Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Congressional research reportFeb 10, 2022
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Congress and the War in Yemen:
Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Updated February 10, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45046
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Summary
This CRS report provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy
toward the conflict in Yemen, with summary tables providing information on various legislative
proposals considered in the 114th, 115th, 116th, and 117th Congresses. These proposals have
reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including
the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict;
the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the
coalition led by Saudi Arabia;
the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia;
the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led
coalition;
the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign and its adherence to
international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict;
the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen;
the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and
U.S. support to parties to the conflict;
the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security
cooperation; and
the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces
of the Houthi movement.
The 117th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi
Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war
has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; as of January 2022, the World
Food Programme reported that 16.2 million Yemenis were food insecure, more than half the
country’s population. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for
governments and aid agencies to count the war’s casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and
European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that
targeted airstrikes and drone attacks reportedly killed 8,513 civilians in Yemen from March 18,
2015 to December 31, 2021, out of more than 14,573 civilians reported killed overall.
President Joseph Biden has ended some U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led
coalition and is engaged in efforts to secure a ceasefire agreement while Congress considers
proposals that could further restrict U.S. military involvement. The Biden, Trump, and Obama
Administrations have opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or
condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to coalition
operations in Yemen.
This report does not include Yemen-related Iran sanctions legislation, which is covered in CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, please see the following CRS products:
CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.
CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.
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Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016) ..................................................... 4
2015 ........................................................................................................................................... 4
2016 ........................................................................................................................................... 5
Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2020) ...................................................... 7
2017 ........................................................................................................................................... 7
2018 ......................................................................................................................................... 10
2019 ......................................................................................................................................... 15
2020 ......................................................................................................................................... 18
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 20
Congress, the Biden Administration, and Yemen (2021) .............................................................. 22
2021 ......................................................................................................................................... 22
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 26
Tables
Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 117th Congress............................................ 29
Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress............................................ 33
Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress............................................ 48
Table 4. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114th Congress............................................ 66
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 68
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Overview
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the
Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar
Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah
Saleh (for background see text box below).1 During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia
in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their unilateral military campaign to occupy the Yemeni
capital of Sana’a, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama
Administration to react quickly.2
At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that
the United States would provide “logistical and intelligence support” to the coalition’s operations
without taking “direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort.”3 Soon thereafter, a joint
U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the
campaign, which eventually included refueling support for coalition air operations, weapons
transfers, intelligence support, and training. At the United Nations Security Council, the United
States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things,
required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and
demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict.
U.S. support for the coalition’s operations has been reduced since 2015, reflecting U.S. concerns
about civilian casualties and goals of promoting a ceasefire. After six years of conflict, hundreds
of thousands of Yemenis have been displaced, millions are in need of humanitarian assistance,
and the Houthi movement controls most of northern Yemen. Through December 2021, the
Houthis continued to launch strikes across the border into Saudi Arabia, attack areas of Yemen
loyal to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), and press an offensive against the city of
Marib, seat of the last ROYG stronghold in the north.
On December 7, 2021, President Joseph Biden reported to Congress “consistent with” the War
Powers Resolution that4
A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct
operations against al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS. The United States military
continues to work closely with the Government of the Republic of Yemen and regional
partner forces to degrade the terrorist threat posed by those groups.
As reported previously, I directed an end to the United States support for the Saudi-led
Coalition's offensive military operations against the Houthis in Yemen. United States
Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, continue to provide military advice and limited
information to regional forces for defensive and training purposes only as they relate to the
Saudi-led Coalition's campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. Such support does not
involve United States Armed Forces in hostilities with the Houthis for the purposes of the
War Powers Resolution.
1 The Houthi-Saleh alliance later unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on December 4, 2017.
2 See, “How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World,” New
York Times Magazine, October 31, 2018.
3 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, March 25, 2015.
4 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, December, 2021.
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United States Armed Forces are deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect United
States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran and Iran-backed
groups. These forces, operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of
United States fighter aircraft. The total number of United States forces in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia is approximately 2,120.
Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active
role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.5 Members have considered
legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition’s
operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods
and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the
Bab al Mandab Strait; improve U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in
Yemen; and/or support, condition, or end U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition.
Beyond Yemen, many Members have referred to the conflict as an element of a broader regional
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and discussed the conflict’s implications for the U.S.
effort to limit Iran’s malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have described the Yemen
conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern
that deepened after the 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government
personnel. Congress has considered and passed proposals to reject certain U.S. defense sales to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to direct an end to U.S. military
involvement in military operations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, but has not voted to
override presidential vetoes of related legislation.
Mixed results from attempts to limit U.S. support for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also
appear to be reinvigorating some Members’ interest in strengthening the role of Congress in
foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch.6 Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured
bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit
executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and
authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations.
Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen has also led to enacted and proposed legislative
changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense’s authority to enter into and use
acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries.7 The Trump Administration’s
invocation of emergency requirements to proceed with proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, including sales of air-to-ground munitions scrutinized in the context of the Yemen war,
has similarly led some in Congress to propose changes to underlying arms sales authorities
granted to the executive branch.8
5 Congress periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and appropriations legislation prior to
the 2015 Saudi-led intervention, such as providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist
groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba;
overseeing the issuance of visas for Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in
Yemen; and prohibiting U.S. assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces that use child soldiers.
6 See, for example, Senators Chris Murphy, Mike Lee, and Bernie Sanders, “Murphy, Lee, Sanders Introduce
Sweeping, Bipartisan Legislation to Overhaul Congress’s Role in National Security,” July 20, 2021.
7 Section 1271 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232) modifies 10 U.S.C. §2342
to prohibit the use of such agreements to transfer support or services to third parties and to require annual reporting.
8 Section 1270 of the House-passed version of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2500, would have
altered the authority granted to the President to determine that an emergency exists, which requires waiving
congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2776). Conferees did not include
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The Biden Administration has ended U.S. support to Saudi-led coalition offensive operations in
Yemen and has expanded U.S. diplomatic support for efforts to negotiate a settlement to the
Houthi-coalition conflict. Some legislative proposals in the 117th Congress have sought additional
changes to U.S. policy.
Conflict Overview and Root Causes of Crisis
The United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and international relief agencies all have often described
Yemen’s ongoing humanitarian and food crisis as “man-made,” meaning it is a direct result of the ongoing armed
conflict that began in March 2015.9 More than six years ago, Saudi Arabia established a coalition (hereinafter
referred to as the Saudi-led coalition) and launched a military operation aimed at restoring the rule of Yemen’s
internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s government was being gradually supplanted
by an alliance comprised of the Iran-supported Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous President, Ali
Abdullah Saleh (hereinafter referred to as Houthi-Saleh forces). The internationalization of Yemen’s conflict
reflects wider trends that have seen Iran seek to challenge the security of its regional rivals through the provision
of material support to state and non-state actors.
Although the current conflict began in 2015, its root causes are much deeper. A major factor in the conflict is
competition between political elites for primacy in Yemen and between sub-state actors and ruling elites for
influence. For decades, the most powerful political actor in Yemen had been former president Ali Abdullah Saleh
who was killed in 2017. Saleh ruled northern Yemen from 1978 to 1990 and unified Yemen from 1990 to 2012.
His presidency began to unravel in 2011, when political unrest broke out throughout the Arab world. Popular
youth protests in Yemen were gradually supplanted by political elites jockeying to replace then-President Saleh.
Concerned that the political unrest and resulting security vacuum were strengthening terrorist elements, the
United States, Saudi Arabia, and other members of the international community attempted to broker a political
compromise. A transition plan was developed, and in 2012 former Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi
became president.
With the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations Security Council, President Hadi
attempted to reform Yemen’s political system. Throughout 2013, key stakeholders convened a National Dialogue
Conference aimed at reaching broad national consensus on a new political order. However, in January 2014 it
ended without agreement.
One antigovernment group in particular, the northern Yemeni Houthi movement, sought to use violence to
reshape the political order.10 Within weeks of the National Dialogue Conference concluding, it launched an armed
offensive against various tribal allies of President Hadi. The Houthi were joined by the forces still loyal to former
President Saleh, creating an alliance of convenience and emerging as a formidable opponent to President Hadi and
his allies. Ultimately, Houthi militants took over the capital and advanced from the capital all the way to Aden. In
March 2015, after President Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, appealed for international intervention, Saudi
Arabia and a hastily assembled international coalition launched a military offensive aimed at restoring Hadi’s rule
and evicting Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities. Both sides have been fighting ever since.
Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners’ interest in developments in Yemen arguably reflects their concern about
regional security and threats to their territory and populations. The Houthis and other Iran-aligned actors
describe their cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as retaliatory and tactical, but
the attacks reinforce regional governments’ strategic concerns about Iran-backed armed groups and may
contribute to their reluctance to curtail their military intervention.
this provision in the final enacted version of the bill, S. 1790/P.L. 116-92.
9 “‘Man-Made Crisis’ Has Robbed Millions of Hope, Dignity, Secretary-General Tells Yemen Pledging Conference,
Stressing Urgent Need For Support,” U.N. Secretary-General Press Release, April 25, 2017; and U.N. Special Envoy
for Yemen Martin Griffiths, Briefing to United Nations Security Council, June 15, 2021.
10 The Houthi movement was formed in the northern Yemeni governorate of Sa’dah (in the mountainous district of
Marran) in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Houthi family. Between 2004 and 2010, the central
government and the Houthis fought six wars in northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia supported the central government of
Yemen in these various military campaigns against a Houthi insurgency. With each successive round of fighting, the
Houthis improved their position, as antigovernment sentiment became more widespread amidst an aggrieved
population in a war-torn and neglected north. Although the Houthi movement originally sought an end to what it
viewed as Saudi-backed efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs, its goals grew in scope and ambition in
the wake of the 2011 uprising and government collapse to embrace a broader populist, anti-establishment message.
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Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021
Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen
(2015-2016)
2015
In the months following the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had made modest
but inconclusive gains on the ground, and civilian casualties from coalition air strikes were
drawing increasing international criticism. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express
concern through letters and statements about civilian casualties, the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Yemen, and U.S. policy.11 In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to
President Obama urging him to “work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the
fullest extent possible.”12
By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration reportedly tried to balance its concern for
adherence to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners,13 lawmakers began to
express concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition’s intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms
sales to Saudi Arabia.14 When the Administration informally notified15 Congress of a proposed
sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its
formal notification.16 After the formal notification in November 2015,17 the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (SFRC) chair and ranking member jointly requested that the Administration
notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this priornotification request authority.18 No related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of
PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and the request for additional notification
arguably demonstrated congressional concern.19
11 “Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” New York Times, September 29, 2015.
12 Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al. to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS
to congressional clients.
13 “As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback,” Reuters, October 10, 2016.
14 See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor
for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of
King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015.
15 See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
16 “Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen,” Al Monitor, October 7, 2015.
17 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.
18 The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in
December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201
of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to
any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires
both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (Senate Foreign Relations
Committee/House Foreign Affairs Committee) to jointly request that the President provide such a “pre-shipment
notification” 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was
about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment.
19 Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option
explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for
in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional
Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
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2016
By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition20
to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation
of human rights abuses21 and errant coalition air strikes.22 In April 2016, legislation was
introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously
approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (Table 4).23 Proposed amendments to
FY2017 defense legislation24 would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to
implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia.25 The
PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was defeated in a
June 2016 House floor vote.26
In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in
Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led
coalition largely spared Yemen’s capital Sana’a from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to
the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudiled coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified.
During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some of the U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.Saudi planning cell.27 Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August
2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi
Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the
proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.28 In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of
the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). On
September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further
consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).29 During debate over the motion, many
20 See, for example, Senator Chris Murphy’s remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016.
21 In April 2016, the “Saudi Arabia-led coalition” was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the
annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that
resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not
removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said
“the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the conclusions of a review. ... But I want to
repeat: the content of the report stands.” See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for Killing Children in Yemen,
Reuters, October 5, 2017.
