Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

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Worker Rights Provisions and

U.S. Trade Policy

July 16, 2021

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R46842

SUMMARY

Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

R46842

July 16, 2021

Worker rights provisions are a prominent and often contentious issue in debates over

U.S. trade negotiations, agreements and programs. Congress has input into and oversight Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs

Analyst in International

over the design and implementation of U.S. trade agreements and policies, and interest

Trade and Finance

in monitoring their impact on U.S. industries and workers. Broadly, Congress also has

an interest in the U.S. role in setting labor standards and promoting fair competition in

the global trading system. Multilateral trade rules under the World Trade Organization

(WTO) do not cover labor issues, which has in part limited global alignment and

enforcement of trade-related labor issues, and spurred unilateral, bilateral and regional approaches within trade

policies. WTO members deferred to the International Labor Organization (ILO) as the competent body to deal

with core labor standards, and trade agreements with labor provisions typically refer to ILO obligations.

Various U.S. trade statutes address the treatment of worker rights and labor standards. Section 307 of the Tariff

Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. §1307) prohibits U.S. imports of products mined, produced, or manufactured

wholly or in part by forced labor; in 2015, Congress strengthened the prohibition by removing a broad exception.

In recent years, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has increasingly taken action under Section 307 to

block U.S. imports produced by forced labor. Since 1984, Congress has included respect for internationally

recognized worker rights as part of eligibility criteria for developing countries to qualify for duty-free benefits

under unilateral trade preferences programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Following

eligibility reviews, the United States has rescinded unilateral trade preferences of some beneficiary developing

countries over worker rights criteria.

Since 1988, Congress has also included worker rights as a U.S. principal trade negotiating objective within trade

promotion authority (TPA) legislation, which has evolved significantly with subsequent reauthorizations—the last

TPA (P.L. 114-26) expired on July 1, 2021. The issue became elevated within reciprocal trade agreement

negotiations with the pursuit of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—the first U.S. trade

agreement with a developing country (Mexico). U.S. administrations have been at the forefront internationally of

using free trade agreements (FTAs) to promote core worker rights. Labor provisions have evolved significantly

since NAFTA, moving from a side agreement to integral chapters within U.S. FTAs, with additional provisions

subject to enforcement. The most recent U.S. FTA, the 2020 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) replaced

NAFTA and made several changes to recent U.S. practice. Like several past FTAs, worker rights and enforcement

issues were sticking points for some Members of Congress, and USMCA implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113)

dedicated resources and enhanced interagency cooperation toward these issues. Several labor disputes initiated

under USMCA are ongoing. Alongside trade agreements, trade capacity building and technical assistance for

developing countries have also expanded as mechanisms for improving labor standards and compliance with

obligations.

Some U.S. stakeholders and labor rights advocates view worker rights provisions and effective enforcement as

important to strengthening worker rights abroad, preventing a potential “race to the bottom” in lowering

standards, and protecting workers from perceived unfair competition. Developing countries and other

stakeholders have raised concerns that advanced economies may promote labor standards as a form of disguised

trade protectionism to undermine other countries’ comparative advantage. Some policymakers and experts

contend that FTAs and trade liberalization support economic development and over time raise labor standards and

wages in lower income countries. In this view, the promotion of global labor standards with trade liberalization

can encourage the spread of the benefits of globalization, discourage the worst labor abuses, and increase support

for trade agreements. Others question whether trade agreements are an appropriate and effective vehicle for

addressing labor issues, and view expanded labor clauses and trade enforcement as potentially infringing national

sovereignty. How to ensure effective enforcement of labor provisions has become a perennial concern for some

stakeholders in the debate.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

“Putting workers at the center” is a priority of the Biden Administration’s trade policy. The Administration

pledged to review past trade policies for impacts on workers and to enforce labor obligations under U.S. trade

agreements. It also emphasized using the full range of trade tools to ensure products of forced labor are not

imported, and to challenge other unfair labor practices.

This report provides background and analysis on key U.S. trade policies addressing worker rights abroad. It

contextualizes the U.S. approach with key debates and comparison with global approac hes. Several issues may be

of interest to Congress, including the role of U.S. trade agreements and programs as vehicles for improving labor

rights; the role of multilateral institutions; compliance with labor commitments and approaches to enforcement;

and debates over capacity building efforts.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

Overview: Trade Rules and Labor Commitments ................................................................. 2

Lack of Multilateral Rules in the World Trade Organization ............................................. 2

Role of the International Labor Organization (ILO) ........................................................ 6

ILO Core Labor Standards and Principles ................................................................ 7

Supervisory and Enforcement Measures................................................................... 8

ILO and FTA Provisions ........................................................................................ 9

United States and ILO Fundamental Conventions.................................................... 10

Global Trends in Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements ................................................ 12

Debate over Role and Impact of Labor Provisions ........................................................ 13

Labor Provisions in Selected U.S. Trade Policy Tools ......................................................... 15

Section 307 of Tariff Act of 1930 and Forced Labor ...................................................... 15

Eligibility Criteria in U.S. Trade Preference Programs ................................................... 18

Congressional Requirements in Trade Promotion Authority............................................ 22

Key U.S. FTA Commitments ..................................................................................... 24

Innovations in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) ................................. 26

Trade Capacity Building ........................................................................................... 28

Biden Administration Trade Policy Priorities ..................................................................... 30

Enforcement Mechanisms and Labor Disputes................................................................... 31

U.S. Process for FTA Labor Complaints ...................................................................... 32

Outcomes of U.S. FTA Disputes ................................................................................ 33

Ongoing USMCA Labor Disputes .............................................................................. 34

Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 35

U.S. Trade Agreements and Programs as Vehicles for Improving Labor Rights ............ 35

Multilateral Trade Rules at the WTO and the Role of the ILO ................................... 37

Trading Partner Compliance and U.S. Approaches to Enforcement............................. 38

Labor-Related Trade Capacity Building and Interagency Coordination ....................... 39

Figures

Figure 1. ILO Fundamental Conventions Ratified by U.S. FTA Partners ................................ 10

Figure 2. Countries with Production by Forced Labor and/or Forced Child Labor ................... 16

Figure 3. Trade-Related Labor Obligations by Implementing Agency, FY2014-FY2019........... 29

Figure 4. Labor Submissions under NAALC, 1994-2020..................................................... 33

Tables

Table 1. Recent GSP Eligibility Reviews Involving Worker Rights ....................................... 20

Table 2. TCB Assistance, Trade-Related Labor Activities .................................................... 29

Table A-1. U.S. Submissions under Labor Chapters of U.S. FTAs ......................................... 41

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Appendixes

Appendix A. Past U.S. Submissions Under Labor Chapters of U.S. FTAs .............................. 41

Contacts

Author Information ....................................................................................................... 44

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

Introduction

Worker rights provisions are a prominent and often contentious issue in debates over U.S. trade

policy. Congress has input into and oversight over the design and implementation of U.S. trade

agreements and policies, and interest in monitoring their impact on U.S. industries and workers.

Broadly, Congress also has an interest in the U.S. role in enhancing core worker rights globally

and promoting fair competition in the global trading system. Some Members may also see worker

rights provisions as a means of promoting human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Multilateral trade

rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO) do not cover specific obligations on worker

rights, due to differences among members regarding the best forum for addressing them, among

other issues. This has in part limited global alignment and enforcement of trade-related labor

issues, and spurred unilateral, bilateral, and regional approaches within trade policies.

“Putting workers at the center” is a priority of the Biden Administration’s trade policy. 1 The

Administration pledged to review past trade policies to assess their impacts on workers, and to

fully enforce labor obligations under U.S. trade agreements. It aims to use the full range of trade

tools, including domestic laws, to ensure products made by forced labor are not imported, and to

challenge other unfair labor practices.

Various U.S. trade statutes address worker rights and labor standards, and have evolved over time.

Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. §1307), prohibits U.S. imports of

products of forced labor. 2 Since 1984, Congress has included respect for internationally

recognized worker rights as part of the eligibility criteria for developing countries to qualify for

duty-free benefits under unilateral trade preferences programs, including the Generalized System

of Preferences (GSP). Since 1988, Congress has also included worker rights as a principal trade

negotiating objective within trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation (previously known as

“fast track” authority), which has evolved significantly with subsequent reauthorizations—the last

TPA (P.L. 114-26) expired on July 1, 2021. The issue became elevated and more contentious

within reciprocal trade agreement negotiations during the pursuit of the 1994 North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—the first U.S. FTA with a developing country (Mexico).

Notably, NAFTA was the first of any FTA, both in the United States and globally, to address labor

issues. Alongside trade agreements and programs, trade capacity building and technical assistance

for developing countries have also expanded as mechanisms for promoting worker rights.

U.S. administrations have been at the forefront internationally of using trade agreements to

promote core worker rights, though the adequacy of enforcement has been a longstanding point of

contention. Labor provisions have evolved significantly since NAFTA, and have moved from

being a side agreement to comprising integral chapters within subsequent U.S. FTA texts, with

additional provisions subject to enforcement. The most recent U.S. FTA, the 2020 U.S.-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA) updated NAFTA and made several changes to past U.S. FTA

practice. As in several past U.S. FTAs, worker rights and enforcement issues were sticking points

for some Members of Congress during congressional approval of USMCA, and implementing

legislation (P.L. 116-113) dedicated resources and enhanced interagency cooperation toward these

issues. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) committed to pursuing labor dispute

cases, and in May 2021, self-initiated its first USMCA labor complaint. Both U.S. and Mexican

labor groups have also already filed their own cases. Key issues for Congress in oversight of

1 UST R, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, March 2021.

2 In 2015, Congress strengthened the prohibition by removing a broad exception.

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USMCA implementation include how the new “rapid response” dispute mechanism will work,

and whether USMCA labor obligations should be the template for future U.S. FTAs.

Some U.S. stakeholders and labor rights advocates broadly view worker rights provisions and

effective enforcement as important to strengthening worker rights abroad, arguing that they help

prevent a potential “race to the bottom” in lowering labor standards to gain advantages and may

protect workers from perceived unfair competition. Developing countries and other stakeholders

have raised concerns that advanced economies may promote labor standards as disguised trade

protectionism to undermine other countries’ comparative advantages of abundant labor and lower

labor costs, or to impede national sovereignty. Some policymakers and experts contend that FTAs

and trade liberalization support economic development and, over time, help raise labor standards

and wages in lower income countries. In this vein, some experts view that the promotion of global

labor standards with trade liberalization can encourage the spread of the benefits of globalization,

discourage the worst labor abuses, and increase public support for trade agreements.3 At the same

time, others question whether FTAs are an appropriate and effective vehicle for addressing labor

issues.

How to ensure effective enforcement of labor provisions has become a perennial concern. Some

Members and stakeholders have raised concerns over U.S. trading partners’ compliance with

commitments and view U.S. enforcement of FTA provisions as falling short. They call for more

monitoring and oversight of labor practices. Some foreign governments and labor groups also

have expressed concerns regarding U.S. practices and lack of adherence to labor commitments,

such as Mexican concerns over U.S. protections for migrant workers. Experts stress cooperative

efforts and trade capacity building as critical factors to improving standards globally and

incentivizing compliance, and many generally view trade sanctions as a measure of last resort. 4

This report provides background and analysis on the evolution of key U.S. trade policies with

labor provisions, with a focus on trade programs, negotiations, and agreements. It contextualizes

the U.S. approach with key debates and comparison with global approaches. Several issues of

interest to Congress may include the role of trade policy tools as vehicles for improving labor

rights globally; the role of multilateral institutions; trading partner compliance with labor

commitments and approaches to enforcement; and debates over capacity building efforts. Issues

related to the distributional impact of globalization, trade liberalization, and trade policies on U.S.

and foreign workers and on the labor market are beyond the scope of this report.

Overview: Trade Rules and Labor Commitments

Lack of Multilateral Rules in the World Trade Organization

Labor issues are not subject to multilateral trade rules under the WTO, due to past contentious

debate and a lack of consensus among members over whether and how the global trade agenda

should address trade and labor linkages. 5 The issue surfaced repeatedly in debates during both the

drafting of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and establishment of the

3 Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Labor Standards,” in Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook,

ed. Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Jean-Christophe Maur (Washington, DC: T he World Bank, 2011), p. 428.

4 E.g., Sandra Polaski, “Protecting Labor Rights through T rade Agreements: An Analytical Guide,”

Journal of

International Law and Policy, vol. 10, no. 13 (July 2004): 13-25.

5 For the history of the debate over linking trade and international competitiveness to labor standards, see Virginia A.

Leary, “Workers’ Rights and International T rade: T he Social Clause, (GAT T , ILO, NAFT A, U.S. Laws),” in Fair

Trade and Harmonization, ed. Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

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WTO in 1995, which encompassed and succeeded the GATT. Proposals to consider a “social

clause” linking trade concessions to the observation of worker rights, or to create a working group

to study the issue, failed to garner majority support. WTO members ultimately confined treatment

of the issue to a broad statement, deferring to the International Labor Organization (ILO) as the

competent body to deal with core labor standards (see below).

Discussions of a social clause in the context of a multilateral trade agreement date back to the

1948 Havana Charter of the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO)—signed but never

ratified—which included a section on labor standards recognizing that “unfair labour conditions,

particularly in production for export, create difficulties for international trade.”6 The proposed

ITO provided the premise for later debates over reforms to the GATT, which parties conceived

more narrowly to focus initially on tariff liberalization. 7 The United States sought to introduce a

labor clause in subsequent GATT negotiations, in particular during the Tokyo Round (1973-1979)

of multilateral trade talks, though ultimately abandoned such efforts.8 U.S. trade officials

proposed work programs to examine “minimum international labor standards,” and how

“internationally recognized” standards relate to trade and GATT objectives.

While the GATT does not explicitly address labor issues, Article XX, its general exceptions

article, includes one provision that permits restrictions on trade in goods made from prison labor

(Article XX(e)). 9 Advocates of incorporating a broader trade-related labor provision in the GATT

view certain GATT articles as potentially justifying trade measures based on social policies and

violations of core labor rights, or offering avenues for expanding their scope through explicit

language on such rights. 10 GATT Article XX, for example, allows member governments to adopt

certain trade restrictions necessary to protect “public morals” and “human life or health.” Experts

have also cited provisions on antidumping (Article VI), subsidies (Article XVI), and safeguards

(Article XIX), as well as the nonviolation nullification or impairment clause (Article XXIII), as

potentially applicable tools that could be adapted to provide for labor enforcement. For example,

some analysts contend worker rights suppression could in effect constitute “social dumping” or

subsidization and warrant coverage. 11 Experts have debated the practical and legal feasibility and

6 IT O’s Havana Charter Pt. II, Article VII: “Members recognize that measure related to employment must take fully

into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental declarations, conventions and agreements. T hey recognize

that all countries have common interest in the achievement and maintenance of labour standards related to productivity,

and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit…unfair labour conditions,

particularly in production for export, creates difficulties in internat ional trade, and, accordingly each Member shall take

whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.”

