Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy:
Issues for the 115th Congress
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R44897
Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
Summary
This report examines human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
policy options for Congress. The PRC government under the leadership of Chinese Communist
Party General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping has implemented a clampdown on
political dissent, civil society, human rights activists and lawyers, and the religious, cultural, and
linguistic practices of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Other major human rights violations in China
include the practice of incommunicado detention, torture of persons in custody, censorship of the
Internet, and restrictions on the freedoms of religion, association, and assembly.
The era of Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, who was China’s leader from 2002 to 2012, was marked
by serious human rights abuses, but also by an emerging civil society of nongovernmental
organizations and advocacy groups, a growing number of human rights activists and lawyers, and
the rise of limited investigative reporting and public discourse on social media platforms. Despite
moving forward with some policies aimed at reducing rights abuses and making the government
more transparent and responsive, Xi has implemented new laws that appear to strengthen the role
of the Communist Party and the state over a wide range of social and civil society activities in the
name of national security, and instated greater government controls over the media and the
Internet. Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been temporarily
detained, arrested, sentenced to prison terms, or placed under heavy surveillance in what is
known as the “7-09 Crackdown.”
Human rights conditions in the PRC long have been a central issue in U.S.-China ties. According
to some analysts, the Trump Administration has indicated a partial departure from the Obama
Administration’s approach toward human rights in China, which some analysts say suggests less
emphasis on human rights in U.S. dealings with Beijing. The issue of human rights is not among
the “four pillars” of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during
discussions between President Trump and President Xi at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. In a speech
to State Department employees in May 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that “guiding
all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human
dignity, the way people are treated.” He also said, “If we condition too heavily that others must
adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to
our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests.”
Congress and successive Administrations have developed an array of means for promoting human
rights and democracy in China, often deployed simultaneously. Policy tools include open censure
of China; quiet diplomacy; congressional hearings and legislation; funding for rule of law and
civil society programs in the PRC; support for dissidents and prodemocracy groups in China and
the United States; sanctions; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; public diplomacy; and
coordinating international pressure. Another high-profile policy practice is the U.S. government
issuance of congressionally mandated country reports, including reports on human rights,
religious freedom, and trafficking in persons.
Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and
methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. Possible approaches range from
supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international
engagement, to conditioning the further development of bilateral ties on improvements in human
rights in China. Some approaches attempt to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with
other U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship. Other approaches challenge the underlying
assumption that U.S. human rights values and policies may involve trade-offs with other U.S.
interests, arguing instead that human rights are fundamental to other U.S. objectives.
Congressional Research Service
Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
For additional information, including policy recommendations, see CRS Report R41007,
Understanding China’s Political System; the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s
Annual Report 2016; the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2016; and other resources cited in the report.
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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Assessing Human Rights and Democracy in China ........................................................................ 4
Public Opinion and Democracy ................................................................................................ 6
U.S. Policy Questions and Options ................................................................................................. 7
Crackdown on Dissent.................................................................................................................... 11
Arrests of Rights Lawyers and Activists ................................................................................. 12
Selected Prominent Cases ................................................................................................. 12
Civil Society .................................................................................................................................. 15
New PRC Laws ............................................................................................................................. 16
National Security Law............................................................................................................. 16
Cybersecurity Law .................................................................................................................. 17
Counterterrorism Law ............................................................................................................. 17
Overseas NGO Law ................................................................................................................ 18
Charity Law............................................................................................................................. 19
Family Violence Law .............................................................................................................. 19
Frequently Raised Human Rights Issues ....................................................................................... 19
Ongoing Human Rights Issues: Selected Examples ............................................................... 20
Rule of Law ............................................................................................................................. 21
Criminal Justice ................................................................................................................ 22
Forms of Detention ........................................................................................................... 23
Torture ..................................................................................................................................... 23
Prisoners of Conscience .......................................................................................................... 25
Liu Xiaobo ........................................................................................................................ 25
Gao Zhisheng .................................................................................................................... 27
Xu Zhiyong ....................................................................................................................... 27
Media Freedom ....................................................................................................................... 28
The Internet ....................................................................................................................... 28
Weibo and WeChat............................................................................................................ 30
Religious Freedom and Ethnic Minority Issues ...................................................................... 31
Christians .......................................................................................................................... 33
Tibetans ............................................................................................................................. 34
Uyghur Muslims ............................................................................................................... 39
Falun Gong .............................................................................................................................. 42
Organ Harvesting Allegations ................................................................................................. 43
China’s Family Planning Policies ........................................................................................... 45
U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China .......................................................................... 46
Legislation and Hearings......................................................................................................... 47
Global Magnitsky Act ............................................................................................................. 48
Human Rights, Rule of Law, and Civil Society Programs ...................................................... 49
National Endowment for Democracy ...................................................................................... 49
Sanctions ................................................................................................................................. 50
Human Rights Dialogue .......................................................................................................... 51
Internet Freedom ..................................................................................................................... 52
International Broadcasting ...................................................................................................... 53
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) ................................................................. 53
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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
Joint Statement on Human Rights in China ............................................................................ 55
Appendixes
Appendix. Selected Legislation Related to Human Rights in China ............................................. 56
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 58
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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
Introduction
Human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) long have been a central issue
in U.S.-China relations. The two governments’ different perceptions of human rights are an
underlying source of mutual misunderstanding and mistrust. Frictions over human rights issues
affect other issues in the bilateral relationship, including those related to economics and security.
China’s weak rule of law and restrictions on the Internet affect U.S. companies doing business in
the PRC. People-to-people exchanges, particularly educational and academic ones, and
collaboration among U.S. and PRC nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are hampered by
periodic Chinese government campaigns against “Western values” and restrictions on foreign
NGOs, as well as on the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly.
For some U.S. policymakers, human rights conditions in China represent a test of the success of
overall U.S. policy toward the PRC. They argue that the U.S. policy of cultivating diplomatic and
economic ties with China has failed to promote meaningful political reform and improvements in
human rights, and that without progress in these areas, China’s foreign policy is likely to become
more aggressive, and mutual trust and cooperation in other areas of the bilateral relationship will
remain difficult to achieve. They contend, furthermore, that the long-standing, overarching policy
of U.S. engagement with China, which they say focuses on other U.S. interests, particularly
economic ones, at times acts at cross purposes with U.S. efforts to support human rights.1 Others
opine that U.S. economic engagement with China has helped to strengthen the communist regime
through the legitimacy and resources that economic development has provided, and thereby
lessened the impetus for fundamental political reform.2 Other experts, by contrast, maintain that
U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social transformations that create the
necessary conditions for political reform and improvements in rights protections in China,
particularly over the long term. They add that change in China’s human rights policies will come
mostly from within, and that Washington has little direct leverage over such developments and
Beijing’s actions.3
Since the end of the 1980s, following the 1989 military suppression of prodemocracy
demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing, successive U.S. Administrations have
employed broadly similar strategies for promoting human rights in China. Some analysts have
referred to the U.S. foreign policy approach of promoting human rights and democracy in China
through diplomatic and economic engagement, without directly challenging Communist Party
rule, as a strategy of seeking China’s “peaceful evolution.”4 PRC leaders long have been
1 Rep. Christopher H. Smith, Cochair, Opening Remarks before the Congressional Executive Commission on China,
“Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016;
James Mann, Statement before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for
Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; Daniel Blumenthal, “Tiananmen’s
Anniversary Is a Chance for Obama to Fight for Human Rights in China,” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2014; “Can the U.S.
Help Advance Human Rights in China?” The Atlantic, June 13, 2013.
2 “Capitalism Is Making China Richer, But Not Democratic,” NPR, November 7, 2014.
3 Wilson Center, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, “The Value of Values: Reconsidering the Role of
Human Rights in U.S.-China Relations,” April 20, 2016; Simon Denyer, “Will the U.S.-Cuba Opening Mirror
Engagement with China?” Washington Post, December 20, 2014; Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to the
People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Tiananmen at 25:
Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political Development,” May 20, 2014.
4 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; Warren Christopher, Secretary
of State under the Clinton Administration (1993-1997), stated: “Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution
of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that
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suspicious of any U.S. efforts that they perceive as part of a long-term plan to subvert their rule
through “peaceful evolution.”5 President Bill Clinton favored an approach that he and members of
his Administration called “constructive engagement”—furthering diplomatic and economic ties
while pressing for open markets, human rights, and democracy—calling it “our best hope to
secure our own interest[s] and values and to advance China’s.”6 President George W. Bush also
came to view U.S. engagement as the most effective means of promoting U.S. interests as well as
freedom in the PRC.7 Both Bush and President Barack Obama emphasized that China’s respect
for international human rights norms would benefit China’s own success and stability.8
The Obama Administration attempted to forge bilateral cooperation on many fronts, while
“managing differences” with China on issues including human rights.9 Then-Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton described the Administration’s human rights policy as one of “principled
pragmatism.”10 This approach was based upon the premise that tough but quiet diplomacy is both
less disruptive to the overall relationship and more effective in producing change than public
censure. Nonetheless, the Obama Administration publicly criticized China’s human rights policies
on many occasions.11
Some human rights groups and policymakers have criticized the Trump Administration’s
“transactional” focus on U.S. security and economic interests in foreign affairs, while appearing
to downplay human rights issues or preferring to raise them quietly.12 They criticized Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson for not appearing in person as his predecessors had done to publicly announce
the release of the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in
March 2017, and the Trump Administration for not signing a joint letter, signed by 11 other
countries, that denounced China over its alleged torture of detained human rights lawyers and
activists.13 In a speech to State Department employees on May 3, 2017, Tillerson stated that
“guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom,
human dignity, the way people are treated.” He also stated, “If we condition too heavily that
others must adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates
obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests.”14 Some
great country.” Warren Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 13, 1993.
5 Baogang He, “Working with China to Promote Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2013.
6 “Clinton Defends ‘Constructive Engagement’ of China,” CNN.com, October 24, 1997.
7 “Transcript of Bob Costas’ Interview with President George W. Bush,” PRNewsChannel.com, August 11, 2008;
“Bush Woos China on Trade,” BBC News, May 30, 2001.
8 Department of State, “Press Conference Following U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue,” Beijing, China, August 2,
2013; Ewen MacAskill and Tania Branigan, “Obama Presses Hu Jintao on Human Rights During White House
Welcome,” Guardian.co.uk, January 19, 2011; Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but
Stresses Ties to China,” New York Times, January 19, 2011.
9 Zachary Keck, “Kerry: US-China Ties ‘Most Consequential in the World,’” The Diplomat, November 5, 2014.
10 Charley Keyes, “U.S. Is ‘Pragmatic’ with China, Russia,” CNN, December 14, 2009; Hillary Clinton, Georgetown
University, December 14, 2009, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/hillaryclintonhumanrightsagenda.htm.
11 See, for example, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi
Jinping of China in Joint Press Conference,” Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, November 12, 2014.
12 “A Coldly Transactional China Policy; Donald Trump’s First Meeting with Xi Jinping Was All About Business,”
Economist.com, April 8, 2017; Kevin Liptak, “Trump Signals He Won’t Press Human Rights Ahead of Key Diplomatic
Week,” CNN, April 2, 2017.
13 Nahal Toos, “Rubio Chides Tillerson over Absence on Human Rights Report’s Launch,” Politico.com, March 2,
2017; Simon Denyer and Emily Rauhala, “Eleven Countries Signed a Letter Slamming China for Torturing Lawyers.
The U.S. Did Not,” Washington Post, March 22, 2017.
14 Rex. W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, “Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees,” Washington, DC, May 3,
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observers criticized this approach. In an opinion piece published on May 8, 2017, for example,
Senator John McCain stated:
In a recent address to State Department employees, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said
conditioning our foreign policy too heavily on values creates obstacles to advance our
national interests.... To view foreign policy as simply transactional is more dangerous than
its proponents realize. Depriving the oppressed of a beacon of hope could lose us the world
we have built and thrived in. It could cost our reputation in history as the nation distinct
from all others in our achievements, our identity and our enduring influence on mankind.
Our values are central to all three.15
In March 2017, Tillerson, on his first official trip to China, stated in closing remarks that he was
there to forge a “constructive and results-oriented relationship between the United States and
China” and that he “made clear that the United States will continue to advocate for universal
values such as human rights and religious freedom.”16 Senators Ben Cardin and Marco Rubio, in
a letter to the Secretary of State, noted that Tillerson made “only one public mention of human
rights concerns in the context of the bilateral relationship” during his visit to Beijing, and urged
him to make human rights a “top priority” in discussions with PRC officials during the meeting
between President Trump and President Xi in April 2017 at Mar-a-Lago.17 Secretary Tillerson, in
a briefing to reporters following the Trump-Xi meeting, stated that during the talks, which some
observers described as “coldly transactional,” Trump “noted the importance of protecting human
rights and other values deeply held by Americans.”18 While no mention was made of specific
issues, Tillerson added that human rights “occupied a core of all of our discussions.” The issue of
human rights, however, was not listed among the “four pillars” of the new U.S.-China
Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during the discussions.19
During his March 2017 visit to Beijing, Secretary Tillerson reportedly pressed Chinese officials
on the case of U.S. citizen Sandy Phan-Gillis, who had been detained in China since March 2015
on espionage charges.20 A few weeks after the April 2017 meeting between Trump and Xi, PhanGillis, a business consultant and cultural ambassador from Houston who had made frequent trips
to China, was sentenced by PRC authorities to three-and-a-half years in prison and then deported
to the United States.21 Some observers believe that the case of Phan-Gillis may signal a shift in
U.S. human rights policy that may emphasize U.S. citizens detained in China and focus less on
2017.
15 “John McCain: Why We Must Support Human Rights,” New York Times, May 8, 2017.
16 Department of State, “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a Press Availability,” Beijing, China,
March 18, 2017.
17 “Cardin, Rubio Call on Tillerson to Raise Human Rights Concerns with Chinese President Xi,” Congressional
Documents and Publications, April 4, 2017.
18 “A Coldly Transactional China Policy; Donald Trump’s First Meeting with Xi Jinping Was All About Business,” op.
cit.
19 “Briefing by Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mnuchin, and Secretary Ross on President Trump’s Meetings with
President Xi of China,” White House Press Releases and Documents, Palm Beach, Florida, April 7, 2017. The four
pillars of the newly established U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue are: the diplomatic and security dialogue; the
comprehensive economic dialogue; the law enforcement and cybersecurity dialogue; and the social and cultural issues
dialogue.
20 Lomi Kriel, “China Sentences Houston Businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis in Spying Case,” Houston Chronicle,
April 26, 2017.