22 For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen
O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016, and Press briefing note on
Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Rupert Colville, Geneva,
Switzerland, March 4, 2016.
23
In the 114th Congress, see S.J.Res 31—A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer of certain United
States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To provide limitations on the transfer of
certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia.
24 In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L.
114-328.
25 In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017.
26 See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml.
27 “U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen planning,” Reuters, August 19, 2016.
28 See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016.
29 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.
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Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey
Graham remarking “To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people
in Iran will cheer you on.”30
In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi air strike on a funeral hall in Sana’a that killed 140 people,
the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.31 Based
on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and
refueling for coalition aircraft.32
In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces exchanged fire with HouthiSaleh forces. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy
vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time
U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration responded
to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles
against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as
self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict.33 In
August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker
a peace initiative in Oman, but the parties rejected his efforts.
Leahy Law and Saudi-led Coalition Strikes in Yemen
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance
authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is
credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S.
embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible
to receive U.S. assistance or training. In October 2016, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked that “The humanitarian
crisis in Yemen has received too little attention, and it directly, or indirectly, implicates us.... The reports of civilian
casualties from Saudi air attacks in densely populated areas compel us to ask if these operations, supported by the
United States, violate [that law].”34
Analysis
By the end of the 114th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign
policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the
U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Yemen, more lawmakers still seemed to view the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a
localized affair.35 Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with
Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members described Iran’s support
for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran’s malign
regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. When Houthis targeted Gulf state
30 op.cit., Congressional Record.
31 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Yemen, October 8,
2016.
32 “U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia amid Concerns over Yemen War,” New York Times, December 13, 2016.
33 Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 14,
2016.
34 “U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns,” Foreign Policy.com, October 15, 2016.
35 “Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War,” Al Monitor, September 21, 2016.
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infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, U.S. officials and nongovernment observers cited their
behavior as evidence of Iran’s growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security.36
While some Members described the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iranbacked Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others portrayed it as a test of long-standing U.S.
commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security.37 Supporters of the relationship, while
acknowledging that Saudi Arabia’s conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to
curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that
was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border.38
Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving
coalition behavior but was damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to
international law and human rights.39 The 114th Congress did not enact legislation to limit U.S.
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but these years marked the beginning of the broader congressional
debate that has continued.40
As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid
groups were pressing Congress to pay more attention to the growing humanitarian crisis in
Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to
limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, some
nongovernmental groups deemed this insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, “Whatever
conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of
precision munitions near the tail end of Obama’s term and suspending cluster munition transfers
earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition
attacks on civilians.”41
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen
(2017-2020)
2017
In his first year in office, President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter
Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, while at the same time his
Administration also took strong positions at times on the need for the coalition to improve
humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian
casualties.
From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump signaled strong support for
the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference.
36 Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, pp. H6202-H6208.
37 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.
38 See colloquy between Senators Bob Corker and John McCain on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional
Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
39 See remarks by Senator Christopher Murphy and Senator Rand Paul on Senate floor, September 21, 2016.
Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
40 As one analyst described this trend in 2016, “We haven’t seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of
a century.... Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don’t think it’s going to go back in.” “Saudi
Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress,” Washington Post, September 21, 2016.
41 “Obama Officials’ Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen,” Just Security, November 19, 2018.
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He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama’s October 2016
restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.42 On March 19, 2017, just
before his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with
three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the
Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.43
In May 2017, the Trump Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed
with sales of precision-guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had
deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia’s air force on both
targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict.44 Congress debated another resolution of disapproval
(S.J.Res. 42) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy
review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration “to focus on ending the war and
avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia’s
territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea.”45
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Yemen 2015-2020
During both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the United States sustained counterterrorism operations
against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various affiliates of the Islamic State in Yemen. Throughout
the conflict in Yemen, the United States targeted high-value individuals successfully within terrorist organizations.
For example, in 2015, a U.S. strike killed then-AQAP leader Nasser al Wuhayshi.
At the start of the Trump presidency, the United States markedly increased the tempo of strikes.46 According to
one report, in early 2017, the President declared parts of three Yemeni provinces to be an “area of active
hostilities” where more permissive rules of engagement reportedly applied.47 In January 2017, Ryan Owens, a
Navy SEAL, died during a counterterrorism raid in which between 4 and 12 Yemeni civilians also were killed,
including several children. One of the children was a U.S. citizen. The raid was the Trump Administration’s first
acknowledged counterterror operation.
In subsequent years, these operations intensified and reportedly killed a number of prominent AQAP targets. In
2018, U.S. officials claimed that one of the most high-value members in the AQAP organization, bomb-maker
Ibrahim al Asiri, had been killed in a U.S. air strike.48 On January 4, 2019, the Department of Defense announced
that a U.S. precision strike had killed Jamal al Badawi, one of the primary Yemeni terrorists involved in the 2000
USS Cole bombing. In February 2020, the United States announced that it had killed AQAP leader Qassim al Raimi
in a drone strike.
42 “Trump Administration Looks to Resume Saudi Arms Sale Criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen,”
Washington Post, March 8, 2017; and, “Trump Administration Weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War,”
Washington Post, March 26, 2017.
43 DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043
(Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.
44 A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase $7 billion in precision munitions from U.S.
companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy $7 billion in Precision Munitions
from U.S. firms: Sources,” Reuters, November 22, 2017.
45 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
46 “2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes,” Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent
Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017.
47 “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, March 12,
2017.
48 Asiri was a Saudi national who was believed to have created the explosive devices used in the 2009 Christmas Day
attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, in a 2009 attack against former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief
Mohammed bin Nayef, and in the October 2010 air cargo packages destined for Jewish sites in Chicago.
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As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the
Saudi-led coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen’s 280-mile western coastal plain
ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah (Yemen’s highest
capacity port). In early 2017, some Members of Congress responded to the coalition’s gradual
advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, by
imploring the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017,
several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to “use
all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international
humanitarian aid organizations.”49 A month later, another group of House Members wrote to
President Trump stating that “any decision by the administration to engage in direct U.S.
hostilities against Yemen’s Houthis must be subject to a congressional debate and vote.”50
On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution (S.J.Res. 42) to disapprove of three
direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the
motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of
S.J.Res. 42, Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral
relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some
lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled
alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that continuing U.S.
support to the coalition improves its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties.
For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that “If we are worried about collateral
damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt
it.”51 Senator Murphy responded, saying “What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these
precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the
Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are
going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis.”52 On
June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion
resolution was not taken up in the House (H.J.Res. 102).
Representative Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 81) pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition’s military
intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a
compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until
after the November 2018 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative (H.Res. 599, 366-30,
1 Present, Roll no. 623).53
In November 2017, the conflict deepened when a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian
origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia and the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of
Yemen’s ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country’s humanitarian
crisis.54 The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and
49 “Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port,” March 13,
2017.
50 U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, “Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress
Before Taking Military Action in Yemen,” April 11, 2017.
51 Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100—Daily Edition.
52 op.cit., Congressional Record.
53 Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, pp. H9148-H9155.
54 After the coalition’s imposition of the port’s total closure, food and fuel prices skyrocketed, leading international aid
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December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi
Arabia to “completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who
desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately.”55
On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of
Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen
to increase the port’s capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods.56 The next day,
the White House issued a statement welcoming “Saudi Arabia’s announcement of these
humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict.”57
2018
As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate proposed use of
the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition’s military
intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint
resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic
of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in
counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces).” The Senate continued
considering proposals to direct the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen (see Table 3
below).
Throughout 2018, there was disagreement between Congress and the Trump Administration and
within Congress itself, as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been
introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some
Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been
introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated” based
on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution.58 The Trump Administration disagreed. In February
agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni ports lasted 20 days; the Saudi-led coalition
then announced that it would begin allowing humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial
shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports.
Yemen imports 80% of its food from commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources.
55 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 6,
2017. Other statements include the following: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement
on Iranian-Supported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian
Conditions in Yemen, December 8, 2017.
56 In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State
Department’s nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the
coalition’s blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, “GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over
Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, “Trump Nominee Concedes
Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator
Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that, per
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a)), the coalition’s blockade triggers a
prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after
promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction
of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found
in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia’s Actions in Yemen,
December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html.
57 The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Saudi Arabia and Yemen, December 21, 2017.
58 For example, see remarks of Senator Mike Lee on the Senate floor, November 28, 2018. Congressional Record, 115 th
Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 187.
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2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the
extent of current U.S. support, and reported that “the United States provides the KSA [Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia]-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling;59
certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the
law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties.”60
On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54. During floor debate, arguments centered
on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis to
reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and
hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to
discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54. Senator
Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker’s approach, a
majority of committee members voted to table the motion.61
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel
testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled
Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition
aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets.62 Then-Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that “It’s correct
that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen.”63 During the same
hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the
Administration was dealing with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the
following:
Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee
have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from
whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations,
restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods
specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that
59 Until November 2018, U.S. in-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
was conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the
Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country. Some retransfers of fuel services were provided
to Saudi-led coalition members, and in 2015, Saudi Arabia received general purpose bombs retransferred by the United
Arab Emirates. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 U.S.C. §2341-2350. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was
signed in May 2016. Prior to May 2016, a “Joint Staff Execute Order signed on March 27, 2015, directed DOD to
provide aerial refueling support to the SLC [Saudi-led coalition], if requested, and stated that the support would be
provided on a reimbursable basis either through foreign military sales (FMS) or an ACSA.” U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Defense Logistics Agreements: DOD Should Improve Oversight and Seek Payment from
Foreign Partners for Thousands of Orders It Identifies as Overdue, GAO-20-309, March 20, 2020, Appendix IV.
60 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
61 Senator Menendez said, “Based upon Chairman Corker’s commitments to those hearings and future markups and
based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not
ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not
unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions.” Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115 th Congress, 2nd
Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48—Daily Edition.
62 Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 18, 2018.
63 Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17,
2018.
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messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is
extremely important.64
After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new
legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported
S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for
in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting
select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained.65
The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of
S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified
further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the
FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515, see textbox below). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in midAugust, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a
statement accompanying the President’s signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump
objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration’s view that such
provisions “encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is
feasible and consistent” with “[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief
and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs.”66
As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations
in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of
2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched “Operation Golden Victory,” aimed at
retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and
around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could
become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to thenSecretary of State Michael Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis saying, “We are
concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate
the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical
infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a nearterm political resolution to the conflict.”67
Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of
Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said,
I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective
leverage to push back on Iran’s actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own selfdefense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates
64 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.
65 The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would
have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary
provided an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have
required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those
objectives.
66 White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515, August 13, 2018.
67 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member’s Press, Menendez, Corker, Murphy, Young, Colleagues
raise Concerns about Imminent Military Operations at Hudaydah, Yemen, June 12, 2018.
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humanitarian suffering.... Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling
perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.68
Congress Restricts In-Flight Refueling for Coalition Aircraft
Section 1290 of P.L. 115-232 states that potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of
coalition aircraft would not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State or “related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components
in Yemen.” Under the final version of the provision, the Administration was required to certify that the Saudi and
Emirati governments were undertaking
an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen;
appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food,
fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen’s Red Sea ports,
including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana’a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and
demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military
operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen,
including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or
transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to
civilians and civilian infrastructure.
With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also was required certify that “the Government of Saudi
Arabia is undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with
secondary inspection and clearance processes other than [the United Nations Verification and Inspections
Mechanism].” The Administration could waive the certification requirement if certain explanatory submissions
were made. Reporting and strategy submission requirements also were included in the final version.