7 Legal scholars argue that attempts to incorporate labor standards into the GAT T /WT O were shaped by an evolving

understanding of what constitutes “fair labor standards,” with legal and institutional implications for how and whether

labor provisions could be incorporated into trade rules today. Debates over the GAT T were driven by the conception of

labor standards largely based on wages, i.e., concerns over the impact of low wages, as perpetuated by lower labor

standards, on exports to other members; there was minimal discussion of social concerns that have become central to

modern human rights concepts of labor rights. See Elissa Alben, “GAT T and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective

on the Labor-T rade Link,” Columbia Law Review, vol. 101, no. 6 (October 2001): 1410-1447.

8 Peter Watson, “The Framework for the New T rade Agenda,” Law and Policy in International Business, vol. 25

(1994): 1237-1253.

9 See https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX.

10 For an overview, see Kimberly Ann Elliot t, Developing a More Inclusive US Trade Policy at Home and Abroad ,

CGD Policy Paper 146, Center for Global Development, June 2019.

11 Dani Rodrik, Towards a More Inclusive Globalization: An Anti-Social Dumping Scheme, Economists for Inclusive

Prosperity, December 2018; Gregory Shaffer, “ Retooling T rade Agreements for Social Inclusion,” University of Illinois

Law Review, vol. 2019, no. 1 (2019): 1-44.

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shortcomings of various approaches. 12 While some advocate for addressing worker rights issues,

others maintain that incorporating enforceable labor standards in the WTO would be misguided

and risks overloading the WTO with issues it was not designed to deal with. 13

The creation of the WTO following the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) renewed debate over labor

standards. At the WTO’s first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, the issue was the

most controversial in the proposed agenda. 14 Norway and the United States were the primary

proponents and advocated for a work program to reach understanding among members on “how

to reinforce the mutually supporting nature of increased trade and improving labor standards.”15

Congress expressed interest in such a working group in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act

(P.L. 103-465)—the statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership (see Text Box). The proposals,

however, gained little traction. Developing and some developed countries, such as Australia and

the United Kingdom (UK), viewed the WTO as an inappropriate forum to address labor and

“non-trade” issues, and some members threatened to boycott the meeting over the proposals.

WTO and Labor: Congressional Directives in Uruguay Round Agreements Act

The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465) established congressional interest in exploring linkages

between trade and labor. Section 131 directs the President to seek the establishment in the WTO of “a working

party to examine the relationship of internationally recognized worker rights … to the articles, objectives and

related instruments of the GATT 1947 and the WTO.” Objectives included:

explore the linkage between international trade and internationally recognized worker rights, taking into

account differences in countries’ level of development;

examine the effects on international trade of the systematic denial of such rights;

consider ways to address such effects; and

develop methods to coordinate the work program of the working party with the ILO.

Developing country members feared such rules would undermine economic development or be

used by developed countries as disguised barriers to trade to protect labor-intensive, importcompeting industries. 16 A more complex legal question in contention was the potential

relationship in linking ILO standards and WTO agreements, i.e., whether or how labor standards

could be applied in a way that was consistent with WTO rules. 17 Due to these divisions, at the

1996 Singapore Ministerial, WTO members agreed to renew their commitment to observe

Ibid. Also see Simon Lester, “Responding to ‘Social Dumping’ with T ariffs,” International Economic Law and

Policy Blog, February 25, 2019, at https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/02/responding-to-social-dumping-withtariffs.html; Guillermo de la Dehesa, “ Are developing countries engaging in “social dumping”? VoxEU, May 24, 2007,

at https://voxeu.org/article/social-dumping-misconceptions; and Alben, “GAT T and the Fair Wage.”

13 See e.g., T .N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to the

Uruguay Round and the Future (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 71-79; Keith Maskus, Should Core Labor Standards

be Imposed Through International Trade Policy? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1817, August 1997;

José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs and Jorge Mario Martinez-Piva, “Trade, Labour Standards and Global Governance: A

Perspective from the Americas,” in ed. Stefan Griller, International Economic Governance and Non-Economic

Concerns: New Challenges for the International Legal Order (Vienna/New York: Springer, 2003).

14 Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (Geneva: WT O Publications, 2013), p.

380. T he Ministerial Conference is the WT O’s topmost decision-making body, and usually convenes every two years.

It is comprised of political representatives from each member, and can take decisions on all matters under any of the

WT O’s multilateral trade agreements.

15 Ibid, p. 378.

Ibid.

17 WT O, “ Labour standards: consensus, coherence and controversy ,” at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/

whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm.

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“internationally recognized core labor standards,” while reaffirming the ILO as the competent

body to deal with labor issues and denouncing the “use of labor standards for protectionist

purposes” (see Text Box). 18

WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, December 1996

“We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards. The

International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we

affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered

by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the

use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries,

particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put in question. In this regard, we note that the

WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.”

Subsequent efforts to elevate labor standards as part of the global trade agenda met similar

resistance. At the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, a working group was set up to decide

whether the Ministerial declaration should create a formal working party within the WTO, or a

body operated jointly by international organizations, such as the ILO. 19 U.S. trade officials

warned that lack of recognition of the link between trade and labor could damage credibility and

support for the global trading system. 20 President Clinton’s remarks on the issue, in particular the

suggestion that trade sanctions could be used to enforce labor rights, created added controversy.21

Developing country members viewed U.S. insistence on raising the issue as counterproductive,

and efforts to compromise on other issues stalled as WTO members promised to block consensus

necessary to adopt them. 22 Then WTO Director-General Mike Moore decried the “bitterness and

divisiveness” of the trade and labor debate, and gave his view that “unacceptable working

conditions” must be met by expanding trade and not by imposing sanctions. 23 Ultimately, efforts

failed with the collapse of the Seattle talks. In the subsequent 2001 Doha Round, members

reaffirmed the Singapore Declaration, taking no further action. To date, the WTO and ILO

secretariats primarily cooperate through collaborative studies. 24

As one former ILO Deputy Director-General reflected on the outcome at Singapore, “It was far from clear whether

all of the WT O Ministers wanted to move the issue of the relationship between trade and labour standards to the ILO so

that something meaningful would happen. Some wanted to get rid of it, not only in the WT O but in the ILO as well.

T his had been the thrust of the unsuccessful proposal in 1994 for a Conference resolution banning further discussion on

the social clause in the ILO.” Kari T apiola, The Teeth of the ILO: The Impact of the 1998 ILO Declaration on

Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Office, ILO, 2018, p. 29.

19 VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization , pp. 390-391.

20 In 1999, then-UST R Charlene Barshefsky said, “T he WT O does not recognize the link between trade and labor….

T hat is intellectually indefensible, and over time, it will weaken public support for global trade.” Kimberly Ann Elliott

and Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? (Washington: Peterson Institute for

International Economics, 2003), p. 73.

21 Clyde Summers, “T he Battle in Seattle: Free T rade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values,”

University of Pennsylvania

Journal of International Law, vol. 22 (Spring 2001), p. 61.

22 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes and

Lessons Learned, Statement of Susan S. Westin, Associate Director, February 10, 2000; Steven Greenhouse and Joseph

Kahn, “U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails,” New York Times, December 3, 1999.

WT O, “Labour Issue is ‘False Debate’, Obscures Underlying Consensus, WT O Chief Mike Moore T ells Unions,”

Press release, November 28, 1999.

24 WT O, “ T he WTO and International Labour Organization,” at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_ilo

_e.htm.

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Role of the International Labor Organization (ILO)

The ILO, established in 1919, is the multilateral organization with primary responsibility for

promoting international labor standards and “decent work” through conventions and principles. 25

When founded, its raison d’être was to achieve social justice to advance global peace. A

specialized agency of the United Nations, the ILO has a tripartite structure composed of

representatives from governments, employers, and worker organizations from 187 member states,

including the United States. 26 The Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs

(ILAB) represents the United States at the ILO, and U.S. government agencies often collaborate

with ILO programs and are a key source of funding for technical assistance.27

WTO discussions over a possible “social clause” and the Singapore declaration pressured the ILO

to contribute to the debate over linking labor standards and trade practices. 28 As in the WTO,

discussions were marked by divergent views among ILO member states and stakeholders. 29 A

central concern was that countries engaged in social and labor reforms should not end up

disadvantaged in international competition. Then ILO Director-General Michel Hansenne

reflected on the core issues at the heart of the debate:30

The crucial question is whether, given the voluntary acceptance of obligations arising from

its standards, the ILO can maintain the spirit of “emulation” towards social progress in

spite of the countervailing influence exerted by the globalization of the economy and the

growth of international competition. I am referring … to the issue of “social clauses”, or

the guarantees that a growing number of advocates wish to incorporate in international

trade agreements to ensure that the gradual liberalization of markets is accompanied by

improvements in conditions of work, or at least by the elimination of the most flagrant

abuses and forms of exploitation. Through the social clauses, either the access of exporting

countries to international markets is made conditional on compliance with certain basic

ILO standards, or - more concretely - a link is established between the lowering of barriers

to trade and compliance with certain labour and social protection standards.

A 1994 working party in the ILO Governing Body on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization

of International Trade debated how the ILO should protect and promote core labor standards, but

ultimately avoided linking them explicitly with international trade. Among the most divisive

issues was the potential use of the WTO to enforce ILO commitments. While ILO procedures

provide for the possibility of stronger action against countries found not to meet ILO obligations,

in practice, the ILO has relied on peer and political pressure, rather than punitive measures. This

preference is based on the premise that the ILO “should rely on cooperation rather than coercion

in its efforts to promote social progress.”31 As one WTO scholar described a common criticism

25 For more on the Decent Work agenda, see https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang—en/index.htm.

26 ILO, “ T he US: A Leading role in the ILO,” at https://www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-and-the-united-states/the-usa-

leading-role-in-the-ilo/lang—en/index.htm.

27 See “ T rade Capacity Building.” T he United States is a member of the ILO Governing Body, which is the ILO’s

executive body. See ILO, The United States: ILO Cooperation, October 2019; Partner Classification: United States in

2020, ILO Development Cooperation Dashboard, at https://www.ilo.org/DevelopmentCooperationDashboard/

#a1hsnnd.

28 Leary, “Workers’ Rights and International Trade.”

29 For discussion, see T apiola, The Teeth of the ILO, pp. 11-37.

Defending Values, Promoting Change: Social Justice in a Global Economy: An ILO Agenda, Report of the DirectorGeneral (Part 1), International Labour Conference, 81 st session, Geneva, 1994, p. 57. Hansenne outlined concrete

options for dealing with trade and labor standards, which members ultimately did not take up, see pp. 56 -63.

31 Ibid.

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that emerged, “In the ILO, there are labour standards without ‘teeth,’ while the WTO has teeth but

almost no standards related to labour.”32 Some contest this view, however, and maintain that the

ILO’s less confrontational approach may be more pragmatic and conducive to cooperation. 33

ILO Core Labor Standards and Principles

Trade agreements with labor provisions typically require adherence or otherwise refer to ILO

obligations and instruments. The ILO has adopted 190 conventions and six protocols. Of these

instruments, eight “fundamental conventions” relate to core labor standards that are considered

“universal” and applicable to all member states, regardless of level of economic development (see

Figure 1). The 1998 Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its

follow-up incorporate these core principles and rights, in which countries commit “to respect, to

promote and to realize” whether or not signatories to the underlying fundamental conventions

(see Text Box). 34 Reflecting concurrent debates at the WTO, the 1998 Declaration also stresses

language similar to the WTO Singapore Declaration—e.g., that labor standards “should not be

used for protectionist trade purposes” and “comparative advantage of any country should in no

way be called into question by this Declaration and its follow -up.”

Underlying the ILO’s approach to advancing labor standards and principles globally is the

recognition that differences in labor conditions and levels of protection are linked to differences

in levels of development. As a former ILO Director-General reflected, the ILO’s aim is not “to

achieve uniformity in the level of social protection in order to ensure a proper international

competition,” but the “universal recognition of certain basic rights” and “respect of certain

common rules of the game.”35 More pointedly, “All the partners in the multilateral trade system

must guarantee certain fundamental rights, without which workers cannot be assured of receiving

their fair share of the fruits of economic progress generated by the liberalization of trade.”36

ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work:

Concepts and Meaning

The 1998 ILO Declaration declares that all members, even if they have not ratified the eight

fundamental conventions, have an obligation to promote and realize the principles concerning the fundamental

rights which are the subject of those conventions, including:

(a) Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collec tive bargaining:



All workers and employers have the right to freely form and join groups that support and advance their

occupational interests.



Freedom of association means workers can set up, join and run their own organizations without interference

from the state or one another. This includes the right to freely run their own activities, e.g., independently

determine how best to promote and defend their interests, including recourse to strike.



Collective bargaining is a process through which employers an d trade unions or representatives of workers

discuss and negotiate their relations and the terms and conditions of work.

32 VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization , p. 169. T he idea of “juxtapose[ing]

international right law’s normative content with trade law’s economic and enforcement entitlements or ‘teeth’” is not

unique to labor standards, but has been central in discussions of human rights and trade more broadly. See Desirée

LeClercq, “ T he Disparate T reatment of Rights in U.S. T rade,” Fordham Law Review, forthcoming March 2021.

33 Salazar-Xirinachs and Martinez-Piva, “Trade, Labour Standards and Global Governance,” pp. 332 -335.

ILO, “About the Declaration,” at https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang—en/index.htm.

35 Standard Setting and Globalization, Report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference, 85 th Session,

Geneva, 1997.

36 Ibid.

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

To realize these rights in practice requires a legal basis that guarantees such rights are enforced, an enabling

institutional framework, and absence of discrimination against individuals exercising such rights.

(b) Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor:



Forced labor occurs where work or service is extracted by the state or others with power to threaten

workers with severe deprivations, e.g., withholding wages, abuse, and restricting people’s movements.



Debt bondage and labor trafficking are practices where workers become dependent on an intermediary and

labors in slave-like conditions, possibly subject to confiscated identity papers and other intimidation.



Children have rights to protection from economic exploitation and from dangerous work.



Effective abolition of child labor is based on ensuring children have the opportunity t o develop physically and

mentally to their full potential by eliminating work that jeopardizes education and development.



To achieve abolition, a minimum age at which children can enter work should be enforced, in general not less

than the age of completing compulsory schooling or 15 years.



Certain work performed by children (i.e., under age 18) categorized as “worst forms of child labor" are to be

prohibited and eliminated as a matter of urgency, e.g., slavery in all its forms (trafficking, debt bondage, forced

military recruitment), prostitution and all forms of commercial sexual exploitation, and use of children in illicit

activities, such as drug trafficking.

(d) Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation:



Discrimination can occur on the basis of sex, age, race, skin color, social origin, religion, political opinion,

disability or HIV status. It denies opportunities and deprives societies of what workers could contribute.



Equality at work means all individuals are afforded opportunities to fully develop knowledge, skills and

competencies related to economic activities they wish to pursue.



Eliminating discrimination entails dismantling barriers to ensuring equal access to training, education, and

resource use and ownership. It also involves the conditions for setting up enterprises, and the policies related

to hiring, work conditions, pay and benefits, promotions and employment termination.

Source: ILO, Declaration Overview, May 2004.