21 Dui Hua Foundation, “Dui Hua Welcomes Return of Sandy Phan-Gillis to the United States,” April 28, 2017; “China
Convicts American as Spy,” Dow Jones, April 26, 2017; Lomi Kriel, “China Sentences Houston Businesswoman
Sandy Phan-Gillis in Spying Case,” Houston Chronicle, April 26, 2017.
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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress
Chinese dissidents and prisoners of conscience.22 In February 2017, U.S. officials reportedly
assisted the family of Chinese human rights attorney Xie Yang, whose youngest daughter is a
U.S. citizen by birth, as his wife and two daughters were attempting to leave Thailand for the
United States.
The U.S. government has employed an array of efforts and tactics aimed at promoting human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law in China. The effects of these efforts primarily have been
evident along the margins of the PRC political system. Congressional policy tools include open
letters to the Administration and to Chinese leaders in support of human rights or critical of PRC
policies; hearings; funding for foreign assistance programs in China and U.S.-based groups that
promote human rights; meetings with Chinese dissidents and human rights lawyers; raising
human rights issues during official visits to China; and sanctions. Executive branch options
include diplomatic negotiations and formal dialogues focused on human rights issues; public
diplomacy programs; international broadcasting; and coordination of international pressure.
Another high-profile practice is the issuance of congressionally mandated country reports,
including reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons. Many analysts
have observed that China’s leaders have become less responsive to international pressure on
human rights in recent years.23 Other experts, however, have emphasized that the treatment of
some prominent Chinese dissidents and rights activists by PRC authorities may have been less
severe than it might otherwise have been in part as a result of international attention and
pressure.24
Assessing Human Rights and Democracy in China
The PRC government is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose rule is referenced in
the preamble to China’s Constitution. The PRC Constitution provides for many civil and political
rights, including, in Article 35, the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and
demonstration. Other provisions in China’s constitution and laws circumscribe or condition these
rights and freedoms, however, and the state restricts these freedoms in practice. China’s leaders
typically view these rights as subordinate to their own authority and to the policy goals of
maintaining state security and social stability, promoting economic development, and providing
for economic and social rights. They assert that perspectives on human rights vary according to a
country’s level of economic development and social system, implying that human rights are not
“universal,” in contrast to statements by some U.S. government officials that have emphasized
“universal rights.” PRC leaders frequently denounce foreign criticisms of China’s human rights
record and policies as interference in China’s sovereign, internal affairs.25
Nearly 30 years after the 1989 demonstrations for democracy in Beijing and elsewhere in China
and the subsequent military crackdown, the Communist Party remains firmly in power, through
both coercive measures and highly publicized efforts to improve governance. Many Chinese
citizens have attained living standards, educational and travel opportunities, access to
information, and a level of global integration that few envisioned in 1989. Little progress,
however, has been made in most areas of political freedom and civil liberties. China’s leaders
22 “China Lawyer’s Family Says US Helped Them Flee,” The Telegraph, May 8, 2017.
23 John Kamm, Dui Hua Foundation, “China’s Human Rights Diplomacy: Past, Present, Future,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, March 28, 2014.
24 Simon Denyer, “In China, Signs that Global Pressure May (Sometimes) Get Results,” Washington Post, January 2,
2016; Sophie Richardson, “Underestimating Bad Faith,” Human Rights Watch, July 9, 2014; Sophie Richardson, “EU
Brings Some Transparency to Dialogue with China,” Human Rights Watch, December 9, 2014.
25 See Wang Yi, “Work Together to Promote and Protect Human Rights, China Daily, February 27, 2017.
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have rejected institutional reforms that they perceive might undermine the CCP’s monopoly on
power, and continue to respond forcefully to signs and instances of autonomous social
organization, independent political activity, and social instability. They seek to prevent the
development of linkages among individuals, social groups, and geographical regions that they
perceive as having potential political impact. The government maintains severe restrictions on
unsanctioned religious, ethnic, and labor activity and groups, political dissidents, and human
rights lawyers. Government authorities have imposed harsh policies against Tibetans, Uyghurs,
and practitioners of Falun Gong.
As CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping took over the reins of power in 2012
and early 2013, there was a period of cautious optimism and discussion in intellectual circles in
China about the need for political reform and how to address these issues.26 However, Xi has
carried out a crackdown on political dissent and civil society, reversing what appeared to some
observers to be a trend toward increased tolerance of mild criticism of government policies, the
exchange of some news and opinion on social media, some advocacy by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and legal actions against officials on behalf of some aggrieved citizens.27
Many citizens who had openly discussed political issues, engaged in political or social activism,
attempted to defend dissidents or human rights
activists in court, or tried to expose some
China and U.N. Human Rights
corrupt officials have been punished.28 Xi’s
Covenants
focus on national security and the perception
China has signed (1997) and ratified (2001) the
of civil society as a threat to Communist Party
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
rule appear to be driven in part by the
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and signed (1998), but not
ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and
daunting political challenges that he faces,
Political Rights (ICCPR).
including persistent political corruption; a
slowing national economy; rising popular
expectations; severe environmental pollution; unrest in Tibet and violent clashes in Xinjiang; and
the growing popular attraction to organized religions, which some of China’s leaders contend
may undermine their authority.29
In some ways, the PRC central government has continued to demonstrate a measure of
responsiveness toward popular and expert opinion, reflecting a style of rule that some experts
refer to as “responsive authoritarianism” or “consultative authoritarianism,” and what PRC
leaders refer to as “consultative democracy.”30 The CCP has striven to meet the demands and
expectations of many Chinese citizens for competent and accountable governance and fair
26 Jamil Anderlini, “How Long Can the Communist Party Survive in China?” Financial Times, September 20, 2013.
27 James Fallows, “China’s Great Leap Backward,” The Atlantic, December 2016; Tom Mitchell, “Xi’s China:
Smothering Dissent,” Financial Times, July 27, 2016.
28 Robert Daly, “China in 2014: The Three Rs,” CNN.com Blogs, December 16, 2013; Zachary Keck, “Four Things
China Learned from the Arab Spring,” The Diplomat, January 4, 2014.
29 David Ignatius, “China’s Xi Jinping Consolidates Power and Brings Stability,” Washington Post, February 28, 2014;
Willy Lam, “Xi Consolidates Power at Fourth Plenum, but Sees Limits,” China Brief, vol. 14, no. 22, November 20,
2014; David Shambaugh, “Obama in China: Preserving the Balance,” transcript, Brookings Institution, November 5,
2014, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20141105_obama_china_transcript.pdf.
30 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.; Jessica Teets, “Civil Society and Consultative Authoritarianism in
China,” The 7th Annual Conference on U.S-China Economic Relations and China’s Economic Development, Elliot
School of International Affairs, George Washington University, November 21, 2014; David M. Lampton, “How China
Is Ruled: Why It’s Getting Harder for Beijing to Govern,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014; Robert P. Weller,
“Responsive Authoritarianism,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparisons
with Taiwan, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2008.
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application of the laws, while some policymaking processes have become more inclusive. In
recent years, the PRC government has implemented some legal and institutional reforms aimed at
preventing some rights abuses and making the government more transparent and responsive. The
state has limited repressive measures largely to selected key individuals and groups, although the
scope of those targeted has widened under President Xi. Many citizens continue to enjoy
“everyday freedoms” and appear to remain supportive of the regime.31 Although public protests in
China are common, they largely are focused upon local economic and environmental issues rather
than national political ones.32
Public Opinion and Democracy
Some experts believe that, over the long term, economic development will lead to
democratization in China, as it already has in other East Asian societies, such as South Korea and
Taiwan.33 They posit that the growing urban middle class, a manifestation of such development,
will likely be a key agent of political change.34 According to other analysts, however, China’s
burgeoning middle class has not yet become a catalyst for democracy, despite its members’
growing awareness of their interests and in some cases their participation in public protests.35
Third National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020)36
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in June 1993, the World Conference on Human
Rights recommended that all countries develop national action plans identifying steps whereby they would strive
to improve the promotion and protection of human rights.37 The PRC released its first human rights action plan in
2009. The third action plan was released in September 2016.38 The plan includes sections on economic, social, and
cultural rights, civil and political rights, and the rights of specific groups, including ethnic minorities and women.
Part II, Civil and Political Rights, addresses some of China’s most pressing human rights issues. It includes
commitments toward preventing torture in police and administrative custody, abiding by the rules and regulations
on places of surveillance, reducing judicial interference, and implementing the principle of presumption of
innocence. Part II also includes the objectives of expanding citizens’ right to know and enlarging public involvement
in legislation.
31 “The Rise of ‘Everyday Freedoms’ in China,” Al Jazeera, June 2, 2016; Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op.
cit.
32 “NYT Correspondent: Substantive Political Change Unlikely Anytime Soon,” Asia Society, March 8, 2017;
“Officials Call For Calm Amid Mass Pollution Protests in China’s Hubei,” Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2016; “Chinese
Blogger Who Compiled Protest Data Missing, Believed Detained,” Radio Free Asia, June 21, 2016; Brendon Hong,
“China’s Hidden Protests,” The Daily Beast, January 5, 2016.
33 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959). Lipset argued that socioeconomic development, including
higher levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, are correlated with democracy.
34 Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free,” in Andrew J. Nathan, Larry Diamond, and Marc F.
Plattner, eds, Will China Democratize? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013; J. Stapleton Roy, Former
U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, “Tiananmen at 25: Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political Development,” May 20,
2014.
35 Jie Chen, A Middle Class Without Democracy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
36 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, National Human Rights Action Plan of China
(2016-2020), September 29, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/29/c_135722183.htm.
37 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “World Conference on Human Rights,” 14-25
June 1993, Vienna, Austria, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/PlansActions/Pages/PlansofActionIndex.aspx.
38 “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020),” Xinhua, September 29, 2016,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/29/c_135722183.htm
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Some public opinion polling suggests that in China, economic development has been weakly
correlated with democracy, and that Chinese define democracy differently from most Americans.
In a study published in 2016, one U.S. scholar found that a plurality (27%) of Chinese
respondents in a survey viewed democracy as government that is “governed by and for the
people,” but fewer than 40% perceived of democracy in terms of either competitive elections,
rights and freedoms, or equality and justice.39 In many ways, according to some studies, members
of China’s middle class are dependent upon the state for their material well-being and are not
prone to agitate for democracy if they perceive that their economic needs are being met. They
value social and political stability, which they believe the Communist Party can provide, and have
expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.40 Many Chinese reportedly are generally satisfied
with the level of democracy in their country and are optimistic that the level of democracy they
enjoy will rise in the future. This sentiment causes some Chinese to resent foreign criticism of
human rights conditions and to withhold sympathy for democracy activists.41
U.S. Policy Questions and Options
Debates about what policies the U.S. government should pursue in order to promote human rights
in China tend to revolve around the following principal sets of questions:
To what extent should the U.S. government expend time and resources promoting
human rights in other countries, including China? How do such efforts relate to
and advance U.S. interests and policy objectives?
Which human rights issues and developments in China most warrant U.S.
attention, and why? Should human rights issues be prioritized? How might
improvements in some human rights lead to improvements in other human
rights?
Approaches to promoting human rights vary. Some are more (or less)
confrontational, public, or punitive. Which approaches have been more effective
in promoting human rights in China? How have U.S. approaches changed over
time?
What is the range of possible policy tools for promoting human rights in China?
Which options are the most effective, and over what time frame are they most
effective?
How much importance should the United States attach to multilateral efforts to
promote human rights in China? Should international approaches be focused on
the United Nations, or be coordinated directly with like-minded governments?
How are possible U.S. human rights policies constrained, if at all, by other U.S.
policies and interests related to China? How are they constrained, if at all, by the
institutions and mechanisms that form the basis of U.S.-China relations?
Should the United States’ interest in human rights be the subject of negotiation,
and, if so, should the United States be willing to match improvements in China’s
39 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.
40 Andrew Nathan, National Endowment for Democracy, “12th Annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture: The Puzzle of
the Chinese Middle Class,” October 20, 2015; Jie Chen, “Attitudes Toward Democracy and the Behavior of China’s
Middle Class,” in Cheng Li, ed. China’s Emerging Middle Class, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
41 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.
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human rights conditions with actions valued by China? In what areas might such
matching “action for action” be explored?
Should the U.S. government press China to abide by international human rights
standards and covenants in a separate bilateral human rights dialogue, or as part
of other dialogues?
Some human rights advocates argue that promoting human rights in China should be viewed as a
national interest and elevated to first order importance in U.S. policy toward China. They contend
that U.S. foreign policy should be more values-focused, and that other areas of the bilateral
relationship, such as security and trade, would benefit from prioritizing human rights. Some
experts recommend a “whole-of-government” approach, whereby human rights policy is
coordinated among all agencies dealing with China, and suggest that the Administration and
Congress work together to consider legislative and other measures.42 They favor placing human
rights conditions upon Beijing before satisfying China’s desire for international cooperation in
many areas, and imposing sanctions when necessary.43
Other specialists contend that open censure and efforts to place human rights-related conditions
upon further development of the bilateral relationship have not been very effective. They suggest
that it is more useful, particularly in the long run, to take a more cooperative and flexible
approach toward promoting human rights in China. In this way, U.S. policies to promote human
rights in the PRC are less likely to meet resistance among CCP hardliners and more likely to find
agreement among Chinese governmental and nongovernmental leaders who also may be pursuing
human rights and related objectives.44 A less confrontational approach, they add, is also more
compatible with the myriad ongoing forms of U.S. engagement and cooperation with China. They
urge U.S. policymakers to seek common ground with their Chinese counterparts and to appeal as
much as possible to China’s own interests on human rights issues.45
The following are possible steps put forward by a diverse group of experts that the U.S.
government and other actors could take, or that Congress could mandate or otherwise require, to
promote human rights in the PRC. The U.S. government has attempted to put some of these
recommended policies and efforts into practice. For a discussion of U.S. government human
rights activities related to China, see “U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China,” below.
Support congressional hearings, legislation, resolutions, letters, and statements
expressing concerns about human rights developments in China and individuals
and groups persecuted in China for exercising internationally recognized human
rights that are protected in the PRC Constitution.
Increase U.S. government support for rule of law, civil society, and political
participation programs in China. Provide funding to the National Endowment for
42 Yang Jianli, Remarks before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered
for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, October 6, 2016; “US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China
Dialogue,” Human Rights Watch, June 5, 2016; “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?” The Atlantic,
op. cit.
