Taiwan: Issues for Congress

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Summary

Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), is an island democracy of 23

million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. It is the United States’

tenth-largest trading partner. Since January 1, 1979, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has been

unofficial, a consequence of the Carter Administration’s decision to establish diplomatic relations

with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and break formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled

Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22

U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for the unofficial U.S.Taiwan relationship. It also includes commitments related to Taiwan’s security.

The PRC considers unofficiality in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to be the basis for the U.S.-PRC

relationship. Some Members of Congress have urged the executive branch to re-visit rules

intended to distinguish the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship from official U.S. relationships

with diplomatic partners, in order to accord Taiwan greater dignity and respect.

The PRC continues to threaten the use of force to bring about Taiwan’s unification with mainland

China. Beijing codified that threat in 2005, in the form of an Anti-Secession Law. The United

States terminated its Treaty of Mutual Defense with Taiwan as of January 1, 1980, but on the

basis of the Taiwan Relations Act, it has remained involved in supporting Taiwan’s military.

Initially, support was focused on arms sales, which Taiwan Relations Act calls for “to enable

Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Starting in 1997, the security relationship

broadened to include dialogues, training and military education opportunities for Taiwan military

personnel, and support for other “non-hardware aspects of military capability.”

After eight years of relative stability in the cross-Strait relationship during the administration of

former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), tensions between Taiwan and the PRC

leadership have risen under current President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive

Party (DPP). The main point of disagreement is the long-standing issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Beijing insists that President Tsai commit to the notion that Taiwan and mainland China are parts

of “one China.” President Tsai has been unwilling to make such a commitment.

Since President Tsai’s election in January 2016, Beijing has progressively increased pressure on

her government. Among other moves, it has established diplomatic relations with three countries

that previously recognized Taiwan, pressured host countries to force Taiwan’s unofficial

representative offices to change their names, blocked Taiwan’s participation as an observer at

international meetings, stepped up deployments of the PRC military near Taiwan, reduced the

number of mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, demanded that other countries return

Taiwan citizens accused of crimes to the PRC, rather than Taiwan, and, for the first time, tried a

Taiwan activist on charges of attempted subversion of the PRC state. Questions for Congress

include whether the U.S. government should seek to support Taiwan in the face of mounting

pressure from the PRC, and if so, how to balance such support with the U.S. interest in peace and

stability across the Taiwan Strait and the desire for constructive relations with the PRC

The 115th Congress passed FY2017 appropriations legislation (P.L. 115-31) to fund the American

Institute in Taiwan, through which the United States conducts relations with Taiwan. FY2018

appropriations legislation (H.R. 3354 and S. 1780) is pending. Other pending legislation includes

the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R. 2810 and S. 1519), the Taiwan

Security Act of 2017 (S. 1620), the Strengthening Security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Act (H.R.

2621), the Taiwan Travel Act (S. 1051 and H.R. 535), a bill “To direct the Secretary of State to

regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization” (H.R. 3320), and a resolution

calling for negotiations to enter into a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan (H.Res. 271).

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Taiwan’s History .............................................................................................................................. 2

Nomenclature .................................................................................................................................. 4

Taiwan’s Government Structure ...................................................................................................... 5

Taiwan’s Top Leaders ...................................................................................................................... 5

U.S.-Taiwan Relations ..................................................................................................................... 7

Long-Standing U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan ............................................................. 7

The Three Joint Communiqués with the PRC .................................................................... 8

The Taiwan Relations Act ................................................................................................... 9

“The Six Assurances” to Taiwan ....................................................................................... 10

The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review .......................................................................................11

President Bill Clinton’s “Three No’s” (1998) ................................................................... 12

U.S. Policy Statements on Taiwan .......................................................................................... 12

Trump Administration Policy Toward Taiwan ........................................................................ 13

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) ................................................................................. 15

Status of AIT Personnel .................................................................................................... 16

AIT Budget ....................................................................................................................... 16

Taiwan’s Representative Office in the United States .............................................................. 17

Taiwan and the Twin Oaks Estate in Washington, DC ............................................................ 18

Interactions Between U.S. and Taiwan Officials..................................................................... 19

Cabinet-Level U.S. Government Travel to Taiwan ........................................................... 21

Travel by Taiwan Leaders and Senior Officials to the United States ................................ 21

U.S. Security Cooperation with Taiwan .................................................................................. 23

Dialogues .......................................................................................................................... 25

Training ............................................................................................................................. 26

Legislative Proposals for U.S.-Taiwan Port Calls ............................................................. 26

Legislative Proposals for Taiwan’s Inclusion in Multilateral Military

Training Activities ......................................................................................................... 28

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan ...................................................................................................... 29

U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan Arms Sales ........................................................... 29

The Trump Administration and Taiwan Arms Sales ......................................................... 30

“Regularity” of Taiwan Arms Sales .................................................................................. 31

Competing Assessments of Taiwan’s Defense Needs ....................................................... 32

Taiwan’s Non-NATO Ally Status ...................................................................................... 34

PRC Objections to Taiwan Arms Sales ............................................................................. 34

Cooperation to Address Global Challenges ............................................................................ 35

U.S.-Taiwan Commercial Ties ................................................................................................ 36

Visa Waiver ............................................................................................................................. 37

Cross-Strait Relations .................................................................................................................... 38

The PRC Position on Taiwan .................................................................................................. 38

The “One-China Principle” and the “1992 Consensus” .................................................... 38

Peaceful Reunification and “One Country, Two Systems” ............................................... 39

The 2005 PRC Anti-Secession Law and the Threat of Use of Force ................................ 40

PRC Discourse on Taiwan Independence ......................................................................... 41

Key Statements by Top PRC leaders ................................................................................ 41

Taiwan’s President Tsai and “One China”............................................................................... 42

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Taiwan’s KMT Opposition Party and “One China” ................................................................ 44

The U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Relations ........................................................................... 45

PRC Actions to Pressure Taiwan to Endorse “One China” ..................................................... 45

Cross-Strait Economic Ties ..................................................................................................... 48

Taiwan’s Democracy ..................................................................................................................... 49

Taiwan’s Economy ........................................................................................................................ 50

Taiwan’s Engagement with the World ........................................................................................... 53

Diplomatic Partners ................................................................................................................. 53

Taiwan Representative Offices Abroad ................................................................................... 54

North Korea ............................................................................................................................. 55

Participation in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS ............................................................. 55

Taiwan in International Organizations .................................................................................... 56

The United Nations and Its Specialized Agencies ............................................................ 56

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ................................................................... 60

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) ............................................... 61

Taiwan’s Security .......................................................................................................................... 62

Taiwan’s Defense Budget ........................................................................................................ 63

Maritime Disputes ......................................................................................................................... 64

The East China Sea ................................................................................................................. 64

The South China Sea ............................................................................................................... 65

Legislation in the 115th Congress Related to Taiwan..................................................................... 67

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Taiwan ................................................................................................................. 4

Figure 2. Taiwan Real GDP Growth: 2010-2017 .......................................................................... 51

Figure 3. Annual Growth of Taiwan’s Merchandise Trade: 2010-July 2017*............................... 52

Figure 4. The ROC’s “11-Dash Line” in the South China Sea ...................................................... 65

Tables

Table 1. Key AIT Personnel .......................................................................................................... 16

Table 2. Key CCNAA/TECRO Personnel ..................................................................................... 17

Table 3. U.S. Cabinet-Level Visitors to Taiwan 1978-Present ...................................................... 21

Table 4. President Tsai’s Transit Visits Through the United States ............................................... 23

Table 5. Notifications of Proposed Major Arms Sales to Taiwan 2007-2017 ............................... 32

Table 6. Legislation on Taiwan Enacted into Law in the 115th Congress ...................................... 67

Table 7. Provisions in the Pending National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R.

2810) Related to Taiwan............................................................................................................. 68

Table 8. Other Pending Legislation in the 115th Congress Related to Taiwan ............................... 70

Table B-1. Major Arms Sales to Taiwan, 2000-2017 .................................................................... 75

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Appendixes

Appendix A. The Six Assurances .................................................................................................. 73

Appendix B. Major Arms Sales to Taiwan .................................................................................... 75

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 78

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Introduction

Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), is an island democracy of 23

million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China and north of the Philippines.

Since January 1, 1979, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has been unofficial, a consequence of

the Carter Administration’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic

of China (PRC) and break formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC

claims sovereignty. At the time, both the PRC and the ROC insisted that the United States could

have diplomatic relations with only one of them. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22

U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for the unofficial U.S.Taiwan relationship. It also includes commitments related to Taiwan’s security.

Long-standing issues for U.S. policy, including for Congress, include how to balance support for

Taiwan’s democracy, prosperity, and security with the U.S. interest in peace and stability across

the Taiwan Strait and the desire for constructive relations with the PRC, whose global influence

continues to grow. Congress has shown a strong interest in executive branch implementation of

the Taiwan Relations Act, including executive branch decisions related to arms sales to Taiwan,

which are called for by the Taiwan Relations Act, and other security-related support for Taiwan.

Over the decades since 1979, many Members have pressed the executive branch to ease selfimposed U.S. restrictions on contacts with Taiwan officials and representatives, which they

consider to be inappropriate for a former treaty ally that has evolved to become a flourishing

democracy, the United States’ tenth-largest merchandise trading partner, and its second largest

customer for Foreign Military Sales. Congress has also shown a strong interest in helping Taiwan

break out of the international isolation imposed on it by the PRC, by, for example, supporting

Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations.

Before his inauguration, President Donald J. Trump had signaled that he might seek a closer

relationship with Taiwan than his immediate predecessors. On December 2, 2016, then-Presidentelect Trump spoke by telephone with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, making him the first

incoming or incumbent U.S. president known to speak with a Taiwan president during the era of

unofficial relations.1 In a December 11, 2016, Fox News interview, President-elect Trump

appeared to question the U.S. “one-China” policy, under which the United States recognizes the

PRC as “the sole legal Government of China” and maintains only unofficial relations with

Taiwan, while also honoring commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act.2 In a February 9, 2017,

telephone call with PRC President Xi Jinping, however, President Trump recommitted the United

States to its “one-China” policy.3

The United States has a strong interest in the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC. With the

landslide victory of President Tsai and her traditionally China-skeptic Democratic Progressive

Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s January 2016 elections, Taiwan’s relations with the PRC entered a new,

less stable, era. Mindful of the views of her supporters, Tsai has declined to embrace the position

that Taiwan and mainland China are both parts of “one China,” although she has not refuted it

Anne Gearan, Philip Rucker, and Simon Denyer, “Trump’s Taiwan Phone Call Was Long Planned, Say People Who

Were Involved,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-taiwanphone-call-was-weeks-in-the-planning-say-people-who-were-involved/2016/12/04/f8be4b0c-ba4e-11e6-94ac3d324840106c_story.html.

“Exclusive: Donald Trump on Cabinet Picks, Transition Process,” Fox News Sunday, December 11, 2016,

http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/12/11/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process.html.

The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” February 9, 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china.

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either. The PRC has ratcheted up pressure on her to endorse the concept, which her predecessor

from the Kuomintang (KMT) party, Ma Ying-jeou, had accepted with caveats. The PRC has

suspended communications mechanisms across the Taiwan Strait, established diplomatic relations

with three countries that previously recognized Taiwan, pressured host countries to force

Taiwan’s unofficial representative offices to change their names, blocked Taiwan’s participation

as an observer at international meetings, stepped up deployments of the PRC military near

Taiwan, reduced the number of mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, demanded that other

countries return Taiwan citizens accused of crimes to the PRC, rather than Taiwan, and, for the

first time, tried a Taiwan activist on charges of attempted subversion of the PRC state. After

Taiwan’s most significant diplomatic partner, Panama, switched recognition to the PRC in June

2017, President Tsai declared, “Coercion and threats will not bring the two sides closer. Instead,

they will drive our two peoples apart.” She said that Taiwan “will never surrender to such

intimidation.”4

Taiwan’s History5

Taiwan was originally settled by Austronesian peoples (also called “aboriginals”) about 6,000

years ago.6 Approximately 500,000 of their descendants live on Taiwan today. Dutch traders

arrived in 1623 and established a settlement on the southwest coast. The Dutch East India

Company administered most of Taiwan until 1661. The Spanish maintained settlements in

northern Taiwan from 1626 to 1642. Migration from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan continued

throughout.

In 1661, Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, led a force of more than 25,000 men from

the Chinese mainland to Taiwan. They expelled the Dutch and established a civil administration

in opposition to China’s Qing Dynasty rulers. Zheng died in 1662. His son continued the struggle

against the Qing until his death in 1681. The Qing established control over Taiwan in 1683.7

In 1895, at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan

to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan remained a Japanese colony for 50 years, until the

end of World War II. The Republic of China, which was founded on January 1, 1912 on mainland

China and led by the Kuomintang Party (KMT), assumed control of Taiwan on October 25, 1945,

also known as “Retrocession Day.” In February 1947, residents of Taiwan staged an uprising

against KMT rule. KMT forces put down the unrest by force, at the cost of as many as 28,000

lives, in what is now known as the February 28 or “2-28” Incident.8

Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Tsai’s Remarks on Termination of Diplomatic

Relations with Panama,” June 13, 2017, http://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5161.

Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,

2014; Cecilia Sun, Laura Lee-Chin and Alfred Ritter, “Democracy in Taiwan: Part One,” World Affairs, vol. 155, no. 2,

(Fall 1992), pp. 53-57, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672339.

Albert min-Shan Ko, Chung-Yu Chen, and Qiaomei Fu, et al., “Early Austronesians: Into and Out of Taiwan,” The

American Journal of Human Genetics, vol. 94, issue 3 (March 6, 2014), pp. 426-436.

Ralph C. Croizier, “Zheng Chenggong,” Encyclopedia Britannica, October 15, 2009, https://www.britannica.com/

biography/Zheng-Chenggong.

Chris Horton, “Taiwan Commemorates a Violent Nationalist Episode, 70 Years Later,” The New York Times,

February 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/26/world/asia/taiwan-1947-kuomintang.html; Nicholas D.