Supervisory and Enforcement Measures

While there is scope for enforcement measures, historically the ILO has encouraged compliance

with labor standards through its supervisory and technical assistance systems. At its core, the ILO

plays a “sunshine” monitoring function through a supervisory and reporting system to monitor the

application of ratified conventions. The 1998 Declaration Follow-up requires countries that have

not ratified conventions to report annually on the status of the relevant rights and principles,

impediments to ratification, and areas requiring technical assistance. The ILO also reports on

global efforts toward implementing standards. In addition, through technical assistance (e.g.,

research, capacity building, and field-based projects) the ILO helps countries address problems in

developing and implementing legislation and undertaking other actions to meet their obligations.

ILO representation (Articles 24-25 of ILO Constitution) and complaint procedures (Article 26)

permit industrial associations of workers/employers and member states, respectively, to raise

concerns over a country’s alleged noncompliance with ratified conventions. 37 There is a special

Committee within the ILO Governing Body with distinct procedures for addressing violations of

freedom of association rights. 38 Upon receipt of a general complaint, the Governing Body may

T o date, there have been 35 Article 26 complaints, and 14 resulted in Commissions of Inquiry reports. T he

Committee on Freedom of Association has received more than 3,400 complaints, 44 involving the United States. T here

have been more than 250 Article 24 representations. See https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promotinginternational-labour-standards/lang—en/index.htm.

38 T he Committee may hear a complaint about a government’s violation of freedom of association regardless of

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establish a Commission of Inquiry, the ILO’s highest-level investigative procedure, which is

generally pursued when a country is accused of persistent and serious violations. If a country

refuses to meet a Commission’s recommendations, the ILO Governing Body can take action

under authority in Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, and recommend “action as it may deem

wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith,” including possibly punitive action. 39 Such

authority has been rarely invoked, however—the ILO invoked Article 33 once in 2000 to compel

Burma to take action after it failed to implement recommendations of an investigation that found

“widespread and systematic” forced labor. 40 Some observers have advocated for more effective

use of the ILO forum to pressure the Chinese government to address state-sponsored forced labor

in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (see “Section 307 of Tariff Act of 1930 and Forced

Labor”). 41

ILO and FTA Provisions

Most FTAs with labor provisions refer to ILO commitments, generally through broad affirmations

of ILO obligations and political commitment to the 1998 Declaration, and/or reference to ILO

instruments to define the scope of certain labor provisions. According to the ILO, nearly threequarters of trade-related labor provisions refer to the ILO, with most legally binding

commitments in respect of “core internationally recognized labor standards.”42 With the growth in

trade agreements that refer to the ILO (see “United States and ILO Fundamental Conventions”

countries have increasingly sought ILO support to help meet FTA commitments. 43

Some experts view expansion of such provisions as strengthening the potential enforcement of

labor standards; on the other hand, some view such a decentralized approach and lack of

uniformity in definitions of standards or their application as having potential to weaken ILO

attempts to develop a consistent approach. 44 While a more uniform manner of referencing ILO

obligations in trade agreements could mitigate such concerns, the majority refer primarily to the

1998 Declaration, which some contend gives rise to legal uncertainty due to its broad scope. 45

Some observers maintain that FTA language that refers to conventions provides for greater clarity

and concrete obligations. 46

whether the government has ratified Convention No. 87.

39 Changes to the ILO Constitution in the 1940s remo ved explicit references to economic measures, in large part to

avoid discouraging least developed countries from joining the institution. This was also driven by the broader view that

weak labor standards were primarily driven by gaps in national enforcement, reinforcing the importance of

international action to develop capacity. See Elliott and Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization?

p. 106. For discussion of the origin and debate over the ILO’s use (or disuse) of trade sanctions, see Steve Charnovitz,

The Lost History of the ILO’s Trade Sanctions, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2019 -74, 2019.

40 ILO, “ILO Governing Body opens the way for unprecedented action against forced labour in Myanmar,” Press

release, November 17, 2000.

41 For example, Andrew Samet,”Will the ILO Defend China’s Uyghurs?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2020, and Janice

Bellace and George Dragnich, “A Path for Business out of the China Forced Labor Dilemma,” The Hill, May 10, 2021.

42 ILO, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and Investment Arrangements, 2017, p. 5.

43 Ibid, p. 23.

44 Jordi Agustí-Panareda, Franz Christian Ebert , and Desirée LeClercq, “ILO Labor Standards and T rade Agreements:

A Case for Consistency,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, vol. 36 (2015), p. 348.

Ibid.

46 E.g., AFL-CIO, NAFTA at 20, March 2014, p. 19. Moreover, implementation of rat ified conventions is subject to

ongoing ILO supervision. Agustí-Panareda, Ebert , and LeClercq, “ILO Labor Standards and T rade Agreements.”

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In its most recent FTAs, the United States includes an enforceable commitment to maintain and

uphold the rights and principles of the ILO Declaration in domestic laws. U.S. FTAs do not

include commitments to enforce the fundamental conventions themselves, in large part because

the United States has ratified only two of the eight conventions: forced labor (No. 105), and worst

forms of child labor (No. 182) (see below). 47 Most U.S. FTA partners have ratified all eight, with

some exceptions (Figure 1).

Figure 1. ILO Fundamental Conventions Ratified by U.S. FTA Partners

Source: Created by CRS. Data from World Bank, World Development Indicators database, at

https://databank.worldbank.org/, and ILO, “Ratifications of fundamental Conventions by country,” as of July 2021.

Note: The U.S.-Japan trade agreements cover limited tariff cuts and rules on digital trade.

United States and ILO Fundamental Conventions

While the United States arguably has achieved many labor standards, it has not ratified most ILO

conventions in large part due to inconsistencies between domestic legislation, including certain

47 ILO, “ Ratifications for United States of America,” at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=

1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNT RY_ID:102871.

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state laws, and the conventions. The President’s Committee on the ILO—established by

Executive Order in 1980, and chaired by the Secretary of Labor—declared “there is no intention

to change State law and practice by Federal action through ratification of ILO conventions. ”48

In its 2007 assessment, the Committee’s U.S. Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor

Standards (TAPILS) asserted that five of the eight core conventions “directly conflict with U.S.

law and practice and would require significant and widespread changes to U.S. state and federal

law” if ratified. 49 These include freedom of association (No. 87); right to organize/collective

bargaining (No. 98); forced labor (No. 29); minimum age for employment (No. 138); and equal

remuneration (No. 100). In particular, ratification of No. 87 and No. 98 would require “drastic

changes” to U.S. law. 50 To take one example, the Panel determined that No. 29 on forced labor

cannot be ratified namely due to “the trend of states to subcontract the operation of prison

facilities to the private sector in the United States conflicted with the requirements … relating to

circumstances under which the private sector may profit from prison labor.”

In the view of U.S. government officials, “although an improved record ratification [is] an

important objective towards which to strive … in practice United States law [meets] or [exceeds],

in almost every case,” standards set out in the ILO conventions. 51 However, some experts point to

what they perceive as lower levels of U.S. coverage and protection for workers in key respects

than required by ILO standards. 52 Moreover, some observers, including some Members of

Congress, view the relatively low U.S. ratification of ILO conventions (14 out of 190), and

particularly the fundamental conventions (2 out of 8), as potentially disadvantaging the United

States through “reputational cost” within the ILO, and undermining U.S. credibility in its efforts

to use trade policy to promote respect for core labor rights. 53 In particular, some observers view

the United States as well positioned to ratify convention No. 111 concerning discrimination in

employment. 54 In practice, limited ratification also generally prevents the United States from

raising ILO complaints against other countries for failure to observe ratified conventions. At the

same time, some observers question the efficacy of ILO conventions and point to limitations of

ratification as an indicator of higher labor standards, given evidence that despite ratification, there

can be lack of implementation and adherence by some countries. Some empirical studies suggest

U.S. Council for International Business, U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards, April 2007.

49 Ibid.

50 President Harry S. T ruman sent convention No. 87 to the Senate for advice and consent in 1949. Steve Charnovitz,

“T he ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Its Future in the United States,” American Journal of

International Law, vol. 102, Issue 1 (2008): 90-107.

51 Quoted in Alston, “Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. T rade Law,” p. 31.

David Weissbrodt and Matthew Mason, “Compliance of the United States with International Labor Law,” Minnesota

Law Review, vol. 84 (2014): 1842-1878.

E.g., former Senator Orrin Hatch reflected in 1985: “our dismal nonratification record undercuts our credibility at the

ILO.” Ibid. One legal scholar contended: “the United States would be acting on much stronger and certa inly more

persuasive grounds if it were itself a party to the relevant international conventions and if those were the standards

being applied. Instead, what emerges is a major discrepancy between the United States’ refusal to submit itself to

multilateral accountability (through the ILO), and its preparedness to subject others to a form of accountability in which

the United States acts as the sole legislator, judge, jury, and enforcement author.” Philip Alston, “Labor Rights

Provisions in U.S. T rade Law: ‘Aggressive Uniliateralism?’” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 15 (1993), p. 32.

President Clinton submitted the convention in May 1998 to the Senate for advice and consent to ratify. At the time,

T APILS determined there was no legal impediment in U.S. law to ratification, and that existing legislation brings the

United States into compliance. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting ILO Convention (No.

111) Concerning Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), Adopted by the International Labor Conference at its

42 nd Session in Geneva on June 25, 1958, 115 th Cong., 2 nd sess., T reaty Doc 105—45 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998).

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countries often merely comply with those conventions that already fit their national legislation,

while others emphasize other determinants of ratification and some positive outcomes. 55

Global Trends in Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements

The lack of multilateral trade rules on and prevailing concerns over labor practices led to the

proliferation of other trade arrangements with labor provisions. The United States and European

Union (EU) were among the first to include conditional labor clauses within unilateral trade

preference programs, which offer duty-free market access to eligible imports from less-developed

countries. In addition, reciprocal labor commitments increasingly have become a feature of

bilateral and regional FTAs, especially over the past decade. Per its latest survey, the ILO

reported that as of 2019, nearly 90 bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements included labor

provisions—about a third of agreements then in force globally. 56 This compares to nearly 60 trade

agreements in 2013, 20 in 2005, and four in 1995. 57 Such agreements involve those between

advanced and developing economies, as well as increasingly between developing and emerging

economies. Of the surveyed FTAs, more than half include at least one G-7 trading partner

(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States). 58 Given the lack of

multilateral trade rules on labor, some officials viewed past U.S.-EU attempts at negotiating an

FTA as offering an opportunity for possibly aligning approaches on using trade policy to promote

social sustainability59 and labor protections (see Text Box). 60

Recent agreements include dedicated labor commitments within FTA chapters, varying both in

substance and enforcement mechanisms. Common features include references to domestic and

international standards per the ILO that address labor rights and working conditions; mechanisms

for monitoring or promoting compliance; and frameworks for cooperation. 61 Some create new

institutional mechanisms to carry out cooperation activities and to engage in technical assistance.

The majority of provisions commit trade partners to observe certain minimum labor standards

and/or to enforce and not weaken domestic labor laws to attract trade and investment.

Implementation and enforcement mechanisms vary among agreements. Most provide a

framework for dialogue and monitoring, and many provisions are subject to limited or no FTA

For discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer, “Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and

Innovation in the ILO,” Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (2006): 649-726, and Nancy H. Chau and S. M. Ravi

Kanbur, “T he Adoption of International Labor Standards Conventions: Who, When and Why?” Brookings Trade

Forum , vol. 1 (January 2001): 113-156.

56 ILO, Labour Provisions in G7 Trade Agreements: A Comparative Perspective, 2019. ILO analysis is based on the

WT O Regional T rade Agreements database, and considers agreements with labor references and obligations that go

beyond aspirational preamble statements. For context, according to the WT O, as of January 2021, of nearly 350 trade

agreements in force, 110 agreements are categorized as containing labor provisions based on broader metric: “T his

category includes provisions on ‘labour measures’ which are t ypically found in the services or/and investment chapter

or in the economic cooperation or sustainable development chapters. T his includes best endeavour provisions and

rendezvous clauses.” See WT O, Regional T rade Agreements Database, and RTA Provisions Glossary.

57 ILO, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions, 2017 and Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements, 2015.

58 ILO, Labour Provisions in G7 Trade Agreements. T he G-7 agreements treat EU-wide agreements as those of the

relevant G-7 countries, as the EU has exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude FT As.

59 See e.g., National Board of T rade Sweden, Trade and Social Sustainability: An Overview and Analysis, 2017.

60 European Parliament, Policy Department A, Economic and Scientific Policy, TTIP and Labour Standards, 2016. EU

officials framed its T T IP proposal as providing the opportunity to negotiate “the most comprehensive set of

fundamental international standards of labour rights […] ever contained in a trade agreement.” Cecilia Malmström,

Commissioner for T rade, “T T IP: What consumers have to gain,” European Commission – Speech, January 26, 2016.

61 ILO, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions, p. 1.

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dispute settlement procedures. Key distinguishing features include the nature of penalties for

failure to abide by labor obligations, establishment of incentives for compliance, and the extent of

capacity-building assistance. 62 Many agreements, such as those of the EU, New Zealand, and

Chile, focus on cooperation and dialogue activities, as well as consultations to resolve disputes,

with the support of an expert body. U.S. and Canadian agreements generally provide for

enforcement mechanisms with recourse to trade sanctions for at least some labor provisions. To

date, the vast majority of labor complaints submitted under trade agreements involve U.S. FTAs.

Two labor disputes have been adjudicated through dispute settlement procedures resulting in

panel decisions: the U.S.-Guatemala dispute under the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA

(CAFTA-DR) in 2017; and the EU-Korea dispute under their bilateral FTA in 2021.

Labor Provisions in EU FTAs Compared to U.S. Approaches

Recent EU FTAs typically contain a “Trade and Sustainable Development” (TSD) chap ter that includes labor

provisions. The EU approach to such provisions has similarities and differences to U.S. approaches. Like U.S. FTAs,

EU labor provisions commit parties to effectively enforce their labor laws, and not to derogate from, or fail to

enforce such laws to encourage trade or investment. Both U.S. and EU FTAs generally commit to uphold the

fundamental principles and rights of the ILO 1998 Declaration. EU FTAs also typically refer to additional

instruments, such as the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair

Globalization. They commit to implementing ratified ILO conventions and to “make continued and sustained

efforts” toward ratifying all fundamental conventions—the EU has ratified all eight, compared to two by the U.S. In

the case of the EU-Vietnam FTA (entered into force in 2020), to advance this commitment, before FTA

ratification, Vietnam reformed its labor code, ratified two ILO conventions (collective bargaining and forced labor),

and adopted a “road map” for ratifying the freedom of association convention.63

In terms of enforcement, both U.S. and EU FTAs emphasize cooperation and dialogue mechanisms for initially

resolving labor compliance concerns and disputes. Unlike the United States, EU FTAs generally do not include

recourse to trade sanctions and may have distinct dispute settlement mechanisms, such as use of a Panel of

Experts. In its first labor dispute under a modern FTA, the EU challenged South Korean compliance, requesting a

panel in 2019.64 The EU posited that South Korea had failed to uphold commitments of “respecting, promoting

and realizing” in laws and practices ILO principles, namely related to freedom of association and collective

bargaining, and to make “continued and sustained efforts” towards ratification of core conventions. Some experts

argue that the outcome could have implications for the interpretation of FTA labor provisions in the adjudication

of future disputes.65

In its 2021 trade strategy, the European Commission emphasized efforts to ensure effective implementation and

enforcement of FTA TSD chapters “to level-up social, labour and environmental standards globally” and pledged

to review the scope of TSD commitments, monitoring mechanisms, and possibility of sanctions as a remedy.66

Debate over Role and Impact of Labor Provisions

Debate over the role of labor provisions, or “social clauses,” in trade agreements is longstanding,

and has featured prominently in broader debate over the tradeoffs of globalization. 67 An extensive

Polaski, “Protecting Labor Rights through T rade Agreements: An Analytical Guide.”

