reportedly, U.S. officials. 70 By August 13, U.S. officials were reportedly
concerned that the Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With the fall of Jalalabad in the east
and Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, the Taliban captured the last major cities and eliminated the final
outposts of organized Afghan government resistance. On the morning of August 15, 2021, the
Taliban began entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of the country. The central and
historically significant province of Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to
establish an armed resistance to the Taliban, was reportedly captured by Taliban forces in
September 2021 amid reports of Taliban killings of civilians. 71
Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the T aleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.
68 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the T aliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
67
69
Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing, U.S. Department
of Defense, July 21, 2021.
70 Zeke Miller et al., “Biden team surprised by rapid T aliban gains in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, August 15, 2021.
71 “Afghanistan crisis: T aliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold,” BBC, September 13, 2021.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
Figure 1. Taliban Control of Provincial Capitals, August 6-15, 2021
Source: Created by CRS. Boundaries from U.S. State Department, GADM, and Esri.
While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in
some areas, 72 some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting. In many
of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the departure of government forces (and the
handover of their weapons) through payments or through the mediation of local elders seeking to
avoid bloodshed. 73
Experts have offered a number of explanations for why the ANDSF did not stem the Taliban
advance. 74
Reportedly high casualty and attrition rates in the ANDSF in recent years. 75
While the ANDSF’s official force level was reported to be just under 300,000,
most observers assess its actual strength was lower.
72 BBC News, Afghanistan: T aliban continue attacks on three major cities, August 1, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-58040141.
73 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,
2021.
74 See also CRS Insight IN11728, The Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Implications for
U.S. Security Assistance and Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia.
75 Once-public statistics on ANDSF metrics were withheld by the U.S. military starting in October 2017. Shawn Snow,
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
Widespread corruption within the Afghan military and government, often leading
to soldiers going without salaries or even food, which arguably undermined the
government’s authority and alienated former and potential supporters. 76
A lack of preparation on the part of Afghan civilian and military leaders, who,
according to some analysts, did not believe that the United States would
ultimately withdraw troops and contractors.77
A political calculation by the Afghan government to not cede vulnerable rural
outposts to the Taliban, leaving Afghan forces overstretched and easily isolated
by Taliban fighters. 78
The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, which reportedly “demoralized”
Afghan forces and prompted ever-growing numbers of Afghan soldiers to accept
Taliban payments to surrender. 79 Some also argue that the end of largescale U.S.
airstrikes after the February 2020 agreement allowed the Taliban time to regroup
and further weakened Afghan forces’ will to fight. 80
The withdrawal (per the U.S.-Taliban accord) of U.S. and international
contractors, upon whom Afghans depended for maintenance of their own air
force as well as intelligence and close air support. 81
The centralized structure of the Afghan military, with some observers arguing
that the United States trained a centralized national military ill-fitted to
Afghanistan’s unique circumstances, specifically its ethnic diversity and history
of locally organized and led security forces. 82
The prioritization by the United States of the quantity of ANDSF forces over
their quality, which led to decisions about ANDSF end strength that was
unaffordable without international support. 83
What is the status of the former Afghan government?84
President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, factional
infighting, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country on the morning of
“Report: US officials classify crucial metrics on Afghan casualties, readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017.
Chas Danner, “ Why Afghanistan’s Security Forces Suddenly Collapsed,” New York Magazine, August 17, 2021;
T homas Gibbons-Neff and T aimoor Shah, “T he T aliban Close in on Afghan Cities, Pushing the Country to the Brink,”
New York Times, July 9, 2021.
77 Amy Kazmin, et. al., “Low morale, no support and bad politics: why the Afghan army folded,” Financial Times,
August 15, 2021.
76
78 Benjamin Jensen, “How the T aliban did it: Inside the ‘operational art’ of its military victory,” Atlantic Council,
August 15, 2021.
79 George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse.”
80 Yaroslav T rofimov, “How the T aliban Overran the Afghan Army, Built by the U.S. Over 20 Years,” Wall Street
Journal, April 14, 2021.
Jack Detsch, “Departure of Private Contractors Was a T urning Point in Afghan Military’s Collapse,” Foreign Policy,
August 16, 2021.
82 T ara Copp, “T he US Spent $83 Billion T raining Afghan Forces. Why Did T hey Collapse So Quickly?” Defense One,
August 14, 2021.
81
For a previous discussion of this point, see Rebecca Zimmerman, “ T raining Foreign Military Forces: Quantity versus
Quality,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2015.
83
84 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
August 15, 2021. On the evening of August 15, Ghani posted on Facebook that he left Kabul to
prevent bloodshed and that the “Taliban have won the judgment of sword and guns and now they
are responsible for protecting the countrymen’s honor, wealth and self-esteem.”85 After days of
questions about his location, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation announced on August 18 that “the UAE has welcomed President Ashraf
Ghani and his family into the country on humanitarian grounds.”86 As of September 17, he does
not appear to have formally resigned his office.
Many other government-aligned elites, formerly regarded as influential powerbrokers, also have
left the country or been sidelined by the takeover. Militia commander and former Herat governor
Ismail Khan was captured by the Taliban in fighting in Herat before being allowed to relocate to
Iran; Marshal Abdulrashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, another former governor,
convened their forces in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and subsequently fled to Uzbekistan.
Another group of Afghan political leaders, including High Council for National Reconciliation
Chairman Abdullah Abdullah, former President Hamid Karzai, and former Islamist insurgent
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, met with Taliban officials after the group’s takeover, but are not
playing a role in the Taliban government. One August 26 media account described Karzai and
Abdullah as “effectively under house arrest.”87
Former First Vice President Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter on August 17 to be the
“legitimate care taker [sic] President” and to be “reaching out to all leaders to secure their support
& consensus.”88 Saleh had previously vowed to never submit to Taliban rule and called on
Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He relocated to the central province of Panjshir, whose
strategic location and historic legacy (it was never occupied by the Soviets in the 1980s or the
Taliban in the 1990s) give it outsized import. He was joined by the son of the late Northern
Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. They stated that they have formed an armed
resistance to the Taliban and appealed for U.S. and international support. 89 The Taliban claim to
have taken control of the province as of September 6, amid reports of continued sporadic fighting
and Taliban killings of civilians. 90
With the taking of Panjshir, the Taliban appear to effectively control the entire country, unlike the
1990s when the former Northern Alliance represented significant armed opposition and held
around 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also have stronger ties with regional powers
(including some that once supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban). Still, the
Chantal Da Silva, Ahmed Mengli and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ From Afghan nation-builder to life in ‘exile’: Ashraf
Ghani flees country in defeat ,” NBC News, August 16, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-nationbuilder-life-exile-ashraf-ghani-flees-country-defeat-n1276826
86 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Statement on President Ashraf Ghani, August 18
2021.
85
Nic Robertson, “T aliban removes security from ex-Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, source
says,” CNN, August 26, 2021.
87
88 Amrullah Saleh, T witter, August 17, 2021, 9:59AM, https://twitter.com/AmrullahSaleh2/status/
1427631191545589772. Section 60 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President “shall act in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” in the event of the president’s “absence, resignation or death.”
Section 67 of the Afghan constitution provides that the first Vice President shall assume the responsibilities of
president in the case of the president’s resignation, impeachment, or death; the president is to “personally tender” his
resignation to the National Assembly.
Ahmad Massoud, “Opinion: T he mujahideen resistance to the T aliban begins now. But we need help,” Washington
Post, August 18, 2021.
89
90 Natasha T urak, “Fighting continues in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley as anti-T aliban resistance vows to hold out,”
CNBC, September 7, 2021.
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existence of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a rallying point or
galvanize Taliban opponents nationwide, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or
other international assistance.
How have the Taliban acted since taking power?91
The Taliban have controlled territory in parts of Afghanistan for years, but their takeover of the
country in August 2021 puts them in control of urban areas for the first time since 2001. The
Afghanistan that the Taliban will govern in 2021 is different in economic, political, and social
terms from the country the group ruled two decades ago. As the Taliban consolidated power,
observers also speculated on how much they had changed and how they might govern. 92 The
hardline “caretaker” government announced by the Taliban on September 7, 2021, does not
indicate a more inclusive approach to governing.
On September 7, 2021, longtime Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid (making his first
appearance in public) announced the names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting”
ministers that fill a “caretaker cabinet” to administer the country; the Taliban refer to this
government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom and why these individuals might be replaced going forward or
in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. The Taliban’s
government in the 1990s reportedly was also “nominally interim.”93
Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada (of whom one verified photograph exists and who has
never made a public appearance) is to hold supreme power as the group’s emir; former Taliban
Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund is the Acting Prime Minister. One analyst describes
Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure whose selection forestalls competition
among more powerful figures and factions within the Taliban. 94 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led
negotiations with the United States, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister. Baradar released an
audio recording on September 13, 2021, denying rumors of his death or injury in a brawl with
other Taliban figures; the BBC reported on September 15, 2021, that Baradar had gone to
Kandahar after a heated disagreement with Haqqani figures (see below) over whether the
Taliban’s political or military wings deserve credit for the group’s takeover.95 Other key figures
include Acting Director of Intelligence Abdul Haq Wasiq (detained at the U.S. naval station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2001 until his release in a 2014 prisoner exchange) and Acting
Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob (son of founding Taliban leader Mohammad Omar).
Nearly all members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists.
All members of the “caretaker cabinet” are male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns,
mostly from southern Afghanistan. Over half were previously designated for U.S. and/or U.N.
sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of
State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of
Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). Some argue the Haqqanis’ role in the Taliban caretaker government is a
91 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
92 “T aliban Rule Begins in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group, August 24, 2021.
93 “Who Will Run the T aliban Government?” Int ernational Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
Martine van Bijlert, “T he Focus of the T aleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.
94
95 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: T aliban leaders in bust -up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September
15, 2021.
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reflection of their outsized military import, and could make U.S. cooperation with the Taliban
more difficult. 96 A State Department spokesman said the government “certainly does not reflect
what the international community and what, as part of that, the United States hoped to see. ”97
Some had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government officials
(such as former President Hamid Karzai) or to others from outside the movement as part of their
promise to establish an “inclusive government.”
