Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
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Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated August 27, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45811
SUMMARY
Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress
R45811
August 27, 2025
Kelley M. Sayler
Specialist in Advanced
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering
Technology and Global
weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike
Security
program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on
developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines
during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable
“responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles]
when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic
weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have
shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs
and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S.
hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a
result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than
nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2026 budget request for hypersonic research was $3.9 billion—down from $6.9 billion in the FY2025
request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $200.6 million for hypersonic defense in FY2025, up from its
$182.3 million request in FY2025. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record
for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term
funding plans. Indeed, as former Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead
developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the
rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control.
Potential questions include the following:
•
What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective
means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine
and concepts?
•
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate
funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic
weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research
on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and
technologically feasible?
•
•
How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral
arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?
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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
United States ............................................................................................................................. 4
Programs ............................................................................................................................. 4
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 12
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 15
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 16
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 18
China ....................................................................................................................................... 18
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 19
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 20
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 23
Mission Requirements ............................................................................................................. 23
Funding and Management Considerations .............................................................................. 24
Industrial Base and Supply Chain ........................................................................................... 26
Strategic Stability .................................................................................................................... 26
Arms Control ........................................................................................................................... 27
Figures
Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles............ 3
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard......................................................................................... 17
Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype ........................................................... 21
Tables
Table 1. Summary of Selected U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding ............................... 10
Table 2. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Procurement Funding ........................................11
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities ..................................................................... 29
Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges................................................................................................ 30
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets ..................................................................................................... 30
Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities .............................................................................. 31
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities ..................................................... 31
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities .......................................................... 31
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure ....................................................................... 29
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Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 33
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Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has focused
such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates
that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before FY2027. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for potential use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result,
U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically
challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.
1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1840_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-rangehypersonic-glide.
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(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) funding requests for U.S. hypersonic
technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:
•
•
Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target.7
Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or
time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy
derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.11 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.
4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689.
6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing
hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread
of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html;
and Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.
7 When hypersonic glide vehicles are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to
as a hypersonic boost-glide weapon.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13.
10 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/112019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.
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Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding Missiles That Fly Faster Than Mach 5 Are Coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-flyfaster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only
a single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that spacebased sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for
defending against hypersonic weapons in the future.15 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved
tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including [hypersonic glide vehicles] and
hypersonic cruise missiles.”16
12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV as Part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.
13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018, at
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/. See also U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to
Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf,
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority
to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense
missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.”
15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1840_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing
on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
16 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/
2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
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Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of widearea hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “pointdefense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you
would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts have
argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of
“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”19
(For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,
Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Hannah D. Dennis, Jennifer DiMascio, and
Kelley M. Sayler.)
United States
DOD is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike
(CPS) program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened
or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army,
and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) programs.20 Those who support these
development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide
the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense
systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.21 In
recognition of this, the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of
the key technologies “[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the
future.”22 Similarly, the House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task
Force Report notes that hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the
years to come.23
Programs
Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed.
As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more
17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (as in
America Can’t Stop Them),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/
04/23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
20 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
21 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks at
the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3, at
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
23 House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/
424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.
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technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,
according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100
times less accurate [than a conventionally armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24
According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic
technology programs, including the following (see Table 1):
•
•
•
•
U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
U.S. Air Force—Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapons (ARRW); and
U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.25
U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
Common Hypersonic Glide Body for use across the services.26 The glide body is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System. The Navy’s CPS is
expected to pair the glide body with a booster system to create a common All Up Round (AUR)
for use by both the Navy and Army. The first test of the AUR, conducted in June 2022, resulted in
failure.27 Subsequent flight tests, including those planned for March and September 2023, did not
occur due to failed preflight checks.28 DOD completed successful “end-to-end” tests of the AUR
in June and December 2024 and in April 2025.29
The Navy’s FY2026 budget documents note an intention to continue CPS integration on
Zumwalt-class destroyers through 2026 and to begin CPS integration on Virginia-class
submarines in FY2025.30 Although Navy officials have previously noted plans to achieve “limited
24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, but Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March
15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Ramps up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February
28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
27 Jon Herskovitz and Anthony Capaccio, “US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program,”
Bloomberg, June 29, 2022, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-30/us-hypersonic-missile-fails-intest-in-fresh-setback-for-program.
28 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, January 2024, p. 168, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=
d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
29 See Department of Defense, “DOD Completes Flight Test of Hypersonic Missile,” June 28, 2024, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3821376/dod-completes-flight-test-of-hypersonic-missile/;
Department of Defense, “Army and Navy Successfully Test Conventional Hypersonic Missile,” December 12, 2024, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3999835/army-and-navy-successfully-test-conventionalhypersonic-missile/; and Department of Defense, “U.S. Navy Proves Sea-Based Hypersonic Launch Approach,” May
2, 2025, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4172652/us-navy-proves-sea-based-hypersoniclaunch-approach/.
30 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1559, at
(continued...)
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operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines as early as 202531 and to eventually field
hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in current budget
documents.32 The FY2024 Annual Report of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, notes
that “insufficient data are available to assess operational effectiveness, lethality, and suitability of
the Phase 1 CPS prototype.”33 The Navy is requesting $798.3 million for CPS RDT&E in
FY2026—a decrease from the FY2025 request of $903.9 million.34 The Navy did not request
funding for CPS weapons procurement in FY2025 or FY2026.35
U.S. Army
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program, also known as Dark Eagle, is
expected to pair the common glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system.36 The system is
intended to have a range of over 1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic
attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long-Range Fires, and
engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets”;37 however, the FY2024 Annual Report of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, notes that “insufficient data are available to evaluate
the operational effectiveness, lethality, suitability, and survivability of the LRHW system.”38 The
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/26pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf. Reports indicate that Zumwaltclass destroyers could carry up to 12 missiles each. See Sam LaGrone, “Navy Awards HII Planning Contract for
Zumwalt Hypersonic Upgrades,” USNI News, January 9, 2023, at https://news.usni.org/2023/01/09/navy-awards-hiiplanning-contract-for-zumwalt-hypersonic-upgrades?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=
sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d.
