Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Congressional research reportNov 30, 2017

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

(name redacted)

Specialist in Aviation Policy

(name redacted)

Analyst in Transportation and Industry

November 30, 2017

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R44791

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Summary

Funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA

Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190), expired at the end of FY2017. A

subsequent six-month extension (P.L. 115-63) is set to expire at the end of March 2018. Longterm FAA reauthorization measures (H.R. 2997 and S. 1405) are currently under consideration. In

addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set policy on a wide range of

issues related to civil aviation. This report considers prominent topics in the 115th Congress

reauthorization debate.

Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), which is

funded by a variety of taxes and fees on air transportation. The financial health of the AATF is

generally good. However, airlines’ unbundling of ancillary fees from airfares is adversely

affecting AATF revenue, as only base airfares are subject to the ticket tax that is the largest source

of revenue for the trust fund. Reductions in AATF revenue would leave FAA more reliant on

appropriations from the general fund. Other major issues likely to arise during the reauthorization

debate include the following:



Air traffic control privatization. Many commissions over the years have

recommended moving responsibility for air traffic control from FAA, a

government agency, to either an independent government-owned corporation or a

private entity controlled by aviation stakeholders. Delays in implementing the

satellite-based NextGen air traffic control system have renewed interest in this

possibility, although Congress chose not to enact such proposals in 2016.

Unmanned aerial vehicles. Large numbers of drones have come into use, and

the numerous reports of near-collisions between drones and manned aircraft raise

safety concerns. Additionally, Congress has not addressed privacy concerns

related to government-operated, commercial, and recreational drones.

Essential Airline Service (EAS). Congress has repeatedly attempted to limit the

number of localities eligible to participate in this program to subsidize flights to

communities that would otherwise lose all commercial airline service, as well as

to limit the amount of subsidies per passenger. Few communities have been

dropped from the program, and costs continue to rise.

Foreign airlines. Some U.S. airlines and airline labor unions seek

reconsideration of the recent U.S. approval of a foreign carrier permit for

Norwegian Air International, an Ireland-based discount air carrier, to fly across

the Atlantic. Some U.S. carriers also have called for renegotiation of U.S. air

service agreements with Persian Gulf states amid claims that three fast-growing

airlines based in that region are posing unfair competition to U.S. air carriers.

Certification reform. FAA relies heavily on aircraft and aircraft parts

manufacturers to provide technical expertise in the certification process. FAA

oversight has been found to be inconsistent, raising questions regarding safety

and efficiency. Equipment manufacturers have raised concerns that FAA’s

certification process makes it difficult to bring new products to market in a timely

fashion and threatens their international competitiveness.

This report does not attempt to be comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the

FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 are not discussed unless further congressional

consideration appears probable. Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as

Congress moves forward with reauthorization.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Aviation Funding ............................................................................................................................. 1

FAA Funding Accounts ............................................................................................................. 2

Airport Financing ............................................................................................................................ 3

Evaluating Capital Needs .......................................................................................................... 4

Airport Improvement Program (AIP) ........................................................................................ 5

AIP Funding ........................................................................................................................ 6

Funding Distribution ........................................................................................................... 8

Entitlements (Formula Funds) ............................................................................................ 8

Discretionary Funds ............................................................................................................ 9

State Block Grant Program ................................................................................................11

The Federal Share of AIP Matching Funds ........................................................................11

Distribution of AIP Grants by Airport Size ........................................................................11

Grant Assurances .............................................................................................................. 12

Passenger Facility Charges...................................................................................................... 13

Airport Privatization ...................................................................................................................... 15

Types of Airport Privatization ................................................................................................. 16

The Interests at Stake .............................................................................................................. 17

The Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP) .......................................................................... 18

Participation in APPP .............................................................................................................. 19

Why Has the APPP Not Stimulated Privatization? ................................................................. 20

APPP Application Process ................................................................................................ 20

Regulatory Conditions and Obligations ............................................................................ 20

Adequate Access to Funding ............................................................................................. 21

Policy Issues Related to Privatization ............................................................................... 22

Aircraft Noise Issues ..................................................................................................................... 22

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) ........................................................ 23

NextGen Evolution.................................................................................................................. 24

Elements and Funding ............................................................................................................. 26

Current Status .......................................................................................................................... 27

Aircraft Equipage .............................................................................................................. 27

Anticipated Benefits.......................................................................................................... 28

Policy Concerns ................................................................................................................ 29

FAA Organizational Issues ............................................................................................................ 30

Facility Consolidation ............................................................................................................. 30

The Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program .......................................................................... 31

Technological Developments Affecting Potential Safety Impacts of Possible Future

Tower Closures or Facility Consolidations .......................................................................... 33

Facility Security and Continuity of Operations ....................................................................... 34

Air Traffic Control Privatization ............................................................................................. 35

Controller Selection and Hiring .............................................................................................. 37

Aviation Safety Issues ................................................................................................................... 38

Airline Safety .......................................................................................................................... 38

Pilot and Airline Crew Fatigue ................................................................................................ 39

Airline Pilot Qualifications and Pilot Supply .......................................................................... 40

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Commercial Aircraft Tracking and Flight Data Recorders ..................................................... 41

Satellite Tracking .............................................................................................................. 41

Deployable Recorders ....................................................................................................... 42

Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Stations ....................................................................... 43

Safety and Reliability Issues ............................................................................................. 44

Regulatory Oversight ........................................................................................................ 44

The Role of Foreign Regulatory Agencies ........................................................................ 46

English Language Concerns ............................................................................................. 46

Drug and Alcohol Testing and Substance Abuse Programs .............................................. 47

Airport Surface Movement Safety .......................................................................................... 47

Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Operations ........................................................................ 48

Enforcement Authority...................................................................................................... 50

Oversight of Commercial Space Activities ............................................................................. 51

Aircraft and Parts Certification ............................................................................................... 52

Research and Development ........................................................................................................... 53

Airline Issues ................................................................................................................................. 55

Essential Air Service (EAS) .................................................................................................... 55

EAS Funding..................................................................................................................... 56

Subsidies ........................................................................................................................... 57

Small Community Air Service Development Program ................................................................. 57

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) ................................................................ 58

Airline Consumer Issues ............................................................................................................... 59

Passenger Rights Provisions in 2016 Reauthorization .................................................................. 60

Training Regarding Assistance for Persons with Disabilities ................................................. 60

Air Travel Accessibility........................................................................................................... 61

Refunds for Delayed Baggage................................................................................................. 61

Tarmac Delays ......................................................................................................................... 61

Family Seating ........................................................................................................................ 61

Advisory Committee for Aviation Consumer Protection ........................................................ 61

International Aviation Issues ......................................................................................................... 62

Figures

Figure 1. FY2016 AIP Distribution: Entitlement and Discretionary Grants ................................. 10

Figure 2. FY2016 AIP Grant Distribution by Airport Type ........................................................... 12

Figure 3. FAA Research Funding by Account ............................................................................... 54

Tables

Table 1. Aviation Taxes and Fees .................................................................................................... 1

Table 2. Funding Levels for FAA Accounts .................................................................................... 3

Table 3. Annual AIP Authorizations and Amounts Made Available for Grants, FY2000FY2017 ......................................................................................................................................... 7

Table 4. Distribution of PFC Approvals and AIP Grants by Project Type, FY2016 ..................... 14

Table 5. Full Airport Privatization Under the APPP vs. Outside the APPP ................................... 18

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Table 6. Participation in the APPP................................................................................................. 19

Table 7. Funding for NextGen Programs....................................................................................... 26

Table 8. Regulatory Differences Between Domestic and Foreign Repair Stations ....................... 45

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 63

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Introduction

The funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA

Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) and the subsequent Disaster Tax

Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-63), is now set to expire on

March 31, 2018.1 In addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set

policy on a wide range of issues related to civil aviation. This report considers topics likely to

arise as the 115th Congress continues to debate FAA reauthorization. It does not attempt to be

comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security

Act of 2016 are not discussed unless further congressional consideration appears probable.

Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as Congress moves forward.

Aviation Funding

Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF),2

sometimes referred to as the Aviation Trust Fund. The AATF was established in 1970 under the

Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-258) to provide for expansion of the

nation’s airports and air traffic system. Since FY2009, the AATF has provided between 66.6%

and 93% of FAA’s total annual funding, with the remainder coming from general fund

appropriations.3 Revenue sources for the trust fund include passenger ticket taxes, segment fees,

air cargo fees, and fuel taxes paid by both commercial and general aviation aircraft (see Table 1).

Table 1. Aviation Taxes and Fees

(CY2017 rates)

Tax or Fee

Rate

Passenger ticket tax (on domestic ticket purchases and frequent flyer awards)

7.5%

Flight segment tax (domestic, indexed annually to Consumer Price Index)

$4.10

Cargo waybill tax

6.25%

Frequent flyer tax

7.5%

General aviation gasoline

19.4 cents/gallon

General aviation jet fuela (kerosene)

21.9 cents/gallon

Commercial jet fuela (kerosene)

4.4 cents/gallon

International departure/arrivals tax (indexed annually to Consumer Price Index)

(prorated Alaska/Hawaii to/from mainland United States)

$18.00

(Alaska/Hawaii = $9.00)

Fractional ownership surtax on general aviation jet fuel

14.1 cents/gallon

Source: Federal Aviation Administration, Current Aviation Excise Tax Structure, updated January 2017.

a. Does not include 0.1 cents/gallon for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) trust fund.

For information about the short-term funding extension provided by P.L. 115-63, along with the two bills (H.R. 2997

and S. 1405) that sought to provide longer-term FAA authorization, see CRS Insight IN10795, Short-Term FAA

Extension in Place, but Legislative Debate Continues, by (name redacted) and (name

dacted)

re .

For more information about the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, see CRS Report R44749, The Airport and Airway

Trust Fund (AATF): An Overview, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)

Federal Aviation Administration, Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) Fact Sheet, http://www.faa.gov/about/

office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aatf/media/AATF_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

In addition to excise taxes deposited into the trust fund, FAA imposes air traffic service fees on

flights that transit U.S.-controlled airspace but do not take off from or land in the United States.

These overflight fees partially fund the Essential Air Service (EAS) program.4

In 2016, the AATF had revenues of over $14.4 billion and maintained a cash balance of more than

$14 billion. The uncommitted balance was estimated to be approximately $5.7 billion at the end

of FY2016, reversing several years of decline following the onset of the global economic crisis in

2008.5 The trust fund balance is projected to grow in the near term, as AATF revenue continues to

rise and airport capital needs are projected to decline over the next five years. In the longer term,

however, the vitality of the AATF remains a concern, as reductions in general fund appropriations

to FAA have increased the proportion of FAA funding that is derived from the trust fund.

Changes in airline business practices pose a risk to the AATF revenue structure. Trust fund

revenue is largely dependent on airlines’ ticket sales, and the spread of low-cost air carrier models

has held down ticket prices and therefore AATF receipts. In addition, airlines increasingly impose

fees for a variety of options and amenities, such as checked bags and onboard meals, rather than

including them in the base ticket price. Generally, fees not included in the base ticket price are not

subject to federal excise taxes. Air carriers generated over $4.17 billion in baggage fees alone in

2016, which would have brought about $313 million into the trust fund had they been subject to

the 7.5% ticket tax.6

Airlines have long contended that general aviation operators, particularly corporate jets, should

provide a larger share of the revenues supporting the trust fund. General aviation interests dispute

this, arguing that the air traffic system mainly supports the airlines, and that nonairline users pay a

reasonable share given the relatively small incremental costs arising from their flights. Proposals

in 2012 to increase the general aviation jet fuel tax were not adopted. The Clinton, George W.

Bush, and Obama Administrations all proposed per-flight user charges. In the 110th Congress, the

Senate voted to impose a $25-per-flight fee on all commercial and general aviation flights (see S.

1300, 110th Congress) as an additional revenue source for the AATF.7 None of those proposals has

been enacted into law.

FAA Funding Accounts

In recent years, FAA funding has totaled between $15 billion and $16 billion annually. FAA

funding is divided among four main accounts. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) makes up the

largest portion of the FAA budget, receiving slightly more than 60% of total FAA appropriations.

It is the only FAA account that is funded, in part, by general fund contributions. The O&M

account principally funds air traffic operations and aviation safety programs. The Airport

Improvement Program (AIP) provides federal grants-in-aid for projects such as new runways and

taxiways; runway lengthening, rehabilitation, and repair; and noise mitigation near airports. The

See CRS Report R44176, Essential Air Service (EAS), by (name redacted).

The uncommitted balance consists of funds that have not been expended or obligated through current or prior-year

activities, whereas the cash balance includes funds that have been obligated but not expended. See Congressional

Budget Office, Projected Balances of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, August 2016, and U.S. Government

Accountability Office, Airport and Airway Trust Fund: Declining Balance Raises Concerns over Ability to Meet Future

Demands, GAO-11-358T, February 3, 2011.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Aviation: Consumers Could Benefit from Better Information

about Airline-Imposed Fees and Refundability of Government-Imposed Taxes and Fees, GAO-10-785, July 2010.

Office of Management and Budget, Living Within Our Means and Investing in the Future: The President’s Plan for

Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, September 2011, pp. 22-23.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account provides funding for the acquisition and maintenance of

air traffic facilities and equipment, and for engineering, development, testing, and evaluation of

technologies related to the federal air traffic system. The Research, Engineering, and

Development account finances research on improving aviation safety and operational efficiency

and on reducing environmental impacts of aviation operations. Authorizations and appropriations

for these accounts are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Funding Levels for FAA Accounts

(dollars in millions)

Account

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

FY2017

Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

Authorized levels

9,653

9,539

9,596

9,653

9,910

Appropriated amounts

9,653

9,148

9,651

9,741

9,909

10,026

Airport Improvement Program (AIP)

Authorized levels

3,350

Appropriated amounts

3,350

3,343

3,480

3,350

Facilities and Equipment (F&E)

Authorized levels

2,731

2,715

2,730

2,855

Appropriated amounts

2,731

2,588

2,600

2,855

Research, Engineering, and Development

Authorized levels

168

166

Appropriated amounts

168

159

133

157

166

177

Authorized levels

15,902

15,772

15,814

15,901

16,281

Appropriated amounts

15,902

15,238

15,864

15,848

16,281

16,407

TOTALS

Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 114-190, P.L. 112-55 (FY2012 Appropriations), P.L. 113-6 (FY2013 Appropriations),

P.L. 113-76 (FY2014 Appropriations), P.L. 113-235 (FY2015 Appropriations), P.L. 114-113 (FY2016

Appropriations), P.L. 115-31 (FY2017 Appropriations).