It remains to be seen how this Taliban government will address the many challenges Afghanistan
faces, including a burgeoning economic crisis. The Taliban appear to lack many technical and
administrative capabilities and may struggle to execute the functions of government and security
nationwide, especially without the participation of individuals who had previously supported the
former Afghan government. It is possible that the Taliban may induce or coerce such individuals
to obtain their participation. At an August 17, 2021, press conference, Mujahid reiterated the
Taliban’s proclaimed amnesty for government employees, saying
I would like to assure all the compatriots, whether they were translators, whether they were
with military activities or whether they were civilians, all of them have been important.
Nobody is going to be treated with revenge…. Thousands of [Afghan] soldiers who have
fought us for 20 years, after the occupation, all of them have been pardoned.98
Observers noted that the Taliban made similar statements after taking control of Kabul in 1996,
only to contradict them with brutal repression and human rights violations. 99
Protests against the group have taken place in several cities across the country, including by
hundreds of women in Kabul. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on September 8,
2021, banning unapproved demonstrations. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet said on September 13 that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against
protesters and journalists.”100
What are some of the implications if the Taliban is recognized as
the official government of Afghanistan by the United States and
the international community?101
No country has recognized the government established by the Taliban in the wake of their
takeover of Afghanistan. The United States has not stated whether it will recognize an Afghan
government led by the Taliban, 102 and observers say no decision for such recognition is expected
96 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,
September 10, 2021.
97
Department of State, Department Press Briefing – September 9, 2021.
98 “T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August
17, 2021.
99 Graeme Wood, “ T his Is Not the T aliban 2.0,” The Atlantic, August 18, 2021.
“Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48 th Session of the Human Rights Council, September
13, 2021.
101 T his section was prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, and Jennifer K. Elsea,
Legislative Attorney.
100
102 When asked, “Do you consider the T aliban the de facto ruler of Afghanistan right now?” at an August 23 press
conference, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said, “it’s been a fluid situation. T here has not been any sort of
formal transfer of power.” In an August 25 press conference, Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby referred to the T aliban
as “the titular heads of government.”
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from the U.S. government in the near term. 103 While the Taliban arguably control and govern
Afghanistan at this point from a practical, or “de facto,” perspective, the international community
has not accepted the Taliban as the legitimate, or “de jure,” government of the country. Pursuant
to the law of nations, official recognition of a foreign government acknowledges that a
government has the right to control a state’s territory and exercise sovereign state power,104 and
makes such government responsible for meeting that state’s international obligations, including
complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions, of which many currently apply to
Afghanistan. Each state makes the decision to formally recognize the government of another
state; recognition can occur via overt declaration or other positive statement of recognition, or be
implied by the actions of the recognizing state, such as by concluding an international agreement
with the government being recognized. 105 Recognition is usually a prerequisite for the
establishment of diplomatic relations. In the United States, recognized governments may sue in
U.S. courts as a foreign sovereign, and benefit from sovereign immunity from suit in certain
circumstances. Under domestic law, the authority to recognize foreign governments in the
conduct of international relations lies with the President. 106
When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996, and acted as the de facto government until
the U.S. invasion in 2001, neither the United States nor the wider international community
recognized the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Three individual
states, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, officially recognized the Taliban.
Afghanistan was represented at the United Nations by the Permanent Representative and other
officials of the predecessor Afghan government, with the Credentials Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly deferring indefinitely the question of whether the representatives of the
predecessor government or the Taliban should represent the country. 107 A U.N. Security Council
resolution required states to close official Taliban diplomatic offices on their territory. 108 In March
2020, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2513 held that the Taliban were “not recognized at the
United Nations, and furthermore the Security Council does not support the restoration of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.... ”109
The Afghan Permanent Representative (as appointed by the Ghani government) spoke on behalf
of Afghanistan before the Security Council on August 16, 2021, and has continued to be treated as
the official Afghan representative at the United Nations. A new Credentials Committee is to be
chosen during the opening of the 2021-22 U.N. General Assembly during September 2021; the
United States, as well as other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, 110 often sit as
members of the Committee. The Committee may not make an immediate decision on Afghan
representation in the United Nations, leaving the current Afghan Permanent Representative in
place. As it did the previous time the Taliban was in power, the Committee could delay any
decision on Afghan credentials indefinitely. Despite the fact that the former Afghan government
103 See Nahal T oosi, “Biden unlikely to formally recognize T aliban government,” Politico, September 11, 2021.
104 Restatement (T hird) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, Comment a, p. 84 (1986).
105 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 93 (7 th ed., 2008).
106 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 11 (2015).
See P RACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CASES OF CHALLENGED REPRESENTATION OF A MEMBER STATE —GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 396(V) OF 14 DECEMBER 1950, 1997 U.N. Juridical Yearbook, pp. 465-67; see also
“Credentials,” Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Part IV, Rules 27-29,
https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/credent.shtml.
108 Para. 8(a) of S/RES/1333.
107
109 S/RES/2513.
110 China, France, Russian Federation, and United Kingdom.
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does not seem to be asserting that it remains in power, 111 leaving only the Taliban claiming a seat
in the United Nations, the Taliban could be prevented from representing Afghanistan even if no
competing representatives challenged its authority to do so, according to at least one observer. 112
Whether or not a government is democratically elected can sometimes be an issue in the
recognition practice of many states, including in some cases the United States. 113 The question of
recognition of the Taliban could be influenced if the Taliban seek accommodation with or appoint
to government posts officials of the former Ghani administration (though they did not do so in the
caretaker government announced on September 7, 2021). Such a step could be seen as a
counterweight to any illegitimacy problems the Taliban may face by having taken power from a
democratically elected Afghan government. 114 The Taliban have long sought recognition as a
legitimate governing entity, and some observers maintain the group has improved its foreign
policy apparatus since first governing Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. 115
Some states and international organizations might wish to use recognition as a tool to hold the
Taliban accountable for Afghanistan’s obligations under international law, such as conditioning
recognition on such compliance or withholding diplomatic relations until such conditions are
met. 116 Only a recognized Afghan government can request foreign assistance, including military
and humanitarian aid and economic assistance from international financ ial institutions. On August
15, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, without mentioning the Taliban, stated that an
Afghan government that abides by its international obligations and protects the human rights of
its people “is a government we can work with and recognize.”117 China, Russia, and other
prominent states seem to have indicated that recognition of the Taliban is a possibility, citing the
Taliban’s effective, albeit nascent, rule of the majority of the country. 118 As of September 2021, it
seems most states are prepared to monitor the Taliban’s actions domestically and internationally
to determine whether to recognize and form official relations with a Taliban government, instead
pledging their continued support for the Afghan people, their human rights, and humanitarian
assistance. 119
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
At what point might the United States consider extending official recognition to a
Taliban-led Afghan government? Short of recognition, are there opportunities for
U.S. cooperation or engagement with such a government?
See Federica Paddeu and Niko Pavlopoulos, “Between Legitimacy and Control: T he T aliban’s Pursuit of
Governmental Status,” Just Security, September 7, 2021.
112
Larry D. Johnson, “How Can T he T aliban Be Prevented From Representing Afghanistan In T he United Nations?”,
Just Security, August 18, 2021. It is possible that a T aliban representative could participate in Security Council
meetings concerning the situation in Afghanistan even without formal recognition as the legitimate government of the
country. T he rules of the Security Council permit the Council to invite other “competent” parties to meetings if such
parties can provide information important to Council deliberations.
111
113 See Restatement (T hird) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, Reporter’s Note 1.
114 T ess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, “ Recognition and the T aliban,” Just Security, August
17, 2021.
115 See Barnett R. Rubin, Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition , Afghan Peace Process Issues
Paper, United States Institute of Peace, March 2021.
116 See Bridgeman and Goodman, op. cit.
117 See CNN, State of the Union, August 15, 2021 (transcript).
Andrew Osborne, “ Russia says Kabul seems safer under T aliban than it was under Ghani,” Reuters, August 16,
2021.
118
119 See, e.g., State Department Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement on Afghanistan, August 15, 2021; Afghan
Regional Conference, Final Chairman Statement, August 12, 2021.
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U.S. Policy Implications of the Taliban Takeover
How is the Taliban’s takeover affecting the U.S. diplomatic
presence in Afghanistan?120
On August 15, 2021, the State Department confirmed that it had evacuated the U.S. diplomatic
compound in Kabul and that all remaining embassy personnel were located on the premises of
Kabul International Airport. Following the completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Secretary Blinken announced that the State Department had suspended its diplomatic presence in
the country and transferred operations to Doha, Qatar. 121 Ian McCary, a career State Department
official, leads the U.S. diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in Doha. 122
Some additional questions that Congress may consider or ask the executive branch include
What kind of diplomatic presence, if any, should the United States maintain in
Afghanistan? How will the United States perform consular or other functions
from Doha?
What is the situation regarding evacuations from Afghanistan?
On August 30, 2021, U.S. officials announced the completion of the withdrawal of its military
and diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan and largely concluded its efforts to airlift U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and certain Afghans out of the country. 123 The State
Department and the Pentagon say they directly evacuated or facilitated the evacuations of around
124,000 individuals, including about 6,000 American citizens. 124 President Biden has described
the mission as an “extraordinary success,” although U.S. officials acknowledge that around 100
American citizens and thousands of eligible Afghans remain in Afghanistan, many of whom seek
to leave. 125 Some Members of Congress and rescue groups have questioned this figure, arguing
that the number of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan could total as many as several hundred more than
the Administration’s estimate. 126
President Biden has said that the United States remains committed to assisting American citizens
and other eligible persons who wish to leave Afghanistan, adding that he will hold the Taliban to
its commitment to provide safe passage. 127 U.S. officials are providing limited information
regarding such evacuations, citing “an ongoing terrorist threat to operations of this nature.”128
120
T his section was prepared by Cory Gill, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.
121 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken’s Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021.
U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to Embassy Doha and Mission Afghanistan ,”
September 7, 2021.
123
T o review the parameters under which Afghans may be eligible for resettlement in the United States, see the “ What
is the status of U.S. efforts to provide immigration relief to Afghans who assisted the U.S. government in the fight
against the T aliban and other forces?” section of this report.