31 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY
2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf;
and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020,
at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.
32 David B. Larter, “All US Navy Destroyers Will Get Hypersonic Missiles, Says Trump’s National Security Adviser,”
Defense News, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-gethypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/.
33 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2024 Annual Report, January 2025, p. 206, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/annualreport/.
34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1529, at
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/26pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
35 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Weapons Procurement,
at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/26pres/WPN_Book.pdf. The Navy’s FY2024 request of $304
million was to support the procurement of eight CPS weapons. See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025
Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Weapons Procurement, p. 1, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/25pres/WPN_Book.pdf.
36 For additional information about LRHW, see CRS In Focus IF11991, The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic
Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle, by Andrew Feickert.
37 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking
Defense, May 12, 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-mileswatch-out-china/; https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannonadvances/; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
38 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2024 Annual Report, January 2025, p. 142, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/annualreport/.
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Army is requesting $513 million for LRHW RDT&E in FY202639 and $353.4 million for the
procurement of LRHW ground support equipment and three AURs and canisters.40 The Army has
fielded prototype LRHW equipment and “intends to field two additional batteries of LRHW” by
FY2027.41 DOD’s December 2024 AUR test “was the first live-fire event for the [LRHW] system
using a Battery Operations Center and a Transporter Erector Launcher.”42
U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW, pronounced “arrow”) is to
leverage DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic
glide vehicle prototype capable of travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8
at a range of approximately 1,000 miles.43 ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test
flight in June 2019. It then experienced three successive failures before completing three
successful flight tests in 2022.44 Although the first test of the full operational ARRW prototype in
December 2022 was successful, ARRW’s flight testing record since then appears to have been
mixed, with at least one 2023 test flight failure.45 The Air Force declined to comment on the
outcome of a second 2023 test, noting only that it “gained valuable new insights into [ARRW’s]
capabilities.”46 Following the March 2023 failure, then-Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall
stated that the Air Force is “more committed to HACM at this point in time than [it is] to
ARRW.”47 The Air Force conducted its final test of ARRW in March 2024 but also declined to
39 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 5D, p. 215, at
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2026/Discretionary%20Budget/rdte/RDTE%20%20Vol%203%20-%20Budget%20Activity%205D.pdf.
40 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
p. 107, at
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2026/Discretionary%20Budget/Procurement/Missi
le%20Procurement%20Army.pdf.
41 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, January 2024, p. 123, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=
d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
42 Department of Defense, “Army and Navy Successfully Test Conventional Hypersonic Missile,” December 12, 2024,
at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3999835/army-and-navy-successfully-test-conventionalhypersonic-missile/.
43 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says
New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away in Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-milesaway-in-under-12-minutes.
44 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” Military.com, April 6, 2021, at
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=
In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; John A. Tirpak,
“Hypersonic ARRW Flies Successfully for Second Time, Completing Booster Tests,” Air Force Magazine, July 13,
2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-arrw-flies-successfully-for-second-time-completing-booster-tests/.
45 Ilka Cole, “Air Force Conducts First ARRW Operational Prototype Missile Test,” U.S. Air Force, December 12,
2022, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3243194/air-force-conducts-first-arrw-operational-prototypemissile-test/; and Stephen Losey, “US Air Force Fires Hypersonic ARRW in First Test Since March Failure,”
C4ISRNet, August 21, 2023, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/08/21/us-air-force-fires-arrwhypersonic-in-first-test-since-march-failure/.
46 Stephen Losey, “US Air Force Fires Hypersonic ARRW in First Test Since March Failure,” C4ISRNet, August 21,
2023, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/08/21/us-air-force-fires-arrw-hypersonic-in-first-testsince-march-failure/.
47 John A. Tirpak, “Kendall: Air Force ‘More Committed’ to HACM After Latest Unsuccessful ARRW Test,” Air and
(continued...)
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discuss the results of that test.48 The Air Force did not request RDT&E funds for ARRW in
FY2025 or FY2026 and budget documents characterized the program as “completed.”49 The Air
Force requested $387.1 million for ARRW procurement in FY2026.50
In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon
program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose
between ARRW and HCSW.51 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW
was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW]
is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he
explained.52 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four
ARRWs.53
Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)
program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA
technologies.54 Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers
and fighter aircraft,55 with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20
HACMs or more.56 Similarly, the B-1 could reportedly carry up to 36 HACMs.57 According to the
Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is contingent upon fully funded and
Space Forces Magazine, March 28, 2023, at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/kendall-air-force-hacm-unsuccessfularrw-test/.
48 See, for example, Michael Marrow, “Air Force conducts final test of ARRW hypersonic missile, won’t discuss
‘specific’ results,” Breaking Defense, March 20, 2024, at https://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/air-force-conductsfinal-test-of-arrw-hypersonic-missile-wont-discuss-specific-results/.
49 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 181, at
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=RV1Rmq2MmP0%3d&portalid=84.
50 Budget documents note that “quantities (and price per unit) are able to be discussed in an appropriately cleared
forum.” Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile
Procurement, Volume I, pp. 43-44, at
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY26/FY26%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.pdf?ver
=x-XGa7JzdnR0WwzVQkWiDg%3d%3d.
51 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Kills One of Its Hypersonic Weapons Programs,” Defense News, February 10, 2020,
at https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonicweapons-programs/.
52 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2,
2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. Tirpak additionally notes
that “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed
to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.”
53 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
54 According to Air Force budget documents, “the program leverages Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research
Experiment (SCIFiRE) investment, a bi-lateral U.S./Australian air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile prototyping
effort which is a prelude to HACM.” Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Air Force
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 191, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jQCmIF-YLMg%3d&portalid=84.
55 FY2023 Air Force budget documents note that “the HACM program will prioritize integration on the F-15E platform
to enable quick entry into flight test.”
56 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
57 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Tries Out New Pylon on B-1, Transforming Bomber into ‘Hypersonic Testbed,’” Air &
Space Forces Magazine, August 6, 2024, at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-new-pylon-b-1-hypersonictestbed/.