Note: The partial FY2018 funding provided by P.L. 115-63 extended funding at the annualized FY2017 level

through March 31, 2018. For more information, see CRS Insight IN10795, Short-Term FAA Extension in Place, but

Legislative Debate Continues, by (name redacted) and (name

acted).

red

Airport Financing8

The federal government supports the development of airport infrastructure in three different

ways. First, the AIP provides federal grants to airports for planning and development, mainly of

capital projects related to aircraft operations such as runways and taxiways. Second, Congress has

authorized airports to assess a local passenger facility charge (PFC) on each boarding passenger,

subject to specific federal approval. PFC revenues can be used for a broader range of projects

than AIP funds, including “landside” projects such as passenger terminals and ground access

For a more extensive discussion of airport financing issues, see CRS Report R43327, Financing Airport

Improvements, by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

improvements. Third, federal law grants investors preferential income tax treatment on interest

income from bonds issued by state and local governments for airport improvements (subject to

compliance with federal rules). Airports may also draw on state and local funds and on operating

revenues such as lease payments and landing fees.

Different airports use different combinations of AIP funding, PFCs, tax-exempt bonds, state and

local grants, and airport revenues to finance particular projects. Small airports are more likely to

be dependent on AIP grants than large or medium-sized airports. Larger airports are much more

likely to issue tax-exempt bonds or finance capital projects with the proceeds of PFCs. Each of

these funding sources places various legislative, regulatory, or contractual constraints on airports

that use it. The availability and conditions of one source of funding may also influence the

availability and terms of other funding sources. In a 2007 study, GAO found that bonds financed

50% of airports’ capital spending, AIP 29%, PFCs 17%, state and local contributions 4%, and

airport revenue 4%.9

Evaluating Capital Needs

The assessment of airport capital needs is fundamental to determining the appropriate federal

support needed to foster a safe and efficient national airport system.10 The federal government’s

interest goes beyond capacity issues to include implementation of federal safety and noise

policies.

The U.S. passenger airline industry has seen a wave of bankruptcies and several major airline

mergers since 2000, including the merger of American Airlines and U.S. Airways in 2013.

Consolidation led to a reduction in the number of commercial flights between 2005 and 2009.

Since that year, the number of commercial flights has been fairly steady, but at a level 15% to

18% lower than in 2005, as carriers have consolidated operations and eliminated some duplicative

hubs and routes.11 Government data indicate that domestic airlines have shown considerable

capacity discipline; instead of adding flights, they have been flying fuller planes, with an average

load factor nearly 85% in 2017.12 The reduced number of flights may ease the pressure on airport

and air traffic control facilities.

Both FAA and the Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) have issued

projections of airports’ long-term financial needs. FAA estimated in its report that the national

system’s capital needs for FY2017-FY2021 will total $32.5 billion (an annual average of $6.5

billion).13 The ACI-NA capital needs survey resulted in an estimate of $99.9 billion over the same

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Airport Finance: Observations on Planned Airport Development Costs and

Funding Levels and the Administration’s Proposed Changes in the Airport Improvement Program, GAO-07-885, 2007,

p. 8.

49 U.S.C. §47103. See FAA, Report to Congress: National Plan of Integrated Airport System (NPIAS) 2013-2017,

http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/npias/.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), “Flights, All U.S. Carriers-All

Airports,” https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=5, viewed November 6, 2017.

BTS, “Load Factor—“passenger-miles as a proportion of available seat-miles in percent (%),”

http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=5, viewed November 6, 2017.

FAA. National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), 2017-2021, Executive Summary.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

years (an annual average of $20 billion).14 The main reason for the widely differing estimates was

disparate views on what kinds of airport projects to include.15

The FAA estimate was based on information taken from airport master plans and state system

plans, but FAA planners screened out planned projects not justified by aviation activity forecasts

or not eligible for AIP grants. Only designated airports were included in the FAA study. Implicit

in this methodology is that the planning has been carried through to the point where financing is

identified. The ACI-NA study casts a substantially wider net. It includes projects funded by PFCs,

bonds, or state or local funding; airport-funded air traffic control facilities; security projects

funded by airports or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); “necessary” AIPineligible projects such as parking facilities, hangars, revenue portions of terminals, and offairport roads and transit facilities; and AIP-eligible projects for which AIP funding was not

requested. These additions cause the ACI-NA estimate of capital needs to be far higher than the

FAA estimate.

FAA has devoted particular attention to evaluating capital needs at the largest airports, which

handle the vast majority of commercial passenger boardings. The agency has undertaken three

studies to determine which improvements at major airports are most critical to increasing system

capacity. The most recent such study, called FACT3, was released in January 2015.16 FACT3

concluded that the nationwide air traffic system has become more reliable and that congestion has

been reduced, due to the combined effects of structural change in the airline industry as well as

the addition of 18 new runways and 7 extended runways at the busiest hub airports since 2000.

FACT3 indicated that while NextGen is helping to manage delays caused by airport congestion,

new capacity and other solutions are still necessary to address traffic growth and reduce delays at

some of the largest and busiest airports. The study found that while capacity constraints across the

aviation system may not be as dire as in previous analyses, several of the busiest airports would

continue to be capacity-constrained in the near term, including all the New York City-area

airports, Philadelphia International Airport, and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.17

Airport Improvement Program (AIP)

The AIP provides federal grants to airports for airport development and planning. Participants

range from very large publicly owned commercial airports to small general aviation airports that

may be privately owned but are available for public use.18 AIP funding is usually limited to

construction of improvements related to aircraft operations, such as runways and taxiways.

Commercial revenue-producing facilities are generally not eligible for AIP funding, nor are

operating costs.19 The structure of AIP funds distribution reflects congressional priorities and the

objectives of assuring airport safety and security, increasing airport capacity, reducing congestion,

Airports Council International, Airport Capital Development Needs: 2017-2021, http://aci-na.org/sites/default/files/

2017infrastructureneedsstudy-web.pdf.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Airport Funding: FAA’s and Industry’s Cost Estimates for Airport

Development, GAO-17-504T, March 23, 2017.

FACT3 is short for Future Airport Capacity Task, study 3. The previous reports are called FACT1 and FACT2.

FAA, FACT3: Airport Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System, January 2015, http://www.faa.gov/airports/

planning_capacity/media/FACT3-Airport-Capacity-Needs-in-the-NAS.pdf.

General aviation airports do not serve military (with a few Air National Guard exceptions) or scheduled commercial

service aircraft but typically do support one or more of the following: business/corporate, personal, instructional flying;

agricultural spraying; air ambulances; on-demand air taxies; charter aircraft.

For detailed guidance on allowable costs under the AIP, see Chapter 3 of the AIP Handbook, at http://www.faa.gov/

airports/resources/publications/orders/media/aip_5100_38c.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

helping fund noise and environmental mitigation costs, and financing small state and community

airports.

The main financial advantage of the AIP to airports is that as a grant program, it can provide

funds for capital projects without the financial burden of debt financing, although airports are

required to provide a relatively modest local match to the federal funds. Limitations on the use of

AIP grants include the range of projects that the AIP can fund and the requirement that recipients

adhere to all program regulations and grant assurances.

Federal law requires the Secretary of Transportation to publish a national plan for the

development of public-use airports in the United States. This appears as a biannual FAA

publication called the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS).20 For an airport to

receive AIP funds, it must be listed in the NPIAS.

AIP Funding

The AIP program structure and authorizations are set in FAA authorization acts. AIP spending

authorized and the amounts made available for grants since FY2000 are illustrated in Table 3.

According to FAA, 3,340 of the 19,536 airports in the United States are listed in the NPIAS report, 2017-2021.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Table 3. Annual AIP Authorizations and Amounts Made

Available for Grants, FY2000-FY2017

(dollars in millions)

Fiscal Year

Authorization

Grant Amounts Available

2000

$2,475

$1,851

2001

$3,200

$3,140

2002

$3,300

$3,223

2003

$3,400

$3,295

2004

$3,400

$3,294

2005

$3,500

$3,384

2006

$3,600

$3,424

2007

$3,700

$3,402

2008

$3,675

$3,471

2009

$3,900

$3,385

2010

$3,515

$3,378

2011

$3,515

$3,378

2012

$3,350

$3,199

2013

$3,350

$3,192

2014

$3,350

$3,194

2015

$3,350

$3,193

2016

$3,350

$3,192

2017

$3,350

Sources: FAA, AIP Annual Report of Accomplishments, 2009, and data from FAA Airports

Branch. Amounts made available for grants do not include obligations used for administration

expenses, the Small Community Air Service Program, and some research funding.

After trending upward from FY1982 to FY1992, grant funding approved in annual appropriations

declined through the mid-1990s as part of federal deficit reduction efforts, leaving large gaps

between authorized AIP spending levels and the amounts the program was actually allowed to

expend. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21;

P.L. 106-181), enacted in 2000, provided major increases in the AIP’s authorization, starting in

FY2001. The amount available for grants peaked at $3.47 billion in FY2008. The FAA

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 authorized funding through FY2015 at an annual level of

$3.35 billion. The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 authorized funding through

FY2017 at an annual level of $3.35 billion. A six-month extension, included in the Disaster Tax

Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-63), continued federal funding

through March 2018.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Current AIP Funding Guarantees

Historically, FAA authorization acts have included provisions designed to compel appropriators to both fully expend

annual trust fund revenues and fully fund FAA’s capital programs: the AIP and Facilities and Equipment (F&E).21

The current guarantee requires that total budget resources made available from the trust fund in any year (including

appropriations and obligation limitations) for the AIP, F&E, research and development, and the trust fund share of

FAA operations must be equal to the sum of 90% of the revenues for the year plus the amount calculated by

subtracting the amount made available from the trust fund from the actual revenues received, based on the data from

the fiscal year two years prior to the current fiscal year.

This guarantee is enforced by making it out of order in both the House and the Senate to consider any provision that

does not adhere to the guarantees. Point-of-order enforcement provisions have had limited success in the past. This

is largely because points of order may be waived by the Rules Committee in the House, and points of order are rarely

raised against conference reports in the Senate.

Funding Distribution

The distribution system for AIP grants is complex. It is based on a combination of formula grants

(also referred to as apportionments or entitlements) and discretionary funds.22 Each year, the

entitlements are first apportioned by formula to specific airports or types of airports. Once the

entitlements are satisfied, the remaining funds are defined as discretionary funds. Airports apply

for discretionary funds for projects in their airport master plans. Formula grants and discretionary

funds are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that airports receiving formula funds may also

apply for and receive discretionary funds. Grants are generally awarded directly to airports.

Entitlements (Formula Funds)

Entitlements are funds that are apportioned by formula to airports, and may generally be used for

any eligible airport improvement or planning project. These funds are divided into four

categories: primary airports, cargo service airports, general aviation airports, and Alaska

supplemental funds. Each category distributes AIP funds by a different formula.

Most airports have up to three years to use their apportionments. Non-hub commercial service

airports have up to four years. The formula distributions are contingent on an annual AIP

obligation limitation of $3.2 billion or more. If this threshold is not met in a particular fiscal year,

most formulas revert to prior authorized funding formulas.

Primary Airports. The apportionment for airports that board more than 10,000 passengers each

year is based on the number of boardings (also referred to as enplanements) during the prior

calendar year.23 The amount apportioned for each fiscal year is equal to double the amount that

would be received according to the following formulas:



$7.80 for each of the first 50,000 passenger boardings;

$5.20 for each of the next 50,000 passenger boardings;

See CRS Report RL33654, Aviation Spending Guarantee Mechanisms, by (name redacted)

See U.S.C. 49 Chapter 471 and FAA, Airport Improvement Program Handbook, http://www.faa.gov/airports/

resources/publications/orders/media/aip_5100_38c.pdf.

Passenger enplanements are the total number of passengers boarding aircraft, including originating passengers as

well as those changing aircraft.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress



$2.60 for each of the next 400,000 passenger boardings;

$0.65 for each of the next 500,000 passenger boardings; and

$0.50 for each passenger boarding in excess of 1 million.

The minimum allocation to any primary airport is $1 million. The maximum is $26 million.24

Cargo service airports. Some 3.5% of AIP funds subject to apportionment are apportioned to

airports served by all-cargo aircraft with a total annual landed weight of more than 100 million

pounds. The allocation formula is the proportion of the individual airport’s landed weight to the

total landed weight at all cargo service airports.25

General aviation airports. General aviation, reliever, and nonprimary commercial service

airports are apportioned 20% of AIP funds subject to apportionment. From this share, all airports,

excluding all nonreliever primary airports, receive the lesser of the following:



$150,000 or

one-fifth of the estimated five-year costs for airport development for each of

these airports as listed in the most recent NPIAS.

Any remaining funds are distributed according to a state-based population and area formula. FAA

makes the project decisions on the use of these funds in consultation with the states. Although

FAA has ultimate control, some states view these funds as an opportunity to address general

aviation needs from a statewide, rather than a local or national, perspective.26

Alaska supplemental funds. Funds are apportioned to airports in Alaska to assure that Alaskan

airports receive at least twice as much funding as they did under the Airport Development Aid

Program in 1980.27

Forgone apportionments. Large and medium hub airports that collect a passenger facility charge

of $3 or less have their AIP formula entitlements reduced by an amount equal to 50% of their

projected PFC revenue for the fiscal year until they forgo or give back 50% of their AIP formula

grants. In the case of PFC above the $3 level, the percentage forgone is 75%. A special small

airport fund, which provides grants on a discretionary basis to airports smaller than medium hub,

gets 87.5% of these forgone funds. The discretionary fund gets the remaining 12.5%.

Discretionary Funds

The discretionary fund includes the money not distributed under the apportioned entitlements, as

well as the forgone PFC revenues that were not deposited into the small airport fund. AIP

discretionary funding for FY2016 was about 13% of total AIP funding. Discretionary grants are

approved by FAA based on project priority and other selection criteria. Figure 1 illustrates the

composition of both apportioned and discretionary grants, based on FY2016 data.