122
124 U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley
Press Briefing,” September 1, 2021.
125 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” August 31, 2021 ; U.S.
Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 10, 2021,” September 10, 2021.
Julie Watson and Bernard Condon, “ Rescue groups: US tally misses hundreds left in Afghanistan,” Associated
Press, September 4, 2021.
126
127 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Af ghanistan,” August 31, 2021.
128 T he White House, National Security Council, “ Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Further U.S.
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Following the reopening of the Kabul International Airport on September 9, 2021, the State
Department began facilitating the evacuations of American citizens and LPRs on commercial
flights. The State Department is also helping evacuate American citizens and LPRs via overland
routes to an undisclosed neighboring country. 129 On September 17, a State Department
spokesperson said that since August 31, the State Department had assisted 36 U.S. citizens and 24
LPRs in departing Afghanistan via charter flights and overland routes. 130
Some Members of Congress and other observers have criticized what they characterize as poorly
planned U.S. evacuation efforts, asserting that the United States failed to deliver on assurances
made to American citizens and eligible Afghans that it would help them leave the country prior to
the U.S. withdrawal. 131 Press reports indicate that some personnel involved in evacuation efforts
during the withdrawal process were concerned that eligibility criteria for Afghans were “everchanging,” which may have led to instances where U.S. personnel prohibited eligible Afghans,
including the family members of U.S. citizens, from accessing the airport. 132 Some Members have
expressed concern that many Afghans who were evacuated may not actually qualify for
resettlement in the United States. 133 Following the withdrawal, additional reports suggest that the
State Department has faced difficulties facilitating the evacuations of LPRs and eligible Afghans.
For example, U.S. efforts to evacuate hundreds of U.S. Agency for Global Media Afghan national
employees, contractors, and their families have thus far not succeeded, although Secretary
Blinken affirmed on September 14 that the State Department was still prioritizing their
evacuation. 134
Additionally, some Members have accused the Taliban of refusing to allow American citizens to
leave Afghanistan, with one asserting that the Taliban “is holding them hostage for demands,”
including diplomatic recognition from the United States for the Taliban. 135 Secretary Blinken has
said that he is not aware of any such hostage-like cases. 136 On September 9, a National Security
Council spokesperson stated that the Taliban has been “cooperative” in facilitating the departures
of American citizens and LPRs. 137
In addition to the matters discussed above, Members of Congress may consider the following
issues as evacuations continue.
Citizen Departures from Afghanistan,” September 10, 2021.
129
130
U.S. Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 10, 2021.”
U.S. Department of State, “ Department Press Briefing – September 17, 2021,” September 17, 2021.
131 House Foreign Affairs Committee (Republicans), “McCaul: ‘Disgraceful’ State Dept. Left Hundreds of USAGM
Journalists in Afghanistan,” press release, August 31, 2021.
Patsy Widakuswara and Carla Babb, “'Hunger Games’ Evacuations as US Left Afghanistan,” Voice of America,
September 2, 2021.
133
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan , 117 th
Cong., 1 st sess., September 14, 2021.
132
134 T estimony of Secretary of State Antony Blinken at Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the U.S.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan, September 14, 2021.
135 House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Michael McCaul, int erview by Chris Wallace, Fox News
Sunday, September 5, 2021.
136 U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, Qatari Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al T hani, and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister Dr. Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah at a Joint Press Availability ,” September 7, 2021.
137 T he White House, “ Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on Qatar Airways Charter Flight from Kabul,”
September 9, 2020.
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Press reports indicate that U.S. officials are examining possible cases in which
older evacuated Afghan men were admitted into the United States with girls who
are under 18 years old whom they claim as wives, raising potential human
trafficking concerns. 138 The State Department has not provided a precise number
of such cases, although one press report refers to “numerous incidents” where
“Afghan girls have been presented to authorities as the ‘wives’ of much older
men.”139 One report further notes that U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates
transmitted a cable to Washington, DC, stating that some young Afghan girls
were forced into marriages to escape Afghanistan after the Taliban seized control
of the country. 140
What evacuation plans, if any, did the Biden Administration inherit from the
Trump Administration? What were the evacuation plans that the Biden
Administration prepared for Afghanistan and for what possible scenarios did it
plan?
What is the status of U.S. efforts to provide immigration relief to
Afghans who assisted the U.S. government in the fight against the
Taliban and other forces?141
As of the date of this report, there are two main ways that Afghan nationals can gain U.S.
admission and obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) 142 status based largely on the assistance
they provided to the United States: special immigrant visa (SIV) programs and the U.S. refugee
program. In addition, Afghans may be paroled into the United States by the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A person granted parole (parolee) is permitted to enter
and remain in the United States for the duration of the parole grant. Parolees do not have a set
pathway to LPR status.
Special Immigrant Visas
Congress has enacted provisions to enable certain Afghans to obtain SIVs. Afghans apply for
these SIVs on their own behalf and must provide required documentation. Individuals whose
applications are approved and enter the United States on SIVs are granted LPR status upon
admission. 143 As of August 28, 2021, an approximate total of 82,000 Afghans (23,000 principal
applicants and 59,000 dependent spouses and children) had been granted special immigrant status
under these provisions. In FY2021 only, as of August 28, 2021, approximately 9,000 Afghans
(2,000 principal applicants and 7,000 dependent spouses and children) had been granted special
immigrant status under these provisions. 144
138 Margaret Brennan and Bo Erickson, “U.S. investigates ‘child bride’ cases among Afghan evacuees,” CBS News,
September 7, 2021.
139 Matthew Lee, “ Afghan evacuation raises concerns about child trafficking,” Associated Press, September 3, 2021.
140
Matthew Lee, “ Afghan evacuation raises concerns about child trafficking,” Associated Press, September 3, 2021.
141 T his section prepared by Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Immigration Policy.
142 LPRs (also known as green card holders) can live permanently in the United States. T ypically after five years, they
can apply for U.S. citizenship, subject to applicable requirements.
143 For additional information on Afghan SIVs, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa
Programs.
144 Links to Special Immigrant Visa Statistics as of June 30, 2021, are available from the U.S. Department of State,
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The SIV provisions established two programs that include Afghans. One program, which is
permanent, applies to Afghans who worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of
Mission (COM) authority, as translators or interpreters and meet other requirements. The other
program, which is temporary, applies to Afghans who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S.
government, or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan and satisfy
other requirements. The latter program is subject to a 14-step application process, which has been
widely criticized for being bureaucratic, inefficient, and slow. 145
President Biden’s announcement that the United States would begin the final withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Afghanistan in May 2021146 heightened long-standing concerns of, and for, Afghan
nationals who had assisted the U.S. government. In July 2021, after initially rejecting calls for an
evacuation of these Afghans, 147 the State Department announced the arrival of “our first group of
Afghan special immigrant applicants to the United States under Operation Allies Refuge.”148 In a
joint statement on August 15, 2021, the Department of State and the Department of Defense said,
“We will accelerate the evacuation of thousands of Afghans eligible for U.S. Special Immigrant
Visas, nearly 2,000 of whom have already arrived in the United States over the past two weeks.”
The statement further noted: “For all categories, Afghans who have cleared security screening
will continue to be transferred directly to the United States. And we will find additional locations
for those yet to be screened.”149
At an August 16, 2021, press briefing, the State Department spokesperson was asked how many
Afghan SIV applicants would be relocated to the United States. He declined to provide a number,
citing the fluidity of the situation. 150 Future relocations were also discussed at a Pentagon press
briefing that same day. After stating that 2,000 Afghan SIV applicants had already arrived in the
United States, Garry Reid, director of the Department of Defense’s Afghanistan Crisis Action
Group, said that “USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and the U.S. Army are working to
create additional capacity.”151
In more recent statements, U.S. officials have not indicated how many Afghan evacuees are SIV
holders or SIV applicants. On September 3, 2021, Secretary of State Blinken referenced Afghan
Bureau of Consular Affairs at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/immigrant-visastatistics.html. Updated FY2021 data (through August 28, 2021) were provided to CRS by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs. FY2021 data are preliminary.
145 For further information, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs.
146
White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan , April 14, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-wayforward-in-afghanistan/.
147 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Antony J. Blinken On CNN’s State of the Union
with Dana Bash, press release, June 13, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cnns-state-of-theunion-with-dana-bash/.
148
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson , Arrival of First Flight of Operation Allies Refuge, July 30,
2021, https://www.state.gov/arrival-of-first-flight-of-operation-allies-refuge/.
149 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement from the Department of State and
Department of Defense: Update on Afghanistan, August 15, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-from-thedepartment-of-state-and-department-of-defense-update-on-afghanistan/.
150
See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing—August 16, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-16-2021/.
151
U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing , August 16, 2021,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2733523/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirbyholds-a-press-briefing/. Although Reid referenced “refugee relocation” in his remarks, he seemed to be referring to
capacity for Afghan SIV applicants. For example, he noted that the arrivals “ will have been prescreened by the
Department of Homeland Security to enter on a condition of full immigration processing once they arrive.”
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special immigrants as a proportion of the overall evacuee population, but said he could not
provide specific numbers:
Of the roughly 124,000 people who’ve been evacuated, the vast majority—the vast
majority, 75, 80 percent—are Afghans at risk. And of those, some significant number will
be SIVs, either people who already hold an SIV visa or those who are actually in the
pipeline.152
At a September 1, 2021, press briefing, the State Department spokesperson provided data on
Afghan arrivals to the United States:
Since August 17th and through August 31st at midnight Eastern time, 31,107 people have
arrived … to the U.S. as part of this operation. So of that s ubset—which, of course, is just
a small subset of the 124,000—we understand that about 14 percent are U.S. citizens, or
4,446; about 9 percent are LPRs, 2,785; and the remaining 77 percent —23,876 individuals
—are Afghans at risk. And, of course, falling into that category are SIVs, other visa holders
….153
Press reports published on or after September 8, 2021, cite DHS data on Afghan evacuees
who have arrived in the United States. For example, a Washington Post article stated:
Of the 60,000 evacuees who have arrived so far, 11 percent are U.S. citizens and 6 percent
are legal permanent residents, according to DHS. The remaining 83 percent are considered
"at-risk Afghans" who either qualify for special immigrant visas as a result of their work
for the U.S. government, or are part of a much larger number who will arrive with a
provisional immigration status known as “humanitarian parole.” 154
U.S. Refugee Program
Individuals of any nationality can be considered for refugee admission to the United States.