Kristof, “Taipei Journal: The Horror of 2-28: Taiwan Rips Open the Past,” The New York Times, April 3, 1992,

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/03/world/taipei-journal-the-horror-of-2-28-taiwan-rips-open-the-past.html.

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In December 1949, after losing a civil war on mainland China to the forces of the Communist

Party of China (CPC), the KMT moved the seat of the ROC across the Taiwan Strait to Taipei,

Taiwan. An estimated 1.5 million to 2 million Chinese fled with the KMT to Taiwan. Families

whose forebears arrived in Taiwan with the KMT in the 1940s are known in Taiwan today as

“mainlanders.” Ethnic Chinese whose forebears lived on the island before the arrival of the KMT

are known as “Taiwanese.”

On Taiwan, the KMT administered decades of authoritarian one-party rule. In May 1948, while

still based on mainland China, the ROC National Assembly adopted “Temporary Provisions

Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist

Rebellion,” suspending many of the freedoms outlined in the ROC constitution. The National

Assembly imposed martial law on Taiwan on May 20, 1949. Martial law remained in effect for 38

years, until July 15, 1987, when President Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted it in the last year of his life.

The move ended military censorship and the trial of citizens by military courts and opened the

way for political liberalization. Taiwan legalized the formation of political parties in 1989 with

passage of the Law on the Organization of Civic Groups. The DPP, founded in September 1986

with strong support from native Taiwanese, claims credit for a major role in “toppling the KMT’s

one-party dictatorship.”9 The National Assembly formally cancelled the “Temporary Provisions”

in 1991.

Taiwan held its first direct election for the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, in December

1992. It held its first presidential election in 1996. Chen Shui-bian of the DPP was Taiwan’s first

non-KMT president, serving two terms from 2000-2008. Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT served two

terms from 2008 to 2016.Taiwan presidents are limited to two four-year terms. In January 2016

elections, the DPP won both the presidency and, for the first time, control of the legislature. The

DPP describes itself as “the party of democracy, freedom, human rights, and a strong Taiwanese

identity,” the latter in contrast to the KMT, with its roots in mainland China.10

Long after the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT continued to vow to re-take mainland China. In 1971,

however, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s

representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,” and

expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-President.11 (See “The United

Nations and Its Specialized Agencies,” below.) Since canceling the related “Temporary

Provisions” in 1991, the ROC government has claimed “effective jurisdiction” only over Taiwan,

the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen (also known as Quemoy), and Mazu (also known as Matsu),

and a number of smaller islands. ROC sovereignty claims also include disputed islands in the East

China Sea and South China Sea.

Democratic Progressive Party, “Welcome to the DPP: About Our Party,” accessed on May 23, 2016,

http://english.dpp.org.tw/about-the-dpp/.

Ibid.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s

Republic of China in the United Nations,” October 25, 1971, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/

GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Map of Taiwan

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map and information generated by (name redacted) using data from National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (2017); Department of State (2017); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).

Nomenclature

Nomenclature for Taiwan is highly contested. The government of Taiwan officially calls itself the

Republic of China (ROC). To distinguish the ROC from the PRC, official government websites in

Taiwan often use the name, “Republic of China (Taiwan).” Taiwan’s ruling party, the Democratic

Progressive Party, considers the “Republic of China” name to have been imposed on Taiwan by

the KMT, which assumed control of Taiwan in 1945, when the Japanese gave up their colonial

rule of the island. A revision of the DPP’s Party Charter in 1991 called for the establishment of a

“Republic of Taiwan.” President Tsai, however, regularly uses the name, “Republic of China.”

The PRC maintains that the ROC ceased to exist when the PRC was established. Beijing refers to

the government of Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities,” and to the President of Taiwan as “the

leader of the Taiwan authorities.” Beijing has effectively blocked Taiwan from using the ROC

name internationally. In the World Trade Organization, Taiwan is the “Separate Customs Territory

of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” also known as “Chinese Taipei.” In many other

international fora, Taiwan is “Chinese Taipei.”

U.S. executive branch policy is to use the name “Taiwan” instead of “Republic of China” or

“Republic of China on Taiwan”; to refer to Taiwan as an “area” or “economy,” rather than a

“country”; and to refer to the “Taiwan authorities,” rather than to the Taiwan “government.”12 The

U.S. Department of State, “Guidelines on Contacts with Taiwan,” unclassified memorandum to diplomatic and

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

U.S. Congress’ most significant legislation related to Taiwan, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act,

refers to Taiwan’s government as, “the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United

States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.” Multiple pieces of legislation since

then, however, have referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of China” or the “Republic of China on

Taiwan.” In recent years, legislation has increasingly referred to Taiwan simply as “Taiwan.”13

The Legislative Branch is not subject to executive branch rules on how to refer to Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Government Structure

Taiwan’s central government consists of the Office of the President and five government

branches, known as “yuan.” The president serves as head of state and commander of the armed

forces. Descriptions of the five yuan follow.



The Executive Yuan, headed by a premier appointed by the President, is

Taiwan’s cabinet. Members include the vice premier, ministers, chairpersons of

commissions, and ministers without portfolio.

The Legislative Yuan is Taiwan’s unicameral parliament, with 113 members, all

elected for four-year-terms with no term limits. In the January 2016 election, the

DPP won 68 seats, ending the KMT’s previously unbroken control of the body.

The KMT won 35 seats, the New Power Party five seats, the People’s First Party

(PFP) 3 seats, the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) 1 seat, and an

independent candidate who caucuses with the DPP 1 seat.14

The Judicial Yuan oversees Taiwan’s judiciary.

The Examination Yuan administers Taiwan’s civil service system, including

standards for employment, salaries, and benefits.

The Control Yuan, which includes the National Audit Office, monitors

government expenditures and investigates allegations of wrongdoing by public

servants or agencies.15

An ongoing debate in Taiwan about constitutional reform includes discussion of whether Taiwan

should abolish the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan, whose functions are often portrayed

as relatively narrow.

Taiwan’s Top Leaders

Taiwan’s top leaders are listed below, with their family names preceding their given names.

President Tsai Ing-wen, 61, took office on May 20, 2016. In the January 2016 elections, she won

56% of the vote in a three-way race. Her inauguration marked the third transfer of presidential

(...continued)

consular posts, October 7, 2013.

In the 115th Congress, S. 1620, The Taiwan Security Act of 2017, for example, would direct the Secretary of Defense

to permit the U.S. Pacific Command to receive port calls by “the navy of the Republic of China.” The bill includes an

additional 33 references to “Taiwan.”

Alison Hsiao, “Elections: DPP to Control Legislative Yuan,” Taipei Times, January 17, 2016,

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/01/17/2003637414.

Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Government,” The Republic of China Yearbook 2016,

http://english.ey.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=8A84304601DEC81E.

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power from one party to another through a peaceful electoral process since Taiwan began holding

direct presidential elections in 1996. She serves concurrently as chair of the DPP.

President Tsai was born in 1956, trained as a lawyer in Taiwan, earned a master’s degree in law

from Cornell University in 1980 and a Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics and

Political Science in 1984, with a specialization in international trade law and competition law.

She served as a law professor at universities in Taiwan from 1984 to 2000.

Tsai began her public service career while still teaching law. From 1992 to 2000, she served as

Chief Legal Advisor to Taiwan’s negotiating team for its bid to join the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor organization to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Taiwan gained WTO membership in 2002. From 1994 to 1998, she also served as Senior Advisor

to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, and from 1999 to 2000 as a Senior Advisor to President

Lee Teng-hui’s National Security Council.

Transitioning to full-time government service, Tsai served as Chair of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs

Council under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2004. Tsai joined the Democratic

Progressive Party (DPP) in 2004 and won election to Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan,

where she served from 2004 to 2006. She served as Vice Premier under President Chen from

2006-2007. Tsai first won election to be chair of the DPP from 2008 to 2012, and regained the

chairmanship in 2014. She is Taiwan’s first female president and also, according to her official

biography, “the first female head of state in Asia who was not born into a political family.” Her

family ran an auto repair shop.16

Public support for Tsai appears to have fallen off sharply since her inauguration. In August 2017,

the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation’s monthly public opinion poll found 29.8% of

respondents approved of her leadership, the lowest percentage of her time in office so far.

Respondents were particularly critical of her handling of judicial reforms and a major

infrastructure development project.17

Vice President Chen Chien-jen, 66, is a noted epidemiologist who received a Doctor of Science

degree in epidemiology and human genetics from Johns Hopkins University in 1982. Vice

President Chen’s prior public service includes positions as Minister of the National Science

Council (2006-2008), Minister of Health (2003-2005), a post he took over at the height of the

2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak on the island, and Vice President of

Academica Sinica, Taiwan’s most prestigious research institution (2011-2016). In his official

biography, Chen describes himself as a devout Catholic who has had audiences with Pope John

Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI, and Pope Francis.18 Chen is a political independent.

Premier Lai Ching-te (William Lai), 57, trained as a physician and holds a master’s degree in

public health from Harvard University. Often described as a political rival of President Tsai, he

served 11 years as a DPP legislator and a subsequent seven years, from 2010 to 2017, as mayor of

the city of Tainan before Tsai appointed him premier on September 5, 2017. Questioned about the

relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in his first appearance before the

Legislative Yuan, Lai set off a political firestorm by stating, “We are a sovereign independent

country. Our name is the Republic of China. The two sides of the Strait are not subordinate to

Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Tsai,” http://english.president.gov.tw/Page/40,

accessed October 3, 2017.

Sophia Yeh and Elizabeth Hsu, “President’s Rating Hits New Low, Taipei Mayor Liked by 70%: Poll,” Focus

Taiwan, August 14, 2017, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201708140021.aspx.

Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Vice President Chen,” http://english.president.gov.tw/Page/41.

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each other. That is the real relationship at present.” Lai is President Tsai’s second premier. His

predecessor, Lin Chuan, a political independent, resigned on September 4, 2017.

Legislative Yuan Speaker Su Jia-chyuan, 60, is the first non-KMT member to serve as Speaker

of Taiwan’s parliament. He was previously the DPP’s Secretary-General. Su served earlier in his

career as Chairman of Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture, Minister of the Interior, and as a

legislator from Pingtung County for two terms, from 1992 to 1997.

U.S.-Taiwan Relations

The United States terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan on January 1, 1979, and

established diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the time, both Taiwan and the PRC insisted that

countries could only have relations with one of them, not both. Since the break in diplomatic

relations, the United States has maintained a highly unusual relationship with Taiwan, one that is

extensive and vibrant but also officially “unofficial” and low profile. With no precedent for such a

relationship with a security partner and major trading partner, U.S. policymakers have long

improvised rules for how the unofficial relationship with Taiwan should differ from the official

relationships that the United States maintains with diplomatic partners. Those rules, which are not

negotiated with Beijing, have evolved over time.

In its management of Taiwan policy, the executive branch has sought to assure the PRC that the

United States is upholding its commitments to the PRC and is not conferring “officiality” on the

U.S.-Taiwan relationship. At the same time, it has sought to demonstrate to Taiwan and Taiwan’s

supporters in the United States that it is honoring the Taiwan Relations Act, which includes

security commitments related to Taiwan. The executive branch has also sought to portray itself as

responsive to calls from Members of Congress and others for the United States to accord Taiwan

the dignity and respect that many believe Taiwan deserves for its democratic and economic

achievements.

A core goal of U.S. policy has been the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,

seeing it as central to the security of Asia. To achieve that goal, the United States has long

opposed unilateral changes in the status quo by either the PRC or Taiwan. Since 1998, U.S.

officials have explicitly stated that the United States does not support Taiwan independence,

though they do not say that the United States opposes it.

Long-Standing U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan20

A series of U.S. commitments related to Taiwan underpin the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The

executive branch’s shorthand for those commitments, in the words of a senior Trump

“賴清德：不會另行宣布台灣獨立” (Lai Ching-te: Will Not Separately Declare Taiwan Independence), CNA,

http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201709265011-1.aspx. CRS translation. Some English-language reports

inaccurately translated his words more provocatively, as “The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are independent of each

other, with Taiwan being an independent sovereign state carrying the designation the ‘Republic of China.’” Chen

Chun-hua, Justin Su, and Y.F. Low, “Premier Says His Stance on Taiwan, China Not Contradictory,” CNA via Focus

Taiwan, September 26, 2017, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201709260018.aspx; Lu Hsin-hui, Yeh Su-ping, and Flor

Wang, “Constitutional Reform a Bottom-Up Task: President Tsai,” CNA via Focus Taiwan, October 2, 2017,

http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201710020007.aspx.

For a detailed analysis of the key documents that underpin the U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China relationships, see

Richard C. Bush, “The ‘Sacred Texts’ of United States-China-Taiwan Relations,” in At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan

Relations Since 1942 (M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 124-178.

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Administration official, is that the United States adheres to “our one-China policy that’s based on

the three joint communiqués with China, as well as the Taiwan Relations Act.”21

The Three Joint Communiqués with the PRC

The United States concluded joint communiqués with the PRC in 1972, 1978, and 1982, all with

key provisions related to Taiwan. The first two communiqués paved the way for the establishment

of diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979. As executive

decrees, the three joint communiqués do not have the force of law.



In a 1972 joint communiqué, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, the Nixon

Administration declared that the United States “acknowledges that all Chinese on

either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is

a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”

It added that the United States, “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of

the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”22

In a 1978 joint communiqué on the establishment of U.S.-PRC diplomatic

relations, the Carter Administration stated that the United States “recognizes the

People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” The

Administration reserved the right to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan by

stating, “Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain

cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”

Revising the language in the Shanghai Communiqué, the 1978 communiqué also

states that, “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the

Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”23

The 1982 joint communiqué begins with a summary of the 1978 joint

communiqué, stating that in that document, the United States “recognized the

Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of

China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and

Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people

of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other

unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” The heart of the 1982 joint

communiqué is commitments related to arms sales to Taiwan. The communiqué

states that, “the United States Government understands and appreciates the

Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.” In

that context, the communiqué states that the United States “does not seek to carry

out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will

not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those

supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between

The White House, “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Visit of President Xi Jinping of

the People’s Republic of China,” April 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/04/backgroundbriefing-senior-administration-officials-visit-president-xi.