In a year in which the amount made available is below $3.2 billion, the amounts apportioned to primary airports are

not doubled, the minimum apportionment returns to $650,000, and the maximum apportionment is $22 million.

In a year in which the amount made available is below $3.2 billion, not more than 8% of cargo service apportionment

may be apportioned to any one airport. Landed weight is the weight of the aircraft and its contents at landing.

In any year in which the amount made available under Section 48103 is less than $3.2 billion, the formula reverts

back to the amounts determined by the area and population formula set forth in Section 47114 (d) (1) and (2).

In any year in which the amount made available under Section 48103 is less than $3.2 billion, Alaska supplemental

funds will be apportioned based on the way in which amounts were apportioned in the fiscal year ending September 30,

1980.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Despite its name, the discretionary fund is not allocated solely at FAA’s discretion. Allocations

are subject to the following three set-asides and certain other spending criteria:



Airport noise set-asides. At least 35% of discretionary funds are set aside for

noise compatibility planning and for carrying out noise abatement and

compatibility programs.

Military Airport Program. At least 4% of discretionary funds are set aside for

conversion and dual use of up to 15 current and former military airports. The

program allows funding of some projects not normally eligible under the AIP.

Grants for reliever airports. Two-thirds of 1% of discretionary funds are set

aside for reliever airports in metropolitan areas suffering from flight delays.28

Figure 1. FY2016 AIP Distribution: Entitlement and Discretionary Grants

Source: Data from FAA Airports Branch.

Notes: MAP refers to Military Airport Program. Carryover is also referred to as Protected

Entitlement Funds. C/S/S/N = Capacity, Safety, Security, and Noise Abatement. Amounts may not

add to 100% due to rounding.

The Secretary of Transportation is also directed to see that 75% of the grants made from the

discretionary fund are used to preserve and enhance capacity, safety, and security at primary and

reliever airports, and also to carry out airport noise compatibility planning and programs at these

airports. From the remaining 25%, FAA is required to set aside $5 million for the testing and

evaluation of innovative aviation security systems.

Subject to these limitations and the three set-asides, the Secretary of Transportation, through

FAA, has discretion in distribution of grants from the remainder of the discretionary fund.29

Reliever airports are high-capacity general aviation airports meant to provide general aviation pilots with alternatives

to using congested hub airports. Reliever airports must have 100 or more based aircraft or 25,000 annual itinerant

operations. These airports average 230 based aircraft. In total, 28% of the general aviation fleet in the United States is

based at reliever airports.

For a description of FAA’s process for selecting projects, see 26th AIP Annual Report of Accomplishments,

http://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_histories/media/26th_AIP_Annual_Report_of_Accomplishments.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

State Block Grant Program30

Under this program, FAA provides funds directly to participating states for projects at airports

classified as other than primary airports. Each participating state receives a block grant made up

of the state’s apportionment (formula) funds and available discretionary funds. A block grant

program state is responsible for selecting and funding AIP projects at the small airports in the

state. In making the selections, the participating states are required to comply with federal

priorities. Each block grant state is responsible for project administration as well as most of the

inspection and oversight roles normally assumed by FAA. The states that currently participate in

the state block grant program are Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, North

Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.

The Federal Share of AIP Matching Funds

For AIP projects, the federal government share differs depending on the type of airport.31 The

federal share, whether funded by formula or discretionary grants, is as follows:



75% for large and medium hub airports (80% for noise compatibility projects);

90% for other airports;

“not more than” 90% for airport projects in states participating in the state block

grant program;

70% for projects funded from the discretionary fund at airports receiving

exemptions under 49 U.S.C. Section 47134, the pilot program for private

ownership of airports;

airports reclassified as medium hubs due to increased passenger volumes may

retain eligibility for up to a 90% federal share for a two-year transition period;

certain economically distressed communities receiving subsidized air service

may be eligible for up to a 95% federal share of project costs.

This cost-share structure means that smaller airports pay a lower share of AIP-funded project

costs than larger airports. The airports themselves must raise the remaining share from other

sources.32

Distribution of AIP Grants by Airport Size

Although smaller airports’ individual grants are of much smaller dollar amounts than the grants

going to large and medium hub airports, the smaller airports are much more dependent on the AIP

to meet their capital needs. This is particularly the case for noncommercial airports, which

received over 27% of AIP grants distributed in FY2016. Figure 2 shows the share of AIP grants

awarded in FY2016, by value, broken out by airport type.

49 U.S.C. §47128. For program requirements, see 14 C.F.R. Part 156.

49 U.S.C. §47109.

Higher federal shares are available to airports in states with large amounts of federal land; see 49 U.S.C. §47109(b).

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Figure 2. FY2016 AIP Grant Distribution by Airport Type

Source: Data from FAA Airports Branch.

Grant Assurances

Airports’ grant applications are conditioned on assurances regarding future airport operations.

Examples of such assurances include making the airport available for public use on reasonable

conditions and without unjust economic discrimination (against all types, kinds, and classes of

aeronautical activities); charging air carriers making similar use of the airport substantially

comparable amounts; maintaining a current airport layout plan; making financial reports to FAA;

and expending airport revenue only on capital or operating costs at the airport.33 Within the AIP

context, assurances are a means of guaranteeing the implementation of federal policy.

Obligations derived from airports’ assurances extend beyond the formal closure of AIP grantsupported projects. Obligations related to the use, operation, and maintenance of an airport

remain in effect for the expected life of the improvement, up to 20 years. In the case of the

purchase of land with AIP funds, the federal obligations do not expire.34 Airports may request that

FAA release them from their AIP contractual obligations. Typically, as a condition of the release,

the airport sponsor must either reimburse the federal government for the AIP grants (in the case of

land grants, the federal share of the fair market value of the land) or reinvest the amount in an

approved AIP project.35

Decisions about which airport expansion projects are most justified have implications for the

reauthorization of the AIP. Large runway projects can require long lead times—10 or more years

49 U.S.C. §47107. The layout plan must be approved by the Secretary of Transportation, as must any revision or

modification. This, in effect, means that any AIP project must be written into the airport’s plan. The nondiscrimination

provision protects a wide variety of users including, for example, nighttime users and cargo carriers.

Assurances that no carrier will receive exclusive rights, that airport revenue will be used at the airport, and that the

airport will comply with civil rights protections continue in perpetuity.

For a listing of the grant assurances, see http://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_assurances/.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

from concept to initial construction is not unusual. At large and medium hub airports, runway

projects are usually paid for, in part, by AIP funds. Therefore, some projects needed by 2025 may

require AIP funding in earlier years. Because large and medium airports must forgo either 50% or

75% of their AIP formula entitlement funds if they levy passenger facility charges (see below),

most federal funding for their runway projects will probably need to take the form of AIP

discretionary funds. If the AIP budget is constrained in the future, either under a reauthorization

bill or during the annual appropriations process, and the entitlement formulas remain as they are,

the discretionary portion of the AIP budget may be squeezed, limiting large airports’ ability to

draw on AIP funds for major capacity expansion projects.

There are several ways Congress might shift AIP funds if it seeks to give priority to enhancing

capacity at large and medium hub airports. One would be to eliminate the requirement that large

and medium hub airports that impose the maximum PFCs forgo 75% of their entitlement. This

change would give larger airports a greater share of entitlement funding, but at the cost of

depleting the discretionary small airport fund and reducing AIP grants to small airports.

Alternatively, changes in the statutory set-asides of discretionary funds could give FAA more

flexibility to use that money for capacity enhancement, but might reduce funding for noise

mitigation and other purposes.

The current AIP structure and funding mechanism generally tend to benefit airports smaller than

medium hub size. In particular, the increased amount of apportioned funds has limited the

availability of funds for discretionary grants, such as those for operational evolution plan projects

at major airports. Policy changes giving airports increased flexibility in the use of their

entitlements might benefit smaller airports not served by commercial aviation, in line with the

national goal of having an “extensive” national airport system,36 but this use of funds might

conflict with the goal of reducing congestion at major commercial airports.

One way to reduce the amount of trust fund revenue needed for the AIP would be to allow large

and medium hub airports to opt out of the AIP and rely exclusively on PFCs to finance capital

projects. This would require raising or eliminating the federal cap on PFCs. These

“defederalized” airports could then be released from some or all of the AIP grant assurances

under which they now operate, such as land use requirements and airport revenue use

restrictions.37 If airports exit the program, AIP spending could be reduced or redirected to other

airports.

Passenger Facility Charges

In 1990, concerns that existing sources of funds for airport development would be insufficient to

meet national needs led to authorization of a new user charge, the passenger facility charge

(PFC). The PFC was seen as a complementary funding source to the AIP. The Aviation Safety and

Capacity Expansion Act of 199038 allowed the Secretary of Transportation to authorize public

agencies that control commercial airports to impose a fee on each paying passenger boarding an

aircraft at their airports. Initially, there was a $3 cap on each airport’s PFC and a $12 limit on the

total PFCs that a passenger could be charged per round trip.

NPIAS, p. 1. The NPIAS includes the attribute that “the airport system be extensive, providing as many people as

possible with convenient access to air transportation, typically by having most commuters with no more than 20 miles

of travel to the nearest NPIAS airport.” Also see http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning-capacity/ga_study/.

This approach is backed by the American Association of Airport Executives, Eliminate Federal Cap on Local

Passenger Facility Charges, http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=GRSRWZ.

P.L. 101-508, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Title IX.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The PFC is a state, local, or port authority fee, not a federally imposed tax deposited into the

Treasury.39 Because of the complementary relationship between the AIP and PFCs, PFC

provisions are generally folded into the sections of FAA reauthorization legislation dealing with

the AIP. The money raised from PFCs must be used to finance eligible airport-related projects.

Unlike AIP funds, PFC funds may be used to service debt incurred to carry out projects.40

Legislation in 2000 raised the PFC ceiling to $4.50, with an $18 limit on the total PFCs that a

passenger can be charged per round trip. To impose a PFC above $3, an airport has to show that

the funded projects will make significant improvements in air safety, increase competition, or

reduce congestion or noise impacts on communities, and that these projects could not be fully

funded by using the airport’s AIP formula funds or AIP discretionary grants. Large and medium

hub airports imposing PFCs above the $3 level forgo 75% of their AIP formula funds. PFCs at

large and medium hub airports may not be approved unless the airport has submitted a written

competition plan to FAA, which includes information about the availability of gates, leasing

arrangements, gate-use requirements, controls over airside and ground-side capacity, and

intentions to build gates that could be used as common facilities.

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 included minor changes to the PFC program.

The act made permanent the pilot program that authorized non-hub small airports to impose

PFCs. The act also required GAO to study alternative means of collecting PFCs without including

the PFC in the ticket price.41 The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 did not include

significant changes to the PFC program.

Unlike AIP grants, of which over 70% in FY2016 went to airside projects (runways, taxiways,

aprons, and safety-related projects), PFC revenues are heavily used for landside projects such as

terminals and transit systems on airport property, and for interest payments. Table 4 shows the

AIP grant awards and PFC approvals by project type in FY2014. Annual system-wide PFC

collections grew from $85.4 million in 1992 to over $3 billion in 2016.42

Table 4. Distribution of PFC Approvals and AIP Grants by Project Type, FY2016

Type of Project

PFC

AIP

Airside

15.7%

71.1%

Landside

60.2%

12.3%

Noise

0.0%

4.4%

Roads/Access

2.6%

0.6%

Interest on Bonds

21.4%

—

Unclassified, State Block Grants, Misc.

—

11.7%

100.0%

Total

Source: FAA, Airports Branch.

Air carriers collect the PFCs for airports and are paid a small administrative fee.

49 U.S.C. §40117.

GAO identified three alternative means of collecting PFCs, but found that none of the alternative methods was better

than the existing collection method. See GAO-13-262R, Alternative Methods for Collecting Airport Passenger Facility

Charges, February 14, 2013, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-262R.

For PFC collections by year, see http://www.faa.gov/airports/pfc/monthly_reports/media/stats.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The PFC statutory language lends itself to a broader interpretation of “capacity enhancing”

projects, and the implementing regulations are less constraining than those for AIP funds. Air

carriers, which historically have preferred funding to be dedicated to airside projects, must be

notified and provided with an opportunity for consultation about airports’ proposals to fund

projects with PFC revenues. They are generally less involved in the PFC project planning and

decision-making process than is the case with AIP projects. The difference in the pattern of

project types may also be influenced by the fact that larger airports, which collect most of the

PFC revenue, tend to have substantial landside infrastructure, whereas smaller airports that are

much more dependent on AIP funding have comparatively limited landside facilities.

The central legislative issue related to PFCs is whether to raise or eliminate the $4.50 per

enplaned passenger ceiling.43 In general, airports argue for increasing or eliminating the ceiling,

whereas most air carriers and some passenger advocates oppose higher limits on PFCs. A GAO

study released in January 2015 modeled several scenarios of higher PFCs, and found that raising

the cap would significantly increase PFC collections available to airports. However, the GAO

report suggests that higher PFCs could also marginally slow passenger growth, and therefore the

growth in revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.44

The permissible uses of revenues are an ongoing point of contention. Airport operators, in

particular, would like more freedom to use PFC funds for off-airport projects, such as

transportation access projects, and want the process of obtaining FAA approval to be streamlined.

Carriers, on the other hand, often complain that airports use PFC funds to finance proposals of

dubious value, especially outside airport boundaries, instead of high-priority projects that offer

meaningful safety or capacity enhancements. The major air carriers are also unhappy with their

limited influence over project decisions, as airports are required only to consult with resident air

carriers instead of having to get their agreement on PFC-funded projects.

Airport Privatization45

Almost all commercial service airports in the United States are owned by local and state

governments, or by public entities such as airport authorities or multipurpose port authorities.46 In

1996, Congress established the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP)47 to explore the

prospect of privatizing publicly owned airports and using private capital to improve and develop

them. In addition to reducing demand for government funds, privatization has been promoted as a

way to make airports more efficient and financially viable.