63 Some have also criticized EU approaches in the proposed EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

(CAI) for lacking binding, enforceable language committing China to ratify ILO conventions on forced labor. Shannon

T iezzi, “ China-EU Investment Deal Sparks Backlash Over Rights Concerns,” The Diplomat, January 13, 2021.

64 Panel of Experts Proceeding Constituted Under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Report of

Panel of Experts, January 20, 2021.

65 For example, Desirée LeClercq, “ T he Panel Report under the EU-Korea T rade Agreement Concerning Labor

Practices,” International Economic Law and Policy Blog, February 8, 2021.

66 European Commission, Trade Policy Review - An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy, February 18, 2021.

A formal review of its 15-point action plan on implementation and enforcement of T SD chapters is expected in 2021.

67 See Leary, “Workers’ Rights and International Trade;” Jagdish Bhagwati, T rade Liberalization and ‘Fair T rade’

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body of literature focuses on various aspects of the debate, including the impact of labor

standards on trade and investment flows, the merits and impact of linking labor standards to trade

agreements, and effects of trade policies on labor rights and labor markets. Overall, studies find a

lack of robust evidence of either a “race to the bottom” in standards—as some labor advocates

allege, or of protectionist use of labor standards—a prevailing concern in developing countries

and among other stakeholders. 68 Some analyses find evidence that lower labor standards tend to

reduce competitiveness, rather than bolster export performance or attract investment. 69 One study

finds that while labor clauses in FTAs do not have a significant impact on bilateral trade flows on

average, they have benefited exports of low-income countries.70 Such effects were amplified by

provisions that facilitated deeper cooperation, such as technical assistance and capacity building,

and establishment of committees for monitoring implementation of labor commitments.

Conclusions vary as to the effectiveness of labor provisions in trade agreements. 71 Several studies

attempt to measure the impact of FTA provisions on labor standards and working conditions,

which can be difficult to assess due to the lack of comparable cross-country data and challenges

measuring the application of labor standards—e.g., ratification of ILO conventions and passage

of laws often do not effectively measure enforcement. 72 Empirical analysis of the impact of U.S.

FTAs with Latin American and Caribbean countries finds overall significant improvement in

labor law enforcement through more inspection resources and activities (with the exception of

inconclusive findings in Mexico). 73 The findings reinforce other qualitative studies documenting

positive effects of U.S. FTAs in Latin America, such as through increased fiscal resource

allocations to inspection agencies and labor inspector training. 74 One study finds that U.S. FTAs

more often led to ex-ante improvement of labor rights in partner countries (i.e. countries

improved labor standards before signing) rather than ex-post enforcement of labor provisions

after FTAs enter into effect. 75 The ILO also contends that U.S. FTAs with pre-ratification

conditionality—i.e., requirements to address deficiencies in domestic labor standards prior to FTA

ratification—led to more comprehensive and significant changes in labor legislation. 76

Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, World Economy, vol. 18 (1995): 745-759;

Maskus, Should Core Labor Standards be Imposed Throu gh International Trade Policy?; Drusilla Brown,

International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey of the Recent Literature , Labour Market and Social Policy

Occasional Papers Nº 43, OECD, October 2000; Samira Salem and Faina Rozental, Labor Standards and Trade: A

Review of Recent Empirical Evidence, U.S. International T rade Commission, 2012; and Elliott, “Labor Standards.”

Salazar-Xirinachs and Martinez-Piva, “Trade, Labour Standards and Global Governance”; Elliott and Freeman, Can

Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization?; and Robert Stern, Labor Standards and Trade Agreements,

Discussion Paper No. 496, University of Michigan, 2003.

69 Will Martin and Keith E. Maskus, “Core Labour Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for Global T rade

Policy,” Review of International Economics, vol. 9, no. 2 (2001); OECD, International Trade and Core Labour

Standards, 2000, and T rade, Employment and Labour Standards, 1996.

70 Céline Carrère, Marcelo Olarreaga, Damian Raess, Labor Clauses in Trade Agreements: Worker Protection or

Protectionism? August 2017.

71 Salem and Rozental, Labor Standards and Trade: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence.

72 Anne Posthuma and Franz Christian Ebert , Labour Provisions in Trade Arrangements: Current Trends and

Perspectives, ILO International Institute for Labour Studies Discussion Paper, July 2010.

73 Sabina Dewan and Lucas Ronconi, U.S. Free Trade Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America ,

IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-543, Inter-American Development Bank, November 2014.

74 Ibid, p. 8.

Moonhawk Kim, “Ex Ante Due Diligence: Formation of PT As and Protection of Labor Rights,” International

Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4 (2012): 704-719.

76 ILO, Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements, International Institute for Labour Studies, 2013, pp. 29 -41.

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Some studies find certain conditions may increase the likelihood that labor obligations have a

positive impact. These include the threat of enforcement through trade sanctions, positive

incentives such as trade benefits or capacity-building assistance, and certain market or sectoral

factors. 77 The ILO emphasizes that the political will of countries involved and advocacy of civil

society are crucial factors.78 Some analyses use a case study approach and focus on specific

indicators, such as child labor. For example, civil society engagement coupled with potential trade

restrictions were credited with helping to mitigate use of child labor or advance labor protections

in the cases of Bangladesh’s garment sector, Pakistan’s manufacturing, and Cambodia’s textiles

industries. 79

The role and effectiveness of trade sanctions are debated, with punitive action generally viewed

as a measure of last resort, given the underlying development objectives of labor clauses, the

potential harm to foreign workers, and limited resources governments have to carry out labor law

enforcement. 80 Many analysts contend that the “stick” of suspension of trade benefits for labor

violations is more effective when coupled with “carrots” of technical assistance. Some argue that

a trade sanctions approach may be less effective in mitigating labor issues, in particular those that

occurring in less prominent export sectors and driven by lower development and other conditions;

for example, in the case of child labor which often occurs in non-tradable sectors. 81

Labor Provisions in Selected U.S. Trade Policy Tools

Section 307 of Tariff Act of 1930 and Forced Labor82

The persistence of forced labor in some global supply chains has become an elevated issue for the

trade enforcement priorities of the Biden Administration and for some Members of Congress.

Since the late 19th century, the United States has prohibited imports produced by prison labor.

Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. §1307), expanded this prohibition

to ban U.S. imports of any product mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, by

forced labor, including forced or indentured child labor. 83 An individual may submit a petition

under Section 307 alleging goods produced by forced labor are being imported, and CBP may

investigate, issue a withhold release order (WRO) to block entry into the United States, and

77 Elliott and Freeman, Can Labor Standard Improve Under Globalization? ; Polaski, “Protecting Labor Rights through

T rade Agreements”; Salem and Rozental, “Labor Standards and T rade: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence,” pp.

1-36; and Gunseli Berik and Yana Rodgers, “Options for Enforcing Labour Standards: Lessons from Bangladesh and

Cambodia,” Journal of International Development, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 2010): 56-85.

78 ILO, Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements.

79 Elliott and Freeman, Can Labor Standard Improve Under Globalization? pp. 111-119.

As one expert reflects: “the goal of potential penalties is not to utilize them per se, but rather to establish a

disincentive or punishment that is adequate to deter a party from failing to carry out its obligations, and thus to

encourage voluntary compliance…. Because the ultimate victim of a party’s non-compliance is the working population

of that country and not the government or employers, care must be taken to ensure that the penalty will help and not

harm those workers. A fine that is used directly to address the labor problem may be more effective than a withdrawal

of trade benefits in correcting the underlying violation.” Polaski, pp. 20 -21.

81 Salazar-Xirinachs and Martinez-Piva, “Trade, Labour Standards and Global Governance.”

82 For more detail and analysis, see CRS Report R46631, Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor:

Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.

83 T he act defines forced labor as work or service “ exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its

nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily .” Labor trafficking that is linked to forced

labor is considered one of the severe forms of trafficking in persons, defined by the T ra fficking Victims Protection Act

of 2000 (22 U.S.C. §7102).

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potentially seize the merchandise. 84 Various other U.S. government measures may inform the

issuance of WROs under Section 307 and seek to address labor trafficking more broadly. 85

The ILO estimated that, in 2016, 25 million people were engaged in forced labor, with

approximately 16 million of those in the private sector. 86 Sizing up the volume of trade flows tied

to forced labor is difficult, due to the complexity of supply chains, the magnitude of global trade,

and challenges to tracing, given widespread subcontracting and at times ineffective auditing. U.S.

data are also limited, as CBP does not disclose the value of shipments produced by forced labor

that are imported, detained, or seized. Congressionally-mandated reports by DOL’s Bureau of

International Labor Affairs (ILAB) provide broad insights on countries and sectors at high risk for

forced labor. ILAB’s latest list specifies 63 categories of goods in at least 41 countries with

known production by forced labor (including 26 with forced child labor) (Figure 2). 87

Figure 2. Countries with Production by Forced Labor and/or Forced Child Labor

Source: U.S. DOL, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced

Labor and 2019 List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor.

Notes: * Categories may overlap; some countries with forced child labor also have incidence of non -child forced

labor.

Since the Tariff Act’s enactment, CBP has issued around 50 WROs to restrict imports under

Section 307. None were issued between 2000 and 2016, and nearly 30 have been issued since

2016. 88 The limited enforcement of Section 307 prior to 2016 was in large part due to the

“consumptive demand” clause, which allowed forced labor imports if U.S. production of those

goods was not sufficient to meet the U.S. consumptive demand. Congress removed this exception

84 CBP may issue a WRO when information reasonably, but not conclusively, indicates that merchandise produced with

forced labor is being, or likely to be, imported into the United States. Pursuant t o WROs, CBP may detain shipments at

U.S. ports of entry, unless an importer provides sufficient evidence that it was not made with forced labor.

For discussion, see CRS Report R46631, Section 307 and U.S. Imports of Products of Forced Labor.

86 ILO, “ Forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking,” at https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/

lang—en/index.htm.

U.S. DOL, ILAB, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor and 2019 List of Products

Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor.

88 U.S. CBP, “Withhold Release Orders and Findings,” at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forced-

labor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings.

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in 2015. 89 While WROs have typically been limited to specific manufacturers and producers, CBP

recently has issued broader industry- and country-wide orders, covering entire product lines.

A regional enforcement approach has gained traction recently in particular for responding to

forced labor practices in China, given deepening concerns over the arguably systemic statesponsored forced labor of ethnic Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur

Autonomous Region, and China’s central role in global manufacturing. 90 Since 2019, the majority

of CBP’s Section 307 actions have targeted products involving Xinjiang-related forced labor,

with nearly a dozen WROs against Xinjiang goods. In January 2021, CBP issued its first regionwide WRO against Xinjiang, blocking all imports of cotton and tomatoes grown in the region, as

well as downstream products.91 The CBP orders effectively require U.S. importers of apparel and

textiles to demonstrate that their imports do not contain material from Xinjiang, necessitating a

more robust system for traceability and verification. 92 The U.S. government’s updated “Xinjiang

Supply Chain Business Advisory,” issued in July 2021, identified several high-risk sectors and

warned businesses of significant reputational, economic, and legal risks of involvement with

entities engaged in human rights abuses and forced labor. 93 It noted that “businesses and

individuals that do not exit supply chains, ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang

could run a high risk of violating U.S. law.”

The effectiveness of Section 307 in deterring forced labor imports and practices remains subject

to debate. Some labor groups and government agencies recommend improving transparency in

CBP decisions and requirements, such as clarifying evidentiary standards, and improving

collaboration with other anti-trafficking initiatives. 94 Other stakeholders argue that companies

should improve supply chain due diligence (see Text Box), and advocate for greater enforcement

actions against an entire industry, region, or country.95 The private sector has cautioned about

potential spillover effects of expanded enforcement, such as disrupting legitimate supply chains,

and raised concerns about practical challenges, such as tracing difficulties in supply chains. 96

Multinationals, Codes of Conduct, and Supply Chain Due Diligence

Increasing consumer and multinational company demand for goods produced under decent labor conditions has

shaped the development of global trade rules and measures on worker rights. In particular, in the 1990s,

consumer backlash rose against sweatshop labor, spurred by media accounts and incidents involving high profile

companies, such as Nike, and global apparel and footwear manufacturing. To assist in navigating third-party

suppliers and markets abroad, multinational companies developed codes of conduct, social audits, risk

Per the T rade Facilitation and T rade Enforcement Act, P.L. 114-125.

90 See CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs, by T homas Lum and Michael A. Weber.

91 U.S. CBP, “ CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” P ress

release, January 13, 2021.

92 For example, see Amy K. Lehr, New Approaches to Supply Chain Traceability, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, November 2020.

93 U.S. Departments of State, the T reasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, “ Xinjiang Supply Chain Business

Advisory,” updated July 13, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/.

For example, International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), Combatting Forced Labor and Enforcing Workers’ Rights

Using the Tariff Act, Briefing Paper, February 2020; and U.S. GAO, Forced Labor – Better Communication Could

Improve Trade Enforcement Efforts Related to Seafood , GAO-20-441, June 2020.

95 ILRF, Combatting Forced Labor.

96 Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC), Report of the Intelligent Enforcement Subcommittee

Forced Labor Working Group, July 15, 2020; T estimony by Stephen Lamar, President and CEO, American Apparel &

Footwear Association, U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by

Forced Labor in Xinjiang, hearing, 116 th Cong., 2 nd sess., September 17, 2020.

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management and due diligence measures, often in concert with civil society and international organizations, such as

the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),97 and in response to various national

legislation on labor-related disclosure requirements.98 Multi-stakeholder codes of conduct on worker rights, such

as of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), generally contain provisions on

monitoring, verification, certification of supplier factories, enforcement mechanisms, and transparency. 99

With respect to forced labor, U.S. importers have an obligation to exercise “reasonable care” when importing

into the United States, which includes the responsibility to take reliable measures to ensure goods are not

produced wholly or in part with forced labor. Many U.S. companies have issued public commitments to eliminate

forced labor in supply chains and emphasize a zero tolerance approach. In general, companies tend to be more

advanced in developing supply chain commitments and monitoring labor conditions of their first-tier suppliers with

whom they have direct relationships. While efforts have made important strides in certain sectors, forced labor in

some supply chains persists, and some argue for greater accountability and transparency measures. To this end,

some bills in the 117 th Congress aim to improve disclosure and transparency of companies (e.g., H.R. 2072). There

have been similar efforts in the past, but no bill has passed at the federal level, with the exception of due diligence

requirements related to conflict minerals.100

Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in ensuring CBP actively applies Section

307, and have proposed various legislation to address enforcement issues. For example, the

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 1155/S. 65) would create a rebuttable presumption

provision that all goods produced or manufactured in Xinjiang are made with forced labor, and

are thus prohibited under Section 307. This and other bills also aim to improve disclosure and

transparency from companies. Provisions of the Trade Act of 2021 (Division G of S. 1260) direct

CBP to prioritize certain forced labor investigations, and to prevent imports of seafood harvested

or produced with forced labor. Congress also used passage of USMCA (P.L. 116-113) to bolster

enforcement efforts related to Section 307 and interagency coordination, through creation of the

new Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Eligibility Criteria in U.S. Trade Preference Programs

U.S. unilateral trade preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), offer duty-free market access to certain

imports from less developed countries, with the receipt of benefits conditioned on eligibility

criteria including related to worker rights. Country specific programs, such as for Haiti, may also

include labor-related criteria. 101 The United States has also engaged some beneficiary countries in

supplemental programs and sectoral trade agreements that focus on strengthening labor standards

(see Text Box).