After the Trump Administration issued a certification to allow continued in-flight refueling, it subsequently decided
to end that type of support (see below). The next year, Congress moved to codify a prohibition on the provision
of in-flight refueling for a two-year period (Section 1273 of P.L. 116-92). In the 117th Congress, the House
approved an amendment to its version of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act to extend this prohibition
for two further years (House Rules Committee Amendment 852, H.R. 4350). The provision was included in the
final version of the act (Sec. 1339, S. 1605/P.L. 117-81; see Table 1).
On August 9, the coalition conducted an air strike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen,
in the northern Sa’ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51
people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claimed that its air strike was a “legitimate
military operation” conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a
day earlier that had killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on
the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a “thorough and transparent investigation into the incident.”69
Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information
regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan.70 Several
Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act
(H.R. 6157) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the
Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to
Congress that the coalition air campaign “does not violate the principles of distinction and
proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians.” The provision would not have
applied to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
in Yemen.
68 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member’s Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump
Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward, June 28, 2018.
69 State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, August 9, 2018.
70 “Congress, White House Reaching Breaking Point on Yemen?” Lobe Log, August 16, 2018.
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On September 12, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of
FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms
of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA, P.L. 115-232). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration’s actions,
asserting that the coalition had not met the act’s specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian
casualties in Yemen.71
On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138, which sought to direct the
President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces
engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within
30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been
enacted into law. In response to H.Con.Res. 138, the Administration referenced its earlier detailed
argument in objecting to S.J.Res. 54, expressing the President’s view that U.S. forces supporting
Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen.72
By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen, coupled with international reprobation
over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials, had created pressure on the
Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, thenSecretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Pompeo called for all parties to reach a ceasefire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective
immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—
to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen.73
Though fighting continued along several fronts, Special Envoy of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire on December 13, 2018, centered on the
besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.74 As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the
Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside
Hudaydah city and port.75 The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination
Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The Security Council praised the
Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a
comprehensive peace settlement.76
Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among
other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S.
forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers
twice approved rules containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President
to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration (H.Res.
71 Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Statement Following Trump Administration’s Certification in Support of Saudi-led
Coalition, September 12, 2018.
72 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
73 White House, Statement of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 54, November 28, 2018.
74 The full text of the cease-fire agreements are available at https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholmagreement.
75 On December 6, 2018, the warring parties to the conflict in Yemen convened in Sweden under the auspices of the
United Nations to discuss various de-escalation proposals and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace
settlement. The talks were the first formal negotiations since 2016. After a week of negotiations, all sides agreed to the
Stockholm Agreement, which consists of three components; a cease-fire around the port city of Hudaydah, a prisoner
swap, and a statement of understanding that all sides would form a committee to discuss the war-torn city Taiz.
76 U.N. Document SC/13643, Security Council Authorizes Immediate Deployment of Advance Team to Monitor Force
Withdrawals, Ceasefire in Yemen, Adopting Resolution 2451 (2018), December 21, 2018.
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1142 and H.Res. 1176).77 On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69, which, among
other things, expressed the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
was responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there was no statutory
authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war.
2019
For the first several months of 2019, implementation of the Stockholm Agreement stalled.
According to Special Envoy Griffiths, “the initial timelines were rather ambitious” and “a
complex situation on the ground” was stalling U.N.-backed efforts.78 The Stockholm Agreement
did not specify which local actors were to assume responsibility for security in Hudaydah after
both parties redeployed.79 According to reporting by the United Nations, initial implementation of
the Stockholm Agreement was hindered by an overall lack of trust and a reluctance to make
operational concessions outside of a comprehensive political agreement. On February 17, 2019,
the United Nations announced that “The parties reached an agreement on Phase 1 of the mutual
redeployment of forces” whereby the Houthis would withdraw from Hudaydah port and the
Saudi-led coalition would move out of the eastern outskirts of Hudaydah city.80
At the February 2019 Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East in
Warsaw, Poland, members of the self-described “quad” (United States, United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) met to coordinate their policy toward the Yemen conflict.
The quad emphasized the importance of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, the problematic
role Iran plays in arming and financing the Houthis, and the need for additional humanitarian
assistance. The foreign ministers comprising the quad also “expressed full support for Saudi
Arabia and its legitimate national security concerns and called for an immediate end to such
attacks by Houthi forces and their allies.”
In February 2019, CNN reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had provided U.S. military
equipment (armored vehicles) to local Yemeni units fighting the Houthis in possible violation of
end-user foreign military sale or direct commercial sale agreements.81 The coalition denied these
charges, while the U.S. State Department said that it was “seeking additional information” on the
issue.82 In Senate and House hearings in early February, some Members expressed concern about
end-use monitoring of equipment provided to the coalition.83
77 See Section 2 of H.Res. 1176, Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2) to
provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through
fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes.
78 “U.N. Envoy Urges Yemen Combatants to Withdraw from Lifeline Port,” Reuters, January 28, 2019.
79 “Explainer: What’s So Hard About Implementing a Peace Deal in Yemen’s Main Port,” Reuters, February 26, 2019.
80 “Yemen’s Parties Agree to Start Stalled Troop Withdrawal from Main Port,” Reuters, February 17, 2019.
81 Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit and Laura Smith-Spark, “Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy,”
CNN.com, February 2019. Available at https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/.
82 In May 2020, CNN reported that the State and Defense departments concluded their investigation into the possible
illegal transfer of U.S. equipment and determined that the UAE had been cleared, adding that the “State Department
has told some leaders in Congress that it is ‘satisfied no actual transfers were made.’” See, Nima Elbagir, Alison Main,
Salma Abdelaziz, Laura Smith-Spark and Jennifer Hansler, “The US Cleared the Way for a New Arms Sale to the
UAE, Despite Evidence it Violated the Last One,” CNN, May 22, 2020.
83 “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Central Command in Review of the Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 5,
2019; “Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6, 2019.
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On February 7, 2019, Senator Robert Menendez, ranking member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, introduced S. 398, the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019
(Table 2). This bill, which was originally introduced in the 115th Congress, would have, among
other things, legislatively required an end to in-flight refueling for Saudi-led coalition operations
in Yemen, suspended certain arms sales to the kingdom, sanctioned persons blocking
humanitarian access in Yemen, and sanctioned persons supporting the Houthis in Yemen. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the bill to the Senate in July 2019.
In response to reporting by the New York Times on the use of child soldiers by the Saudi-led
coalition, 13 Members of Congress wrote to Secretary Pompeo on February 15, 2019, seeking
information about the accuracy of the reports, and about whether these children had been
provided U.S.-made weapons and uniforms. Coalition officials denied the reports. Saudi Arabia
and the UAE were not included on the annual U.S. list of countries using child soldiers, although
the 2019 Trafficking in Persons report detailed continuing concerns about the government of
Yemen’s willingness and ability to end child soldier use by its forces and others.84
On February 13, 2019, the House passed H.J.Res. 37 (248-177), a joint resolution originally
introduced in the 115th Congress (S.J.Res. 54), “Directing the removal of United States Armed
Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.”
Prior to its passage by the House, the White House issued a State of Administration Policy in
which the Administration argued that “the premise of the joint resolution is flawed” because the
United States had provided only “limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition”
and U.S. forces providing such intelligence and logistics support were not engaged in hostilities.
Section 4 of H.J.Res. 37 includes a rule of construction stating that “Nothing in this joint
resolution may be construed to influence or disrupt any intelligence, counterintelligence, or
investigative activities conducted by, or in conjunction with, the United States Government.”
In March, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 7 (54-46), the companion resolution to H.J.Res. 37. The
House passed S.J.Res. 7 (247-175) on April 4. President Trump vetoed the resolution on April 16,
citing a concern that the resolution would weaken his constitutional authorities as Commander in
Chief, harm bilateral relationships, and negatively affect efforts to prevent civilian casualties and
prevent the spread of terrorist organizations in the Arabian Peninsula.85 House Majority Leader
Steny Hoyer responded to the presidential veto message stating that “the fight is not yet over, and
the House will explore further legislation and conduct rigorous oversight.”86
On May 2, 2019, the resolution failed to garner the 67 votes needed to override the veto in the
Senate (53-45). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell reiterated his opposition to what he
referred to as the false premises of the measure: “We’re not parties to the civil war in Yemen.
We’re no longer providing air-to-air refueling. More importantly, the measure would make it
actually more difficult to prevent the loss of innocent lives.”87 Text from the House-passed
version of H.J.Res. 37 subsequently was added to the House version of the FY2020 Defense
appropriations act (Title X of H.R. 2968) and passed by the House, but not included in the final
version of the act.
84 State Department, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 20, 2019. Yemen was listed as a “Special Case” for the
fourth consecutive year.
85 The White House, “Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J. Res. 7,” April 16, 2019.
86 “Hoyer Statement on President Trump’s Veto of the Bipartisan Yemen War Powers Resolution,” Press Release,
April 17, 2019.
87 Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to override Trump’s veto on Yemen,” Politico, May 5, 2019.
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Houthi forces began handing over control of Hudaydah and two other ports on the Red Sea on
May 10, in accordance with the first phase of redeployment laid out in the Stockholm Agreement.
Hadi government officials subsequently questioned the legitimacy of the withdrawal, with the
Information Minister calling it a “theatrical play”; Special Envoy Griffiths stated in a briefing to
the U.N. Security Council on May 15 that the Houthis had complied with the withdrawal.88
Though mediators had expressed hope that the Stockholm Agreement would lead to broader
peace negotiations, the Houthis escalated their drone and ballistic missile attacks against Saudi
Arabia during the summer of 2019. The Houthis called these attacks their “airport for airport”
campaign, stating that they would target Saudi civilian airports for as long as the Saudi-led
coalition maintains its closure of Sana’a airport. The Houthis launched multiple unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) attacks against regional airports in Saudi Arabia (Jizan, Najran, and Abha), forcing
the suspension of flights, damaging runways, and killing several civilians. Iran is believed to be
the original source of UAV technology and knowledge transfer to the Houthis.89 However, the
Houthis may have begun manufacturing their own UAVs. According to Jane’s Defence, “the
available evidence suggests that Ansar Allah is increasingly making use of parts that are
commercially available on the international market to develop new UAV designs.”90
On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of immediate foreign
military sales and direct commercial sales of training, equipment, and weapons with a possible
value of more than $8 billion, including sales of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, and the gift transfer of PGMs by the UAE to Jordan. Other notified sales
included, among others, F-15 engines and support for Saudi Arabia and AH-64 equipment,
Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles, and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles for the UAE. In the
Administration’s justification for the emergency sales to Congress, it described a “rapidlyevolving security situation in the region” and noted, among others, the threat posed by Iranianbacked Houthis, who have “publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military
targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in
Yemen.”91
On June 5, 2019, a group of seven Senators introduced 22 separate joint resolutions of
disapproval against the sales. One cosponsor, Senator Lindsey Graham, expressed in a statement
his concern about “the precedent these arms sales would set by having the Administration go
around legitimate concerns of Congress.”92 The Senate adopted all 22 of the measures. Three of
the measures focused on proposed sales of air-to-ground munitions were adopted by the House
and Senate and vetoed by the President (see Table 2).
In summer 2019, the UAE unilaterally withdrew most of its forces from Yemen. The UAE had
been Saudi Arabia’s primary partner in the coalition war against the Houthis. The UAE’s local
partners in southern Yemen, the Transitional Political Council for the South (aka Southern
Transitional Council, STC), attempted to seize more power in Aden from the Hadi government
88 “Houthi withdrawal from Yemen ports going according to plan: UN,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019.
89 In January 2018, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen identified military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian
origin (Ababil-T/Qasef-1) and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted 2015 arms embargo. See
Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342
(2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR].
90 “Ansar Allah ‘Airport for Airport’ Strategy underlines Potential for Re-Escalation of Yemen Conflict,” Jane’s
Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, June 21, 2019.