Neither the reauthorization bill reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, H.R. 2997,

nor the corresponding Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation bill, S. 1405, would change the

$4.50 per enplaned passenger PFC ceiling. However, the Senate version of the Transportation, Housing and Urban

Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, Section 119L, contains language that would increase

the PFC ceiling to $8.50, with the PFC for applicable connecting flights capped at $4.50.

Commercial Aviation: Raising Passenger Facility Charges Would Increase Airport Funding, but Other Effects Less

Certain, GAO-15-107, December 2014, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-107.

For more complete discussion of this subject, see CRS Report R43545, Airport Privatization: Issues and Options for

Congress, by (name redacted).

Commercial service airports are publicly owned airports that receive scheduled passenger service and board at least

2,500 passengers a year. Branson Airport in Branson, MO, is the only privately funded, privately developed, and

privately operated commercial passenger airport in the United States.

49 U.S.C. §47134; Section 149 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996; P.L. 104-264.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Participation in the APPP has been limited. Two airports have completed the privatization

process, and one of them later reverted to public ownership. Owners of other airports considered

privatization, but eventually chose not to proceed. The lack of interest in privatization among

U.S. airports could be the result of (1) readily available financing sources for publicly owned

airports; (2) barriers or lack of incentives to privatize; (3) the potential implications for major

stakeholders; and (4) satisfaction with the status quo.

Privatization refers to the shifting of governmental functions, responsibilities, and sometimes

ownership, in whole or in part, to the private sector. With respect to airports, “privatization” can

take many forms up to and including the transfer of an entire airport to private operation and/or

ownership. In the United States, most cases of airport privatization fall into the category of

“partial privatization;” full privatization, either under or outside the APPP, has been rare.

Types of Airport Privatization

Airport privatization has taken four generic forms:



Service contracts. Many U.S. airports outsource some noncore operations to

private firms that specialize in those functions. Examples of operations that are

frequently outsourced are cleaning and janitorial services, airport landscaping,

shuttle bus operations, and concessions in airport terminals. Outsourcing of

service contracts is probably the most common type of privatization among U.S.

airports.

Management contracts. Some airports engage the management expertise of the

private sector by contracting out specific facilities or responsibilities such as

parking, terminal concessions, terminal operations, airfield signage, fuel farms,

and aircraft refueling. In a few cases, a private management company has been

awarded a contract to manage an entire airport for a specified term.

Developer financing/operation. A wide range of contracts has been used to

involve the private sector in providing financing, development, operation, and

maintenance services. This is also known as the Design-Build-Finance-OperateMaintain (DBFOM) model. Airport DBFOM examples include passenger

terminals (notably Terminal 5 at Chicago O’Hare International Airport and

Terminal 4 at New York John F. Kennedy International Airport), parking garages,

and rental car facilities.48

Long-term lease or sale. Full privatization involves the sale or long-term lease

of an airport to a private owner or operator. Under a long-term lease or

concession agreement, the airport owner grants full management and

development control to the private operator in exchange for capital improvements

and other obligations such as an up-front payment and/or profit-sharing

arrangements. Under a full sale, ownership and full responsibility for operation,

capital improvements, and maintenance would be transferred to a private buyer.

Several airports in Europe have been privatized in this way, but there have been

no sales of commercial service airports in the United States.

Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Report 66, “Considering and Evaluating Airport Privatization,” p. 4.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The Interests at Stake

Airport privatization, especially in the case of long-term lease or sale, involves four major

stakeholders: airport owners, which in the United States are mostly local or regional governments

or public entities; air carriers; private investors; and the federal government. These stakeholders

ultimately decide whether a privatization deal goes forward, but they tend to have different

objectives and, in many cases, divergent interests. Airline passengers may experience the effect of

privatization via, for example, airport concession offerings, operational efficiency, and changes in

prices and fees, but passenger interests are usually not represented formally in discussions of

privatization.

Airport owners, who are usually local governments, might embrace privatization as a source of

revenue, but federal regulations generally require that lease or sale revenue from airport

privatization be used only for airport purposes (unless the majority of airlines agrees otherwise,

under the APPP). On the other hand, privatization involves surrendering control of an

economically important facility. Reducing or eliminating responsibilities of the public agency or

authority that owns the airport may lead to the loss of public-sector jobs. Hence a public-sector

owner may see few benefits from selling or leasing an airport to a private operator unless the

facility is losing money—and in that case, private investors might not find the airport an attractive

investment. The APPP encourages privatization by granting certain exemptions to public-sector

owners with regard to revenue diversion and other obligations.

Air carriers, including both scheduled passenger airlines and cargo airlines, would like to keep

their costs low. They also want to have some control over how airport revenues are used,

especially to ensure that the fees paid by themselves and their customers are used for airportrelated purposes. Their interest in low landing fees and low rents for ticket counters and other

facilities may be contrary to the interest of potential private operators in increasing revenue. At

the same time, however, air carriers have an interest in ensuring that the airports they use are well

maintained and carefully managed. They might have reason to support a proposed privatization if

they thought it would result in lower charges, better airport services, or increased efforts to

promote the airport.

Private investors and operators expect a financial return on their investments. They generally

will be looking above all at growth potential such as opportunities to bring additional flights to

the airport, to earn additional lease revenue by improving amenity offerings such as shopping and

dining for passengers, or to draw more freight traffic by offering lower fees or improved facilities.

If they attempt to increase profitability by raising landing fees or rents, that may bring them into

conflict with air carriers using the airport.

The federal government, represented by FAA, has been directed by Congress to engage private

capital in aviation infrastructure development and reduce reliance on federal grants and subsidies.

However, FAA also has statutory mandates to maintain the safety and integrity of the national air

transportation system and to enforce compliance with commitments, known as “grant

assurances,” that airports have made to obtain grants under the AIP. Thus FAA is likely to

carefully examine privatization proposals that might risk closures of runways or airports or

otherwise reduce aviation system capacity, or that appear to favor certain airport users over

others.

The divergent interests of stakeholders are a significant issue in privatization. Striking a balance

among these interests while facilitating privatization is one of the purposes of the APPP.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP)

Section 149 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (49 U.S.C. §47134; P.L. 104264) authorizes the FAA Administrator to exempt participating airports from all or part of the

requirements to use airport revenue for airport-related purposes, to repay federal grants, or to

return airport property acquired with federal assistance upon the lease or sale of the airport

deeded by the federal government.49 The law originally limited participation in the APPP to no

more than five airports. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) increased

the number of airports that may participate from 5 to 10. Only one large hub commercial airport

may participate in the program, and that airport may only be leased, not sold. Only general

aviation airports can be sold under the APPP.

Table 5 provides a comparison of the requirements and regulations governing airport

privatization under and outside the APPP.

Table 5. Full Airport Privatization Under the APPP vs. Outside the APPP

Full Privatization Under APPP

Full Privatization Outside APPP

Eligible Airports

A maximum of 10 airports may participate,

among which only one may be a large hub

airport. One slot is reserved for a general

aviation airport. Commercial airports may

only be leased; general aviation airports

may be sold.

No restrictions on number or type of

airports.

Use of Sale/Lease

Proceeds

Airports can request U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) approval to use

sale/lease proceeds for nonairport

purposes. For commercial service airports,

this also requires consent of 65% of

airlines. For general aviation airports, this

requires consultation with owners of

aircraft based at the airport.

Sale/lease proceeds are considered airport

revenue, and must be used for airport

purposes.

Grant Repayment

DOT may grant exemptions from existing

repayment obligations. Airports must

abide by other grant assurance obligations.

DOT cannot grant exemptions from grant

assurance obligations or existing

repayment obligations.

AIP Formula Grants

Private operator is eligible for grants from

AIP formula funds, but at a lower federal

share.

Private operator may be eligible for grants

from AIP formula funds under certain

conditions such as when a privately owned

airport is used for public purpose as a

reliever or provides at least 2,500

passenger boardings a year.

Rates or Charges on

Airlines

Rates on airlines may not rise faster than

the inflation rate without consent of 65%

of airlines. Rate increases for general

aviation aircraft owners may not exceed

percentage rate increase for airlines.

Rates and charges must be reasonable and

not unjustly discriminatory, pursuant to

grant assurances.

For a primary airport, the use of airport revenue for airport-related purposes requires approval by 65% of the

scheduled air carriers serving the airport and by the scheduled and unscheduled air carriers representing 65% of the

total landed weight of all aircraft serving the airport in the preceding calendar year. For more information about the

APPP, see http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_compliance/privatization/.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Charges on Passengers

Full Privatization Under APPP

Full Privatization Outside APPP

Private operator is authorized to impose,

collect, and use revenue from passenger

facility charges (PFCs).

Private operator is authorized to impose

charges on passengers (subject to

reasonableness and nondiscrimination

requirements of the grant assurances), but

not to impose, collect, or use PFCs.

Source: Federal Aviation Administration.

Participation in APPP

The APPP has had limited success in increasing the number of privately run airports. Since its

inception, 11 airports have applied to enter the APPP; two have completed the entire privatization

process. One of these later reverted to public ownership. The most recent applicant is Westchester

County Airport, NY, which applied to enter the program in December 2016. Table 6 lists the

APPP applicants and their status.

Table 6. Participation in the APPP

(as of November 2017)

Status

Airport

Location

Application Results

Inactive

Brown Field Municipal Airport

San Diego, CA

Application withdrawn in 2001.

Inactive

Chicago Midway International

Airport

Chicago, IL

Application withdrawn in 2013.

Inactive

Gwinnett County Briscoe Field

Airport

Lawrenceville,

Application withdrawn in 2012.

Active*

Hendry County Airglades Airport

Clewiston, FL

In August 2014, FAA approved management contract

between county and private operator, pending

submission of final APPP application by the county.

Inactive

Louis Armstrong New Orleans

International Airport

New Orleans, LA

Application withdrawn in 2010.

Privatized*

Luis Muñoz Marín International

Airport

San Juan, Puerto

Rico

Preliminary approved in December 2009; final

application approved in February 2013. Privatized under

long-term lease.

Inactive

New Orleans Lakefront Airport

New Orleans, LA

Application terminated in 2008.

Inactive

Niagara Falls International Airport

Niagara Falls, NY

Application withdrawn in 2001.

Inactive

Rafael Hernandez Airport

Aguadilla, Puerto

Rico

Application withdrawn in 2001.

Active*

St. Louis Lambert International

Airport

St. Louis, MO

Preliminary application accepted in April 2017.

Inactive

Stewart International Airport

Newburgh, NY

Airport privatized in 2000 after FAA approval; reverted

to public operation in 2007.

Active*

Westchester County Airport

White Plains, NY

Preliminary application accepted on December 2, 2016.

Source: Federal Aviation Administration; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Airport Privatization, GAO-1542, November 2014.

Notes: The rows marked with an asterisk represent the four active participants as of October 2017. FAA

terminated New Orleans Lakefront Airport’s application when the airport missed the deadline to submit

additional materials.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Why Has the APPP Not Stimulated Privatization?

The APPP has had limited success in stimulating wide interest in airport privatization. The

program’s relatively modest results appear to have several causes.

APPP Application Process

Applying to privatize an airport under the APPP, as reported by FAA, makes the transfer from

public to private ownership too “time consuming” and presents risks that could cause a potential

deal to fail.50 The application process begins with an airport filing a preliminary application for

FAA approval. FAA has 30 days to review the preliminary application. The entire process,

however, may take years to complete. In the case of Hendry County Airglades Airport, for

example, a preliminary application was approved by FAA in 2010, but final FAA approval is still

pending.

Once an airport receives preliminary approval, it then may select a private operator, negotiate an

agreement, and submit a final application to FAA. There is no timeline as to how quickly FAA

must complete its review of the final application. After FAA gives notice of its proposed approval

of the final application and lease agreement in the Federal Register, there is a 60-day public

review and comment period. After that, FAA completes its review and prepares its Findings and

Record of Decision (ROD), in which it addresses the public comments and publishes the details

of its decision.51

Regulatory Conditions and Obligations

Airport privatization under the APPP has a number of regulatory requirements. These

requirements may have lessened airport owners’ and/or investors’ interest in privatization. They

include the need for 65% of air carriers serving the airport52 to approve a lease or sale of the

airport; restrictions on increases in airport rates and charges that exceed the rate of increase of the

Consumer Price Index (CPI); and a requirement that a private operator comply with grant

assurances made by the previous public-sector operator to obtain AIP grants.53 In addition, after

privatization, the airport will be eligible for AIP formula grants to cover 70% of the cost of

improvements, versus the normal 75%-90% federal share at publicly owned airports. This serves

as a disincentive to privatize an airport because it will receive less federal money after

privatization.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Report to Congress on the Status of the Airport

Privatization Pilot Program, United States Code, Title 49, Section 47134, August 2004, p. 1; Matthew Hummer,

“Airport Privatization: A Plan to Help Fill a $50 Billion-Plus Investment Gap,” Bloomberg Government, December 20,

2011, p. 13.

For details of the APPP application procedures, see http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/

federal_register_notices/media/obligation_private97.pdf.

Approval must be granted both by 65% of the air carriers using the airport and by carriers collectively accounting for

65% of the landed weight during the previous year.

Examples of grant assurances include making the airport available for public use on reasonable conditions and

without unjust economic discrimination (against all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical activities); charging air

carriers making similar use of the airport substantially comparable amounts; maintaining a current airport layout plan;

making financial reports to FAA; and expending airport revenue only on capital or operating costs at the airport. For a

listing of the AIP grant assurances, see http://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_assurances/.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Adequate Access to Funding

In surface transportation, a key purpose of privatization is to attract private capital to supplement

public spending that is insufficient to provide the desired level of construction and maintenance. 54

In general, lack of resources has been a far less important issue for airport operators than for

highway and public transportation agencies.

Publicly owned airports have access to five major sources of funding. The AIP provides federal

grants to airports for planning and development, mainly of capital projects related to aircraft

operations, such as runways and taxiways.55 Local passenger facility charges of up to $4.50 per

boarding passenger, imposed pursuant to federal law, can generate revenue for a broad range of

projects including “landside” projects on airport property such as passenger terminals and ground

access improvements, and for interest payments. Tax-exempt bonds, often secured by airport

revenue, offer less costly financing than is generally available to private entities. Tenant leases,

landing fees, and other charges are important revenue sources at some airports. Many airports,

especially smaller ones, also benefit from state and local grants.56

These financing arrangements have important implications for airport privatization.