“U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (1972),” February 28, 1972, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/

key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1972/.

Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Normalization

Communique),” January 1, 1979 (released December 15, 1978), https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/

key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1979/.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of

arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”24

The PRC argues that by agreeing to the language in the three joint communiqués, the United

States agreed that Taiwan is a part of China, a position that the PRC’s government sees as being at

the heart of the “one China” policy that it demands of its diplomatic partners. Many U.S.

commentators, including prominent retired U.S. officials, assert that the United States

acknowledged China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, but did not commit to that being the

U.S. position, leaving the U.S. position on Taiwan’s status as part of China ambiguous.25

The Taiwan Relations Act

On April 10, 1979, 100 days after terminating diplomatic relations with Taiwan, President Carter

signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8, U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), including security

commitments that Congress added to the Carter Administration’s original draft of the

legislation.26 Key provisions of the TRA include:



Relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through the American Institute in

Taiwan (AIT), a non-profit corporation.

It is U.S. policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by

other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the

peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United

States.”

It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort

to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the

social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

The United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and

defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to

maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

“The president is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the

security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any

danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and

the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes,

appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”

“Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries,

nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such

laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.”

“U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (1982),” August 17, 1982, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/keyu-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1982/.

See, for example, Richard C. Bush, “A One-China Policy Primer,” Brookings Institution, March 2017. Bush, a

former AIT Chairman, writes that, “By only acknowledging ‘the Chinese position,’ the United States did not adopt [it]

as its own.” See also remarks by former State Department Office of Republic of China Affairs Director Harvey

Feldman: “In fact, officially, the U.S. has never ‘accepted’ the PRC view; we have only ‘acknowledged’ it.” Harvey

Feldman interview with Edward Dillery, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral

History Project, March 11, 1999, http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Feldman,%20Harvey.toc.pdf, p. 70.

For the full text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93Pg14.pdf.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

The Taiwan Relations Act does not require the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the

case of a potential attack from China, but leaves open the possibility that the United States might

do so, creating a policy often referred to as “strategic ambiguity.” The policy is intended to deter

the PRC from attacking Taiwan and to deter Taiwan from taking actions that might provoke a

PRC attack.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13014, issued by President Clinton on August 15, 1996, directs how the

executive branch should implement the Taiwan Relations Act. Entitled “Maintaining Unofficial

Relations with the People on Taiwan,” the executive order’s stated purpose is “to facilitate the

maintenance of commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States

and the people on Taiwan without official representation or diplomatic relations ... .”27 E.O.

13014 superseded E.O. 12143, issued by President Carter on June 22, 1979, which had the same

title and stated purpose.28 President Clinton’s E.O. 13014 delegates to the Secretary of State all

functions that the Taiwan Relations Act confers on the President, unless otherwise delegated to

other agencies or reserved to the President in the order. The E.O. authorizes the Secretary of State

to re-delegate his authority.

“The Six Assurances” to Taiwan

In 1982, a month before the release of the third joint communiqué with the PRC, President

Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s then-President Chiang Ching-kuo what have come to

be known as “the Six Assurances.” The executive branch has never made public the text of the

assurances relayed to President Chiang. Appearing before the House and Senate immediately

after the issuance of the joint communiqué with China, however, a senior Reagan Administration

official included in his prepared statements a set of assurances that corresponded to a version of

“the Six Assurances” made public by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.29 As relayed to

Congress, the assurances were:



[In negotiations with the PRC,] “ ... we did not agree to set a date certain for

ending arms sales to Taiwan”;

“ ... [W]e see no mediation role for the United States” [between Taiwan and the

PRC];

“ ... [N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations

with the PRC”;

Executive Office of the President, “Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the People on Taiwan,” E.O. 13014 of

August 15, 1996, Federal Register, August 19, 1996, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/1996/08/19/96-13014/

maintaining-unofficial-relations-with-the-people-on-taiwan.

National Archives, Executive Order 12143—Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the People on Taiwan,” June 22,

1979, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12143.html.

In 1982, with apparent U.S. acquiescence, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement that

included the following language: “On July 14, 1982, the U.S. side, through appropriate channels, made it known to the

Republic of China that the U.S. side: 1. Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China; 2.

Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese communists on arms sales to the Republic of China; 3. Will

not play any mediation role between Taipei and Peiping; 4. Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5. Has

not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; 6. Will not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter

into negotiations with the Chinese communists.” “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

China [Taiwan] Regarding the U.S.-PRC Communiqué of August 18, 1982,” in Legislative History of the Taiwan

Relations Act: An Analytic Compilation with Documents on Subsequent Developments, ed. Lester L. Wolff and David

L. Simon (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982).

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

“ ... [T]here has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of

sovereignty over Taiwan”;

“We have no plans to seek” [revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act; and]

[the August 17 Communiqué,] “should not be read to imply that we have agreed

to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.”30

Executive branch officials have generally only occasionally mentioned “the Six Assurances” in

public statements. In September 2017, however, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian

and Pacific Security Affairs David Helvey provided a summary of U.S. policy that appeared to

include the Six Assurances as a central element: “Our policy toward Taiwan is founded on the

Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the three joint U.S.-China communiques, and is guided by the

Six Assurances.”31

Congress has long sought to elevate the profile of “the Six Assurances” in the U.S.-Taiwan

relationship, with a focus on assurances that the United States did not agree to set an end date for

arms sales to Taiwan or to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.

The first time a U.S. government body publicly issued a full written text for the Six Assurances

was in the 114th Congress, in H.Con.Res. 88 and S.Con.Res. 38, both of which were passed by

their respective chambers. The concurrent resolutions affirmed the TRA and the Six Assurances

as “cornerstones of U.S.-Taiwan relations.”32

The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review

On September 27, 1994, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Winston Lord, testified to Congress on the results of a two-year-long Taiwan Policy Review.33

According to Lord’s testimony, the review concluded that “it would be a serious mistake” to

Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Policy Toward China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 13-14.

Holdridge used almost exactly the same wording in testimony before the House the next day. U.S. Congress, House

Committee on Foreign Affairs, China-Taiwan: United States Policy, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 18, 1982

(Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 6-7.

Global Taiwan Institute, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” September 14, 2017, http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASDPrepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.

As introduced, H.Con.Res. 88 included a version of the Six Assurances different from that in the final form of the

bill. In that version, “ ... the Six Assurances are guidelines to conduct relations between the United States and Taiwan

and stipulate that the United States would not—(1) set a deadline for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; (2) alter the

terms of the Taiwan Relations Act; (3) consult with China in advance before making decisions about United States

arms sales to Taiwan; (4) mediate between Taiwan and China; (5) alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan

which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure

Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; and (6) formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.... ” This

version of the Six Assurances is included as “Appendix 7: The Six Assurances to Taiwan, July 1982,” in David Dean,

Unofficial Diplomacy: The American Institute in Taiwan: A Memoir, XLibris LLC, 2014, p. 247. On page 121 of the

memoir, however, Dean, a former AIT Director and Chairman, presents the Six Assurances as being the assurances

included in the 1982 Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement. As reported out of committee, H.Con.Res. 88

rendered the Six Assurances in the form they were relayed orally to Congress in 1982. S.Con.Res. 38 did the same.

American Institute in Taiwan, “Taiwan Policy Review: Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,”

by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, September 27,

1994, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/19940927-taiwan-policy-review-by-winston-lord.html. The hearing at which Lord

testified was U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

Review of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., September 26, 1994. The hearing was recessed subject to

call. The GPO did not issue a transcript.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

introduce “what China would undoubtedly perceive as officiality in our relations with Taiwan.”

Lord said that President Clinton had, however, decided to adjust the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan’s

participation in international organizations. Henceforth, Lord testified, “Recognizing Taiwan’s

important role in transnational issues, we will support its membership in organizations where

statehood is not a prerequisite, and we will support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in

organizations where its membership is not possible.”34 That remains U.S. policy today.

The Taiwan Policy Review also led to changes in the ways that U.S. and Taiwan officials engaged

with each other, and in the name of Taiwan’s representative office. For more information about

the implications of the policy review for exchanges between U.S. and Taiwan officials, see

“Interactions Between U.S. and Taiwan Officials,” below.

President Bill Clinton’s “Three No’s” (1998)

On a visit to Shanghai in the PRC on June 30, 1998, President Bill Clinton told a roundtable of

scholars that in his meetings with Chinese leaders, “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy,

which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two China’s,’ or ‘one Taiwan, one

China,’ and we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which

statehood is a requirement.” 35 President Clinton’s statement came to be known as the U.S. “Three

No’s” policy on Taiwan. Nearly two decades later, it remains U.S. policy to state that the United

States does not support Taiwan independence. Although PRC officials sometimes inaccurately

quote U.S. officials as saying that the United States opposes Taiwan independence, U.S. policy is

for officials to state only that the United States does not support it. It also remains U.S. policy to

state that the United States does not believe Taiwan should be a member of any organization for

which statehood is a requirement.36 Executive branch statements in recent years have tended not

to repeat the second “no,” that the U.S. does not support “two China’s” or “one Taiwan, one

China.”

U.S. Policy Statements on Taiwan

In a September 13, 2017 update to the page on its website on U.S.-Taiwan Relations, the State

Department summarizes U.S. policy in these terms:

The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The 1979 U.S.P.R.C. Joint Communiqué switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the

Joint Communiqué, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s

Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese

position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint Communiqué

also stated that the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and

other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The American Institute in Taiwan

(AIT) is responsible for implementing U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

American Institute in Taiwan, “Taiwan Policy Review: Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,”

by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, September 27,

1994, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/19940927-taiwan-policy-review-by-winston-lord.html.

For discussion of the Three No’s, see Jim Mann, “Clinton 1st to OK China, Taiwan ‘3 No’s,’” Los Angeles Times,

July 9, 1998, and Stephen J. Yates, “Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan,” Heritage Foundation Executive

Memorandum #538, July 19, 1998.

U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” September 13, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

35855.htm.

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The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong, unofficial

relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to further peace

and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for the

unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S.

commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. The United States

insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to

the status quo by either side, and encourages both sides to continue their constructive

dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect.37

The Department of Defense’s 2017 annual report to Congress on China’s military summarizes

U.S. policy in this way:

The United States maintains a one China policy that is based on the three Joint

Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The United States opposes any

unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by either side and does not support

Taiwan independence. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of

cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides.38

Trump Administration Policy Toward Taiwan

Both before and after taking office, the Trump Administration has at times signaled that it might

seek to re-evaluate long-standing U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. On December 2, 2016,

President-Elect Trump spoke by telephone with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, making him the

first incoming or incumbent U.S. president known to speak with a Taiwan president during the era

of unofficial relations. In a December 11, 2016, Fox News interview, Trump stated, “I fully

understand the one-China policy. But I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China

policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”39

Shortly after taking office, in a February 9, 2017, telephone call with PRC President Xi Jinping,

however, President Trump recommitted the United States to its “one-China” policy. According to

a White House readout of the call, “President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to

honor our ‘one China’ policy.”40

Trump and Xi held a presidential summit in Florida on April 6-7, 2017. Asked in an April 28,

2017, Reuters interview about the possibility of his speaking by telephone again with President

Tsai, Trump said he “wouldn’t want to be causing difficulty right now for [President Xi]” and

would “want to speak to him first” before agreeing to speak again to President Tsai.41

Since President Trump’s inauguration, officials and the media on Taiwan have expressed concerns

that the Trump Administration may consider some sort of “grand bargain” with the PRC that

could be at odds with Taiwan’s interests. On March 8, 2017, Taiwan’s Chinese-language Liberty

U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” September 13, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

35855.htm.

Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,”

Annual Report to Congress, May 15, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/

2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF.

“Exclusive: Donald Trump on Cabinet Picks, Transition Process,” Fox News Sunday, December 11, 2016,

http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/12/11/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process.html.

The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” February 9, 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china.

Jeff Mason, Stephen J. Adler, and Steve Holland, “Exclusive: Trump Spurns Taiwan President’s Suggestion of

Another Phone Call,” Reuters, April 28, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-exclusiveidUSKBN17U05I.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Times, citing an anonymous Washington, DC-based scholar, reported that former Secretary of

State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who engineered President Nixon’s

rapprochement with China in the early 1970s, was urging President Trump to stabilize U.S.-China

relations by concluding a “fourth communiqué” with China.42 The report did not say what the

contents of such a fourth communiqué might be, and whether it might include language on

Taiwan. Taiwan’s government was sufficiently concerned about the report to reach out to the

Trump Administration with the message that, “such a development is inadvisable,” according to

Taiwan’s Foreign Minister David Tawei Lee.43

At the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3, 2017, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis

provided reassurance to Taiwan that the Trump Administration would continue to sell it arms, as

called for in the Taiwan Relations Act. “The Department of Defense remains steadfastly

committed to working with Taiwan and with its democratic government to provide in [sic] the

defense articles necessary, consistent with the obligations set out in our Taiwan Relations Act,”

Mattis pledged.44 The Trump Administration notified Congress of a suite of arms sales to Taiwan

on June 29, 2017. Mattis also promised in Singapore, “ ... we will not use our allies and partners

or our relationships with them, or the capability integral to their security as bargaining chips.”45

In testimony before the House on June 14, 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reignited

speculation about possible future shifts in U.S. policy toward Taiwan when he stated that the

Trump Administration seeks “another 50 years of stability and no conflict with China in the

Pacific region,” and said, “Taiwan is a big element of that.” His remarks were part of a longer

statement:

As we began our dialogue with Chinese leadership, with this new administration, as you

know, there was some questioning of our commitment to one China early on. The

president has reaffirmed that we are committed to the one-China policy. We are also

completely committed to the Taiwan Relations Act, and fulfilling all of our commitments

to them under that act.

But we are also in a discussion with China, now, about what is our relationship going to

be for the next 50 years. How do we enter another era of stability and absence of conflict?

And Taiwan, clearly, to the Chinese, is a part of that discussion.

So it is important, as we engage with them, that we are able to fulfill our commitments to

Taiwan, which we have every intention of doing, and that—the question is, is the One

曹郁芬 Nadia Tsao, “華府學者透露：季辛吉推動美中簽署第四公報” (“Washington Scholar Reveals: Kissinger

Pushing U.S. and China to Sign Fourth Communiqué”), Liberty Times, March 8, 2017, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/

world/breakingnews/1997392.