91 Congressional Record, June 4, 2019, pp. S3203-S3209.
92 Joe Gould, “Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan,” Defense News,
June 5, 2019.
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following the UAE’s withdrawal. Violent confrontations ensued between STC and pro-Hadi
forces. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE brokered a power-sharing agreement between Hadi’s
supporters and the STC in November 2019, implementation of that deal stalled, leaving the STC
ensconced in the South, the Houthis controlling the north, and the Hadi government isolated.
Beyond the ground war in Yemen, the Houthis continued to launch missile, rocket, and unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV)93 attacks intermittently against Saudi Arabian population centers and energy
infrastructure. After sophisticated air attacks against Saudi Arabian oil fields of Abqaiq and
Khurais in September 2019, attacks widely attributed to Iran but claimed by the Houthis, the
Houthis announced that they would suspend missile and UAV attacks against Saudi Arabia.
Between September and December 2019, Saudi, Yemeni government, and Houthi representatives
engaged in talks aimed at de-escalating the fighting. The talks were accompanied by several
confidence-building measures, such as prisoner exchanges and medical evacuation flights from
Sana’a to Amman, Jordan. However, in January 2020, the Houthis resumed their UAV and missile
attacks against Saudi Arabia (see below).94
Section 1273 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) codified (for a
two-year period) an existing Department of Defense policy to end in-flight refueling of Saudi-led
coalition aircraft engaged in hostile operations in Yemen. After President Trump signed the act, he
issued a signing statement asserting that
Several provisions of the Act, including sections 1254, 1273, 1698(a), and 2810, purport
to restrict the President’s authority to manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in
the manner the President believes to be necessary or advisable for the successful conduct
of military missions and foreign affairs….My Administration will implement these
provisions consistent with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief....
Other provisions proposed, considered, and adopted in the House during 2019 debate over the
National Defense Authorization Act were not included in the final enacted version. These
provisions included language that would have prohibited all U.S. support to and participation in
the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations against the Houthis in Yemen and provided for a oneyear ban on U.S. sales of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, with some exceptions (see Table 1 below).
2020
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis engaged for months during 2020 in negotiations95 over how to
deescalate their conflict, but to the contrary, conflict grew more intense.96 During winter 2020,
amidst the backdrop of fracturing in the anti-Houthi opposition, the Houthis launched a new
offensive into Jawf governorate, where they succeeded in seizing the provincial capital. By April
2020, the Houthis were in position to threaten Marib governorate, one of the last Yemeni areas
93 According to one analysis, “The Houthis have demonstrated that their UAV technology has greatly improved since
the weapons were first introduced to their military arsenal. No other known non-state armed group (NSAG) across the
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region and beyond has reached the same level of UAV technological
sophistication.” See, Ludovico Carlino, “Houthis Selecting More UAVs Over Ballistic Missiles in Arabian Peninsula
Attacks,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, December 6, 2019.
94 See, Missy Ryan and Kareem Fahim, “Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Rebels Were Making Rare Progress in Peace
Talks. Then New Violence Flared,” Washington Post, February 4, 2020.
95 “Saudi, Yemen’s Houthis hold ‘Indirect Talks’ in Oman to End War,” Al Jazeera, November 13, 2019. See also,
Colum Lynch, Lara Seligman, Robbie Gramer, “Can a Young Saudi Prince End the War in Yemen?”
ForeignPolicy.com, November 20, 2019.
96 “Saudi Arabia Looks for an Exit to the War in Yemen,” The Economist, April 18, 2020, edition.
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loyal to the Hadi government and where Yemen’s modest oil and gas reserves are located.
Throughout 2020, the Houthis pressed an offensive against Marib, and fighting continued in and
around the northern port of Hudaydah and along an arc from Ta’izz governorate in the southwest
through Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf governorates.
Evidence of Iranian military support to the Houthis also manifested itself during the year. In
February 2020, the USS Normandy intercepted a small dhow (trading vessel) while on patrol in
the Arabian Sea and discovered a cache of Iranian weapons intended for delivery to Yemen; some
of the items seized included Iranian-made copies of a Russian antitank guided missile, Iraniandesigned and manufactured surface-to-air missiles, and components for unmanned maritime
systems.97 On March 28, 2020, the Houthis fired missiles at the Saudi capital Riyadh (and
elsewhere in the kingdom), and Saudi air defenses reportedly intercepted the projectiles. The
remnants of previous Houthi ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia have proven to
resemble Iran’s Qiam missile, which itself is a modified short-range Scud missile.98
In late April 2020, the STC declared self-administration in southern Yemen, upending a powersharing agreement between it and the central Yemeni government signed in November 2019 in
Riyadh. Violent clashes followed the STC’s announcement, and the separatist group seized
hundreds of millions in cash from the central bank in Aden. Saudi Arabia continued to broker
STC-ROYG negotiations. In December 2020, the STC formally joined a unity government with
the ROYG.
At the end of 2020, the Houthis retained control of Hudaydah, the Stockholm agreement
remained unfulfilled, and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
(UNMHA) remained active. Food insecurity was increasing. As of December 2020, there were
4.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Yemen, among whom 1.7 million were
children. According to the December 2020 United Nations’ Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification (IPC) projections for Yemen, 54% of the population (16.2 million) was seen as
vulnerable to experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in the first half of 2021. U.N.
projections further estimated 11 million people would likely be in crisis (IPC Phase 3), 5 million
in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and 47,000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5, famine-like conditions).99
The COVID-19 Pandemic in Yemen
As the COVID-19 pandemic spread throughout Yemen, humanitarian workers accused the Houthis of covering up
the extent of the outbreak in areas under their control.100 Through the end of 2020, officially reported COVID-19
cases were low, as weak testing capacity masked the extent of infections and likely inflated the relative case fatality
rate.101
As the pandemic escalated, United Nations officials called for worldwide humanitarian cease-fires in various
conflict zones in order to respond. On April 8, 2020, Saudi Arabia unilaterally announced a two-week cease-fire in
Yemen and a $500 million pledge of humanitarian aid. At a June 2020 pledging conference hosted by Saudi Arabia,
97 U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command Holds Defense Department Media Availability, February. 19, 2020.
98 Jeremy Binnie and Mohammed Najib, “‘New’ Houthi Missile Appears to be Another Iranian Scud Derivative,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2020.
99 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), “Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October - December
2020 and Projection for January - June 2021.”
100 “Rebel threats, secret burials and shuttered hospitals mask spread of Yemen’s epidemic,” Washington Post, June 3,
2020.
101 Mohammed Noushad and Inas Shakeeb Al-Saqqaf, “COVID-19 case fatality rates can be highly misleading in
resource-poor and fragile nations: the case of Yemen,” Clinical Microbiology and Infection, April 2021; 27(4): 509–
510.
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donors pledged an additional $1.35 billion to support assistance programs in Yemen. The U.N.’s $2.4 billion appeal
remained underfunded throughout the year, and humanitarian services were scaled back.
International frustration over Houthi obstruction of humanitarian assistance mounted during the
year. Donors and aid implementers warned that if the Houthis would not abide by the principles
of international humanitarian law and allow for unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance,
they would risk losing aid in areas under their control.102 The Trump Administration supported
international attempts to pressure the Houthis to abide by international humanitarian law. On
March 24, 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a partial
suspension of $50 million in humanitarian programming in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen,
and maintained its partial suspension during the year due to continued “Houthi-imposed
bureaucratic impediments.” USAID continued to fund more than $13 million in humanitarian
nongovernmental organization activities in northern Yemen for programs that could be conducted
without Houthi interference.
Amid worsening humanitarian conditions and renewed conflict, some Members of Congress
called on the Trump Administration to step up its role in resolving the standoff between the
Houthis and international aid agencies. In February 2020, several Senators wrote a letter to U.S.
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asking him to take a more active role in “ensuring the
unimpeded, accountable, and impartial flow of assistance and commerce into Yemen.” A month
later, a group of House Members urged Secretary Pompeo to not suspend aid in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic and other humanitarian considerations, concerns about the Houthis
notwithstanding.103
In May 2020, six Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo and Acting USAID Administrator
Barsa saying “We recognize the challenge that Houthi obstruction poses to relief efforts in
Yemen….We must ensure that development dollars provided to Yemen actually benefit the people
most in need of help, and do not enrich Houthi forces or their partners, who have regularly
imposed unacceptable constraints on common-sense measures to track and account for funds and
supplies.”104 In June 2020, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo
seeking his leadership in resolving the conflict in Yemen, writing “Your interventions were
important to securing past interim agreements. We now believe that sustained, high-level U.S.
engagement is necessary to finally put an end to this devastating civil war.”105
Analysis
The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in
the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive
Administrations were adhering to existing law related to providing security assistance, including
102 Lisa Barrington, “Aid to Houthi-controlled Yemen to be cut back over risk it can be diverted–sources,” Reuters,
February 6, 2020.
103 Bryant Harris, “Intel: Democrats Warn Trump Administration against Cutting Yemen Aid,” Al Monitor, March 26,
2020.
104 Letter from Senators Cardin, Young, Coons, Leahy, Sanders, and Reed to Secretary of State Pompeo and Acting
Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development John Barsa, May 12, 2020, available at
https://www.cardin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05122020%20State_USAID%20Yemen%20Letter%20Final.pdf.
105 Letter from Senators Murphy, Young, Coons, Romney, Durbin, Sanders, Merkley, Cardin, and Warren to Secretary
of State Pompeo, June 16, 2020, available at https://www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
20.6.16%20Yemen%20Letter%20Signed%20FINAL.pdf.
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sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human
rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation
that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and
would extend legislative oversight over the executive branch’s policy toward the war in Yemen.
The House and Senate took different approaches to Yemen at the conclusion of the 115th
Congress. The House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war
powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration.106 The Senate passed S.J.Res. 54 at the
conclusion of the 115th Congress demonstrating broader opposition in the Senate to U.S.
involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over
time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or
restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight
measures, and war powers measures.
The 116th Congress debated U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia’s conduct
of the war in Yemen throughout 2019 and 2020. Some Members continued to express dismay at
the humanitarian situation in Yemen and called on relevant parties to implement the Stockholm
Agreement and to establish and maintain a ceasefire. In hearings in both chambers, some
Members raised concerns about the actions of the Saudi-led coalition, highlighting potential enduse monitoring violations of U.S. weapons provided to the coalition, civilian casualties from
coalition air strikes, and reports of coalition use of child soldiers.
President Trump vetoed bipartisan efforts to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen
(S.J.Res. 7) and to disapprove of sales of air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38). Both chambers’ passage of the
underlying measures demonstrated continued congressional opposition to aspects of U.S. policy.
In 2020, the House passed an amendment (Amendment 18 in H.Rept. 116-459, considered as part
of H.Amdt. 851) that would have prohibited the use of some FY2021 funds by the State
Department for the transfer of certain munitions and related items and services to Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates. The provision was not included in the final FY2021 foreign
operations appropriations act (Division K of P.L. 116-260).
Despite the passage of these measures, it remained difficult to identify the locus of congressional
consensus about Yemen. Many in the House and Senate stated that they sought to preserve
cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in broad terms and expressed concern about Iranian activities in
Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the
conflict to a close. Some lawmakers expressed opposition to the Saudi intervention and U.S.
involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition air strikes and the prospect of famine and
mass displacement. Others argued that the conflict was creating opportunities for Iran and Sunni
Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen. Still others also
referred to factors not directly related to conditions in Yemen, such as the mechanisms and
authorities used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi
government over the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi and other human rights issues, when
discussing continued U.S. support for the coalition’s operations.
Congressional consideration of Yemen legislation during the 115th and 116th Congresses also
typified broader efforts by some Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives
toward U.S. foreign policy and to leverage legislative processes to enhance their effectiveness.
Measures to expand oversight of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward
Yemen received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other arms sales and war powers
106 “House Republicans move to block Yemen War-Powers votes for rest of Congress,” The Hill, December 11, 2018.