Among the applicable requirements, an individual must meet the definition of a refugee in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA generally defines a refugee as a person who is
outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 155 Individuals who are admitted to the United States
as refugees are granted refugee status. After one year in the United States in refugee status,
individuals are required to apply to become LPRs.
To be considered for refugee resettlement in the United States, a foreign national must fall under
a “processing priority.” For example, Priority 1 (P-1) covers individual cases referred to the U.S.
refugee program by designated entities based on their circumstances and apparent need for
resettlement. Priority 2 (P-2) covers groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States.
It includes specific groups that may be defined by their nationalities, clans, ethnicities, or other
characteristics. P-2 groups are identified by the State Department in consultation with DHS and
152 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan at a
Press Availability, September 3, 2021.
153 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing – September 1, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press-briefing-september-1-2021/.
Nick Miroff, “44 Afghan evacuees flagged as potential security risks,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2021,
p. A16. DHS does not seem to have otherwise made these data publicly available.
154
155 INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42). For additional inform ation on the U.S. refugee program, see CRS Report
RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy.
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others. Of particular relevance to Afghans who have assisted the United States is a new P-2 group
that was established in August 2021. 156
The new P-2 group is for certain Afghan nationals and their family members (spouses and sons
and daughters of any age). A State Department fact sheet describes this new P-2 program as
providing a resettlement opportunity for “many thousands of Afghans and their immediate family
members who may be at risk due to their U.S. affiliation but who are not eligible for a Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) because they did not have qualifying employment, or because they have
not met the time-in-service requirement to become eligible.” Among those eligible for this P-2
program are “Afghans who work or worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project in
Afghanistan supported through a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement,” and
“Afghans who are or were employed in Afghanistan by a U.S.-based media organization or nongovernmental organization.” Eligible Afghans must be referred to this program by a U.S.
government agency or, in the case of a media organization or NGO, by the most senior U.S.
citizen employee of that organization. 157
A supplementary information sheet on this P-2 program highlights relevant issues for prospective
applicants to consider. Among these considerations is that there is no U.S. refugee processing in
Afghanistan or certain neighboring countries. Individuals who want to pursue refugee
applications must travel to third countries and must do so at their own expense. 158 This need to
process refugee cases in third countries was discussed at an August 2, 2021, briefing with State
Department officials. In response to a question about whether refugee applicants would be
relocated like SIV applicants, an unnamed official said: “At this time, we do not anticipate
relocating P-2 applicants prior to or during the application process. However, we continue to
review the situation on the ground.”159
More recent statements from the State Department suggest that some P-2-eligible and P-1-eligible
Afghans may have been relocated. In his September 3, 2021, comments on the “vast majority” of
Afghan evacuees that are “Afghans at risk,” Secretary Blinken indicated that “some number will
be potential P-1 or P-2 refugees.” At the press briefing on September 1, 2021, the State
Department spokesperson also suggested that Afghans with P-1 or P-2 referrals may have entered
the United States. 160
Immigration Parole
The parole provision in the INA gives the DHS Secretary discretionary authority to “parole into
the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case
156 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Priority 2 Designation for
Afghan Nationals, August 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-refugee-admissions-program-priority-2-designation-forafghan-nationals/. T his fact sheet also describes the other processing priorities.
157 Ibid.
158
See U.S. Department of State, Information for Afghan Nationals Regarding Priority 2 (P-2) Designation,
https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/
Information%20for%20Afghan%20Nationals%20Regarding%20Priority%202%20 (P-2)%20Designation.pdf.
159 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Briefing with Senior State Department Officials On the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program Priority 2 (P-2) Designation for Afghan Nationals, August 2, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-on-the-u-s-refugee-admissions-program-priority2-p-2-designation-for-afghan-nationals/.
160 Persons cannot pursue U.S. refugee applications within the United States. T hey can, however, apply for asylum. For
information about asylum, see CRS Report R45539, Immigration: U.S. Asylum Policy.
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basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States.”161 Parolees can apply for work authorization.
A DHS fact sheet on Operation Allies Welcome, which is described within as “ongoing efforts
across the federal government to support vulnerable Afghans … as they safely resettle in the
United States,” discusses the use of parole for Afghans, as follows:
[Parole] permits certain Afghan nationals to come into the United States, on a case-by-case
basis, for a period of two years and subsequent to appropriate screening and vetting,
provided their movement to the United States is being carried out pursuant to the current
operation. Once paroled by CBP [DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection], Afghan
nationals may be eligible to apply for immigration status through USCIS. Afghan nationals
paroled by CBP will also have conditions placed on their parole, to include medical
screening and vaccination requirements, and other reporting requirements.162
Presumably, these parolees would be among the “Afghans at risk” mentioned in the above section
on “Special Immigrant Visas.” DHS has not published data on the number of Afghans granted
parole.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
How many Afghans have pending special immigrant applications? How many of
these individuals are in the United States? How many of these individuals remain
in Afghanistan, and what plans, if any, are in place to help them leave the
country? How many Afghans who have not submitted SIV applications do you
estimate may be eligible? Where will Afghan SIV processing take place
overseas?
How many Afghan P-2 referrals has the State Department received? Where are
these referred individuals currently located? What plans, if any, are in place to
help referred individuals leave Afghanistan? The P-2 program announcement
indicated that these cases would take 12-14 months to process. Is this still the
expected time frame? What is the status of pending Afghan P-2 cases?
How many Afghans have been paroled into the United States? How does the
security clearance process for Afghan parole applicants compare to that for
Afghan refugee and SIV applicants? What types of services are being provided to
Afghan parolees? How many parolees have pending applications to obtain a
more permanent immigration status, and what statuses are they pursuing?
How might the reestablishment of Taliban rule affect terrorist
groups in Afghanistan?163
Since 2001, counterterrorism has been an important component of U.S. operations in Afghanistan,
where a number of terrorist groups operate. With the Afghan government’s collapse, the United
States has lost a previous counterterrorism partner, leading to questions about the viability of U.S.
efforts to counter future terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the regional
161 INA §212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)). For additional information, see CRS Report R46570, Immigration Parole.
162 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Operation Allies Welcome,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjSm9PKtfz
yAhXeKVkFHWJ-C_4QFnoECAQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhs.gov%2Fpublication%2Ffact -sheetoperation-allies-welcome&usg=AOvVaw3wRvqxh_fSWBJx0NJ9fJqz.
163 T his section was prepared by Clayton T homas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K) are two of
the most significant terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to impact them in
different ways.
The Taliban are not a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (despite at least one past
congressional attempt to call for such a designation), though the group (since 2002) and many of
its members have been designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under
Executive Order 13224. 164 SDGTs are denied access to their U.S.-based assets, U.S. persons are
prohibited from engaging in transactions with them, and any foreign financial institution found to
have conducted or facilitated a significant transaction on behalf of the SDGT can be prohibited
from using the U.S. banking system.
Al Qaeda (AQ) is still assessed to have a presence in Afghanistan and its decades-long ties with
the Taliban appear to have remained strong in recent years. In October 2020, Afghan forces killed
a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living
and working with Taliban forces. 165 In May 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that Al Qaeda
had “minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not
jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”166 In its report on the final quarter of 2020, the
DOD Office of the Inspector General relayed an assessment from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) that the Taliban maintain ties to Al Qaeda and that some AQ members were
“integrated into the Taliban’s forces and command structure.”167 In a semiannual report released
in April 2021, the Department of Defense stated, “The Taliban have maintained mutually
beneficial relations with AQ-related organizations and are unlikely to take substantive action
against these groups.”168 AQ-Taliban ties have been reinforced by the groups’ shared struggle in
Afghanistan and personal bonds, including marriage links.
In the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban committed to not allow any terrorist groups, including
Al Qaeda, to use Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies, including
by preventing such groups from training, fundraising, recruiting, or residing in Afghanistan. The
accord does not provide for verification mechanisms to monitor Taliban compliance. The Taliban
have claimed in recent years there are no “foreign fighters”—a term generally used to denote
non-Afghans fighting with, or alongside, the Taliban—in Afghanistan. In February 2021, the
group reportedly issued a directive barring Taliban fighters from “bringing foreign nationals into
their ranks or giving them shelter.”169
One analyst argues that while some parts of the Taliban oppose the group’s ties with Al Qaeda,
citing the costs of the relationship in terms of the Taliban’s international image and U.S. pressure,
shared ideology links the two groups. While the Taliban do not have transnational aims like Al
Qaeda does, Al Qaeda, he argues, “sees the Afghan Taliban as an important partner in its
164 See H.Con.Res. 13, introduced in February 2015.
Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for T error Group,” Voice of America, October 26,
2020.
165
166 Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557
(2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020.
167 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 December 31, 2020, released February 17, 2021.
168
U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2020, released April 23,
2021.
169 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan T aliban Ask Fighters Not T o Harbor ‘Foreign’ Militants as US Reviews Peace Deal,’” Voice of
America, February 2, 2021.
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stewardship of global jihad,” as evidenced by the allegiance successive AQ leaders have pledged
to successive Taliban leaders. 170 In an August 2021 interview, a Taliban spokesman said “there
was no proof [bin Laden] was involved” in the September 11, 2001, attacks.171 AQ figures were
reportedly among the thousands of prisoners released from Parwan Detention Facility by the
Taliban in August 2021. 172
U.S. officials reportedly told Senators in August 2021 that “terror groups like al-Qaida may be
able to grow much faster than expected” in the wake of the Taliban takeover. 173 U.S. intelligence
officials also reportedly said in September 2021 that their “current assessment” is that Al Qaeda
could “build some capability to at least threaten the homeland” in one to two years. 174 They
additionally said there are “indications of some potential movement of al Qaeda to Afghanistan,”
but that the United States faces greater terrorism threats from Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq. 175
Others argue that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.
counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and the potential
for Taliban pressure. 176 The power dynamic between Al Qaeda and the Taliban has changed over
the past 20 years: AQ financial and military support was critical in bolstering the Taliban before
2001, but AQ seems to have played little if any direct role in the Taliban’s 2021 return to power.