43 Sophie Richardson, “How to Deal with China’s Human Rights Abuses,” ChinaFile, September 1, 2016.
44 “A Bow to Reality, Not China,” USA Today, February 27, 2009; Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a
Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly, July 2009; William F.
Schulz, “Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China,” Center for
American Progress, January 2009.
45 Wilson Center, op. cit.; Winston Lord, op. cit.
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Democracy to support human rights and democracy groups based in the United
States and Hong Kong.
Support nongovernmental actors, including umbrella organizations that
coordinate the efforts of disparate groups focused on human rights issues in
China.46 Formulate a code of conduct for U.S. civil society organizations,
including think tanks, universities, and cultural-exchange entities, for interacting
with Chinese officials and policies when faced with human rights restrictions.47
Provide financial assistance to dissidents and victims of religious and ethnic
persecution in China and Chinese political and religious refugees.
Support research and documentation of human rights conditions and abuses in
China.
Link U.S. economic and human rights policies.
Impose restrictions upon Chinese trade and investment ties with the United
States unless human rights conditions improve.48
Link permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status and low import tariffs
with improvements in human rights conditions in China.
Challenge Chinese security regulations and restrictions on Internet use as
barriers to trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Tighten U.S. export controls in response to human rights violations or reduce
the export of U.S. technologies and services that can be used to violate
human rights, such as Internet, surveillance, and law enforcement products
and equipment.
Encourage U.S. companies in China to speak out against policies that affect
both business interests and human rights.49
Impose sanctions on China and PRC officials in response to Chinese human
rights abuses.
Deny U.S. visas to, or freeze the U.S. banks accounts of, Chinese officials
responsible for severe human rights violations (see “Global Magnitsky Act,”
below).
Apply provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act that deny U.S.
visas to foreign officials responsible for particularly severe violations of
religious freedom.50
46 Freedom House, The Politburo’s Predicament: Confronting the Limitations of Chinese Communist Party Repression,
January 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/china/politburo-predicament.
47 Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk, Chairs, Asia Society Center on US-China Relations and University of California
San Diego 21st Century China Center, “Task Force Report: US Policy Toward China: Recommendations for a New
Administration,” February 2017.
48 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “The Broken Promises of China’s WTO Accession:
Reprioritizing Human Rights,” March 1, 2017; Wei Jingsheng, Remarks before the Congressional Executive
Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look
Forward,” December 7, 2016; Paul Carsten and Michael Martina, “US Says China’s Internet Censorship a Burden for
Business: Report,” Reuters, April 8, 2016.
49 Sophie Richardson, “In China, Big Companies Are Learning the Business of Human Rights,” The Globe and Mail,
September 14, 2014.
50 P.L. 105-292, §604.
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Impose penalties on PRC officials for human rights violations, including
placing holds on their foreign bank accounts.
Suspend U.S. engagement and exchanges with China’s Ministry of Justice
and Ministry of Public Security until all human rights lawyers are released
from detention or prison or their constitutional rights are restored.
Suspend U.S. engagement and exchanges with Chinese officials from
provinces where egregious incidents of religious persecution have been
reported.51
Noting the rise in detentions of some U.S. citizens and green card holders in
China, some advocacy groups urge the State Department to issue a travel
advisory, warning U.S. citizens and green card holders that there is a risk of
arbitrary detention if they travel to China.
Invoke the principle of reciprocity as a means of promoting human rights in
China.
Demand that U.S. journalists, academics, and media outlets enjoy the
same level of access to China that Chinese journalists, academics, and
media outlets have in the United States.52
Call for mutual treatment in issuing visas for journalists and oppose the
PRC government’s denial of visas to U.S. and other foreign journalists
who write critically of CCP leaders or sensitive policy issues.
Grant the PRC an additional consulate in the United States if and only if
the PRC government agrees to a U.S. consulate in Lhasa, Tibet.53
Raise human rights in bilateral interactions.
Raise human rights issues, not only in State Department-led dialogues and
meetings with Chinese officials, but also in discussions and meetings led by
other U.S. departments and agencies.
Support a separate U.S.-China human rights dialogue.
Make official human rights discussions more transparent, and open them up
to include representatives from civil society, including human rights
organizations.
Include civil society representatives in human rights discussions.
Bolster international efforts.
Support collective statements and resolutions critical of Chinese human
rights policies in the United Nations and other international fora.
Field a larger and more active U.S. delegation at the United Nations Human
Rights Council (UNHRC). Hold China to its UNHRC Universal Periodic
Review commitments.
51 For a look at religious persecution by province, see Freedom House, The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival,
Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping, February 2017.
52 For example, see H.R. 1112, Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2015 (McGovern, introduced on February 26, 2015,
but did not become law) and H.R. 2899, Chinese Media Reciprocity Act of 2011 (Rohrabacher, introduced on
September 12, 2011, but did not become law).
53 See Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §611).
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Coordinate with Asian and European democracies in engaging in diplomatic
and other forms of pressure on the Chinese government to improve human
rights conditions.
Back internet freedom efforts.
Increase funding to the Department of State and Broadcasting Board of
Governors for the development of software applications that enable Chinese
Internet users to circumvent censorship.
Support efforts aimed at enabling Chinese audiences to circumvent Internet
censorship and access Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA)
online programming.
Oppose the PRC government’s efforts to promote the concept of “Internet
sovereignty,” by which each country applies its own rules on issues of
Internet freedom.
Strengthen public diplomacy.
Provide greater funding for VOA and RFA broadcast and online programs in
Mandarin, Cantonese, Tibetan, Uyghur, and English.
Strengthen the International Visitor Leadership Program, which brings
established and potential leaders from China to the United States for shortterm stays that include study tours in the areas of government, media,
education, economics, environment, labor, and rule of law.54
Crackdown on Dissent
Less than one year into the 2012 leadership transition that brought Xi Jinping to power, PRC
authorities began to carry out a clampdown on political dissent, free expression, and civil society.
While the PRC government has engaged in many cycles of reform and repression in the nearly
three decades since the 1989 Tiananmen military crackdown, recent security measures have been
striking for their scope and severity, say observers. Xi’s policies have included detentions and
arrests of hundreds of human rights attorneys, investigative journalists, prominent bloggers,
members of ethnic minorities, and civil society leaders. Freedom House reported that in China,
which it deems to be among the bottom 20 “unfree” countries in the world, “[a] renewed push for
party supremacy and ideological conformity has undermined rule of law reforms and curtailed
civil and political rights.”55 In May 2013, the CCP issued a classified directive (Document No. 9)
identifying seven “false ideological trends, positions, and activities,” largely aimed at the media
and liberal academics. According to the document, topics to be avoided in public discussion
include universal values, constitutional democracy, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights,
an independent judiciary, and criticism of the CCP.56
In 2016, a liberal journal, Yanhuang Chunqiu, under pressure from conservatives within the
Communist Party, ceased publication. For 25 years, the periodical reportedly had been a
54 United States Embassy, Beijing, China, The International Visitor Leadership Program, http://beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/ivlp.html.
55 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf.
56 Asia Society, “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” November 8, 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-translation.
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mouthpiece for political reformers and exercised relative independence, as long as it did not
broach the most sensitive political topics. A former editor stated that its patrons in the Party “had
grown politically weak under the current leadership.”57 In January 2017, Beijing authorities shut
down two websites run by a liberal Chinese think tank, reportedly after its founder criticized the
Supreme People’s Court’s top judge for publicly rejecting the ideal of judicial independence.58
Arrests of Rights Lawyers and Activists
Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been detained, arrested, or
placed under surveillance or house arrest in what is known as the “7-09 Crackdown.” Launched
on July 9, 2015, some observers say this campaign against the growing number of human rights
lawyers in China has been unprecedented in scale.59 PRC authorities have targeted, in particular,
staff of the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing, which had represented Uyghur rights advocate Ilham
Tohti, dissident artist Ai Weiwei, Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of alleged government
misconduct.
Of the hundreds of rights lawyers and activists whom Chinese authorities have detained, most
have been released, although from 15 to over 30 have been sentenced to prison terms, released on
bail, or given suspended sentences usually of three years of home detention.60 At least two rights
lawyers and one activist—Xia Lin, Zhou Shifeng, and Hu Shifeng—have received lengthy prison
terms. Some lawyers and activists who were released on bail or suspended sentences reportedly
have disappeared.61 Some rights attorneys reportedly suffered torture and psychological abuse by
security personnel, were held incommunicado or at unknown locations, or were coerced into
making televised confessions. Some have had their freedom of movement restricted or been
prevented from travelling abroad.62 Spouses of detained lawyers have been subjected to
surveillance and restrictions on movement and travel. Authorities reportedly have installed
cameras or posted guards at spouses’ homes, cut off their telephone service, frozen their bank
accounts, and warned them not to give interviews.63
Selected Prominent Cases
Guo Feixiong is the pen name of Yang Maodong, a legal rights advocate arrested
in 2013 for demonstrating against the censorship of a progressive publication,
Southern Weekend. In 2015, Guo was sentenced to six years in prison for
57 Philip Wen, “The Final Stand of Yanhuang Chunqui, Torchbearer of Chinese Liberal Thought,” Sydney Morning
Herald, July 27, 2016.
58 Wendy Wu and Jane Cai, “Beijing Internet Censors Close Websites of Liberal Economic Think Tank,” South China
Morning Post, January 21, 2017.
59 “Torture Accusations as EU Ambassador Raises Case of Chinese Lawyer Xie Yang,” Hong Kong Free Press,
January 25, 2017; Simon Denyer, “A Broken Lawyer and a Hawkish Judge Cast Deep Pall over China’s Legal
System,” Washington Post, January 22, 2017; “Mass Suppression of Lawyers Reveals True Nature of Xi’s ‘Rule by
Law,’” Human Rights in China, July 14, 2015.
60 William Ide and Joyce Huang, “China Rights Lawyer Recants Torture Allegations in High Profile Case,” Voice of
America, May 9, 2017.
61 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China Must Drop All Charges Against Lawyer Xie Yang,” May 9, 2017.
62 Simon Denyer, “A Broken Lawyer and a Hawkish Judge Cast Deep Pall over China’s Legal System,” op. cit.;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Politically Charged Arrests in China Escalate Persecution of Rights Lawyers,”
January 14, 2016; “China to Try Top Human Rights Lawyer, Delays Three Other Cases,” Federal Information & News
Dispatch, December 7, 2016; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
63 “Wives of China’s Detained Lawyers Fight On,” Daily Mail, July 6, 2016.
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“gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.” In December 2016, Chinese
authorities suspended the legal license of Li Jinxing, Guo’s defense lawyer, for
one year allegedly for “interfering with court proceedings.”64
Guo Hongguo, a rights activist and member of an unregistered Christian church,
was convicted of subversion and given a three-year suspended sentence.65
Hu Shigen, a democracy advocate and Christian church leader with ties to the
Fengrui Law Firm, was detained in July 2015 and formally arrested in January
2016 on the charge of subverting state power. He was convicted in August 2016
and sentenced to seven-and-one-half years in prison. Hu had formerly served a
16-year sentence for spreading information about the June 4, 1989, military
crackdown in Beijing.66
Jiang Tianyong, a human rights lawyer who had legally defended or assisted
Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and other rights lawyers and advocates,
including Xie Yang, Chen Guangcheng, and Gao Zhisheng, was detained in
November 2016 and held incommunicado for six months. In May 2017, Jiang
was formally charged with subversion of state power.67
Li Heping, an attorney and antitorture advocate who had represented Falun Gong
practitioners, members of unregistered Christian churches, and environmental
activists, and had provided assistance to Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng,
was held incommunicado between July 2015 and January 2016. In April 2017, a
Tianjin Court, in a closed trial, sentenced Li to a three-year suspended jail term
for subverting state power.68
Pu Zhiqiang, a human rights lawyer and government critic, was detained in
2014, along with other attendees of a small gathering to mark the 25th anniversary
of the 1989 military crackdown. In 2015, a Beijing court handed Pu a three-year
suspended sentence for the crimes of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “disturbing
public order,” based in part on comments that he had made online.69
Wang Quanzhang, a member of the Fengrui Law firm, defended Falun Gong
practitioners, human rights lawyers, and victims of illegal land takings. After
being detained during a trial reportedly for refusing a judge’s command, Wang
wrote a legal manual on judicial detention for other rights lawyers. Wang was
64 Te-Ping Chen, “Chinese Human Rights Lawyer’s Legal License Is Suspended,” Wall Street Journal, December 2,
2016.
65 “Bailed Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Have Yet to Regain Liberty,” Radio Free Asia, August 8, 2016; Human
Rights in China, “Profiles: Gou Hongguo, Hu Shigen, Zhai Yanmin, and Zhou Shifeng,” August 5, 2016.
66 Javier C. Hernandez, “China Sentences Hu Shigen, Democracy Advocate, to 7 Years in Prison,” New York Times,
August 3, 2016.
67 “Prominent Chinese Rights Activist Charged with Subversion after Being Held Six Months,” Reuters, June 6, 2017;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Jiang Tianyong,” https://www.nchrd.org/2017/02/jiang-tianyong/; Elizabeth M.
Lynch, “Codifying Illegality? The Case of Jiang Tianyong,” China Law and Policy, January 20, 2017.
68 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Li Heping,” https://www.nchrd.org/2015/08/prisoner-of-conscience-li-heping/;
Lucy Hornby, “China Sends Warning to Lawyers with Secret Trials,” Financial Times, April 30, 2017; “The AntiTorture Work of Lawyer Li Heping That Irked the Chinese Authorities,” China Change, January 26, 2017.
69 Tom Phillips, Scuffles Outside Beijing Court as Human Rights Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang Goes on Trial,” The Guardian,
December 21, 2015; Didi Tang, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Pu Denies All Police Charges,” Associated Press, December
10, 2014.
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held incommunicado for 18 months and indicted on subversion charges in
January 2017.70
Wang Yu, a rights lawyer at the Fengrui Law Firm who had defended Uyghur
scholar Ilham Tohti as well as Chinese feminists, was detained in July 2015 and
charged with subversion in January 2016. Wang was released on bail in August
2016 after she gave a televised confession that included a denunciation of her
colleagues, which observers believe was coerced.71 Wang’s husband and
colleague, Bao Longjun, and their son, Bao Zhuoxuan, were detained in July
2015 as they attempted to board a flight for Australia so that Bao Zhuoxuan could
attend high school there.
Xia Lin, an attorney who had assisted human rights lawyers such as Pu Zhiqiang
and government critics such as Ai Weiwei, was found guilty of fraud and
sentenced to 12 years in jail in September 2016. At his trial, Xia’s lawyers raised
numerous legal and procedural violations in his case.72
Xie Yang, an attorney who defended rights advocates, was detained in July 2015.