Ku Chuan and Evelyn Kao, “Taiwan’s Concerns Voice over Possible 4th U.S.-China Communique,” CNA via Focus

Taiwan News Channel, March 22, 2017, http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/AIPL/201703220013.aspx.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 3, 2017,

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-shangrila-dialogue/source/GovDelivery/. A senior Chinese military officer publicly chastised Mattis for not mentioning the

three joint communiqués with the PRC in his remarks in Singapore. Lieutenant General He Lei, Vice President of the

Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, stated, “If the Taiwan issue is talked about,

one should not mention the Taiwan Relations Act only. He or she should also mention the three joint communiqués

between China and the United States, thus giving a full picture of the issue.” “China Strongly Opposes U.S. Arms Sales

to Taiwan: Senior Military Officer,” Xinhua, June 3, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/03/

c_136336997.htm.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 3, 2017,

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-shangrila-dialogue/source/GovDelivery/.

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China policy sustainable for the next 50 years? And those are the kinds of discussions

we're having.

They are extremely complex in many regards. But this is what we seek—is another 50

years of stability and no conflict with China in the Pacific region. Taiwan is a big element

of that. North Korea is a big element of that. Their island building and militarization of

islands is a significant element of that.

All of these are in our discussion with them about how do we define this relationship for

the next half century, to ensure we have a continued era of no conflict and stability.46

On October 16, 2017, in an apparent effort to reassure Taiwan ahead of President Trump’s

scheduled visit to Asia the next month, including a stop in Beijing, David Helvey, Acting

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, recalled Secretary Mattis’

earlier promise not to use allies and partners as “bargaining chips.” In remarks to an audience

from Taiwan and the United States, he stated, “This includes Taiwan: we will not pursue a grand

bargain that trades U.S. interests in a secure and prosperous Taiwan.”47

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)

After terminating diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, the United States could no longer

conduct relations with Taiwan through embassies in each capital. The Taiwan Relations Act

directed that U.S. relations with Taiwan be conducted instead by a newly-created, non-profit,

private corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. That entity is known

as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). AIT comprises a Washington headquarters, based in

Arlington, VA, a Taipei “main office,” known as AIT/T, a “branch office” in Kaohsiung, known

as AIT/K, and a “virtual branch office” in Taichung. It operates under contract with the

Department of State.

AIT Washington is overseen by a six-person board of trustees, led by a board chair.48 Day-to-day

operations are led by a managing director. AIT Washington’s responsibilities include liaising with

Taiwan’s representative office in the United States and with U.S. government agencies,

supporting U.S.-Taiwan trade policy and the bilateral defense relationship, and conducting public

diplomacy.49

AIT Taipei, with a staff of over 120 Americans, nearly 300 local staff, and a few dozen family

members and contractors, performs functions similar to those of an embassy, including consular

functions. A new $240-million office compound for AIT Taipei is scheduled for completion in the

first quarter of 2018. AIT Kaohsiung has a staff of nearly 40, including over a dozen Americans.

Testimony by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The FY2018

Foreign Affairs Budget, 115th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2017, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-fy-2018foreign-affairs-budget/.

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Helvey, prepared remarks for

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, October 16, 2017, http://us-taiwan.org/reports/

2017_october16_david_helvey_dod_keynote.pdf.

The AIT board consists of the AIT Chairman; the AIT Managing Director; the State Department’s Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan; the Executive Director for the State Department’s Bureau of East

Asian and Pacific Affairs; and two retired Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). The last two slots are currently filled by

David G. Brown and Douglas Spelman.

U.S. Department of State, “FY2018 Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations,

and Related Programs,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf, p. 177.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Table 1. Key AIT Personnel

AIT Position

Incumbent

Start Date in Position

AIT Washington Chair

Amb. James F. Moriarty

October 2016

AIT Washington Managing Director

John J. Norris Jr.

September 2016

AIT Taipei Director

Kin Moy

June 2015

Source: Website of the American Institute in Taiwan, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/directors-and-chairs.html and

https://www.ait.org.tw/en/pressrelease-pr1649.html.

Status of AIT Personnel

Prior to 2003, the U.S. government required that AIT employees not be U.S. government

employees, so Foreign Service officers left government service temporarily to serve at AIT, while

defense-related positions were filled by contractors, many of them retired military personnel. The

Section 326 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-228) changed that,

authorizing the Secretary of State and the head of any other department or agency of the United

States to detail employees to work for AIT. The first active duty U.S. military personnel and

Department of Defense civilians detailed to work at AIT Taipei arrived in 2005.

Mindful of the fact that AIT Taipei is not an embassy, U.S. government personnel there have

different titles than they would have in embassies. The head of AIT Taipei, the most senior U.S.

representative in Taiwan, has the title of “Director,” rather than “Ambassador,” for example. The

senior military representative at AIT Taipei is “Chief, Liaison Affairs Section,” rather than

“Defense Attaché.”50

AIT Budget

AIT is funded by a line item in appropriations legislation for the Department of State. The line

item, designated in appropriations legislation as “Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan,” is

provided within the Administration of Foreign Affairs accounts that are funded in Title I of

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations acts.51 In FY2017,

Congress authorized a $31,963,000 payment to AIT “for necessary expenses to carry out the

Taiwan Relations Act” (P.L. 115-31).

For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested a $26,312,000 payment to AIT. This request

would constitute a reduction of approximately 18% from the FY2017 enacted figure. The

administration’s budget request states that the request “supports AIT’s core operations and the

move into the newly constructed New Office Compound scheduled for completion and

occupancy in the first quarter of FY2018. AIT will continue to meet cost savings measures by

lengthening maintenance services, gain efficiencies through operational measures and limit core

travel and training.”52

A 2016 Taiwan news article, for example, reports that, “Gene Richards, chief of the American Institute in Taiwan’s

(AIT’s) Liaison Affairs Section, accepted commemorative ‘Defending Taiwan’ medals on behalf of,” two U.S. officers

killed on Taiwan’s Kinmen Island in 1954. Amy Huang and Kay Liu, “Taiwan Awards Posthumous Medals to Two

U.S. Officers,” Focus Taiwan, February 7, 2016, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201602070018.aspx.

For example, see Division J, Title I, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31).

U.S. Department of State, “FY2018 Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations,

and Related Programs,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf, p. 178.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

H.R. 3354, which passed the House on September 14, 2017, would authorize a payment of

$30,557,000 to AIT for FY2018, representing a reduction of $1.4 million from the FY2017

enacted total. S. 1780, which was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General

Orders on September 7, 2017, would authorize a payment of $31,963,000, maintaining AIT’s

FY2018 budget at the same level as in FY2017.

Taiwan’s Representative Office in the United States

Taiwan’s principal representative office in the United States is the Taipei Economic and Cultural

Representative Office (TECRO). TECRO oversees 12 subsidiary offices around the United

States, known as Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECOs). They are located in Atlanta,

Boston, Chicago, Denver, Guam, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San

Francisco, and Seattle.53 The Taipei headquarters for the U.S. TECRO office is the Coordination

Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).54

Table 2. Key CCNAA/TECRO Personnel

Position

Incumbent

Start Date in Position

Chairperson, Coordination Council for North

American Affairs (Taipei)

Yi-Feng Tao

August 2016

Representative to the United States

Stanley Kao

June 2016

Source: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/

default.html.

Because of the unofficial nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, TECRO and TECO officers do

not hold the A-category visas that the United States issues to diplomats or foreign government

officials, but rather E-category visas, intended for “treaty trader/treaty investor” applicants.55

Under a February 4, 2013 Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions, and Immunities between AIT

and TECRO, however, TECRO employees enjoy privileges and immunities similar to those

enjoyed by diplomats from countries with which the United States has official relations.56 Such

immunities include full criminal immunity, meaning TECRO employees and their families may

not be arrested or detained. TECRO employees had previously enjoyed immunity only for official

acts.57 TECRO and TECO employees are also eligible for tax exemption privileges, similar to

those for foreign missions. Those privileges include exemption from sales tax, occupancy tax, and

other similar taxes at the point of sale.58

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., “TECRO Profile and Mission,” April 20, 2016,

http://web.roc-taiwan.org/us_en/post/18.html.

Taiwan’s representative office used the name Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) until the

1994 Taiwan Policy Review allowed Taiwan to change the office’s name to TECRO.

U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Directory of Visa Categories,” accessed August 24, 2016,

https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/general/all-visa-categories.html.

American Institute in Taiwan, “Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities Between the American

Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States,” February 4,

2013, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/ait-tecro-privileges-and-immunities-agreements.html.

Like foreign diplomats assigned to consulates within the United States, TECO employees have more limited

immunity, covering only official acts.

U.S. Department of State, “Tax Exemption Cards,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/235652.pdf.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

The Department of State’s Diplomatic Motor Vehicles Office, which is located within the Office

of Foreign Missions, provides a full range of motor vehicle services for foreign missions and their

eligible members, including the issuance of driver’s licenses and license plates.59 Prior to

December 2014, TECRO and TECO employees were required to apply to state motor vehicle

administrations for driver’s licenses and license plates. Since December 2014, however, TECRO

and TECO employees have been issued identity cards, personal tax exemption cards, driver’s

licenses, and license plates similar in appearance to those issued to diplomats, although they

differ in certain respects. Whereas diplomats’ identification cards and personal tax exemption

cards are issued in the name of the State Department, for example, TECRO and TECO

employees’ cards are issued in the name of AIT, with issuance “approved by the U.S. Department

of State.”60 License plates issued to TECRO and TECO employees and their spouses look like

those issued to diplomats, and are similarly “issued by and property of the United States

Department of State,” but have an “E” prefix, instead of the “D” prefix that appears on diplomatic

license plates or the “S” prefix that appears on the license plates of diplomatic spouses, and do

not bear the word “Diplomat.”61

Neither TECRO nor any of the TECOs is permitted to fly the Republic of China flag. Taiwan

military officers stationed at TECRO are not permitted to wear their uniforms.62

Taiwan and the Twin Oaks Estate in Washington, DC

Twin Oaks is a 26-room mansion on 18.24 acres in northwest Washington, DC. The estate served

as the residence of ROC Ambassadors to the United States from 1937 to 1978. The ROC rented

the estate for the first decade, and then purchased it in 1947 from the family of the original owner.

In December 1978, to prevent the property from being transferred to the PRC when the United

States switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, the ROC sold the estate for a

nominal fee to the Friends of Free China Association, a U.S. non-profit organization headed by

then-Senator Barry Goldwater and lawyer Thomas Corcoran. Taiwan’s representative office in the

United States bought the estate back from the non-profit in 1982. 63

Congress helped Taiwan maintain ownership of the estate after the United States terminated

diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Its most consequential action was to include in the Taiwan

Relations Act the following provision:

U.S. Department of State Office of Foreign Missions, “Diplomatic Motor Vehicle Program,” https://www.state.gov/

ofm/dmv/index.htm.

U.S. Department of State Office of Foreign Missions, “Announcing: New American Institute in Taiwan

Identification Cards to be Issued!” 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236119.pdf.

An image of a sample “E”-prefix license plate is available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/

236117.pdf.

On New Year’s Day 2015, TECRO raised the ROC flag at its Twin Oaks estate in northwest Washington, DC, for

the first time since 1978, and conferred honors on Taiwan military personnel wearing their uniforms. The TECRO

Representative at the time, Shen Lyu-shun, told the media that his office had received approval from the Obama

Administration for those moves. A State Department spokesperson denied, however, that the Obama Administration

had advance notice of the flag raising. Nadia Tsao and Jake Chung, “ROC Flag Flies Against at U.S.’ Twin Oaks,”

Taipei Times, January 3, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/01/03/2003608344; William

Lowther, “U.S. Denies It Knew of ROC Flag-Raising,” Taipei Times, January 7, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/front/archives/2015/01/07/2003608644.

Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, “A Brief Introduction of Twin Oaks,”

February 9, 2017, http://www.roc-taiwan.org/us_en/post/27.html. In 2017, the city of Washington, DC, assessed the

value of the estate at over $62 million. District of Columbia real property database, http://geospatial.dcgis.dc.gov/

realproperty/.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the

United States, recognition of the People’s Republic of China shall not affect in any way

the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and

other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter

acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.

The provision was crafted with Twin Oaks and its furnishings in mind. According to the memoir

of David Dean, former chairman and director of AIT, “Beijing objected strenuously. The State

Department, concerned that all of its property in China would not be returned, told Beijing that it

had the option to challenge this clause of the TRA in the Supreme Court and, that if it did so, the

State Department would support the PRC’s claim.” Dean reports, however, that China chose not

mount a legal challenge.64

Although Taiwan’s representative office in the United States has owned Twin Oaks since 1982,

the State Department has not allowed Taiwan to use the estate as a residence for its

representatives since de-recognition. In 2011, however, the Obama Administration authorized

Taiwan to resume using Twin Oaks for its annual reception marking the October 10 (“Double

Ten”) anniversary of the uprising that brought down the Qing Dynasty and led, on January 1,

1912, to the founding of the Republic of China. Double Ten receptions have been held at Twin

Oaks every year since 2011. State Department guidance bars all executive branch employees

from attending events at Twin Oaks.65 Legislative Branch employees are not covered by that

guidance. Some Members of Congress regularly attend the Double Ten reception and other

functions at Twin Oaks.66 So, too, do AIT personnel, including the AIT Chairman and Managing

Director.

Interactions Between U.S. and Taiwan Officials

In the decades since U.S. de-recognition of Taiwan, the State Department has issued guidelines

for executive branch personnel on how to handle interactions with Taiwan, including restrictions

on venues for meetings and requirements that senior U.S. government personnel from certain

agencies receive written permission from the State Department before traveling to Taiwan. The

guidelines, which are updated periodically, are intended to distinguish the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan

relationship from the official relationships that the United States maintains with diplomatic

partners. State Department guidelines issued in 2013 state that, “Taiwan representatives should be

treated with courtesy and respect, within the framework of our unofficial relations with the

island.”67 The most recent guidelines on contacts with Taiwan were issued during the Obama

Administration. The Trump Administration has not so far updated them. The guidance does not

apply to legislative branch personnel, including Members of Congress.