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successful predecessor capability development efforts.”58 The Air Force requested $802.8 million
for HACM in FY2026, up from the $517 million request and $466.7 million appropriation in
FY2025.59
The Air Force is also developing the Expendable Hypersonic Air-Breathing Multi-Mission
Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem. According to then-Principal
Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the next step in what the
opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” and is intended to be
capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”60 Some reports
indicate that Project Mayhem may be developing an uncrewed hypersonic bomber capable of
flying at Mach 10 and performing both strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions.61
DARPA
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, conducted tests of TBG, a wedge-shaped hypersonic
glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “[aimed] to develop and demonstrate technologies to
enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”62 TBG “also
[considered] traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch System”
and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA did not request funds for
TBG in FY2025, describing the program as “completed.”63
DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly sought to leverage TBG technologies to develop a groundlaunched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
58 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/
RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
59 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 189, at
https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=RV1Rmq2MmP0%3d&portalid=84; and Department of
Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Volume II, p. 191, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jQCmIFYLMg%3d&portalid=84.
60 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A
Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defenseconversation-mike-white.
61 See, for example, Darren Orf, “Project Mayhem, the Air Force’s Secret Hypersonic Bomber, Has Begun Cooking,”
Popular Mechanics, January 20, 2023, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a42589676/air-forcessecret-hypersonic-bomber-project-mayhem-updates/; and Howard Altman and Joseph Trevithick, “Future Of Mayhem
Hypersonic Strike-Recon Aircraft Program Murky,” The War Zone, February 16, 2024, at https://www.twz.com/newsfeatures/future-of-mayhem-hypersonic-strike-recon-aircraft-program-murky.
62 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
63 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 167, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2025.pdf.
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defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” OpFires completed its
first flight test in July 2022.64 The OpFires program concluded in FY2022.65
DARPA has similarly concluded work on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept
(HAWC), which, with Air Force support, sought “to develop and demonstrate critical
technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”66
DARPA successfully tested HAWC in March and July 2022 and in January 2023, launching the
missile from a B-52 bomber.67 Former Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated
that hypersonic cruise missiles like HAWC would be smaller than hypersonic glide vehicles and
could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Former Principal Director White has
additionally noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more
easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.68 HAWC’s successor program, More Opportunities with
HAWC (MOHAWC), similarly sought to develop technologies for use in future air-launched
hypersonic cruise missiles.69 DARPA did not request funds for MOHAWC in FY2025, describing
the program as “completed.”70
Table 1. Summary of Selected U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
Title
FY2025 Request
($ in millions)
FY2025 Enacted
($ in millions)
PB2026
($ in millions)
Schedule
Conventional
Prompt Strike (CPS)
904
904
798
Continue testing
through FY2026
Long-Range
Hypersonic
Weapon (LRHW)
538
470
513
Field two
operational
batteries by FY2027
Hypersonic Attack
Cruise Missile
(HACM)
517
467
803
Continue follow-on
development
through FY2029
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force FY2025 and FY2026 Justification
Books, available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
64 DARPA, “Operational Fires Program Successfully Completes First Flight Test,” July 13, 2022, at
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2022-07-13a.
65 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 172, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf.
66 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/
program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
67 Oren Liebermann, “US Tested Hypersonic Missile in mid-March but Kept It Quiet to Avoid Escalating Tensions
with Russia,” CNN, April 5, 2022, at https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html;
Courtney Albon, “Raytheon Hypersonic Scramjet Missile Has Another Successful Flight Test,” Defense News, July 19,
2022, at https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/19/darpas-hypersonic-scramjet-missile-logs-anotherflight-test-success/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c3444bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d; and DARPA, “Final Flight of HAWC Program Screams Through the Sky,” January 30,
2023, at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2023-01-30.
68 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
69 Ibid.
70 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 168, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2025.pdf.
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Table 2. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Procurement Funding
FY2025 Request
($ in millions)
FY2025 Enacted
($ in millions)
PB2026
($ in millions)
LRHW
744
669
354
Request would
procure 3 LRHWs
ARRW
0
0
387
Request would
procure a classified
quantity
Title
Status
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Army and Air Force FY2025 and FY2026 Justification Books,
available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Hypersonic Missile Defenses71
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities. In September 2018, MDA—
which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section 1687 of the
FY2017 NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore hypersonic
missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and
electronic attack systems.72 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype proposals
for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor intended to be
fielded in the mid-2030s; however, the program was later cancelled in favor of an alternative
solution, the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI).73 According to MDA FY2024 budget documents, the
agency sought to field a regional, sea-based GPI capability in FY2034.74 Section 1666 of the
FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31) directed MDA to accelerate this timeline to achieve initial
operational capability by December 31, 2029, and full operational capability by December 31,
2032; however, MDA’s FY2025 budget documents state that GPI is to be delivered in FY2035.75
The agency’s FY2026 request notes that $247 million in mandatory funding, as provided by the
FY2025 reconciliation bill (P.L. 119-21), is to accelerate delivery of GPI to FY2032.76 On May
15, 2024, MDA announced that it had formalized a Cooperative Development Project
Arrangement to co-develop GPI with Japan.77
71 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Hannah D. Dennis, Jennifer DiMascio, and Kelley M. Sayler.
72 H.Rept. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; and Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
73 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon
System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8; and Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,”
Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveilsgpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
74 Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
75 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 643, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB25_Justification_Book.pdf.
76 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 699, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2026/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/R
DTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB26_Justification_Book.pdf.
77 Per the arrangement, MDA is to “provide hypersonic missile defense capability during the glide-phase portion of
hypersonic flight,” while Japan is to “lead development of rocket motors and propulsion components of GPI.” DOD,
“U.S. Department of Defense Statement on the Signing of the Glide Phase Interceptor Cooperative Development,” May
(continued...)
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In addition, MDA is developing the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) in
an effort to improve the agency’s ability to detect and track incoming missiles.78 The January 27,
2025, executive order “The Iron Dome for America” directs the Secretary of Defense to, among
other actions, develop plans to accelerate the deployment of HBTSS.79 MDA requested $57.2
million for HBTSS in FY2026 and $200.6 million for the hypersonic defense program element.80
Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),81 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.82 These specialized
facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,
pressure, heating),83 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) facilities, 2
Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5 industry or academic facilities.84 In its 2014
evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S.
facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading
environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate these characteristics above Mach 8.”
Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened Mach 6
15, 2024, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3775546/us-department-of-defense-statement-onthe-signing-of-the-glide-phase-intercepto/.
78 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 841, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-15, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and Sandra Erwin,
“Pentagon agencies team up in upcoming launch of hypersonic tracking satellites,” Space News, December 28, 2023, at
https://spacenews.com/pentagon-agencies-team-up-in-upcoming-launch-of-hypersonic-tracking-satellites/.
79 The executive order additionally directs the Secretary to, for example, “submit to the President a reference
architecture, capabilities-based requirements, and an implementation plan for the next-generation missile defense
shield,” which is to “include, at a minimum, plans for defense of the United States against ballistic, hypersonic,
advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries.”
Executive Office of the President, “The Iron Dome for America,” January 27, 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/2025/01/the-iron-dome-for-america/.
80 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book 2a of 5, pp. 899 and 699,
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2026/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/R
DTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB26_Justification_Book.pdf.
81 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071.
82 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and
private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office,
Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination Across Development
Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
83 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.
84 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See
(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively
and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and
Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
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and Mach 10 quiet wind tunnels, Purdue University has opened a Mach 8 quiet wind tunnel, and
at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.85 In addition, the University of
Arizona modified one of its wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M
University—in partnership with Army Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach
10 wind tunnel.86 The United States also uses the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test
Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range in Norway for flight testing.87 (For an
illustrative list of U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.) DOD
officials additionally announced in November 2024 that the United States, Australia, and the
United Kingdom have “entered the Hypersonic Flight Test and Experimentation (HyFliTE)
Project Arrangement (PA) to use each other’s testing facilities and share technical information to
develop, test, and evaluate hypersonic systems.”88 The PA “includes up to six trilateral flight test
campaigns to occur by 2028 with a total funding pool of $252 million.”89 Overall, DOD spent
approximately $1.09 billion on the testing of hypersonic boost-glide systems and approximately
$221 million on the testing of hypersonic cruise missiles between FY2021 and FY2025.90
In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its twoyear-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability
and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did not
release the evaluation to the public.91 Similarly, the FY2022 Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Report evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test
infrastructure.92 The DOT&E report concluded that “additional missile test range modernization
85 Jessica Sieff, “University of Notre Dame Adds Two New Hypersonics Research Facilities,” Notre Dame News, June
6, 2022, at https://news.nd.edu/news/university-of-notre-dame-adds-two-new-hypersonics-research-facilities/; and
Evamarie Socha, “Purdue Applied Research Institute Opens $41M Hypersonics and Applied Research Facility,”
Purdue University News, June 7, 2023, at https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2023/Q2/purdue-appliedresearch-institute-opens-41m-hypersonics-and-applied-research-facility.html.
86 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to Open Hypersonic Testing
Facility at Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-openhypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of Tennessee, and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research.
87 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure. For
example, the Government Accountability Office reports that HACM is to be tested “both in Australia from Australian
Air Force F-18s, and in the United States from F-15Es.” See Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons:
DOD Could Reduce Cost and Schedule Risks by Following Leading Practices, July 2024, p. 14, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106792.pdf.
88 Department of Defense, “AUKUS Partners Sign Landmark Hypersonics Agreement,” November 18, 2024, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3966986/aukus-partners-sign-landmark-hypersonicsagreement/.
89 Department of Defense, “AUKUS Partners Sign Landmark Hypersonics Agreement,” November 18, 2024, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3966986/aukus-partners-sign-landmark-hypersonicsagreement/.
90 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, February 7,
2025.
91 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; and
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/
Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/.
92 DOT&E, FY2022 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2023, pp. 18-19, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/
reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d.
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efforts are needed to support an increase in the tempo of testing and the development of new
capabilities to measure hypersonic missile flight performance in increasingly complex threat
environments.”93 Congress appropriated $47.5 million to USD(R&E) and DOT&E in FY2022 for
hypersonic test infrastructure; however, the FY2023 DOT&E Annual Report notes that at least
one hypersonic weapon program’s “flight test schedule [was still] continually challenged due to
the limited availability and numbers of hypersonic flight corridors, target areas, and test support
assets.”94 DOT&E’s FY2024 report similarly notes that “the [overland] corridors need to increase
capacity to support the testing of new hypersonic weapons and use of hypersonic-specific range
instrumentation for terminal area and lethality assessments, including mobile data collection
assets.”95
DOD reportedly plans to expand hypersonic test infrastructure in the coming years. In January
2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch Test Complex at China Lake, CA, to
improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the CPS program.96 DOD has also
announced the development of the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed
(MACH-TB), which is to “increase domestic capacity for hypersonic flight testing and leverage
multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-along hypersonic payloads.”97 DOD
reportedly conducted successful flight tests of MACH-TB—including recovering the test-bed—in
December 2024 and March 2025.98 Similarly, DOD is reportedly adapting RQ-4 Global Hawk
uncrewed aircraft systems into systems capable of monitoring hypersonic tests.99 According to an
assessment conducted by the Government Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated
approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.100 Senior
defense officials note that, overall, “the Department is establishing, upgrading, and refurbishing
93 Ibid., p. 18.
94 Ibid., p. 19; and DOT&E, FY2023 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2024, pp. 18-19, at https://www.dote.osd.mil/
Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2023/other/2023annual-report.pdf?ver=d7gusiIrcbYmxM0oDkPSFg%3d%3d.
95 DOT&E, FY2024 DOT&E Annual Report, January 2025, p. 24, at
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2024/other/2024AnnualReport.pdf?ver=AkqD4y1xIhmNndurzRkvqQ%3d%3d.