The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan (ISKP), on the other hand, opposes the Taliban and the
two groups have often clashed. The Islamic State views the Taliban’s nationalist political project
as opposed to their own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The Taliban’s takeover likely
represents a setback for ISKP; Taliban forces reportedly executed an imprisoned former ISKP
leader after the Taliban captured an Afghan government prison in Kabul. 177 Taliban compromises
on certain issues as the group begins governing could prompt hardliners to defect to ISKP; some
Taliban fighters have associated themselves with ISKP in the past. The United States previously
supported Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation. 178 At a
September 1, 2021, press conference, when asked about the possibility of future U.S.
coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General Milley said, “It’s possible.”179
On August 26, 2021, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack (comprising a suicide
bomber and additional fighters with firearms) at Kabul International Airport that left 13 U.S.
service members and more than 150 Afghans dead. The attack raises questions about the
Asfandyar Mir, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the T aliban is Unlikely to Break T ies with Al-Qaeda,” Modern
War Institute at West Point, August 10, 2021.
170
Rachel Pannett, “Taliban spokesman says ‘no proof’ bin Laden was responsible for 9/11 attacks,” Washington Post,
August 26, 2021.
172
Nick Paton Walsh and Sandi Sidhu, “Al Qaeda and T aliban members among thousands of prisoners left under
Afghan control in jail next to deserted US air base,” CNN, July 6, 2021.
171
173 Michael Balsamo et al., “Concerns over US terror threat rising as T aliban hold grows,” Associated Press, August
15, 2021.
174
Julian Barnes, “Al Qaeda Could Rebuilt in Afghanistan in a Year or T wo, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,
September 14, 2021.
175 Barnes, op. cit., Courtney McBride and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Spies See Signs of Al Qaeda Fighters Returning to
Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2021.
Ahmad Siddiqi, “T he West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,
“Will Afghanistan Become a T errorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.
177 Yaroslav T rifimov et al., “T aliban Consolidate Control in Afghanistan’s Capital as T housands Remain Stranded,”
Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2021.
176
178
Wesley Morgan, “Our secret T aliban air force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
179 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the
U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.
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Taliban’s ability (or perhaps willingness) to combat ISKP and the threat ISKP represents to the
Taliban’s effort to demonstrate its ability to govern and secure the country.180
Beyond Afghanistan, some argue the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan could boost Islamist
extremist terrorist groups worldwide; AQ supporters reportedly greeted the Taliban takeover as a
victory for the cause of global jihadism. 181 One analyst has argued, in contrast, that the Taliban
takeover showed the utility of diplomacy and negotiation to the achievement of jihad aims. 182
Amid the U.S. withdrawal in the summer of 2021, U.S. officials said that the United States would
maintain “over-the-horizon” capabilities to combat terrorist threats. With the Taliban in control of
the country, the United States might have to alter those plans, for instance by replacing manned
flights with drone operations, flown from U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region that are remote
from Afghanistan’s borders. 183 The lack of a U.S. military presence or partner force on the ground
may also restrict intelligence gathering capabilities. An August 29, 2021, U.S. drone strike in
Kabul that killed civilians demonstrated the challenges and limitations of these restrictions. 184
Some Members of Congress have argued that the Administration has not been sufficiently
forthcoming with regard to U.S. plans to counter terrorism in Afghanistan going forward. 185
What are the prospects for continued U.S. civilian assistance to
Afghanistan?186
As of June 30, 2021, the United States had allocated approximately $36.29 billion in current
dollars for “governance and development assistance” in Afghanistan since FY2002, representing
25% of total U.S.-provided reconstruction assistance.187 Such funding has aimed to support a
range of development goals, including expanding education, combating corruption, promoting
good governance and civil society, and empowering women and girls. The majority of civilian
assistance has been implemented by nongovernmental partners such as multilateral entities,
nonprofit organizations, universities, and private sector actors.
Congress regularly enacts laws that require the withholding of U.S. assistance subject to various
conditions including, for Afghanistan, those related to counternarcotics efforts, corruption, and
women’s rights. 188 Successive Administrations have, pursuant to these laws, certified Afghan
180 Sudarsan Raghavan, “T he U.S. branded the Haqqanis terrorists and issued $5 million bounties. Now they’re in
power in the T aliban government,” Washington Post, September 11, 2021.
181 Warren Strobel and Dustin Volz, “Extremists Celebrate T aliban T akeover of Afghanistan on Social Media,” Wall
Street Journal, August 17, 2021.
182 Hassan Hassan, “What the Global War on T error Really Accomplished,” Newlines, September 9, 2021.
183 Missy Ryan and Souad Mekhennet, “After Taliban triumph, Biden faces even greater test in preventing extremist
resurgence in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 16, 2021.
184 Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon acknowledges Aug. 29 drone strike in Af ghanistan was a tragic mistake
that killed 10 civilians,” New York Times, September 17, 2021.
185
186
Jonathan Swan and Zachary Basu, “Red flags for Biden’s ‘over-the-horizon’ strategy,” Axios, September 12, 2021.
T his section was prepared by Emily Morgenstern, Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy.
187 SIGAR, June 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, p. 25. According to SIGAR, other reconstruction assistance includes
security assistance, humanitarian aid, and agency operations.
188 For example Section 7044(a)(2)(B) of the FY2016 SFOPS appropriations bill (Division K of P.L. 114-113) required
that prior to obligating Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds, the
Secretary of State certify that the Government of Afghanistan had met or was meeting certain requirements. T hese
included “ ... continuing to implement laws and policies to govern democratically and protect the rights of individuals
and civil society, including steps to protect and advance the rights of women and girls ... ” and “ ... reducing corruption
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compliance with these conditions and no U.S. funds have been withheld. 189 However, with the
Taliban takeover and the Afghan government’s collapse, bilateral aid that has traditionally been
implemented by nongovernmental entities may be reduced or eliminated pursuant to existing
conditions included in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
(SFOPS) appropriations measures. For example, current Economic Support Fund and
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance appropriated for Afghanistan
may not be made available for any program, project or activity that —(i) cannot be
sustained, as appropriate, by the Government of Afghanistan or another Afghan entity; (ii)
is not accessible for the purposes of conducting effective oversight in accordance with
applicable Federal statutes and regulations; (iii) initiates any new, major infrastructure
development; or (iv) includes the participation of any Afghan individual, organization, or
government entity if the Secretary of State has credible information that such individual,
organization, or entity is knowingly involved in acts of grand corruption, illicit narcotics
production or trafficking, or has committed a gross violation of human rights. 190
Bilateral U.S. aid to government entities in Afghanistan may also cease depending on
Administration determinations. This action might occur pursuant to Section 7021(b) of the
FY2021 SFOPS appropriations measure, which prohibits funds from being made available to any
foreign government, which the President determines “grants sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism” or “otherwise supports
international terrorism.”
Taliban control of Afghanistan could also raise significant concerns about the long-term
effectiveness and sustainability of any U.S.-administered assistance programs, regardless of
which implementing partners carry out such programs. The current security situation in
Afghanistan and resulting evacuations of U.S. diplomatic and development staff might also
directly affect program oversight capabilities, potentially requiring the United States to rely
heavily or solely on third-party monitoring for any assistance programs that may continue.
The Biden Administration has not signaled whether or not it will seek to provide civilian
assistance to a Taliban-governed Afghanistan. Administration requests for funding related to
Afghanistan have primarily focused on humanitarian assistance to aid Afghans in need, including
those remaining in the country as well as those who have fled, as well as the processing of
Afghan refugees. 191 Some Members of Congress have stated that they would not support bilateral
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan under any conditions, while others may support some aid subject
to certain criteria. 192 As the situation in Afghanistan evolves, it remains to be seen how, if at all,
civilian assistance could be delivered, administered, and overseen, and how Congress might
evaluate its funding for and conditions on assistance to the country.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
and prosecuting individuals alleged to be involved in illegal activities ... ”, among others.
189 For more, see “Aid Conditionality and Oversight” in CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S.
Policy, by Clayton T homas.
190 Section 7044(a)(1)(C) the FY2019 SFOPS bill (Division F of P.L. 116-6). Section 7044(a)(1)(F) of the FY2021
SFOPS bill (Division K of P.L. 117-260), reaffirms the provision’s applicability for FY2021 appropriated funds.
“ FY 2022 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues (anomalies required for a short -term CR),” at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CR_Package_9-7-21.pdf.
191
192 Arshad Mohammed, Patricia Zengerle, and Jonathan Landay, "U.S. seen funding humanitarian aid for Afghanistan,
but not its government," Reuters, September 4, 2021.
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Are there concerns that civilian assistance to the country could be at risk of
diversion by the Taliban or other, nonstate malign actors?
What U.S. policy options are available to promote human rights in
Afghanistan and respond to human rights abuses?193
Various U.S. policy options exist that may allow the United States to pressure the Taliban to
protect human rights in Afghanistan, although the ability of the United States to induce genuine,
robust, or sustained human rights commitments or actions is arguable. 194 The United States may
consider whether and, if so, how to condition U.S. recognition of the Taliban as the official
government of Afghanistan—or diplomatic relations with the government following such formal
recognition—on criteria that includes respect for human rights. 195 The United States may also
consider whether to maintain, increase, or reduce U.S. sanctions depending on actions taken by
the Taliban with regard to human rights. 196 Biden Administration officials have indicated that
sanctions will not be lifted if the Taliban is not protecting the basic rights of the Afghan people,
and that the United States will condition recognition of the Taliban in part on human rights
matters. 197
To date, the United States has reportedly been working to coordinate policy on these matters with
allies and partners, which could increase the likelihood of inducing actions or commitments by
the Taliban. 198 An August 24, 2021 statement by G7 leaders stated that the Taliban “will be held
accountable for their actions” on human rights and connected the “legitimacy of any future
government” in Afghanistan with the Taliban’s upholding of international obligations and
commitments. 199 On August 30, 2021, a U.N. Security Council resolution reaffirmed “the
importance of upholding human rights including those of women, children, and minorities,” and
encouraged an “inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful
participation of women, that responds to the desire of Afghans to sustain and build on
Afghanistan’s gains over the last twenty years in adherence to the rule of law.”200 Secretary of
State Blinken, while co-hosting a September 8, 2021 ministerial on Afghanistan with allies and
partners, stated that the Taliban’s desired legitimacy and support “has to be earned ... through a
sustained pattern of action that demonstrates a genuine commitment to core expectations that are
193
T his section was prepared by Michael Weber, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.