State Department guidance does not bar executive branch officials at any level from visiting

Taiwan, but does state that Department of State and Department of Defense officials above the

rank of Office Director and uniformed military personnel above the level of 06 (Colonel or Navy

David Dean, Unofficial Diplomacy: The American Institute in Taiwan, XLibris LLC, 2014, p. 117.

U.S. Department of State, “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,” unclassified memorandum to all department and

agency executive secretaries, March 4, 2011.

See, for example, “Members of Congress Laud ROC on Double 10th, Encourage Signing of BIA,” Central News

Agency (Taiwan) via The China Post, October 13, 2013, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/

2013/10/13/391158/members-of.htm. The article reported that 12 Members of Congress attended the Double Ten

reception at Twin Oaks that year.

U.S. Department of State, “Guidelines on Contacts with Taiwan,” unclassified memorandum to diplomatic and

consular posts, October 7, 2013.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Captain) must obtain written permission from the State Department’s Office of Taiwan

Coordination before undertaking official travel to Taiwan. For personal travel, executive branch

officials at or above the level of Assistant Secretary or three-star flag officers must obtain

clearance from the Office of Taiwan Coordination. All executive branch officials are also required

to use regular passports, rather than diplomatic or official passports, for travel to Taiwan, “in

keeping with the absence of diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan.”68

On the subject of meetings with Taiwan visitors and representatives in Washington, DC, State

Department guidance dating from 2011 is that such meetings may take place in most U.S.

government offices, but not in the State Department, the White House, or the Eisenhower

Executive Office Building.69 Updated 2015 guidance provides for exceptions, including in the

case of meetings of international groups of which Taiwan is a member. Because Taiwan is a

member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), for

example, Taiwan’s representative in Washington, DC, attends meetings of the coalition at the

State Department.70 (See “Participation in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS,” below.) In 2015,

during Taiwan’s presidential election campaign, then-candidates Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu were

both granted meetings in the State Department and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.71

Congress has long sought to ease executive branch restrictions on interactions between U.S. and

Taiwan officials. In the 115th Congress, pending House and Senate versions of a Taiwan Travel

Act (H.R. 535 and S. 1051) both include a finding that since the 1979 enactment of the Taiwan

Relations Act, U.S.-Taiwan relations “have suffered from insufficient high-level communication

due to self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on high-level visits to Taiwan.”

They also include almost identical non-binding provisions stating, in the case of H.R. 535, that,

It should be the policy of the United States to—(1) allow officials at all levels of the

United States Government, including cabinet-level national security officials, general

officers, and other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese

counterparts; (2) allow high-level officials of Taiwan to enter the United States, under

conditions that demonstrate appropriate respect for the dignity of such officials, and to

meet with officials of the United States, including officials from the Department of State

and the Department of Defense and other cabinet agencies; and (3) encourage the Taipei

Economic and Cultural Representative Office, and any other instrumentality established

by Taiwan, to conduct business in the United States, including activities which involve

participation by Members of Congress, officials of Federal, State, or local governments

of the United States, or any high-level official of Taiwan.

S. 1051 would also authorize officials at all levels of the U.S. government to travel to Taiwan and

require the Secretary of State to submit reports every 180 days on travel by U.S. executive branch

officials to Taiwan.

Ibid.

U.S. Department of State, “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,” unclassified memorandum to all department and

agency executive secretaries, March 4, 2011.

U.S. Department of State, “List of Participants: Meeting of the Ministers of the Global Coalition—Working to Defeat

ISIS,” March 22, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/269036.htm.

See, for example, “蔡英文返台，北京不满美高官会蔡” (“Tsai Ing-wen Returns to Taiwan; Beijing Dissatisfied

That Senior U.S. Officials Met Tsai”), Voice of America Chinese Service, June 11, 2015, http://www.voachinese.com/

a/dpp-tsai-20150610/2816234.html and “Chu Held Talks with U.S. Officials on Visit to Washington,” CNA via Focus

Taiwan News Channel, November 13, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201511130003.aspx. Tsai’s visit preceded

her election as president in January 2016.

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Cabinet-Level U.S. Government Travel to Taiwan

U.S. guidance on Cabinet-level travel to Taiwan continues to be based on the outcome of a

Taiwan Policy Review undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1994. That review yielded a

policy of permitting senior executive branch officials in “economic and technical areas” to visit

Taiwan, with visits by Cabinet-level officials in such areas “not ruled out.”72 By implication, the

policy has discouraged, though not barred, visits by Cabinet-level officials in other than economic

and technical areas.

Six Cabinet-level executive branch officials have visited Taiwan since the United States

terminated diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, all of them in economic or technical posts.

The first was then-United States Trade Representative Carla Hills, who visited in 1992, at the end

of the George H.W. Bush Administration. Following the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, the Clinton

Administration sent four Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan. No Cabinet-level officials visited

Taiwan in the George W. Bush Administration. One Cabinet-level official, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Gina McCarthy, visited Taiwan during the Barack Obama

Administration, in 2014.73 She was the only Cabinet-level official to visit Taiwan in the last 17

years.

Table 3. U.S. Cabinet-Level Visitors to Taiwan 1978-Present

Name

Title

Administration

Date

Carla Hills

U.S. Trade Representative

George H.W. Bush

December 1992

Federico Pena

Secretary of Transportation

Clinton

December 1994

Phil Lader

Administrator, Small Business

Administration

Clinton

December 1996

Bill Richardson

Secretary of Energy

Clinton

November 1998

Rodney E. Slater

Secretary of Transportation

Clinton

June 2000

Gina McCarthy

Administrator, Environmental

Protection Agency

Obama

April 2014

Source: American Institute in Taiwan press releases and media reports.

Travel by Taiwan Leaders and Senior Officials to the United States

The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review determined that Taiwan’s “top leadership” could make “normal

transits” of the United States, but should be “forbid[den]” from making non-transit visits to the

American Institute in Taiwan, “Taiwan Policy Review: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,”

by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, September 27,

1994, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/19940927-taiwan-policy-review-by-winston-lord.html. U.S. Department of State,

“Taiwan Policy—New Practices” and “Taiwan Policy—Elements Which Will Not Change,” briefing papers prepared

for the visit of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff to China, circa August 1995, downloaded

from ProQuest’s Digital National Security Archive.

John Liu, “US Cabinet-level Official to Meet Ma,” The China Post, April 14, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/

taiwan/intl-community/2014/04/14/405279/US-Cabinet-level.htm; “Courteous Reception by US ‘Best Ever’: Ma,”

CNA in The China Post, March 15, 2016, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/intl-community/2016/03/15/460811/

Courteous-reception.htm; American Institute in Taiwan, “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery: U.S. Secretary of

Transportation Rodney E. Slater Transportation Policy Mission Arrival Statement,” June 14, 2000,

http://www.ait.org.tw/en/pressrelease-pr0032.html.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

United States or carrying out “public activities” on U.S. soil.74 That remains executive branch

policy. “Top leaders” has generally been defined to include Taiwan’s President, Vice President,

and Premier. The term originally also included Vice Premiers, but since 2016, the State

Department has not included them in the category of “top leaders” restricted to transit visits.

President Tsai has so far made three overseas trips that have involved transit layovers in the

United States. Following long-standing U.S. protocol, she did not meet with executive branch

officials during her transit visits, but was accompanied by the AIT Chairman or, in one case, the

Managing Director. Grace Choi, the State Department spokesperson for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs, described Tsai’s October 2017 transit of Hawaii and a planned November 2017 transit of

Guam as “private and unofficial” and said they were based on long-standing U.S. practice

consistent with “our unofficial relations with Taiwan.” According to Reuters, Choi said the

transits were approved out of consideration for the “safety and convenience of the traveler.”75

Taiwan presidents often meet in person and speak by telephone with some Members of Congress

during their transit visits and also meet with local officials and members of the local TaiwaneseAmerican community. On her transit visit to Houston in January 2017, during which she stayed

one night in the city, President Tsai met with Senator Ted Cruz, Representative Blake Farenthold,

Representative Al Green, and Texas Governor Greg Abbott. She also visited the House Museum

of Fine Arts and two Taiwan business facilities in the area, and was honored at a dinner for 600

Taiwanese-Americans.76 In March 2017, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister David Lee cited President

Tsai’s transit visits as evidence of her successful management of Taiwan-U.S. relations. “By

maintaining mutual trust she has earned the affirmation of Washington,” Lee told Taiwan’s

parliament. “She has made transit stops this year and last year in four American cities, receiving

high-level security privileges and forging closer contact with important U.S. officials each

time.”77

U.S. Department of State, “Taiwan Policy—New Practices” and “Taiwan Policy—Elements Which Will Not

Change,” briefing papers prepared for the visit of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff to China,

circa August 1995, downloaded from ProQuest’s Digital National Security Archive.

Ben Blanchard and Jess Macy Yu, “Ahead of Trump Trip, China Urges U.S. Not to Allow Taiwan President In,”

Reuters, October 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan/ahead-of-trump-trip-china-urges-u-s-notto-allow-taiwan-president-in-idUSKBN1CW0TD. The State Department spokesperson’s language on Tsai’s October

and November 2017 transits appears consistent with a State Department spokesperson’s comments on Tsai’s June and

July 2016 transits, during the Obama Administration. U.S. Department of State, “State Department Briefing for Foreign

Media,” given by Mark C. Toner, Deputy Department Spokesperson, June 9, 2016, http://fpc.state.gov/258327.htm.

“Tsai Arrives in Houston for Transit Stop,” CNA via Taipei Times, January 9, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/front/archives/2017/01/09/2003662766; “Cruz, Texas Governor Meet with Taiwanese President in Houston,”

January 8, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan/cruz-texas-governor-meet-with-taiwanese-president-inhouston-idUSKBN14S0X9.

“Report by H.E. David Tawei Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), at the Foreign

Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan,” March 6, 2017, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/

News3.aspx?n=4BAF9BD5400A05D9&sms=BA5E856472F10901.

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Table 4. President Tsai’s Transit Visits Through the United States

Date

Destination Country/Countries

U.S. Cities Visited in Transit

June 24-25, June 30-July 1, 2016

Panama

Miami, Los Angeles

January 7-8, January 13-14, 2017

Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El

Salvador

Houston, San Francisco

October 28-29, 2017

Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, the

Marshall Islands

Honolulu

Source: Media reports.

The State Department has maintained an effective bar on Taiwan’s foreign ministers visiting

Washington, DC. Former AIT Chairman Richard C. Bush explains that, “The rationale is that the

foreign minister is Taiwan’s leading diplomatic official, and diplomacy is by definition official for

purposes of U.S. policy.”78 In the era of unofficial relations, the United States has only twice

permitted a Taiwan Minister of Defense to visit the United States, both times in the George W.

Bush Administration. The first time was in March 2002, when the Bush Administration granted

Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming permission to attend the first U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry

Conference in St. Petersburg, Florida.79 The second time was in September 2008, when the Bush

Administration granted Defense Minister Chen Chao-min permission to attend the seventh

conference in the series, on Amelia Island, Florida.80

U.S. Security Cooperation with Taiwan

From 1954 until 1979, the United States and Taiwan, under the name Republic of China, were

parties to a Treaty of Mutual Defense under which,

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the

territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and

declares that it would meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional

processes.81

When President Carter announced that the United States had decided to establish diplomatic

relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979, he also announced that the United States would be

giving one year’s notice of its intention to terminate its defense treaty with Taiwan and would be

withdrawing its military personnel from Taiwan.82 President Carter withdrew all U.S. military

personnel from Taiwan by April 30, 1979. The defense treaty was terminated on January 1, 1980,

at the expiry of the one-year notice period.83

Richard C. Bush, “A One-China Policy Primer,” The Brookings Institution, March 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/

research/a-one-china-policy-primer/.

Tang met at the conference with then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State

for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, drawing strong protests from China. Embassy of the People’s Republic

of China in the United States of America, “China Protests U.S. Official Contacts with Taiwan,” March 14, 2002,

http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t36755.htm.

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference,” http://www.us-taiwan.org/defense/

2008/info.html.

“Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China,” signed December 2, 1954, entered

into force March 3, 1955, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chin001.asp.

“East Asia: U.S. Normalizes Relations with the People’s Republic of China,” Department of State Bulletin, January

1979, p. 26.

See Charles L. Cochran and Hungdah Chiu, “U.S. Status of Force Agreements with Asian Countries: Selected

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Based on provisions in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, however, the United States has remained

involved in supporting Taiwan’s military. Initially, support was focused on arms sales; the Taiwan

Relations Act states that “ ... the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles

and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a

sufficient self-defense capability.” Starting in 1997, after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996

(see box below), the security relationship broadened to include dialogues, training and military

education opportunities for Taiwan military personnel, and assessments of Taiwan’s military

capabilities, defense bureaucracy, and procurement procedures.84

In 2017, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David

Helvey described the United States as “especially focused on assisting Taiwan with the nonhardware aspects of military capability.” He mentioned an effort to help Taiwan “overhaul” its

reserve forces to make them “more agile and effective.” He noted an effort “to develop improved

joint doctrine, part of a larger effort to increase jointness and service interoperability in the

Taiwan military.” Helvey also noted an emphasis on “asymmetric warfare,” including an initiative

“to increase the ability of Taiwan’s ground forces to operate in a more decentralized fashion, with

less reliance on higher-level command-and-control.” In a similar vein, Helvey said the United

States is helping Taiwan with its non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, “with an aim toward

greater decentralization, with greater initiative at the NCO level.”85

U.S. government officials characterize U.S. security assistance to Taiwan as contributing to peace

and stability in Asia by giving Taiwan the confidence to engage with mainland China and by

deterring potential PRC coercion and aggression against Taiwan. In congressional testimony in

2011, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Peter

Lavoy explained the U.S. position this way:

The preservation of stability in the Taiwan Strait is fundamental to our interests of

promoting peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific writ large. A Taiwan that is strong,

confident, and free from threats or intimidation, in our view, is best postured to discuss

and adhere to whatever future arrangements the two sides of the Taiwan Strait may

peaceably agree upon. In contrast, a Taiwan that is vulnerable, isolated, and under threat

would not be in a position to discuss its future with the mainland and might invite the

very aggression we would seek to deter, jeopardizing both our interests in regional peace

and prosperity, and the interests of the people on Taiwan.86

(...continued)

Studies,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 7, 1979 (28), School of Law,

University of Maryland, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=mscas.