In January 2017, Xie’s lawyers released a transcript of him describing various
forms of torture that he stated he had endured during a period in which he was
held incommunicado. During a court hearing on May 8, 2017, Xie, in what
supporters say was a forced confession, pleaded guilty to charges of inciting
subversion of state power, and denied that he had been tortured.73 Xie was
released on bail on May 9, 2017, before a verdict was announced.74
Zhai Yanmin, a rights activist who worked for the Fengrui Law Firm, was
convicted of subversion and handed a three-year suspended sentence in August
2016.75
Zhou Shifeng headed the Fengrui law firm, which had taken on many politically
sensitive cases. In August 2016, Zhou was found guilty of subverting state power
and sentenced to seven years in prison.76
70 Nectar Gan, “Human Rights Lawyer Swept Up in 709 Crackdown to Face Court in Tianjin for Subversion,” South
China Morning Post, February 16,2017; Michael Caster and Peter Dahlin, “China Should Be Proud of Wang
Quanzhang—Instead It Persecutes Him,” The Guardian, September 22, 2016.
71 Javier Hernandez, “China Frees Wang Yu, Human Rights Lawyer, after Videotaped Confession,” New York Times,
August 1, 2016.
72 Tom Phillips, “China: Lawyer for Ai Weiwei Jailed for 12 Years in ‘Severe Retaliation,’” The Guardian, September
22, 2016; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Xia Lin,” https://www.nchrd.org/2015/02/prisoner-of-conscience-xialin/.
73 Nectar Gan, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Subversion,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2017; Josh
Chin, “Document of Torture: One Chinese Lawyer’s Story from Jail,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2017.
74 “Rights Lawyers Li Heping and Xie Yang Released from Jail,” China Digital Times, May 10, 2017; Tom Phillips,
“China Puts Leading Human Rights Lawyer on Trial for Subversion,” The Guardian, May 8, 2017; “UN Denounces
China Crackdown on Lawyers, Seeks Release,” Reuters, May 5, 2017.
75 “Bailed Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Have Yet to Regain Liberty,” Radio Free Asia, op. cit.; Human Rights in
China, “Profiles: Gou Hongguo, Hu Shigen, Zhai Yanmin, and Zhou Shifeng,” op. cit.
76 Javier C. Hernandez, “Zhou Shifeng, Chinese Lawyer, Is Sentenced to 7 Years for Subversion,” New York Times,
August 4, 2016.
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Civil Society
In the past decade, the impact of nongovernmental organizations, also known in China as “social
organizations” or “civil society organizations,” has grown.77 The PRC government increasingly
has contracted the public provision of social services to NGOs, and nonstate entities have played
a small but growing role in social advocacy and policy input. Environmental groups were at the
forefront of civil society development, and some of them were met with resistance or repression
by state authorities. Other types of social organizations have emerged in the areas of public
health, education, rural development, legal aid, and policy research. China has over 650,000
registered NGOs, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, while the number of unregistered
NGOs ranges from 1 million to 7 million.78 In addition, in 2016, several thousand foreign NGOs
operated in China, of which about 1,000 had an established presence and 4,000-6,000 engaged in
short-term projects, according to official and unofficial Chinese sources.79 In 2013, the PRC
government announced that the process by which domestic NGOs could register to operate would
be simplified, allowing them to apply directly to the Bureau of Civil Affairs to acquire legal status
without also obtaining an official sponsor or supervisory unit. The government released draft
legislation allowing direct registration for some types of NGOs in 2016.80
Many experts view civil society broadly—the nonstate, nonbusiness component or “third sphere”
of society that includes NGOs, grass-roots groups, religious congregations, academia, trade
unions, political and other organizations—as a vital agent through which human rights and
democracy are defended and exercised. Under Xi Jinping, the PRC government increasingly has
tried to manage civil society, which he and other leaders apparently view as a potential security
threat, while attempting to harness its value. Many individuals and NGOs working in areas
previously deemed acceptable or even praiseworthy by the government have faced growing
restrictions. Many U.S.-based and other international NGOs in China, particularly those engaged
in rule of law programs and social advocacy work, have faced increasing scrutiny, and new
regulations have placed additional constraints on foreign NGOs. Although the number of civil
society organizations may still be growing, according to one expert, the “space in which civil
society may operate is actually shrinking.”81 In January 2016, state security officers detained and
then deported Peter Dahlin, a Swedish national who had cofounded the Beijing-based Chinese
Urgent Action Working Group, which provided legal aid and trained Chinese rights defenders. In
a later interview, Dahlin stated, “I think the era for effecting change in China seems to be over for
now for NGOs.”82
77 PRC commentators often prefer to use the term “social organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” in
order to avoid suggesting an adversarial relationship between society and the state. Some Western analysts use the term
“civil society organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” to reflect Chinese NGOs’ lack of real
autonomy.
78 The estimates of unregistered NGOs include organizations registered as business entities. Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.; Kristie Lu Stout, “People Power in the People’s Republic of
China,” CNN, June 26, 2014.
79 Edward Wong, “U.S. Denounces Chinese Law Restricting Foreign Operations,” New York Times, April 29, 2016;
Nectar Gan, “China’s Controversial New Law on Foreign NGOs to Include Greater Police Oversight, Stricter Financial
Scrutiny,” South China Morning Post, April 26, 2016; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Wrestles with Draft Law on
Nongovernmental Organizations,” New York Times, March 11, 2016.
80 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
81 “Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,” The Economist, April 12, 2014.
82 Edward Wong, “Inside China’s Secret 23-Day Detention of a Foreign Nonprofit Chief,” New York Times, July 9,
2016.
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New PRC Laws
At the end of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Party Congress, held in October 2014, the CCP
Central Committee issued a communique proclaiming that it was essential to “comprehensively
advance the law-based governance of the country,” including the need to “improve the system for
ensuring independent and impartial exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers in accordance
with the law.” The statement, however, also stressed that “[u]pholding the Party’s leadership is
fundamental to socialist rule of law....”83 Although the PRC government under Xi Jinping has
furthered the development of the law in some areas related to human rights and civil society, such
as criminal justice, domestic violence, and philanthropy, it largely has developed the law to
strengthen CCP rule. The National People’s Congress (NPC) has passed new laws that appear to
strengthen the role of the state over a wide range of social activities in the name of national
security, place additional restrictions on defense lawyers, and authorize greater government
controls over the Internet and ethnic minority groups. According to one analyst, “Under Xi
Jinping the government is creating a more coherent legal framework to enforce the preservation
of the party-state.”84 In January 2016, the ambassadors of the United States, Canada, Germany,
Japan, and the European Union, in a “rare joint response,” signed a letter to China expressing
concerns about the new laws. The letter stated, “While we recognize the need for each country to
address its security concerns, we believe the new legislative measures have the potential to
impede commerce, stifle innovation, and infringe on China’s obligation to protect human rights in
accordance with international law.”85
National Security Law
In July 2015, China’s National People’s Congress passed a new National Security Law that
provides legal grounds for greater scrutiny and state control over many social, ethnic, and cultural
activities as well as speech. Some critics argue that the law’s expansiveness and vague wording
may grant the government the authority to violate human rights in “almost every domain of
public life” in the name of national security.86 According to the law, the state resists “negative
cultural influences,” punishes “activities dividing ethnicities,” and opposes “foreign influences”
that interfere with domestic religious affairs, among other mandates.87 Article 25 establishes a
system for securing the Internet, including preventing illegal activity such as network attacks,
cybertheft, and the dissemination of unlawful and harmful information.88
83 Shannon Tiezzi, “4 Things We Learned from China’s 4 th Plenum,” The Diplomat, October 23, 2014; Communique of
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, October 23, 2014,
http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-12/02/content_34208801.htm.
84
Tom Mitchell, “Xi’s China: Smothering Dissent,” Financial Times, July 27, 2016.
85 Jason Subler, “Exclusive: Major Powers Team Up to Tell China of Concerns over New Laws,” Reuters, March 1,
2016.
86 Edward Wong, “Chinese Security Laws Elevate the Party and Stifle Dissent. Mao Would Approve,” New York
Times, May 29, 2015; Ankit Panda, “The Truth About China’s New National Security Law,” The Diplomat, July 1,
2015; Council on Foreign Relations, “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China,” July 1, 2015; Edward
Wong, “China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist Rule,” New York Times, July 1, 2015.
87 China Law Translate, “National Security Law,” July 1, 2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en.
88 Ibid.
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Cybersecurity Law
In November 2016, the NPC passed the Cybersecurity Law. A Chinese government official stated,
“The law fits international trade protocol and its purpose is to safeguard national security.”89
Analysts say that while most policies promoted by the law are not new, the law provides a legal
framework for the centralization and coordination of China’s efforts to control the Internet.
The cybersecurity law gives the government broad powers to control the flow of online traffic,
including blocking the dissemination of unlawful information and temporarily restricting network
communications for the purposes of protecting social order or national security.90 Its detractors
say that the law establishes categories of illegal Internet use that can be interpreted broadly for
political purposes. While Article 12 provides that the state “protects the rights of citizens, legal
persons, and other organizations to use networks in accordance with law,” it outlaws activities in
a number of vague areas that may result in infringements upon freedom of speech. Prohibited
online activities include those that endanger “national security, national honor and interests”;
incite “subversion of national sovereignty,” “the overturn of the socialist system,” “separatism,”
and “ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination”; undermine “national unity”; advocate “terrorism or
extremism”; and create or disseminate “false information to disrupt the economic or social
order.”91 The law also places greater legal burdens upon private Internet service providers
(“network operators”) to monitor content, obtain information on the real identity of their
customers, participate in the state’s network security protection system, and assist public security
organs.
Counterterrorism Law
New counterterrorism legislation, passed in December 2015, contains provisions that critics say
potentially may be used to stifle free speech, particularly among Uyghur Muslims. In particular,
some analysts note that the definition of terrorism contained in the law includes not only actions
but also “propositions.”92 Article 19 restricts media coverage of terrorist incidents, and “where
information with terrorist or extremist content is discovered, its dissemination shall immediately
be halted.” Although Article 6 states that counterterrorism efforts “be conducted in accordance
with law” and “respect and protect human rights,” some analysts assert that the law grants
“enormous discretionary powers” to the state and that the government has not passed
corresponding safeguards against potential human rights violations.93
89 “China Adopts Cybersecurity Law Despite Foreign Opposition,” Bloomberg News, November 7, 2016.
90 See Article of 58 of the Cybersecurity Law. China Law Translate, “2016 Cybersecurity Law,” November 7, 2016,
http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritylaw/?lang=en.
91 Ibid.
92 Article 3 states: “‘Terrorism’ as used in this Law refers to propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger
public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods
such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives.” China Law
Translate, “Counter-Terrorism Law,” December 28, 2015, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/bilingual-counterterrorism-law/?lang=en.
93 Ibid.; Zunyou Zhou, “China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2016; Shannon
Tiezzi, “China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law,” The Diplomat, December 29, 2015.
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Overseas NGO Law
A new law regulating foreign and overseas nongovernmental organizations, which went into
effect in January 2017, has raised international concern.94 Foreign observers believe that the law
reflects the PRC leadership’s suspicion of foreign influences on civil society, by placing overseas
NGOs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, and no longer the Ministry of
Civil Affairs. The new law tightens registration requirements on foreign NGOs, many of which
have been operating without official ties and status, by mandating that they find a government
agency (“professional supervisory unit”) to sponsor them. New regulations also impose greater
supervision and potentially greater controls upon their activities, funding, and staffing.95 Experts
contend that PRC leaders fear the kinds of political uprisings, aided by civil society and the
support of foreign NGOs and governments, that they perceive fueled popular demonstrations and
toppled governments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the early 2000s and the Middle East
in 2010-2011.96
Many observers say the foreign NGO law’s vague and broad provisions have created an air of
uncertainty. Some experts argue that while local authorities may enforce the law with flexibility,
foreign NGOs that fail to comply potentially may face civil or criminal penalties. Furthermore,
foreign NGOs that work in politically sensitive areas may be especially vulnerable to arbitrary
applications of the law.97 Article 47, for example, prohibits NGOs from engaging in any act that
“endangers national security” or “harms national interests.” Other illegal activities under the law
include engaging in or funding political or religious activities.98
Human rights groups assert that the law may deal “a very severe blow” to foreign NGOs and the
domestic NGOs with which they often support, train, and partner, thus causing a “ripple effect”
throughout Chinese civil society.99 Some foreign NGOs have suspended or ceased operations,
while domestic social organizations have reported a drop in foreign funding.100 Some observers
contend that the new law may prove too burdensome or pose too many risks for many foreign
NGOs, particularly smaller ones or those involved in human rights and related activities. Others
worry that the law may hamper people-to-people exchanges, including cultural, business, and
professional interactions. Some fear that many foreign NGOs may have difficulties finding
appropriate professional supervisory units, or that official PRC entities may decline to partner
with foreign NGOs due to possible political risks.101 In response to U.S. government and other
criticism of the foreign NGO law, an NPC official asserted that “We have always held a
welcoming and supportive attitude toward overseas NGOs that are engaged in friendly activities
94 The law applies to NGOs from foreign countries as well as “overseas” Hong Kong and Macau.
95 China Law Translate, “2016 PRC Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities
Within Mainland China,” http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/2016-foreign-ngo-law/?lang=en.
96 Stanley Lubman, “China’s New Law on International NGOs—and Questions about Legal Reform,” Wall Street
Journal, May 25, 2016; Edward Wong, “U.S. Denounces Chinese Law Restricting Foreign Operations,” op. cit.
97 Simon Denyer, “In China, Civic Groups May Face New Controls,” Washington Post, March 25, 2015; Human Rights
Watch, “China: Scrap Repressive Foreign Organizations Law,” June 2, 2015.
98 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations
in the Mainland of China, Adopted at the 20th Meeting of the 12th Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress on April 28, 2016, http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254314/n2254409/n4904353/c5548987/content.html.
99 Julie Makinen, “China’s Move Toward Restricting Foreign NGOs Spurs Anxiety in Many Organizations,” Los
Angeles Times, July 5, 2016; Simon Denyer, “In China, Civic Groups May Face New Controls,” op. cit.
100 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), March 3, 2017.
101 Zheping Huang “NGOs Are Under Threat in China’s Latest Crackdown Against ‘Foreign Forces,’” Quartz, January
4, 2017.