If a publicly owned airport were to be privatized outside the APPP, its private

operator may not be eligible to receive AIP formula funds and may have to draw

on its own resources to improve runways and taxiways. The operator would not

be entitled to issue bonds with federal tax-exempt status, and would therefore

have to pay higher interest rates on its bonds than a public-sector operator. On the

other hand, the private operator would have relative freedom to impose passenger

usage fees and to increase landing fees, rents, and other charges, so long as this

was not done in a discriminatory fashion.

An airport privatized under APPP would continue to have access to federal AIP

grants, although the private operator would have to provide a 30% match,

considerably more than the 10%-25% matches required of publicly owned

airports. The operator would not be entitled to issue bonds with federal taxexempt status, and would therefore have to pay higher interest rates on its bonds

than a public-sector operator. It could continue to collect passenger facility

charges, but could not impose charges higher than those authorized by federal

law. Its ability to raise fees paid by air carriers would be constrained.

These limitations are largely the consequence of federal laws. They may explain why airport

privatization has been less attractive in the United States than in Europe and Canada.

Two factors that have facilitated privatization in other countries do not exist in the United States.

First, many of the major airports that have been privatized in Europe and Canada were previously

owned by national governments, not by local or provincial governments, so the decision to

privatize did not need to be taken at multiple levels of government. Second, the tax-favored status

of debt issued by U.S. state and local governments has no analogue in most other countries, so the

See CRS Report R43410, Highway and Public Transportation Infrastructure Provision Using Public-Private

Partnerships (P3s), by (name redacted) .

For more discussion of the AIP and airport financing, see CRS Report R43327, Financing Airport Improvements, by

(name redacted).

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Airport Finance: Observations on Planned Airport Development Costs and

Funding Levels and the Administration’s Proposed Changes in the Airport Improvement Program, GAO-07-885, 2007,

p. 8.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

shift from public to private ownership did not necessarily entail higher borrowing costs, as it

would in the United States.

Policy Issues Related to Privatization

Congress has been interested in airport privatization as a way to save money by making airports

less dependent on federal assistance while also, in the long run, increasing the nation’s aviation

capacity to meet growing demand for air travel. However, under current federal law, privatization

has struggled to achieve these goals.

Privatization outside the framework of the APPP is generally unattractive to both airport owners

and potential investors. Streamlining the APPP application and review process might make

privatization somewhat more attractive by reducing the risks arising from a long application

period, such as changes in economic and capital market conditions. However, significantly

increasing interest in airport privatization is likely to require structural change to the existing

airport financing system. Options might include the following:



Offering the same tax treatment to private and public airport infrastructure

bonds. This could be done by eliminating the current federal income tax

exemption of interest on bonds issued by public-sector airport owners or by

extending tax-exempt or tax-preferential treatment to airport infrastructure bonds

issued by private investors. Either change would eliminate a major disincentive

to shift airports from public to private ownership. On the other hand, removing

the tax exemption on public-sector airport bonds would raise airports’ financing

costs, while extending it to private-sector bonds could have consequences for

federal revenues.

Changing AIP requirements. Reducing the percentage match private operators

must provide to obtain AIP grants to the level of comparable public operators

would make privatization more attractive to private investors, but would increase

their share of federal funding.

Relaxing AIP grant assurances. If private investors were freed from some of

the requirements agreed to by the public owner in order to obtain AIP funding,

privatization might become more attractive to investors. However, some of the

changes that might be most attractive to investors, such as allowing the sale of

airport property, might interfere with the federal interest in maintaining aviation

system capacity and safety.

Liberalizing rules governing fees. Allowing privatized airports more flexibility

to impose passenger facility charges and to raise rents and landing fees would

make privatization more attractive to investors. However, this might increase

airline opposition to privatization and could lead to higher costs for passengers

and air cargo shippers.

Easing limits on the use of privatization revenue. Reducing the obstacles for

public-sector owners to use privatization revenue for nonairport purposes would

stimulate local and state government interest in privatization. On the other hand,

it could potentially lead to a lower level of investment in aviation infrastructure.

Aircraft Noise Issues

Noise from aircraft taking off and landing is an issue at many airports. Under the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), FAA and airport operators are required to assess

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

environmental impacts, including noise impacts, associated with federally funded airport projects

and airspace redesigns. Noise has been a contentious issue in the redesign of airspace in the New

York City, New Jersey, and Philadelphia region. Similarly, noise concerns have been raised

regarding a number of airport expansion projects, including the completion of a new runway at

Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport in 2013.

The number of residents in the United States exposed to significant amounts of aircraft noise has

declined precipitously, from about 7 million in 1975 to an estimated 320,000 in 2012.57 Major

reductions in aircraft noise levels have been achieved over the past 30 years. Louder Stage 2

airliners over 75,000 pounds were phased out in the 1990s, and a provision in the FAA

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 required that all jet airplanes, regardless of size, meet

quieter Stage 3 or Stage 4 noise standards by the end of 2015. Newly introduced aircraft types

must meet Stage 4 noise standards, and FAA plans to issue rules for even more stringent Stage 5

noise standards.58 Noise reductions have been achieved through quieter engine technologies,

greater use of lightweight aircraft materials, and advances in aerodynamics. FAA, in cooperation

with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and industry, has invested in the research

and development of quiet aircraft technologies.

While reducing aircraft noise emissions has been highly successful and new aircraft are

significantly quieter than their predecessors, the volume of air traffic, particularly around major

airports, has increased over the past 30 years. Historically, Congress has addressed airport noise

concerns by setting aside 35% of discretionary funding under the AIP for noise mitigation and

abatement. Generally, these funds may be used only within the Day Night Average Sound Level

(DNL)59 65 decibel (dB) noise impact area around an airport. Proposals to grant FAA the

flexibility to routinely fund noise mitigation projects in areas with lower DNL levels would

enable it to support additional abatement projects, but could divert resources from capacity and

safety projects. A related issue is whether to make the planning for noise-mitigating air traffic

control procedures at individual airports eligible for AIP funding.

The Next Generation Air Transportation System

(NextGen)

NextGen refers to the Next Generation Air Transportation System, a large-scale modernization of

air traffic technologies and procedures intended to expand national airspace system capacity to

meet future demand. NextGen is a multiyear initiative to modernize and improve the efficiency of

the national airspace system, primarily by migrating to technologies and procedures using

satellite-based navigation and aircraft tracking. Initiated in legislation in 2003 (see P.L. 108-176),

the NextGen system targets full-scale implementation by 2025.

With regard to air traffic management, the goals of NextGen include



reduced air traffic separation;

flexible spacing and sequencing of aircraft, both in the air and on the ground;

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/noise_emissions/airport_aircraft_noise_issues/.

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/noise_emissions/airport_aircraft_noise_issues/levels/.

Day Night Average Sound Level (DNL) is the standard federal metric for determining cumulative exposure to noise.

DNL is the 24-hour average sound level in decibels (dB), with a 10-dB adjustment (penalty) added to each aircraft

operation occurring during nighttime hours (10 p.m. to 7 a.m.).

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress



increased utilization of airspace, airports, and runways, particularly those that are

currently underutilized;

improved and tailored weather forecasts; and

reductions in environmental impacts of noise and emissions.60

In 2003, Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) established an

interagency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) within FAA to develop and

implement an integrated plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS, now

known as NextGen) capable of meeting the needs associated with projected air traffic demands in

2025. The act also established a senior policy committee to consult with industry stakeholders

and advise the Secretary of Transportation on goals and strategic objectives for transforming the

national airspace system to meet future needs and provide policy guidance to the JPDO.

In 2004, the JPDO released its first iteration of the Integration National Plan for NextGen. The

NextGen integrated plan, as envisioned, seeks to ensure that the NextGen system meets air

transportation safety, security, mobility, efficiency, and capacity needs by 2025. It contends that if

steps are not taken to alleviate air travel congestion through NextGen in concert with airport

capacity expansion, the annual cost to consumers related to air traffic delays and flight

cancellations could be as high as $20 billion by 2025.61

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 refined and expanded several facets of NextGen

implementation. It established the position of Chief NextGen Officer within FAA, and

redesignated the JPDO director as Associate Administrator for NextGen Planning and

Development and Interagency Coordination. The act required the NextGen Senior Policy

Committee to submit annual progress reports to Congress. It also ordered a U.S. Department of

Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) review of the Automated Dependent

Surveillance (ADS-B) ground system installation and deployment of ADS-B services, and a

National Research Council review of the enterprise architecture for NextGen. The act directed

FAA to accelerate the deployment of NextGen technologies and procedures and defined specific

national airspace performance metrics that FAA must track. Other provisions required FAA to

evaluate the role of airport surveillance technologies in the implementation of NextGen airport

surface operations management; authorized the establishment of a NextGen research and

development center of excellence; and authorized public-private partnerships to leverage and

maximize private-sector capital for the purpose of equipping general aviation and commercial

aircraft with NextGen avionics. FAA is to report to Congress on its initiatives to encourage

NextGen equipage, including policies that give priority handling to ADS-B-equipped aircraft.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-76) defunded the JPDO for FY2014 and

directed FAA to absorb the JPDO’s functions into its operations account under the NextGen and

operations planning activity. In May 2014, FAA moved the JPDO functions into a newly created

NextGen Interagency Planning Office.

NextGen Evolution

A report by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University

described NextGen as “one of the most significant efforts of cross-boundary transformation ever

U.S. Department of Transportation. Integrated National Plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,

December 12, 2004.

Ibid.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

contemplated by the United States government and its industry partners.”62 The report observed

that the NextGen concept eliminates the historical delineation between air traffic control

infrastructure and aircraft navigation and communications devices by integrating certain elements

of the underlying infrastructure into cockpit instrumentation.63

The genesis of core NextGen technological concepts was the effort of the cargo airline industry to

develop low-cost collision avoidance and aircraft tracking technologies. In the 1990s, cargo

airlines were exempted from regulations requiring transport-category aircraft to be equipped with

traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS). The cargo airlines’ initiatives to develop a low-cost

alternative to TCAS that could also provide airline fleet tracking capabilities using Global

Positioning System (GPS) technology led to the initial development of core NextGen cockpit

technologies.

In 1999, express cargo carrier UPS received accolades for its role in developing ADS-B

technology, now considered the backbone of the NextGen system. Its subsidiary, UPS Aviation

Technologies, played a major part in developing ADS-B avionics that were flight-tested by UPS

airplanes under FAA’s Ohio River Valley demonstration project, a component of its Safe Flight 21

research-and-development program in the 1990s. UPS Aviation Technologies was subsequently

acquired by Garmin Ltd. in 2003. Garmin has since positioned itself as a major supplier of GPS

navigation devices, ADS-B equipment, and advanced avionics, primarily for small to midsized

general aviation aircraft.

Also, in 1999, FAA initiated the Capstone Program in Alaska to explore the potential safety

benefits of GPS, ADS-B, advanced avionics, and flight information service broadcasts for general

aviation operations. The research program served as a test bed for technologies that came to form

the core of the NextGen initiative.

Extensive delays and numerous flight cancellations at commercial airports in summer of 2000 led

FAA, in collaboration with aviation industry partners, to closely examine the aviation system’s

future capacity needs and develop a systematic strategy for addressing those needs. In 2001, FAA

created an Operational Evolution Plan (OEP, now known as the Operational Evolution

Partnership) to define airport infrastructure and technology needs to meet future capacity

requirements, with a particular focus on the nation’s busiest airports and airspace. The technology

solutions proposed in the OEP, including area navigation (RNAV) procedures, augmentation of

GPS signal accuracy through the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), controller-pilot data

link technologies, and reduced vertical separation, came to be regarded as components of a more

comprehensive plan for expanding air traffic control system capacity. This was later reflected in

the NextGen initiative.

In some regards, NextGen is an evolutionary extension of FAA’s earlier initiatives to develop air

traffic management technologies to provide controllers and pilots with increased operating

flexibilities and fewer restrictions, thus allowing for more efficient routing of aircraft. In other

regards, it is transformative in its approach. Specifically, it differs significantly from past air

traffic modernization initiatives in that it is predicated on replacing radar-based tracking of

aircraft and ground-based navigational infrastructure with a system that relies on precision

navigation and aircraft tracking using the satellite-based GPS.

Stephen Goldsmith, Zachary Tumin, and Fred Messina, Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air

Transportation System: A New Strategy for Networked Governance, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and

Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2010, p. 3, http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/nextgen.pdf.

Ibid., p. 9.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Elements and Funding

Funding for NextGen programs totals more than $1 billion annually. The funds primarily come

through FAA’s Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account (Table 7).

Table 7. Funding for NextGen Programs

(dollars in millions)

Account

FY2016

Actual

FY2017

Annualized

FY2018

Request

Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

Facilities and Equipment (F&E)

855

877

868

Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D)

TOTALS

980

1,007

980

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2018, Federal Aviation Administration.

Note: Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Core components of the NextGen system include the following:



Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). A system for

broadcasting and receiving aircraft identification, position, altitude, heading, and

speed data derived from onboard navigation systems such as a GPS receiver.

“ADS-B Out” functionality refers to a basic level of aircraft equipage that

transmits position data. “ADS-B In” incorporates aircraft reception of ADS-B

signals from other air traffic and/or uplinks of traffic, weather, and flight

information from ground stations. FAA funds support the installation, operation,

and maintenance of the ground network and associated infrastructure to receive

ADS-B transmissions and relay them to air traffic facilities and other aircraft.

Most aircraft will be required to have “ADS-B Out” capability by 2020.

System Wide Information Management (SWIM). A system for aviation

system data sharing, consisting of a seamless infrastructure for data exchange,

similar to the Internet. As envisioned, SWIM will consist of an extensive,

scalable data network to share real-time operational information such as flight

plans, flight trajectories, weather, airport conditions, and temporary airspace

restrictions across the entire airspace system.

Data Communications (DataComm). A digital voice and data network, similar

to current wireless telephone capabilities, to transmit instructions, advisories, and

other routine communications between aircraft and air traffic service providers.

Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies (CATMT). A suite of

technologies, including various automation and decision support tools, designed

to enhance existing aircraft flow management functions by exploiting other

NextGen technologies and capabilities such as SWIM.