Michael S. Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation,” p. 163.

Global Taiwan Institute, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” September 14, 2017, http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASDPrepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.

Prepared Testimony of Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security

Affairs, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Why Taiwan Matters, Part II, 112th Cong., 1st sess.,

October 4, 2011, 112-70 (Washington: GPO, 2011).

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

In 1995, after Congress overwhelmingly passed H.Con.Res. 53, “Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a

private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States,” the Clinton

Administration granted permission to Taiwan’s then-President Lee to make a private visit to his alma mater, Cornell

University. Beijing responded by carrying out two rounds of missile exercises in waters near Taiwan, and then, in

March 1996, launching a third round of missile exercises, as well as other military exercises, in an apparent attempt to

drive down support for Lee ahead of Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, which Lee ultimately won. The United

States responded to the third set of exercises by dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. The events

of that period have come to be known as the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, following two earlier crises in 1954 and

1958.87 The crisis led to an expansion of U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation that has continued over the intervening

decades.

Dialogues

The most senior, regularly-scheduled U.S.-Taiwan bilateral military discussion is the Monterey

Talks, an annual strategic discussion between the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and senior civilian leaders. From 1997 to 2014, the talks

were held in Monterey, CA. In 2015, they moved to the Pentagon in Washington, DC. In 2017,

they were held in Hawaii. At the 2017 talks, the U.S. delegation reportedly included National

Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Matthew Pottinger and Acting Assistant

Secretary of Defense David Helvey. The Taiwan delegation was reportedly led by a Deputy

Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council and included a Vice Minister of

National Defense.88 Other dialogues include the Defense Review Talks, the General Officer

Steering Group (GOSG), and discussions involving the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific

forces. In his 2017 remarks, DOD’s Helvey noted, “We have additional, ad-hoc meetings that

occur regularly, and we conduct robust, service-level exchanges that focus on personnel, training,

maintenance, tactics, professionalization, and other topics.”89

In the 114th Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L.

114-328) included a non-binding provision (Section 1284) stating that the Secretary of Defense

should carry out a program of exchanges between the United States and Taiwan of senior military

officers and civilian officials. Senior military officials were defined as general or flag officers on

active duty, and senior Department of Defense officials were defined as civilians at the level of

Assistant Secretary of Defense or above. As noted above (see “Interactions Between U.S. and

Taiwan Officials”), the executive branch does not bar travel to Taiwan by senior defense officials

and officers, but does require Department of Defense officials above the rank of Office Director

and uniformed military personnel above the level of 06 (Colonel or Navy Captain) to obtain

H.Con.Res. 53 passed the House 396-0 and the Senate 97-1. For discussion of the events of 1995 and 1996, see

Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Political

Science Quarterly, vol. 115, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 227-246; Arthur S. Ding, “The Lessons of the 1995-1996

Taiwan Strait Crisis: Developing a New Strategy for Taiwan and the United States,” in The Lessons of History: The

Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, ed. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel (Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), pp. 379-402; Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation:

Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alan

Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Henry L.

Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 164-176.

Nadia Tsao and Jonathan Chin, “Taiwan to Submit Letter of Request to U.S. for Fighters,” Taipei Times, August 17,

2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/08/17/2003676658.

Global Taiwan Institute, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” September 14, 2017, http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASDPrepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

written permission the State Department’s Office of Taiwan Coordination before undertaking

official travel to Taiwan.

In the 115th Congress, Sec. 1270D of the Senate amendment to the NDAA for FY2018 (H.R.

2810) would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report by April 1, 2018 with a list of

actions taken to implement, and future plans to implement, the recommendations in Sec. 1284 of

the NDAA for FY2017, related to military exchanges, or reasons why no actions have been taken

or no future plans made to implement the recommendations. The House version of H.R. 2810

contains no analogous provision.

Training

The U.S. Pacific Command sends several dozen observers each year to Taiwan’s Han Guang

military exercises. Taiwan F-16 pilots train at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona on F-16 Fighting

Falcon aircraft. In August 2017, however, a visiting Taiwan legislator noted that Luke Force Base

is being converted to F-35 flight operations. It is not clear where F-16 training for Taiwan pilots

will happen in the future.90 Approximately 400 Taiwan military officers study each year at U.S.

military academies and other institutions.

Legislative Proposals for U.S.-Taiwan Port Calls

Section 1270E of the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for

FY2018 (H.R. 2810) and Section 12709(b) of the Senate amendment to H.R. 2810 would require

the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress assessing the feasibility and advisability

of the U.S. Navy making port calls to Taiwan, and of the United States receiving port calls by the

ROC navy in Hawaii, Guam, “and other appropriate locations.” The Senate amendment would

include an additional binding provision directing the Secretary of Defense to “reestablish regular

ports of call” in Taiwan and to permit the U.S. Pacific Command to receive port calls from the

Taiwan Navy. The latter provision also appears in S. 1620, the Taiwan Security Act of 2017,

introduced by Senators Cotton and Gardner on July 24, 2017.

In 2016, both Senator Ted Cruz and Representative Randy Forbes, the then-Chairman of the

House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, called for

the United States to consider port calls to Taiwan after the PRC cancelled a port call to Hong

Kong by the USS John C. Stennis.91 Forbes issued a statement saying that, “China has repeatedly

politicized the long-standing use of Hong Kong for carrier port visits, inconveniencing the

families of thousands of U.S. sailors and continuing a pattern of unnecessary and disruptive

behavior.” He added, “As Beijing’s direct control of Hong Kong intensifies, the U.S. Navy should

strongly consider shifting its carrier port calls to more stable and welcoming locations.” Forbes

mentioned Taiwan as a possible option.92

Writing as a private citizen, former State Department official Randall Schriver argued the case for

U.S. port calls to Taiwan in a subsequent 2016 article. They would, he said, “send reassurance to

the people of Taiwan at a time when Beijing is increasing pressure on our democratic friend.”

Wang Cheng-chung and Evelyn Kao, “Taiwan Legislators Visit Luke Air Force Base in Arizona,” August 2, 2017,

http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201708020006.aspx.

Cruz tweeted, “U.S. carrier denied port visit in Hong Kong. Proof that PRC isnt [sic] U.S. partner. We should send

carrier to Taiwan instead.” Twitter feed of Senator Ted Cruz, April 29, 2016, https://twitter.com/sentedcruz/status/

726135248870846466.

Tony Liao and Elaine Hou, “U.S. Congressman Suggests Taiwan as New Carrier Port-Call Location,” Focus Taiwan,

May 3, 2016, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605030007.aspx.

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

They would familiarize the U.S. Navy with Taiwan ports, thus serving to “enhance our

operational readiness in meaningful ways related to a known contingency for which our own law

obligates us to prepare.” In addition, he argued, “Unlike PRC-controlled Hong Kong, Taiwan

would always be there if we were in distress—as they were when two U.S. F/A-18s were forced

to make an emergency landing at Tainan Air Base in Taiwan in April 2015.”93 The White House

announced on October 27 that it intended to nominate Schriver for the position of Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs.94

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense welcomed the port calls language when it first appeared in

the Senate’s NDAA bill, S. 1519 (115th Congress), saying, “The move shows that the U.S. values

military exchanges with Taiwan. The ministry welcomes any form of partnership that would

enhance Taiwan’s national defense and bring stability to the region.”95

Critics of the proposal for port visits with Taiwan see them as inconsistent with the unofficial

nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations. In addition, some note that China considers Taiwan to be

sovereign Chinese territory and could seek to interdict or harass a U.S. warship seeking to enter

the 12-nautical mile territorial sea around Taiwan. According to James Moriarty, Chairman of the

American Institute in Taiwan, the non-profit corporation through which the United States

conducts relations with Taiwan, “To state the obvious, it would be very difficult and perhaps

dangerous for U.S. naval ships to go into a port in Taiwan.”96

Spokespeople for both the PRC’s Ministry of National Defense and its Foreign Ministry strongly

criticized the proposal for port calls. A PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson stated:

We are always firmly opposed to any form of official contact and military interaction

between Taiwan and the U.S. We urge the American side to abide by its commitment to

the Chinese side with regard to the Taiwan issue, and stop military contacts with Taiwan,

so as not to cause damage to the relations between the two militaries and the two

countries as well as to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.97

A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated:

We are strongly concerned about and firmly opposed to the bill approved by the Senate

Armed Services Committee. We have lodged solemn representations with the U.S. side

about its erroneous actions on Taiwan-related issues. I have to stress once again that the

Taiwan question bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and belongs to

China’s domestic affairs. Taiwan-related contents in the aforementioned bill severely

violate the three joint communiqués between China and the U.S., and constitute

interference in China’s domestic affairs. China by no means accepts that. We urge the US

to honor its commitment on the Taiwan question, immediately stop military contact and

arms sales to Taiwan, and avoid causing damage to the bilateral relationship and bilateral

cooperation in a broader range of areas.98

Randall Schriver, “The Case for U.S. Ship Visits to Taiwan,” The Diplomat, May 9, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/

2016/05/the-case-for-us-ship-visits-to-taiwan/.

“Trump Announces the Pentagon’s Top Asia, Technology Nominees,” Navy Times, October 28, 2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/pentagon/2017/10/28/trump-announces-top-asia-technology-nominees/.

Shelley Shan, “Military Welcomes Possible U.S. Navy Ports of Call,” Taipei Times, June 30, 2017,

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/06/30/2003673575.

Rita Cheng and Lilian Wu, “AIT Chairman Skeptical U.S. Naval Vessels Will Visit Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, July 12,

2017, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201707120010.aspx.

Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on

June 29,” June 30, 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-06/30/content_4784139.htm.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

U.S. legal experts have questioned whether Congress has the authority to direct the Department of

Defense to carry out port calls in Taiwan. Hofstra University School of Law Professor Julian Ku

writes, “As a constitutional matter, the power to direct and deploy U.S military assets is held

exclusively by the President under his Article II Commander-in-Chief powers.”99

Legislative Proposals for Taiwan’s Inclusion in Multilateral Military

Training Activities

Congress has shown interest in inviting Taiwan to participate in U.S.-hosted multilateral military

training activities. In the 115th Congress, the Senate amendment to the National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2018 (H.R. 2810), would include a discretionary “sense of

Congress” statement supporting inviting Taiwan “to participate in multilateral training activities

hosted by the United States.” It would also include binding language directing the Secretary of

Defense to invite Taiwan’s military to participate in a “Red Flag” exercise at either Eielson Air

Force Base in Alaska or Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. The House version of the bill contains

no analogous provisions.

The pending Taiwan Security Act of 2017 (S. 1620) would require the Secretary of Defense to

invite the Taiwan military to participate in the 2018 Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) as

well as a “Red Flag” exercise at Eielson Air Force Base or Nellis Air Force Base.

Nellis Air Force Base describes “Red Flag” as “the U.S. Air Force’s premier air-to-air combat

training exercise” and says, “Participants often include both United States and allied nations’

combat air forces.”100 Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska describes RED FLAG-Alaska as “a series

of Pacific Air Forces commander-directed field training exercises.”101 The U.S. Navy describes

RIMPAC as “the world’s largest international maritime exercise.” It is held every other year in

Hawaii and Southern California. In 2016, the exercise drew participants from 26 nations,

including the PRC.102

Among the questions related to a possible invitation to Taiwan to participate in any of these

activities is how such an invitation might affect the willingness of allies and coalition partners to

continue their participation. Most nations currently avoid interaction with the Taiwan military

because of concerns about being seen to be violating “one China” pledges made to the PRC and

thus undermining their broader relationships with the PRC. Other questions include to what

degree, if at all, learning to operate in a multilateral environment will help Taiwan with its core

mission of island defense, in which it is unlikely to be operating in concert with partners other

than the United States.

(...continued)

Press Conference,” June 29, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1474166.shtml.

Julian Ku, “It’s a Good Idea, but Congress Can’t Require the U.S. Navy to Make Port Calls in Taiwan,” Lawfare

Blog, June 30, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-good-idea-congress-cant-require-us-navy-make-port-callstaiwan.

100

Nellis Air Force Base, “Red Flag,” accessed September 21, 2017, http://www.nellis.af.mil/Home/Flying-Operations/

. See also Nellis Air Force Base, “414th Combat Training Squadron ‘Red Flag,’” July 6, 2012, http://www.nellis.af.mil/

About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/284176/414th-combat-training-squadron-red-flag/.

101

Eielson Air Force Base, “RED FLAG-Alaska,” accessed September 21, 2017, http://www.eielson.af.mil/Info/REDFLAG-Alaska/.

102

U.S. Navy, “RIMPAC Exercise to Bring 26 Nations Together in Pacific,” June 24, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/

submit/display.asp?story_id=95379.

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

Since 1979, all administrations have notified Congress of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to

Taiwan, presenting the sales as consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in the Taiwan

Relations Act. Taiwan is the largest customer for FMS programs in Asia and the United States’

second largest FMS partner globally. Over its eight years in office (2009-2017), the Obama

Administration notified Congress of more than $14 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan

and licensed another $6.2 billion in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).103 Taiwan describes the $20

billion in total arms sales to Taiwan over the seven years from 2009 through 2015 as “the largest

amount [of arms sales] in any comparable period following the enactment” of the Taiwan

Relations Act in 1979.104

Among the advanced military systems Taiwan has acquired from the United States in the era of

unofficial relations are:



AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters;

Patriot-3 missiles;

F-16 A/B aircraft, with subsequent upgrades to the latest F-16V configuration;

tactical data links; and

a long-range surveillance radar system, the AN/FPS-115 PAVE Phased Array

Warning System (PAVE PAWS). Constructed by Raytheon Corporation on a

mountaintop in Hsinchu County in the north of Taiwan, the PAVE PAWS system

allows Taiwan to monitor aerial activities within a range of 3,000 miles,

including Chinese missile and Air Force flight activity. The system was

commissioned into service in 2013.105

U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan Arms Sales

Sec. 2(b)(5) of the Taiwan Relations Act states that it is the policy of the United States “to provide

Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.” Sec. 3(a) and (b) state:

(a) ...[T]he United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense

services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient

self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such

defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in

accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s defense

needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with

recommendations to the President and the Congress.