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in China.... But an extremely small number of NGOs attempt to, or have already engaged in,
activities that endanger China’s social stability and state security. Therefore, we need to apply the
rule of law to overseas NGOs’ activities in China.”102
Charity Law
In 2016, the NPC passed China’s first Charity Law.103 The law eases registration requirements for
charitable organizations and allows them to engage in public fundraising, but also strengthens
government oversight. Backers of the legislation say that tougher reporting requirements are
designed to improve transparency, protect donors, and improve public trust in charitable
organizations. Some human rights groups have expressed concern that provisions of the law
prohibiting the funding of activities that contravene national security may be used broadly against
politically sensitive activities. Some critics contend that the law potentially restricts informal
fund-raising, such as online crowdsourcing, which has become a means by which some citizens
have provided financial support to Chinese dissidents and their families.104
Family Violence Law
China’s first national law on domestic violence, the culmination of years of efforts by Chinese
women’s rights advocates, went into effect in March 2016. The Anti-Domestic Violence Law
covers physical and mental abuse between family members and cohabitating couples. It provides
stronger legal mechanisms by which to protect women from domestic abuse. Although the
legislation was heralded as a “significant step forward” in the area of women’s rights, the
government has placed some restrictions on women’s rights advocates during the recent
crackdown on civil society. In 2016, authorities ordered the closure of the Beijing Zhongze
Women’s Legal Counseling and Service Center, reportedly without providing a reason. The
Center had provided services in the areas of anti-domestic violence litigation and rural women’s
land rights for over two decades.105
Frequently Raised Human Rights Issues
The following sections discuss prominent human rights concerns that frequently have been raised
by human rights organizations and some Members of Congress. The bullet points below provide
selected examples of ongoing human rights issues in China, some of which are discussed at
greater length elsewhere in this report. For more detailed descriptions of human rights topics, see
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016 and the Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016.106 The PRC government has
102 Simon Denyer, “China Passes Law Tightening Regulation of Foreign NGOs,” Washington Post, April 29, 2016;
Press Conference of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, April 28, 2016, translated by China
Law Translate, May 4, 2016, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/fngo-law-presser/?lang=en.
103 China Development Brief, “The Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China,” http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/
wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Charity-Law-CDB-Translation.pdf.
104 “China Approves Law on Charities, NGOs,” Voice of America, March 26, 2016; “China’s New Charity Law Makes
Donating Easier, Tightens Control,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 1, 2016; Laura E. Butzel and David J.
O’Connell, “China’s New Laws on Foreign and Domestic NGOs,” Exemptorgresource.com, May 19, 2016.
105 Chen Tingting, The Asia Foundation, “Battling Domestic Violence in China,” In Asia, June 29, 2016; Didi Kirsten
Tatlow, “China Said to Force Closure of Women’s Legal Aid Center,” New York Times, January 29, 2016; Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
106 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit., and Department of State, Country
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attempted to reduce rights violations in some of these areas. However, the lack of checks on state
power and the CCP’s subordination of the law to its objective of maintaining its authority and
“social stability” continue to lead to human rights abuses and violations of China’s own
constitution. Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese law and politics, suggests that although China
has made progress in some legal areas, fundamental human rights problems endure:
The lesson of the past twenty-five years seems to be that economic and social progress,
enactment of better legislation, improvements in legal institutions, and reformist official
policy statements do not guarantee either the enjoyment of civil and political rights or the
protection of political and religious activists and their lawyers against the arbitrary exercise
of state and party power.107
Ongoing Human Rights Issues: Selected Examples108
Harassment, detention, house arrest, prison terms, and residential surveillance of
protest leaders, civil society activists, journalists covering stories that authorities
deem to be politically sensitive, petitioners, and political dissidents and their
family members.
Arbitrary use of state security and “social stability” laws against political
dissidents.
Holding dissidents incommunicado for long periods and failing to comply with
legal provisions that require authorities to notify family members of their
detention.
Strict controls and punishments for speech that authorities deem to be politically
sensitive; heavy censorship of online communication and expression.
Forced closure of law offices and suspension or revocation of attorneys’ law
licenses; physical assaults, detention, house arrest, prison terms, and residential
surveillance of attorneys who take on cases authorities deem to be politically
sensitive.
Physical and mental abuse against criminal suspects and administrative detainees,
in some cases resulting in forced confessions and sometimes resulting in death.
Harsh religious and ethnic policies and the arbitrary use of state security laws
against Tibetans and Uyghurs.
Harassment and arrests of some Christians worshipping in unregistered churches;
demolition or forced alterations of church properties in some localities.
Detention of Falun Gong adherents and forced renunciations of their beliefs.
Repatriation of North Korean nationals residing in China, who may face severe
forms of punishment after returning to North Korea, in violation of U.N.
conventions.
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
107 Jerome Cohen, “After June 4, China Is Still Fumbling Towards Respect for Rights of All,” South China Morning
Post, June 2, 2014.
108 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit., and Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
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Government harassment, intimidation, and obstruction of independent or nonCCP candidates and their supporters in local elections; alleged manipulation of
ballots and electoral procedures in order to exclude independent candidates.109
Violations of international labor rights, including the right to form independent
labor unions, limitations on collective bargaining, and arrests of strike leaders
and labor activists.110
Constraints on foreign journalists in China, including restrictions on movement
and cases of harassment and intimidation by state security agents when
journalists attempt to report on events that authorities deem to be politically
sensitive or interview local citizens.111
Trafficking in persons, including reports of forced labor in Xinjiang, drug
rehabilitation facilities, and administrative and extrajudicial detention centers,
forced labor and sex trafficking, and the forced labor in China and forcible
repatriation of North Koreans. In 2017, the Department of State downgraded
China to Tier 3, for not “fully meet[ing] the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking” and “not making significant efforts to do so.”112
Rule of Law
Many experts believe that strengthening the rule of law is a key means of protecting human rights
and an important area of U.S. engagement in China. The lack of judicial independence, adequate
legal protections, and due process guarantees for many dissidents, protest leaders, rights lawyers,
activists, journalists, and ordinary aggrieved citizens, as well as the people and interests that they
represent, undermines progress in human rights conditions in the PRC. Some policy experts argue
that calling on PRC leaders to abide by provisions in China’s own constitution and laws is one of
the most effective ways for international actors to promote human rights in the PRC. In recent
years, the Chinese government has enacted some measures aimed at reducing arbitrary
applications of the law and some patterns of human rights abuse as well as making the
government more transparent. However, the Communist Party and its main policy objectives
generally remain above the law, particularly in areas that China’s leaders deem politically
sensitive.
Since 2014, the PRC government has announced some policies aimed at reducing government
influence over the courts, particularly at the local level. Reforms include transferring power over
budgets and personnel appointments of basic level courts from local to provincial governments.113
In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued an opinion directing judges to record instances
109 PRC citizens can directly elect officials to village committees and assemblies and to the larger township, county,
and municipal district People’s Congresses. Although voters generally have a choice of candidates, who are not
required to be Communist Party members, CCP election committees may disqualify candidates at any level, and they
may effectively control candidate lists.
110 Lucy Hornby, “Workers’ Rights Activists Sentenced in China,” Financial Times, September 26, 2016; Javier C.
Hernandez, “Labor Protests Multiply in China as Economy Slows, Worrying Leaders,” New York Times, March 14,
2016.
111 Roy Greenslade, “Foreign Journalists Working in China Face Increased Harassment,” The Guardian, November 15,
2016.
112 Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2017.
113 Stanley Lubman, “Power Shift: Hopeful Signs in China’s Legal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014;
Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Moves to Enact Rule of Law, with Caveats,” New York Times
(International), October 23, 2014; Ren Jin, “Judicial Reform Enforces Rule of Law,” China Daily, December 4, 2014.
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of Party and state interference. In addition, the SPC has made efforts to retry cases of wrongful
conviction and reduce the rate of pretrial detention.114 Some experts contend, however, that
China’s leaders may want to reduce corruption of the judicial branch at the local level, but not to
subject the national government to judicial oversight.115 In January 2017, Zhou Qiang, President
of China’s Supreme People’s Court, who is known as a reformer, publicly denounced the
“Western” notion of judicial independence. Some experts say that Zhou’s speech reflected
pressure from Xi Jinping.116
Government Transparency
In 2016, the government published new guidelines promoting the “open government information” (OGI) system,
which obliges government agencies to publish official materials on matters that are of public interest and allows
citizens to submit requests for government information. Areas for public disclosure include major policies,
assessments and audits of policies in force, government-held records, and government agencies’ administrative
powers and responsibilities. The guidelines exempt some kinds of information from disclosure, including
information that might “endanger state security, public security, and social stability.”117 According to some studies,
many requests go unanswered, although some citizens have taken their cases to the courts, claiming that local
governments are not complying with the law.118 In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court began to provide
information on trials, verdicts, and the implementation of court decisions online. In 2016, China’s court system
launched a website, China Open Trial Network, which airs selected criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings,
as part of a move to expand people’s trust in the judicial system, according to experts.119
Criminal Justice
China’s criminal justice system remains rife with abuses, especially in human rights cases. The
rate of legal representation remains low, the role of lawyers is severely constrained, and there is a
heavy presumption of guilt and alleged reliance upon forced confessions. In recent years,
government funding for legal aid has increased, and access to legal counsel reportedly has
improved. However, the rate of legal representation in criminal cases has dropped to roughly
20%, and although the acquittal rate has increased, the conviction rate remains at over 99% in
criminal trials.120 Judges retain significant discretion over whether witnesses or accusers must
appear in court, and only a small percentage of trials reportedly involve witnesses, thus
weakening the defense in many cases.121
In 2015, the government announced new regulations to “safeguard lawyers’ rights,” including the
rights for lawyers to meet with their clients and collect evidence. Legal experts say, however, that
114 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: China – Events of 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/
country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
115 “Trump Attacks and the State of China’s Legal System,’ China Digital Times, February 13, 2017.
116 Michael Forsythe, “China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince,” New York
Times, January 18, 2017.
117 Jamie P. Horsley, “China Promotes Open Government as it Seeks to Reinvent Its Governance Model,” Wilson
Center, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, February 23, 2016; Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, “Regulations on Open Government Information of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.cecc.gov/
resources/legal-provisions/regulations-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-on-open-government.
118 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
119 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (China), April 13, 2016; Jerome Cohen
and David Wertime, “A Crack of Daylight Enters Chinese Court Proceedings,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2016.
120 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.; “China Lags Behind in Rule-of-Law
Ranking,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2016; Cao Yan, “Courts Act To Improve Protection of Rights,” China
Daily, March 13, 2017.
121 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
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other revisions to the law further curtail the role of defense lawyers in sensitive cases. Under new
laws and regulations, lawyers may face penalties for “insulting, defaming, or threatening judicial
officers,” “severely disrupting courtroom order,” disclosing client or case information to the
media, or using the media and other public means to influence court decisions.122 Some Chinese
lawyers openly opposed the changes.123
Forms of Detention
The PRC government practices various forms
Administrative Detention
of detention in violation of China’s
Black jails: unofficial, secretive detention centers in
various unmarked places such as hotels, residences,
obligations under international law and in
government offices, and abandoned buildings.
some cases its own laws. The Criminal
Legal Education Centers: Purpose-built and ad hoc
Procedure Law permits suspects of serious
locations often used to “transform” Falun Gong
crimes, including “endangering state security”
practitioners or to persuade or coerce them to
and terrorism, to be placed at a “designated
renounce their beliefs.
location” (residential surveillance) for up to
Community Correction Centers: Under this
six months, and the law does not require the
system, parolees, juveniles, and other minor offenders
family to be notified of the place of detention
are restricted in traveling but generally live in their own
residences while attending classes on “public morality,”
(Article 73).125 Although the government
current affairs, and the law, and taking part in social
formally abolished the Re-education Through
service activities.124
Labor (RETL) system in 2013, in practice
public security bureaus continue to
administratively detain many citizens for minor political offenses, such as “creating a disturbance
and causing trouble,” without trial.126 Many people are held in quasilegal and extralegal forms of
detention, such as “Legal Education Centers,” said to hold many Falun Gong members;
psychiatric (ankang) facilities; and “black jails.”127 These and other forms of incarceration can be
even more secretive and prone to abuses than the former RETL facilities.128 In April 2016, the
U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention criticized Chinese authorities for their detention and
treatment of U.S. citizen Sandy Phan-Gillis, stating that they had violated “international norms
relating to the right to a fair trial and to liberty and security.”129
Torture
China’s criminal justice system has continued to utilize torture, particularly as a means to extract
confessions. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which went into effect in 2013,
122 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (China), op. cit.
123 David Bandurski, “Speak Not of Lawyers Speaking Out,” China Media Project, October 12, 2016.
124 Dui Hua Foundation, “Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts,” December 19, 2013; Dui Hua
Foundation, “Criminal Detention as Punishment in Post-RTL Era,” January 22, 2014.
125 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,”
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
126 PRC citizens can be administratively detained for such activities as participating in demonstrations or petitioning the
government.
127 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
128 Margaret K. Lewis, Professor of Law, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
“China’s Pervasive Use of Torture,” April 24, 2016; Frank Langfitt, “China Ends One Notorious Form of Detention,
But Keeps Others,” NPR, February 5, 2014.
129 Human Rights Council, “Opinion No. 12/2016,” http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/Opinions/
Session75/Opinion_2016_12_China.pdf.