Some observers view GSP, the largest and longest running program, as expanding more broadly

into U.S. trade law and policy “both the principle of a labor rights-trade linkage and the practice

97 For example, OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018 and Update of the OECD

Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011. Per the OECD, “risk-based due diligence refers to the steps companies

should take to identify and address actual or potential risks in order to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated

with their activities or sourcing decisions.”

98 Nicola Phillips, Genevieve LeBaron, and Sara Wallin, Mapping and Measuring the Effectiveness of Labour-related

Disclosure Requirements for Global Supply Chains, Working Paper No. 32, ILO, June 2018.

99 For discussion, see Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 2008.

100 Section 1502 of T itle XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203)

requires publicly-traded companies to report if and where they purchased “conflict minerals” mined in or sourced from

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries, and engage in due diligence reporting. See CRS

Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses, by Nicolas Cook.

101 See ILAB, “Laws and Regulations,” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/about/laws.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

of applying it.”102 GSP was created in 1974 and involved 119 beneficiary developing countries

and territories when it expired in December 2020. 103 Some Members have proposed

reauthorization legislation. When designating beneficiary countries, the President is directed to

consider certain mandatory and discretionary criteria. As part of GSP reauthorization in 1984

(P.L. 98-573), Congress expanded eligibility criteria to include whether that country is “taking

steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers.”104 The Trade and

Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200) expanded criteria to include implementation of

commitments to eliminate the “worst forms of child labor.” The latest version of the statute

defines “internationally recognized worker rights” as: (a) the right of association; (b) right to

organize and bargain collectively; (c) prohibition on the use of forced or compulsory labor; (d)

minimum age for the employment of children, and prohibition on the worst forms of child labor;

and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and

occupational health and safety. 105

The interagency GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), chaired by

USTR, conducts annual reviews of compliance with eligibility requirements, and makes

recommendations to the President to remove, suspend, or limit GSP status or benefits (at both the

country or product level). USTR may self-initiate eligibility reviews or interested parties may file

a petition requesting review, including in cases where countries are not upholding worker rights.

DOL’s ILAB informs such decisions through annual findings on beneficiary country

implementation of commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.

AGOA (P.L. 106-200) extends duty-free treatment to imports of certain products from eligible

sub-Saharan African countries, with similar criteria of whether a country has “established, or is

making continual progress toward establishing … protection of internationally recognized worker

rights.”106 To remain eligible, sub-Saharan African countries must meet eligibility requirements

for both GSP and AGOA programs. USTR with other TPSC members also conducts annual

AGOA eligibility reviews and make recommendations to the President. USTR’s congressionally

mandated biennial AGOA reports include an assessment of AGOA beneficiaries’ eligibility status.

Sectoral Approaches: U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement

The U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, signed in January 1999 and renewed through 2004, 107 was notable for

tying positive market access incentives to Cambodia’s improved enforcement of labor laws and protection of ILO

core standards in the textile and apparel sector.108 The agreement set U.S. import quotas that increased annually

for 12 categories of textile and apparel exports from Cambodia. A program carried out by the ILO facilitated

102 Lance A. Compa and Jeffrey S. Vogt, “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20 -Year Review,”

Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, vol. 22 (2001), pp. 204-205.

T itle V of the T rade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§2461 – 2467), as amended. See CRS Report RL33663, Generalized

System of Preferences (GSP): Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian C. Jones and Liana Wong.

104

19 U.S.C. §2462(b)(G). In considering GSP renewal Members emphasized: “ It is not the expectation of the

Committee that developing countries come up to the prevailing labor standards in the United States and other highlyindustrialized developed countries. It is recognized that acceptable minimum standards may vary from country to

country.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of

1984, report on H.R. 6023, 98 th Cong., 2 nd sess., H.Rept. 98-1090 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984).

103

105 19 U.S.C. §2467(4).

106 See CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), by Brock R. Williams. 19 U.S.C §3703.

107

T he agreement expired in 2005 with the end of the WT O Multifibre Arrangement, at https://www.wto.org/english/

tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm#MFA.

108 T ext at https://photos.state.gov/libraries/cambodia/231771/PDFs/uskh_texttile.pdf; UST R, “ U.S.-Cambodian T extile

Agreement Links Increasing T rade with Improving Workers’ Rights,” Press release, January 7, 2002.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

compliance through factory level monitoring of labor rights.109 While the agreement was in force, Cambodia’s

apparel exports quintupled to $2 billion.

Many observers viewed the agreement as successful in facilitating improvements in wages for garment workers in

Cambodia, working conditions, and respect for workers’ rights.110 Some considered the agreement as offering

“best practices” of improving factory compliance with labor standards.111 Experts attributed success to various

factors, including the close connection between firm behavior and incentives for the Cambodian government, as

well as conditioning the quotas on sector-wide performance, ensuring peer pressure on non-compliant firms. In

particular, the combination of positive incentives and improved information about factory conditions was seen as

incentivizing wider compliance than the potential threat of punishment for noncompliance. Observers also

emphasized ILO monitoring as a key factor. Following the end of the agreement, the Cambodian government

continued to seek a monitoring program that would provide a stronger certification of compliance, and Better

Factories Cambodia (backed by the ILO and World Bank’s International Finance Corporation) remains active.

The United States pursued sectoral agreements with some other countries, including a textile agreement with

Vietnam in 2003. On labor rights, the agreement called for Vietnam to reaffirm its commitments to and cooperate

with the ILO, and to continue its bilateral programs with the U.S. DOL. Some criticized the less comprehensive

provisions compared to the Cambodia labor provisions.112

Following the addition of GSP labor criteria, more than 100 petitions to review eligibility were

filed in the first decade, usually by labor unions such as the AFL-CIO and non-governmental

organizations. 113 From 1984 to 2000, various U.S. administrations suspended GSP status for 13

countries. 114 More recently, in one notable instance, the Obama Administration suspended

Bangladesh’s GSP benefits in June 2013 due to worker rights and workplace safety issues

uncovered in the wake of the Rana Plaza building collapse and Tazreen Fashion factory fire

incidents, which spurred an ongoing multi-stakeholder effort to resolve concerns. 115 Recent

enforcement actions included President Trump’s decisions to suspend one-third of Thailand’s

GSP benefits in April 2020, and terminate Mauritania’s AGOA eligibility over forced labor in

January 2019.

Table 1. Recent GSP Eligibility Reviews Involving Worker Rights

Beneficiary

Basis for petition

Petitioner

Status/Action Taken

Azerbaijan

Worker Rights

USTR

Ongoing

Eritrea

Worker Rights

USTR

Ongoing

Kazakhstan

Worker Rights & Child Labor

AFL-CIO

Ongoing

Zimbabwe

Worker Rights

USTR

Ongoing

Bolivia

Worker Rights & Child Labor

USTR

Closed October 2019, no loss of benefits

Iraq

Worker Rights

AFL-CIO

Closed October 2019, no loss of benefits

Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working To Improve Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment

Factories, Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004.

109

110 Polaski, “Protecting Labor Rights through T rade Agreements,” p. 21.

111 Don Wells, “‘Best practice’ in the Regulation of International Labor Standards: Lessons of the U.S. -Cambodia

T extile Agreement,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, vol. 27 (2006): 357-376.

112 CRS Report RL31470, The Vietnam -U.S. Textile Agreement, by Mark E. Manyin and Amanda Douglas.

113 Elliott and Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? p. 75.

114 Compa and Vogt, “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Prefer ences,” p. 209.

Proclamation 8997, “To Modify Duty-Free T reatment Under the Generalized System of Preferences, and for Other

Purposes,” 78 Federal Register 39949, July 2, 2013. UST R, “United States and Bangladesh Hold 4 th T rade and

Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement Council Meeting,” press release, September 2018. ILO, “ T he Rana Plaza

Accident and its aftermath,” at https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/geip/WCMS_ 614394/lang—en/index.htm.

115

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Thailand

Worker Rights

AFL-CIO

Proclamation (October 25, 2019) removed

certain tariff lines from GSP eligibility, in

effect April 2020

Georgia

Worker Rights

AFL-CIO

Closed October 2020, no loss of benefits

Uzbekistan

Worker Rights & Child Labor

ILRF

Closed October 2020, no loss of benefits

Source: USTR, “Ongoing Country Reviews,” at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/preference-programs/generaliz edsystem-preferences-gsp/current-reviews/ongoing-country.

Note: AFL-CIO = American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; ILRF = International

Labor Rights Forum

Some experts view the GSP labor rights clause as an important instrument that set a precedent for

other U.S. trade policy tools (see Text Box). In this view, the “willingness of the United States to

act unilaterally, most pointedly in the GSP context, has driven a process of bilateral, regional, and

multilateral action to promote workers’ rights in trade that goes far beyond the GSP program.”116

At the same time, other observers criticized the unilateral approach of GSP in placing conditions

on countries, and for shortcomings in design and implementation. 117 Some experts questioned the

invocation of “internationally recognized worker rights” in U.S. trade statutes without reference

to ILO conventions or other precepts, arguing this may undermine efforts to create consistent

international norms. 118 For example, the GSP statute’s definition excludes nondiscrimination,

long recognized as a core labor standard, 119 while including working conditions, such as

minimum wages, and health and safety that lie outside of the core ILO conventions. Other

observers cite concerns over lack of clarity in GSP eligibility decisions over worker rights issues,

and the President’s discretion to inject strategic and political considerations into such decisions.120

A 2018 study assessing GSP actions from 1986-2013 examined the influence of domestic political

interests in the application of the program’s labor provisions to assess whether interests of importcompeting firms and industries drive eligibility decisions. 121 The authors found that the U.S.

government generally took country-level actions against beneficiaries who most severely violate

labor rights, thus undermining perceptions that such actions are a vehicle for “disguised trade

protectionism.” At the same time, the study noted that worker rights were not systematically

taken into consideration at the country-product level (i.e., a particular product produced in a

specific country), where GSP decisions can have greater material value.

116 Compa and Vogt, “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences.”

Alston, “Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. T rade Law: ‘Aggressive Unilateralism?’”; George T sogas, “Labour

Standards in the Generalized Systems of Preferences of the European Union and the United States,” European Journal

of Industrial Relations, vol. 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 349–370.

117

Alston, “Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. T rade Law,” p. 32.

Some Members in the 117 th Congress have introduced legislation to add elimination of discrimination; “Wyden

introduces trade preference bill with new GSP conditions,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 18, 2021. In the 2002 debate to

reauthorize T PA, a Senate amendment also proposed adding non -discrimination to GSP to make it “consistent with the

concept as defined by the ILO.” U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, T rade Act of 2002, conference report to

accompany H.R. 3009, 107 th Cong., 2 nd sess., H.Rept. 107-624 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), pp. 188-189.

118

119

120 Compa and Vogt, “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences.”

121 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Layna Mosley, and Robert Galantucci, “Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at

Home: Rights-based Conditionality in T rade Preference Programs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, issue 5

(2019): 1253-1282.

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Labor Conditionality in Other U.S. Trade Policy Tools



In 1985, Congress added a labor rights clause governing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation

(OPIC), which provided political risk insurance, financing and other support for U.S. companies investing

overseas. Projects could be implemented only in countries that have, or are taking steps to adopt and

implement, laws that uphold internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in the GSP statute (22 U.S.C.

§2191a(a)). Congress extended similar requirements to the U.S. International Development Finance

Corporation (DFC), created per P.L. 115-254, which assumed OPIC’s functions. The DFC also must include

language in all contracts for supporting worker rights and combatting forced or child labor.



The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) amended Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and

authorized the USTR to investigate and potentially impose trade sanctions for violations of worker rights by

trading partners as actions that are “unjustifiable” or “unreason able” and burden U.S. commerce (19 U.S.C.

§2411(d)(3)(B)(iii)). In the 1998 Omnibus Trade Act, Congress also added protection of labor rights to the

principal negotiating objectives of TPA—see “Congressional Requirements in Trade Promotion Authority.”



The Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200) amended Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to

include “forced or indentured child labor” in its definition, reflecting a similar amendment to GSP.

Source: Compa and Vogt, “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences,” pp. 205 -206, CRS In Focus

IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), by Shayerah I. Akhtar and Nick M. Brown, and

CRS Report R46604, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.

Analyses of the impact of GSP conditionality on improving labor practices find certain factors

may correspond with higher rates of success. One study of early GSP petitions concluded that

cases were more likely to lead to improvements depending on factors such as the involvement of

human rights groups in the process; the degree of democracy in recipient country; the category of

worker rights contested; and the extent of the target country’s reliance on U.S. trade. 122 The

authors found the impact of trade sanctions to be inconsistent in producing improvements—often,

weaknesses in local enforcement prevented compliance, especially absent technical and financial

assistance. The impact of the potential loss of trade preferences on labor outcomes and workers

remains a key issue. In the view of one expert “serious violations of human or worker rights

should be addressed,” however, “strict enforcement of all [GSP] conditions would likely mean

that very few countries remain eligible … and it’s not clear [that] would improve the underlying

conditions of concern. Yet, withdrawing preferences would cost poor workers in the beneficiary

country their jobs.”123 In this vein, another expert emphasizes the “overall aim of social clauses in

trade should be to further the economic and social progress of developing countries.”124

Congressional Requirements in Trade Promotion Authority

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is the key legislative vehicle by which Congress establishes

U.S. negotiating objectives and priorities for trade agreements, as well as expedited procedures

for considering FTA implementing legislation. 125 The last authorization of TPA expired on July 1,

2021; a request by the Biden Administration for reauthorization could spur renewed congressional

debate over objectives with respect to labor. Since 1988, Congress has included promoting core

worker rights as a principal trade-negotiating objective in TPA. Such provisions have evolved,

illustrating changing congressional priorities and compromises. Members have often contested

122 Elliott and Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? pp. 75-79.

123 Elliott, Developing a More Inclusive US Trade Policy, p. 7.

124

T sogas, “Labour Standards in the Generalized Systems of Preferences,” p. 366.