103

Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Senior Advisor, Department of Defense, Performing the Duties of the Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council

Defense Industry Conference, October 3, 2016, http://us-taiwan.org/reports/

2016_october3_david_helvey_dod_keynote.pdf; Global Taiwan Institute, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” September 14, 2017,

http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASD-Prepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.

104

Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, http://english.ey.gov.tw/

cp.aspx?n=AAA55B728159E214.

105

Spencer Ackerman, “Taiwan’s Massive, Mega-Powerful Radar System Is Finally Operational,” Wired, March 8,

2013, https://www.wired.com/2013/03/taiwan-radar/; “Talk of the Day: Taiwan Formally Commissions New Radar

System,” Focus Taiwan News Channel, February 3, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201302030023.aspx.

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Former AIT Chairman Richard Bush, who served as a congressional staffer early in his career,

suggests that Sec. 3(a) is not as strong a statement as commonly assumed. Bush writes, “In U.S.

legislative practice, if Congress wishes to require an action by the executive, it uses the word

‘shall.’ To say that ‘the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and

defense services’ represents less a mandate for action than it does a statement of intention.”106

With regard to Sec. 3(b), Bush highlights the inclusion of the phrase, “in accordance with

procedures established by law.” The phrase, Bush explains, is a reference to the Arms Export

Control Act, “which requires that the Executive Branch inform Congress of arms sales very late

in the process ... and even then only for transfers above a certain value.” Bush asserts that, “By

including this phrase, Congress was taking itself out of [the decision-making process], and giving

the Executive Branch substantial discretion regarding what Taiwan’s needs were and what

specific weapon systems to provide.”107

The Reagan Administration’s Six Assurances to Taiwan, provided in 1982, include two additional

provisions related to arms sales to Taiwan. They are that in the 1982 negotiations with the PRC

over the third U.S.-China joint communiqué on arms sales, “ ... we did not agree to set a date

certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan,” and the communiqué, ‘‘should not be read to imply that

we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.”108 The

latter assurances, though presented to Congress in past tense, have been widely interpreted as a

proscription on setting deadlines for ending arms sales and on consultation with Beijing about

Taiwan arms sales.

The 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué itself states that the United States “does not seek to carry

out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed,

either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the

establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends

gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final

resolution.”109 Testifying before Congress about this third communiqué, a senior Reagan

Administration official emphasized that, “ ... our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan

are premised on the continuation of China’s peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences

with Taiwan.”110

The Trump Administration and Taiwan Arms Sales

On June 29, 2017, the Trump Administration notified Congress of seven proposed Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) programs for Taiwan, with a total value of $1.36 billion. The day before, on

June 28, 2017, the State Department took the unusual step of notifying Congress of an additional

proposed Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) to Taiwan with a value of $68.8 million.111 State

106

Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942, M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.157.

Ibid, p. 158.

108

Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Policy Toward China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 13-14.

Holdridge used almost exactly the same wording in testimony before the House the next day. U.S. Congress, House

Committee on Foreign Affairs, China-Taiwan: United States Policy, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 18, 1982

(Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 6-7.

109

“U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (1982),” August 17, 1982, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/

key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1982/.

110

Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 13-14.

111

Department of State, Transmittal No. DDTC 16-071 for the MK-41 Vertical Launching System, June 28, 2017.

107

Congressional Research Service

Taiwan: Issues for Congress

Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert combined the value of the FMS programs and the DCS

program in announcing that the Trump Administration had notified Congress of $1.42 billion of

arms sales to Taiwan. She said, “There is continuity here; the United States has been doing

defense sales with Taiwan for 50 years or so, so nothing has changed.”112

Of the seven proposed FMS programs notified, the largest is a $400 million operations and

maintenance follow-on package for Taiwan’s Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). Other

notifications cover joint stand-off weapons (JSOW), high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs),

MK-48 heavy-weight torpedoes, MK-54 light-weight torpedoes, upgrades to existing torpedoes,

air-to-ground missiles, and an anti-warfare systems upgrade to four ex-KIDD class destroyers.

The proposed DCS program notified is for the MK-41 Vertical Launching System. See Appendix

B for a full list of all FMS programs notified to Congress from 2000 to 2017.

“Regularity” of Taiwan Arms Sales

The TRA is silent on the question of how the President and Congress should determine the timing

of arms sales to Taiwan. From 1983 to 2001, the United States and Taiwan held annual Arms

Sales Talks in Washington, DC, at which a Taiwan Ministry of National Defense delegation

presented its requests for defense articles and services and the U.S. government provided formal

responses. The talks attracted intense interest from both the Taiwan media and the PRC

government. The Washington Post described annual meeting as a “contentious, once-a-year

showdown over arms sales to Taiwan.” The George W. Bush Administration ended the annual

talks after the April 2001 meeting, moving to meetings on an “as-needed” basis.113

The executive branch notified Congress of proposed major arms sales to Taiwan at least once a

year from 2001 to 2008, with the exception of 2006. In three separate years, 2001, 2002, and

2007, it notified Congress of arms sales to Taiwan on four separate occasions over the course of

the year. In October 2008, however, the George W. Bush Administration adopted a new approach

to arms sales notifications with six notifications of arms sales programs sent to Congress on a

single day. A critical 2012 report from the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council and the Project 2049

Institute, an Arlington, VA-based research institute, alleges that the goal of this bundling of arms

sales notifications was “to reduce the potential retaliation from China and subsequent

consequences for U.S.-China relations, as well as a way to game the calendar in a manner that

positioned the sales at the least-worst time.”114 Since 2008, the executive branch has routinely

chosen to notify Congress of multiple proposed FMS programs for Taiwan on a single date, with

112

Nauert told reporters, “So the administration had formally notified Congress of seven proposed defense sales for

Taiwan. It’s now valued about $1.42 billion.” That $1.42 billion figure reflects the seven FMS sales, with an aggregate

value of $1.36 billion, and the additional proposed Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) to Taiwan with a value of $68.8

million notified to Congress on June 28, 2017. Unlike FMS programs, which are publicly listed on the website of the

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DCS sales are not required to be notified to Congress and are not usually made

public. The notification of multiple FMS programs for Taiwan and one DCS sale has a precedent in the Obama

Administration. On December 16, 2015, the Obama Administration notified Congress of eight FMS programs for

Taiwan and one DCS program, with a combined value of $1.83 billion. U.S. Department of State, “Department Press

Briefing,” June 29, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/06/272265.htm#CHINA3; Defense Security

Cooperation Agency, “Major Arms Sales,” http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales.

113

President Bush told the Washington Post, “We have made it clear to the Taiwanese that we will not have this socalled annual review—that we will meet on an as-needed basis.” Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, “Bush to Drop Annual

Review of Weapons Sales to Taiwan,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

archive/politics/2001/04/25/bush-to-drop-annual-review-of-weapons-sales-to-taiwan/f65586dd-a180-4768-8cdde5f51d1ad7ee.

114

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales,” March 2012,

https://project2049.net/documents/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf.

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sometimes extended gaps between notifications. The Obama Administration presided over a gap

of over four years between notifications of major arms sales to Taiwan, lasting from September

21, 2011 to December 19, 2015. With its seven-program notification in June 2017, the Trump

Administration is the third administration to bundle arms sales to Taiwan.

Table 5. Notifications of Proposed Major Arms Sales to Taiwan 2007-2017

Number of Dates on Which Notifications Were Issued, Total Number of FMS Programs Notified, and

Aggregate Value of Programs Notified, by Calendar Year

Years

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017a

Dates

Programs

$3.72

bill

$6.46

billion

$6.39

billion

$5.85

billion

$1.72

billion

$1.36

billion

Value

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales.

Notes: Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629) requires congressional notification

of letters of offer to sell major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services

valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. This is the

definition of “major arms sales” used in this table.

a. 2017 data is for January 1, 2017, to October 20, 2017.

The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R. 2810), the

Senate amendment to H.R. 2810, and the pending Taiwan Security Act (S. 1620) all seek more

frequent transfers of defense articles and services to Taiwan, while H.R. 2810 also calls for a

“timely review” of arms requests from Taiwan. The Senate amendment calls for “regular

transfers” of arms to Taiwan. H.R. 2810 would also include a “sense of Congress” statement

calling for the Secretary of Defense to undertake “a case-by-case review” of Taiwan’s requests for

arms sales “consistent with the standard processes and procedures in an effort to normalize the

arms sales process with Taiwan”; submit a report to Congress no later than 120 days after each

letter of request received from Taiwan, reporting on the status of the request; and brief

congressional committees every six months on the status of any arms sales requests from Taiwan.

S. 1620, would require the United States to “conduct regular transfers of defense articles to

Taiwan” and would revive annual sales talks “to ensure the regular transfer of defense articles.”

Competing Assessments of Taiwan’s Defense Needs

Tensions have sometimes surfaced among the executive branch, Congress, and Taiwan military

planners over assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs. Taiwan has often sought to acquire small

numbers of expensive, highly sophisticated military platforms with long timelines for delivery,

such as F-16C/D fighters in an earlier era, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter today. The executive

branch’s view is that Taiwan faces a growing threat from the PRC and must move urgently to

ensure that it has a credible deterrent capability now. Speaking in October 2017, DOD’s Helvey

argued that, “The ways of traditional defense procurement that focus on high price-tag, high-end

systems, with large scale production, and imports are not fully suited to island defense.” While

acknowledging that Taiwan may continue to need “high-end major defense systems,” he urged

Taiwan to focus “on acquiring, maintaining, and training on affordable, timely, and cutting edge

systems that are integrated into a multi-domain defense.”

Helvey also counseled Taiwan, “Don’t discount older and simpler capabilities,” such as sea and

surf-zone mines that “offer significant obstacles to an invading force.” He urged Taiwan to seek

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

“to network the old with the new so that they complement one another.” Helvey challenged

Taiwan, for example, to leverage its technological and innovation strength to explore such

questions as, “How can mines be mobile, layered in defensive belts and intelligent” and “What

devices can be built that disrupt the electronic communications of an attacker or that counter the

effects of jamming?” Taiwan’s goal, he said, should be to maintain a “resilient deterrent” that is

“networked, survivable, and adaptive.”115

Taiwan Interest in the F-35

Taiwan’s 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review lists “acquisition of advanced weapon systems” as

the third priority for defense spending, after defense research and development and indigenous

production of weapons and equipment. The Review specifically mentions plans “to acquire new

fighters capable of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) and having stealth

characteristics,” an apparent reference to the United States’ F-35 strike fighter.116 In an April 27,

2017, interview with Reuters, President Tsai explicitly raised the possibility that Taiwan may

request to buy the F-35 from the United States. “We don’t rule out any items that would be

meaningful to our defense and our defense strategy and the F-35 is one such item,” she told the

news agency.117 The F-35 is currently projected to cost between $95 million and $123 million per

plane, depending on the model.118

Indigenous Submarine Program

President Tsai has also backed an ambitious indigenous defense submarine (IDS) program and

indigenous fighter-trainer program for which Taiwan hopes to receive technical support from the

United States. In the 115th Congress, Sec. 1270B of the Senate amendment to the National

Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R. 2810) would direct that, “The Secretary of Defense

shall implement a program of technical assistance and consultation to support the efforts of

Taiwan to develop indigenous warfare capabilities, including vehicles and sea mines, for its

military forces.”

In his September 2017 remarks, the Department of Defense’s Helvey sounded a note of caution

about U.S. support for Taiwan’s development of indigenous warfare capabilities. He stated that

“the U.S. government does not own much of the technology Taiwan seeks for its domestic

industry.”119 That may be particularly true for the IDS program, given that the United States

manufactures only nuclear-powered submarines, whereas Taiwan’s plans involve diesel-electric

submarines. Because of the technology Taiwan is seeking, Helvey suggested that any support

115

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” for delivery at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference,

Princeton, New Jersey, October 16, 2017, http://us-taiwan.org/reports/

2017_october16_david_helvey_dod_keynote.pdf.

116

Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, “2017 Quadrennial Defense Review,” March 2017,

http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2000/01/2017-Taiwan-Quadrennial-Defense-ReviewQDR.pdf.

117

Jean Yoon and J.R. Wu, “Exclusive: Taiwan President Says Phone Call with Trump Can Take Place Again,” April

27, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-president-idUSKBN17T0W3.

118

Kyle Mizokami, “The Cost of the F-35 Is Going Up Again,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 17, 2017.

For more information on the F-35, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by (name red

acted) .

119

Global Taiwan Institute, “Prepared Remarks of David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,” September 14, 2017, http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASDPrepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

from the United States may need to be in the form of Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). In a DCS

framework, Taiwan would work directly with U.S. defense contractors, rather than with the U.S.

government, as in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework in which Taiwan has traditionally

operated for the bulk of its arms purchases. In the FMS framework, Helvey explained, “the

Department of Defense and its contractors absorb a great deal of the cost and risk involved in

developing and producing new weapon systems, including from delays, cost-overruns, and

quality assurance or performance problems.” He noted that, “As Taiwan transitions toward

indigenous manufacturing aided by direct commercial sales, the risks of developing new weapons

systems will shift to the buyer, and that is something Taiwan will have to reconcile.” Helvey also

cautioned that Taiwan “will need to ensure compliance with U.S. standards and requirements for

safeguarding sensitive defense technologies,” which may require Taiwan “to establish new

regulatory mechanisms.”120

Taiwan’s Non-NATO Ally Status

Section 1206 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003, P.L. 107-228, requires that

Taiwan be treated as if it were a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) for the purpose of transfers of

defense articles or services under the Arms Control Export Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, or any other provision of law. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,

MNNA status makes Taiwan eligible for stockpiling of U.S. defense articles; purchase of depleted

uranium anti-tank rounds; with a reciprocity agreement, exemption from indirect costs,

administrative charges, and billeting costs for training; and use of any allocated foreign military

financing programs (FMFP) funding for commercial leasing of defense articles. 121

PRC Objections to Taiwan Arms Sales

In directing the President and Congress to determine “the nature and quality” of defense articles

and services sold to Taiwan “based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan,” the

Taiwan Relations Act appears to proscribe consideration of the potential impact of such sales on

U.S.-China relations. Taiwan’s supporters have sometimes alleged that in declining to sell Taiwan

certain advanced defense articles, such as F-16C/D combat aircraft, the executive branch has

allowed concerns about the PRC’s potential reaction to influence its decisions about what items to

sell Taiwan, in violation of the act.122

Arms sales to Taiwan typically draw strong protests from the PRC. Beijing sees them as a

violation of the August 1982 U.S.-China joint communiqué, which stated that the United States

intended “gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final

resolution.” The PRC also argues that arms sales make Taiwan less willing to negotiate a

resolution to the cross-strait standoff.