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prohibit the use of confessions obtained under torture as evidence and require audio or video
recordings of interrogations in major criminal cases.130 The United Nations Committee against
Torture concluded in late 2015, however, that despite these legal reforms, China had failed to
eliminate torture and numerous other forms of ill treatment, particularly during the pretrial period
and in cases of extralegal detention. The committee also expressed concern over the lack of a
legal guarantee for the right of detained persons to immediately meet with a lawyer.131
Re-education Through Labor System (RETL)
Established in the mid-1950s, China’s Re-education Through Labor (laojiao) penal system was long used to detain
citizens who were perceived to pose a threat to “social stability” or political control, but whose offenses were not
considered serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution. RETL, an administrative measure that did not involve
courts or judicial processes, empowered the police to sentence persons deemed guilty of minor or noncriminal
offenses to a maximum of three to four years in labor camps without trial. These offenses included petty theft,
illegal drug possession, and prostitution, as well as activities that authorities deemed to be politically sensitive, such
as participating in unauthorized religious groups and alleged cults such as Falun Gong, “disrupting social order,”
presenting formal complaints against the government (petitioning), and rights advocacy. Estimates of the RETL
population vary, from roughly 160,000 to 260,000 detainees at any time in roughly 350 centers before they were
abolished.132 According to some estimates, the facilities held up to 300,000 to 400,000 prisoners at their peak,
especially when they swelled with Falun Gong practitioners during the mid-2000s.133 According to some estimates,
in recent years, drug offenders constituted the largest group in the RETL system, and between 2% and 10% of the
RETL population were political prisoners.134 Although RETL conditions and sentences were in many cases less
severe than prison terms, human rights groups reported many abuses in RETL centers, including forced labor,
beatings, psychological torment, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and inadequate access to medical care, in
some cases resulting in death.135
In 2016, a joint statement issued by China’s judicial, procuratorial, and public security bodies
reiterated that suspects must not be forced into confessing crimes and that any evidence collected
through coercion should be excluded from their cases.136 The Ministry of Public Security issued
disciplinary regulations aimed at holding police officers accountable for misconduct, including
for obtaining confessions through torture, and subjecting them to criminal, administrative, and
disciplinary punishments.137 However, reports of torture, including some that have caused public
outrage, have continued.138 The Communist Party’s internal disciplinary system, known as
130 Dui Hua Foundation, Annual Report 2012, http://duihua.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AR2012/
2012AR_Eng_web.pdf; “China Bans Forced Confessions in Investigations,” Xinhua, December 26, 2012.
131 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China,
February 3, 2016.
132 Maya Wang, “Rights Group: China May Not Be Ready for Labor Camp Reforms,” CNN, January 16, 2013; Minnie
Chan, “Kinder Face for Notorious Re-education Camps,” South China Morning Post, February 21, 2007; Jim Yardley,
“Issue in China: Many Jails Without Trial,” New York Times, May 9, 2005.
133 Julie Makinen, “China’s Closure of Labor Camps Gets Qualified Applause,” Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2014;
Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education Through Labor in China, Amnesty International,
2013. Falun Gong adherents constituted up to one-half of all RETL detainees, according to some estimates. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 (China), March 11, 2010.
134
Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013.
135 Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education Through Labor in China, op. cit.; Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), February 27, 2014.
136 “China’s Government Tries Again to Stop Forced Confessions Through Torture,” Reuters, October 10, 2016.
137 Margaret K. Lewis, Professor of Law, “China’s Pervasive Use of Torture,” Testimony before the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, April 24, 2016.
138 Amnesty International, “Urgent Action Update: Website Founder at Risk of Torture,” January 13, 2017; Chun Han
Wong, “China Middle-Class Anger Reignited by Death of Researcher in Custody,” Wall Street Journal, December 27,
2016.
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shuanggui, has swelled with cases as part of Xi Jingping’s anticorruption drive. Human rights
groups and relatives of CCP members subjected to the process, in which the accused do not have
the right to legal counsel, have alleged widespread use of torture to extract confessions.139
Prisoners of Conscience
The number of political prisoners in China is difficult to determine, although thousands of
citizens are estimated to have been detained and incarcerated for exercising internationally
recognized freedoms of speech and assembly, engaging in religious activities that are not
officially approved, or promoting ethnic minority rights in cases involving grievances against the
state. The Dui Hua Foundation, a U.S.-based human rights organization that focuses on the
treatment of prisoners, criminal justice reforms, and women’s rights in China, estimated that there
were 6,700 political and religious prisoners as of June 2016.140 These numbers include
practitioners of Falun Gong and many Tibetans and Uyghurs. The Congressional–Executive
Commission on China (CECC) maintains a Political Prisoner Database that contains information
on over 1,400 cases of political and religious prisoners known or believed to be detained or
imprisoned, noting that there are considerably more cases than those documented in the
database.141 According to the Department of State, those held in prison or administrative detention
in China for reasons related to politics and religion number in the tens of thousands.142 Some of
the most prominent cases are discussed below.
Liu Xiaobo
On July 13, 2017, Liu Xiaobo, a political dissident, writer, activist, and winner of the Nobel
Peace Prize, died while serving an 11-year prison term. In December 2008, Liu helped draft
“Charter 08,” commemorating the 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and inspired by “Charter 77” of the Czechoslovakian
democracy movement that began in 1976. Charter 08, initially signed by over 300 PRC citizens,
called for civil and political rights, legislative democracy, an independent judiciary, and a new
Chinese Constitution, and urged the Chinese people to join to “work for major changes in
Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional
country.”143 The Charter eventually garnered roughly 10,000 additional signatures online.
On December 8, 2008, a day before Charter 08 was published online, Liu was detained by the
Beijing police, and on December 25, 2009, a Chinese court sentenced him to 11 years in prison
for “inciting subversion of state power” for his writings and use of the Internet, including
coauthoring, signing, and distributing the Charter. Liu’s indictment also included reference to six
139 Chris Buckley, “Confessions Made Under Duress Tarnish China’s Graft Fight,” New York Times, December 6,
2016; Nathan Vanderklippe, “China Systematically Using Torture in War on Corruption: Report,” The Globe and Mail,
December 6, 2016. See also Human Rights Watch, “Special Measures: Detention and Torture in the Chinese
Communist Party’s Shuanggui System,” December 6, 2016.
140 Dui Hua Foundation, Databases, Political Prisoners, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=195.
141 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Political Prisoner Database, October 2016, http://www.cecc.gov/
resources/political-prisoner-database.
142 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit.
143 For the full text of Charter 08, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Charter 08 (Chinese and
English Text),” December 10, 2008, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/charter-08-chinese-and-englishtext; Perry Link, “China’s Charter 08,” New York Review of Books, January 15, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2009/01/15/chinas-charter-08/; Human Rights in China, “Charter 08,” December 9, 2008,
http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/238.
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political essays that he wrote between 2005 and 2007.144 In October 2010, the Nobel Committee
awarded Liu the Nobel Peace Prize for his “long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human
rights.” PRC authorities barred members and representatives of Liu's family from traveling to
Oslo in December 2010 to accept his Nobel award, and placed Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo’s wife,
effectively under house arrest.
Liu earned a reputation as an incisive critic of the Chinese Communist Party, an eloquent
commentator on the harmful and “cruel” effects of many CCP policies on PRC society and
citizens, and a supporter of gradual political reform driven “from below” through the raising of
popular awareness about democracy.145 He had undergone other periods of incarceration and
house arrest for his writings and activism, including a 20-month sentence in prison following his
participation in the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations for democracy and three years in a Reeducation Through Labor camp (1996-1999). Liu advocated for the families of those killed in the
Tiananmen military crackdown and for an official reassessment of the events of June 1989.146
In May 2017, Liu Xiaobo was granted medical parole, having been diagnosed with advancedstage liver cancer. Liu Xiaobo’s family asked the PRC government for permission for both Liu
Xiaobo and Liu Xia, who also reportedly is ill, to seek medical treatment abroad.147 Chinese
authorities did not reduce Liu’s sentence nor allow him to travel abroad for treatment, although
they agreed to invite foreign medical experts to join a team of Chinese doctors treating Liu. A
German and an American doctor who examined Liu on July 8, 2017, stated at that time that they
believed Mr. Liu could be safely transported to Germany or the United States for treatment “with
appropriate medical evacuation care and support, while Chinese authorities asserted that Liu’s
condition made him too ill for such a trip.148 U.S. government officials urged Beijing to allow Liu
to travel abroad for medical treatment and to free Liu Xia from house arrest and to allow her to go
abroad as well.149
Following Liu Xiaobo’s death, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Chinese government
“to release Liu Xia from house arrest and allow her to depart China, according to her wishes.”
Tillerson also stated that “I join those in China and around the world in mourning the tragic
passing of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, who died while serving a lengthy prison
144 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial to Take Place December 23,”
December 22, 2009, http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/prosecutors-indict-liu-xiaobo-trial-to-takeplace-december-23.
145 Emily Rauhala, “Chinese Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo Is Called “A Monument to Morality,” Washington Post, July
13, 2017; Liu Xiaobo, “Changing the Regime by Changing Society,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 22, no. 1 (January
2011).
146 Wu Qiang, “Liu Xiaobo: The Founder of China’s Political Opposition Movements,” China Change, June 20, 2017;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Liu Xiaobo,” https://www.nchrd.org/2011/03/prisoner-of-conscience-liu-xiaobo/;
Nobel Prize.org, “Liu Xiaobo—Biographical,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/xiaobobio.html.
147 Mimi Lau, “Liu Xiaobo’s Family Want His Cancer Treated Outside China,” South China Morning Post, June 28,
2017.
148 M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, “Recommendation for the Further Treatment of Chinese Nobel Prize Laureate Liu
Xiaobo: Joint Statement from Dr. Joseph M. Herman, Clinical Research Director, Department of Radiation Oncology,
The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, and Dr. Markus Büchler, Chairman, Department of Surgery,
University of Heidelberg,” July 8, 2017, https://www.mdanderson.org/newsroom/2017/07/recommendation-for-thefurther-treatment-of-chinese-nobel-prize-.html.
149 Chris Buckley, “In Liu Xiaobo’s Last Days, Supporters Fight China for His Legacy,” New York Times, July 11,
2017; “Liu Xiaobo to Be Seen by American and German Doctors,” Agence France-Presse, July 7, 2017; Heather
Nauert, Department of State Press Briefing, June 29, 2017; “New U.S. Ambassador Risks China’s Ire with Support for
Liu Xiaobo,” Bloomberg News, June 27, 2017.
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sentence in China for promoting peaceful democratic reform. Mr. Liu dedicated his life to the
betterment of his country and humankind, and to the pursuit of justice and liberty.”150 Several
members of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China released statements that they
were “deeply saddened” by the loss of Liu Xiaobo and expressed their continued support for the
promotion of human rights and peaceful democratic change in China, which Liu had advocated.
They urged the PRC government to grant Liu Xia permission to leave China for a country of her
choosing.151 Following and prior to Liu’s death, some Members of Congress introduced
resolutions honoring Liu’s life and legacy, urging the PRC government to allow Liu Xiaobo and
Liu Xia to seek medical treatment abroad, and designating the vicinity of the Chinese Embassy in
Washington, DC, “Liu Xiaobo Plaza” (see Appendix).
Gao Zhisheng
Gao Zhisheng, a prominent rights lawyer, was named one of China’s top 10 lawyers by the
Ministry of Justice in 2001. However, as his rights advocacy expanded to protect citizens who
had run afoul of policies that authorities deemed to be sensitive, including family planning,
religious practice, and Falun Gong, Gao was detained numerous times. In late 2011, he reportedly
began serving a three-year prison term that had been handed down in 2006, but was suspended
for five years. During his periods of detention, prison officials reportedly tortured him, denied
him access to legal counsel and regular visits from his family, and withheld information about his
location.152 Authorities released Gao in August 2014 but he remains under house arrest and
constant surveillance by security agents.153
Xu Zhiyong
In January 2014, constitutional rights advocate Xu Zhiyong was tried and convicted of “gathering
a crowd to disturb public order” and sentenced to four years in prison. Xu, a lawyer, scholar,
Haidian district people’s congress deputy, and rights activist, helped found the New Citizen’s
Movement, a loosely organized network numbering roughly 5,000 people that promoted the rule
of law, government transparency, citizens’ rights, civic engagement, and social justice. Its
members, some of whom also have been arrested, reportedly met informally across the country to
discuss politics and engaged in small street rallies in 2012 and 2013.154 The Open Constitution
Initiative, which Xu also helped organize, was a nongovernmental legal research and aid
organization that the government shut down in 2009, ostensibly for tax evasion.155
150 Department of State, “Press Statement, Rex W. Tillerson, “On the Passing of Liu Xiaobo,” July 13, 2017
151 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “CECC Commissioners Issue Statements on the Death of Nobel
Laureate Liu Xiaobo,” July 13, 2017, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/cecc-commissioners-issuestatements-on-the-death-of-nobel-laureate-liu.
152 Edward Wong, “Family’s Visit Pierces Silence on Jailed Chinese Dissident,” New York Times (International),
January 24, 2013.
153 “Chinese Rights Lawyer’s Phone Calls Limited Under House Arrest,” Agence France Presse, January 8, 2015.
154 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Chinese Court Sentences 4 Activists to Jail,” New York Times Blogs, April 18, 2014.
155 Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Sentences Xu Zhiyong, Legal Activist, to 4 Years in Prison,” New York
Times (International), January 26, 2014; Xu Zhiyong Tried for Advocacy of Education Equality and Official
Transparency,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, January 24, 2014.
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Media Freedom
Most major media outlets in China are owned or controlled by the government. Although in some
ways the government exercises less direct control over news and information than it did in the
early 2000s, due to the commercialization of the media, private financing of some media
companies, and the rapid growth of popular use of the Internet and social media, the Chinese
government continues to severely restrict the press, broadcasting, publishing, and online
communication. China ranked 176th out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ 2017
World Press Freedom Index, and nearly 40 journalists and dozens of “netizens” reportedly were
incarcerated in 2016.156 According to the CECC, the Chinese government has “used a variety of
legal and extralegal measures to target journalists, editors, and bloggers who covered issues
authorities deemed to be politically sensitive,” including cyberattacks, dismissal or disciplinary
action, harassment, physical violence, detention, and prison sentences.157 Publications that broach
topics related to political reform have faced growing harassment by state authorities and the
independent reporting of official corruption and misconduct has been curtailed.158 Under an
amendment to the PRC Criminal Law that became effective in November 2015, journalists may
be held criminally liable for ‘‘fabricating false reports’’ in their coverage of ‘‘hazards, epidemics,
disasters, and situations involving police.’’159 Meanwhile, the trend toward the commercialization
of the press has begun to reverse, according to some analysts, while reliance upon government
support, particularly by the print media, has increased.160
The Internet
China has the world’s largest number of Internet users, estimated at over 700 million people, and
one of the most extensive Internet censorship systems in the world, although its implementation
remains uneven.161 At times, the Internet has served as an outlet for many citizens to express
opinions and “let off steam,” provided a lifeline to political dissidents and liberal thinkers,
enabled social activists to organize, and helped to publicize corrupt practices and negligent
behavior on the part of government officials. Internet users have developed ways to circumvent
censorship, and politically sensitive news and opinion sometimes get widely disseminated, if only
fleetingly, online. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese government has treated the Internet, like civil
society, as a rising security threat. Since 2014, President Xi has attempted to established greater,
centralized control over the Internet with the formation of the Central Leading Group for Cyber
Security and Informatization, which he heads.162
156 Reporters Without Borders, 2017 World Press Freedom Index, https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table; Reporters Without
Borders, Violations of Press Freedom Barometer 2017, https://rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2017&type_id=235#listbarometre; Yaqiu Wang, “Weighing China Jailed Cases amid Censorship and Fear,” Committee to Protect Journalists,
December 13, 2016.