96 “Update: US Navy to Develop China Lake to Support CPS Weapon Testing,” Jane’s (subscription required),
February 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
97 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Announces New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing Tempo,”
October 6, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3182305/dod-announces-new-contract-toincrease-hypersonic-flight-testing-tempo/. According to a Dynetics press release, Dynetics is to lead a MACH-TB team
composed of over 20 partners, including Peraton, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Stratolaunch, JRC Integrated
Systems, NineTwelve Institute, Corvid, SpinLaunch, Varda, Kitty Hawk Technologies, Systima Division of Karman
Space and Defense, Sandia National Laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, X-Bow Systems, RLNS and other
hypersonic experts. See PRNewswire, “Dynetics Awarded New Contract to Increase Hypersonic Flight Testing
Tempo,” October 20, 2022, at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dynetics-awarded-new-contract-to-increasehypersonic-flight-testing-tempo-301654753.html.
98 Courtney Albon, “Stratolaunch hits milestone with fully reusable hypersonic testbed,” Defense News, May 5, 2025,
at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2025/05/05/stratolaunch-hits-milestone-with-fully-reusable-hypersonictestbed/.
99 The first of these systems, called Range Hawks, are to be delivered to DOD’s Test Resource Management Center in
2025. See Stephen Losey, “Northrop Grumman modifying Global Hawk drones for hypersonic tests,” Defense News,
February 29, 2024, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/02/29/northrop-grumman-modifying-global-hawkdrones-for-hypersonic-tests/.
100 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to
Ensure Coordination Across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-21-378.
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test capabilities in 14 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia.”101
Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222
of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to
the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities
and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in
testing capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based
testing for such weapons.”102 Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the
Secretary of Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and
Test Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement.
Similarly, Section 237 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of Defense to
both assess DOD’s capacity to test and evaluate hypersonic capabilities and “[identify] test
facilities outside the Department of Defense that have potential to be used to expand [DOD]
capacity ... including test facilities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
academia, and commercial test facilities.” Section 218 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31)
directs the Secretary to update this assessment at least once every two years. It additionally
directs the Secretary to conduct a study to evaluate at least two possible locations in the United
States that “have potential to be used as additional corridors for long-distance hypersonic system
testing” and to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD funding
and investments in hypersonic capabilities. Reports indicate that DOD’s Test Resource
Management Center “identified more than 1,600 possible locations [for long-distance hypersonic
system testing] around the world” before narrowing the list to three potential corridors: one in
Australia, one over Alaska, and one at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.103
Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to
assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply
chain.104 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.105
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
101 “Statement of Dr. James Weber and Mr. George Rumford Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: U.S. and Adversary Hypersonics Programs,” March 12, 2024, at
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116949/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS29-Wstate-WeberJ-20240312.pdf.
102 This report was delivered to the committees on December 16, 2021.
103 According to Defense News, “if the regulatory approval process moves at a standard pace, the department could start
flying in [the domestic] corridors by 2029.” Courtney Albon, “How Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ could speed up
hypersonic range expansion,” Defense News, March 3, 2025, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2025/03/03/
how-trumps-golden-dome-could-speed-up-hypersonic-range-expansion/.
104 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon Launches Hypersonic Industrial Base Study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
105 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD
News, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisitionregulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.
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2002.106 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”107 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability.108
Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic
missile.109
Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”110 Reports indicate that Avangard is
currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat reportedly entered combat duty in September 2023.111
Avangard features onboard countermeasures and will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was
successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of
Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that
Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019.112
106 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challengeand-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
107 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
108 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemmapub-76894.
109 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—
and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for
reference.
110 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
111 Al Jazeera, “Russia Puts Advanced Sarmat Nuclear Missile System on ‘Combat Duty,’” September 2, 2023, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/2/russia-puts-advanced-sarmat-nuclear-missile-system-on-combatduty#:~:text=Russia%20test%2Dfired%20the%20Sarmat,in%20Russia's%20far%20east%20region. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
112 “First Regiment of Avangard Hypersonic Missile Systems Goes on Combat Duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27,
2019, at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.
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Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard
Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of
striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a
maximum range of approximately 625 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems
mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350
frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.113 These sources assert
that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, and
December 2020 and May 2022 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.114
Russia reportedly deployed Tsirkon on the Project 22350 frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union Gorshkov in January 2023 and first launched the missile into Ukraine in February 2024.115
In addition, Russia has fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified
from the Iskander missile. Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal from a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft in
Ukraine116 and additionally plans to deploy the missile on the Su-34 long-range strike fighter117
and the Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, although the slower-moving bomber may face challenges in
“accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”118 Russian media has reported
113 “Russia Makes over 10 Test Launches of Tsirkon Seaborne Hypersonic Missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
114 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; Samuel Cranny-Evans,
“Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required), October
4, 2021; and Isabel van Brugen, “Putin to Give Navy Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Beats U.S. in Arms Race,”
Newsweek, July 18, 2022, at https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russian-navy-hypersonic-missiles-zircon-1725426.
115 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin Deploys New Zircon Hypersonic Cruise Missiles to Atlantic,” Reuters, January 4, 2023,
at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-sends-off-frigate-armed-with-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-2023-0104/; and Brad Lendon, “Russia used an advanced hypersonic missile for the first time in recent strike, Ukraine claims,”
CNN, February 13, 2024, at https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/europe/ukraine-russia-zircon-hypersonic-missile-intlhnk-ml/index.html.
116 Roxana Tiron, “Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, April 6, 2022, at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hypersonic-weapons-who-has-them-and-why-it-matters/2022/04/05/
1f6d0280-b557-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html.
117 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense
Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
118 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range If Fired from Supersonic
(continued...)
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Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both ground
and naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims
regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S.
intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.119
Infrastructure
Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic
Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in
Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur
Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.120
China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “most
experts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [in
China] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.121 In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the United
States to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.122
As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a
February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a
[nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile
defense and warning systems.123 Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested a
nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle124—launched by a Long March rocket—in August
2021.125 In contrast to the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch hypersonic
Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aeroballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
119 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.
120 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia Announces
Successful Flight Test of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, at
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard System Is Tested, Said to Be Fully Ready for
Deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/
avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
121 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma.”
122 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic
Glide,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 15, 2017, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/
topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
123 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-statesstrategic-command.