194 For an analysis of possible leverage that the United States has over the T aliban, see Desha Girod, “Can the West
Make the T aliban Moderate?” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2021.
See T ess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, “ Recognition and the T aliban,” Just Security, August 17, 2021; and
“What are some of the implications if the T aliban is recognized as the official government of Afghanistan by the
United States and the international community?” above.
196 For a discussion of the possible implications of existing sanctions on the T aliban as a result of its control of
Afghanistan, see Adam M. Smith, “ T he Humanitarian and Policy Challenges of U.S. Sanctions on the T aliban ,” Just
Security, August 23, 2021.
195
U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Jake T apper of State of the Union on CNN,”
interview, August 15, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing, September 1, 2021.
198 Ryan Heath, “ Western nations coordinating to block T aliban recognition ”; Andrea Shalal, “ G7 leaders plan to
pledge unity on T aliban recognition, sanctions,” Reuters, August 23, 2021; Patrick Wintour, “ US-led meeting to set out
framework for T aliban cooperation,” The Guardian, September 8, 2021.
197
199 United Kingdom Prime Minister’s Office, “ G7 Leaders Statement on Afghanistan,” August 24, 2021.
200 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Document S/RES/2593 (2021), August 30, 2021.
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enshrined” in the Security Council resolution. Blinken noted that “the names in the caretaker
government do not inspire confidence” that the Taliban will form an inclusive government. 201
As noted above, reports of human rights violations in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan may raise
the prospect of targeted U.S. sanctions against individual perpetrators. 202 Congress has provided
the executive branch with global authorities to target foreign persons for sanctions based on
human rights, which can aim to “name and shame” individuals, disrupt human rights violations or
abuses and/or deter future such acts, and promote accountability, among other goals. Most
prominently, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L.
114-328) provides the executive branch standing discretionary capacity to impose economic and
visa sanctions on individuals or entities based on human rights. 203 Executive Order 13818, which
implements and builds on the act, also provides broad scope to sanction associated networks of
individuals and entities. 204 Separately, a recurring provision in SFOPS, Section 7031(c), provides
for public visa sanctions designations against foreign officials as well as their immediate family
members for gross violations of human rights. 205 Aside from utilizing these or other relevant
authorities, the executive branch could also potentially choose to draw on Presidential emergency
powers to establish an Afghanistan-specific sanctions regime that targets human rights abuses
there. 206
Foreign assistance is another possible tool to promote human rights in Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. As discussed elsewhere in this report, human rights and other conditions may lead
the United States to reduce or eliminate assistance to Afghanistan in the wake of the Afghan
government’s collapse. 207 Various standing provisions of U.S. law also require or allow assistance
restrictions based on human rights that could have relevance in the event of the Taliban’s
continued control of the country. Provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
restrict security and development assistance to any country the government of which “engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”208 Other
provisions of law provide the capacity to more narrowly restrict certain types of assistance based
on human rights-related matters. 209 The extent to which democracy assistance—which Congress
U.S. Department of State, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken Opening Remarks at Ministerial on Afghanistan ,”
September 8, 2021.
202
According the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, there are “ credible reports of serious violations of
international humanitarian law, and human rights abuses, taking place in many areas under effective T aliban control.
T hey include, among others, summary executions of civilians and hors de combat members of the Afghan national
security forces; restrictions on the rights of women – including their right to move around freely and girls’ right to
attend schools; recruitment of child soldiers; and repression of peaceful protest and expression of dissent.” See U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “ Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights,” August 24, 2021.
201
203
For additional background see CRS In Focus IF10576, The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, by
Michael A. Weber and Edward J. Collins-Chase.
204
E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” 82
Federal Register 60839, December 20, 2017.
205 For additional background see CRS In Focus IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting
Foreign Corruption and Human Rights Violations, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber
206 See CRS Report R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use ,
coordinated by Christopher A. Casey.
207 See “ What are the prospects for continued U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan ” and “ What will happen to U.S.
funding provided for Afghanistan security forces?”
208 See Section 116 (22 U.S.C. §2151n) and Section 502B (22 U.S.C. §2304).
209 For instance, human trafficking and the recruitment or use of child soldiers, which the United States has previously
identified Afghanistan in association with pursuant to relevant laws. See CRS Report R44953, The State Department’s
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makes available “notwithstanding any other provision of law”—will continue in Afghanistan and
in what form is arguably uncertain given the current security situation and possible curtailments
on the activities of civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and independent media
under Taliban rule. Notably, Congress has appropriated some assistance globally for purposes of
supporting and protecting civil society activists and journalists who have been “threatened,
harassed, or attacked.”210
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
What specific human rights actions or commitments are sought from the Taliban,
and how will the United States assess the credibility of any commitments? What
actions will the United States take in response?
To what extent, if at all, could U.S. attempts to exercise leverage over the Taliban
be undermined by the actions of other actors such as China and Russia?
What, if any, possible unintended humanitarian or other consequences could
result if the United States maintains or increases sanctions due to concerns over
human rights, and how, if it all, can these consequences be mitigated?
What plans exist, if any, for U.S. democracy and human rights foreign assistance
to continue in the context of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan?
What might the Taliban takeover mean for security cooperation as a
national security tool?211
A central aspect of the U.S. and coalition campaign in Afghanistan was training and equipping the
ANDSF. 212 Some observers, citing long-standing deficiencies in certain components of the
ANDSF, as well as recent events, have questioned the efficacy of U.S. efforts to build the security
capacity of allies and partners writ large. 213 Drawing on this example, the fact that the ANDSF did
not forestall a Taliban takeover could suggest to some that such capacity-building efforts are
strategically problematic and that the U.S. should exercise caution when trying to build foreign
militaries. Others have countered that the situation in Afghanistan was unique, that train and
equip efforts were being conducted during wartime, and that there were myriad other factors
leading to the collapse—including the failings of the Afghan government and the unique
dependence of the Afghan military on U.S. support—that are not always present in other security
cooperation endeavors. 214 A 2014 Rand Corporation study of the relationship between security
cooperation and fragility found that U.S. security cooperation efforts did correlate with a
Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan,
and Liana W. Rosen; and CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions, by
Michael A. Weber.
210 See Section 7032(h) of P.L. 116-260.
211 T his section was prepared by Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security.
Craig Whitlock, “ Afghan security forces’ wholesale collapse was years in the making,” The Washington Post,
August 16, 2021.
213 Anthony Capaccio,” As Kabul Fell, U.S. Watchdog Wrote Sad Coda to a 20-Year Failure,” Bloomberg News,
August 17, 2021; Kori Schake, Why the Afghan Army Folded: America has historically struggled to train foreign
militaries, The Atlantic, August 17, 2021.
212
214 CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J.
McInnis; Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of
Afghanistan Reconstruction, August 2021.
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reduction in partner state fragility, but that that (a) most of the effect was concentrated at lower
funding levels; and (b) the correlation was stronger in more democratic states and those with
stronger institutions. 215 In 2020, the Fund for Peace, a nongovernmental organization, ranked
Afghanistan among the ten most fragile states in the world. 216 Members of Congress and others
may seek to draw lessons from security sector reform efforts in Afghanistan and determine what
lessons, if any, might be transferable or relevant in other contexts.
Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include
With the collapse of the Afghan military, is there potential for U.S.- and
coalition-trained and armed Afghan forces to join the Taliban or regional terrorist
groups? If this happens, what are the possible threats posed by these individuals?
Likewise, is there a possibility that some Afghan Special Forces or other
elements could form the nucleus of a credible counter-Taliban resistance
movement? Under what circumstances might the U.S. government provide
support to such a group, if any?
Social and Economic Implications of the
Taliban Takeover
What might be the implications of the Taliban takeover for Afghan
women and girls?217
Decades of war after 1978 and the repressive five-year rule of the Taliban severely undermined
the rights and development of Afghan women, who had been granted equal rights under the 1964
constitution. These rights were not always observed, but prior to 1978, women were present in
legislative bodies, universities, and work places, particularly in urban areas. During their rule
between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban “perpetrated egregious acts of violence against women” as
part of a “war against women,” according to a 2001 State Department report.218 Based on their
particularly conservative interpretation of Islam and Pashtun social norms, the Taliban prohibited
women from working, attending school after age eight, and appearing in public without a male
blood relative and without wearing a burqa. Women accused of breaking these or other
restrictions suffered severe corporal or capital punishment, often publicly.
To date, the Taliban have not described in detail how they now view women’s rights or what role
women would play in a future Taliban-governed society. In February 2020, deputy Taliban
leader Sirajuddin Haqqani wrote of “an Islamic system … where the rights of women that are
granted by Islam—from the right to education to the right to work—are protected.”219 Skeptics
note that a pledge to safeguard the rights of women “according to Islam” and their interpretation
of sharia is subjective and echoes similar pledges made by the Taliban while previously in power.
215
Michael J. McNerney et al., “Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventiv e T ool,” Rand Corporation, 2014.
216 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, 2020, https://fragilestatesindex.org/.
217 T his section was prepared by Sarah R. Collins, Research Assistant. For additional background, see CRS In Focus
IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action , by Clayton T homas and Sarah R. Collins.