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measures used legislative mechanisms to ensure prompt and/or privileged consideration of their
proposals. The volume and frequency of expressions of congressional opposition and the passage
of measures rejecting aspects of the Administration’s policy by majorities in both chambers
appeared to signal constraints on the choices available to the White House and governments in
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
In considering the NDAA for 2021 (H.R. 6395), the House endorsed a Yemen-related provision
directing a complete end of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition airstrike operations, though
House and Senate conferees removed the provision from the final version of the act. As the 116th
Congress drew to a close, Members enacted the NDAA over the President’s veto, including
comprehensive reporting and oversight requirements related to Yemen. The act directed the
Comptroller General to complete a report on all U.S. assistance to the coalition from the start of
the conflict and to examine the relationship between U.S. support to the coalition and civilian
casualties and humanitarian access restrictions.
Congress, the Biden Administration, and Yemen
(2021)
2021
In January 2021, in the final weeks of the Trump Administration, President Trump designated the
Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(SDGT) entity. In notifying Congress, then-Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that the Houthis
were closely linked to Iran and that the designations were intended to hold the Houthis
accountable for terrorist acts.107 The designations reportedly had been under consideration for
months, and aid organizations had repeatedly cautioned that designations would exacerbate the
humanitarian crisis. On January 19, in concurrence with the FTO designation of the Houthis, the
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued four general
licenses to allow humanitarian assistance and other commodities to reach Yemen even if a
transaction involved the Houthis.
Congressional reactions to President Trump’s actions in the final days of his Administration were
mixed. Some Members wished to see the United States continue its maximum pressure campaign
on Iran and viewed the Houthi designation as part of that effort, while other Members called on
the Biden Administration to reverse the designations. The terrorist designations of the Houthis
also drew bipartisan congressional concern over their timing, efficacy, potential harm to any
peace process, and possible humanitarian impact.108
After President Biden took office, one of his first foreign policy priorities was to review the
previous administration’s recent actions on Yemen. On January 25, OFAC issued a new general
license exempting nearly all transactions with the Houthis from sanctions restrictions until
February 26, 2021, while the Yemen sanctions policy was reviewed.109
107 U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo,
Secretary of State, January 10, 2021.
108 Jack Detsch, “Stop F—ing Lying’: Congress, Trump Officials in Heated Exchange Over Terrorism Designations,”
Foreign Policy, January 11, 2021.
109 U.S. Department of the Treasury, available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl13.pdf.
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On February 4, 2021, President Biden announced that his Administration would increase U.S.
efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by (1) appointing a special envoy to Yemen; (2) ending
U.S. support for offensive operations in the war, including relevant arms sales; and (3) continuing
to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory from Houthi attacks. A week later, Secretary of State
Antony Blinken revoked the FTO and SDGT designations of the Houthis stating, “We have
listened to warnings from the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of
Congress, among others, that the designations could have a devastating impact on Yemenis’
access to basic commodities like food and fuel.”110 The Secretary retained the designations of
three Houthi individuals as Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) under Executive Order (E.O.)
13611.111 President Obama issued that order in 2012 to block property of persons threatening the
peace, security, or stability of Yemen. On March 2, the Biden Administration designated two
additional Houthi leaders under E.O. 13611.112
Military Developments. In February 2021, the Houthis resumed their offensive against Marib.113
That offensive intensified in the fall of 2021, expanding to new fronts in parts of southern Yemen,
as the Houthis sought to cut off ROYG reinforcement of Marib. Houthi fighters attacked in waves
and used unmanned aerial vehicles to target ROYG fortifications. According to one report, as of
October 1, 2021, 1,700 government troops in Marib province had been killed and around 7,000
wounded.114 The Houthis endured high casualties as well as they made gains toward Marib city,
as Saudi air strikes targeted Houthi fighters advancing over open ground.115 In late 2021, Yemeni
forces backed by the UAE made advances against Houthi forces, recapturing the governorate of
Shabwa and severing some Houthi resupply lines to Marib.116 Nevertheless, as of December 2021
the Houthis controlled or contested most of northern Yemen, including the country’s three largest
cities (Sana’a, Taiz, and Al Hudaydah).
Peace Process. Throughout 2021, U.S. Special Envoy Lenderking engaged in talks with key
parties to the conflict through an ongoing series of visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other
regional countries. In March 2021, Saudi Arabia offered a nationwide ceasefire117 that Lenderking
praised.118 The Houthis almost immediately dismissed the Saudi proposal as “nothing new” and
reiterated their demands for the Saudis unilaterally to lift their blockade of Sana’a airport and
Hudaydah port.119
110 U.S. Department of State, Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah, Press Statement
Antony J. Blinken, Secretary Of State, February 12, 2021.
111 Ibid., U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021.
112 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders of the
Ansarallah Militia in Yemen,” Press Release, March 2, 2021.
113 “Yemen’s Houthis Renew Offensive to Capture Government Stronghold Marib,” Middle East Eye, February 8,
2021.
114 Siobhán O'Grady and Ali Al Mujahed, “Battle for the Badlands: Yemen’s seven-year civil war could turn on fierce
fighting in remote Marib province,” Washington Post, October 1, 2021.
115 Samy Magdy, “Grueling Battle for Key Yemeni City,” Associated Press, July 12, 2021.
116 “Yemen rebels lose key battleground area after missile attack on UAE,” AFP, January 25, 2022.
117 Specifically, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan proposed that, if the Houthis agree to a nationwide
ceasefire under U.N. supervision, Saudi Arabia would (1) adhere to a U.N.-supervised ceasefire, (2) reopen Sana’a
International Airport to direct flights, (3) allow fuel into Hudaydah port with revenues deposited in a joint HouthiROYG bank account, and (4) restart political negotiations for a permanent settlement to the conflict.
118 U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah
Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.
119 Reuters, “Houthis say nothing new in Saudi peace offer, will keep talking,” March 22, 2021.
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By summer 2021, the Biden Administration had become more openly critical of the Houthis for
rejecting repeated attempts at brokering a cease-fire while continuing their ground offensive in
Yemen and their aerial assaults against civilian targets inside Saudi Arabia. According to State
Department spokesperson Ned Price
When it comes to Yemen, you asked if we are fed up with the Houthi attacks. The answer
to that is yes. We are beyond fed up. We are horrified by the repeated attacks on Marib.
We strongly condemn the Houthi missile attack on a residential neighborhood in Marib on
June 29th. It took civilian lives, including the life of a child. We believe it is long past time
to end the conflict in Yemen and to provide immediate relief to the Yemeni people. 120
Several months later, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Richard
Mills spoke before the Security Council, where he reiterated the Biden Administration’s view that
the Houthis were obstructing the peace process. According to Ambassador Mills,
In 2021 alone, the Houthis have launched more than 240 attacks into Saudi Arabia,
endangering civilians throughout the country, including the 70,000 American citizens who
reside there.121
Through the end of 2021, the Houthis continued to demand that the coalition agree to lift
restrictions on access to airports and ports in northern Yemen prior to any ceasefire agreement.122
Iranian Influence. Throughout 2021, the Biden Administration continued the policy of
successive administrations to attempt to thwart Iranian assistance to the Houthis. In May 2021,
the USS Monterey seized hundreds of smuggled weapons inside a stateless dhow (fishing boat) in
the Arabian Sea. U.S. officials noted that the illicit shipment originated in Iran and was most
likely bound for the Houthis.123 In December 2021, the U.S. Navy seized 1,400 assault rifles from
a vessel originating in Iran; U.S. officials stated that the ship was “on a route historically used to
illegally smuggle weapons to the Houthis in Yemen.”124 In another line of effort to curb Iranian
influence in Yemen, on June 10, 2021, under the authority of Executive Order 13224, OFAC
designated several members of a smuggling network that “helps fund Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis in Yemen.”125 This
designation came several weeks after the Biden Administration, pursuant to Executive Order
13611, designated two senior Houthis leaders as SDNs for their role in the offensive against
Marib.126
U.S. Ceases Support for Offensive Operations. Since the President’s February 2021 policy
pronouncement on Yemen, the United States has ceased support to offensive operations by Saudi
Arabia and its coalition partners and made some changes to U.S. missile and air defense posture
120 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, July 1, 2021.
121 United States Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United
Nations, New York, NY, September 10, 2021.
122 On August 8, Oman-based Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam said via Twitter, “There is no use in having
any dialogue before airports and ports are opened as a humanitarian necessity and priority.” Reuters, “Top Houthi
negotiator says no point in meeting new U.N. envoy now,” August 8, 2021.
123 John Gambrell, “US Navy Seizes Weapons in Arabian Sea Likely Bound for Yemen,” Associated Press, May 9,
2021.
124 State Department press statement, “Illegal Iranian Flow of Weapons to Yemen,” December 23, 2021.
125 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Network Financing Houthi Aggression and Instability in
Yemen,” press release, June 10, 2021.
126 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Official Overseeing Group’s
Offensive Operations,” press release, May 20, 2021.
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in Saudi Arabia. In April 2021, CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. told
one reporter that in Marib, “We’re not doing anything in terms of ISR (intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance) … on things happening in Marib or places like that.”127 Nevertheless,
Administration officials have reiterated U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense. In
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, stated:
Our second line of effort is to provide limited, non-combat support to the Saudi-led
Coalition (SLC) focused on defending Saudi Arabia from external threats. This noncombat support is consistent with President Biden’s February 4, 2021 announcement to
increase U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war in Yemen and cease U.S. support to SLC
offensive operations in Yemen. Continued U.S. assistance is designed to reassure U.S.
partners of our commitment to their defense so that they can meaningfully engage in the
United Nations political process to end the war. In support of the President’s policy,
roughly 60 DoD military advisors are deployed to help Saudi Arabia’s Armed Forces
defend their territory from threats emanating from Yemen. 128
In December 2021, a U.S. official stated, “our support for the Saudi-led offensive operations in
Yemen, it ended in February, including relevant arms sales. We have suspended, as you know,
proposed sales of certain air-to-ground munitions, but we are committed to continuing to provide
[...] support to Saudi Arabia to improve its ability to defend its territory.”129 Administration
officials the same month opposed proposals in Congress to block the sale of advanced medium
range air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 31/H.J.Res. 63 ), stating that, “Saudi Arabia
uses these munitions to defend against aerial cross-border attacks, such as Houthi explosive-laden
drones.”130
Humanitarian Aid. Throughout 2021, the United States remained the top single donor of
humanitarian assistance for Yemen. In FY2021, the United States contributed $805.8 million
toward the crisis, bringing total U.S. contributions to nearly $3.9 billion since the start of the
crisis in 2014/2015. U.S. officials have called for restrictions on fuel imports through Hudaydah
port to be “lifted immediately” and for Sana’a airport to be “opened and operational.”131
Congressional Action. In 2021, the crisis in Yemen has not been as prominent a matter before
Congress as in previous years, when Congress considered and voted on war powers
authorizations and possible emergency arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
others. During the 117th Congress, as Table 1 below indicates, Yemen has featured in
consideration of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1605/H.R. 4350). Provisions
related to Yemen also are contained in House versions of the FY2022 foreign operations and
defense appropriations bills (H.R. 4373 and H.R. 4432).
One issue regarding Yemen that has received some bipartisan attention is the continued Saudi-led
coalition restriction of access to some Yemeni ports. In April 2021, House Foreign Affairs Middle
East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee Chair Ted Deutch and Ranking
Member Joe Wilson sent a letter to Secretary Blinken seeking U.S. support in ending the Saudi127 “US-Made Drones Downed over Yemen weren’t Military’s, CENTCOM says,” Al Monitor, June 24, 2021.
128 Testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Hearing
entitled, “National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa,” House
Armed Services Committee, April 20, 2021.
129 State Department Spokesperson Ned Price, Press Briefing – December 20, 2021.
130 White House, Statement of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 31, December 7, 2021.
131 U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah
Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.