125 CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and

Christopher M. Davis.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

language defining objectives, and differences over labor provisions have featured prominently in

some reauthorization debates—including rare instances of revocation of TPA. 126

Labor provisions were not included in negotiating objectives in the original grant of TPA in the

Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618)—enacted during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade

negotiations—but they were specified in the context of GATT reform. The 1974 Act directed the

President to bring trade agreements “into conformity with principles promoting the development

of an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair world economic system,” including through “adoption of

international fair labor standards and of public petition and confrontation procedures in the

GATT.”127

Congress subsequently specified principal negotiating objectives on labor in the Omnibus Trade

and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418). These included to promote respect for worker

rights; secure a review of the relationship of worker rights to the GATT with a view to ensuring

the trading system benefits all workers; and adopt the GATT principle that denial of worker rights

should not be a means for countries or industries to gain competitive advantage. 128 This language

shifted from advocating for an explicit GATT provision, to a review of labor and trade linkages,

perhaps in recognition of the limitations of ongoing multilateral efforts and shifting priorities. Of

note, the section did not specifically refer to “internationally recognized” worker rights.

Disagreements over labor-related trade objectives were one factor in the instance of failed TPA

reauthorization in 1998. Although Republican congressional leadership and the Clinton

Administration supported TPA, the two sides could not agree on negotiating objectives for labor,

among other issues, and the bill did not garner enough support to pass.129

The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) expanded the language on labor. It specified overall trade

negotiating objectives “to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent

with core labor standards of the ILO … and an understanding of the relationship between trade

and worker rights,” and promote universal ratification and compliance with ILO Convention No.

182 on the worst forms of child labor. 130 It expanded on principal negotiating objectives,

including to ensure a party does not “fail to effectively enforce” its labor laws through a

“sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade and investment;”

and to strengthen trading partners’ capacity to respect “core labor standards.”131 It also directed

the President to “seek greater cooperation between the WTO and ILO,” and to establish

consultative mechanisms to strengthen capacity of trading partners to promote res pect for core

labor standards, in order to maintain U.S. competitiveness. 132 The act directed the Secretary of

Labor to consult with any country seeking an FTA about its labor laws and to provide technical

assistance, if needed.

126 For example, see Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 148, no. 62 (May 15, 2002), pp. S4343-S4345.

127

P.L. 93-618 (January 03, 1975), §121(a)(4); 88 Stat. Codified at 19 U.S.C. §2131. In reflecting on the provision, the

Senate Finance Committee emphasized, “international fair labor standards and procedures to enforce them should be

established,” and “additional steps are need which would lead to the elimination of unfair labor conditions which

substantially disrupt or distort trade.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, T rade Reform Act of 1974, report,

together with additional views, on H.R. 10710, 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess., S.Rept. 93-1208 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974).

128

P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988), §1101(b)(14); 102 Stat. 1122.

129 CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F.

Fergusson.

130 P.L. 107-210 (August 6, 2002), §2102(a)(6), 116 Stat. 994, codified at 19 U.S.C. §3802.

131 19 U.S.C. §3802(b)(11)(A-G).

132 19 U.S.C. §3802(c)(1-2).

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

Under the Trade Act of 2002, Congress also approved a procedure for the Executive branch to

seek expedited approval and implementing legislation for the majority of U.S. FTAs (11 of 14)

now in force. 133 Dissatisfied with FTA outcomes, some Members sought to strengthen labor (and

other) provisions in agreements already negotiated with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South

Korea. These efforts resulted in the bipartisan “May 10th Agreement” of 2007 between

congressional leadership and the George W. Bush Administration, 134 which included elements

proposed by House Democrats during the 2002 TPA renewal debate. Such changes subsequently

were codified within TPA in 2015 (see below).

In the case of the Colombia FTA, some Members initially opposed passage, amid concerns over

worker rights and violence against unions. 135 After the Bush Administration pushed consideration

of implementing legislation in 2008, without resolving congressional concerns, the House

approved a resolution withdrawing it from TPA treatment. The FTA was ultimately approved

under the Obama Administration in 2011, after the signing of an Action Plan Related to Labor

Rights.

The last TPA authorization, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act

of 2015 (P.L. 114-26) was in effect through June 30, 2021. Objectives on labor largely reflect the

May 10th Agreement, which required that parties not only enforce their domestic labor laws, but

also that those statutes uphold the ILO Declaration. Key objectives include:



to ensure a party does not waive or otherwise derogate from statutes or

regulations implementing internationally recognized core labor standards in a

manner affecting trade or investment;

to ensure that decisions regarding the distribution of labor enforcement resources

are not used as a reason for breaching labor obligations;

to strengthen capacity of trading partners to promote respect for core standards;

to ensure that labor obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement and

remedies as other enforceable obligations under the FTA;

to ensure that an FTA is not construed to empower a party’s authorities to

undertake labor law enforcement activities in the territory of the United States .

Key U.S. FTA Commitments

Recent U.S. FTAs largely reflect the evolving negotiating objectives under TPA statutes; at the

same time, some FTAs also influenced subsequent versions of TPA. U.S. FTA labor provisions

generally represented a balance between policymakers and stakeholders advocating for more

substantive commitments and those skeptical of FTAs as an appropriate vehicle for addressing

labor and trade issues. Some experts characterized early U.S. FTAs as “largely concerned with

finding politically acceptable trade-labor mechanisms that permit trade agreements to proceed,

while doing little to ensure that labor standards improve.”136

133 For a visual depiction of U.S. FT As considered under T PA, see CRS Infographic IG10001, Trade Promotion

Authority (TPA) and U.S. Trade Agreements, by Brock R. Williams.

134 T ext available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/tpp-focus.

135

E.g., “ Pelosi, Hoyer, Rangel, and Levin Statement on T rade,” Press release, June 29, 2007.

136 Elliot and Freeman, Can Labor Standard Improve Under Globalization ? p. 89. Also see I. M. (Mac) Destler,

American Trade Politics in 2007: Building Bipartisan Compromise, Policy Brief 07-5, Peterson Institute, May 2007.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

Approaches under NAFTA provided the baseline for this evolution. The original NAFTA did not

include labor provisions, leading President Clinton to negotiate a side agreement, the North

American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The NAALC contained 11 “guiding

principles” on worker rights. 137 It laid out an extensive list of issues and means for cooperation

and capacity building activities, and set up a labor cooperation mechanism, with regular meetings.

NAALC aimed to settle labor complaints primarily via dialogue and consultations. Thus most

commitments were subject to dispute procedures separate from those applicable to NAFTA’s

main commercial obligations. More formal dispute procedures, including an arbitral panel and

monetary penalties, applied to allegations involving a “persistent pattern of failure” to enforce

“occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards,” where

the matter was trade-related. Other key issues, such as freedom of association and the right to

organize, were limited to ministerial consultations. 138

Following NAFTA, most U.S. FTAs signed in the 2000s, beginning with Jordan, included an

obligation not to fail to effectively enforce domestic labor laws in a manner affecting trade

between the parties. While there are differences in the agreements’ provisions, some observers

have coined these as essentially “first generation” U.S. FTAs. 139 “Labor laws” reflect the worker

rights as specified in the GSP statute, and parties commit to “strive to ensure that such [ILO]

labor principles and the internationally recognized labor rights ... are recognized and protected by

its law [emphasis added].” The FTAs establish institutional and labor cooperation mechanisms to

oversee review and implementation of obligations, and generally limit enforcement measures for

labor disputes to imposition of monetary fines. In the exceptional case of the U.S.-Jordan FTA,

labor and commercial provisions were subject to the same dispute resolution procedures;

however, amid concerns of some Members of Congress, the parties informally agreed to seek to

resolve any disputes without resorting to trade sanctions.140 Importantly, CAFTA-DR was the first

U.S. FTA to include measures in support of labor capacity building (see “Trade Capacity

Building”).

Many observers view the May 10th Agreement of 2007 as ushering in a “second generation” of

labor provisions in U.S. FTAs, through the obligation to “adopt and maintain” ILO fundamental

rights and principles, and no limits on recourse to dispute settlement. 141 U.S. FTAs with

Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea were the first to reflect this structure. Some Members

and stakeholders viewed these agreements as breaking new ground in strengthening labor

provisions; others criticized them for not going far enough. 142 At the same time, Members also

raised concerns about potential ramifications of expanded labor provisions for the United States.

During congressional consideration of the U.S.-Peru FTA, one Member saw the labor chapter as

creating, “an unacceptable risk that the United States will be required to change important

137 NAALC, art. 1.2, Annex 1.

138

USMCA, which entered into force in 2020, supersedes NAALC for future disputes involving the three partners.

139 Steve Charnovitz, The Expanding Labor Dimension of US-Negotiated Regional Trade Agreements: TPP and

USMCA, GW Law, March 2021.

140

Before Congress considered implementing legislation in 2001, then UST R Robert Zoellick and Jordanian

Ambassador Marwan Muasher stated their intent in an exchange of letters that each party “would not expect or intend

to apply the Agreement’s dispute settlement enforcement procedures…in a manner that results in blocking trade.”

“Jordan Free T rade Agreement Approved by Finance and Ways and Means,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 27, 2001.

141

For more on FT A dispute settlement procedures, see CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and

U.S. Trade Agreements, by Ian F. Fergusson.

142 For the debate, see “United States-Peru T rade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act,” remarks in the Senate,

Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 153, no. 184 (December 4, 2007), pp. S14719-S14728.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

provisions of U.S. Federal and state labor law or be subject to trade sanctions.”143 In this view,

Congress’ implementation of such FTAs should provide “explicit safe harbor for U.S. labor law.”

While recent U.S. FTAs subject the labor chapter to the same dispute settlement procedures as

commercial obligations, some Members and stakeholders remain concerned about compliance

with and enforcement of labor provisions, both in terms of U.S. trading partners fulfilling FTA

obligations and U.S. administrations pursuing enforcement (see “Enforcement Mechanisms and

Labor Disputes”). Efforts to address such concerns as related to the Colombian government’s

implementation led to a negotiated labor action plan in April 2011, which outlined several issue

areas to be addressed before Congress would consider the FTA. 144 Issues addressed in the plan

included Colombian government commitments to protect unionists from perceived systemic

violence against them, to bring perpetrators to justice, and to increase the protection of worker

rights. This provided the basis for the first U.S. FTA associated with a separate plan requiring

labor reforms and setting specific benchmarks.

The U.S. bilateral labor plans with Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam to supplement the labor

chapter in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) strengthened this approach and may

inform future options. Such plans mandated specific institutional and legal reforms, as well as

monitoring mechanisms and a role for the ILO, particularly in the case Vietnam. 145 The three

countries were required to meet certain commitments prior to FTA ratification, and the plans were

subject to FTA dispute settlement. In the bilateral plan with Vietnam, certain commitments

regarding the formation of unions were also to be subject to an additional U.S. review mechanism

that allowed for unilateral U.S. suspension of future scheduled tariff reductions under the FTA. 146

The terms of the proposed TPP labor chapter, but not the bilateral side agreements, were left

intact for other TPP members following U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2017. During

TPP and later USMCA negotiations, some Members also called for a labor plan for Mexico to

address concerns over labor practices. The Mexican government strongly opposed such a plan.

Innovations in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)

The NAALC side agreement was an innovation of its time and made important strides towards

promoting North American labor cooperation. 147 At the same time, some experts and stakeholders

143 Ibid, p. S14722. In this view, concerns were that the lack of definition of what ILO rights entail could leave

interpretation to a dispute panel. Note that while a panel decision could lead a trading partner to retaliate against the

United States for a measure in violation of the FT A, it could not compel the United States to alter its laws. DS decisions

under trade agreements are not considered to be self-executing, i.e., where a federal law or regulation is in conflict and

the Executive branch does not have delegated authority to act, legislation would be needed to comply. Provisions in

FT A implementing legislation typically specify, “No provision of the Agreement, nor the application of any such

provision to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”

U.S.-Peru T rade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, P.L. 110-138, §102(a), 19 U.S.C. §3805 note.

144 For detail, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by M.

Angeles Villarreal and Edward Y. Gracia.

Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, “Labor Standards in the T PP,” in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Innovations in

Trading Rules, Volume 2, PIIE Briefing 16-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2016.

146

Section VIII, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/T PP-Final-Text-Labour-US-VN-Plan-for-Enhancement-of-Tradeand-Labor-Relations.pdf.

145

E.g., see Lance Compa, “T rump, T rade, and T rabajo: Renegotiating NAFT A’s Labor Accord in a Fraught Political

Climate,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 26, no. 1 (2019): 263-304; and Gary Clyde Hufbauer and

Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (Washington: Institute for International Economics,

2005). For information on NAFT A, see CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by

M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.

147

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

criticized the agreement for shortcomings in coverage and implementation, spurring expanded

provisions in subsequent U.S. FTAs and debate during the renegotiation of NAFTA under the

Trump Administration. 148 U.S trade officials and some Members frame USMCA as the strongest

of U.S. FTA labor chapters and as a possible template for future U.S. trade agreements. 149

USMCA updates NAALC to reflect and build on the labor chapters of U.S. FTAs that follow the

May 10th Agreement approach, with labor provisions included in the core of the agreement, and

subject to full dispute settlement (DS) procedures (see below).150 Reflecting Section 307 of the

Tariff Act of 1930, parties commit to prohibit imports of goods “from other sources produced in

whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory child labor” and

to establish cooperation for the identification and movement of such goods.151 Other new

provisions address violence against workers exercising labor rights, protection of migrant workers

under labor laws, and policies protecting against sex-based employment discrimination. 152 In

addition, the labor chapter’s Annex 23-A on Worker Representation in Collective Bargaining

commits Mexico to specific legislative actions, as part of domestic reforms already underway. 153

Key changes to USMCA following its signing were negotiated between House Democrats and the

Trump Administration, and affect prospective implementation and enforcement of the labor

chapter (see “Enforcement Mechanisms and Labor Disputes”). Changes to DS procedures include

provisions to prevent an FTA party from blocking the formation of a panel in state-to-state dispute

settlement, and to require the development of rules of evidence. 154 Updated language in the labor

chapter obligations also seeks to remove “hurdles” to potential enforcement actions, drawing

from experience in the U.S. dispute loss to Guatemala (see “Outcomes of U.S. FTA Disputes”). 155

This includes creating a rebuttable presumption that alleged violations of labor obligations occur

in ‘‘a manner affecting trade or investment,” unless the other party demonstrates otherwise.

A notable change in USMCA is the creation of a new mechanism that supplements state-to-state

DS procedures. The “rapid-response” labor mechanism provides for the enforcement of certain

worker rights at individual facilities, in contrast to general DS, which covers government’s

failures to uphold labor obligations. A panel of independent labor experts may conduct

verifications of compliance at certain facilities in response to allegations of ‘‘denial of rights”

related to freedom of association and collective bargaining. This covers facilities in the United

States and Mexico that (1) are in a “priority sector,” involving manufactured goods, services, or

mining; and (2) produce goods or supplies services traded between the parties.156 With respect to

the United States, a claim can be brought only with respect to a covered facility under an enforced

148 See U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on T rade, Mexico’s Labor Reform:

Opportunities and Challenges for an Improved NAFTA, hearing, 116 th Cong., 1 st sess., June 25, 2019; and Enforcement

in the New NAFTA, hearing, 116 th Cong., 1 st sess., May 22, 2019.

149 Per UST R T ai, USMCA “includes the most comprehensive, enforceable labor and environmental standards of any

U.S. trade agreement – and, I would argue, any trade agreement .” Testimony of Ambassador Katherine Tai Before the

House of Ways and Means Com mittee Hearing on the President’s Trade Agenda, Press release, May 13, 2021.