157 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
158 Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2016: China,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china.
159 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
160 Freedom House, “Media Freedom in China: Recent Trends, Challenges, and Implications for U.S. Business
Interests,” Washington, DC, April 28, 2016.
161 Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, “Can the Chinese Government Really Control the Internet? We Found Cracks in
the Firewall,” Washington Post, February 21, 2017.
162 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization,” China Copyright and Media,
April 26, 2016.
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The Chinese government reportedly blocks access to 172 out of 1,000 of the world’s top
websites, according to the nonprofit countercensorship service GreatFire.org, including 8 of the
25 most trafficked global sites.163 Continuously inaccessible websites, social networking sites,
and file sharing sites include Radio Free Asia, Voice of America (Chinese language), international
human rights websites, including those related to Tibet and Falun Gong, many Taiwanese news
sites, Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, and YouTube. Some English language news sites, including
the Washington Post, the Voice of America (English), and Yahoo homepage, are generally
accessible or occasionally censored. The Wall Street Journal and Wikipedia are blocked. The New
York Times and Bloomberg websites have been inaccessible since 2012, when they reported on
the personal wealth of Chinese leaders. Google services, including Gmail, have been
intermittently blocked since 2014.
In addition to international websites, the government often shuts down Chinese websites that
broach sensitive topics.164 The state also has blocked news of major events and shut down the
Internet almost entirely in some places. Authorities blocked nearly all Internet traffic in Xinjiang
for 10 months following unrest in 2009 and continue to do so in selected areas of the country
from time to time.165
Commonly filtered keywords, Internet searches, and microblog and social media postings include
those with direct and indirect or disguised references to Tibetan policies; the Tiananmen
crackdown of 1989; Falun Gong; PRC leaders and dissidents who have been involved in recent
scandals or issues that authorities deem to be politically sensitive; and discussions of democracy.
Other areas that authorities occasionally have targeted for censorship include the following:
controversial government policies and cases of misconduct; public health and safety; sensitive
foreign affairs issues; and media and censorship policies.166 The government reportedly has
employed or enlisted students, public employees, and volunteers to post progovernment
comments online and to divert public discussion from politically sensitive topics.167
For Chinese Internet users in search of information beyond the PRC’s Internet gateways, or
“Great Firewall,” accessing filtered sites is made possible by downloading special software
applications, such as virtual private networks (VPNs). The government occasionally has
attempted to disrupt VPN services or impose new restrictions, but either has allowed, or has not
been able to stop, the continuation of many circumvention efforts.168 In 2015, the PRC
163 “China Tightens Great Firewall by Declaring Unauthorized VPN Services Illegal,” South China Morning Post,
January 23, 2017; Simon Denyer, “For Beijing, Censorship is Working,” Washington Post, May 24, 2016; Paul Mozur,
“U.S. Adds China’s Internet Controls to List of Trade Barriers,” New York Times, April 7, 2016.
164 Wendy Wu and Jane Cai, “Beijing Internet Censors Close Websites of Liberal Economic Think Tank,” South China
Morning Post, January 21, 2017.
165 Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, “Analysis: China Is Losing a War over Internet,” Wall Street Journal, December 31,
2009; Simon Denyer, “China’s Clampdown on Islam Stokes Resentment and Violence,” Washington Post, September
20, 2014.
166 Sarah Cook, Freedom House, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
“Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States,” May 15, 2014.
167 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts
for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” American Political Science Review, January 2017; Henry Farrell,
“The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year,” Washington Post, May 19,
2016; Simon Denyer, “Online, in China, the Communist Party and Military Are at War with Ideas,” Washington Post,
July 11, 2016; Christina Sterbenz, “China Banned the Term ‘50 Cents’ to Stop Discussion of an Orwellian Propaganda
Program,” Business Insider, October 17, 2014; Katie Hunt and CY Xu, “China ‘Employs 2 Million to Police Internet,”
CNN, October 7, 2013.
168 Simon Denyer, “Internet Activists are Finding Ways Around China’s Great Firewall,” Washington Post, June 14,
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government launched a cyberattack on some countercensorship sites, which disrupted access to
them.169 In January 2017, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced that
domestic VPN services would require government approval, although some observers say that the
new regulations may be implemented flexibly.170
According to some experts, the Chinese government does not intend for its censorship of the
Internet to be total. Many foreigners staying in China for business, academic and cultural
exchanges, international development programs, and other purposes, as well as their Chinese
counterparts, depend upon VPNs to access the global Internet. Chinese leaders view limited
online discussion of political and social issues as valuable for monitoring public opinion and
providing people a “safety valve” through which to air their views. According to some experts,
China’s leaders appear to be especially worried about the Internet as a tool for engaging in
collective action, and are relatively less concerned about it as a medium for sensitive words.171
VPNs allow some motivated Internet users to bypass censorship, but impose just enough
inconvenience, such as slower browsing speeds and in some cases a small financial cost, to
discourage most Chinese Internet users from utilizing them. The number of Chinese netizens who
utilize VPNs has grown rapidly in the past several years, from under 5% to 29%, according to a
2015 survey of Chinese Internet users.172 Some studies have shown, however, that the vast
majority of Internet users in China do not go online for political purposes, and that many of them
accept the government’s justifications for regulating the Internet or do not feel unduly affected by
censorship.173 In one Chinese survey, 6% of respondents answered that they both “encountered
censorship” and “were angry about it.”174
Weibo and WeChat
Chinese versions of microblogging services (weibo), similar to Twitter, and social networking
sites became important sources of news and platforms for public opinion until the government
imposed restrictive measures on them. Between around 2009 and 2012, Sina Corporation’s weibo
quickly became the “most prominent place for free speech,” and the country’s “most important
public sphere,” where netizens posted both news and commentary.175 Due in part to growing
2016.
169 Tom Risen, “China’s ‘Great Cannon’ Redirects U.S. Traffic for Censorship,” U.S. News and World Report, April
14, 2015.
170 AJ Dellinger, “China VPN Ban: Government Requires Official Approval for Use,” International Business Times,
January 24, 2017; Olivia Solon, “China Cracks Down on VPNs, Making It Harder to Circumvent Great Firewall,” The
Guardian, January 23, 2017.
171 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but
Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review, 107:2 (May 2013); Andrea Chen, “Chinese
Internet Censors Target Collective Activities More Than Sensitive Subjects, Says Harvard Report,” South China
Morning Post, August 23, 2014.
172 “China Reinforces Great Firewall with New VPN Rules,” China Digital Times, January 23, 2017.
173 Simon Denyer, “Internet Activists Are Finding Ways Around China’s Great Firewall,” op. cit.; John Gapper,
“China’s Internet Is Flourishing Inside the Wall,” Financial Times, November 23, 2016; Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent
of the Networked, New York: Basic Books, 2012.
174 “Only 15 percent of respondents encountered censorship, and of these, only 40 percent were angry about it ... ”
Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit., p. 258.
175 Mary Kay Magistad, “How Weibo Is Changing China,” Yale Global Online, August 9, 2012; Kathrin Hile, “China’s
Tweeting Cops Blog to Keep Peace,” Financial Times, December 5, 2011; Keith B. Richburg, “In China,
Microblogging Sites Become Free-Speech Platform,” Washington Post, March 27, 2011; Ed Zhang, “Does Blogs’
Blooming Mean Schools of Thought Can Contend?” South China Morning Post, December 4, 2011.
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restrictions on blogging, including government harassment against bloggers with large
followings, weibo declined significantly in popularity and influence and become more
entertainment-oriented, while Tencent Holdings’ weixin (“microchannel”), also known as
WeChat, exploded in popularity. WeChat, an instant messaging app launched in 2011, offers its
users a platform for voice and video chats, posting messages and photographs, e-commerce,
online gaming, and following celebrities. Unlike weibo, WeChat connects an individual account
holder with a private circle of friends rather than a public audience, and thus has less potential
political impact.176
Less than two years after it was released, however, China’s leaders became alarmed as some of
WeChat’s users began posting politically sensitive comments and news stories, and some users
with public accounts designed for companies and celebrities gained millions of followers. In
December 2012, the government enacted a new law requiring those who apply for Internet,
mobile service, and social networking accounts to use their real names.177 In 2013, the Supreme
People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation by which bloggers can face up to three years in
prison if content deemed defamatory is reposted 500 times or viewed 5,000 times. These policies
reportedly had a “chilling effect on online discourse.”178 Several dozen WeChat public accounts
were shut down by authorities, and prominent online political commentators and whistle-blowers
were harassed, detained, or arrested.179 New regulations in 2014 mandated that microblogging
and instant messaging services as well as web portals could only repost, and not report, news on
current events, and only after they obtained a permit from the State Internet Information Office.180
Other regulations placed restrictions on WeChat groups, such as limiting the number of people
belonging to a group chat.181 According to one observer, “Critical voices are still there, but it is
less likely they will coalesce into a broader form of protest.”182
Religious Freedom and Ethnic Minority Issues
The extent of religious freedom and activity in China varies widely by religion, region, ethnic
group, and jurisdiction, largely depending on “the level of perceived threat or benefit to party
interests, as well as the discretion of local officials.”183 Article X of the PRC Constitution
guarantees freedom of “religious belief,” but not freedom of religious practice as it explicitly
protects only “normal” religious activities and those that do not “disrupt public order, impair the
health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.”184 At a conference on
“religious work” in April 2016, President Xi Jinping emphasized that the “legitimate rights of
religious peoples must be protected,” but also stated, “We must resolutely guard against overseas
176 “China’s Hot Messaging App WeChat May Be Good News for Censors,” Reuters, December 11, 2013.
177 Joe McDonald, “China Requires Internet Users to Register Names,” Associated Press, December 28, 2012. The
Supreme People’s Court approved this policy in 2014. Angela Meng, “China’s Top Court Puts Tighter Grip on Internet
and Social Media,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2014.
178 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.; “China Threatens
Tough Punishment for Online Rumor Spreading,” Reuters, September 9, 2013.
179 G. E., “A Crackdown on WeChat,” The Economist, March 14, 2014.
180 Only authorized news agencies and websites may publish original news content. Adrian Wan, “China Regulates
Original News Feeds on Messenger Apps Such as WeChat,” South China Morning Post, August 8, 2014.
181 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.
182 Simon Denyer, “Online, in China, the Communist Party and Military Are at War with Ideas,” op. cit.
183 Freedom House, The Battle for China’s Spirit, op. cit.
184 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
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infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”185 By
contrast, Xi has been relatively supportive of Chinese Buddhism and folk religions, Daoism, and
Confucian philosophy, which China’s leaders apparently perceive to be more compatible with
CCP rule.186
Some observers say that, despite government restrictions and the avowed atheism of the PRC’s
Communist leaders, religious life in China continues to grow, due in part to a yearning for
spirituality in Chinese society. An estimated 350 million PRC citizens openly practice one of five
officially recognized religions (Buddhism, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Daoism, and
Islam).187 Furthermore, religious organizations in China are playing growing roles in providing
social and charitable services. A 2017 report by Freedom House on religious practice and
government policies in China states that since Xi came to power, “authorities have intensified
many of their restrictions,” including codifying previously informal restrictions and increasing
measures to prevent children from participating in religious activities. The report emphasizes,
however, that “believers have responded with a surprising degree of resistance....”188
The PRC government often has imposed harsh and arbitrary policies and measures upon many
unregistered Christian churches, Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, and Falun Gong
practitioners. This is largely due to the perceived potential for these groups to become
independent, organized social forces or cultivate foreign support. Chinese authorities increasingly
have persecuted Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims for carrying out religious and cultural
activities that they have regarded as “extremist,” “separatist,” and “terrorist” acts.
International Religious Freedom Act
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292) established an Office of International Religious
Freedom within the Department of State and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF), an independent, bipartisan U.S. government commission dedicated to defending the universal right to
freedom of religion or belief abroad. The Department of State and USCIRF publish annual reports on international
religious freedom pursuant to the act.
The Department of State has identified China as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) for
“particularly severe violations of religious freedom” for 16 consecutive years (2000-2015). Due
in part to China’s designation as a CPC, the U.S. government restricts the U.S. export of crime
control and detection instruments and equipment to the PRC.189 In 2016, the Department of State
reported that “there continued to be reports that the government physically abused, detained,
arrested, tortured, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered
religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices.”190 In April 2017, the
USCIRF recommended that the Department of State again designate China as a CPC for 2016.191
185 “China Focus: Xi Calls For Improved Religious Work,” Xinhua, April 23, 2016.
186 See Ian Johnson, The Souls of China, New York: Pantheon Books, 2017.
187 Ibid.; Freedom House, The Battle for China’s Spirit, op. cit.
188 Ibid.
189 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292). This restriction originally was imposed as part of the
“Tiananmen sanctions” following the 1989 Chinese military crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing.
See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246, §902(a)(4)).
190 Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for
2015, released August 10, 2016.
191 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2016 Annual Report, April 26, 2017.
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In August 2015, then-U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom David
Saperstein traveled to China to discuss religious freedom issues with government officials,
religious leaders, and civil society representatives.192 While in China, Saperstein called for an end
to the campaign of cross removals and church demolitions in Zhejiang province, urged Chinese
authorities to “reassess counterproductive policies,” particularly restrictions on Tibetan Buddhist
and Uyghur Muslim religious practices, and expressed deep concern over detentions of religious
leaders and human rights defenders. Saperstein also noted some positive developments, including
the growth in numbers of religious adherents and activities and faith-based charitable and social
services organizations.193
Christians
Christianity is the second-largest religion in China after Buddhism. Between 70 million and 90
million Chinese Christians worship in officially registered and unregistered churches, split
roughly evenly between the two.194 Membership in both types of churches continues to grow
steadily and somewhat haphazardly, according to observers.195 Some experts estimate that about
one-quarter of China’s human rights lawyers are Christian.196
Many Chinese Protestants have rejected the official church, known as the Three Self Patriotic
Movement, for political or theological reasons. “Three Self” refers to “self-governance,” “selfsupport,” and “self-propagation,” or independence from foreign missionary and other religious
groups and influences. Some independent or “house” church leaders claim that they have
attempted to apply for official status and been rejected by local government Religious Affairs
Bureaus. Although in many localities, unsanctioned religious congregations reportedly experience
little state interference, many house churches have faced harassment by government authorities,
their leaders have been harassed, detained, or imprisoned, and their properties have been
confiscated or demolished. The U.S.-based China Aid Association reported worsening levels of
persecution in 2016, including 303 Christians who were sentenced to prison.197 The government
issued new religious regulations in 2016 that impose restrictions on Chinese contacts with
overseas religious organizations and require government approval for religious schools and
websites. The new rules also officially allow Chinese religious organizations to set up charities
and provide social services.198
Since 2014, authorities in Zhejiang province, where there is a large and growing Christian
population, have carried out efforts against “excessive religious sites” and “illegal” structures.