124 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle is the same model as that referenced by General
O’Shaughnessy.
125 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China Tests New Space Capability with Hypersonic Missile,” October 16,
(continued...)
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glide vehicles, the Long March, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the
hypersonic glide vehicle into orbit before the hypersonic glide vehicle deorbits to its target. This
could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of
target warning time prior to a strike.126
China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic glide vehicle only days after Russia tested its
own system.127 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source Chinese
papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs.128 This could
indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional context.
Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed
hypersonic glide vehicles with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an antiaccess/area denial strategy.129
Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch hypersonic glide vehicles. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that
the missile has a range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and is now fielded.130 Similarly,
DOD has noted that the “long-range” DF-27 “likely has a [hypersonic glide vehicle] payload
option as well as conventional land-attack, conventional anti-ship, and nuclear capabilities.”131
China has also deployed the DF-41 ICBM, which could be modified to carry a conventional or
nuclear hypersonic glide vehicle, according to a report by a U.S. congressional commission. The
development of the DF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat
to the U.S. mainland,” the report states.132
China has tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (previously referred to as the WU-14) at
least nine times since 2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable
hypersonic glide vehicle. Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
t1915130.shtml.
126 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth from Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,
at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
127 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”
128 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,
at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.
129 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese
Hypersonic Programme Reflects Regional Priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, at
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
130 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,” The National Interest, December 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinasnewly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Department of Defense, Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, at
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTSINVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.
131 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, p. 109,
at https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTSINVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.
132 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
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ZF as approximately 1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing
“extreme maneuvers” during flight.133 China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020.134
According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.135 China claims the vehicle
reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.136
Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives
lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by
2025.137 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.138
Infrastructure
China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.
Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as
many hypersonic tests as the United States.139 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models
(D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September
2018.140 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons that
fly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach
6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components
and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.141
133 “Gliding Missiles That Fly Faster Than Mach 5 Are Coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, at
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-arecoming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-smissile-defense-systems/.
134 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 60,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.
135 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
136 Jessie Yeung, “China Claims to Have Successfully Tested Its First Hypersonic Aircraft,” CNN, August 7, 2018, at
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html.
137 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
138 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, at
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
139 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
140 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese Hypersonic Programme Reflects Regional Priorities,” Jane’s
(subscription required), March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
141 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s Hypersonic Military Projects Include Spaceplanes and Rail Guns,” Popular
Mechanics, June 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.
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Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype
Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China Reveals Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Missile at National Science and
Technology Expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018.
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic ground
testing facilities.”142 For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center
claims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known
to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable of
reaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.143 China also operates the JF-12
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.144 It reportedly
completed construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach 30, in
2023.145 In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan Satellite
Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.
142 Andrew Tate, “China Conducts Further Tests with Hypersonic Vehicles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription
required), October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW.
143 Kelvin Wong, “China Claims Successful Test of Hypersonic Waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required), August 10,
at 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China Builds
Advanced Weapons Systems Using American Chip Technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021.
144 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A Look at China’s Most Exciting Hypersonic Aerospace Programs,” Popular Science,
April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
145 Akhil Kadidal, “Chinese Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Passes Acceptance Check,” Janes Defence Weekly (subscription
required), June 8, 2023, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinese-hypersonic-wind-tunnel-passesacceptance-check.
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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a
number of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—
are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has collaborated with Australia
on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic
technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a
Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor,
the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonic
air-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the
Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly
operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarly collaborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology
Demonstrator Vehicle program and successfully tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. In
addition, India reportedly tested an unspecified domestically produced hypersonic weapon with a range of
approximately 930 miles in November 2024. India operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is
capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has collaborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. Although
France has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France is
modifying its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight, successfully testing the modified
missile in June 2023. Some analysts believe that the V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic
nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successfully tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germany may have pulled funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues to
research and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLLAS II project, which seeks to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11.
In addition, South Korea reportedly has been developing a ground-launched Mach 6+ hypersonic cruise missile,
Hycore, since 2018. According to Janes, South Korea is developing the missile “in response to growing concern
about North Korea military modernization” and plans to eventually develop sea- and air-launched variants.
Although North Korea tested the Hwasong-8—which it identifies as a hypersonic glide vehicle—in September
2021, reports indicate that the vehicle may have reached speeds of only Mach 3. Similarly, North Korea claims to
have tested a second hypersonic weapon in January 2022; however, experts believe that that weapon may instead
be a maneuvering reentry vehicle.
Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP). It reportedly plans to field HVGPs for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. A highsupersonic HVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a more advanced, hypersonic version available by
FY2030; HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency operates three
hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the University of Tokyo.
According to DOD, Japan and the United States have agreed to conduct “a joint analysis focused on future
cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.”
Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and Brazil—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic airflows
and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, a
number of countries are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do
not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report.
Note: For information about South Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Jon Grevatt and Rahul Udoshi,
“South Korea Develops Hycore Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” Janes (subscription required), January 25, 2022. For
information about North Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea's ‘Hypersonic
Missile’ Appears to Be at Early Stage of Development: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2021; and Ankit
Panda, “The Real Danger of North Korea’s New Hypersonic Missile Is not Its Speed,” NK News, January 10, 2022.
For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Gordon Arthur, “Japan reveals test launch of its
hypersonic strike missile program,” Defense News, July 10, 2024. For additional information about global
hypersonic weapons programs, see Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation.
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Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and their
implications for strategic stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some of
these questions.
Mission Requirements
Although DOD is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has not established any
programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements for hypersonic
weapons or long-term funding plans.146 Indeed, as former Principal Director for Hypersonics
(USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic
weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable overarching weapon
system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on success and challenges.” 147
As of November 2024, DOD is reportedly “[moving] into the next phases of hypersonic weapons
[and concepts] development known as ‘hypersonics 2.0 and 3.0.’”148
Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing
perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For
example, former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not
going to be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small
inventories of [hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”149 Conversely, a number of other senior
defense officials have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons.