218 U.S. Department of State, Report on the Taliban’s War Against Women, November 17, 2001.
219 Sirajuddin Haqqani, “ What We, the T aliban, Want ,” The New York Times, February 20, 2020.
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Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to
protecting women’s rights “within the framework of Sharia.”220 Some observers question whether
the statements by the Taliban are an attempt to assuage concerns that a rollback of women’s rights
is imminent and to dispel “rumors” about reported actions recently carried out by the group, such
as forced marriages. 221 In the immediate aftermath of the takeover, Taliban leaders called on
women government employees to return to their posts, as long as they were wearing the hijab
(headscarf), and granted “amnesty” to all who worked with foreign powers.222 Taliban leaders
have subsequently called for women to stay home temporarily, until the military situation
becomes more clear and “until we have a new procedure,” citing concerns over new Taliban
forces who “have not yet been trained very well” and who may mistreat, harm, or harass
women. 223
The Taliban are accused of numerous attacks on girls’ schools during their insurgency. The
Taliban claim to not oppose education for girls, and in Taliban-controlled areas some girls had
been attending primary school. In some cases, before the full takeover in August, when a local
community advocated for girls’ education, the Taliban allowed it until sixth grade; when it did
not, the Taliban closed girls’ schools. A 2018 study could not identify a single girls’ secondary
school open in areas of heavy Taliban influence or control. 224 On September 12, 2021, Acting
Minister for Higher Education Abdul Baqi Haqqani announced that women would be allowed to
continue attending university; however classrooms would be gender-segregated and Islamic dress
would be compulsory for women. Haqqani also noted that a curriculum review would be
undertaken, and that female students would only be allowed to be taught by women or by male
teachers if they are hidden behind a curtain or via video conferencing. 225
The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Others have
noted that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of women’s rights that in
some cases predate the Taliban movement, particularly in rural areas where 76% of the population
resides: “For many rural women, particularly in Pashtun areas but also among other rural
minority ethnic groups, actual life has not changed much from the Taliban era, formal legal
empowerment notwithstanding.”226
Moreover, the physical and psychological toll of the conflict’s violence have further undermined
women’s development. According to the 2021 SIGAR lessons learned report on gender equality
One outcome of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was supposed to have been a steady
improvement in the lives of Afghan women—and, to be sure, improvements have
220 “ T ranscript of T aliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021.
221 Lynne O’Donnell, “ As T aliban Expand Control, Concerns About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise,” Foreign
Policy, July 23, 2021.
222 “ T aliban urges government staff to return to work,” Ariana News, August 16, 2021. Other restrictions imposed in
some areas of the country since May 2021 have included ordering women not leave the home without a male guardian,
closing girls and mixed-gender schools, and banning the use of television. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, “Escalation of Violent Confrontations and a Rise in Violations of Human Rights, June 22 to July 6,
2021,” July 17, 2021.
Maggie Astor, Sharif Hassan, and Norimitsu Onishi, “ A T aliban spokesman urges women to stay home because
fighters haven’t been trained to respect them,” The New York Times, August 24, 2021.
224 Ashley Jackson, “Life Under the T aliban Shadow Government,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2018.
223
Ezzatullah Mehrdad, Gerry Shih and Miriam Berger, “ T aliban minister says women can attend university, but not
alongside men,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021.
225
226 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,
September 2020.
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U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: FAQs
happened. But these gains have occurred alongside, and in many cases in spite of, the
misery wrought by the last two decades of war. Violence continues to be one of the biggest
challenges facing Afghan women, both directly and indirectly [ ... ] every civilian casualty
brings with it a series of potential ripple effects: increasingly desperate poverty, mental
trauma, and the social stigma and discrimination that accompany permanent disability and
widowhood.227
For some Afghan women, particularly those in rural areas more affected by conflict, the Taliban
takeover may represent an improvement over high levels of violence that have characterized
recent years, if the group can prevent further violence and improve security conditions. Fieldwork
conducted in 2019 and 2020 found that “peace is an absolute priority for some rural women, even
a peace deal very much on the Taliban terms.”228 Some have credited the Taliban’s takeover in
1996 with reducing the widespread sexual and gender-based violence perpetuated by militias
during the preceding civil wars. 229
For other women, the Taliban’s takeover in 2021 has increased fears of sexual violence,
retaliation, and displacement, and highlight longer-term concerns over the future of women’s
rights under a Taliban government. 230 A number of women have publicly protested in Kabul and
other cities to demand protection for human rights and inclusion in the Taliban government.
Reports indicate some women have been beaten by Taliban fighters while protesting, and some
journalists have been detained while covering the protests. 231 The caretaker cabinet announced on
September 7, 2021, reinstates the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,
which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the 1990s. It did not include the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs, which was not present in the prior Taliban government but had been created
during the most recent Afghan government. 232
The future of women’s rights and status in Afghanistan could depend on many factors, including
Consensus, or a lack thereof, within the Taliban over which rights will be
afforded under an Islamic system;
The security situation and the level of violence;
Levels of international development aid and the ability of donors to implement
programs for women; and
The degree to which international or domestic actors can induce the Taliban to
institute policies respecting women’s rights.
227 SIGAR, Support for Gender Equality: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, February 2021, pp. 11-12.
Allen and Brown, “ T he fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan”; International Crisis Group, “ What Will Peace T alks
Bode for Afghan Women?” briefing note, April 6, 2020.
228
229 Aisha Ahmad, “Afghan Women: T he State of Legal Rights and Security,” Policy Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1
(January - June 2006), pp. 25-41.
230 See e.g. “ ‘I worry my daughters will never know peace’: women flee the T aliban —again,” The Guardian, August
12, 2021; Farnaz Fassihi and Dan Bilefsky, “ For Afghan Women, T aliban Stir Fears of Return to a Repressive Past ,”
The New York Times, August 17, 2021.
Yaroslav T rofimov, “ Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line T aliban Government, Face Violent Crackdown ,” Wall
Street Journal, September 8, 2021.
231
232 Rachel Pannett, “ Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the T aliban’s top
officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.
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How has the Taliban advance affected the humanitarian situation
on the ground in Afghanistan?233
The humanitarian situation since the Taliban takeover is fragile and subject to change.
Humanitarian needs are expected to rise significantly, and many humanitarian organizations are
assessing the status of their activities based on the security situation. Current conditions could
further hinder assistance delivery and risk the safety of humanitarian personnel. The United
Nations confirmed its commitment to stay, deliver assistance, and support the humanitarian
response in Afghanistan234 ; however, these efforts could shift depending on security
considerations. 235 While the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has historically
engaged with the Taliban, the level and extent, if any, of current communications are not publicly
available. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which has been in Afghanistan since
1987 and has provided assistance across the country (including in Taliban-controlled areas), plans
to continue its efforts along with the Afghan Red Crescent Society. 236 As of early 2021, roughly
half of Afghanistan’s population (18.4 million people, out of a population of 35 to 40 million)
faced a severe humanitarian crisis 237 , with approximately one-third of the population struggling
with emergency-level food insecurity. 238 The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
conflict, and natural disasters (most recently drought conditions) have exacerbated the
humanitarian situation, resulting in chronic vulnerability among the general population.
Escalating conflict in recent months has resulted in increasing numbers of trauma injuries among
Afghans as well as increased overall protection concerns, particularly for women.239
233
234
T his section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
Humanitarian assistance is provided according to principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.
U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Statement by Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, U.N. [Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General] DSRSG and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on UN staying to
support aid response in Afghanistan,” August 17, 2021. Specific U.N. entities have issued similar statements. On
September 13, 2021, U.N. Secretary-General Guterres convened a high-level ministerial meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan . See https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/secretarygenerals-remarks-high-level-ministerial-meeting-humanitarian-situation. Member States pledged more than $1.2 billion
for the people of Afghanistan at the ministerial meeting.
236
ICRC, “Afghanistan: A Statement from Robert Mardini, the Director-General of the ICRC,” August 17, 2021.
235
237
T he COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the humanitarian situation; immediate and secondary impacts contributed
to a near doubling of the number of people requiring assistance, from 9.4 million in January 2020 to 18.4 million in
January 2021. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), “Afghanistan: Humanitarian
Response Plan (2018-2021) - Year-End Monitoring Report (Jan - Dec 2020),” January 2020, and UNOCHA,
“ Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan Summary 2021 ,” May 9, 2021. T he immediate response to COVID-19
focuses largely on the health and hygiene impacts of the pandemic, while the longer term response to the secondary
impacts focuses on protection, food security and livelihoods, nutrition, and education. T he urgent need to shift
programming and resources toward the COVID-19 response also came at the expense of some other humanitarian
priorities.
238 “ WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report ,” August 16, 2021; See also, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification,
“Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis: March - November 2021,” April 2021. High food insecurity is due
to a complex mix of factors, such as food prices, reduced income and poverty, conflict, COVID -19 impacts, and natural
disasters.
239 In Afghanistan, many protection concerns exist for vulnerable populations as well as the local staff aiming to assist
them. According to the United Nations, for humanitarian organizations, protection is typically about advocating for and
supporting ways to reduce and prevent people’s exposure to risks and to ensure respect for t he rights of individuals in
accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. UNOCHA, “Protection.” See
https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/protection. Systematic violations of international humanitarian law and international
human rights law by the T aliban and other armed groups ranged from deliberate attacks on health and education
facilities to targeted killings and the forced recruitment of children as child soldiers. Office of the Special
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U.N. Funding Appeals. Prior to the Taliban takeover, humanitarian needs were not fully met, in
part due to limited resources, government capacity shortcomings, and security constraints on
humanitarian operations. The 2021 U.N. Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan totaled $1.3
billion to meet basic needs such as food, water, shelter, protection, and medical services
(including those related to COVID-19). 240 The August 27, 2021, U.N. Regional Refugee
Preparedness and Response Plan sought $299 million in anticipation of half a million Afghan
refugee arrivals in neighboring countries through the end of 2021. 241 On September 5, 2021, the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued a flash appeal for $606 million
to meet immediate humanitarian response gaps through the end of the year. 242 For years, the U.S.
government has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for the Afghan population,
including those displaced internally or as refugees. 243
What is the status of Afghan Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
and refugees?244
The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations continue to assess the rapidly evolving
displacement situation in Afghanistan. 245 The status and number of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in Afghanistan are not known due to the rapidly evolving security and political situation
on the ground. Prior to the Taliban takeover, the United Nations estimated there were more than
3.4 million IDPs, a number which is anticipated to increase. 246 Most Afghans are reportedly
staying inside the country, with some returning home as areas stabilize and others fleeing rural
areas for Kabul province and other major cities. 247 Humanitarian organizations are providing
assistance to IDPs where access is possible.