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led coalition’s “continued obstruction of commercial and humanitarian imports to Yemen.”132 In
the Senate, Democrats sent a similar letter to the President, seeking his support in demanding
“that Saudi Arabia allow the unfettered delivery of food, fuel, and other humanitarian aid through
the Hodeidah port, under United Nations auspices to deliver humanitarian assistance to the
Yemeni people.”133
Analysis
The Biden Administration has made a number of changes in U.S. Yemen policy designed to
emphasize its peacemaking role and prioritize efforts to resolve the humanitarian crisis.134
Nevertheless, the Houthis have escalated their attacks in Yemen and across the border against
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since February 2021, perhaps in an effort to maximize
their territorial gains and their leverage amid renewed international efforts, including by the
Biden Administration, to broker a cease-fire to the conflict.
Saudi Arabia’s intervention using air power in 2021 focused on supporting ROYG ground forces
in Marib and, combined with other coalition support to the ROYG, appeared pivotal to the
outcome of fighting there. The Administration has not described publicly the extent of any SaudiU.S. understandings over what type of coalition operations in Yemen constitute defensive versus
offensive air strikes. U.S. officials demanded a halt to the Houthi offensive in Marib, but the
Administration did not indicate what specific military, advisory, or assistance steps, if any, it was
willing to take to attempt to ensure that outcome or compel the parties involved. Saudi Arabia
offered ceasefire terms to the Houthis and continues to engage U.S. and other international parties
in peace talks, but ongoing Houthi cross-border attacks pose what Saudi and Emirati officials
regard as an unacceptable threat to their country. Saudi Arabia and its partners may continue to
seek to disrupt weapons transfers and support from Iran and Iran-backed groups to the Houthis.
Reports of errant Saudi air strikes that have resulted in civilian casualties continued in 2021,
though less frequently than in earlier periods of the war. While the Houthis do not possess
manned aircraft, they conducted mortar, missile, rocket, and unmanned drone attacks against their
Yemeni adversaries and against Saudi territory, the latter of which they described as a response to
the Saudi-led coalition’s maritime blockade of Yemen’s west coast and closure of Sana’a airport.
According to the Yemen Data Project, a nongovernmental organization that compiles public
reporting about the conflict in Yemen, Saudi and coalition airstrikes nearly doubled in volume
during 2020 relative to 2019, and continued near 2020 levels through 2021, with nearly half
occurring in and around Marib. Overall civilian casualties in the conflict were highest in 2015,
and continued to occur in connection with indiscriminate fire by Houthi forces, shelling by
government of Yemen and allied local forces, and, to a less frequent extent than in the early years
of the conflict, Saudi and coalition airstrikes.135
The Administration’s 2021 decision to withdraw U.S. missile and air defense assets from Saudi
territory was coordinated with Saudi officials, who said it was “carried out through common
132 Congressman Ted Deutch, “US Reps. Send Bipartisan Letter to Sec. Blinken on Ending Yemen Blockade,” press
releases, Washington, DC, April 13, 2021.
133 Available at https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2021.05.19%20Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Saudi%20blockade%20of%20Yemen%20(1).pdf.
134 U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah
Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.
135 Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) through December 2021, available
at https://www.acleddata.com.
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understanding and realignment of defense strategies.”136 Saudi defense officials have stated that
Saudi military capabilities are sufficient to defend the kingdom’s territory, but press reports
suggest that the frequency and volume of Houthi attacks are straining the kingdom’s defenses.137
Saudi Arabia has welcomed additional missile defense support from U.S.-ally Greece, and the
Biden Administration has approved the sale and transfer of Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia by
other U.S. allies and partners.138
As noted above, the conflict in Yemen has generally not been a major foreign policy issue of
congressional consideration in the 117th Congress, but amendments considered and adopted to the
House version of the 2022 NDAA and provisions of the final version of the act reflect continued
concern about the conflict and U.S. policy toward it. The final version of the act extends a ban on
U.S. refueling of Saudi coalition aircraft and requires reporting on Saudi offensive airstrikes in
Yemen resulting civilian casualties and the aircraft and munitions used in such strikes. It does not
include other restrictive provisions endorsed by the House in its version of the bill. The Senate
voted in December 2021 against advancing a measure to block the sale of certain air-to-air
munitions to Saudi Arabia, with some Senators highlighting Houthi cross border attacks during
floor debate (S.J.Res. 31, Table 1).139
Congress has allocated funds in recent foreign operations appropriations acts for stabilization
purposes in Yemen and could consider additional requests from the Administration if mediation
efforts produce a durable ceasefire and allow for stabilization operations to expand while intraYemeni political negotiations resume. Questions about the delivery of assistance in areas
remaining under Houthi control are likely to remain relevant, including in the context of the
potential re-imposition of terrorism sanctions on the Houthis as a group.
In light of the Houthis’ cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia, their offensive operations against
Yemeni rivals, and Saudi and coalition counter-operations, Congress also may continue to debate
the extent to which U.S. support to Saudi and Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen should be
conditioned or restricted by law. In light of expressed views in Congress and congressional voting
patterns, unilateral escalation of the conflict by the coalition or coalition operations resulting in
increased civilian casualties or harm could potentially generate additional opposition to U.S.
involvement among Members. This might lead Congress to attempt to assert more influence over
executive branch decisions and possibly override presidential preferences. Debate to date also
suggests that, similarly, escalation attributable to the Houthis, closer overt coordination between
the Houthis and Iran, and/or Houthi rejection of United Nations resolution efforts may lead some
Members to support continued or more expansive U.S. cooperation with the coalition. Houthi
successes on the battlefield could complicate congressional considerations on issues of legislative
relevance, such as security assistance and humanitarian aid.
Looking ahead, lawmakers might broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the
current conflict to address Yemen’s chronic instability more fully. They also might focus on
challenges to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism threats, or prospects for
broader U.S. security cooperation with ROYG forces. Yemen has been devastated by years of
war: at the start of 2022, U.N. officials described it as one of the world’s worst humanitarian
136 Associated Press, “U.S. removes advanced missile defense system from Saudi Arabia,” September 11, 2021.
137 Andrew England, Samer Al-Atrush, and James Politi, “Saudi Arabia turns to Gulf states to replenish depleted air
defences,” Financial Times (UK), January 8, 2022.
138 Ibid., and, Saudi-U.S. Trade Group, “After U.S. Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles, Greece Delivers System to Saudi,”
September 15, 2021.
139 Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, Vol. 167, No. 211, pp. S8952-S8955.
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crises.140 Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial
assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. Thus, Congress
may grapple with Yemen-related questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of
U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance and defense funds for years to come.
140 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Yemen Situation Report, January 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 117th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 117th Congress through December 31, 2021
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments
H.Res. 175
Representative David Trone
(D-MD)
The resolution would call on the U.S. government to cease all arms transfers to
Saudi Arabia until the Saudi government among other things ends its military
operations in Yemen.
Introduced 02/26/2021
Referred to Committee on
Foreign Affairs and
Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
H.J.Res. 63
Representatives Ilhan Omar
(D-MN), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI),
and James McGovern (D-MA)
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 280 AIM–120C–7/C–8 Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and 596 LAU–128 Missile Rail
Launchers (MRL), along with related items and support described in direct
commercial sale license notification DDTC 20–11.
Introduced 11/12/2021
Referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs
S.J.Res. 31
Senators Rand Paul (R-KY),
Bernie Sanders (I-VT), and
Mike Lee (R-UT)
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 280 AIM–120C–7/C–8 Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and 596 LAU–128 Missile Rail
Launchers (MRL), along with related items and support described in direct
commercial sale license notification DDTC 20–11.
Introduced 11/18/2021
Motion to discharge the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from further
consideration of S.J.Res. 31
rejected on 12/07/2021
(Yeas and Nays 30-67,
Record Vote Number 484)
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022
H.R. 4373
CRS-29
Representative Barbara Lee
(D-CA)
House Committee on Appropriations report on the bill (H.Rept. 117-84) would
allocate $500,000 in Diplomatic Programs funding made available by the bill to
support the Special Envoy for Yemen.
Report states Committee “supports the Administration’s ongoing efforts to press
for full and consistent humanitarian access in northern and southern Yemen and a
comprehensive nationwide ceasefire that guarantees lasting relief to the Yemeni
people. The committee directs the Secretary of State to continue pressing
government officials in Saudi Arabia to unconditionally ease all restrictions on
Yemen’s ports and airports and to enable the free flow of fuel, food, and
medicine into and throughout Yemen.”
Introduced and reported to
the House 07/06/2021
(H.Rept. 117-84)
Passed in the House on
07/28/2021 (Yeas and Nays
217-212, Roll no. 243)
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022
H.R. 4432
Representative Betty
McCollum (D-MN)
Section 8153 would state that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by the Act may be used to support or facilitate offensive military
operations conducted by the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in the war in
Yemen.
Introduced and reported to
the House 07/15/2021
(H.Rept. 117-88)
National Defense Authorization Act, 2022
H.R. 4350
Representative Adam Smith
(D-WA)
Section 1288 (HASC Reported)—Requires regular reporting to Congress on
improvements to the military capabilities of Iran-backed militias, including the
Houthis.
Introduced 07/02/2021 and
reported to the House
09/10/2021 (H.Rept. 117118)
Included as Sec. 1227 in final
version of the Act (S.
1605/P.L. 117-81).
H.R. 4350
Representatives Meeks (DNY), Lieu (D-CA), Deutch (DFL), Smith (D-WA), Schiff (DCA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 57—Would have required the
suspension of U.S. sustainment and maintenance support to Saudi air force units
determined to be responsible for airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties in
Yemen with certain exemptions for territorial self-defense, counterterrorism
operations, and defense of U.S. government facilities or personnel.
Made in order as
Amendment 30 in H.Rept.
117-125
Agreed to 09/23/2021 as
H.Amdt. 114 (Yeas and
Nays: 223–204, Roll no. 279)
Not included in final version
of the Act (S. 1605/P.L. 11781).
H.R. 4350
Representatives Khanna (DCA), Jayapal (D-WA), Schiff
(D-CA), Adam Smith (D-WA),
DeFazio (D-OR), Porter (DCA), Welch (D-VT), Johnson,
Hank (D-GA), Schakowsky
(D-IL), Connolly (D-VA), Lieu
(D-CA), Himes (D-CT),
Torres, Ritchie (D-NY), Tlaib
(D-MI), Blumenauer (D-OR),
Cohen (D-TN), Dingell (D-MI)
House Rules Committee Amendment 573—Would have prohibited the
use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act for U.S. military logistical
support, and the transfer of spare parts to Saudi warplanes conducting aerial
strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and intelligence sharing that enables
offensive strikes and any U.S. effort to command, coordinate, participate in the
movement of, or accompany Saudi-led coalition forces in the war in Yemen.
Made in order as
Amendment 28 in H.Rept.
117-125
Agreed to 09/23/2021 as
H.Amdt. 113 (Yeas and
Nays: 219–207, Roll no. 278)
Not included in final version
of the Act (S. 1605/P.L. 11781).
CRS-30
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
H.R. 4350
Representative Debbie Dingell
(D-MI) and Representative
Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)
House Rules Committee Amendment 550—Would have stated that none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the act were authorized to be
made available for any U.S. governmental or private entity to participate in, or in
any way assist, restrictions on imports, including humanitarian and civic assistance,
or travel at Yemen’s air or sea ports, including any communication, coordination,
training, or any other interaction between the U.S. military and the members of
an air force or navy that may enable, aid, or facilitate the enforcement of these
restrictions.
Not made in order
H.R. 4350
Representative Adam Schiff
(D-CA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 670—Would have prohibited funds
authorized to be appropriated by the act or otherwise made available for fiscal
year 2022 for the Department of Defense from being used to share intelligence
with Saudi ships enforcing the blockade of the Port of Al Hodeidah, Yemen, and
Saudi aircraft imposing a no-fly zone over the airport in Sana’a, Yemen.