Former DOD Director of Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD
wants “to deliver hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of
time in the hands of the warfighter.”150 Similarly, former Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike
White has stated that DOD seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able
to deliver capability in meaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”151 These
perspectives appear to be grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic
weapons. Likewise, they are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons.
As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain
information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost
analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing potential mission sets, and an
146 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
147 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
148 Mikayla Easley, “Grady: DOD preparing for ‘hypersonics 2.0 and 3.0’ to understand operational concepts,” Defense
Scoop, November 22, 2024, at https://defensescoop.com/2024/11/22/dod-grady-hypersonics-2-0-weaponsdevelopment-operational-concepts/.
149 John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, due to Cost,” Air Force
Magazine, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafsfuture-due-to-cost/.
150 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Breaking Defense, April 24,
2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/.
151 “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon
Harper, “Just in: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” National Defense Magazine,
March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-massproducing-hypersonic-weapons.
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assessment of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous command
and control systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For
example, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “a
description of how the requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons will be addressed
with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements will be formally
provided to the military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to additionally
include “the potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning to
support targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.”
Congress may also consider the conclusions of a Congressional Budget Office assessment of
hypersonic weapons and their alternatives, including the following findings:
•
•
•
“Both hypersonic and ballistic missiles are well-suited to operate outside
potential adversaries’ anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD), or ‘keep-out,’
zones.”152
“Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic
missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles
encountered highly effective long-range defenses.”153
“Hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic
missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.”154
Funding and Management Considerations
Former Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing
offensive programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”155
This approach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $200.6
million for the hypersonic defense program element and $3.9 billion for offensive hypersonic
weapons programs in FY2026. Similarly, in FY2025, the department requested $182.3 million for
the hypersonic defense program element and $6.9 billion for offensive hypersonic weapons
programs.156
Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth in
hypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
152 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives, January 2023, at https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/58255.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019,
at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonicdefense/.
156 DOD has noted that the total request for all programs related to hypersonic defense was $1.9 billion in FY2025.
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification
Book 2a of 5, p. 643, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/budget_justification/
pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB25_Justification_Book.pdf; and CRS correspondence with the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 13, 2024.
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capabilities and increase costs.”157 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 million for
DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an
integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university
consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.158
DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded
Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to
manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).159 UCAH is to be overseen
by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the
University of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, the
California Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles,
and the Georgia Institute of Technology.160 Senior defense officials note that “over 100 U.S.
universities, 10 universities in Australia and the United Kingdom, 17 university affiliated research
centers and federally funded research and development centers, and 197 industry partners”
participate in the UCAH.161 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic research into
developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce system development
timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”162
In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Army
and the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs with
respect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy and
schedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these
programs.163
157 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.
158 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, was
originally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint
Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91).
Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter
into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not established
until April 2020.
159 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26,
2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-totexas-am-university/.
160 Ibid.
161 “Statement of Dr. James Weber and Mr. George Rumford Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: U.S. and Adversary Hypersonics Programs,” March 12, 2024, at
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116949/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS29-Wstate-WeberJ-20240312.pdf.
162 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26,
2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-totexas-am-university/.
163 The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic
weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government
Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination
Across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
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Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may be
challenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs,
enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.
Industrial Base and Supply Chain
U.S. government officials have expressed ongoing concern about the ability of the industrial base
to support future demand for hypersonic weapons—particularly if multiple weapons programs go
into production at the same time.164 Indeed, a July 2022 DOD industry solicitation notes that “the
expansion of industrial base capacity is required” [emphasis added] if DOD is to meet its goal of
“[producing] the air-breathing engine constituent materials, subcomponents, components, and
subsystems to support an initial integrated system production capacity of no less than 48 all-upround (AUR) missiles (four to five units per month) and up to 72 AURs per year (six per
month).”165
Furthermore, a DOD report issued in response to Executive Order 14017 (“America’s Supply
Chains”) recommends investments in the hypersonic industrial base.166 The report notes that
DOD is in the process of “developing a hypersonics industrial base roadmap to inform
investments over the next five years, which will guide investment decisions over this period. The
roadmap will address sub-tier supplier development, and where appropriate, develop and retain
competition that enables affordable production.”167 The report additionally recommends that
DOD “identify partners and allies with capabilities to aid in the development and expansion of
[the U.S.] hypersonics supply chain, especially for materials and components where domestic
sources may not exist.”168 Congress may wish to conduct oversight of DOD’s efforts to strengthen
the industrial base and supply chain for hypersonic weapons.
Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short time
of flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, or
from the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and a
nuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that [a
hypersonic glide vehicle] launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a
164 See, for example, Justin Katz, “Hypersonics Too Expensive, Industrial Base Too Small For Services to Go It Alone:
Admiral,” Breaking Defense, November 3, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/hypersonics-too-expensiveindustrial-base-too-small-for-services-to-go-it-alone-admiral/.
165 Department of the Air Force, “Request for Information (RFI) on Supplier Based Initiative for Air-Breathing Engines
for Hypersonic Systems,” at https://www.businessdefense.gov/ai/dpat3/docs/
AirBreathing%20Enginesfor%20HypersonicsRFFA8650225507.pdf.
166 Department of Defense, Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains: An action plan developed in response to
President Biden’s Executive Order 14017, February 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/24/2002944158/-1/-1/
1/DOD-EO-14017-REPORT-SECURING-DEFENSE-CRITICAL-SUPPLY-CHAINS.PDF.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
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weapon as strategic in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon,
and decide that a strategic response was warranted.”169 Differences in threat perception and
escalation ladders could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led
Congress to restrict funding for CPS programs.170
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and military
capability.”171 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with ICBMs, which, when launched in
salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.172 Furthermore, these analysts note that in the
case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “it is really a stretch to try
to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threating to
use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States ... would end
well.”173
Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that examines
How escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic
weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or are
planned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks
posed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dualuse capable weapons.
Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks or
limit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
measures.174
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.175 However, Article V of the treaty
169 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.
170 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional
Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
171 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-statesinf/.
172 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,
“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
173 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons Are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, at
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
174 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic
Missile Proliferation.