National Airspace System Voice System (NVS). Upgraded digital voice

communications infrastructure that will replace existing analog equipment.

NextGen Weather. An integrated platform for providing a common weather

picture to air traffic controllers, air traffic managers, and system users.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

Additionally, NextGen is dependent upon other ongoing modernization initiatives to upgrade

FAA facilities and equipment to make them NextGen-capable. Most significantly, completion of

the Enroute Modernization (ERAM) program, an upgrade to automated air traffic systems at

FAA’s en route centers, is considered by FAA and aviation experts as a necessary milestone

toward giving the centers that direct high-altitude traffic the necessary data-handling capabilities

to support NextGen.

Current Status

The network of ADS-B ground receiver stations in the contiguous 48 states has largely been

deployed. FAA has implemented performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures including

departures, arrivals, and instrument approaches that improve airport access and operational

efficiency. A large majority (more than 90%) of the air carrier fleet is equipped with PBN

navigation equipment allowing utilization of NextGen procedures such as area navigation

(RNAV). In contrast, a very small percentage (less than 20%) of the airline and air taxi fleet is

ADS-B equipped. Only a small percentage of the general aviation fleet is equipped for either

navigation or tracking in the NextGen environment. FAA estimates that about 30,000 fixed-wing

general aviation aircraft have installed compliant ADS-B units as of November 2017, but this also

represents less than 20% of the total general aviation fleet.

Aircraft Equipage

One of the greatest challenges to FAA in implementation of NextGen is overcoming stakeholder

reluctance to adopt NextGen technologies. This reluctance is fueled in large part by perceived

uncertainties about the technical details and the potential benefits of particular technologies.

Users fear that early investments may not yield near-term benefits, and may prove costly if

technical specifications change as NextGen evolves.

In May 2010, FAA published a notice informing aircraft operators that most aircraft operating in

controlled airspace would be required to equip with approved ADS-B Out equipment by 2020.64

In adopting this rule, FAA rejected the no-action alternative, finding that the existing radar-based

aircraft system is becoming operationally obsolete and incapable of accommodating projected

increases in air traffic. FAA examined alternative technologies as well as exemptions for certain

classes of operators, but determined that a uniform equipment mandate was the only alternative

that could provide seamless surveillance capabilities to air traffic controllers and the most costeffective solution.

A cost-benefit analysis of the final rule identified benefits, including the dollar values of time and

fuel savings, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions, and increased system capacity, totaling

$6.8 billion to $8.5 billion over the period from 2009 through 2035. In comparison, the analysis

identified costs, including avionics equipage costs incurred by the industry and infrastructure

costs incurred by FAA, ranging from $3.3 billion to $7.0 billion over the same period. Of this,

equipage costs were estimated to fall between $2.5 billion and $6.2 billion, with a midpoint of

$4.4 billion.

The rulemaking process also examined impacts to small businesses operating aircraft. FAA found

that “small U.S. business operators may bear a disproportionate impact,” and noted that it would

Federal Aviation Administration, “14 CFR Part 91, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out

Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule,” 75 Federal Register 3016030195, May 28, 2010.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

be difficult for small operators to recover their compliance costs.65 It estimated that more than

1,500 small operators would incur costs greater than 1% of annual revenues, and, in addition,

more than 1,000 would incur costs greater than 2% of annual revenues. FAA estimated that costs

to general aviation (i.e., nonairline civil operators) would total $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion. To

offset some of these costs, FAA sponsored a rebate program for operators of single-engine general

aviation airplanes that installed compliant ADS-B transmitters. Under the rebate program, FAA

provided reimbursement of $500 toward the ADS-B purchase and installation cost. The rebate

program has now concluded, and no plans for future incentive programs have been announced.

Primarily aimed at airlines and business jet operators, FAA proposed a “best-equipped bestserved” concept to encourage investment in NextGen technologies. Under this concept, those that

equip early with NextGen capabilities would reap some of the benefits of those capabilities

through, for example, preferential treatment with respect to flight routing and arrival and

departure queuing. In addition, ADS-B may provide some intrinsic benefits, particularly to small

general aviation aircraft, by providing pilots with robust traffic and weather data that may

enhance safety. FAA plans to promote these potential benefits, in conjunction with equipment

mandates for ADS-B, to encourage more users to adopt NextGen technologies in the near term.

FAA has not adopted a formal policy with regard to how it would implement best-equipped bestserved practices, indicating that practices may vary from region to region and from airport to

airport.

Anticipated Benefits

In addition to the potential benefits specifically tied to ADS-B equipage, FAA anticipates that the

suite of NextGen technologies would provide substantial benefits to both commercial and general

aviation operators by improving efficiency and safety, and thereby reducing time, fuel burn, and

environmental impacts associated with aviation operations. According to FAA, NextGen

improvements have already saved operators more than $1.6 billon, and will yield aggregate

benefits of more than $160 billion by 2031.66

Benefits for Commercial Airlines

Under NextGen, commercial airlines are expected to benefit significantly from more direct

routing and reduced flight delays, which are expected to result in fuel savings. For commercial

operators, FAA has implemented a best-equipped best-served model, providing early adopters of

NextGen technologies with priority access to certain airports and flight routes. The benefit of

NextGen equipage can thus be realized through fuel cost savings, as well as indirect benefits that

may include improved customer satisfaction, reduced operational costs due to more efficient

operations, and environmental payoffs associated with reduced emissions and noise that could

potentially help better market the airline to increasingly environmentally conscious consumers.

Benefits for General Aviation

FAA argues that general aviation operators will also benefit from improved airspace and airport

access available to NextGen-equipped aircraft.

Ibid., p. 30191.

Federal Aviation Administration, “Update to the Business Case for the Next Generation Air Transportation System

Based on the Future of the NAS Report,” July 2016.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

One element of improved system access for general aviation is procedures that utilize NextGen

technologies to increase navigational accuracy and provide procedures to improve access to

thousands of airports under a wider variety of weather conditions.

To meet the navigational accuracy, integrity, and availability requirements for civil aviation, FAA

developed a system for correcting errors in GPS signals over the entire National Airspace System

(NAS). It began working on the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) in 1995. WAAS,

which was first activated in 2003 for use by general aviation aircraft, consists of ground reference

stations that compute GPS signal corrections. These signal corrections are continuously

transmitted to satellites which, in turn, broadcast them to WAAS-enabled GPS devices aboard

aircraft. Beginning in 2004, FAA began approving avionics systems and developing procedures

that allow aircraft to fly instrument approaches to airports using WAAS and GPS to provide both

lateral and vertical guidance.

WAAS enables general aircraft to access additional airports in poor weather conditions. As of

March 2017, FAA has published more than 3,700 approach procedures that use this technology.

Depending on terrain considerations, these procedures allow instrument-qualified pilots to

descend to as low as 200 feet above the ground, in conditions as poor as 1.5-mile visibility, before

establishing visual contact with the runway. This can reduce weather-related diversions and

associated fuel costs for general aviation operators, and improve accessibility and system

capacity.

Whereas the annual airport maintenance cost for a precision instrument landing system (ILS) that

provides similar capabilities is estimated at $85,000 annually, a WAAS approach can be

maintained for less than $3,000 every two years.67 With WAAS, there is no ground equipment to

maintain. The main costs to airports consist of the upkeep of runway lighting and markings

required for certification of the approach, and any costs incurred from working with local

planners to address possible impacts of newly constructed towers and buildings near the approach

path. While WAAS is not considered a core NextGen technology, it provides an enabling

capability for implementing precision NextGen airport approach procedures.

In addition to WAAS-enabled navigation equipment, ADS-B In functionality may provide

benefits to general operators that install equipment with this capability. FAA ADS-B ground

stations transmit Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) and Flight Information

Services-Broadcast (FIS-B). These broadcasts of air traffic, textual and graphical weather data,

and aeronautical information, such as temporary flight restrictions and other notices, are provided

free of charge to appropriately equipped aircraft with ADS-B In capability. This information is

anticipated to enhance safety by improving pilot situation awareness.

Policy Concerns

An overarching policy concern is FAA’s ability to manage the NextGen program and implement

technologies and procedures that would allow industry stakeholders to realize anticipated

operational benefits. For general aviation, delivery of promised safety improvements is an

important consideration in justifying large initial costs associated with equipping aircraft with

NextGen avionics. Interagency coordination and collaboration on NextGen initiatives remains a

significant policy concern. A November 2016 Department of Transportation Office of Inspector

General report found that significant uncertainties remain regarding the cost and schedule of

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, “Air Traffic Services Brief: Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS),”

April 23, 2010, http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Air-Traffic-Services-,-a-,-Technology/Air-Traffic-Services-BriefWide-Area-Augmentation-System-WAAS.aspx.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

NextGen implementation.68 Similarly, an August 2017 GAO report cautioned that uncertainties

regarding future funding, aircraft equipage compliance, potential air traffic control restructuring,

FAA leadership stability, and cybersecurity risks all posed unique challenges for NextGen

implementation.69 GAO, however, found that spending on NextGen has thus far roughly tracked

early cost estimates and that FAA has adopted an enterprise risk management approach to help

identify and mitigate risks that could impact NextGen implementation.

Providing suitable funding mechanisms for both Next Gen infrastructure and industry equipage

remains a significant challenge in the current budgetary climate. Rough estimates indicate that the

total federal cost to develop NextGen infrastructure will be about $21 billion. In addition, the cost

to upgrade the civilian aircraft fleet with NextGen avionics will be about $14 billion, roughly $5

billion for the commercial fleet plus about $9 billion for general aviation.70

Other policy concerns include achieving global harmonization regarding equipment and

procedural standards, particularly with ongoing air traffic management initiatives in Europe;

appropriately measuring progress and results stemming from NextGen initiatives; and identifying

reliable backup systems to supplement core NextGen technologies and provide adequate

safeguards and redundancies.

FAA Organizational Issues

Facility Consolidation

Consolidation of FAA air traffic facilities and functions is viewed as a means to control

operational costs, replace outdated facilities, and improve air traffic services. Consolidation

efforts to date have primarily focused on terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities.

TRACON consolidation has been ongoing for many years, but in the past has been limited to

nearby or overlapping terminal areas in major metropolitan areas such as New York/Northern

New Jersey, Washington/Baltimore, and Los Angeles/San Diego. More recently, FAA has sought

to decouple combined airport tower/approach control facilities and merge approach control

functions across larger geographical areas.

These consolidation projects have been coupled with airport control tower replacements.

Replacements for outdated combined tower/TRACON facilities are being designed to house

tower functions only, and TRACON components are being relocated to consolidated facilities that

may be at some distance from the airport. Remaining operations at low-activity towers that lose

their TRACON components are more likely to be outsourced under the federal contract tower

(FCT) program, an issue of particular concern to FAA labor unions. Currently, about half of all

airport control towers in the United States are operated under the FCT program.

Facility consolidation has been particularly controversial, and FAA’s system-wide plan for

realignment and consolidation has been delayed significantly. The general approach calls for

more comprehensive integration of TRACONs and en route centers into large integrated facilities.

The DOT OIG cautioned in 2012 that FAA is still in the early stages of planning for this

Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Total Costs, Schedules, and Benefits of FAA’s NextGen

Transformational Programs Remain Uncertain, AV-2017-009, November 10, 2016.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Progress and Challenges in

Implementing NextGen, GAO-17-450, August 31, 2017.

Ibid.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

comprehensive effort, and has not made key decisions or developed metrics to assess these

plans.71 GAO reported in 2017 that FAA has scaled back its efforts to reduce the overall number

of air traffic facilities and gain additional benefits from NextGen implementation due to fiscal

constraints.72 FAA is reported to be focusing solely on replacing the New York terminal radar

approach control facility instead of moving forward with a long-planned integrated control

facility that was to manage all the airspace around New York City, New Jersey, Philadelphia, and

eastern Pennsylvania.

FAA plans are politically sensitive, as consolidation initiatives could result in job losses in

specific congressional districts even if they do not result in an overall decrease in jobs for air

traffic controllers, systems specialists, and other supporting personnel. Rather, realignment and

consolidation coupled with airspace modernization under the NextGen system are anticipated to

change the nature of these job functions and consolidate them in fewer physical facilities.

Provisions in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) required FAA to

develop a report providing a comprehensive list of its proposed recommendations for realignment

and consolidation of services and facilities. The report is to include a justification, projected cost

savings, and a timeline for each proposed action. FAA is required to subsequently provide

Congress with formal consolidation and realignment recommendations, along with public

comments received. Congress would then have the opportunity to, within 30 days, pass a joint

resolution formally disapproving any recommendation included in the FAA plan. If Congress

disapproves, FAA would not be able to implement that specific recommendation, although the

law is silent with respect to FAA’s recourse to subsequently propose alternative approaches.

While FAA has not yet developed a comprehensive approach for facilities consolidation across

the entire air traffic system, it has released two documents in response to the 2012 mandate

addressing consolidation options in parts of New England, Texas, and Oklahoma, portions of

western Pennsylvania and New York, and in northern Ohio and southern and central Michigan.73

FAA’s future course of action regarding these recommendations as well as future facility

consolidation plans remains uncertain.

The Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program

Of U.S. airports with control towers, 253 (slightly less than half) are operated by private firms

and staffed with contract employees under the FCT program. Sixteen of the 253 contract towers

are funded under arrangements in which local governments or entities pay up to 20% of the costs.

Regardless of funding and operation, FAA maintains responsibility for the regulation and

oversight of operations and safety at all civil air traffic control towers in the United States.

Contract towers and contract controllers must be certified by FAA and must follow FAA

directives.74

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: The Success of FAA’s Long-Term

Plan for Air Traffic Facility Realignments and Consolidations Depends on Addressing Key Technical, Financial, and

Workforce Challenges, AV-2012-151, July 17, 2012.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Progress and Challenges in

Implementing NextGen, GAO-17-450, August 31, 2017.