Withdrawn
H.R. 4350
Representative Ted Lieu (DCA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 852—Extends prohibition on in-flight
refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil
war in Yemen enacted in Section 1273(a) of the FY2020 NDAA (Public Law 116–
92) for two years.
Made in order as
Amendment 247 in H.Rept.
117-125
Agreed to 09/23/2021 as
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 123
(Yeas and Nays: 367–59, Roll
no. 288)
Included as Sec. 1339 in final
version of the Act (S.
1605/P.L. 117-81).
CRS-31
Status
Bill Number
S. 1605/P.L. 117-81
Principal Sponsors
Senator Rick Scott (R-FL)
Summary
Status
Section 1340 states that “it is the policy of the United States—
(1) to continue to support and further efforts to bring an end to the conflict in
Yemen;
(2) to support efforts so that United States defense articles and services are not
used for military operations resulting in civilian casualties; and
(3) to work with allies and partners to address the ongoing humanitarian needs of
Yemeni civilians.”
Requires a report not later than 90 days after the date of enactment from the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense “on whether
the Government of Saudi Arabia has undertaken offensive airstrikes inside Yemen
in the preceding year resulting in civilian casualties.”
The report is to include “a full description of any such airstrikes, including a
detailed accounting of civilian casualties incorporating information from nongovernmental sources”; an identification of Government of Saudi Arabia air units
responsible for any such airstrikes; “a description of aircraft and munitions used
in any such airstrikes.”
The report is to be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex if necessary.
Amendment passed in the
House on 12/07/2021 (Yeas
and Nays 363-70, Roll no.
405)
House amendment agreed to
in the Senate on 12/15/2021
(Yeas and Nays 88-11,
Record Vote Number 499)
Became P.L. 117-81 on
12/27/2021.
Sources: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules.
CRS-32
Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 116th Congress
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments
S.Res. 243
Senator Christopher Murphy
(D-CT)
Resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia’s human rights practices in
Yemen pursuant to Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/10/2019
S.J. Res. 27-48
Senator Robert Menendez (DNJ)
22 separate resolutions providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan,
certain defense articles and services described in the certification DDTC
Transmittals No. 17-079, 17-094, 17-112, 17-126, 17-128, 18-029, 18-030, 18050, 18-080, 18-103, 18-109, 18-110, 19-001 and DSCA Transmittals No. 17-0B,
17-39, 17-70, 17-73, 18-21, 18-31, 19-01, 19-18.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/05/2019
S.J.Res. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, and 48
agreed to en bloc in the
Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 51-45, Record
Vote Number 179)
See below for further
consideration of S.J.Res. 37
S.J.Res. 36
Senator Robert Menendez (DNJ)
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Italian Republic of certain
defense articles and services.
Would have disapproved of the
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/05/2019
Agreed to in the Senate on
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays
53-45, Record Vote Number
177)
Passed in the House on
07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays
238-190, Roll no. 486)
Vetoed by President on
07/24/2019
Passage over veto failed in
Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 45-40, Record
Vote Number 231)
CRS-33
coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway Pre-Amp Circuit
Card Assemblies (CCA), Guidance Electronics Assembly (GEA) CCAs, and
Control Actuator System (CAS) CCAs for all Paveway variants;
coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway II Guidance
Electronics Detector Assemblies (GEDA) and Computer Control Groups
(CCG); and
transfer of up to 64,603 additional kits, partial kits, and full-up-rounds.
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 37
Senator Robert Menendez (DNJ)
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export
to the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Republic of France of certain defense articles and services.
Would have disapproved of the proposed transfer of 44,000 GBU-12 Paveway II
Kits and the proposed transfer of 16,000 GBU-10 Paveway II Kits.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/05/2019
Agreed to in the Senate on
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays
51-45, Record Vote Number
179)
Passed in the House on
07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays
238-190, Roll no. 487)
Vetoed by President on
07/24/2019
Failed of passage in Senate
over veto on 07/29/2019
(Yeas and Nays 45-39,
Record Vote Number 232)
S.J.Res. 38
Senator Robert Menendez (DNJ)
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland of certain defense articles and services.
Would have disapproved of the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense
services, and technical data to support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing
System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/05/2019
Agreed to in the Senate on
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays
53-45, Record Vote Number
178)
Passed in the House on
07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays
237-190, Roll no. 488)
Vetoed by President on
07/24/2019
Passage over veto failed in
Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 46-41, Record
Vote Number 233)
CRS-34
Bill Number
S.J.Res. 7
CRS-35
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT),
Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and
Senator Christopher Murphy
(D-CT)
Would have directed the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed
Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not
later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint
resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date),
and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces has been enacted.
For purposes of the resolutions’ directive section, the term “hostilities” included
in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the
ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would have stated that nothing in the resolution
shall have been construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.
Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and
the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional
humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen;
and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces
abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi
Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.
As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the
115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 3 below).
Amended during Senate consideration on 03/13/2019 to include S.Amdt. 193
stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed as authorization
for use of military force and S.Amdt. 195 stating that nothing in the joint
resolution should be construed to “influence or disrupt” Yemen-related
intelligence collection, analysis, or sharing deemed necessary for national security
reasons by the President.
Introduced 01/30/2019
Motion to discharge the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from further
consideration of S.J.Res. 7
agreed to on 03/13/2019 by
voice vote
Motion to table S.Amdt. 194
agreed to (Yeas and Nays
52-48, Record Vote Number
47)
S.Amdt. 193 and S.Amdt.
195 agreed to by voice vote
Agreed to in the Senate with
amendments on 3/13/2019
(Yeas and Nays 54-46,
Record Vote Number 48)
Passed in the House on
04/04/2019 (Yeas and Nays
247-175, Roll no. 153)
Vetoed by President on
04/16/2019
Failed of passage in Senate
over veto on 05/02/2019
(Yeas and Nays 53-45,
Record Vote Number 94)
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.J.Res. 37
Representative Ro Khanna (DCA)
Would have directed the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed
Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not
later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint
resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date),
and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces has been enacted.
For purposes of the resolutions’ directive section, the term “hostilities” included
in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the
ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would have stated that nothing in the resolution
shall have been construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.
Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and
the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional
humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen;
and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces
abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi
Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.
As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the
115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 3 below).
Amended during House consideration on 02/13/2019 to include H.Amdt. 41
stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to “influence or
disrupt” Yemen-related intelligence collection, analysis, or sharing deemed
necessary by the President and H.Amdt. 42 regarding anti-Semitism.
Introduced 01/30/2019
Reported by the Committee
on Foreign Affairs on
02/08/2019 (H.Rept. 116-7)
Considered under the
provisions of rule H.Res. 122
on 02/13/2019
H.Amdt. 41 agreed to on
02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays
252-177, Roll no. 81)
H.Amdt. 42 agreed to on
02/13/2019 by voice vote
Passed in the House on
02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays
248-177, 1 Present, Roll no.
83)
H.J.Res 56
Representative Justin Amash
(R-MI)
Would have directed the President to terminate the use of the United States
Armed Forces with respect to the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in the
Republic of Yemen not later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on
the date of the enactment of the joint resolution unless and until a declaration of
war or specific authorization for such use of the Armed Forces had been enacted
into law.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Affairs on 04/10/2019
H.Con.Res. 50
Representative Will Hurd (RTX)
Would have condemned human rights violations, violence against civilians, and
cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Affairs on 07/17/2019
CRS-36
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Con.Res. 21
Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)
Would have condemned human rights violations, violence against civilians, and
cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/27/2019
S.Res. 169
Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR)
Would have requested a statement under Section 502B(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the
Government of Saudi Arabia, specifically regarding measures the Government of
Saudi Arabia is taking to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and to reduce
the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military
operations of that Government in Yemen.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 04/11/2019
H.R. 910
Representative Ted Lieu (DCA), Representative Tom
Malinowski (D-NJ),
Representative Ted Yoho (RFL)
Would have prohibited the use of federal funds to provide for in-flight refueling
of Saudi or Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing
coalition intervention in Yemen.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee
on Armed Services on
01/30/2019
S. 398
Senator Robert Menendez (DNJ)
Would have revised and reintroduced provisions of S. 3652 from the 115th
Congress (see below)
The bill would have required additional reporting on Russia’s activities and
objectives in Yemen; the parties’ implementation of the Stockholm Agreement;
and U.S. in-flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United
States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen between
March 2015 and November 11, 2018. Also would have added emergency
protections under U.S. law for Yemeni cultural property.
Introduced and referred to
Committee on Foreign
Relations on 02/07/2019
Reported by Committee on
Foreign Relations and placed
on Senate Legislative
Calendar under General
Orders, Calendar No. 167
on 07/30/2019
CRS-37
Bill Number
S. 2066
CRS-38
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Senator James Risch (R-ID),
Senator Jeanne Shaheen (DNH), Senator Marco Rubio
(R-FL), and Senator Chris
Coons (D-DE)
To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes. Would have
required regular briefings on ending the war in Yemen from the Secretary of
State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National
Intelligence. Would have required reporting on actions by Iranian individuals with
regard to Yemen and related sanctions actions. Would have required reporting
on the causes and consequences of civilian harm occurring in the armed conflict
in Yemen, including war crimes and gross violations of human rights, as a result of
the actions of all parties involved in hostilities in Yemen. Would have required
reporting on illicit arms shipments to Yemen and U.S. and other interdiction
efforts. Would have directed the President, subject to humanitarian exceptions
and waiver authority, to enact sanctions against persons hindering humanitarian
access and threatening the peace or stability of Yemen. Would have directed the
President to impose sanctions on entities providing material and financial support
to the Houthis if the President is unable to certify that the Houthis have “engaged
meaningfully” with U.N.-led peace efforts. Would have authorized joint defense
research and development efforts with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates to protect against unmanned aerial systems. Would have authorized
technical assistance to the Central Bank of Yemen. Would have expanded
protections for Yemeni cultural property. Would have amended Section 1290 of
the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(Public Law 115-232) to extend certification requirements regarding Saudi Arabia
and UAE operations in Yemen.
Introduced and referred to
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 07/09/2019
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019
H.R. 648
Representative Nita Lowey
(D-NY)
Explanatory statement for Division E on State Department and Foreign
Operations states “Funds in the Act for assistance for Yemen shall be made
available for stabilization and humanitarian assistance, including for United
Nations stabilization and governance facilities.”
Statement generally was to direct the Administration to comply with the
directives, reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829
accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the
115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.
See Table 3 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced
reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an
observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents
the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the
explanatory statement.
Introduced 01/17/2019
Passed in the House on
01/23/2019 (Yeas and Nays
234-180, Roll no. 49)
Received in the Senate
01/24/2019 and placed on
Senate Legislative Calendar
under General Orders,
Calendar No. 16 on
01/28/2019
H.J.Res 31/P.L. 1166
Representative Lucille RoybalAllard (D-CA)
Explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) for Division F on State Department and
Foreign Operations directs the Administration to comply with the directives,
reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829
accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the
115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.
See Table 3 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced
reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an
observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents
the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the
explanatory statement.
Division F, Sec. 7041(l) made funds under the heading Economic Support Fund
available for stabilization assistance for Yemen.
Introduced 01/17/2019
Passed in the House on
01/24/2019 (Yeas and Nays
231-180, Roll no. 51)
Conference report H.Rept.
116-9 agreed to in the
Senate on 02/14/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 83-16, Record
Vote Number 26)
Became P.L. 116-6 on
02/15/2019
CRS-39
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020
H.R. 2839
Representative Nita Lowey
(D-NY)
Sec. 7041(l) would have continued prior year language permitting funds under the
heading Economic Support Fund to be made available for stabilization assistance
for Yemen.