Zhejiang officials, apparently fearful of the influence and foreign connections of Christian
groups, reportedly have ordered crosses to be removed from more than 1,200 churches, or an
estimated 90% of all church crosses, and 20 church structures have been destroyed as part of a
192 International Religious Freedom Report for 2015, op. cit.
193 Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Ambassador David Saperstein’s Visit to China,” Washington DC,
August 31, 2015.
194 Over three-fourths of China’s Christians are Protestant and the rest are Catholic. Yuan Ren, “China’s Quiet
Christians,” The Spectator, November 12, 2016.
195 Brookings Institution, Christianity in China: Force for Change? June 3, 2014.
196 Ian Johnson, “China’s Unstoppable Lawyers: An Interview with Teng Biao,” NYR Daily, October 19, 2014.
197 ChinaAid Association, 2016 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Christians and Churches in
Mainland China, January-December 2016, February 1, 2017.
198 Matthew Bell, “China’s Atheist Leaders Issue Some Striking New Rules on Religion,” Public Radio International,
October 12, 2016; Gerda Wielander, “China’s New Religious Regulations,” Policy Forum, November 1, 2016.
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provincial crackdown.199 Although many churches had received government approvals in the past,
local officials stated that they did not comply with zoning regulations. This policy has been met
by resistance among not only parishioners of unregistered churches but also leaders of some
registered churches.
Catholics in China are divided among those expressing allegiance to the Pope and those heeding
the government-affiliated Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), which does not
recognize Papal authority. Tensions between the Vatican and Beijing include disagreements over
the appointment of bishops, religious freedom, and the Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Most Chinese bishops have received approval from both Beijing and the Holy See; however,
since 2010, the CCPA has ordained several bishops without Rome’s consent, which has been a
key source of contention between the Vatican and Beijing. The two sides resumed dialogue in
2014 with the aim of improving relations, and some bishops have received joint approval since
2015. Under a draft agreement reported in October 2016, the PRC government would select
candidates for bishops, and the Pope would then choose among those candidates. However, the
Vatican and the PRC government have not resolved issues related to 30 Vatican-approved
Chinese bishops in unregistered churches and 8 bishops ordained by the Chinese government
without the Vatican’s permission.200 In 2012, Thaddeus Ma Daqin, a new bishop approved by
both the Vatican and Beijing, renounced his ties to the CCPA. The government stripped Ma of his
title and confined him to a seminary outside Shanghai, and in 2016 reportedly shut down his
microblogging account.201
Tibetans202
Although Beijing has controlled Tibet since 1951, Tibetan grievances over Beijing’s rule persist,
with some Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas in China
viewing PRC government policies as hostile to their religion, culture, language, and identity. The
TAR, formally established in 1965, constitutes just under half of the area that Tibetan exile
groups consider to be historical Tibet,203 and it is home to about 2.7 million out of China’s total
ethnic Tibetan population of 6 million.204 Most of China’s remaining ethnic Tibetan population
(just over 3 million) lives in Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties outside the TAR, in
Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, which border the TAR, and in Qinghai province.
Tensions between the PRC government and many Tibetans have been high, particularly since a
period of unrest in 2008, when waves of protest swept across the Tibetan plateau. At the same
time, talks between envoys of the Tibetan spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, and
Beijing have stalled. PRC officials and representatives of the Dalai Lama participated in nine
199 Ian Johnson, “Decapitated Churches in China’s Christian Heartland,” New York Times, May 21, 2016;
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
200 Marlin Jeschke, “Global Faiths: Catholic Church in China Is at a Standoff,” The Goshen News, February 16, 2017;
Francis X. Rocca, “Vatican, China Consider Deal on Selection of Bishops After Decades of Division,” Wall Street
Journal, October 30, 2016.
201 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
202 For further information, see CRS Report R43781, The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation,
by (name redacted) .
203 The Tibet Autonomous Region is a provincial-level, ethnic minority administrative region. The PRC also
established ethnic Tibetan-majority, Tibetan Autonomous prefectures and counties in other PRC provinces.
204 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 西藏自治区2010年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报
(Public Notice of Important Statistics from the 2010 Sixth National Census in the Tibet Autonomous Region) (in
Chinese), February 28, 2012, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/201202/t20120228_30406.html.
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rounds of talks between 2002 and 2010 on issues related to Tibetan autonomy and the return of
the Dalai Lama. The ninth round reportedly failed to bring about fundamental progress. The Dalai
Lama’s envoys pledged respect for the authority of the PRC central government, but continued to
push for “genuine autonomy” for the Tibetan people, while a senior Chinese official dismissed
the proposal as tantamount to “half independence.”205 China’s leaders have emphasized social and
economic development in Tibet and continued to condemn the Dalai Lama’s “separatist
activities” and “Middle Way approach.”206
A heightened police presence in the TAR and the imposition of more intensive controls on
Tibetan religious life and culture have exacerbated grievances in Tibetan areas, according to some
observers.207 The Department of State reported “severe repression of Tibet’s unique religious,
cultural, and linguistic heritage by, among other means, strictly curtailing the civil rights of
China’s ethnic Tibetan population, including the freedoms of speech, religion, association,
assembly, and movement.”208 Government measures include political education campaigns in
monasteries and villages and limitations on use of the Tibetan language in schools, despite a
provision in China’s Regional Ethnic Minority Law that stipulates that schools with a majority of
ethnic minority students “should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and
use these languages as the media of instruction” (Article 37).209 In recent years, authorities in
Tibetan areas reportedly have searched some Tibetan homes and businesses for photographs of
the Dalai Lama, examined cell phones for “reactionary music” from India, and monitored
correspondence and Internet posts for political content.210
Tibetan religious and community leaders, academics, writers, artists, and those involved in social
and cultural activities have been targeted for persecution, including arbitrary arrests and
extrajudicial detentions and killings by state agents.211 Many Tibetans have been detained for
participating in protests, disseminating information or images online, and engaging in other
activities that previously were tolerated or are considered relatively minor offenses in other parts
of China.212 The CECC has documented the cases of 650 Tibetan political prisoners and detainees
as of August 2016, the vast majority of whom were apprehended following the 2008 protests.213
In addition, many Tibetans complain of the domination of the local economy by Han Chinese,
particularly in urban areas; forced resettlement; and the adverse environmental effects of
Beijing’s development projects in the region. Officially, Hans, the country’s majority ethnic
group, form a minority in the TAR, or about 8% of the region’s total population, according to
205 “Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts with Dalai Lama,” China Daily, February 11, 2010.
206 “China Issues White Paper on Tibet,” Xinhua, September 6, 2015; Tenzin Monlam, “China Will Never Accept
Middle Way Approach,” Phayul.com, August 27, 2015. The Dalai Lama has proposed a “Middle Way” or “genuine
autonomy” without independence, while Beijing has referred to the middle way as “independence in disguise.”
207 Human Rights Watch, “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s ‘Stability Maintenance’
Campaign,” May 22, 2016.
208 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (Tibet), March 3, 2017.
209
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People’s Republic of
China,” https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regional-ethnic-autonomy-law-of-the-peoples-republic-ofchina-amended.
210 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
211 Human Rights Watch, “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s ‘Stability Maintenance’
Campaign,” op. cit.
212 Ibid.
213 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit. The actual number of Tibetan
prisoners is likely to be much higher.
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Chinese census figures.214 However, some observers believe that Han people actually constitute
over half of the population of Lhasa, the TAR capital, as many Han laborers, business persons,
officials, police, and paramilitary forces have migrated there, many of whom remain registered as
residents of other parts of China.215
Larung Gar
In the past year, authorities continued efforts to demolish structures and homes of the Larung Gar
Buddhist Academy in Sichuan Province, restrict the number of Tibetan Buddhists living there,
and install surveillance equipment. The government states that it intends to make Larung Gar
“more orderly, beautiful, safe and peaceful.”216 Some local residents say that the government fears
a loss of social control and aims to reduce the number of lay and monastic practitioners living
there, including Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, Han Chinese, and foreign students, from
20,000 to 5,000 people.217 Founded in 1980, the religious center has become known as one of the
world’s largest and most important centers for the study of Tibetan Buddhism.218 In November
2016, six U.N. special rapporteurs on human rights issues issued a joint statement, sent to the
PRC government, expressing “deep concern” about expulsions of monks and nuns and
demolitions of monastic dwellings at Larung Gar and Yachen Gar in Sichuan Province.219
Self-Immolations
Since 2009, about 150 Tibetans within China are known to have self-immolated, many apparently
to protest PRC policies or to call for the return of the Dalai Lama, and 119 are known to have
died.220 Most of the self-immolations were committed during 2012-2013 in Tibetan areas in China
outside the TAR. Additional self-immolations by Tibetans have occurred in India and Nepal. The
PRC government has implemented policies that punish relatives, friends, and other associates of
self-immolators, including prison terms or death on “intentional homicide” charges for allegedly
“aiding” or “inciting” others to self-immolate.221 Dr. Lobsang Sangay, elected head (Sikyong) of
the Dharamsala, India-based Central Tibetan Administration and a leader of the Tibetan exile
community, stated that “[w]e have consistently and categorically urged the Tibetan community
not to resort to any kind of drastic action, including self-immolations,” and blamed PRC
repression.222 Although PRC officials often have blamed the Dalai Lama and “hostile foreign
forces,” self-immolations have not been limited to Tibetans. Other PRC citizens, including
farmers protesting land takings by the government, have self-immolated as well.223
214 Hans constitute 92% of the population in the PRC, according to numerous sources.
215 Ananth Krishnan, “Trust Deficit in Tibet,” India Today, July 2, 2015.
216 Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” New York Times, November 29, 2016.
217 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.
218 “Han Chinese, Western Students of Buddhism Also Forced from Larung Gar,” Government Publications and Press
Releases, December 29, 2016.
219 “UN Rights Experts Raise Concern about Larung Gar Buddhist Institute in Tibet,” International Tibet Network,
February 26, 2017; Edward Wong, “U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite to Condemn China over Expulsions of
Tibetans,” New York Times, February 27, 2017.
220 “Young Tibetan Monk Becomes the 150th Self-Immolator in Tibet,” International Campaign for Tibet, May 23,
2017; “Self-Immolations by Tibetans,” May 23, 2017, http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolationsby-tibetans/.
221 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (Tibet), op.cit.
222 Anuradha Sharma, “Interview: Lobsang Sangay,” The Diplomat, April 7, 2014.
223 Jonathan Kaiman, “In China, the State Decides Who Can Come Back from the Dead,” Los Angeles Times, March 8,
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U.S. Policy on Tibetan Issues
The U.S. government has expressed support for Tibetan people’s rights and traditions while
recognizing that “Tibet is a part of China.”224 Presidential and congressional meetings with the
14th Dalai Lama have been among the most high-profile expressions of U.S. support for
Tibetans.225 Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush met with the Dalai Lama on several
occasions. Barack Obama met with the Dalai Lama four times during his presidency, and
expressed support for the Tibetan spiritual leader’s “commitment to peace and nonviolence” and
“Middle Way” approach.226 China’s Foreign Ministry expressed Beijing’s opposition to Obama’s
meetings with the Dalai Lama, objecting to U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs. After
President Obama’s 2016 meeting, China said the Dalai Lama is “not simply a religious figure but
a political figure in exile who has been conducting secessionist activities internationally under the
pretext of religion....”227
Tibetan Policy Act of 2002
The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, incorporated into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228,
Title VI, Subtitle B), directs the executive branch to encourage the PRC government to enter into a dialogue with
the Dalai Lama or his representatives; call for the release of Tibetan political and religious prisoners in China;
support economic development, cultural preservation, environmental sustainability, and other objectives in Tibet;
and carry out other activities to “support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct
identity.” For further information, see CRS Report R43781, The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and
Implementation, by (name redacted) .
The Dalai Lama and exiled Tibetan officials have regularly met with Members of Congress, many
of whom have openly expressed support for Tibetan aspirations. In 2016, the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission (TLHRC), in letters to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, urged
the PRC government to repeal policies related to the demolitions at Larung Gar and the
persecution of relatives and communities associated with self-immolators.228 In August 2016,
Representative Jim McGovern, TLHRC cochair, sponsored a letter, signed by 72 Members of
Congress, calling on the U.S. government to “redouble efforts in support of the Tibetan
people.”229 In November 2015, a congressional delegation led by House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi travelled to Beijing, the TAR, and Hong Kong. While in Tibet, members of the delegation
2016; Ian Johnson, “Picking Death over Eviction,” New York Times, September 9, 2013.
224 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Readout of the President’s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV
Dalai Lama, June 15, 2016.” See also CRS In Focus IF10421, President Obama’s June 2016 Meeting with Tibet’s
Dalai Lama, by (name redacted) .
225 Anup Kaphle, “China Is Angry About Obama Meeting the Dalai Lama. But the U.S. Shouldn’t Worry,” Washington
Post, February 21, 2014.
226 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Readout of the President’s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV
Dalai Lama,” op. cit.; International Campaign for Tibet, “U.S. Presidential Statements on meetings with the Dalai
Lama, 1991-2016,” https://www.savetibet.org/policy-center/us-government-and-legislative-advocacy/u-s-presidentialstatements-on-meetings-with-the-dalai-lama/.
227 Darlene Superville, “Obama, Dalai Lama Anger China with White House Meeting,” Associated Press, June 15,
2016.
228 Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, “Co-Chairs to China: End Demolitions of Tibetan Buddhist Housing and
Expulsions of Practitioners,” October 19, 2016; Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, “Co-Chairs Call on Chinese
Authorities to Cease Criminalization of Relatives, Friends of Self-Immolators,” February 4, 2016.
229 “McGovern Leads 72 Lawmakers in Call for President Obama to Make Tibet a Priority in Final Months in Office,”
press release, August 18, 2016, http://mcgovern.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/mcgovern-leads-72-lawmakersin-call-for-president-obama-to-make-tibet-a.
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raised issues related to human rights, the preservation of Tibetan religious and cultural traditions,
greater autonomy for Tibetan areas, the environment, the Dalai Lama, and renewing the dialogue
between representatives of the Dalai Lam
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