150 See CRS Report R46793, USMCA: Legal Enforcement of the Labor and Environment Provisions, by Nina M. Hart .

151 USMCA, Article 23.6.

152 USMCA, Articles 23.7-23.9.

153 See CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.

154 Rules of evidence, for example, would allow disputing parties to submit anonymous testimony, redacted evidence,

testimony in person or via other means.

155

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation

Act, report to accompany H.R. 5430, 116 th Cong., 1 st sess., H.Rept. 116-358 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2019), pp. 4-6.

156 T here is a separate similar mechanism covering claims between Canada and Mexico. See USMCA, Annex 31 -B.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 157 For Mexico, a claim can be brought with

respect to an alleged denial of rights under legislation that complies with Annex 23–A. The

investigation could result in the imposition of tariffs or penalties on the facility, and blocked entry

of imports in the case of multiple offenses. Members of Congress envisioned the mechanism to

support labor reforms undertaken by Mexico, emphasizing its stated purpose was ‘‘to ensure a

remediation of a Denial of Rights … [and] not to restrict trade.’’158

Congress also supplemented USMCA labor provisions with additional monitoring and domestic

procedures established through implementing legislation. For example, an interagency committee,

established in June 2020, is responsible for monitoring compliance with labor obligations,

including implementation of Mexico’s reforms. 159 The work of the committee is tied to

enforcement, including through recommending possible dispute settlement actions to USTR. It

also plays a role in the establishment and review of priority sectors under the rapid-response

mechanism, and reviews petitions submitted by stakeholders to assess whether there is a “good

faith” basis to request a review of denial of rights. Congress also specified reporting requirements

and funding for USTR and DOL staff devoted to monitoring and enforcement, including labor

attachés based in Mexico, and for trade capacity building to support Mexico’s reform efforts.

Trade Capacity Building

Trade capacity building (TCB) entails a range of activities that support a country’s ability to

integrate into the global trading system and engage in trade. Per the USTR, TCB is considered a

critical component of U.S. strategy “to enable developing countries to negotiate and implement

market-opening and reform-oriented trade agreements and to improve their capacity to benefit

from increased trade.”160 Within the latest TPA, Congress directed the Executive branch “to work

to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to carry out obligations under trade

agreements by consulting with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States

concerning that country’s laws” including as related to labor, and “to provide technical assistance

to that country if needed.”161 Congress has also played a key role by providing funding and

guidance for TCB through appropriations.

Experts have generally urged policymakers to sustain TCB programs, arguing they are a critical

mechanism for promoting better working conditions and addressing on-the-ground challenges. In

this regard, considerations include whether countries have the resources and political will to hire

inspectors and facilitate work site inspections; whether corruption is a problem; and whether

inspectors have authority to assess penalties. In cases where labor enforcement relies on a petition

process to demonstrate violations under U.S. FTAs, concerns involve whether labor groups,

particularly in countries with poor freedom of association and collective bargaining records have

the capacity to investigate and document violations, and adequate knowledge of the processes.

157 Specifically, there must be an enforced order where a U.S. Court of Appeals has issued a final and conclusive decree

requiring compliance with an order issued by the NLRB. Some labor experts contend such conditions translate to fairly

limited applicability to U.S. facilities; Desirée LeClercq, “ Biden’s Worker-Centered T rade Policy: Whose Workers?”

International Economic Law and Policy Blog, May 16, 2021, at https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/trade_and_labor/.

158 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act, report

to accompany H.R. 5430, 116 th Cong., 2 nd sess., S.Rept. 116-283 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2020), p. 8.

159 UST R, “ Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement Procedural Guidelines for Petitions

Pursuant to the USMCA,” 85 Federal Register 39257, June 30, 2020.

160 UST R, “T rade Capacity Building,” at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/trade-capacity-building.

161 19 U.S.C. §4201(c).

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Over the past decade, funding for TCB related to labor has fluctuated—in FY2019, total laborrelated activity obligations were $84 million, peaking at $239 million in FY2017 (Table 2). 162 In

recent years, trade-related labor activities have been among the highest funded TCB categories,

behind agriculture and/or infrastructure. Activities generally entail (1) improving labor and

workers’ rights; (2) ensuring labor equity and equal access to jobs, particularly for women and

vulnerable groups; (3) building capacity of civil society and worker organizations; (4) reducing

forced labor and child labor; (5) approving labor law compliance and governance; and (6)

assisting with workforce or human capital development.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary source of overall TCB

funding, though several agencies support TCB. The Department of Labor is the top provider, by

funding and implementation for labor-related TCB (Figure 3). DOL’s ILAB implements projects,

which focus on efforts to improve labor conditions often in partnership with the ILO. In FY2020,

ILAB engaged with 48 countries through technical assistance or other collaboration, 163 and

monitored and reported on labor conditions in over 150 countries. Such engagement contributed

to “concrete actions” taken by over 20 trading partners, including labor improvements in key

export sectors, such as autos in Mexico and sugarcane in the Dominican Republic. As of April

2021, 49 ILAB-funded projects were active worldwide, collectively valued at $230 million. 164

Table 2. TCB Assistance,Trade-Related

Labor Activities

Fiscal Year

Figure 3. Trade-Related Labor Obligations

by Implementing Agency, FY2014-FY2019

Total Obligations

(US$ millions)

2009

105

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

103

2015

2016

2017

239

2018

2019

Average (2009-19)

Source: USAID, Trade Capacity Building

Database, at https://tcb.usaid.gov/.

Note: Reports obligations, not appropriations or

disbursements, which are binding agreements that

will result in outlays, immediately or in the future.

Percent Share of Total

Source: USAID, Trade Capacity Building Database,

at https://tcb.usaid.gov/.

Note: Implementing agencies disburse funds to the

implementing partners carrying out foreign assistance.

Implementation of U.S. FTAs is one major

component of TCB efforts.165 Much of the labor-related funding has involved CAFTA-DR

162 USAID, T rade Capacity Building Database, at https://tcb.usaid.gov/.

163 U.S. DOL, FY2020 Annual Performance Report, 2021, p. 35.

164

According to CRS calculations, see https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/projects.

165 See, e.g., “T CB Case Studies” in Scott Miller and Daniel F. Runde, Opportunities in Strengthening Trade

Assistance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2015.

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implementation. 166 CAFTA-DR includes a specific TCB chapter, with commitments to establish a

TCB committee in recognition that “trade capacity building assistance is a catalyst for the reforms

and investments necessary to foster trade-driven economic growth, poverty reduction, and

adjustment to liberalized trade.”167 Committee tasks include prioritizing projects, coordinating

among donors and other entities, and monitoring and assessing progress in implementing projects.

U.S. FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and Peru also have dedicated TCB chapters. As discussed,

capacity building in Mexico was a focus of USMCA implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113),

which allocated $180 million to ILAB through 2023 for “worker-focused capacity building” and

other technical assistance projects.168 From 2018-2020, to this end, ILAB provided more than $80

million in grants to Mexico. 169

In recent years, legislation has sought to refocus ILAB activities on research, and on

administering and enforcing labor provisions in trade agreements. Several administrations and

some Members of Congress have sought cuts to DOL’s budget, including ILAB’s technical

assistance programs. For example, the Trump Administration’s FY2021 budget request proposed

program decreases of $67 million from the FY2020 enacted funding level ($96.125 million). The

reduction was to reflect “workload decrease associated with the elimination of new grants, as well

as a reduction in the intensity of other ILAB work activities,” claiming that “grant funding is

spent on promoting worker protection overseas” with many grants “awarded non-competitively”

to the ILO. 170 The Biden Administration requested $123.751 million for ILAB for FY2022, an

increase over the FY2021 enacted funding level ($96.125 million) “to support the President’s

trade policy agenda through both technical assistance grants and staff, as well as resources for the

agency’s forced labor reporting mandate.”171 The majority of the increase is intended for traderelated worker rights monitoring, enforcement, and capacity building programs.

Biden Administration Trade Policy Priorities

“Putting workers at the center” is a priority of the Biden Administration’s trade policy. 172 The

Administration pledged to review past trade policies for impacts on workers, and in particular,

fully enforce labor obligations under existing U.S. trade agreements. Commitments include:



Self-initiating and advancing petitions under the USMCA rapid-response

mechanism “to ensure workers receive relief through efficient, facility-level

enforcement.”

166 U.S. DOL, ILAB, Office of T rade and Labor Affairs, Progress in Implementing Capacity-Building Provisions under

the Labor Chapter of the Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement (Third

Biennial), 2015; UST R, “ CAFT A-DR Labor Capacity Building,” Factsheet, May 2011.

167 CAFT A-DR, Article 19.4.

168 U.S. DOL, “U.S. Department of Labor to Award $20 Million in New Grants to Sup port USMCA Implementation,

Bringing the 2020 T otal to Nearly $50 million,” news release, December 16, 2020, and “ Labor Rights and the United

States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rightsusmca.

169 U.S. DOL, FY2020 Annual Performance Report, 2021, pp. 33-35.

170 U.S. DOL, FY 2021 Congressional Budget Justification: Departmental Management, 2020, p. DM-41.

171

U.S. DOL, FY2022 Budget in Brief, May 2021, p. 47.

172 UST R, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, March 2021, p. 2; UST R, “ Remarks of Ambassador

Katherine T ai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s ‘Worker-Centered T rade Policy,’” June 10, 2021.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy



Crafting new trade policies “to promote equitable economic growth through the

inclusion in trade agreements of strong, enforceable labor standards that protect

workers’ rights and increase economic security.”



Ensuring trading partners are not allowed “to gain a competitive advantage by

violating workers’ rights and pursuing unfair trade practices.”

Engaging with allies to achieve commitments to combat forced labor and

exploitative labor conditions, and increase transparency and accountability in

global supply chains.

Using full range of trade tools to ensure products of forced labor and exploitative

labor are not imported into the United States, and to combat other unfair labor

practices.



To facilitate these priorities, the Administration aims to create “a more inclusive process … to

understand how trade affects workers,” and improve worker representation in trade policy in the

United States and in multilateral organizations, including the WTO. 173

Enforcement Mechanisms and Labor Disputes

As of mid-2021, U.S.-based complaints regarding FTA labor compliance have been initiated and

processed under five FTAs: NAFTA (entry into force 1994, superseded by USMCA in 2020),

U.S.-Bahrain FTA (2006), CAFTA-DR (2006-2009), U.S.-Peru FTA (2009), and U.S.-Colombia

FTA (2012). 174 In addition, new labor complaints have been raised under the USMCA, and some

remain pending. As highlighted, the labor provisions subject to dispute settlement (DS) differ

among agreements, as do the relevant procedures and remedies. Trading partners most often seek

to resolve disputes and issues with compliance outside of formal DS.

For some Members and stakeholders, effective enforcement has become a key issue in the debate

over U.S. FTA labor provisions. They have criticized enforcement as “slow and cumbersome,”

and over reliant on the political will of governments. 175 Some also call for more institutionalized

monitoring and oversight of FTA implementation and country labor practices.176 According to the

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. agencies have taken steps to strengthen

monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, but lacked a “strategic approach to

systematically assess whether partner countries’ conditions and practices are inconsistent with

labor provisions.”177 Challenges in trading partners, such as limited enforcement capacity and use

of subcontracting, also complicate efforts. Others view the first adjudicated FTA labor dispute as

an important precedent, and evidence that trade-related labor issues are prioritized by U.S.

administrations. 178 At the same time, some Members have expressed concerns about opening up

U.S. labor practices to potential challenges from other trading partners and infringing national

sovereignty through expanded labor clauses and trade enforcement. Other countries and labor

173 “ Remarks of Ambassador Katherine T ai,” June 10, 2021.

174 U.S. DOL, ILAB, at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions.

175 AFL-CIO, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Four Countries that Don’t Comply with U.S. Trade Law, 2015, p. 1.

176 U.S. GAO, Trade Enforcement: Information on U.S. Agencies’ Monitoring and Enforcement Resources for

International Trade Agreements, GAO-17-399, April 2017.

177

U.S. GAO, Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor Commitments, but More Monitoring and

Enforcement Are Needed, GAO-15-160, November 2014, p. 40.

178 UST R, “ What T hey’re Saying: U.S. Proceeds with Labor Enforcement Case Against Guatemala,” September 2014.

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groups also criticize some U.S. practices and lack of adherence to labor commitments, which

have driven complaints, such as by Mexico against the United States (see below).

U.S. Process for FTA Labor Complaints

DOL consults and coordinates with USTR and the State Department on labor monitoring,

enforcement and engagement with trading partners (see Text Box). 179 The Office of Trade and

Labor Affairs (OTLA) receives and reviews complaints (“submissions”) of alleged violations of

U.S. FTA labor commitments. 180 In general, allegations in a submission must meet certain criteria,

raise issues relevant to the labor provisions, and illustrate a country’s failure to comply with its

obligations. 181 If the submission is accepted, OTLA undertakes a review and issues a public report

on its findings, which may include specific recommendations to the FTA partner government and

other recommended actions, including that the U.S. government request consultations. If

consultations do not resolve the complaint, FTA DS procedures may be invoked in certain cases.

Roles of U.S. Agencies in Monitoring and Enforcing FTA Labor Provisions

USTR, DOL, and the State Department have key responsibilities in monitoring implementation of labor

provisions. These roles involve both discrete and shared responsibilities, and formal and informal coordination.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)



Lead negotiator of FTAs, and leads interagency efforts to monitor and enforce trade agreements.

Coordinates and develops the administration’s trade policy by identifying, monitorin g, enforcing, and

resolving a range of international trade issues.



Litigates FTA disputes involving the United States.

Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor (DOL)



Monitors implementation of FTA labor provisions, including by reviewing and investigating public

complaints, and engaging with partners to resolve questions about FTA labor commitments.

Serves as designated point of contact for implementation of FTA labor provisions, as well as for the

labor cooperation mechanisms.

Before congressional approval of an FTA, prepares reports for Congress, in consultation with USTR

and State, on FTA partner labor rights and child labor laws.

Responsible for planning, developing, and pursuing cooperative projects related to labor, and

providing trade capacity building assistance to help FTA partners meet their obligations.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State



Coordinates with Foreign Service in-country labor officers, who carry out regular monitoring and

reporting and day-to-day interaction with foreign governments on labor issues related to FTAs.

Produces annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, with information on labor practices.

Participates in USTR-led interagency team that negotiates FTA labor provisions, contributes input to

DOL research and analysis, and provides technical assistance funding to promote worker rights.

Source: U.S. GAO, 2014 and 2017.

179

For detail on the enforcement process, see Interagency T rade Enforcement Center, Trade Enforcement: Issues,

Remedies and Roles, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/T rade-Enforcement_Issues-Remedies-and-Roles.pdf.

180 As discussed, USMCA also has additional procedures and role for the newly-created Interagency Labor Committee

for Monitoring and Enforcement.