175 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from ICBMs that are already covered by New START, as
is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. See Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic
Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?”
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states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that the
United States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
the New START limits.176 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be a
short-term solution.177
As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a
potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.178 Other analysts have countered that a test
ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonic
missiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also
have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”179 These analysts have instead proposed
international transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;
conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,
distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based
tests.”180
176 James Acton notes: “[D]uring [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute
‘a new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
177 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
178 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, at
https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
179 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
180 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138.
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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure181
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Air Force Arnold Engineering and
Development Complex (AEDC) von
Karman Gas Dynamics Facility
Tunnels A/B/C
Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
to 290 °F
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to
1700 °F
Arnold AFB, TN
Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated
Facilities H1, H2, H3
Simulate thermal and pressure
environments at speeds of up to
Mach 8
Arnold AFB, TN
Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9
59-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up
to 2900 °F
White Oak, MD
Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Propulsion Test Unit
Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F
Arnold AFB, TN
Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic
Range G
Launches projectiles of up to 8
inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20
Arnold AFB, TN
Holloman High Speed Test Track
59,971 ft. track; launches
projectiles at speeds of up to Mach
8
Holloman AFB, NM
Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) Cells 18, 22
Mach 3-7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
AFRL Laser Hardened Materials
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)
High-temperature materials testing
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
Number (Re) Facility
10-inch Mach 6
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Test Resource Management Center
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean
Air Test-bed Facility
Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F
Arnold AFB, TN
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
181 The following information is largely derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on
the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this
material has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Additional information has been provided
by Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs (The University of Texas at San Antonio).
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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range
Location
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Defense Test Site
Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the
Marshall Islands
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)
Kauai, HI
Western Range, 30th Space Wing
Vandenberg AFB, CA
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
(NAWC) Division
Point Mugu and China Lake, CA
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)
New Mexico
Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing
Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
Wallops Island, VA
Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Launch Complex)
Kodiak Island, AK
NAWC Weapons Division R-2508
Complex
Edwards AFB, CA
Utah Test and Training Range
Utah
Nevada Test and Training Range
Nevada
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation
System
PMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety
System 2
United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missile range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Ames Research Center (ARC)
Arc Jet Complex
High-temperature
materials testing
Mountain View, CA
ARC Hypervelocity Free
Flight Facilities
Launches projectiles at
speeds of up to Mach 23
Mountain View, CA
Langley Research Center
(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Laboratory
31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
6
Hampton, VA
LaRC 8-foot High
Temperature Tunnel
96-inch Mach 5 and Mach
6.5
Hampton, VA
LaRC Scramjet Test Complex
Up to Mach 8 and up to
4740 °F
Hampton, VA
LaRC HyPulse Facility
Currently inactive
Long Island, NY
Glenn Research Center
(GRC) Plumbrook Hypersonic
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility
Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to
3830 °F
Sandusky, OH
GRC Propulsion Systems
Laboratory 4
Mach 6
Cleveland, OH
GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
Tunnel
12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10
discrete airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F
Cleveland, OH
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
Sandia National Laboratories Solar
Thermal Test Facility
High-temperature materials testing
and aerodynamic heating simulation
Albuquerque, NM
Sandia National Laboratories
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel
18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14
Albuquerque, NM
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility
Capability
Location
CUBRC Large Energy National
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels
LENS 1: Mach 6-22
LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: Atmospheric reentry
simulation
Buffalo, NY
Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel
48-inch up to Mach 5
St. Louis, MO
Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
Tunnel
48-inch Mach .3-5
Dallas, TX
Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel at
Purdue University
9.5-inch Mach 6
West Lafayette, IN
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Facility
Capability
Location
Purdue Applied Research Institute’s
Hypersonics and Applied Research
Facility
Mach 8 Quiet Wind Tunnel
Hypersonic pulse reflected
shock/expansion tunnel
West Lafayette, IN
AFOSR-University of Notre Dame
Quiet Tunnels
24-inch Mach 6 Quiet Tunnel
Large Mach 10 Quiet Wind Tunnel
Notre Dame, IN
Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft
Reusable Mach 6 test bed
Mojave, CA
University of Texas at San Antonio
Hypersonic Ludwieg Tube
8-inch x 8-inch Mach 7.2
San Antonio, TX
University of Texas at Austin
Blowdown Wind Tunnel
6-inch x 7-inch Mach 2 & Mach 5
Austin, TX
Southwest Research Light-Gas Gun
Quiet, flight enthalpy ballistic range
up to Mach 20
San Antonio, TX
University of Texas at Arlington
Aerodynamics Research Center
1.6 MW Mach 2-6 Arc Jet
13-inch Mach 4-16 Shock Tunnel
Arlington, TX
Texas A&M National
Aerothermochemistry and
Hypersonics Laboratory
7-inch Quiet Mach 6
36-inch Expansion Tunnel
9-inch x 14-inch variable Mach 5-8
College Station, TX
California Institute of Technology
GALCIT
12-inch Mach 5.2 T5 Reflected
Shock Tunnel
6-inch Hypervelocity (up to Mach
7.1) Expansion Tube
Pasadena, CA
University of Arizona Hypersonic
Ludwieg Tube
15-inch Mach 5
Tucson, AZ
Air Force Academy Ludwieg Tube
20-inch Mach 6
Colorado Springs, CO
University of Tennessee Space
Institute Ludwieg Tube
18-inch x 18-inch Mach 7
Tullahoma, TN
Maryland HyperTERP Reflected
Shock Tunnel
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 6
College Park, MD
Florida State Polysonic Wind
Tunnel
12-inch x 12-inch Mach 0.2-5
Tallahassee, FL
Princeton HyperBLaF Wind Tunnel
9-inch Mach 8
Princeton, NJ
Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; and CRS correspondence with Dee Howard Endowed Assistant Professor Dr. Christopher S. Combs
(The University of Texas at San Antonio), October 27, 2022.
Notes: Texas A&M University is in the process of constructing a Mach 10 quiet tunnel. Additional universities,
such as the University of Maryland, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct hypersonic research.
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Author Information
Kelley M. Sayler
Specialist in Advanced Technology and Global
Security
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