After the Trump Administration’s June 29, 2017 notification to Congress of arms sales to Taiwan,

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that China had “lodged representations” with the

U.S. government in both Beijing and Washington, DC. He continued:

120

Ibid.

Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “Chapter 2: Security Cooperation Legislation and Policy,” in The

Management of Security Cooperation (“The Green Book”) (July, 2016), http://www.iscs.dsca.mil/documents/

greenbook/02_Chapter.pdf.

122

For elaboration of such criticism, see U.S.-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, “Chinese Reactions

to Taiwan Arms Sales,” March 2012, https://project2049.net/documents/

2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf.

121

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

The Chinese side pointed out that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. By selling arms

to Taiwan, the US has severely violated international law, basic norms governing

international relations and the three China-US joint communiqués, and jeopardized

China’s sovereignty and security interests. The Chinese side firmly opposes that.

The Chinese side stressed that the Chinese government and people will never waver in

their will and determination to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and

fend against external interference. We strongly urge the US side to honor its solemn

commitments in the three China-US joint communiqués, cancel its arms sales plan, and

stop its military contact with Taiwan, so as not to cause further damage to China-US

relations and bilateral cooperation in major areas.123

Cooperation to Address Global Challenges

According to AIT Chairman James Moriarty, the United States seeks “to help find new ways for

Taiwan to earn the dignity and respect that its contributions to global challenges merit and that

befit its democratic status.”124 One avenue for such efforts has been the Global Cooperation and

Training Framework (GCTF), created in June 2015 through a memorandum of understanding

between AIT and TECRO, and continued under the Trump Administration. As of late July 2017,

the initiative had held eight workshops in Taiwan on such topics as public health, energy

efficiency, women’s empowerment, e-commerce, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,

with participation from more than 100 officials and experts from around the Asia-Pacific.125

Moriarty stated in April 2017 that with the GCTF, the United States seeks “.... to provide more

than technical expertise. Our goal is to create networks and build bridges between Taiwan,

Southeast Asia and South Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean, and beyond.”126

The United States has also helped facilitate contributions from Taiwan to address international

crises. In 2014, after the World Health Organization (WHO) rebuffed Taiwan’s efforts to donate

$1 million via the United Nations Foundation to support the WHO’s response to the Ebola virus

in West Africa, the United States assisted Taiwan in finding other ways to contribute to the global

Ebola response. According to a U.S. State Department report to Congress, “Taiwan coordinated

with the United States to deliver 100,000 sets of personal protective equipment to the PanAmerican Development Foundation to support preparedness across Latin America and the

Caribbean, as well as a $1 million USD contribution to the U.S. CDC Foundation’s initiatives to

fight Ebola in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.”127 Taiwan says its contribution to the Pan –

American Development Foundation was valued at $125,000.128 (See also “World Health

Assembly/World Health Organization,” below.)

123

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular

Press Conference,” June 30, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/

t1474637.shtml.

124

“AIT Chairman James Moriarty Remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),” July 13, 2017,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/american-institute-taiwan-chairman-james-moriarty-remarks.

125

“AIT Chairman James Moriarty Remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),” July 13, 2017,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/american-institute-taiwan-chairman-james-moriarty-remarks.

126

American Institute in Taiwan, “Remarks by AIT Chairman James Moriarty at the Global Cooperation and Training

Framework Mosquito-borne Viral Diseases Laboratory Diagnosis Workshop,” April 25, 2017, https://www.ait.org.tw/

remarks-ait-chairman-james-moriarty-global-cooperation-training-framework-mosquito-borne-viral-diseaseslaboratory-diagnosis-workshop/.

127

U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on P.L. 108-235: U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Participation as an

Observer at the 69th World Health Assembly and in the Work of the World Health Organization,” May 22, 2017.

128

Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Foreign Affairs,” The Republic of China Yearbook 2016,

(continued...)

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

U.S.-Taiwan Commercial Ties

U.S. trade data indicate that in 2016, Taiwan was the United States’ 10th-largest merchandise

trading partner (at $65.4 billion), 14th-largest export market (at $26.0 billion) and 13th-largest

source of imports (at $39.3 billion). From 2000 to 2016, U.S. exports to Taiwan grew by 8.3%,

while imports fell by 4.9%. In comparison, U.S. global exports and imports during this period

rose by 86.3% and 79.9%, respectively. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trading

partner after the PRC.

U.S. data may understate the importance of Taiwan to the U.S. economy because of the role of

global supply chains. For example, many of the consumer electronic products developed by

Apple Inc. (such as iPads and iPhones) are assembled in mainland China by Taiwan-owned firms.

Taiwan has moved a significant level of its labor-intensive manufacturing overseas, especially to

mainland China. This is reflected in Taiwan’s data on export orders received by its firms from

abroad. That data indicate that the percentage of export orders produced abroad rose from 13.3%

in 2000 to 54.2% in 2016; and for information and communications technology products (such as

computers), this figure rose from 24.9% to 93.4%.

Taiwan government data indicate that Taiwan manufacturing firms received export orders from

the United States worth $127.6 billion in 2016, a figure more than three times larger than official

U.S. data for U.S. imports from Taiwan in 2015. From 2000 to 2016, U.S. orders to Taiwan firms

increased by 160.4%. The United States is the largest source of Taiwan’s export orders,

accounting for 28.7% of total in 2016. (Mainland China and Hong Kong together accounted for

24.1%.) This indicates that U.S.-Taiwan commercial ties are significantly greater and more

complex than reflected in standard bilateral trade data. The stock of U.S. FDI in Taiwan through

2016 was $16.2 billion and the stock of Taiwanese FDI in the United States was $7.2 billion, on a

historical-cost basis.129

Many U.S. business groups have indicated optimism over Taiwan’s economic prospects, but have

raised concerns over certain aspects of Taiwan’s business climate. In a 2017 survey by the

American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Taipei, 67% of respondents said their business

operations were “very profitable” in 2016 and 56% said they expected strong profits in 2017.

However, 49% of respondents indicated they were positive about their business prospects over

the next five years, down from 60% who felt that way in 2015. Respondents indicated that the top

five issues affecting their business operations in Taiwan were government bureaucracy, crossStrait relations, lack of clarity in labor laws, inconsistent regulatory interpretation, and political

turmoil in Taiwan.130

The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) 2017 National Trade Estimates of Foreign Trade

Barriers noted Taiwan’s sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on agricultural products,

especially in regards to beef and pork. Taiwan maintains import bans on certain beef products and

a total ban on imported pork containing the leanness-enhancing drug, ractopamine.

The USTR’s 2017 Special 301 on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection cited Taiwan as one

of four U.S. trading partners that had recently strengthened their trade secrets law, but also

identified it as one of 12 trading partners of concern regarding government use of unlicensed

(...continued)

http://english.ey.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=AAA55B728159E214.

129

Bureau of Economic Analysis.

130

American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, 2017 Business Climate Survey, February 20, 2017, available at

https://amcham.com.tw/2017/02/2017-business-climate-survey-press-conference/.

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software, and one of 16 trading partners of concern related to their policies on pharmaceutical

innovation and market access.131

AmCham Taipei’s 2017 White Paper indicated that of the 80 issues discussed by the Chamber’s

committees in the 2016 White Paper, none had been fully resolved by the Taiwan government,

although “favorable progress” was made in banking, infrastructure, pharmaceutical IPR

protection, public health, real estate, sustainable development, and tobacco. AmCham Taipei

recommended ways to boost U.S.-Taiwan commercial ties, including the negotiation of a U.S.Taiwan “fair trade agreement” and bilateral investment agreement, conducting more two-way

high-level visits, and making revisions to the U.S. tax system with regard to the tax treatment of

overseas Americans.132

In 1994, the United States and Taiwan concluded a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

(TIFA). TIFA talks, usually held on an annual basis, serve as a high level forum to discuss major

trade and investment disputes and expanded commercial ties. Topics include market access, IPR

protection, labor and environmental issues, and trade capacity building.133 In the past, the USTR

has indicated that talks under TIFA could potentially lead to discussions focused on reaching a

free trade agreement (FTA). Taiwan’s decision in 2007 to ban beef and pork and imports

containing ractopamine led the United States to suspend the TIFA talks for nearly six years. They

were resumed in March 2013 after Taiwan agreed to allow some beef imports containing

ractopamine, based on a maximum residue limit (MRL), although it did not do so for pork.

At the 2016 TIFA talks, the USTR stated that it had “pressed Taiwan for expeditious resolution of

agricultural trade issues, including removal of longstanding and unwarranted barriers to U.S. beef

and pork, which is necessary for any deepening of our trade relationship.” USTR also noted

further progress in IP protection and enforcement. The two sides pledged to continue efforts to

boost Taiwan’s market access for medical devices and to improve procedural fairness and

transparency in trade and investment.134

In the 115th Congress, H.Res. 271 would call on the USTR to begin negotiations with Taiwan for

a bilateral trade agreement. Previous congressional proposals for an FTA with Taiwan include

H.R. 419 (113th Congress); H.R. 2918 (112th Congress); H.Con.Res. 276 (111th Congress);

H.Con.Res. 137 and S.Con.Res. 60 (110th Congress); and H.Con.Res. 342, H.Con.Res. 346, and

S.Con.Res. 84 S (109th Congress).

Visa Waiver

In October 2012, the United States designated Taiwan as a member of the U.S. Visa Waiver

Program (VWP). The VWP, administered by the Department of Homeland Security in

consultation with the Department of State, allows Taiwan passport holders to visit the United

States for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without a visa. Under the terms of the

program, Taiwan extends reciprocal privileges to Americans visiting Taiwan. The Department of

Homeland Security describes the program as “a comprehensive security partnership with many of

131

The USTR reports can be found at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications.

American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, 2017 Taiwan White Paper, June 2017, available at

https://amcham.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/June-2017-Taiwan-Business-TOPICS.pdf.

133

The USTR’s website lists 56 U.S.TIFA agreements, but does not include the U.S. TIFA with Taiwan. See

https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements.

134

USTR, Press Release, October 2016, 2016.

132

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America’s closest allies.”135 Of the 38 VWP members, Taiwan is the only one that does not have

diplomatic relations with the United States. According to AIT Taipei, in 2015, more than 440,000

Taiwan passport-holders visited the United States and spent a collective $1.8 billion.136

Cross-Strait Relations

The United States has long had a strong interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,

heightened by U.S. security commitments related to Taiwan contained in the Taiwan Relations

Act. After eight years of relative stability in cross-Strait relations during the two presidential

terms of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, from May 2008 to May 2016, tensions are on the rise under

President Tsai. The main point of disagreement between the two sides is the long-standing issue

of Taiwan’s sovereignty, and specifically Beijing’s insistence that President Tsai commit to the

notion that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of “one China,” and President Tsai’s

unwillingness to make such a commitment. Beijing has progressively increased pressure on

President Tsai, starting before she took office, including by seeking to further isolate Taiwan

internationally.

The PRC Position on Taiwan

The PRC views the issue of Taiwan as unfinished business from the 1945-1949 civil war between

the Communist Party of China and the KMT, or Nationalist, forces under the leadership of

Chiang Kai-shek. The PRC position is that the PRC government that the CPC established on

October 1, 1949, replaced the KMT-led Republic of China, with no change in territory, meaning

that the PRC includes Taiwan. In the PRC view, the government on Taiwan is no more than “a

local authority in Chinese territory.”137 The PRC has long threatened to use force, if necessary, to

bring about Taiwan’s unification with mainland China.

The “One-China Principle” and the “1992 Consensus”

The PRC insists that the basis for peace across the Taiwan Strait is Taiwan’s acceptance of a

“one-China principle” that the PRC defines as “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a

part of China and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be separated.” (For its

diplomatic partners, the PRC adds two additional conditions, that partners recognize the PRC as

“the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China” and agree not to maintain

diplomatic relations with Taiwan.138)

During the 2008-2016 Ma Ying-jeou Administration on Taiwan, the PRC and Taiwan reached an

uneasy accommodation on the PRC’s “one-China” demand by pledging their adherence to what

the two sides called the “1992 Consensus.” The term referred to an agreement reportedly reached

during meetings in November 1992 between two semi-official organizations, the PRC’s

Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange

Foundation (SEF). In those meetings, the two organizations reportedly agreed to state orally that

“both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle,” with the understanding that

135

Department of Homeland Security, “U.S. Visa Waiver Program,” accessed August 25, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/

visa-waiver-program#_ftn1.

136

Information provided by AIT Taipei, October 17, 2016.

137

State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” White Paper,

2000.

138

Ibid.

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Taiwan: Issues for Congress

each side had “its own interpretation” of what the “one-China principle” meant.139 Under the

“1992 Consensus” formula, Beijing and Taipei held 11 rounds of quasi-official high-level talks

and signed 23 cross-Strait economic and functional agreements. In November 2015, PRC

President Xi and then-Taiwan President Ma engaged in a first-ever meeting between the leaders

of the ROC and the PRC, though the two men agreed to meet not as “presidents,” but as “leaders”

of Taiwan and mainland China.

Both the PRC and Taiwan’s KMT have called on President Tsai to affirm the “1992 Conse

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