H.Rept. 116-78 expresses Committee concern over “continued denial of
humanitarian access to populations in need in Yemen.” Requires a report within
45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID
Administrator that addresses delivery of humanitarian assistance, including access
for humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance; the capacity of Yemeni ports
to receive commercial and humanitarian goods; and the conditions required to
transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.
Introduced 05/20/2019
Reported from the
Committee on
Appropriations (H.Rept.
116-78) and placed on the
Union Calendar, Calendar
No. 54 on 05/20/2019
Incorporated into
consolidated appropriations
bill as Division D of H.R.
2740 by H.Res. 431
Passed in the House
06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays
226-203, Roll no. 367)
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020
H. R. 1865/P.L. 11694
Representative Bill Pascrell
(D-NJ)
Sec. 7041(l) of Division G (the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020) permits bilateral
economic assistance funds from this act and prior Acts to be made available for
stabilization assistance for Yemen.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the act specifies that the
agreement provides $40,000,000 for stabilization assistance for Yemen, “including
for a contribution for United Nations stabilization and governance facilities, and
to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, including women and girls.”
Introduced in House
03/25/2019
Passed/agreed to in House
10/28/2019
Passed/agreed to in Senate
11/12/2019
Became P.L. 116-94
12/20/2019
National Defense Authorization Act, 2020
H.R. 2500
CRS-40
Representatives Kildee (DMI), Speier (D-CA), Khanna
(D-CA), and Malinowski (DNJ)
House Rules Committee Amendment 285—Would have required the
DoD to report to Congress on civilian casualties caused by Saudi air strikes in
Yemen and whether the Saudi strikes would have complied with the DoD’s rules
of engagement and interpretation of international law.
Section 1270M in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
Revised version included in P.L. 116-92 as Section 1274 (see below).
Made in order as
Amendment 221 in H.Rept.
116-143
Adopted by voice vote
07/11/2019 as part of en
bloc H.Amdt. 543
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2500
Representatives Khanna (DCA), Schiff (D-CA), Smith (DWA), and Jayapal (D-WA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 339—Would have prohibited
support to and participation in the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations against
the Houthis in Yemen.
Section 1270H in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
Made in order as
Amendment 26 in H.Rept.
116-143
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as
H.Amdt. 524 (Yeas and Nays
240-185, Roll no. 450)
H.R. 2500
Representative Tulsi Gabbard
(D-HI) and Representative
Ted Lieu (D-CA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 377—Would have prohibited funds
from the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to aid Saudi Arabia or the United Arab
Emirates if such assistance could be used to conduct or continue hostilities in
Yemen.
Section 1270F in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
Made in order as
Amendment 23 in H.Rept.
116-143
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as
H.Amdt. 522 (Yeas and Nays
239-187 (Roll no. 448)
H.R. 2500
Representatives Ted Lieu (DCA), Representative David
Cicilline (D)-RI), and
Representative Tom
Malinowski (D-NJ)
House Rules Committee Amendment 418—Prohibits in-flight refueling to
non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in
Yemen for two years, or until a specific authorization has been enacted.
Section 1270N in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
Enacted as Section 1273 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 (see below).
Made in order as
Amendment 256 in H.Rept.
116-143
Adopted by voice vote
07/11/2019 as part of en
bloc H.Amdt. 544
H.R. 2500
Representatives Malinowski
(D-NJ), Cicilline (D-RI), Lieu
(D-CA), Khanna (D-CA),
Omar (D-MN), Trone (DMD), Engel (D-NY), and Smith
(D-WA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 473—Would have provided for a
one-year prohibition on the sale of air-to-ground munitions used in the conflict in
Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while
providing an exemption for any export or license suspensions that would incur a
cost to the United States Government.
Section 1099X in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
Made in order as
Amendment 438 in H.Rept.
116-143
Agreed to 07/12/2019 as
H.Amdt. 561 (Yeas and Nays
236-182, Roll no. 470)
CRS-41
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S. 1790/P.L. 116-92
Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)
Section 1288 of S.1790 as reported to the Senate would have required regular
reporting from the Secretary of Defense detailing the expenses incurred by the
United States in providing in-flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led
coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in
Yemen during the period of March 1, 2015, through November 11, 2018, and the
extent to which such expenses have been reimbursed by members of the Saudiled coalition.
As enacted, P.L. 116-92 includes:
Section 1273, which prohibits in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that
engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen for a two-year period
following the enactment of this act, “unless and until a declaration of war or a
specific statutory authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has
been enacted.” (Originally passed by House as Amendment 256 in H.Rept. 116143.)
Section 1274 requires reports from the Secretary of Defense on civilian casualties
caused by the Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen, not later than 90 days after
the enactment of this act and thereafter annually for two years. (Revised version
of Amendment 221 in H.Rept. 116-143.)
Section 1275 requires monthly reports on expenses incurred for in-flight
refueling of Saudi coalition aircraft conducting missions relating to civil war in
Yemen from March 2015 to November 2018, and the extent to which such
expenses have been reimbursed. (Section 1288 in original Senate-passed version
of S.1790.)
Introduced 06/11/2019
Reported by Committee on
Armed Services 06/11/2019
(S.Rept. 116-48)
Agreed to in the Senate with
amendments on 6/27/2019
(Yeas and Nays 86-8, Record
Vote Number 188)
Amended in House under
unanimous consent to strike
text of Senate-passed bill and
substitute text of H.R.2500
as previously passed by the
House. Agreed to in House
09/17/2019
Conference report H.Rept.
116-333 filed 12/09/2019
Conference report agreed
to in the House, 12/11/2019
Conference report agreed
to in the Senate, 12/17/2019
Became P.L. 116-92,
12/20/2019
CRS-42
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020
H.R. 2968
CRS-43
Representative Peter J.
Visclosky (D-IN)
Title X incorporated language from S.J.Res. 7/H.J.Res. 37 that would have
directed the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the
Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress, with rules of
construction regarding continued military operations and cooperation with Israel,
regarding intelligence sharing, and regarding no authorization for the use of
military force. Would have required a report on increased risk of terrorist
attacks to United States Armed Forces abroad, allies and the continental United
States if Saudi Arabia ceases Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United
States.
This provision was not included in final FY2020 Defense Appropriations Act
(Division A of P.L. 116-93). Joint explanatory statement for that act states that
“the language contained in the House and Senate reports warrant full compliance
and carry the same weight as language included in this explanatory statement
unless specifically addressed to the contrary in the bill or this explanatory
statement.”
The House Appropriations Committee report on its version of the bill directed
the Secretary of Defense to update the report required by H.Rept. 115-769
under the heading “Report on U.S. Defense Assistance to Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates Coalition in Yemen’’ not later than 90 days after the
enactment of this act. The committee further expressed concern about reports
regarding allegations of torture by members of the United Arab Emirates security
forces in Yemen and urges the Secretary of Defense to consider such reporting
when making a determination on whether to prohibit assistance to units of
foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.
Reported by the House
Committee on
Appropriations (H.Rept.
116-84) and placed on the
Union Calendar, Calendar
No. 59 on 05/23/2019
Incorporated into
consolidated appropriations
bill as Division C of H.R.
2740 by H.Res. 431.
Passed in the House
06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays
226-203, Roll no. 367)
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021
H.R. 7608
Representative Nita Lowey
(D-NY)
Sec. 7041(l) would have stated that certain economic support and humanitarian
assistance funds made available by the act and previous acts shall be made
available for global health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.
H.Rept. 116-444 expresses Committee concern over “continued denial of
humanitarian access to populations in need in Yemen,” “recognizes the urgent
demining need in Yemen,” and “directs the Secretary of State to conduct an
assessment of the humanitarian demining needs and requirements.”
The report on the bill requires a report within 45 days of enactment from the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator that addresses
delivery of humanitarian assistance, including access for humanitarian
organizations to deliver assistance; the capacity of Yemeni ports to receive
commercial and humanitarian goods; and the conditions required to transition
from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.
Introduced 07/13/2020
Reported from the
Committee on
Appropriations (H.Rept.
116-444) on 07/13/2020
Passed in the House
07/24/2020 (Yeas and Nays
224-189, Roll no. 166)
H.R. 7608
Representatives Malinowski
(D-NJ), Lieu (D-CA), Khanna
(D-CA), Cicilline (D-RI),
Dingell (D-MI), Sherman (DCA), and Deutch (D-FL)
House Rules Committee Amendment 58—Would have prohibited the use
of funds made available by the act “by the Department of State to carry out the
sale, transfer, or authorization for the transfer” of certain U.S. defense articles
and services to the governments of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.
The articles and services in question related to certain air-to-ground munitions
and related functions referenced in specific sections of the U.S. Munitions List (22
CFR 121).
The provision was adopted by the House but it was not included in the final
version of the act, Division K of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260.
Made in order as
Amendment 18 in H.Rept.
116-459.
Agreed to 07/23/2020 as
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 851
(Yeas and Nays 223-194,
Roll no. 160)
CRS-44
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
H.R. 133/P.L. 116260
Representative Henry Cuellar
(D-TX)
Sec. 7041(l) of Division K states that certain economic support, humanitarian
assistance, international narcotics control and law enforcement, and nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs funds made available
by the act and previous acts shall be made available for global health,
humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.
The Joint Explanatory Statement for the act “includes $37,000,000 … for health,
humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.”
Introduced in House
01/03/2019
Passed/agreed to in House
12/21/2020 (Yeas and Nays
359-53, Roll no. 251)
Passed/agreed to in Senate
12/21/2020 (Yeas and Nays
92-6, Record Vote Number
289)
Became P.L. 116-260,
12/27/2020
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
H.R. 6395
CRS-45
Representative Adam Smith
(D-WA)
Section 1271 (HASC Reported) - Would have prohibited the use of funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by the act to provide
United States logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition’s operations against the
Houthis in Yemen for coalition strikes, specifically by providing maintenance or
transferring spare parts to coalition members flying warplanes engaged in antiHouthi bombings for coalition strikes.
Further would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available for any civilian or military personnel of the Department
of Defense or contractors of the Department to command, coordinate,
participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military
forces of the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition forces engaged in
hostilities against the Houthis in Yemen or in situations in which there exists an
imminent threat that such coalition forces become engaged in such hostilities,
unless and until the President has obtained specific statutory authorization, in
accordance with Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)).
Section 1272 in House-passed version of H.R. 6395.
Reported 07/09/2020
Engrossed in the House on
07/21/2020
Not included in conference
report H.Rept. 116-617
The House receded during
conferee consideration of
H.R. 6395
Not included in conference
report H.Rept. 116-617
H.R. 6395
CRS-46
Representative Ro Khanna (DCA)
House Rules Committee Amendment 459—Requires the Comptroller
General of the United States to submit to Congress a report on U.S. military
support for the Saudi-led coalition’s war against the Houthis in Yemen, not later
than one year after enactment.
Section 1271 in House-passed version of H.R. 6395.
As amended, enacted as Section 1296 of P.L. 116-283.
Made in order as
Amendment 21 in H.Rept.
116-457
Adopted as part of en bloc
H.Amdt. 841 (Yeas and Nays
336-71, Roll no. 143)
During conference
committee consideration,
the Senate receded with an
amendment that modified
the elements required by the
report
As amended, enacted as
Section 1296 of P.L. 116-283
Passed Senate over veto
01/01/2021 (Yeas and Nays
81-13, Record Vote Number
292)
H.R. 6395
H.R. 6395
Representative Ted Lieu (CAD), Representative Ted Yoho
(FL-R), and Representative
Tom Malinowski (NJ-D)
Representatives Malinowski
(NJ-D), McGovern (MA-D),
Lieu (CA-D), Bera (CA-D),
Sherman (CA-D), Deutch (FLD), Cicilline (RI-D), Khanna
(CA-D), Allred (TX-D),
Spanberger (VA-D), and
Dingell (MI-D)
House Rules Committee Amendment 509—Requires the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and th
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