181 U.S. DOL, “Submissions under the Labor Provisions of Free T rade Agreements,” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/

ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions; “ Notice of Reassignment of Functions of Office of T rade Agreement

Implementation to Office of T rade and Labor Affairs; Notice of Procedural Guidelines,” 71 Federal Register 76691,

December 21, 2006.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

Outcomes of U.S. FTA Disputes

USMCA superseded the NAALC for labor disputes involving the United States, Canada, and

Mexico. Previously, under NAALC, private parties in the three countries submitted more than 40

petitions with labor complaints. In the United States, OTLA received more than 20 submissions;

it accepted and issued reviews for 13, all involving allegations regarding Mexico’s compliance

(Figure 4). 182 Several reviews resulted in the signing of ministerial agreements. Mexico’s OTLA

counterpart issued reports for 11 submissions, all involving concerns over U.S. compliance.

Canada’s OTLA counterpart issued reports for three submissions regarding Mexico, and has two

reviews ongoing (one each involving Mexico and the United States). By issue of concern, the

majority of U.S. submissions against Mexico involved freedom of association, followed by

occupational health and safety, and minimum employment standards. Mexican labor complaints

most frequently involved U.S. protections for migrant workers. These top issues are the subjects

of the first complaints filed under USMCA (see “Ongoing USMCA Labor Disputes”).

Figure 4. Labor Submissions under NAALC, 1994-2020

Source: Created by CRS; submissions under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),

at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/submissions-under-north-american-agreement-labor-cooperation-naalc.

Notes: Submissions often include more than one issue of concern; numbers do not add up to total accepted. In

the U.S. case, “accepted submissions” do not include two accepted for review, but withdrawn by submitter.

182 In one instance, one OT LA report covered two submissions. Figures reported here do not include submissions

declined for review (seven submissions) or withdrawn by the submitter (four).

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Among U.S. FTAs with labor chapters, OTLA has issued seven reviews—one each involving

Bahrain, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and two involving Peru (see

Table A-1). The dispute with Guatemala involved the first formal consultations requested by the

United States and the first to complete arbitration, although other FTA complaints also resulted in

ministerial or informal consultations.

The U.S.-Guatemala labor dispute set a precedent as the first to have been adjudicated through

FTA dispute settlement in U.S. FTAs and globally. The AFL-CIO and six Guatemalan labor

unions filed the complaint, alleging that the Guatemalan government failed to effectively enforce

labor laws with respect to freedom of association, right to organize and bargain collectively, and

provide for acceptable conditions of work, as documented in five separate cases. 183 Serious

concerns included impunity for threats and violence against trade unions and unlawful dismissal

of union leaders. The OTLA accepted the submission and, in 2009, issued a report raising several

concerns and making recommendations to address prevailing issues. It noted that Guatemala had

taken some initial steps toward resolving some issues and did not recommend formal bilateral

consultations. Subsequently, the U.S. government requested consultations in 2010 amid concerns

Guatemala had not made progress to “correct systemic failures” in labor law enforcement. 184

After failure to reach a resolution, the U.S. government requested establishment of an arbitral

panel, the next step in the DS process. The panel was suspended while the two sides negotiated an

18-point labor enforcement plan in 2013; arbitration resumed after implementation of the plan fell

through. In 2017, the panel issued its final decision. It found that although Guatemala failed to

enforce certain labor laws, the United States did not provide sufficient evidence proving that such

failure was “sustained or recurring” and “in a manner affecting trade.”185

The Guatemala dispute panel provided guidance on the scope and meaning of “effective

enforcement of labor laws.”186 Legal experts suggest that the case outcome revealed the difficulty

of meeting rigorous evidentiary standards and legal standards set in the obligations to

demonstrate a breach of FTA obligations. 187 Some U.S. stakeholders and Members of Congress

contested the outcome.188 Concerns over the dispute outcome and perceived limitations of FTA

language led to specific reforms in USMCA labor and DS chapters.

Ongoing USMCA Labor Disputes

As of mid-2021, several labor complaints have been initiated under USMCA, providing the first

tests of the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms. Of note, similar issues were previously raised

under the NAALC. In the first action, in March 2021, Mexican migrant workers and a binational

group of civil society organizations led by the Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. filed a

183 See UST R, “ In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFT A-

DR,” at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-caftadr.

184 UST R, “United State T rade Representative Kirk Announces Labor Rights T rade Enforcement Case Against

Guatemala,” Press release, July 2010.

Panel report, In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA DR (June 14, 2017).

186 E.g., T equila J. Brooks, “U.S.-Guatemala Arbitration Panel Clarifies Effective Enforcement Under Labor Provisions

of Free T rade Agreement ,” International Labor Rights Case Law¸ vol. 4, issue 1 (March 2018): 45–51.

185

187

Ibid.

188 Richard Neal (D-MA) and T rade Subcommittee Ranking Member Bill Pascrell (D-NJ), Press release, June 26, 2017,

at https://neal.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal-pascrell-statements-guatemala-labor-report.

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Worker Rights Provisions and U.S. Trade Policy

case with the Mexican government alleging sex-based discrimination in the U.S. issuance of

temporary H-2 labor migration visas, in violation of the USMCA labor chapter. 189

Two complaints have been filed under USMCA’s rapid-response labor mechanism. In May 2021,

the AFL-CIO with Mexican labor groups and others, filed a complaint against Tridonex, an auto

parts factory located in Matamoros in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico. 190 Following review of the

petition, the Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement, co-chaired by USTR

and DOL, found “sufficient credible evidence of a denial of rights enabling the good faith

invocation of enforcement mechanisms.”191 As the next stage of the process, it requested that the

Mexican government conduct a 45-day review of the allegations. Also in May 2021, USTR selfinitiated its first dispute, requesting that the Mexican government review whether workers are

being denied their rights at a General Motors (GM) facility in Silao in the state of Guanajuato. 192

USTR emphasized the “innovative” mechanism will facilitate addressing longstanding labor

issues in Mexico, and that the recent action “demonstrates that we will act when workers in

certain facilities are denied their rights under laws necessary to fulfill Mexico’s labor

obligations.”193 On July 8, 2021, the U.S. and Mexican governments announced settlement of the

dispute, through an agreed course of action to remediate denial of the rights of freedom of

association and collective bargaining rights for workers at the GM facility. 194

Issues for Congress

U.S. Trade Agreements and Programs as Vehicles for Improving Labor Rights

Labor commitments in U.S. FTAs have evolved substantially, culminating with those in the

USMCA. With TPA expiring on July 1, 2021, any potential future reauthorization could provide

Congress with an opportunity to revisit U.S. trade negotiating objectives with respect to labor

issues, as well as how these provisions are working in practice. As discussed, debates over TPA

authorization often led to key shifts and compromises in U.S. approaches to labor provisions as

Congress assessed the effectiveness of approaches and potential revisions. Several Members and

observers view USMCA labor provisions as a template for future FTAs, while others may seek

different approaches. 195 Should TPA be renewed, Congress will likely debate and legislate on this

issue in determining U.S. principal negotiating objectives on labor for future U.S. FTAs.

One area of potential debate is whether and how labor side agreements covering domestic

commitments at the country level (such as related to the U.S. FTA with Colombia, labor annex

with Mexico, and proposed TPP bilateral labor plans), or whether bilateral enforcement

mechanisms like in USMCA (i.e., rapid-response mechanism) that target specific worker rights,

in addition to core enforceable obligations in the agreement itself, may be pursued in future

189 CDM, “Migrant Worker Women File First Complaint against the U.S. Governm ent Under the United States-

Mexico, Canada Agreement,” Press release, March 23, 2021.

190 “AFL-CIO, SEIU, SNIT IS and Public Citizen Announce Filing of First USMCA ‘Rapid Response Mechanism’

Labor Case to Fight for Mexican Workers Denied Independent Union Rep resentation,” Press release, May 10, 2021.

191 UST R, “United States Seeks Mexico’s Review of Alleged Freedom of Association Violations at Mexican

Automotive Parts Factory,” June 9, 2021.

192 UST R, “United States Seeks Mexico’s Review of Alleged Worker’s Rights Denial at Auto Manufacturing Facility,”

Press release, May 12, 2021.

193

UST R, Testimony of Ambassador Katherine Tai Before the House of Ways and Means Comm ittee Hearing on the

President’s Trade Agenda, Press release, May 13, 2021.

194 U.S. DOL, “US, Mexico announce enforcement of worker protection agreement,” news release, July 9, 2021.

195 Speaker of the House, “ T ranscript of Speaker Pelosi Press Conference Announcing New USMCA Agreement ,”

Press release, December 10, 2019.

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prevailing U.S. FTAs. Congressional examination of how these mechanisms are working will

help shed light on these approaches, as well as how trading partners, such as the EU, are

addressing these issues. In this regard, underlying considerations are to what extent trade

agreements should address domestic regimes, as well as how detailed should Congress be in

proscribing U.S. negotiating objectives. In addition, because many countries with ongoing labor

concerns are not U.S. FTA partners, engagement through trade preference programs and capacity

building activities will also likely continue to be a primary avenue for addressing labor concerns.

Congress could examine how these approaches have worked and whether there should be

additional changes to these programs or whether other tools should be pursued (see below).

Another issue subject to debate in the evolution of trade-related labor provisions is the extent of

their alignment with ILO core labor standards. Some experts question whether “internationally

recognized worker rights” in U.S. trade statutes align with ILO precepts, and others view trade

agreements as falling short in not directly binding countries to specific ILO obligations. 196 Others

view specific commitments based largely on the 1998 Declaration as sufficient and argue that

trade agreements have made progress in binding such commitments to dispute settlement and

other processes within FTAs. Despite urging from some stakeholders, affirming ILO conventions

seems unlikely as a commitment in U.S. FTAs, given lack of U.S. ratification. Some legislation to

reauthorize GSP in the 117th Congress proposes adding elimination of discrimination in

occupation and employment to the definition of worker rights to better align with the ILO and

USMCA approach. 197

Members have increasingly focused labor provisions on discrete issues, such as child labor. In

particular, the treatment of forced labor concerns in U.S. trade policy and FTAs remains an issue

of longstanding congressional interest and has evolved in recent years. As evidenced in a

dedicated USMCA provision to prohibit forced labor imports and enhance regional cooperation,

Congress may continue to use FTA provisions and implementing legislation to align and bolster

other U.S. efforts to counter trade in products made with forced labor. In addition, some Members

emphasize the importance of linking trade negotiations with specific labor concerns. For example,

some viewed the Trump Administration’s 2020 “phase-one” trade deal with China as a missed

opportunity to require the Chinese government to commit to address forced labor in Xinjiang—

similar to the EU’s approach in its proposed bilateral investment deal with China. 198

In addition, Congress may consider the role of trade agreements and objectives of labor

provisions in a broader policy context. Some experts have argued for redesigning trade

agreements and conditions of social and developmental policy commitments to advance worker

rights and social inclusivity—i.e., ensuring equitable participation in and distribution of the

benefits of trade. 199 In this view, FTA labor obligations should interact with various mechanisms,

such as required or voluntary private efforts to implement corporate social responsibility policies

in global supply chains and intergovernmental efforts led through the ILO. Others emphasize the

limitations of trade agreements and contend that other policy tools, such as domestic social

policies, trade-adjustment mechanisms, and tax policies, offer broader or more appropriate

Alston, “Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. T rade Law: ‘Aggressive Unilateralism?’”; T odd N. T ucker, Seven

Strategies to Rebuild Worker Power for the 21 st Century Global Economy, T he Roosevelt Institute, 2018.

197 “Wyden introduces trade preference bill with new GSP conditions,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 18, 2021.

196

198

U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, Enforcing the Ban on Imports Produced by Forced Labor in

Xinjiang, hearing, 116 th Cong., 2 nd sess., September 17, 2020; House debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.

166, no. 164 (September 22, 2020), p. H4663.

199 Shaffer, “ Retooling T rade Agreements for Social Inclusion.”

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avenues for addressing labor issues and the impacts of trade. 200 Some experts have argued for

reversing the trend of steadily expanding the scope of trade agreements, and instead focusing

more narrowly on trade-related behind the border issues, while pursuing standards harmonization

in areas like labor in other fora (see below). 201 In this regard, Congress may consider the

effectiveness of FTAs and to what extent trade agreements can or should effectively address

worker rights provisions in relation to other mechanisms.

Multilateral Trade Rules at the WTO and the Role of the ILO

Lack of multilateral trade rules on labor issues has in part limited global alignment on approaches

within trade agreements. Some experts contend there are options for incorporating some rules at

the WTO, but debate continues over the legal, economic and procedural feasibility of various

approaches. Given historical resistance, such issues may not gain traction in the WTO in the near

term; more broadly, the WTO has suffered from lack of political will among members to reach

consensus and advance new issues on the global trade agenda. 202 Some experts contend rather

than expanding labor provisions in trade agreements, a narrower approach that allows for targeted

actions to be taken against the most egregious, trade-related violations of core labor standards

may be more viable to global cooperation, including among skeptical developing countries. 203

Such an approach could leave promotion and enforcement of standards more broadly to other fora

like the ILO. In one approach, USTR recently submitted a proposal to address forced labor in

ongoing WTO multilateral negotiations to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies. 204 One option

might be for Congress to increase its role in building support for such provisions through

legislative resolutions to encourage successful conclusion of these negotiations. 205

Given WTO members’ deference to the ILO, Congress might consider assessing the ILO’s role in

promoting core labor standards and principles, as well as how to enhance U.S. support for the

ILO’s work and strengthen its enforcement mechanisms. Some observers have called for an

enhanced role of the ILO, for example, to more effectively pressure China to mitigate use of

state-sponsored forced labor. 206 At the March 2021 meeting of the ILO Governing Body, the

United States, Canada, New Zealand, and UK faulted the ILO’s latest annual report as reflecting

“information on persistent or systemic labor rights deficits globally,” and called on the ILO to

prioritize elimination of forced labor. 207 Congress could also encourage the Administration to

elevate forced labor or other labor issues as part of trade discussions in other international fora,

such as the G-7/G-20 and OECD. At the June 2021 G-7 summit, leaders directed trade ministers

“to identify areas for strengthened cooperation and collective efforts” towards eradicating forced

200 See Gordon H. Hanson, “Can T rade Work for Workers?: T he Right Way to Redress Harms and Redistribute Gains,”

Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021. UST R Katherine T ai also has reflected on the role of domestic and other policies in

ensuring “economic security for workers here at home.” “ Remarks of Ambassador Katherine T ai,” June 10, 2021.

201 Elliott, Developing a More Inclusive US Trade Policy.

202 See CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction , coordinated by Cathleen D.

Cimino-Isaacs.

203 Elliott, Developing a More Inclusive US Trade Policy, p. 23.

UST R, “ United States Urges WT O Members to Address Forced Labor on Fishing Vessels in Ongoing Fisheries

Subsidies Negotiations,” Press release, May 26, 2021.

205 E.g., H.Res. 382 and S.Res. 101.

204

Andrew Samet, “Will the ILO Defend China’s Uyghurs?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2020; Janice Bellace and

George Dragnich, “A Path for Business out of the China Forced Labor Dilemma,” The Hill, May 10, 2021.

206

207 Joint Statement on Prioritizing the ILO Forced Labor Response, April 9, 2021, at https://geneva.usmission.gov/

2021/04/15/joint-statement-on-prioritizing-the-ilo-forced-labor-response/.

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labor in global supply chains. 208 Another option is seeking greater harmonization in labor

provisions in

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