The United Nations is preparing refugee-receiving countries (specifically Iran, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) for potential new Afghan refugee arrivals. 248 The
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “Afghanistan,” June 2021. See also Report
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed conflict (A/75/873 –S/2021/437) issued on 21 June 2021, pp. 3-5.
240
UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2021, May Update, June 8, 2021. As of September 8, 2021, the appeal
was 40.3% funded.
241
UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
Funding Requirements July-December 2021, August 27, 2021.
UNOCHA, “ Afghanistan Flash Appeal: Immediate Humanitarian Response Needs (Sept - Dec 2021),” September 5,
2021.
242
243 USAID, Afghanistan – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, September 3, 2021.
244 T his section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
245
Refugees have fled their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons based on race,
religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social or political group. Refugees are unwilling or unable to avail
themselves of the protection of their home government due to fears of persecution. Once granted refugee status, a
person has certain rights and protections under international law. Asylum-seekers, who flee their home country, seek
sanctuary in another state where they apply for asylum (i.e., the right to be recognized as a refugee). T hey may receive
legal protection and assistance while their formal status is determined. IDPs have been forced from their homes, often
for many of the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed an international border.
246
UNOCHA, “ Humanitarians seek $1.3 billion to help millions in war-weary Afghanistan,” January 12, 2021 and
“Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Updat e (30 August – 5 September 2021); UNHCR, “ UNHCR warns
Afghanistan’s conflict taking the heaviest toll on displaced women and children ,” August 13, 2021. UNHCR,
“UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan,” August 2021.
247 UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, “Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #4,” September
1, 2021. UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation: Supplementary Appeal: July-December 2021, August 2021.
248 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
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willingness and capacity of neighboring countries to host Afghan refugees in the short- and longterm remains unclear. (Iran and Pakistan already host over 2.2 million registered Afghan
refugees—roughly 85% of all Afghan refugees—from previous waves of displacement.)249
Border closures with neighboring countries continue to fluctuate, although most land bordercrossing points have reportedly been closed except in limited instances. The United Nations has
consistently reported Afghans moving toward Pakistan border posts, but no large-scale
international displacement from Afghanistan has so far been observed. 250 Reports of recent
Afghan arrivals in other countries, such as Turkey, are also beginning to emerge. 251 Citing the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as customary
international law, the United Nations has called on all countries to allow civilians fleeing
Afghanistan access to their territories, to support the right to seek asylum, and to ensure respect
for the principle of non-refoulement (not to forcibly return refugees).252
What are the implications of the Taliban’s takeover for
counternarcotics?253
Afghanistan is among the world’s most significant sources of illicit drugs, particularly opiates.
According to U.S. and U.N. estimates, more than 80% of the world’s heroin supply originates in
Afghanistan. 254 In 2020, an estimated 215,000 hectares of opium poppy was cultivated in
Afghanistan—most of which was harvested in areas under Taliban influence or control. 255
Afghanistan is also a major source of methamphetamine and cannabis products (e.g., hashish or
cannabis resin). The illicit drug trade, just one component of a broader—and thriving—informal
economy in which the Taliban have long operated, is a major source of revenue for the Taliban; it
is also vital as a driver of employment for agricultural workers in opium poppy cultivation
regions of Afghanistan. Opiates have taken a public health toll on the Afghan population, as the
country has reported some of the world’s highest substance abuse rates in recent years.256
Uncertainty surrounds the question of what type of counternarcotics posture the Taliban intend to
adopt. In 2000, following unsuccessful efforts in 1997 and 1999, the Taliban imposed a shortlived ban that dramatically decreased recorded opium poppy cultivation in 2001. 257 A Taliban
Funding Requirements July-December 2021, August 27, 2021.
249 Afghans have been displaced as refugees due to different conflicts over the past four decades, creating one of the
largest protracted refugee situations in the world. Since 2002, nearly 5.3 million Afghan refugees returned to
Afghanistan under UNHCR’s facilitated Voluntary Repatriation Program.
250 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Preparedness and Response Plan: Summary & Inter-agency
Funding Requirements July-December 2021, August 27, 2021.
251 T he New Humanitarian, “ T he Afghan refugee crisis brewing on T urkey’s eastern border,” August 3, 2021.
252
UNHCR, “UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan,” August 2021.
253 T his section was prepared by Liana Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics.
254 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data
on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production,” press release, July 16, 2021; U.S. Department o f
State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2021, p. 86; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 2: Global Overview, June 2021, p. 51; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market T rends, June 2021, pp. 68, 87.
255 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data
on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production,” press release, July 16, 2021.
256 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market T rends, June 2021, p. 108;
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Reports Major, and Growing, Drug Abuse in Afghanistan,”
press release, June 21, 2010.
257 U.S. Department of State, “The T aliban And T he Afghan Drug T rade,” Fact Sheet, December 20, 2000; United
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spokesperson stated on August 17, 2021, that the Taliban envision an elimination of drug
production and smuggling in the country—and are seeking international assistance to achieve this
goal. 258 Some question the credibility of such a posture, and anticipate the prospect of continued
Taliban involvement in and reliance on the opium trade as a revenue source, particularly given its
importance as a generator of labor-intensive employment and cash liquidity. 259 This may include
profiting from the taxation of the movement of illicit drug-related products, such as the import of
precursor chemicals required in the processing and production of heroin and methamphetamine.
Even if the Taliban were to impose an effective ban on the illicit drug trade, revenue opportunities
in the informal or grey-zone economy—through a wide range of taxation and extortion
schemes—may likely persist or expand. 260
Under Afghan Presidents Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai, the U.S. government spent billions of
dollars supporting a wide range of capacity-building assistance, training, and mentoring projects
for counternarcotics-related ministries, task forces, and law-enforcement units in Afghanistan;
U.S. programs also sought to promote alternative licit livelihood options and address drug
treatment and rehabilitation services, particularly for women and children.
Some additional issues that Congress may consider as events continue to unfold include
Whether to continue to support any, some, or all counternarcotics programming
in Afghanistan;
What consequences for human and economic security may result if
counternarcotics donor funding to Afghanistan declines; and
How the counternarcotics policy postures of regional actors, including China,
Iran, and Russia, may evolve under the current circumstances. 261
How might the Taliban takeover affect Afghanistan’s relationships
with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?262
Since rejoining the international community in 2002, Afghanistan has been an active member of
IFIs. The World Bank committed $784 million to development projects in Afghanistan in 2021,
and $5.3 billion to date. 263 The World Bank is the largest single source of funding for
Afghanistan’s development, financing up to 30% of the country’s civilian budget and supporting
Nations International Drug Control Programme, Afghanistan: Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, October 2001, p. 11.
258 Joanna T aylor, “Afghanistan ‘will not be a country of cultivation of opium anymore’, Taliban insists,” Independent
(UK), August 18, 2021.
259 Jonathan Landay, “Profits and poppy: Afghanistan’s illegal drug trade a boon for T aliban,” Reuters, August 16,
2021.
260 Graeme Smith and David Mansfield, “T he T aliban Have Claimed Afghanistan’s Real Economic Prize,” New York
Times, guest essay, August 18, 2021; United Nations Security Council, Twelfth Report Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team , S/2021/486, June 1, 2021, pp. 14-16; Graeme Smith, Resource Flows and Political Power
in Afghanistan, Overseas Development Institute, November 2020. See also World Bank, The Long Shadow of
Informality: Challenges and Policies, Franziska Ohnsorge and Shu Yu, eds., 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/
research/publication/informal-economy.
261 For past criticism, see Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Counternarcotics: Lessons from
the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, June 14, 2018; see also T ia Sewell, “Where’s the U.S. Strategy
for Counternarcotics in Afghanistan?,” Lawfare, November 18, 2020.
262 T his section was prepared by Martin Weiss, Specialist in International T rade and Finance.
263 T he World Bank in Afghanistan, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.
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core functions of the government.264 As of December 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
had extended around $500 million in loans and grants to Afghanistan. 265 Multilateral development
bank (MDB) financing supports a wide range of endeavors. World Bank financing is largely
focused on governance efforts, including macro-fiscal policy and management; finance, private
investment, and job creation; public sector governance and anti-corruption; human capital
development and service delivery; citizen engagement and social inclusion; urban development
and infrastructure; connectivity; and sustainability. ADB financing is focused primarily on large
infrastructure projects. Both development banks are also providing Afghanistan COVID-19related support, such as financing to construct hospitals and train staff.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $370 million COVID-19 relief program for
Afghanistan in November 2020. Afghanistan also benefitted from the IMF’s disbursement of
about $220 million under the Fund’s Rapid Credit Facility and debt-service relief of about $10
million under a special trust fund. Additionally, Afghanistan is eligible to receive a proportionate
share of the recently agreed $650 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation that is
designed to bolster the foreign exchange reserves of member countries. 266 The allocation is
scheduled to be distributed to member states on August 23, 2021. Under the allocation,
Afghanistan would receive around $434 million of SDRs, based on its 0.07% quota in the IMF,
bringing its total SDR allocation up to about $653 million.
A key issue is whether the IMF and the MDBs recognize the Taliban as the official government of
Afghanistan. While IFI charters are explicit about the requirements for a country’s membership,
they are largely silent on the issue of representation, leaving the decision to its member
countries. 267 At the IMF, IMF Press Secretary Gerry Rice released a statement on August 18 that,
“[t]here is currently a lack of clarity within the int’l community regarding recognition of a
government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs or other
IMF resources.”268 The United States was also reportedly negotiating to pause the SDR allocation
to Afghanistan. 269 Some Members of Congress have expressed their concern about Afghanistan’s
SDR allocation. On August 17, Representative French Hill and 17 other lawmakers wrote to
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen urging the United States to intervene and help prevent
Afghanistan from accessing any IMF resources.270
The World Bank suspended funding for dozens of projects in Afghanistan on August 24, citing
questions over the legitimacy of Taliban rule. Under World Bank policies, the organization cannot
disburse funds when there is no agreement by its 189 member countries on whether a country has
a legitimate government. The World Bank completed evacuation of its Kabul-based staff to
Islamabad the previous week.
264 Josh Zumbrun, “World Bank Freezes Aid to Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, Augu
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