Federal Aviation Administration, Section 804 Collaborative Workgroup, FAA National Facilities Realignment and

Consolidation Report Year 1, Part 1 Recommendations, March 11, 2015; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Section 804 Collaborative Workgroup, FAA National Facilities Realignment and Consolidation Report Part 2

Recommendations, May 11, 2016.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Budget Estimates—Fiscal Year 2018, Federal Aviation Administration,

https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/budget/281191/faa-fy-2018-cj-final.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The cost-share program is provided as an option to communities that wish to retain an operating

air traffic control tower after FAA determines that the costs to the federal government outweigh

the tower’s benefits related to safety and efficiency of flight operations. With the exception of

these 16 cost-share towers, towers in the FCT program are fully funded by FAA. In recent years,

the budget for the FCT program has been about $140 million annually, including approximately

$10 million for the federal share of cost-share towers.

The FCT program came into existence in 1982—initially as a pilot program at five airports—in

an effort to provide air traffic services at low-activity towers in the wake of the nationwide air

traffic controller strike and subsequent dismissal of striking FAA controllers. For the first 12

years, the program remained relatively small, growing to 27 towers by 1993. Nonetheless, it

gained the attention of Vice President Albert Gore’s National Performance Review—later known

as the National Partnership for Reinventing Government—which endorsed the program in 1993

and recommended its expansion.75 FAA developed a plan to close or contract out all low-activity

towers, and the number of contract towers grew to 160 by the end of FY1997.76

In FY1999, Congress first funded the cost-sharing program, allowing airports that would not

otherwise have met FAA’s threshold benefit-to-cost ratio to maintain contract tower operations

with nonfederal funds to supplement federal expenditures. Subsequently, Congress has limited the

local share to not more than 20% of a tower’s costs. Currently, 16 towers are funded through this

program at a cost of roughly $10 million annually. While this could expand program eligibility, it

could also have the effect of triggering tower closures in communities that are unwilling or

unable to contribute additional funding for tower operations.

In a 2012 audit, the DOT OIG concluded that the FCT program provided air traffic services to

low-activity airports at lower costs than FAA-staffed towers could. The audit found that on

average, contract towers required six fewer controllers and cost almost $1.5 million less annually

than FAA-staffed towers at airports with comparable levels of flight activity.77 These savings

were achieved through lower staffing levels and lower controller pay at contract towers compared

to FAA towers. The audit found that contract towers had a lower rate of reported safety incidents

than comparable FAA towers. Also, a survey of aircraft operators, conducted as part of the audit,

found similar levels of satisfaction with the services provided by contract towers and FAA towers

handling similar numbers of aircraft.

In March 2013, provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) providing for

automatic reductions to most federal discretionary spending, referred to as sequestration, went

into effect. Among the cost-cutting measures proposed by FAA was the complete closure of up to

238 control towers at airports that have fewer than 150,000 flight operations or fewer than 10,000

commercial operations per year.78 Towers listed as candidates for closure included 195 run by

contractors under the FCT program and 43 staffed by FAA controllers. On March 22, 2013, FAA

announced it would close 149 FCT program towers over four weeks beginning April 7, 2013.

Vice President Albert Gore’s National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that

Works Better and Costs Less (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), p. 150.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. Federal Contract Tower Program, Federal Aviation

Administration, AV-1998-047, May 18, 1998.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Contract Towers Continue to Provide Cost-Effective

and Safe Air Traffic Services, But Improved Oversight of the Program Is Needed, AV-2013-009, November 5, 2012.

See Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Planning for $600 million in 2013 Spending Cuts,” available at

http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=71078.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

On May 1, 2013, following a week of FAA air traffic controller furloughs that contributed to

some isolated air traffic system delays, Congress enacted the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013

(P.L. 113-9). The act gave FAA authority to transfer up to $253 million to FAA operations using

available monies from unspent airport funds, which were not subject to sequestration, and from

other available sources within FAA.79 On May 2, 2013, a bipartisan group of 25 Senators

transmitted a letter to Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood and FAA Administrator Michael

Huerta stating the following: “Congressional intent is clear: the FAA should prevent the slated

closure of 149 contract towers by fully funding the contract tower program.”80 The following

week, FAA canceled the planned closures. The FCT program has been fully funded since then,

and FAA has not moved forward with its tower closure plans.

During the 114th Congress, the FAA reauthorization measure (H.R. 636) as passed by the Senate

on April 19, 2016, sought to reform the contract tower program in a manner that would have

made it more difficult to reduce federal funding or eliminate towers from the program. The bill

would have expanded the program and increase transparency regarding determinations of costs

and benefits of existing and proposed contract towers. The bill ordered reported by the House

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (H.R. 4441) contained similar language.

Additionally, it would have transferred all contract towers to a proposed air traffic corporation.

None of these provisions were enacted, but they have been reintroduced in FAA reauthorization

measures under consideration in the 115th Congress (H.R. 2997, S. 1405).

Technological Developments Affecting Potential Safety Impacts

of Possible Future Tower Closures or Facility Consolidations

The potential safety impacts of long-term tower closures could be mitigated by technologies now

under development. These technologies fall into two broad categories: (1) in-cockpit situation

awareness technologies and (2) remote air traffic services.

In-cockpit situation awareness technologies include capabilities such as moving maps and cockpit

displays of traffic information. While commercial passenger aircraft are equipped with traffic

collision avoidance systems (TCAS), such systems are not affordable for typical general aviation

aircraft, which make up the majority of traffic at most small and mid-sized airports. The ADS-B

technology used in NextGen may provide a means for general aviation aircraft to be equipped

with situation awareness capability. FAA will require most aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B

capability to broadcast precise location information, a capability known as ADS-B Out, by 2020.

However, at present there is no mandate to equip aircraft with the capability to receive and

display information about other traffic, a capability known as ADS-B In. Greater participation

may be needed to obtain a comparable level of situation awareness and traffic avoidance in the air

terminal environment than is currently provided by manned air traffic control towers.

The services currently provided by airport towers could be offered from remote locations. Some

air traffic services are already provided in this way; for example, an aircraft on an instrument

approach to a nontowered airport can remain under the control of an en route or approach control

facility until it descends below radar coverage. Remote or virtual towers are seen as a potential

For further discussion, see CRS Report R43065, Sequestration at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Air

Traffic Controller Furloughs and Congressional Response, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted)

Letter from the Honorable Richard Blumenthal, the Honorable Jerry Moran, and the Honorable Kelly Ayotte, United

States Senate et al. to the Honorable Ray LaHood, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, and the Honorable

Michael Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, May 2, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

next step in air traffic facility consolidation, and could provide a comparatively low-cost

alternative to manned towers by using data from systems such as ADS-B and surface radar

capabilities. Pooling of resources at these consolidated facilities could potentially allow for

significantly reduced staffing compared to stand-alone towers currently in operation. However,

initial start-up costs may be high. Currently, testing of remote tower technologies is ongoing at

Leesburg Executive Airport in Leesburg, VA, and plans are in place to launch a virtual air traffic

control test site at the Fort Collins/ Loveland, CO airport.

Language in H.R. 2997 would establish a pilot program at seven airports in small and rural

communities, including airports that have commercial service, airports with existing control

towers, and airports without existing towers. S. 1405 contains similar language that does not

specify the size of the pilot program, but would require, to the extent practicable, that two

separate vendors participate and that the program encompass one airport in the contract tower

program and one airport that does not have an existing tower. An amendment to S. 1405 agreed to

by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation would allow airports with

remote tower technology to be eligible for federal funding under the contract tower program.

Facility Security and Continuity of Operations

On September 26, 2014, an act of arson at FAA’s Chicago air traffic control center temporarily

shut down air traffic into Chicago’s two commercial airports and disrupted flights across much of

the country. The incident highlighted the potential physical security risks posed by contractors

and employees with access to facilities. It also illustrated the importance of redundancy, as

controllers working at other locations, not in the Chicago area, were able to return the system to

normal operation within a couple of days.

The physical and cybersecurity measures in place at FAA’s air traffic control facilities have been

criticized in the past, most notably in a 2005 GAO report.81 More recently, in 2015, GAO raised

specific concerns over how well FAA is addressing cybersecurity as it transitions to the NextGen

system and as modern aircraft become increasingly connected to the Internet.82 It recommended

that FAA assess developing a cybersecurity threat model and take steps to develop a coordinated,

holistic, agency-wide approach to cybersecurity.

Similarly, in 2017 the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General found FAA’s

response to and preparedness for major system disruptions, including the fire at Chicago center,

to be inadequate due to a lack of training, redundancy, resiliency, and flexibility.83 It cautioned

that many of the technologies to improve continuity of air traffic operations will not be available

for years, and recommended in the interim that FAA take steps to improve contingency planning,

testing of emergency safeguards, and assess the role of NextGen capabilities in enhancing

resiliency and continuity of operations and mitigating future air traffic control disruptions.

P.L. 114-190 requires FAA to oversee the development of a framework of principles and policies

to address aviation cybersecurity. The framework is to address airspace modernization, aircraft

automation, and aircraft systems, including inflight entertainment systems. The act also requires

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Security: Progress Made, but Federal Aviation Administration

Needs to Improve Controls over Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-712, August 2005.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, FAA Needs a More Comprehensive Approach to Address Cybersecurity As

Agency Transitions to NextGen, GAO-15-370, April 14, 2015, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-370.

Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, “Although FAA Has Taken Steps To Improve Its

Operational Contingency Plans, Significant Work Remains To Mitigate the Effects of Major System Disruptions,” AV2017-020, January 11, 2017, https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/35409.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

FAA to address recommendations from the 2015 GAO report and develop and maintain an

agency-wide cybersecurity threat model, and establish a cybersecurity standards plan for FAA

information systems, and an aviation cybersecurity research and development plan.

H.R. 2997 would require FAA to initiate a review of the framework developed in response to the

P.L. 114-190 mandate and modify the framework to assist the proposed air navigation services

corporation in managing air traffic services in a secure manner. S. 1405 does not address FAA’s

cybersecurity plans or facilities security measures, but does include language that would direct

FAA to review and revise as appropriate regulations pertaining to the cybersecurity of aircraft

avionics systems and software, and would require that aircraft flight guidance systems be secured

against unauthorized access through passenger in-flight entertainment systems.

Air Traffic Control Privatization

For almost four decades, Congress has intermittently debated whether the public would be better

served if air traffic services currently provided by FAA were instead provided by an independent

entity. The many proposals and bills on this subject put forth over the years have distinguished

two main alternatives to continued operation of the air traffic control system by a federal agency:



corporatization, which, in this context, generally refers to establishing air traffic

services as a wholly owned government corporation or quasi-governmental

entity; and

privatization, which would entail creating some form of private ownership and

control of an air traffic services corporation.

Many other countries have moved their air traffic control operations into either private entities or

government-controlled corporations. In the United States, however, privatization proposals have

stumbled on two main obstacles. One is funding. Most proposals have envisioned that the air

traffic control entity would be a self-sustaining organization that would cover its costs with fees

charged on aircraft using the system. User fees have been strongly opposed by general aviation

interests, and Congress has repeatedly refused to permit them. The other obstacle has been the

proposed organization’s borrowing costs. Although the ability to borrow in the financial markets

to modernize the air traffic system is often cited as an advantage of an independent entity, such an

entity would face higher borrowing costs than the federal government, unless the federal

government’s full faith and credit were to back the entity’s debt obligations.

FAA has taken modest steps toward privatizing certain functions. Air traffic control operations at

253 airports without radar control are provided by private operators under the FCT program,

discussed above, and since 2006, FAA has contracted out the work performed at automated flight

service station facilities that provide preflight and in-flight weather briefings and flight planning

services, mostly to general aviation operators. FAA also has made increased use of design-buildmaintain contracts that make contractors, rather than FAA personnel, responsible for installing

and maintaining air traffic control equipment.84

In the 114th Congress, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee agreed to

legislation (H.R. 4441) that would have transferred FAA’s air traffic operations to a governmentchartered private corporation. Under the proposal, the corporation was to be managed by a board

of directors chosen by aviation industry and labor stakeholders, and FAA was to carry out safety

For more extensive discussion, see CRS Report R43844, Air Traffic Inc.: Considerations Regarding the

Corporatization of Air Traffic Control, by (name redacted)

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

oversight of the corporation. The corporation was to operate as a nonprofit entity and was to be

funded through user fees imposed on the airlines. While the proposal had the support of airlines

and the air traffic controllers’ union, it was opposed by business aviation interests, even though

general aviation and business aviation flights were to be largely exempt from paying user fees for

air traffic services under the proposal.

Appropriations report language in both the House (H.Rept. 114-129) and the Senate (S.Rept. 11475) expressed concern over the proposal, noting that taking FAA’s air traffic functions out of the

annual budget and appropriations process would eliminate the role of Congress in performing

annual oversight of agency resources. The FAA reauthorization measure passed by the Senate

(see H.R. 636 as agreed to by the Senate on April 19, 2016) did not include any language to

reform FAA air traffic functions by corporatizing or privatizing these activities.

The Trump Administration’s “Budget Blueprint” for FY2018, released on March 16, 2017,

indicated that the Administration would initiate “a multi-year reauthorization proposal to shift the

air traffic control function of the Federal Aviation Administration to an independent, nongovernmental organization.”85 On June 5, 2017, President Trump signed a document outlining a

series of principles for reforming the air traffic control system.86 That document supported

language in the Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization (AIRR) Act (H.R. 2997) that

seeks to separate air traffic control functions from FAA and place them in the hands of an

independent, nonprofit private air navigation services provider managed by a professional board

reflecting the interests of various aviation stakeholders, and should be financially self-sufficient,

funded entirely by user fees.

The Administration’s principles assert that the proposed private air traffic entity should have

access to capital markets in order to spur investment in new technologies and innovations more

effectively. They call for the shift to privatized air traffic control to be completed over a threeyear transition period. The framework asserts that federal air traffic control assets, along with any

environmental liabilities and funds to cover those liabilities, should be transferred to the private

air traffic services entity at no cost to the entity, arguing that the users of the air traffic system

have already paid for these assets through AATF revenue mechanisms and should not be required

to pay for them again by imposing costs on the corporation that would be offset in its user fee

scheme. The foundational principles also assert that the corporation should not be charged for its

use of radiofrequency spectrum. Finally, the framework asserts that the corporation should honor

existing labor agreements, and that employees should have rights and protections similar to those

they have now as federal employees, without the right to strike.

H.R. 2997, as reported in the House on September 6, 2017, would create an American Air

Navigation Services Corporation to take operational control of air traffic services in U.S. airspace

at the beginning of FY2021. The bill would establish a governing board selected from nominating

panels representing various segments of the aviation industry and affiliated labor organizations.

The board would oversee the corporation and set user fees to cover the costs of providing air

traffic services. FAA would be responsible for safety oversight of the corporation, and would

retain its responsibility for safety oversight of airlines, manufacturers, and other aviation entities.

The bill is similar to H.R. 4441 as introduced in the 114th Congress, and has similarly garnered

Office of Management and Budget, America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again, March 16,

2017, p. 35.

President Donald J. Trump, President Donald J. Trump’s Principles for Reforming the U.S. Air Traffic Control

System, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 5, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

2017/06/05/president-donald-j-trumps-principles-reforming-us-air-traffic-control.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

support from airlines, airline pilots, and air traffic controllers, but faces opposition from business

and general aviation interests even though those groups would largely be exempt from any user

fees for air traffic services under the terms of the bill. In contrast, S. 1405 does not contain any

language pertaining to air traffic control reforms.

Controller Selection and Hiring

Recent changes in FAA’s controller selection and hiring process have proven controversial, and

may be debated during reauthorization.

Historically, FAA has advertised job openings to specific categories of applicants, using separate

evaluation processes for each category. In February 2014, it switched to a single, nationwide

vacancy announcement with a uniform evaluation process that was open to all qualified U.S.

citizens between the ages of 18 and 30. FAA also changed its process for selecting among eligible

candidates in response to recommendations from two reports undertaken to examine barriers to

workplace diversity in the air traffic control hiring process.

These changes were substantial. While the new process retained legally required veterans

preferences, FAA otherwise evaluates all applicants—regardless of background, education, or

experience—using a single set of evaluation tools and assessment criteria. FAA required all prior

applicants who had not received tentative offers of employment prior to February 2014 to reapply,

including candidates who had already passed the Air Traffic Selection and Training Exam (ATSAT), a measure of skills and abilities important for air traffic control. Under earlier hiring

practices, qualified candidates achieving a specified score on the AT-SAT were chosen to

interview with a selection panel that would make provisional hiring decisions.

Under the process used for hiring pursuant to the February 2014 vacancy announcement, a

biographical assessment was utilized as a first step to assess applicants’ experience and aptitude

for air traffic control. Research indicated that the questionnaire, developed by FAA, was a valid

predictor of air traffic controller job performance, and was fair and unbiased with respect to

gender and ethnicity. Only applicants who scored above a specified level on the biographical

assessment and satisfied other job requirements were invited to complete the AT-SAT. Those

getting sufficiently high scores on the AT-SAT were given conditional offers of employment,

pending medical evaluations and background investigations. FAA received approximately 28,000

applications in response to the February 2014 announcement. About 2,200 applicants, or 8% of

the applicant pool, made it past the new biographical assessment, and roughly 1,600 received

conditional employment offers.

FAA asserted that the biographical assessment effectively addressed workforce diversity concerns

while identifying those applicants most likely to succeed in training and as fully certified air

traffic controllers. Moreover, FAA claimed that the revised selection process reduced costs by

more than $7 million. However, the new hiring and selection process raised concerns among the

36 colleges and universities that have developed curricula tailored to careers in air traffic control

under an FAA program known as the Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI). Students

and graduates of AT-CTI programs applying in February 2014 were three times more likely to

receive conditional offers than other applicants. However, not all AT-CTI students were found

eligible under the new selection process, and some deemed eligible under prior job

announcements did not receive sufficiently high scores on the biographical assessment. FAA

responded that its data indicated that AT-CTI graduates had only a slightly higher success rate in

completing FAA training than other hires. It said it would continue the AT-CTI program, but may

seek to work with the schools to modify AT-CTI curricula.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

The Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General found in 2017 that FAA’s revision

of controller hiring, intended to address equal opportunity issues, lacked an effective roll-out or

communications strategy, and suffered from delays that limited its ability to meet hiring goals.87

The Inspector General recommended that FAA develop a system to individually track applicants

throughout the hiring process and establish a process to address applicants that receive contingent

hiring offers but fail to initiate required medical screening or security background checks.

P.L. 114-190 limited FAA’s ability to continue the hiring process used for the February 2014

vacancy announcement. It mandated that FAA give preferential consideration to air traffic

controller applicants with prior experience at an FAA, FAA-contracted, or military air traffic

facility and further stipulated that, after giving preference to experienced controllers, FAA select

in roughly equal numbers from two separate applicant pools of (1) AT-CTI graduates, and (2) all

U.S. citizens applying in response to a general recruitment announcement. The act also banned

FAA from using biographical assessments to evaluate applicants who are experienced controllers

or AT-CTI graduates. It also required FAA to reevaluate any experienced controllers or AT-CTI

graduates who were disqualified based on the results of a biographical assessment after applying

in response to the February 2014 announcement, even if they were older than the maximum age

restriction of 30 years. For applicants with one or more years of prior air traffic control

experience, the law increases the maximum entry age to 35 years.

Aviation Safety Issues

Airline Safety

In response to concerns over regional airline safety following the February 12, 2009, crash of a

Continental Connection flight from Newark, NJ, to Buffalo, NY, Congress enacted the Airline

Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-216) on August 1,

2010. The act required FAA to make substantive regulatory changes addressing airline pilot

fatigue; airline pilot qualifications; FAA pilot records; airline flight crew and dispatcher training;

FAA oversight and surveillance of air carriers; pilot mentoring, professional development, and

leadership; and flight crewmember pairing and crew resource management techniques.

In response to these mandates, FAA issued rulemaking to significantly change flight time and

duty time limits and rest requirements for passenger airline flight crews in December 2011. The

new regulations, effective in January 2014, set duty limits based on time of day, number of flight

segments, and number of time zones crossed, and established a minimum 10-hour rest period

between duty periods, two hours more than had been required. FAA also requires air carriers to

implement fatigue risk management programs to aid airlines and flight crews in ensuring that

pilots are fit for duty.88 In addition, FAA has issued new requirements regarding qualification

standards for first officers, generally requiring that they meet the same certification minimum

training and experience requirements as airline captains.89 FAA has revised regulations regarding

Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, “While FAA Took Steps Intended To Improve Its

Controller Hiring Process, the Agency Did Not Effectively Implement Its New Policies,” February 15, 2017,

https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/35516.

Federal Aviation Administration, “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements,” 77(2) Federal Register 330403, January 4, 2012; Federal Aviation Administration, “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements;

Correction,” 77(95) Federal Register 28763, May 16, 2012.

Federal Aviation Administration, “Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations;

Final Rule,” 78(135) Federal Register 42324-42380, July 15, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

airline training programs for flight crews and dispatchers, and air carrier safety management

systems to provide comprehensive, process-oriented programs for managing safety throughout an

airline organization. It also plans to require modifications to air carrier training programs to

address mentoring, leadership, and professional development of less experienced pilots, as

mandated in P.L. 111-216.90

P.L. 114-190 set a deadline of April 30, 2017, for FAA to make available a pilot records database

allowing airlines to review FAA, air carrier, and national driver register records pertaining to pilot

job applicants. It also directed FAA to issue guidance to air carriers and inspectors for assessing

pilot competency in manual flying skills and use of cockpit automation, and to verify that airline

pilot training programs adequately address the monitoring of automated systems and controlling

of aircraft without the use of autopilot or autoflight systems. The act also directed FAA to

consider whether additional screening and treatment for mental health conditions, including

depression and suicidal thoughts or tendencies, should be considered in the medical certification

of airline pilots.

Pilot and Airline Crew Fatigue

The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-216)

mandated changes to airline pilot flight time and rest requirements. Specifically, Section 212 of

the act required FAA to “issue regulations, based on the best available scientific information, to

specify limitations on the hours of flight and duty time allowed for pilots to address problems

relating to pilot fatigue.” It also required all airlines to submit fatigue risk management plans.

Section 216 of the act required FAA to issue rules to ensure that within three years of enactment,

all airline flight crewmembers have obtained an airline transportation pilot certificate.

In response, FAA published its final rule on Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements on

January 4, 2012.91 This added 14 C.F.R. Part 117, which prescribes passenger airline flight crew

flight time, duty time, and rest requirements based on crew size, time of day, time and distance

away from home base, and other factors. The regulation also requires airlines to implement a

fatigue risk management system. The rules went into effect on January 14, 2014.

While these regulations are mandatory for passenger airlines, compliance is optional for all-cargo

carriers that operate under 14 C.F.R. Part 121. Pilot labor organizations have long argued for

uniform fatigue regulations under an umbrella “single level of safety” approach, although FAA

and the airline industry maintain that air cargo operations are sufficiently unique that separate

regulatory requirements are appropriate. Efforts to include all-cargo pilots under the same set of

duty and rest rules as passenger airline pilots did not pass in the 114th Congress (e.g., S. 1612).

The 114th Congress also did not pass legislation to increase flight attendant rest periods to be on

par with those of passenger airline pilots (S. 3421, H.R. 4295).

Both H.R. 2997 and S. 1405 include language that would require FAA to revise existing flight

attendant duty periods and rest requirements to ensure that flight attendants are provided a postduty rest period of at least 10 consecutive hours. While H.R. 2997 would not allow a rest period

to be reduced under any circumstances, S. 1405 would permit a single rest period to be reduced to

9 consecutive hours if it is followed by a rest period of 11 consecutive hours following the next

U.S. Department of Transportation, Report on DOT Significant Rulemakings, November 2013, http://www.dot.gov/

sites/dot.dev/files/docs/NOV%202013%20Internet%20Report.docx.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFinalRule.nsf/0/681787AC6E53DF238625797C005321DE?

OpenDocument.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

duty period. Both bills would require airlines to develop FAA-approved fatigue risk management

plans for flight attendants.

Airline Pilot Qualifications and Pilot Supply

The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 required that FAA

amend regulations to require that pilots attain the airline transportation pilot rating prior to being

hired as airline first officers. Section 217 of the act required FAA to “conduct a rulemaking … to

modify requirements for the issuance of an airline transport pilot certificate,” and specified that

“the total flight hours required by the Administrator … shall be at least 1,500 flight hours.” On

July 15, 2013, FAA issued a final rule on Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for

Air Carrier Operations.92 It required, effective August 1, 2013, that all pilots and first officers

operating under 14 C.F.R. Part 121 (air carrier revenue operations) hold an airline transportation

pilot certificate. It also required those serving as an air carrier pilot-in-command (captain) to have

at least 1,000 flight hours in air carrier operations.

Previously, pilots could be hired as airline first officers with a commercial pilot certification that

required a minimum of 250 hours total flight time. Some regional airlines and communities

served by regional carriers have complained that the change has limited the supply of qualified

first officers. The merit of these claims, however, has been disputed, particularly by pilot labor

organizations that contend that low wages make regional airline first officer jobs undesirable.93

FAA data indicate that the number of certificated airline transport pilots in the United States has

grown by more than 5% over the past decade. However, it remains unclear whether this growth

can keep pace with the demand of the aviation industry, and in particular the regional airlines.

GAO found mixed evidence regarding the supply of qualified pilots available to meet airline

needs, which it estimated to be 1,900 to 4,500 newly hired pilots annually over the next decade. 94

GAO pointed out that pilots’ employment and earnings have decreased since 2000, suggesting

that demand for pilots does not exceed available supply. However, GAO observed that fewer

students are entering pilot training programs, and that opportunities overseas, in the military, or in

corporate aviation may steer pilots away from positions with lower-paying regional carriers.

Addressing concerns that regional air carriers are likely to be most impacted by changes to the

labor market for civilian pilots, the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General

examined regional airline pilot recruitment, pay, and retention.95 In March 2017 it reported that

while regional carriers face strong economic pressures to keep operating costs low, they have

generally increased pay and have used signing and retention bonuses and other incentives to

attract pilots and increase retention. However, it also cited lengthy negotiations of labor

agreements as a factor in lagging wage increases and increased pilot attrition.

The Inspector General found that the new qualification requirements for airline pilots have

generally led regional airlines to hire pilots with more total flight hours but with little experience

https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/07/15/2013-16849/pilot-certification-and-qualification-requirementsfor-air-carrier-operations.

See House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 113th Congress, Hearing: Air Service to Small and Rural

Communities, April 30, 2014, http://transportation.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=376943.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Workforce: Current and Future Availability of Airline Pilots,

GAO-14-232, February 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661243.pdf.

Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Letter to Ranking Member Peter DeFazio and Rankimg

Member Rick Larsen regarding Regional Air Carrier Pilot Pay and Qualifications, CC-2017-009, March 2, 2017,

http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/35544.

Congressional Research Service

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 115th Congress

flying multiengine aircraft. It also found a large increase in the number of pilots with restricted

airline transportation pilot certificates, allowing them to be provisionally hired as first officers

with fewer than 1,500 flight hours. This option is available only to former military pilots and

graduates of certain college programs with approved courses of study in aviation. Increasingly,

these programs and being regarded as feeder pathways to airline pilot careers.96

During a June 29, 2017, markup of S. 1405, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation agreed to an amendment that would allow non-academic structured and

disciplined ground training courses to count toward the 1,500-hour requirement. Under current

regulations only flight hours can be counted toward the 1,500-hour requirement for airline

transportation pilot certification. Currently, only classroom hours at approved higher education

institutions offering accredited aviation-related degree programs are allowed to be credited

toward the requirements to obtain a restricted airline transportation pilot certificate with fewer

than 1,500 flight hours. The amended bill has not yet been reported in the Senate.

Commercial Aircraft Tracking and Flight Data Recorders

Two 2014 incidents renewed concern about the deployment of tracking technologies aboard

passenger aircraft. The whereabouts of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared in March

2014, remained uncertain as of early 2017, and the crash site of Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501,

which went down in the Java Sea on December 28, 2014, took several days to locate, despite the

widespread availability of tracking technologies using GPS. While most transoceanic airliners are

equipped with GPS, air traffic control continues to rely predominantly on ground-based radar to

track aircraft. Tracking of aircraft based on GPS position is envisioned under FAA’s NextGen

initiative, but this system is to rely on a network of ground-base

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.